Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.
Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,
Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio
Speaker 1: and howda tech Are Yet It's time for a tech
Speaker 1: Stuff classic episode. This episode originally published on May two
Speaker 1: thousand fifteen. It is called the Internet kill Switch, and
Speaker 1: I have a special guest, co host Ben Bolan. Hope
Speaker 1: you enjoy. Hey, can remember to turn off the Internet
Speaker 1: before you go out tonight, right, like before you leave
Speaker 1: the room, turn off the Internet. That's it's not like that.
Speaker 1: It's not I T crowd where you've got a little box, right,
Speaker 1: this jen is the Internet. It's not that it's not
Speaker 1: that good. But I thank you for your your kindness. Um. So,
Speaker 1: the so the kill switch is, in general, it's a
Speaker 1: concept that a party, most often a government, but not
Speaker 1: necessarily because we'll talk about an example in the United
Speaker 1: States that did not involve directly a government agency. But
Speaker 1: usually it's a government elects to restrict or perhaps completely
Speaker 1: eliminate access to the Internet in response to something. Right, Yes,
Speaker 1: So this differs a little bit from filtering. Yeah, because
Speaker 1: filtering is sort of a passive continual process that uh,
Speaker 1: you know, if it goes well in most countries but
Speaker 1: not all, uh, you won't really learn about it, just
Speaker 1: won't be able to get to a certain website. So
Speaker 1: a great example of that is China with a great
Speaker 1: firewall of China, right, and they call it a firewall,
Speaker 1: but really it's a web filter, and it's the whole
Speaker 1: idea is that it filters out things that the Chinese
Speaker 1: government finds objects noble and does not wish the Chinese
Speaker 1: citizenship to have access to. And uh and in that case,
Speaker 1: that is an ongoing situation, and we're going to talk
Speaker 1: a little bit about that, and a little bit about
Speaker 1: a few others as well as the more, um you know,
Speaker 1: kind of temporary but all but equally terrifying uses of
Speaker 1: shutting down Internet access for one reason or another. And
Speaker 1: generally speaking, the justifications for this fall under various versions
Speaker 1: of national security, but there are frequently, and I would argue, uh,
Speaker 1: in most cases, justifiably criticisms of that approach that perhaps
Speaker 1: there are other motivations at play besides trying to protect security,
Speaker 1: even if they're not intended. They may be, they may
Speaker 1: there may be undertones of that absolutely, absolutely because public
Speaker 1: safety would be another uh sort of umbrella term. And
Speaker 1: I don't want to be too cynical with this, but
Speaker 1: I think we can all be honest, ladies and gentlemen
Speaker 1: when we say that national security has an increasingly vague
Speaker 1: definition depending upon which state uses the phrase. Yeah, I
Speaker 1: would argue that almost every state that uses the phrase
Speaker 1: national security keeps it purposefully vague because you well, I mean,
Speaker 1: for one thing, it's impossible to anticipate everything, So I
Speaker 1: can feel some sympathy that in that respect, and the
Speaker 1: idea that if it's my job to ensure the protection
Speaker 1: of a nation's people, I don't know how much sleep
Speaker 1: I'm getting, but but then you know, it is entirely possible,
Speaker 1: because we've seen it time and again to air too
Speaker 1: far on the side of uh, you know, of of
Speaker 1: trying to protect people. And I would also argue that
Speaker 1: eliminating a massive means of communication does far worse to
Speaker 1: endanger people than uh than not doing that, like that,
Speaker 1: that you're not really promoting public safety by cutting off communication. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I really wanted to get your thoughts on this, because
Speaker 1: you're our tech expert or a texpert. That's way easier
Speaker 1: to say it just so everyone knows. Our producer hopefully
Speaker 1: cut out the four times I tried to say tech expert, Yeah,
Speaker 1: we're not gonna if I had bloopers on this show,
Speaker 1: that those would go at the end of this episode.
Speaker 1: But I don't do that, all right, So the reason
Speaker 1: that I want to hear about this is because it
Speaker 1: sounds like almost this villainous James Bond type of thing.
Speaker 1: You know, I'm going to shut down the Internet unless
Speaker 1: you give me one billion dollars. But but you raised
Speaker 1: a fantastic point um, which is that this has not
Speaker 1: only been an idea that's that's a little older than
Speaker 1: a lot of people might think. Sure, but it's by
Speaker 1: no means and uncom thing. It's their precedents for this, right. Oh,
Speaker 1: there's so many. So we're gonna start with nations other
Speaker 1: than our own. But don't worry, we will get to
Speaker 1: the United States because that, you know, I think in particular,
Speaker 1: you're talking about a country that prides itself on certain
Speaker 1: principles and it's very difficult to uh to to take
Speaker 1: this idea and have it mesh with those principles. Right. So,
Speaker 1: but before we get to that, let's talk about some
Speaker 1: other countries where at least from the perspective of of
Speaker 1: our position, we would say it's pretty cut and dry
Speaker 1: that this is a draconian approach. So again, this is
Speaker 1: from the perspective of two Americans. So we're sitting we're
Speaker 1: sitting in a pretty big seat of privilege here. But
Speaker 1: North Korea is the first example I was going to
Speaker 1: point out, and North Korea that is, if you want
Speaker 1: to talk about a nation that is very much concerned
Speaker 1: with the control of access to the Internet, it's hard
Speaker 1: to find a better representative than North Korea because, first
Speaker 1: of all, uh, let me, let me go through what
Speaker 1: you have to be able to do in order to
Speaker 1: have access to the Internet in North Korea. Alright, alright,
Speaker 1: walk me through it. Okay, So yours is in the
Speaker 1: North Korea and you're hoping at one point to connect
Speaker 1: to the Internet. Well, first, you have to obtain a
Speaker 1: license to own a personal computer. It's like having a
Speaker 1: license to own a weapon. You have to You can't
Speaker 1: you can't go out and buy a computer on your own.
Speaker 1: You have to get permission to own a computer first. Secondly,
Speaker 1: you have to be lucky enough to be able to
Speaker 1: buy one. Because the only state sanctioned source for computers
Speaker 1: is a company called Morning Panda, which is owned by
Speaker 1: the government. Um. If however, there's a caveat here, if
Speaker 1: you're somehow fortunate enough to be one of the elite
Speaker 1: in North Korea, you can skirt around this and you
Speaker 1: could actually buy an unsanctioned computer, like an like an
Speaker 1: Apple computer, like a top of the line computer that
Speaker 1: has essentially smuggled in for you. So these are the
Speaker 1: rules for the average joke This is these are the
Speaker 1: rules for fort of the population of North Korea. So
Speaker 1: if you're in that point zero zero one, then you're you.
Speaker 1: You can ignore these other rules. Uh. But third is
Speaker 1: that you would need to connect to that to a network, uh,
Speaker 1: which is not the Internet. It's called the intra neet
Speaker 1: or it's their internet called Kwangmyong which means bright Star.
