WEBVTT - SYSK Selects: Are We in a Cyberwar?

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there everyone, it's me Josh, and for this week's

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<v Speaker 1>s Y s K Selects, I've chosen a classic episode

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<v Speaker 1>on cyber war It's almost certainly hopelessly out of date

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<v Speaker 1>by now, but it is an interesting intro to cyber warfare,

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<v Speaker 1>and we learned that Chuck hates the words stucks net.

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<v Speaker 1>So listen out for that kick back and enjoy this

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<v Speaker 1>classic episode of Stuff You Should Know. Welcome to Stuff

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<v Speaker 1>You Should Know, a production of five Heart Radios How

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff Works. Hey, welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh Clark

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<v Speaker 1>with me is always a child to be Chuck Bryant.

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<v Speaker 1>We call him an authority on UM, cyber security, the

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<v Speaker 1>Internet and everything about it. An expert. You would say,

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<v Speaker 1>that's right. Hey, should we say hello to our our

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<v Speaker 1>latest celebrity fan who we just learned today that miss

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<v Speaker 1>Kristen Bell, the lovely and enchanting and nerdy Kristen Bell.

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<v Speaker 1>Is she nerdy, very nerdy, like prides herself on. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it doesn't surprise me that she listens to the show. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>because she's on record as being a big nerd, which

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<v Speaker 1>is one reason I like her a lot. And she's

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<v Speaker 1>curating UM a newsweek page right, Yeah, like things she

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<v Speaker 1>likes or kind of one of those deals that they

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<v Speaker 1>do in magazines now and she listed us. That's pretty awesome.

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<v Speaker 1>How about that? Thank you very much for that. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>a huge fan of a party down which she was

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<v Speaker 1>in and other stuff that she's been in forgetting Sarah Marshall,

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<v Speaker 1>how's it going? And her You gotta see her sloth

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<v Speaker 1>video online that she did on the Ellen Show. It's

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<v Speaker 1>pretty funny, highly recommended. Okay, so that's all I got.

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<v Speaker 1>That's all the sucking up I'm gonna do. Should we

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<v Speaker 1>say hi to another fan, slightly less famous but pretty cool? Yes? Sam?

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<v Speaker 1>Do you want to give a little a little backstory?

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<v Speaker 1>Giving some backstory here? Sure? We um. We had a

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<v Speaker 1>live Um tribute event here in Atlanta a couple of

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<v Speaker 1>years ago, and at the event was a little, uh

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<v Speaker 1>teenage fan named Sam teenage you mean like just post tween. Yeah, like,

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<v Speaker 1>and his mom brought him and he's a big fan.

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<v Speaker 1>He's just like really sweet kid. Mom was very sweet, sweet,

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<v Speaker 1>very nice family. Flash forward a couple of years we

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<v Speaker 1>got to south By, Southwest there Sam again, apparently mom

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<v Speaker 1>drove him to Austin to come see our life podcast. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>they weren't there to see. I've spoke to mom afterwards

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<v Speaker 1>and was like, so, what else are you guys gonna see?

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<v Speaker 1>She's like nothing. We're going back crazy. I was like,

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<v Speaker 1>what else did you see? She's like nothing. They came

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<v Speaker 1>to see us. So then we were like, all right,

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<v Speaker 1>we gotta think of something for Samy because he's proved

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<v Speaker 1>his metal And Sam wrote in and and sent his

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<v Speaker 1>resume and like all the reasons we should put him

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<v Speaker 1>to work, and it's just like, dude, if the future

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<v Speaker 1>is secure, if kids are like Sam, for I'm not

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<v Speaker 1>worried about a thing anymore. Yeah, So we we racked

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<v Speaker 1>our brains and we found out there's like a surprising

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<v Speaker 1>amount of adult only tasks that we do, like at

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<v Speaker 1>any given time, and we're like, all right, we have

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<v Speaker 1>to we have to figure out something that's age appropriate

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<v Speaker 1>for Sam. That's right. So long story short, I was

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<v Speaker 1>getting kind of thin on podcast topics. I put Sam

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<v Speaker 1>on the case and he sent me like a stellar,

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<v Speaker 1>stellar list with reasons why we should do these and uh,

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<v Speaker 1>this is the first one. This is one, and he

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<v Speaker 1>had a lot of overlap on once we had already

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<v Speaker 1>recorded it aren't out yet, so that just goes to

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<v Speaker 1>show you that Sam is like he gets the show right.

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<v Speaker 1>And uh so, as Sam's picking these out, we're gonna

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<v Speaker 1>let you know if this is a Sam one. But

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<v Speaker 1>this is going on in the summer, we're gonna call

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<v Speaker 1>this the Summer of Sam. That's right, Sam's choice. All right.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's the longest intro ever. That wasn't even the intro. Man, Well,

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<v Speaker 1>let's get to cyber worse. Then, let's bossy. Well, you know, Chuck,

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<v Speaker 1>have you ever been to Bellingham, Washington? No? Okay, I

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<v Speaker 1>have not. Have you been to Washington? Been in Seattle?