Speaker 1: So that's an intranet. It's internally based in North Korea
Speaker 1: without connection to the outside Internet. But it looks kind
Speaker 1: of like the Internet, particularly the Internet of the late nineties. UM.
Speaker 1: It's running on Microsoft software that had been pirated from
Speaker 1: Japanese sources. So it's it's all like the servers are
Speaker 1: all internal servers, not connecting outside um. But in order
Speaker 1: to do that, you need to be probably either in
Speaker 1: a major city or in a university. Those are the
Speaker 1: only places to have Internet connectivity. And if you aren't
Speaker 1: in either of those two places, you're probably out of luck,
Speaker 1: because internal travel in North Korea is not permitted without
Speaker 1: a special dispensation. Yeah, so in other words, if you're
Speaker 1: not there already, you may be stuck. All right, So
Speaker 1: we've got all that taken care of. Now, let's say
Speaker 1: that you are one of the elite, and you you
Speaker 1: you merit certain consideration because of whatever whatever your position
Speaker 1: happens to me, maybe you're maybe you're like ahead of
Speaker 1: a propaganda or something along those lines. If you are
Speaker 1: one of those very few people, you can access the
Speaker 1: actual Internet with two other caveats. Well, first, first of all,
Speaker 1: here's how few there are, right, So there's twenty five
Speaker 1: million people living in North Korea. North Korea has one thousand,
Speaker 1: twenty four I P addresses. In the United States, where
Speaker 1: we have more than three million people, we have more
Speaker 1: than a billion IP addresses. So that tells you that
Speaker 1: we're talking about a tiny number of people. And the
Speaker 1: the line leading into North Korea comes from China. So
Speaker 1: your feed of the Internet is also behind the firewall. Yeah,
Speaker 1: so you are one of the few people who can
Speaker 1: access it. You're accessing it through a line that has
Speaker 1: passed through China. You might there may be a couple
Speaker 1: of satellite sources of of access which would not be
Speaker 1: limited to the Chinese firewall. But uh yeah, and from
Speaker 1: what I've heard, or at least from what people have
Speaker 1: been able to suss out, the access is super slow. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I've heard that too. Um, we're talking about the dial
Speaker 1: up sound effect. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, there have been
Speaker 1: like cyber cafes, some of them are still using dial
Speaker 1: up modems. So it's not it's not a cable or
Speaker 1: or fiber optics system or anything like that. So that
Speaker 1: that's an extreme example. And of course, obviously if the
Speaker 1: North Korean government had decided that this is not a um,
Speaker 1: not something they want anyone to have access to, it
Speaker 1: would be relatively easy to shut it down because there's
Speaker 1: just that one entry. Yeah, other than I guess mobile
Speaker 1: phones that are smuggled in maybe yeah, but even then
Speaker 1: you could as uh you know, as a government shut
Speaker 1: down the cellular systems. So in that case, it's kind
Speaker 1: of a scorched earth policy. But you can do it
Speaker 1: so anyway. That's that's probably the most extreme case, apart
Speaker 1: from maybe countries that are so they're in such a
Speaker 1: developing stage as far as the internet is concerned, that
Speaker 1: they haven't laid out an infrastructure fully yet. Those cases
Speaker 1: it may be a little different. I'm looking mostly at
Speaker 1: at countries that have had the opportunity to role out
Speaker 1: in Yeah, so that that's an extreme example, but it
Speaker 1: also shows how easily that could happen in that in
Speaker 1: that state, in the DPRK or North Korea, just to
Speaker 1: cut off that just that one point. Uh yeah. Now,
Speaker 1: whereas China is another great example that we've already talked
Speaker 1: about the firewall. So the Internet in China is is
Speaker 1: largely censored. Um, there are ways for citizens who are
Speaker 1: savvy to get around that, although it's not a safe
Speaker 1: thing to do necessarily something yeah, and you can um
Speaker 1: yeah and lots of proxies, Yeah you can. You can
Speaker 1: potentially get around some of that, although the danger of
Speaker 1: doing so is not is not insignificant. We'll be back
Speaker 1: with more of this classic episode of tech stuff after
Speaker 1: this quick break. China has also been known to use regionalized,
Speaker 1: localized kill switches in provinces where there is unrest. So,
Speaker 1: in other words, shutting down the the infrastructure that allows
Speaker 1: for communication across the Internet, but only in localized areas.
Speaker 1: We're not talking like a countrywide blackout, So this would
Speaker 1: be like maybe unrest and Tibet leads to US shut down. Yes,
Speaker 1: those are good examples. Yeah, exactly. It's the sort of
Speaker 1: thing where if the government wants to impede the ability
Speaker 1: of any protesters or voices of opposition, they can shut
Speaker 1: down the communication lines, uh and then uh kind of
Speaker 1: kind of squash that that way, or at least at
Speaker 1: least decrease their impact. There are other examples. I mean
Speaker 1: in Egypt in two thousand eleven, there was a pretty
Speaker 1: infamous result of of the the president or the outgoing
Speaker 1: president of Egypt shutting down the various services or sharing
Speaker 1: on access to various services as a means of trying
Speaker 1: to to squash protests in opposition. Syria two thousand twelve.
Speaker 1: Now this one's interesting. You know, I don't know much
Speaker 1: about this one, all right, So this one's right up
Speaker 1: your alley, Ben, This is the stuff they don't want
Speaker 1: you to know. Episode So Syria two thousand twelve. Syria
Speaker 1: is in the middle of a civil war. Internet access
Speaker 1: in Syria blacks out. It's knocked offline, so like it's
Speaker 1: like the entire country just suddenly disappears from online. It's
Speaker 1: goes black. Both sides accused the other side of sabotaging
Speaker 1: the system so that no one could use the Internet. However,
Speaker 1: according to one Mr Snowdon, neither side was responsible, and
Speaker 1: in fact it was the n s A which was
Speaker 1: attempting to infiltrate Syrian web servers to insert malware for
Speaker 1: surveillance purposes and accidentally knocked their servers offline. And then
Speaker 1: we're given just enough authority to hide their tracks rather
Speaker 1: than actually help Syria get back online. Wow, so that's
Speaker 1: a that's even more that's the states are so much higher.
Speaker 1: I'm sorry I'm stuttering, but this is mind boggling to me.