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<v Speaker 1>Isn't that where um Van Nostrin lives? Yeah? Or is

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<v Speaker 1>it Oregon? Now he sees Washington? Ok um? So, uh

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<v Speaker 1>in Bellingham, wash Ington on June at the Olympic Pipeline

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<v Speaker 1>Company a systems control and data acquisition system. There's systems

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<v Speaker 1>twice in there. Um, but a SCATA or SKATA system um,

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<v Speaker 1>which is basically like a computer program that like can

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<v Speaker 1>make a valve turn or turn something off for mechanical

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<v Speaker 1>right from from digital binary instructions right. Um, This Olympic

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<v Speaker 1>Pipeline Company system was operating on this this type of

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<v Speaker 1>program and UM something went wrong and one of their

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<v Speaker 1>pipes started leaking a lot, like millions of gallons of

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<v Speaker 1>gasoline UM and part of it erupted into a fireball

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<v Speaker 1>and killed three people injured many others. UM and they

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<v Speaker 1>went back and looked at it. They think it was

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<v Speaker 1>just a system malfunction. But the fact that this came along,

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<v Speaker 1>this happened because of this system can troll, and it

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<v Speaker 1>happened in as the dot com bubble was starting to

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<v Speaker 1>grow and like the Internet was really becoming a huge thing.

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<v Speaker 1>UM people who are into cybersecurity now point to this

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<v Speaker 1>as evidence of exactly what somebody could do during a

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<v Speaker 1>cyber attack, even though they think this was just an accident, right, irrelevant,

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<v Speaker 1>But they're they're they weren't like pointing to that as well. No,

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<v Speaker 1>they don't think that had anything to do, but they

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<v Speaker 1>were saying, this is what it would look like if

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<v Speaker 1>somebody had wanted to attack, Like, this is what a

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<v Speaker 1>cyber attack would look like. Because it's not just the

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<v Speaker 1>Olympic Pipeline company that's using these systems UM. All over

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<v Speaker 1>the United States, companies, law enforcement agencies, military banks, UM,

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<v Speaker 1>public works, all of these things are all running on

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<v Speaker 1>what amounts to Windows. It's a simple that. Yeah, Microsoft

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<v Speaker 1>systems many of them, and um. As Jonathan Strickland wrote

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<v Speaker 1>this from tech Stuff the article, and as Strickland points out, um,

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of things Microsoft has been uh kind of

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<v Speaker 1>chastise over the years for their security or lack of

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<v Speaker 1>security in some of their programs, and um. The other

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<v Speaker 1>thing he points out is the internets grew so fast

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<v Speaker 1>and everyone got on board so quickly that it kind

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<v Speaker 1>of outpaced what we could even do security wise. It

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<v Speaker 1>was all of a sudden, Government agencies and power grids

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<v Speaker 1>and emergency services and weapons systems, water and fuel pipelines,

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<v Speaker 1>all the stuff is running on on computers and a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of it through the Internet. And we don't quite

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<v Speaker 1>know how to guard against a cyber attack. No, And

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<v Speaker 1>apparently even as far as like the knowledge of how

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<v Speaker 1>to guard against cyber attacks goes, the United States is

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<v Speaker 1>is lacking, Yeah, compared to like China and Russia. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>so we're kind of in this really weird position right

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<v Speaker 1>now where we've realized that all of the ponies are

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<v Speaker 1>hooked to a single basket of eggs and all it's

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<v Speaker 1>gonna take is a couple of black cat firecrackers to

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<v Speaker 1>scare all the horses off. That's the best analogy I

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<v Speaker 1>can come up with. Did you just think of that?

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<v Speaker 1>Or did you I just thought it that. My imagination

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<v Speaker 1>is back. I can tell you where time traveled to

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<v Speaker 1>awesome where I can't think. Okay, um, all right, let's

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<v Speaker 1>go back a little bit in time. I don't think

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<v Speaker 1>we need the way Back machine for this, because we're

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<v Speaker 1>just going to We can just like walk outside. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>they'd be the waste of time for the way Back machine. Umn.

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<v Speaker 1>Some pretty smart people caught on early that hey, we

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<v Speaker 1>could be vulnerable to something like a cyber attack. So

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<v Speaker 1>let's look into this. Let's put a red team on it.

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<v Speaker 1>Red team is a our friends that act as enemies

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<v Speaker 1>to try and you know how they hire these people

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<v Speaker 1>to like break into your home. Yeah, those are red

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<v Speaker 1>teams basically, right, like um from Star Wars. Yeah, exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's get a red team. Let's let's uh name

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<v Speaker 1>it this mission something really cool out of a football playbook.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's name it Project Eligible Receiver. Do you know how

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<v Speaker 1>many times I had to look at that before it

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<v Speaker 1>finally sunk in what words I was looking at? Really

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<v Speaker 1>it is? It does look kind of funny. It looks

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<v Speaker 1>like eleanor Rigby when you glance at it, at least

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<v Speaker 1>I think, so, yeah, it doesn't to me. I was

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<v Speaker 1>thinking more of like a radio receiver or something like,

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<v Speaker 1>I think it just means about football. No, it totally

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<v Speaker 1>just saying like I read this many times before, I

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<v Speaker 1>was like, oh, okay, so a lot of this is

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<v Speaker 1>still classified, so we don't know everything. But basically they

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<v Speaker 1>hired some hackers, which is what you do to test

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<v Speaker 1>your security, they being the Department of Defense. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>depart of Defense saying hey, can you nerds hack into

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<v Speaker 1>the Pentagon system and afterwards we won't assassinate exactly, And

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<v Speaker 1>the nerds were like, just watched this and it took

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<v Speaker 1>three days before the Pentagon even knew that they were

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<v Speaker 1>being cyber attacked by the Red Team, Like pretty successful

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<v Speaker 1>and very sobering. Yeah, so um, they they h it

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<v Speaker 1>was I guess kind of an eye opener for the

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<v Speaker 1>d O D and they I'm sure used it to

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<v Speaker 1>step up security. Not fast enough though, because after this

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<v Speaker 1>Red Team attack, um Operation Eligible Receiver, an actual attack

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<v Speaker 1>which they later came to call what was at Moonlight Maze. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this is one year after that the tests. A year

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<v Speaker 1>after UM, somebody launched an attack and it was a

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<v Speaker 1>I guess what's probably the most typical kind of cyber attack,

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<v Speaker 1>where you insert some sort of software to basically spy

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<v Speaker 1>and get files and gather data and download sensitive materials. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>And apparently took two years before NASA, the Pentagon, UM

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<v Speaker 1>and other agencies in the US government noticed that UM

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<v Speaker 1>accidentally noticed that this that they were being spied on.