Speaker 1: This is a state shutting down another countries internet, not
Speaker 1: not on purpose, but that's kind of not important. Really,
Speaker 1: that's kind of the scariest part. Yeah, it's actually really
Speaker 1: like because then you start thinking, like, not only do
Speaker 1: you have amazing power, but you're operating on a three
Speaker 1: Stooges level. You know, your job is to install this
Speaker 1: one thing, and you've you've not You've burned the building
Speaker 1: down around you, right, and like there's one wall standing
Speaker 1: and it's got the thing you're supposed to install on it,
Speaker 1: but the rest of the building is gone. The last
Speaker 1: thing standing is the door, and the new door knob
Speaker 1: right exactly. That's it. And uh, you know, this is
Speaker 1: obviously not the same sort of thing as the kill
Speaker 1: switches we're talking about in other cases, because again, that
Speaker 1: was not the intention at the time. And this is
Speaker 1: again according to Snowden, who gave an interview with Wired
Speaker 1: and talked about this. So you know, I haven't actually
Speaker 1: read any documents that directly link an say to this
Speaker 1: event in Syria, but according to Snowden, that is what happened.
Speaker 1: So so that is something I should stress. Yeah, So
Speaker 1: that that's a great example. Another one Russia two thousand fourteen,
Speaker 1: so very recent. Uh, there was a news story in
Speaker 1: which it was reported that quote, Russian internet service providers
Speaker 1: will be required to install equipment that would make it
Speaker 1: possible to shut off Russia's access to the global Internet
Speaker 1: in the event of an emergency. And uh, Dmitri Peskov,
Speaker 1: who was Press secretary to a certain Vladimir Putin said
Speaker 1: that there was no intention to isolate Russian users from
Speaker 1: the global Internet. Uh. He playing to the inter Fact
Speaker 1: news agency that the discussions will focus on the ways
Speaker 1: to protect it from possible external actions, so essentially means
Speaker 1: of protecting Russia from cyber attacks. Okay, whether from hacker
Speaker 1: groups or from bash. There's there's also a possibility here
Speaker 1: that might be that that might be apropos for this situation,
Speaker 1: which is uh, financial catastrophes which you're shutting down an
Speaker 1: Internet connection is a great way to shut down regular trade.
Speaker 1: I'm sure it's also a criminal act. Yeah, well, and
Speaker 1: the way I think of it is and this also
Speaker 1: ties back. I'm sure we'll stress this again at the
Speaker 1: end of the episode, that's shutting down the Internet. The
Speaker 1: Internet we depend so heavily on it, not just for communications,
Speaker 1: but for uh, for for trade, you know, for finances,
Speaker 1: that doing doing something as drastic as shutting it down
Speaker 1: would be disastrous. Even if you could argue that it
Speaker 1: was justifiable, and even if it was for a short
Speaker 1: amount of time, the consequences of that action would be
Speaker 1: so tremendous as to probably in hindsight say that was
Speaker 1: probably that was not the right thing to do. There's
Speaker 1: a way, yeah, but well we'll talk more about that.
Speaker 1: So so those are some of the other countries we talk.
Speaker 1: There's also there's ongoing issues with Burundi um where there
Speaker 1: have been some discussions about using various means to shut
Speaker 1: down the ability for people to use Twitter and other
Speaker 1: social media sites. But there are a lot of different
Speaker 1: examples that there were examples during the incidents with Russia
Speaker 1: and the Ukraine. I mean, there's just tons of different
Speaker 1: examples around the world. And meanwhile, here in the United States,
Speaker 1: we often think of ourselves, we Americans often think of
Speaker 1: ourselves as sort of the the paragons of free speech
Speaker 1: and our country value that's what our country was founded on,
Speaker 1: one of the principles we were founded on. In that therefore,
Speaker 1: you know, we have a really good foundation for fair
Speaker 1: means of communication. Yeah, but the right to a free speech,
Speaker 1: like I don't agree with you, but I will defend
Speaker 1: to the death. So it sounds like, you know, we
Speaker 1: would never mess around with that sort of thing. However, Yeah,
Speaker 1: we've got a nice long history of actually putting it
Speaker 1: into policy that we can totally that by we, I
Speaker 1: mean the president can totally mess with things. I mean
Speaker 1: this goes all the way back to the age of
Speaker 1: the telegraph where the president, I think it was like
Speaker 1: nineteen eighteen, where the president was was given the authority
Speaker 1: in times of war and other major catastrophes, be able
Speaker 1: to direct the use of the telegraph systems, so that
Speaker 1: essentially superseding any other use of them and saying either
Speaker 1: they need to be dedicated specifically for whatever, or shutdown
Speaker 1: so that they can't be used for anything else. So yeah,
Speaker 1: So that's that's a startling thing because we know that
Speaker 1: this is the Communications Act, right, Well, that would be
Speaker 1: the ninet that's the next one. The next one is
Speaker 1: the Communications Act, which goes even further, right, Yeah, which
Speaker 1: is says, uh, this was by f DR, I believe, right,
Speaker 1: and this is control over the media. Uh. This this
Speaker 1: gives like electronic communication in any end all forms. Yeah.
Speaker 1: And this is one where there was argument for a
Speaker 1: long time about whether or not the Internet falls under
Speaker 1: this particular category. It's kind of in a parallel argument
Speaker 1: to net neutrality. Yes, whether you can qualify the Internet
Speaker 1: as a utility or another you know, a regulated uh
Speaker 1: entity kind of like the the telephone industry, that sort
Speaker 1: of stuff. Um, and it's it's related but not identical
Speaker 1: to that. Obviously, there there are differences, big differences between
Speaker 1: the two. But um. Nevertheless, some people say that this
Speaker 1: Act gives the President the the explicit means to be
Speaker 1: able to direct any kind of mass communication within the
Speaker 1: United States for whatever purpose. If we're talking about a
Speaker 1: time of war or other major event that threatens national security, right,
Speaker 1: and it's also illegal for anyone to not help. Yes,
Speaker 1: that's that's one of the that's one of the scary things.
Speaker 1: And it also it also absolves any communications company of
Speaker 1: any um legal proceedings to be pursued against it in
Speaker 1: the wake of this. So, in other words, using modern examples,
Speaker 1: if if the President of the United States goes to
Speaker 1: A T and T and says shut it all down,
Speaker 1: you know, Walter Peck style, and they flip the big
Speaker 1: switch and all and all the A T and T
Speaker 1: stuff goes offline, A T and T customers would not
Speaker 1: be allowed to sue A T and T for that
Speaker 1: because under this Act, A T and T is not
Speaker 1: held responsible. They were they were following the rules as
Speaker 1: laid out by the Act, and Uh, therefore they can't
Speaker 1: be sued. Now, you might be able to bring some
Speaker 1: sort of lawsuit against the government and try and have
Speaker 1: the law changed, but you wouldn't, you know, under this
Speaker 1: law you they would. They're like, listen, you know it
Speaker 1: is the law that we were following. And again it's
Speaker 1: four yeah. So uh. Meanwhile, so even if you, even
Speaker 1: if you think the Internet is is um not beholden
Speaker 1: to the same set of rules. Uh. In two thousand
Speaker 1: and six that all became moot because that's when the
Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security adopted a policy that is called
Speaker 1: Standing Operating Procedure through oh three or s o P
Speaker 1: three oh three. And before we came in here, Ben
Speaker 1: and I had had a brief little exchange where I said,
Speaker 1: how terrifying is it to think of this as standard
Speaker 1: operating procedure? Right? Yes? Yeah? And and furthermore, how terrified
Speaker 1: is it to wonder about the other three hundreds something? Yeah?
Speaker 1: And that's assuming there weren't more after three oh three? Right?
Speaker 1: What else? Like, are we in violation of s OP
Speaker 1: for nineteen or Something's just a small tangent. This reminds
Speaker 1: me of when I was in London with my wife
Speaker 1: and we saw a sign that said no busting in
Speaker 1: the London underground, which will come back to in just
Speaker 1: a second, but in the London underground. And I turned
Speaker 1: to my wife and said, what is it? And she said,
Speaker 1: I don't know. Are we doing it? Like I sure
Speaker 1: hope not, because there's because it's apparently against the law
Speaker 1: and we could get fined. So and obviously, I mean
Speaker 1: for those who don't know, busking is is public performance
Speaker 1: of various types of asking for money in return for
Speaker 1: public performance. But at the time we had no idea.
Speaker 1: So it's like that sort of thing, like are we
Speaker 1: violating something? And and here's the deal. This particular standard
Speaker 1: operating procedure was adopted pretty much in secrecy, right, Like
Speaker 1: there's there's no there's no publicly available record of exactly
Speaker 1: what what what sort of um situation has to be
Speaker 1: in place in order for the Department of Homeland Security
Speaker 1: to execute s OP three oh three, right or what
Speaker 1: s sort of oversight? Yeah, yeah, there's there's no there's
Speaker 1: no way for us to know because it's not published publicly. Uh,
Speaker 1: and that that is a real issue of of some concern. Now, Um,
Speaker 1: one thing I should say, said s OP three oh
Speaker 1: three is not an Internet kill switch in the same
Speaker 1: sense as you know, something that you would see in
Speaker 1: North Korea or or whatever. It's UM, it's meant to
Speaker 1: be localized, very much so, to the point where the
Speaker 1: most of the language talks about using it to cut
Speaker 1: off cellular service, mobile service, and wireless service within specific
Speaker 1: areas like a tunnel or a bridge or maybe a municipality. Yeah, yeah, maybe.
Speaker 1: And this, uh, this is strange because we know that
Speaker 1: something like this has occurred right in San Francisco, right,
Speaker 1: and before I talk about the San Francisco one, which
Speaker 1: is extremely problematic. UM. The whole reason why this was
Speaker 1: adopted in two thousand six stems from some attacks in
Speaker 1: London that happened in two thousand five. We've got more
Speaker 1: to say in this classic episode of tech stuff after
Speaker 1: these quick messages. So in July of two thousand five,
Speaker 1: there were the London underground bombings. On July seven, about
Speaker 1: eight fifty in the morning in London time, UH, three
Speaker 1: bombs in three different locations in the London London underground
Speaker 1: system UH exploded within a minute of each other, like
Speaker 1: within fifty seconds, all three had exploded. UH fifty two
Speaker 1: civilians were well. There was a fourth one that exploded
Speaker 1: an hour later on a double decker bus. So three
Speaker 1: were on trains, one was on a double decker bus
Speaker 1: and happened an hour later. Fifty two people were fifty
Speaker 1: two civilians were killed. Uh seven people were injured, and
Speaker 1: the four suicide bombers died as as well. I mean, um,
Speaker 1: so the United States looked at this, and I also remember,
Speaker 1: obviously this is also after nine eleven and two thousand one.
Speaker 1: So the United States looks at this, and they the
Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security started looking into the possibility of
Speaker 1: creating a system to shut down mobile and wireless service
Speaker 1: in in the case that perhaps there was good reason
Speaker 1: to suspect a coordinated terrorist attack on a system or
Speaker 1: a municipality, the idea being that the bombers were using
Speaker 1: cell phones to activate the bombs, to to detonate the bombs. Possible,
Speaker 1: It is possible. I could not find anything official in
Speaker 1: the investigation of the London attacks that definitively found that
Speaker 1: the attackers use their mobile phones. It's just as possible,
Speaker 1: or at least it is possible, maybe not just as possible.
Speaker 1: It is possible that they all had their cell phones
Speaker 1: on an alarm system to alert them of when they
Speaker 1: needed to detonate, and then they used some of their
Speaker 1: system because you know, if they're all using cell phones,
Speaker 1: it's all it's all keyed into the satellites anyway, or
Speaker 1: the cell the cell towers rather the cell tower service,
Speaker 1: so um, you know, it's their time. Their clocks would
Speaker 1: have all been synchronized already, so that's a possibility to
Speaker 1: But assuming that they did use their mobile phones, then
Speaker 1: the United States Department of Homeland Security was saying, well,
Speaker 1: how can we create a system where we shut down
Speaker 1: the ability for anyone to send a signal through these
Speaker 1: wireless or mobile services, and that way we can prevent
Speaker 1: any kind of attack of this nature from being carried
Speaker 1: out the way it was intended. So that's kind of
Speaker 1: the justification, or at least that's the justification that has
Speaker 1: been alluded to by various parties involved. Now, yeah, you know,
Speaker 1: you were alluding to something that happened in San Francisco,
Speaker 1: So that's uh, that was around two thousand and eleven. Uh.
Speaker 1: In two thousand eleven, a group named EPIC. You might
Speaker 1: recognize that the Electronic Privacy Information Center began pursuing this
Speaker 1: DHS well, for the sake of coolness, I'll call it
Speaker 1: a kill switch. But I think you did an excellent
Speaker 1: job showing how it is a little different. Because government
Speaker 1: officials in San Francisco disabled the cell phone system during
Speaker 1: a protest. Yeah, it's a protest that happened on the
Speaker 1: Bay Area Rapid Transitor BART in San Francisco. And what
Speaker 1: had happened was UM there there were protests that were
Speaker 1: related to an incident in which a BART officer, so
Speaker 1: a law enforcement officer working with BART or BART UM
Speaker 1: had shot and killed a homeless man. And so there
Speaker 1: the the BART operators essentially shut down cell service and
Speaker 1: certain areas of the BART system. So think of like
Speaker 1: cell tower repeaters that are in various areas, they shut
Speaker 1: those down, they turned them off, killing cell service in
Speaker 1: those areas. Uh. And the essentially they were doing so
Speaker 1: to prevent the organization of spontaneous protests on the BART system.