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<v Speaker 1>Cyber wise, Yeah, they got data like strategic maps, troop assignments,

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<v Speaker 1>and positions. Not good, right, very scary. And they trace

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<v Speaker 1>it back to Russia. Doesn't necessarily mean that it came

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<v Speaker 1>from Russia in its origin, but at least that's where

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<v Speaker 1>they traced it to. Uh. And this is cyber warfare,

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<v Speaker 1>like it's happening. It's been going on since the nineties

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<v Speaker 1>pretty much. Yeah, I mean it's not is a cyber

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<v Speaker 1>war coming, it's like, how do we prevent like a

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<v Speaker 1>cyber war from bringing us all down? Yeah, pretty much.

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<v Speaker 1>And it's apparently from looking into this, there's like two camps.

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<v Speaker 1>There's like a gloom and doom camp where it's like, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>somebody really wants to mess things up. They're going to

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<v Speaker 1>be able to it's gonna be pretty easy. And the

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<v Speaker 1>sunny optimistic camp is kind of like, no, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>we know we're looking for now, Like, sure they could

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<v Speaker 1>launch an attack, but will we'll be able to stop

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<v Speaker 1>it in time for before we can do like a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of damage. Yeah, so we'll see, we'll lay out

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<v Speaker 1>everything for you can decide who's right, that's rights w

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<v Speaker 1>s K you should. So we've already mentioned that on

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<v Speaker 1>the defensive side of things, the US is sorely lacking, um.

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<v Speaker 1>But on the offensive side of things, we've actually done

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<v Speaker 1>this ourselves more than once. Um during the coast of

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<v Speaker 1>a war. Strickland points out, we used computer attacks to

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<v Speaker 1>compromise Serbian air defenses, basically kind of scrambling their information

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<v Speaker 1>so they had bad I guess coordinates. Well, just on

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<v Speaker 1>the race our screen wasn't wasn't apt? Was okay? Or appropriate?

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<v Speaker 1>Did you see that one? So we did this, We

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<v Speaker 1>launched it and it and it worked. So, uh, that's

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<v Speaker 1>a good thing, but it's also a bad thing if

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<v Speaker 1>you're like, was it Bush the first or Clinton in

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<v Speaker 1>Bush the second? Bush the second in two thou three

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<v Speaker 1>in a rock and Clinton? Well, they were both like,

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<v Speaker 1>we don't think we should be doing much of this

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<v Speaker 1>because a couple of reasons. A. It basically opens us up.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like, hey, they did this, so we can do

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<v Speaker 1>it right back and be I think they could have

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<v Speaker 1>drained some banks of terrorist cells. And they said, we

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<v Speaker 1>kind of depend on the integrity of the banking system worldwide,

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<v Speaker 1>like we don't want to start messing around with us.

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<v Speaker 1>So apparently with with UM cyber warfare, it's very much

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<v Speaker 1>like UM. When you build that virus, it's out there

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<v Speaker 1>and it can be captured and studied and re deployed

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<v Speaker 1>against you. Yeah, so what they were saying with Clinton

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<v Speaker 1>and Bush who were saying like, no, we're not going

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<v Speaker 1>to use a virus to UM to drain those bank

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<v Speaker 1>accounts because they could be it will eventually come back

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<v Speaker 1>on us, and our banking industry is not secure enough

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<v Speaker 1>to withstand something that we ourselves make. Because apparently the

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<v Speaker 1>US is pretty good at making viruses. I'm sure should

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<v Speaker 1>we talk about some of the different ways that this

0:13:27.120 --> 0:13:32.360
<v Speaker 1>can go down. Yeah, the Pearl Harbor attack, Yes, I

0:13:32.400 --> 0:13:34.320
<v Speaker 1>had the feeling strictly might A name this one himself,

0:13:34.440 --> 0:13:36.079
<v Speaker 1>but it's not true. He went to a lot of

0:13:36.120 --> 0:13:39.160
<v Speaker 1>trouble to explain why it's called the Pearl Harbor strategy,

0:13:39.200 --> 0:13:40.679
<v Speaker 1>and I think he could have just left at that.

0:13:41.520 --> 0:13:44.240
<v Speaker 1>The idea here is that it's it's pretty much in

0:13:44.320 --> 0:13:46.880
<v Speaker 1>your face. It's a massive cyber attack where they infiltrate

0:13:47.320 --> 0:13:50.920
<v Speaker 1>and then they sabotage systems. UM much like Pearl Harbor

0:13:51.360 --> 0:13:54.920
<v Speaker 1>was a big surprise and a big attack, wasn't I mean,

0:13:54.960 --> 0:13:57.360
<v Speaker 1>it was sneaky, but it wasn't quiet by any means,

0:13:57.720 --> 0:14:01.360
<v Speaker 1>right or stealthy. I guess the word UM. The other

0:14:01.440 --> 0:14:05.880
<v Speaker 1>ones are pretty much stealthy. Part of a Pearl Harbor attack.