Speaker 1: And they justified their decision by saying that they were
Speaker 1: afraid that any kind of organized, organized protest would uh
Speaker 1: bring the safety of other people into question, that it
Speaker 1: would be too dangerous. Overcrowding was one of the things
Speaker 1: that listed in their official response statement, right, and they
Speaker 1: and also you'll see some differences in the language they're
Speaker 1: choosing because EPIC and the protesters themselves, so this was
Speaker 1: a this was going to be a peaceful protest, whereas
Speaker 1: Bart says, this was going to be a disruptive activity,
Speaker 1: right that it leads to unsafe conditions. So so essentially
Speaker 1: you could say, well, what happened, and Bart pretty much
Speaker 1: disabled continue doing what it's doing for the time being. Anyway, Uh,
Speaker 1: there's nothing that came out of that as far as
Speaker 1: you know, a like a slap on the wrist or anything.
Speaker 1: It was. It was essentially considered justified. And uh, and
Speaker 1: it's particularly worrisome because it was in response to a protest,
Speaker 1: not some sort of terrorist attack, the actual citizens of
Speaker 1: the United States protesting something. And again, the First Amendment
Speaker 1: gives us rights of free speech and assembly and and
Speaker 1: and you could argue that this is a violation of
Speaker 1: those rights. Um. And so this was definitely one of
Speaker 1: those things that has been continuing to play out, and
Speaker 1: that really gave EPIC the the the need to go
Speaker 1: after Department of Homeland Security to say, all right, listen,
Speaker 1: we need to know what are what are the guidelines
Speaker 1: for s Op three oh three, What in what case
Speaker 1: is it legal for the United States government to shut
Speaker 1: off wireless or cellular service within an area? What? We
Speaker 1: don't even know what the guidelines are, right, because we
Speaker 1: the people as corney as is to say, it's true,
Speaker 1: the citizenry of the US, as well as people visiting,
Speaker 1: because of course it affects them to never had the
Speaker 1: chance to find out what this was, what what this
Speaker 1: actually happening. I think a lot of people here in
Speaker 1: this country did not know that it could even be
Speaker 1: a thing. Yeah, I mean, there was no public debate,
Speaker 1: There was no public revelation of this. It was essentially
Speaker 1: one of those behind closed doors deals, uh, which sounds
Speaker 1: it's probably gonna sound pretty familiar to folks because we've
Speaker 1: talked a lot, You and I particularly have talked a
Speaker 1: lot about, uh, a lot of a lot of things
Speaker 1: that are done in the name of national security that
Speaker 1: get very much obvious skated, and the people who are
Speaker 1: behind the policies argue that the obfuscation is necessary to
Speaker 1: preserve the national security. And meanwhile, people who find it
Speaker 1: to be an infringement upon liberties are saying, so you're
Speaker 1: telling me you can't even tell me what the what
Speaker 1: the parameters are, because that in itself is somehow endangering people.
Speaker 1: How can knowing when you are allowed to do this
Speaker 1: be a danger to anyone? And in fact, that's the
Speaker 1: that's the key to the current argument. Right. So EPIC
Speaker 1: essentially sues the Department of Homeland Security. First, there's a
Speaker 1: Freedom of Information Act request, which Department of Homeland Security
Speaker 1: is no, I'm not gonna We're not gonna tell you
Speaker 1: what or we're going to tell you so little that
Speaker 1: it means nothing anyway. Yeah, And so there was a
Speaker 1: series of lawsuits, or our court cases rather, and in
Speaker 1: one the courts found in favor of EPIC, and they said, excellent, DHS,
Speaker 1: you've gotta tell us, you gotta tell us by this
Speaker 1: date what the guidelines are for you to be able
Speaker 1: to use this. This, by the way, isn't about repealing
Speaker 1: s O p. Three oh three. This is just telling
Speaker 1: us when it is allowed, when the government is allowed
Speaker 1: to use s O P. Three oh three. So, uh,
Speaker 1: DHS appeals, like you said, and the d C. District
Speaker 1: Court of Appeals found in favor of the Department of
Speaker 1: Homeland Security. So now there's no longer this mandate that
Speaker 1: the DHS has to give over all the guidelines, although
Speaker 1: there was some time in April where it was going
Speaker 1: to be said, Oh, the DHS is totally gonna talk
Speaker 1: about at least give some information about when s OP
Speaker 1: three oh three can be instituted and what it means,
Speaker 1: what are the parameters, Hope springs eternal? Right, Yeah, still
Speaker 1: haven't heard it yet. No, we still haven't. We still
Speaker 1: haven't heard it. And it's it's fascinating because the things
Speaker 1: that we don't know, it's kind of like a monster
Speaker 1: in a Hitchcock film. The things that we don't know, uh,
Speaker 1: may well be far more monstrous than what's actually going on.
Speaker 1: You and I have talked a lot about how unnecessary
Speaker 1: secrecy or obstucation breeds speculation and really crazy stuff. Yeah,
Speaker 1: and it's and it ends up breeding distrust in in authority,
Speaker 1: and that is not good either. So there comes a
Speaker 1: point where you have to really weigh this and say,
Speaker 1: all right, is it really I mean because because the
Speaker 1: argument that the Department of Homeland Security has been making
Speaker 1: is that the revelation of this information could potentially put
Speaker 1: a human life at risk in danger, and the EPICS
Speaker 1: response was how and the Department Homeland Security that saying
Speaker 1: that would put a person's life in danger. So you're
Speaker 1: saying so you're essentially saying you've got to get out
Speaker 1: of jail free card here that if you play this
Speaker 1: trumps everything else. That if you say that it could
Speaker 1: potentially put some hypothetical person's life and danger, then you
Speaker 1: have a way of getting out of any request for justification,
Speaker 1: and that breeds even more contempt, right So it and
Speaker 1: it could very well be that if there were some
Speaker 1: disclosure of this information, we would say, I now understand
Speaker 1: your justifications. Whether I agree with it or not as
Speaker 1: another matter, but I understand them, and I understand how
Speaker 1: you could argue that it would potentially put someone's life
Speaker 1: in danger. But seems kind of I mean, without knowing.
Speaker 1: It's impossible to say for sure, but it seems to me,
Speaker 1: based upon my limited perspective, that's very difficult to justify.
Speaker 1: I can't tell you when we can put this into
Speaker 1: place because that could potentially put someone's life in danger,
Speaker 1: because it's either going to be in place or it's
Speaker 1: not going to be emblazing. This is not a matter
Speaker 1: of degree so much as it is a matter of
Speaker 1: pretty concrete facts. Yeah, Like, like, is you know, what
Speaker 1: are you saying that that potential attacker would look at
Speaker 1: the guidelines and say, all right, guys, as long as
Speaker 1: we stay just within this, you can't shut down the communications.
Speaker 1: Is that the argument? Which is weird? Right, because like, well,
Speaker 1: so you can't even explain what the because I'm sure
Speaker 1: it's vaguely worded everything is. So it can't be something
Speaker 1: so specific that you know, a determined person could calculating
Speaker 1: lee approach this in such a way where they almost
Speaker 1: but don't quite trigger s Op three or three. Guys,
Speaker 1: as long as we're there before seven thirty two, right, yeah,
Speaker 1: because after that the switches all come on so really quickly.
Speaker 1: To talk about the whole kill switch idea, like we said,
Speaker 1: it's not a physical switch, right, This is a policy
Speaker 1: that the government has and they went to the telecom
Speaker 1: companies and said, this is what our policy is. In
Speaker 1: the case of enacting s Op three oh three, we
Speaker 1: are going to ask you, the telecom companies, to shut
Speaker 1: down your service. And the telecom companies have agreed to
Speaker 1: do this. So, in other words, again not not a
Speaker 1: button that the government pushes, but if the government puts
Speaker 1: the call out to a specific municipality, let's say Dallas, Texas,
Speaker 1: and they say to all the different carriers WI wireless
Speaker 1: and cellular carriers, shut off your service for this duration. Then,
Speaker 1: assuming that they've all agreed to do so, they'll all
Speaker 1: do that individually. Now this is where it gets complicated
Speaker 1: because for for cellular service, it's not too hard because
Speaker 1: there's so many limited players. There's just a limited number
Speaker 1: of players, right, So with a limited number of players,
Speaker 1: the government doesn't have to make a thousand phone calls
Speaker 1: to get this happen. When you get into to rest
Speaker 1: real internet service providers, it gets a lot more complicated.
Speaker 1: Even though most of us have access to you know,
Speaker 1: a couple of major ones, Um, there are smaller ones,
Speaker 1: smaller one and there there, and some of them are
Speaker 1: cooperatives too. Yeah. So uh yeah, I could see that
Speaker 1: you have to all of a sudden, those thousand calls
Speaker 1: you talked about earlier are are coming into play. Yeah,
Speaker 1: and from why I understand s Op three O three
Speaker 1: does not cover landlines. So if you have a landline,
Speaker 1: that's not going to get shut off. Uh, and it
Speaker 1: probably would have some difficulties shutting down any kind of
Speaker 1: of internet service that was not wireless or cellular. Although
Speaker 1: I imagine that you know, some of the big players
Speaker 1: may already have agreements, like you know, I can't even
Speaker 1: I won't name them. But let's say that a major
Speaker 1: internet service provider has that that could effectively silence at
Speaker 1: least a large enough percentage of the population to get
Speaker 1: through whatever the problem happened, the perceived problem happens to
Speaker 1: be right. Yeah, and and again like another thing that
Speaker 1: kill switch is not is a permanent kill switch. This
Speaker 1: is just for a little this at least in the US. Um,
Speaker 1: you said you had a great way of seeing it
Speaker 1: when we were off there earlier. Um, you said, it's
Speaker 1: not a literal switch. It is a policy. Yeah, and
Speaker 1: it's and it's a policy that is meant to to
Speaker 1: endure as long as that state of emergency does whatever
Speaker 1: what however that is defined, which again we don't know
Speaker 1: because we haven't been able to read s Op three
Speaker 1: oh three. But um, you know it's it's it's meant
Speaker 1: to be temporary. The problem is the Bart example is
Speaker 1: very troubling because of it being in response to a protest.
Speaker 1: Even if you can argue convincingly that no, it was
Speaker 1: meant because we didn't want the overcrowding and endangerment of lives.
Speaker 1: The at least, the perception is that you're trying to
Speaker 1: stop people from actually expressing, uh, their their displeasure with authority.
Speaker 1: And that's not what the United States is supposed to
Speaker 1: be about. It's it's in fact antithetical to what are
Speaker 1: our founding principles are supposed to be. And on top
Speaker 1: of that, there's another sort of kill switch I want
Speaker 1: to talk about very briefly. This one is one that's
Speaker 1: installed directly into smartphones. So in California, in two thousand fourteen,
Speaker 1: there was a law that was passed that requires uh
Speaker 1: smartphone uh smartphones being sold in the state to have
Speaker 1: some form of kill switch that would allow the remote
Speaker 1: deactivation and wiping of that phone. Yeah. The thought being
Speaker 1: that this is meant to help prevent, to help disincentivize
Speaker 1: people from stealing smartphones, because the being that if you've
Speaker 1: had your smartphone stolen, you can have it bricked so
Speaker 1: that you don't have to worry about someone getting access
Speaker 1: to your data. They can't use your phone anymore. And
Speaker 1: the idea being that if this is, if this is mandated,
Speaker 1: then stealing a smartphone makes no sense in California anyway,
Speaker 1: because the chances are it's going to be turned into
Speaker 1: a useless piece of plastic in your hands. Um. But
Speaker 1: the fear is that it allows other entities remote access
Speaker 1: to your phone, to turn it off, to wipe the stuff.
Speaker 1: So that what if it were a case of, um,
Speaker 1: you know, citywide riots, and there was the call to
Speaker 1: all right, let's you know, we're not just shutting down
Speaker 1: the system, we're wiping the phones, which sounds like it's
Speaker 1: a truly ridiculous overstepping of bounds. But the point is
Speaker 1: that organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation have said this
Speaker 1: opens the door to that possibility. Anytime you have the
Speaker 1: opportunity for another entity to have some form of access
Speaker 1: to your phone. That's a problem with security, it's a
Speaker 1: problem with privacy. It's a problem with individual liberties. And
Speaker 1: you're you are arguing for the safety of a system
Speaker 1: as opposed to the safety of the person. That's a
Speaker 1: very that's a very good distinction. I'm glad you made it,
Speaker 1: because when we talked about some of this stuff, this
Speaker 1: is just a brief tangent. You remember when, um, do
Speaker 1: you remember when there was the big hubbub about having
Speaker 1: uh having e books from Amazon? How Amazon can control
Speaker 1: them remotely? Yeah, because they they had a particular copy
Speaker 1: I can't remember what well, oh yeah, it was so
Speaker 1: ironic copy of and then they remotely wiped that copy
Speaker 1: from anyone who bought it, which which just sorry, how
Speaker 1: many how many slightly paranoid people just locked themselves in
Speaker 1: their house and started nailing up planks along the door.
Speaker 1: And the only book I can think of that would
Speaker 1: have been equally ironic would have been Fair Night. Yeah,
Speaker 1: be virtually burning the book. So so this, of course,
Speaker 1: this gives us, um, you know, this gives anybody concern,
Speaker 1: and it's not it's not necessarily crazy or paranoid to
Speaker 1: say that if this access occurs, I love that against
Speaker 1: safety of the system over the safety of the individual.