0:14:05.920 --> 0:14:09.120
<v Speaker 1>I believe UM could be a distributed denial of service attack,

0:14:09.760 --> 0:14:12.760
<v Speaker 1>which is basically, you know, like when you UM try

0:14:12.840 --> 0:14:15.679
<v Speaker 1>to get onto a website or whatever, you're sending a

0:14:15.840 --> 0:14:19.760
<v Speaker 1>request to the server to let you on right now.

0:14:19.920 --> 0:14:22.600
<v Speaker 1>If you assault that one server with millions of pings

0:14:23.200 --> 0:14:26.920
<v Speaker 1>and it's trying to accommodate everybody as is appropriate and

0:14:27.040 --> 0:14:33.400
<v Speaker 1>apt UM, it'll basically they crash. Is the point you

0:14:33.480 --> 0:14:35.800
<v Speaker 1>can crash a server by hitting it with millions of

0:14:35.840 --> 0:14:37.760
<v Speaker 1>pings all at once, just slows it down to the

0:14:37.840 --> 0:14:39.960
<v Speaker 1>point either where it doesn't work or it crashes. Yeah,

0:14:40.040 --> 0:14:42.040
<v Speaker 1>and that's that's what anonymous likes to do with like

0:14:42.240 --> 0:14:45.200
<v Speaker 1>MasterCard during the whole wiki leaks thing when they was

0:14:45.240 --> 0:14:48.120
<v Speaker 1>a master Card or Visa crash. I cannot remember, um

0:14:48.280 --> 0:14:50.640
<v Speaker 1>remember when that happened. Though. It's basically just launching a

0:14:50.720 --> 0:14:53.560
<v Speaker 1>bunch of server requests at a specific server in the service,

0:14:53.600 --> 0:14:56.800
<v Speaker 1>like no, no, and this falls over? Is that why

0:14:56.840 --> 0:15:01.520
<v Speaker 1>people say ping? By the way, the ping um? Yeah,

0:15:02.040 --> 0:15:06.760
<v Speaker 1>I hate that. It's better than javastorm. I don't even

0:15:06.800 --> 0:15:09.600
<v Speaker 1>know what that is, drinking coffee while you're having a brainstorm,

0:15:09.840 --> 0:15:12.440
<v Speaker 1>like let's go get coffee and brainstorm something javas to

0:15:12.520 --> 0:15:17.440
<v Speaker 1>people say that, Yeah, I don't say it. I've never

0:15:17.520 --> 0:15:21.880
<v Speaker 1>heard of that. That ping and meta or the three

0:15:21.920 --> 0:15:24.960
<v Speaker 1>things that I will never say. Epic maybe the worst

0:15:25.320 --> 0:15:29.080
<v Speaker 1>to call something epic. I don't mind epic. Oh man,

0:15:29.200 --> 0:15:31.800
<v Speaker 1>I hate epics. At least it's a real word, especially

0:15:32.120 --> 0:15:38.400
<v Speaker 1>epic fail. Well yeah, sure, okay, back to it. Viruses, uh,

0:15:38.800 --> 0:15:43.280
<v Speaker 1>code red, slammer, nimda. These are viruses that Strickland has

0:15:43.360 --> 0:15:47.120
<v Speaker 1>mentioned that it spread very quickly across the Internet, and

0:15:47.280 --> 0:15:49.440
<v Speaker 1>there's a couple of ways this can go down. You

0:15:49.520 --> 0:15:54.960
<v Speaker 1>can either, um, you can set a you can do

0:15:55.000 --> 0:15:57.560
<v Speaker 1>it immediately and release a virus. You can have all

0:15:57.600 --> 0:16:02.160
<v Speaker 1>these other computers deliver the virus. You can put sort

0:16:02.200 --> 0:16:04.880
<v Speaker 1>of like a delay timer on your virus for it

0:16:04.920 --> 0:16:09.200
<v Speaker 1>to go off in two years, automatically or manually whenever

0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:11.480
<v Speaker 1>you want to. It can be waiting for you to

0:16:11.600 --> 0:16:14.160
<v Speaker 1>hit the button and then latch the virus that way,

0:16:14.360 --> 0:16:17.800
<v Speaker 1>or I think, um for the user of that computer

0:16:17.920 --> 0:16:21.560
<v Speaker 1>to do, like say control all delete, Well we'll trigger

0:16:21.600 --> 0:16:24.920
<v Speaker 1>it or something. Yeah, that's pretty scary. Yeah, I don't

0:16:24.960 --> 0:16:28.600
<v Speaker 1>don't press those three buttons all the time on my PC.

0:16:28.800 --> 0:16:32.120
<v Speaker 1>Oh my god, Chuck. I think we should talk about

0:16:32.480 --> 0:16:34.840
<v Speaker 1>right about here is I think we're stucks net fits

0:16:34.880 --> 0:16:39.960
<v Speaker 1>in who stucks net? Say it? When we're stucks net?

0:16:40.040 --> 0:16:42.160
<v Speaker 1>I don't know what that is. You know it's stucks net?

0:16:42.320 --> 0:16:45.680
<v Speaker 1>Is that in this? Yeah? It's the Iranian Um, it's

0:16:45.720 --> 0:16:48.520
<v Speaker 1>the virus that the US and Israel unleashed on Iran.

0:16:49.200 --> 0:16:52.160
<v Speaker 1>It's a perfect example of this. It is. You're right,

0:16:52.960 --> 0:16:56.320
<v Speaker 1>So let's talk about stucks net. Stucks net. It's a

0:16:56.360 --> 0:17:00.160
<v Speaker 1>great name. It was offensive a cyber attack. Offensive been

0:17:00.200 --> 0:17:01.840
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and ten. They thinking maybe it was the

0:17:01.880 --> 0:17:05.200
<v Speaker 1>first one ever, the US launched like a strictly for

0:17:05.320 --> 0:17:10.280
<v Speaker 1>sabotage attack. Basically, they wanted to disable Iran UH Iran's

0:17:11.000 --> 0:17:16.040
<v Speaker 1>UH centrifuges so they could not enrich uranium. And they

0:17:16.119 --> 0:17:19.919
<v Speaker 1>did this through the UH, the new Air Force based

0:17:19.960 --> 0:17:25.159
<v Speaker 1>out of Texas, right, Texas in Georgia. Yeah, what's the

0:17:25.880 --> 0:17:30.320
<v Speaker 1>Warner Robbins Robin's Air Force Space, Yeah, Robin's Air Force Base. Yeah,

0:17:30.359 --> 0:17:32.920
<v Speaker 1>those two places are where they station. Yeah. And this

0:17:33.080 --> 0:17:38.359
<v Speaker 1>is the first all cyber unit. Pretty much pretty cool, right,

0:17:38.440 --> 0:17:41.719
<v Speaker 1>Their whole is it, Their whole task is to wage

0:17:41.800 --> 0:17:46.680
<v Speaker 1>cyber warfare, and I imagine to be defensive against cyber attacks.

0:17:47.240 --> 0:17:50.560
<v Speaker 1>But um, I don't I don't know if they had

0:17:50.640 --> 0:17:53.720
<v Speaker 1>to do with stuck stent, but they probably would have.

0:17:54.440 --> 0:17:58.680
<v Speaker 1>Um I think it was being developed before was ordained

0:17:59.000 --> 0:18:00.840
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand nine. Think it went back to two

0:18:00.840 --> 0:18:05.560
<v Speaker 1>thousand seven when it was started. But basically, the they

0:18:06.000 --> 0:18:09.720
<v Speaker 1>the CIA got their hands on centrifuges that they knew

0:18:09.880 --> 0:18:14.080
<v Speaker 1>Iran was using, and they had just as many as

0:18:14.160 --> 0:18:17.440
<v Speaker 1>Iran did of the same kind, and they studied it

0:18:17.800 --> 0:18:22.040
<v Speaker 1>and they built this virus based on this configuration of

0:18:22.160 --> 0:18:28.119
<v Speaker 1>centrifuges running Windows and Siemens switches, right, yeah, and then

0:18:28.119 --> 0:18:30.480
<v Speaker 1>they build a virus to go infiltrate it. I thought

0:18:30.480 --> 0:18:33.600
<v Speaker 1>it was called Operation Olympic Games. It was, but the malware,

0:18:33.680 --> 0:18:37.240
<v Speaker 1>the virus itself is called Okay that's what I couldn't

0:18:37.240 --> 0:18:39.160
<v Speaker 1>figure it out, but you're right. It was called Operation

0:18:39.240 --> 0:18:44.840
<v Speaker 1>Olympic Games. And this whole operation was this huge, sweeping, awesome,

0:18:45.240 --> 0:18:50.520
<v Speaker 1>massive secretive basically imagine like the CIA. Do you remember

0:18:50.640 --> 0:18:54.159
<v Speaker 1>Uncommon Valor? Oh yeah, okay, do you remember when like

0:18:54.320 --> 0:18:58.119
<v Speaker 1>they're training at that replica of the camp? Okay, the

0:18:58.240 --> 0:19:02.600
<v Speaker 1>CIA did that with Iran centrifuges in the nuclear program,

0:19:03.040 --> 0:19:04.679
<v Speaker 1>and they figured out exactly how he worked, and then

0:19:04.720 --> 0:19:06.359
<v Speaker 1>they figured out the best way to break it. Was

0:19:06.440 --> 0:19:08.399
<v Speaker 1>Gene Hackman bank rolling the whole thing. Oh yeah, he

0:19:08.520 --> 0:19:10.440
<v Speaker 1>was there to get his son out. He he was

0:19:10.560 --> 0:19:13.359
<v Speaker 1>just staring at this menu of guns and silhouette that

0:19:13.440 --> 0:19:15.760
<v Speaker 1>he wanted to order. Remember that? Oh yeah, dude, that

0:19:15.760 --> 0:19:17.840
<v Speaker 1>I thought that was so bad. That yeah, but that

0:19:17.960 --> 0:19:20.600
<v Speaker 1>was a huge, huge movie for like dude's our age. No,

0:19:20.840 --> 0:19:24.280
<v Speaker 1>I'm saying bad isn't like good? Okay, yeah, gotcha? Um

0:19:25.400 --> 0:19:28.240
<v Speaker 1>so stucks and net Olympic Games happened, and like you said,

0:19:28.280 --> 0:19:32.480
<v Speaker 1>it was the first offensive cyber attack. Most of the

0:19:32.520 --> 0:19:36.080
<v Speaker 1>other ones have come in the form of UM sneaking

0:19:36.160 --> 0:19:40.000
<v Speaker 1>in and lying around and watching and waiting and spying. Well,

0:19:40.080 --> 0:19:42.600
<v Speaker 1>stuck that had that too, was that the initial There

0:19:42.720 --> 0:19:46.639
<v Speaker 1>was a companion program called Flame that somehow. This is

0:19:46.720 --> 0:19:49.960
<v Speaker 1>the part that's the biggest mystery. The m Iran's nuclear

0:19:50.000 --> 0:19:53.040
<v Speaker 1>program is not connected to the Internet, so somebody got

0:19:53.119 --> 0:19:58.440
<v Speaker 1>that in on thumb drive, infected their local system. UM

0:19:58.720 --> 0:20:02.800
<v Speaker 1>and Flames sat there and basically just studied everything, told

0:20:03.000 --> 0:20:06.600
<v Speaker 1>the US how the configuration was set up, and then

0:20:06.640 --> 0:20:09.680
<v Speaker 1>they built it, and then they inserted stucks net and

0:20:09.840 --> 0:20:14.320
<v Speaker 1>basically it made all of their data looked like everything

0:20:14.440 --> 0:20:18.080
<v Speaker 1>was operating normally, but it was telling their centrifuges to

0:20:18.200 --> 0:20:20.920
<v Speaker 1>spin out of control and basically break themselves. It's like

0:20:21.000 --> 0:20:24.160
<v Speaker 1>Oceans eleven when they built the Replica vault exactly showed

0:20:24.200 --> 0:20:27.480
<v Speaker 1>the Replica video. There's nothing going on. So basically, the

0:20:27.920 --> 0:20:31.280
<v Speaker 1>Pentagon has been watching a lot of movies pretty much

0:20:44.119 --> 0:20:57.320
<v Speaker 1>as skuld. But this is a hugely successful attack UM,

0:20:57.800 --> 0:21:01.920
<v Speaker 1>if not at the very least for American cyber warfare UM,

0:21:02.359 --> 0:21:06.280
<v Speaker 1>because it's supposedly set Iran's nuclear program back by at

0:21:06.400 --> 0:21:09.280
<v Speaker 1>least a year, if not more, and that this would

0:21:09.640 --> 0:21:11.840
<v Speaker 1>let us continue talk. Yeah, and I think it said

0:21:11.840 --> 0:21:14.199
<v Speaker 1>one of the aims was to make them feel stupid,

0:21:14.640 --> 0:21:18.000
<v Speaker 1>and then they said it worked like they that they

0:21:18.359 --> 0:21:22.040
<v Speaker 1>done something wrong and that's why this these systems were failing.

0:21:22.560 --> 0:21:25.760
<v Speaker 1>It's pretty scary, man. But the point is now is Okay,

0:21:26.040 --> 0:21:28.400
<v Speaker 1>that's out there. Stuck Snut is out there for anybody

0:21:28.440 --> 0:21:31.639
<v Speaker 1>who can get their hands on it. And that's the

0:21:31.760 --> 0:21:35.000
<v Speaker 1>name of it. It's a great name, alright, stuck Snut

0:21:35.080 --> 0:21:40.600
<v Speaker 1>within with an X with a new guetas center. But

0:21:40.720 --> 0:21:43.200
<v Speaker 1>it's out there, and the US is now basically just

0:21:44.000 --> 0:21:49.600
<v Speaker 1>the the computer equivalent of Hiroshima was just launched by

0:21:49.680 --> 0:21:53.760
<v Speaker 1>the United States. Yeah, and nice little set up there.

0:21:53.880 --> 0:21:57.040
<v Speaker 1>A lot of people are comparing these days of the

0:21:57.119 --> 0:21:59.800
<v Speaker 1>early days of cyber warring to the early days of

0:22:00.240 --> 0:22:04.479
<v Speaker 1>of nuclear bombs, and that there's not a ton of defense.

0:22:04.600 --> 0:22:07.159
<v Speaker 1>Not anyone really knows what they're doing. It's sort of

0:22:07.520 --> 0:22:10.200
<v Speaker 1>a chaotic mess that everyone's trying to get their finger

0:22:10.240 --> 0:22:14.080
<v Speaker 1>in the bie though. Yeah, and the other countries like China,

0:22:14.200 --> 0:22:18.919
<v Speaker 1>believe Russia, who are apparently better equipped to defend against

0:22:19.200 --> 0:22:21.720
<v Speaker 1>a cyber attech than the US. So basically the US

0:22:21.840 --> 0:22:26.359
<v Speaker 1>is really playing with fire. Well, and that's why Clinton

0:22:26.400 --> 0:22:29.040
<v Speaker 1>and Bush we're declining to use these is one of

0:22:29.080 --> 0:22:30.760
<v Speaker 1>the reasons where like, you know, this opens us up

0:22:30.800 --> 0:22:34.720
<v Speaker 1>to counterattacks and just may not be the smartest way

0:22:34.760 --> 0:22:37.480
<v Speaker 1>to Like we wouldn't go out and just drop a

0:22:37.560 --> 0:22:42.639
<v Speaker 1>nuclear bomb on a country. Right, Oh wait did all? Right? Oops? Twice?

0:22:43.359 --> 0:22:45.960
<v Speaker 1>What else you got? Let's see, Uh we talked about

0:22:46.000 --> 0:22:51.040
<v Speaker 1>the system controls and UM data acquisition systems. Yeah, that

0:22:51.240 --> 0:22:56.920
<v Speaker 1>was UM. Basically that is the achilles heel of infrastructure

0:22:57.520 --> 0:22:59.520
<v Speaker 1>and the United States. One of the reasons why we're

0:23:00.200 --> 0:23:04.119
<v Speaker 1>not set up to defend against UM a cyber attack

0:23:04.520 --> 0:23:08.840
<v Speaker 1>is because we are so connected to the internet. Yeah

0:23:09.119 --> 0:23:13.919
<v Speaker 1>everything is. Yeah. Iran North Korea, Yeah, not quite as

0:23:14.000 --> 0:23:16.159
<v Speaker 1>much because a lot of their stuff is off the

0:23:16.240 --> 0:23:20.680
<v Speaker 1>grid just by default because they don't have the infrastructure

0:23:20.760 --> 0:23:24.080
<v Speaker 1>that we have. So just the robustness of our own

0:23:24.160 --> 0:23:28.080
<v Speaker 1>infrastructure is one of the one of its vulnerabilities as well. Yeah,

0:23:28.440 --> 0:23:30.720
<v Speaker 1>that's a good point as far as defense goes to

0:23:30.800 --> 0:23:35.359
<v Speaker 1>I forgot about this stuff. Um. Strickland says that like

0:23:35.640 --> 0:23:40.240
<v Speaker 1>the first step is education as far as educating consumers

0:23:40.440 --> 0:23:44.600
<v Speaker 1>over you know, antivirus software and how they search the

0:23:44.640 --> 0:23:47.719
<v Speaker 1>Internet and stuff like that. So I give that a medium.

0:23:47.800 --> 0:23:51.760
<v Speaker 1>But uh, this guy, Richard Clarke, he's a security expert.

0:23:52.320 --> 0:23:56.399
<v Speaker 1>He blames things on companies like Microsoft too. He feels

0:23:56.480 --> 0:24:01.480
<v Speaker 1>like rushes through programs UM but for their fully security

0:24:01.560 --> 0:24:05.560
<v Speaker 1>tested because they want to make you know, they want

0:24:05.600 --> 0:24:08.359
<v Speaker 1>a few coins rub together by selling this stuff, and

0:24:08.560 --> 0:24:11.720
<v Speaker 1>the consumer doesn't want to wait, and the stockholders don't

0:24:11.720 --> 0:24:14.280
<v Speaker 1>want lots of testing because they want those new products

0:24:14.320 --> 0:24:17.040
<v Speaker 1>on the market. So it's a bit of a rough position.

0:24:17.400 --> 0:24:21.400
<v Speaker 1>And um, you know, private companies run most of the net,

0:24:21.440 --> 0:24:23.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, it's not like this big government thing. So

0:24:25.080 --> 0:24:29.080
<v Speaker 1>he contends, Clark does that it's up to these private

0:24:29.160 --> 0:24:32.840
<v Speaker 1>companies who own the Internet's infrastructure to really make it

0:24:33.080 --> 0:24:35.800
<v Speaker 1>more robust in a defensive sense, right, which is good

0:24:35.840 --> 0:24:38.359
<v Speaker 1>in one sense, because then you have a dollar amount

0:24:38.480 --> 0:24:42.800
<v Speaker 1>in the form of lost profits attached to UM a

0:24:43.000 --> 0:24:45.639
<v Speaker 1>security breach, right, so company is going to try to

0:24:45.680 --> 0:24:49.879
<v Speaker 1>protect it UM, which is good. Yeah, But at the

0:24:49.920 --> 0:24:53.000
<v Speaker 1>same time it's like, yeah, if you're putting out products though,

0:24:53.440 --> 0:24:57.960
<v Speaker 1>and you have competition and your competitors products are safer, UM,

0:24:58.119 --> 0:25:01.040
<v Speaker 1>and you're just rushing stuff to market and you're gonna

0:25:01.160 --> 0:25:05.760
<v Speaker 1>lose out ultimately pretty bit the same economic forces. And

0:25:06.240 --> 0:25:09.280
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan also points out to that, you know, a scary

0:25:09.320 --> 0:25:11.879
<v Speaker 1>way this can be implemented is as a one two

0:25:11.960 --> 0:25:15.520
<v Speaker 1>punch with a physical attack. Yeah. So, I mean, this

0:25:15.600 --> 0:25:16.880
<v Speaker 1>is the one that wakes me up in the middle

0:25:16.880 --> 0:25:19.639
<v Speaker 1>of the night is a cyber attack is launched and

0:25:20.480 --> 0:25:24.680
<v Speaker 1>the electric power grid is shut down, and gas lines

0:25:24.720 --> 0:25:27.520
<v Speaker 1>and waterlines start going haywire, and then all of a

0:25:27.560 --> 0:25:31.720
<v Speaker 1>sudden incomes the Red Dawn team parachuting in. Well, that's

0:25:31.760 --> 0:25:33.680
<v Speaker 1>what we did to a Rock in two thousand three.

0:25:34.200 --> 0:25:37.199
<v Speaker 1>We sent a cyber attack that messed with their UM

0:25:37.520 --> 0:25:40.640
<v Speaker 1>I guess their air defense systems, and then we invaded.

0:25:42.160 --> 0:25:45.440
<v Speaker 1>So that's happened before we've done it, doesn't surprise me. Yeah,

0:25:46.400 --> 0:25:48.480
<v Speaker 1>cyber war, we're in the midst of it. We're in

0:25:48.520 --> 0:25:51.879
<v Speaker 1>the midst of it. Pretty crazy stuff. Get your what

0:25:52.080 --> 0:25:58.080
<v Speaker 1>Norton anti virus that'll just solve everything. Yeah. Education, education,

0:25:58.640 --> 0:26:00.560
<v Speaker 1>that's all. That's the only thing, that's all we can

0:26:00.600 --> 0:26:03.600
<v Speaker 1>do to prevent cyber war. UM. If you want to

0:26:03.680 --> 0:26:06.120
<v Speaker 1>learn more about cyber War and read this article by

0:26:06.600 --> 0:26:10.320
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. You can type cyber war one word in

0:26:10.560 --> 0:26:12.800
<v Speaker 1>the search bar how stuff works dot com and will

0:26:12.800 --> 0:26:16.320
<v Speaker 1>bring it up, I said Jonathan Strickland, which means it's

0:26:16.359 --> 0:26:20.080
<v Speaker 1>time for a listener. May all, it's time for a

0:26:20.160 --> 0:26:24.200
<v Speaker 1>lot more than that. Uh. I'm gonna call this beer

0:26:25.560 --> 0:26:29.320
<v Speaker 1>and Fire. Hi, guys, I'm a professor of history and

0:26:29.359 --> 0:26:31.480
<v Speaker 1>a long time act of your show. I use a

0:26:31.520 --> 0:26:33.480
<v Speaker 1>podcast in my college classes to talk about how we

0:26:33.560 --> 0:26:37.040
<v Speaker 1>use history and entertainment. I'm writing about the Great Chicago

0:26:37.119 --> 0:26:40.320
<v Speaker 1>Fire podcast, especially as it relates to my research. See.

0:26:40.480 --> 0:26:42.680
<v Speaker 1>I study the history of alcohol, and I teach a

0:26:42.720 --> 0:26:46.159
<v Speaker 1>class on the history of beer. Uh. Pretty cool. We

0:26:46.440 --> 0:26:48.840
<v Speaker 1>study the economic, social, and cultural history of beer, and

0:26:48.920 --> 0:26:55.719
<v Speaker 1>we make beer in class into weekly beer tastings. What anyway,

0:26:55.760 --> 0:26:57.879
<v Speaker 1>Aside from the stuff you mentioned the show, the Chicago

0:26:57.960 --> 0:27:00.000
<v Speaker 1>fire is important because it wiped out about three quarters

0:27:00.560 --> 0:27:04.600
<v Speaker 1>Chicago's breweries. Something like eighteen breweries were destroyed by the fire.

0:27:04.720 --> 0:27:09.639
<v Speaker 1>Of course, people still wanted beer. Uh. Chicago and the

0:27:09.680 --> 0:27:12.359
<v Speaker 1>Upper Midwest has was populated about a lot of Germans

0:27:12.520 --> 0:27:15.200
<v Speaker 1>at the time. This gave birth to the beer industry

0:27:15.240 --> 0:27:18.480
<v Speaker 1>in Milwaukee before the Great Fire. Milwaukee was a beer town,

0:27:18.560 --> 0:27:21.800
<v Speaker 1>but not a major supply center. Schlitz especially as a

0:27:21.840 --> 0:27:24.960
<v Speaker 1>good example of how the Milwaukee beer industry reacted to

0:27:25.000 --> 0:27:29.840
<v Speaker 1>the fire. Joseph Schlitz, the founder it, first donated thousands

0:27:29.880 --> 0:27:32.560
<v Speaker 1>of barrels of beer to Chicagoans and the weeks after

0:27:32.640 --> 0:27:36.280
<v Speaker 1>the fire. Been Sensing an opportunity, he then opened a

0:27:36.359 --> 0:27:39.680
<v Speaker 1>distribution point in the city. After all, there were still

0:27:39.760 --> 0:27:44.320
<v Speaker 1>hundreds of thousands of thirsty Chicagoans, he opened Schlitz Tide saloons.

0:27:44.720 --> 0:27:47.119
<v Speaker 1>By the eighteen eighties, he was selling about fifty thousand

0:27:47.200 --> 0:27:50.640
<v Speaker 1>barrels of beer in Chicago alone, which is about seventeen

0:27:50.680 --> 0:27:56.280
<v Speaker 1>percent of their total. And the slogan, the slogan for Schlitz,

0:27:57.000 --> 0:28:00.359
<v Speaker 1>the beer that made Milwaukee famous, came out of this period,

0:28:00.680 --> 0:28:03.480
<v Speaker 1>and it's because of the beer sold after the fire,

0:28:04.119 --> 0:28:06.760
<v Speaker 1>so that's where they got the name. By nineteen two,

0:28:06.840 --> 0:28:09.280
<v Speaker 1>Schlitz was the largest brew in the world, a title

0:28:09.359 --> 0:28:12.000
<v Speaker 1>it would trade back and forth with Budweiser until the

0:28:12.080 --> 0:28:14.680
<v Speaker 1>nineteen fifties. And he goes on to point out that

0:28:14.880 --> 0:28:21.160
<v Speaker 1>Blats and perhapsed followed similar trajectories stucks net, stucks net,

0:28:21.840 --> 0:28:25.040
<v Speaker 1>and UH. The Chicago brewing industry sadly never recovered from

0:28:25.080 --> 0:28:29.080
<v Speaker 1>the fire, although beer drinking remained steady. And I don't

0:28:29.119 --> 0:28:35.680
<v Speaker 1>have Professor Beer's name, so we'll just call him Professor Beer. Oh,

0:28:35.880 --> 0:28:38.960
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure he'd appreciate that. Yeah, I'm sure that's what

0:28:39.040 --> 0:28:42.960
<v Speaker 1>the students call him. Thanks, Professor Beer. Yeah. And if

0:28:42.960 --> 0:28:44.280
<v Speaker 1>you want to write in, I'll say your name on

0:28:44.400 --> 0:28:48.600
<v Speaker 1>a later show. Okay. Um. And if you teach, especially

0:28:48.680 --> 0:28:51.680
<v Speaker 1>something interesting or you stuff you should Know? To hell.

0:28:51.720 --> 0:28:54.080
<v Speaker 1>If you teach, we're always interested in hearing that. We

0:28:54.200 --> 0:28:57.080
<v Speaker 1>want to know about it. Okay. You can tweet it

0:28:57.160 --> 0:28:59.760
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0:28:59.840 --> 0:29:02.600
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0:29:03.040 --> 0:29:05.320
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0:29:05.320 --> 0:29:07.720
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0:29:07.760 --> 0:29:09.840
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0:29:10.000 --> 0:29:14.920
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0:29:14.960 --> 0:29:17.720
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