Speaker 1: But I bring the Amazon thing up because I wanted
Speaker 1: to get to a point. You had said it wasn't
Speaker 1: just a state sponsored thing all the time. Yeah, yeah, No,
Speaker 1: it's like, well, I mean, like looking at something like
Speaker 1: bart you know or if you could you know that
Speaker 1: that's a that's the transportation system in San Francisco. That
Speaker 1: wasn't like the state of California. So I see what
Speaker 1: you're saying. Yeah, so that was a problem. But okay, yeah,
Speaker 1: you know that is scary. Yeah, because it's it's and
Speaker 1: and apparently it's fine. We have to be nicer to
Speaker 1: the market drivers. Man. Yeah, I uh, I mean, I'm
Speaker 1: not saying that's why I to work, but I'm not
Speaker 1: not saying no, I'm not I'm being ridiculous. But the
Speaker 1: other thing I wanted to mention is that Ben and
Speaker 1: I are of a very particular opinion obviously about this.
Speaker 1: We are not coming at this from an unbiased point
Speaker 1: of view. But I should also point out that the
Speaker 1: United Nations is on our side of this argument. The UN,
Speaker 1: or at least a group of experts within the United Nations,
Speaker 1: So I shouldn't say the whole organization collectively have said this,
Speaker 1: but uh, experts within the UN have come out to
Speaker 1: say that the use of any sort of communications kill
Speaker 1: switches a violation of human rights, even in a time
Speaker 1: of war or or strife, that it is impermissible under
Speaker 1: international human rights law. Really. Yeah, so that's first off,
Speaker 1: I'm startled that that is not what I was expecting,
Speaker 1: especially that kind of language, any of that language. But
Speaker 1: I you know, Okay, I keep thinking about when we
Speaker 1: did our Area fifty one podcast, right, and we had
Speaker 1: I think one of the best uh we have. We
Speaker 1: have one of the best cases where national security, as
Speaker 1: vague as it may be, as a real and present thing,
Speaker 1: it could have led to It could have maybe led
Speaker 1: to a nuclear war at some point, you know, had
Speaker 1: the secret snupping kept. But this is very this is
Speaker 1: very different. Um. I just I want to be careful
Speaker 1: to acknowledge both sides. Like, is is it possible that
Speaker 1: there would be a situation where shutting off regional cells
Speaker 1: systems or internet access is the best thing to do.
Speaker 1: It's hard to imagine. I can't think of one because
Speaker 1: because the again, the consequences of that are so severe,
Speaker 1: and the immediate consequences involved panic, because now you no
Speaker 1: longer have your We take it for granted that we
Speaker 1: have these phones that allow us an incredible access to
Speaker 1: the Internet and to various forms of communication, even if
Speaker 1: most of us just use it for texting. We still
Speaker 1: we take that for granted. So imagine that that has
Speaker 1: been completely taken away. Imagine that it's during a time
Speaker 1: of of unease for whatever you know. However, that's defined.
Speaker 1: So if you are in the middle of that situation
Speaker 1: and you know, one of your earliest UH impulses is
Speaker 1: probably going to be to touch base with somebody else
Speaker 1: to either find out what's going on or make sure
Speaker 1: they're okay or both right, and then you have no
Speaker 1: means of doing that because the system has been shut down,
Speaker 1: and you don't even know if the system has been
Speaker 1: shut down or if something else has happened to cause
Speaker 1: it to not work. You can't know. There's no way
Speaker 1: to know when you are in the middle of that
Speaker 1: situation that would incite panic. Right, it seems like it
Speaker 1: would make the situation worse. I can't imagine it making
Speaker 1: it better. Stay tuned for the exciting conclusion of this
Speaker 1: tex Stuff classic episode right after we take this break.
Speaker 1: If you're not aware of what is happening, it makes
Speaker 1: it far more terrifying. If you are aware of what's
Speaker 1: what is happening, it's going to very much change your
Speaker 1: perception of authority if it wasn't already one of suspicion,
Speaker 1: because now you're you're thinking your decision to shut this
Speaker 1: down in order to potentially save people. First of all,
Speaker 1: you can't without something horrible happening. You can't say that
Speaker 1: you necessarily saved anyone. Right. This is the worst part
Speaker 1: of the world here. The worst part of the world
Speaker 1: is saying if it works. The reason why. The only
Speaker 1: thing we have to show that it works is that
Speaker 1: nothing awful happened, nothing happened, right, And if nothing awful happened,
Speaker 1: then you have the question of, well, was it necessary
Speaker 1: to do this drastic step to make sure nothing awful
Speaker 1: happen or would nothing awful have happened anyway? Right? Yeah,
Speaker 1: It's very, very difficult to prove that kind of thing.
Speaker 1: And even if we were in some sort of hyper
Speaker 1: hypothetical excuse me, hypothetical nonlinear time space where we could
Speaker 1: see both both effects at once, it sounds like it
Speaker 1: comes down to, um. You know, the only really compelling
Speaker 1: explanation would be the idea of remote detonated bombs, the
Speaker 1: original justification, and then giving that the idea being that
Speaker 1: we're taking the trigger mechanism away, and that is you know,
Speaker 1: it's it's an instantaneous decision, it's an emergency situation. We
Speaker 1: are doing it so that we can save lives in
Speaker 1: that instant It is not meant to be any kind
Speaker 1: of ongoing situation is not meant to be a means
Speaker 1: of silencing people. It's literally meant to save lives. I
Speaker 1: can kind of understand that, but again, I mean why
Speaker 1: can I could certainly understand the motivation, particularly in the
Speaker 1: post nine eleven, post London bombing's world, but I'm not
Speaker 1: entirely certain that that execution would prevent the misuse of
Speaker 1: that system. As the Snowdon leaks have shown us, these
Speaker 1: systems that were put in place, arguably for noble reasons,
Speaker 1: have already been subjugated to incredible misuse. Right, Yeah, and
Speaker 1: even at its best, you're not really removing the trigger.
Speaker 1: You're trading an explosion for a possible riot, yeah, you know,
Speaker 1: which which can have effects that maybe as devastating. And
Speaker 1: really this is all I mean, the Snowden leaks, this
Speaker 1: is all kind of round wound up together. This this
Speaker 1: world we live in that is largely a response to
Speaker 1: a horrible terrorist attack that took place in our past
Speaker 1: and is now defining our present. So it's it's I
Speaker 1: mean again, it's it's the sort of stuff you read
Speaker 1: in those science fiction dystopias where you realize that the
Speaker 1: horrible world that the characters live in probably did not
Speaker 1: spontaneously turn into this totalitarian dystopia. It was something that
Speaker 1: happened by degrees because of well meaning but misled people
Speaker 1: putting in policies in place that ultimately did not do
Speaker 1: what they were intended to do or did more than
Speaker 1: what they were intended to do. So, um, you know,
Speaker 1: I am totally in favor of learning more about s
Speaker 1: Op three oh three and finding out what what actually
Speaker 1: is allowed versus not allowed, and maybe get some more
Speaker 1: information of how this bart use of turning off cell
Speaker 1: systems was truly justified. That to me is still very problematic.
Speaker 1: I mean, having been on Martha during some of the
Speaker 1: worst busiest moments, I can understand a need to try
Speaker 1: and do some crowd control, but I don't think that's
Speaker 1: the right way to do it. Yeah. Yeah. Also, also,
Speaker 1: to be fair, I'd love to hear that stuff too,
Speaker 1: because if we don't, we're speculating, which is fun, but
Speaker 1: it's not. It's not. You know, you're not You're nowhere
Speaker 1: closer necessarily to the truth. You could be going down
Speaker 1: the wrong pathway you're assumed, you could be assuming the
Speaker 1: absolute worst, and it could turn out that you are
Speaker 1: completely off base. But if if you act upon those assumptions,
Speaker 1: it doesn't really matter if you're off base or not.
Speaker 1: You're still doing something that is probably pretty drastic and terrible.
Speaker 1: So if we're speculating, then I think let's go big
Speaker 1: and elder I was going. I was going with the
Speaker 1: n w O. Not not the New World Order as
Speaker 1: in the actual like like kind of like the the
Speaker 1: the supposed New World Order that's controlling the whole world.
Speaker 1: I'm talking about the w c W Wrestling faction, you know,
Speaker 1: Scott Hall, Kevin Nash, and Hull Cogan the n w O.
Speaker 1: Yeahl Hogan, I think, uh little known fact the inventor
Speaker 1: of the SIMSIP. Yeah, yeah, it is a very little
Speaker 1: known fact because because we made it up. Yeah you
Speaker 1: heard it here first. But anyway, so you know, the
Speaker 1: reason why I love to have this discussion and I
Speaker 1: was very very happy to see your suggestion of it, Ben,
Speaker 1: is because I think it does raise some very important
Speaker 1: questions about one our dependence upon technology, and that's our
Speaker 1: you know, become our primary means of communication, to a
Speaker 1: point where sometimes you can make jokes about a couple
Speaker 1: texting each other across from a table from one another,
Speaker 1: you know, uh too. It raises the the question of
Speaker 1: how do you balance security versus liberty, which has been
Speaker 1: a question throughout the history of the world, not just
Speaker 1: the United States. Um, and where's that balance? Some people
Speaker 1: would argue that liberty is the most important, and some
Speaker 1: people would argue, well, you know, you've got to really
Speaker 1: consider security because we're in a much much more complicated
Speaker 1: world now than we were two hundred years ago. That's
Speaker 1: a valid point. And also just that it was good
Speaker 1: to be able to sit down and talk about how
Speaker 1: a kill switch is really an an agreement among multiple
Speaker 1: parties and not not a big red button or a
Speaker 1: physical switch as much fun slash, horror, horrific reality. That
Speaker 1: would be right. I hope it's made by ACME. I
Speaker 1: hope while Coyote has one. I think, you know, like,
Speaker 1: if we were writing an SNL skit at this point,
Speaker 1: we would just we would have the point where President
Speaker 1: Obama had had switched it over to the clapper or
Speaker 1: something like that, like I want to show you that
Speaker 1: I'm gonna turn off all the Internet in Kansas, black clap,
Speaker 1: and that's it. You know, Yeah, that would be uh,
Speaker 1: that would be my SNL skit right there, which which
Speaker 1: like five people would be like that's brilliant and everyone
Speaker 1: else was like wow, I was really waiting until the
Speaker 1: musical guests came on. That's how bad that sketch was.
Speaker 1: So Lord, if you're listening, we have a couple of
Speaker 1: sketches of our sleeve. Yeah. Sure, you're a big fan
Speaker 1: of our shows. And then I realized, you know, I'm
Speaker 1: absolutely certain that the competition to get sketches on the
Speaker 1: air and the SNL writer's room is probably pretty low key, right, Yeah, yeah,
Speaker 1: I think it's I mean just you just have to
Speaker 1: like mail them. Yeah, so, uh so, yeah, call us,
Speaker 1: we're available, We're in the book. Uh anything else you
Speaker 1: wanted to say about about kill Switches SP three oh three?
Speaker 1: I mean I realized that this also, this conversation has
Speaker 1: also been filled with a lot of the triol on
Speaker 1: my part. Well, it's a it is a it is
Speaker 1: a troubling thing, and I really appreciate talking about it
Speaker 1: because again, you are our texpert, and you're the person
Speaker 1: I think who is most likely to have like you have.
Speaker 1: You definitely are opinionated, but you take great pains to
Speaker 1: separate what is what your opinion is uh, from what
Speaker 1: the facts are, right, and I appreciate that I think
Speaker 1: the listeners do to um. But I'm on the same
Speaker 1: page with you here, man, because it is a troubling thing.
Speaker 1: And oh M, full disclosure, ladies and gentlemen, don't forget
Speaker 1: that Jonathan and I both work in an Internet related field,
Speaker 1: so of course we want, we have, we have a
Speaker 1: vested interest in this thing called the Internet still being
Speaker 1: readily available. I mean, if it's not, then we're out
Speaker 1: of a job. But I mean, you know, it's it
Speaker 1: has become such a centralized point in our life that
Speaker 1: it is. It is very difficult to imagine a worthy
Speaker 1: justification of shutting it off, um, apart from the possibility
Speaker 1: of preventing an immediate disaster from happening and having it
Speaker 1: last a relatively short time, however short that might be.
Speaker 1: It might it might be several hours, depending upon what's
Speaker 1: going on and how to stop it. Um. But apart
Speaker 1: from that extraordinary set of circumstances, which again we don't
Speaker 1: know necessarily, is all that s op three oh three
Speaker 1: covers um. Yeah, it's it's hard to it's hard to
Speaker 1: even wrap my mind around when you would make that
Speaker 1: call because again, the consequences are just so devastating. I mean,
Speaker 1: if nothing else, you really invite the the real possibility
Speaker 1: that voters are not going to be happy. So I mean,
Speaker 1: if if you are, if you're serving in some you
Speaker 1: know position where you are going to be re elected
Speaker 1: or not re elected, making that call as a tough one, right,
Speaker 1: you're going to take people off. And that was the
Speaker 1: tech Stuff classic episode, the Internet kill Switch. I gotta
Speaker 1: get Ben back on this show. Occasionally he has me
Speaker 1: on Ridiculous History. If you don't know, I play his
Speaker 1: arch nemesis, the Quizster on that show once in a while,
Speaker 1: and um, you know, it's good to have your arch
Speaker 1: nemesis pop on your own show once in a while.
Speaker 1: Keeps you on your toes. So I should probably get
Speaker 1: him back here at some point. If you have suggestions
Speaker 1: for topics I should cover in future episodes of tech Stuff,
Speaker 1: please reach out to me on Twitter. The handle for
Speaker 1: the show is tech Stuff H s W. I'll talk
Speaker 1: to you again really soon. Text Stuff is an I
Speaker 1: Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from I Heart Radio,
Speaker 1: visit the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever
Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows,