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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio

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Speaker 1: and howda tech Are Yet It's time for a tech

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Speaker 1: Stuff classic episode. This episode originally published on May two

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Speaker 1: thousand fifteen. It is called the Internet kill Switch, and

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Speaker 1: I have a special guest, co host Ben Bolan. Hope

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Speaker 1: you enjoy. Hey, can remember to turn off the Internet

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Speaker 1: before you go out tonight, right, like before you leave

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Speaker 1: the room, turn off the Internet. That's it's not like that.

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Speaker 1: It's not I T crowd where you've got a little box, right,

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Speaker 1: this jen is the Internet. It's not that it's not

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Speaker 1: that good. But I thank you for your your kindness. Um. So,

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Speaker 1: the so the kill switch is, in general, it's a

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Speaker 1: concept that a party, most often a government, but not

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Speaker 1: necessarily because we'll talk about an example in the United

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Speaker 1: States that did not involve directly a government agency. But

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Speaker 1: usually it's a government elects to restrict or perhaps completely

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Speaker 1: eliminate access to the Internet in response to something. Right, Yes,

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Speaker 1: So this differs a little bit from filtering. Yeah, because

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Speaker 1: filtering is sort of a passive continual process that uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, if it goes well in most countries but

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Speaker 1: not all, uh, you won't really learn about it, just

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Speaker 1: won't be able to get to a certain website. So

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Speaker 1: a great example of that is China with a great

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Speaker 1: firewall of China, right, and they call it a firewall,

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Speaker 1: but really it's a web filter, and it's the whole

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Speaker 1: idea is that it filters out things that the Chinese

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Speaker 1: government finds objects noble and does not wish the Chinese

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Speaker 1: citizenship to have access to. And uh and in that case,

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Speaker 1: that is an ongoing situation, and we're going to talk

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Speaker 1: a little bit about that, and a little bit about

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Speaker 1: a few others as well as the more, um you know,

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Speaker 1: kind of temporary but all but equally terrifying uses of

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Speaker 1: shutting down Internet access for one reason or another. And

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Speaker 1: generally speaking, the justifications for this fall under various versions

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Speaker 1: of national security, but there are frequently, and I would argue, uh,

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Speaker 1: in most cases, justifiably criticisms of that approach that perhaps

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Speaker 1: there are other motivations at play besides trying to protect security,

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Speaker 1: even if they're not intended. They may be, they may

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Speaker 1: there may be undertones of that absolutely, absolutely because public

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Speaker 1: safety would be another uh sort of umbrella term. And

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Speaker 1: I don't want to be too cynical with this, but

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Speaker 1: I think we can all be honest, ladies and gentlemen

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Speaker 1: when we say that national security has an increasingly vague

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Speaker 1: definition depending upon which state uses the phrase. Yeah, I

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Speaker 1: would argue that almost every state that uses the phrase

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Speaker 1: national security keeps it purposefully vague because you well, I mean,

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Speaker 1: for one thing, it's impossible to anticipate everything, So I

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Speaker 1: can feel some sympathy that in that respect, and the

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Speaker 1: idea that if it's my job to ensure the protection

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Speaker 1: of a nation's people, I don't know how much sleep

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Speaker 1: I'm getting, but but then you know, it is entirely possible,

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Speaker 1: because we've seen it time and again to air too

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Speaker 1: far on the side of uh, you know, of of

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Speaker 1: trying to protect people. And I would also argue that

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Speaker 1: eliminating a massive means of communication does far worse to

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Speaker 1: endanger people than uh than not doing that, like that,

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Speaker 1: that you're not really promoting public safety by cutting off communication. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I really wanted to get your thoughts on this, because

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Speaker 1: you're our tech expert or a texpert. That's way easier

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Speaker 1: to say it just so everyone knows. Our producer hopefully

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Speaker 1: cut out the four times I tried to say tech expert, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: we're not gonna if I had bloopers on this show,

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Speaker 1: that those would go at the end of this episode.

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Speaker 1: But I don't do that, all right, So the reason

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Speaker 1: that I want to hear about this is because it

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Speaker 1: sounds like almost this villainous James Bond type of thing.

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Speaker 1: You know, I'm going to shut down the Internet unless

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Speaker 1: you give me one billion dollars. But but you raised

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Speaker 1: a fantastic point um, which is that this has not

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Speaker 1: only been an idea that's that's a little older than

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Speaker 1: a lot of people might think. Sure, but it's by

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Speaker 1: no means and uncom thing. It's their precedents for this, right. Oh,

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Speaker 1: there's so many. So we're gonna start with nations other

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Speaker 1: than our own. But don't worry, we will get to

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Speaker 1: the United States because that, you know, I think in particular,

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Speaker 1: you're talking about a country that prides itself on certain

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Speaker 1: principles and it's very difficult to uh to to take

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Speaker 1: this idea and have it mesh with those principles. Right. So,

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Speaker 1: but before we get to that, let's talk about some

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Speaker 1: other countries where at least from the perspective of of

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Speaker 1: our position, we would say it's pretty cut and dry

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Speaker 1: that this is a draconian approach. So again, this is

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Speaker 1: from the perspective of two Americans. So we're sitting we're

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Speaker 1: sitting in a pretty big seat of privilege here. But

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Speaker 1: North Korea is the first example I was going to

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Speaker 1: point out, and North Korea that is, if you want

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Speaker 1: to talk about a nation that is very much concerned

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Speaker 1: with the control of access to the Internet, it's hard

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Speaker 1: to find a better representative than North Korea because, first

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Speaker 1: of all, uh, let me, let me go through what

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Speaker 1: you have to be able to do in order to

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Speaker 1: have access to the Internet in North Korea. Alright, alright,

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Speaker 1: walk me through it. Okay, So yours is in the

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Speaker 1: North Korea and you're hoping at one point to connect

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Speaker 1: to the Internet. Well, first, you have to obtain a

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Speaker 1: license to own a personal computer. It's like having a

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Speaker 1: license to own a weapon. You have to You can't

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Speaker 1: you can't go out and buy a computer on your own.

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Speaker 1: You have to get permission to own a computer first. Secondly,

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Speaker 1: you have to be lucky enough to be able to

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Speaker 1: buy one. Because the only state sanctioned source for computers

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Speaker 1: is a company called Morning Panda, which is owned by

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Speaker 1: the government. Um. If however, there's a caveat here, if

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Speaker 1: you're somehow fortunate enough to be one of the elite

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Speaker 1: in North Korea, you can skirt around this and you

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Speaker 1: could actually buy an unsanctioned computer, like an like an

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Speaker 1: Apple computer, like a top of the line computer that

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Speaker 1: has essentially smuggled in for you. So these are the

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Speaker 1: rules for the average joke This is these are the

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Speaker 1: rules for fort of the population of North Korea. So

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Speaker 1: if you're in that point zero zero one, then you're you.

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Speaker 1: You can ignore these other rules. Uh. But third is

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Speaker 1: that you would need to connect to that to a network, uh,

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Speaker 1: which is not the Internet. It's called the intra neet

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Speaker 1: or it's their internet called Kwangmyong which means bright Star.

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Speaker 1: So that's an intranet. It's internally based in North Korea

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Speaker 1: without connection to the outside Internet. But it looks kind

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Speaker 1: of like the Internet, particularly the Internet of the late nineties. UM.

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Speaker 1: It's running on Microsoft software that had been pirated from

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Speaker 1: Japanese sources. So it's it's all like the servers are

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Speaker 1: all internal servers, not connecting outside um. But in order

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Speaker 1: to do that, you need to be probably either in

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Speaker 1: a major city or in a university. Those are the

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Speaker 1: only places to have Internet connectivity. And if you aren't

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Speaker 1: in either of those two places, you're probably out of luck,

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Speaker 1: because internal travel in North Korea is not permitted without

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Speaker 1: a special dispensation. Yeah, so in other words, if you're

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Speaker 1: not there already, you may be stuck. All right, So

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Speaker 1: we've got all that taken care of. Now, let's say

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Speaker 1: that you are one of the elite, and you you

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Speaker 1: you merit certain consideration because of whatever whatever your position

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Speaker 1: happens to me, maybe you're maybe you're like ahead of

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Speaker 1: a propaganda or something along those lines. If you are

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Speaker 1: one of those very few people, you can access the

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Speaker 1: actual Internet with two other caveats. Well, first, first of all,

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Speaker 1: here's how few there are, right, So there's twenty five

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Speaker 1: million people living in North Korea. North Korea has one thousand,

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Speaker 1: twenty four I P addresses. In the United States, where

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Speaker 1: we have more than three million people, we have more

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Speaker 1: than a billion IP addresses. So that tells you that

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Speaker 1: we're talking about a tiny number of people. And the

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Speaker 1: the line leading into North Korea comes from China. So

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Speaker 1: your feed of the Internet is also behind the firewall. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so you are one of the few people who can

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Speaker 1: access it. You're accessing it through a line that has

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Speaker 1: passed through China. You might there may be a couple

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Speaker 1: of satellite sources of of access which would not be

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Speaker 1: limited to the Chinese firewall. But uh yeah, and from

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Speaker 1: what I've heard, or at least from what people have

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Speaker 1: been able to suss out, the access is super slow. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I've heard that too. Um, we're talking about the dial

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Speaker 1: up sound effect. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, there have been

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Speaker 1: like cyber cafes, some of them are still using dial

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Speaker 1: up modems. So it's not it's not a cable or

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Speaker 1: or fiber optics system or anything like that. So that

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Speaker 1: that's an extreme example. And of course, obviously if the

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Speaker 1: North Korean government had decided that this is not a um,

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Speaker 1: not something they want anyone to have access to, it

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Speaker 1: would be relatively easy to shut it down because there's

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Speaker 1: just that one entry. Yeah, other than I guess mobile

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Speaker 1: phones that are smuggled in maybe yeah, but even then

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Speaker 1: you could as uh you know, as a government shut

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Speaker 1: down the cellular systems. So in that case, it's kind

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Speaker 1: of a scorched earth policy. But you can do it

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Speaker 1: so anyway. That's that's probably the most extreme case, apart

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Speaker 1: from maybe countries that are so they're in such a

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Speaker 1: developing stage as far as the internet is concerned, that

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Speaker 1: they haven't laid out an infrastructure fully yet. Those cases

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Speaker 1: it may be a little different. I'm looking mostly at

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Speaker 1: at countries that have had the opportunity to role out

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Speaker 1: in Yeah, so that that's an extreme example, but it

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Speaker 1: also shows how easily that could happen in that in

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Speaker 1: that state, in the DPRK or North Korea, just to

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Speaker 1: cut off that just that one point. Uh yeah. Now,

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Speaker 1: whereas China is another great example that we've already talked

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Speaker 1: about the firewall. So the Internet in China is is

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Speaker 1: largely censored. Um, there are ways for citizens who are

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Speaker 1: savvy to get around that, although it's not a safe

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Speaker 1: thing to do necessarily something yeah, and you can um

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Speaker 1: yeah and lots of proxies, Yeah you can. You can

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Speaker 1: potentially get around some of that, although the danger of

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Speaker 1: doing so is not is not insignificant. We'll be back

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Speaker 1: with more of this classic episode of tech stuff after

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Speaker 1: this quick break. China has also been known to use regionalized,

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Speaker 1: localized kill switches in provinces where there is unrest. So,

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Speaker 1: in other words, shutting down the the infrastructure that allows

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Speaker 1: for communication across the Internet, but only in localized areas.

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Speaker 1: We're not talking like a countrywide blackout, So this would

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Speaker 1: be like maybe unrest and Tibet leads to US shut down. Yes,

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Speaker 1: those are good examples. Yeah, exactly. It's the sort of

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Speaker 1: thing where if the government wants to impede the ability

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Speaker 1: of any protesters or voices of opposition, they can shut

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Speaker 1: down the communication lines, uh and then uh kind of

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Speaker 1: kind of squash that that way, or at least at

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Speaker 1: least decrease their impact. There are other examples. I mean

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Speaker 1: in Egypt in two thousand eleven, there was a pretty

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Speaker 1: infamous result of of the the president or the outgoing

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Speaker 1: president of Egypt shutting down the various services or sharing

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Speaker 1: on access to various services as a means of trying

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Speaker 1: to to squash protests in opposition. Syria two thousand twelve.

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Speaker 1: Now this one's interesting. You know, I don't know much

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Speaker 1: about this one, all right, So this one's right up

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Speaker 1: your alley, Ben, This is the stuff they don't want

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Speaker 1: you to know. Episode So Syria two thousand twelve. Syria

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Speaker 1: is in the middle of a civil war. Internet access

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Speaker 1: in Syria blacks out. It's knocked offline, so like it's

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Speaker 1: like the entire country just suddenly disappears from online. It's

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Speaker 1: goes black. Both sides accused the other side of sabotaging

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Speaker 1: the system so that no one could use the Internet. However,

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Speaker 1: according to one Mr Snowdon, neither side was responsible, and

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Speaker 1: in fact it was the n s A which was

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Speaker 1: attempting to infiltrate Syrian web servers to insert malware for

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Speaker 1: surveillance purposes and accidentally knocked their servers offline. And then

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Speaker 1: we're given just enough authority to hide their tracks rather

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Speaker 1: than actually help Syria get back online. Wow, so that's

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Speaker 1: a that's even more that's the states are so much higher.

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Speaker 1: I'm sorry I'm stuttering, but this is mind boggling to me.

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Speaker 1: This is a state shutting down another countries internet, not

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Speaker 1: not on purpose, but that's kind of not important. Really,

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Speaker 1: that's kind of the scariest part. Yeah, it's actually really

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Speaker 1: like because then you start thinking, like, not only do

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Speaker 1: you have amazing power, but you're operating on a three

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Speaker 1: Stooges level. You know, your job is to install this

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Speaker 1: one thing, and you've you've not You've burned the building

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Speaker 1: down around you, right, and like there's one wall standing

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Speaker 1: and it's got the thing you're supposed to install on it,

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Speaker 1: but the rest of the building is gone. The last

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Speaker 1: thing standing is the door, and the new door knob

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Speaker 1: right exactly. That's it. And uh, you know, this is

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Speaker 1: obviously not the same sort of thing as the kill

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Speaker 1: switches we're talking about in other cases, because again, that

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Speaker 1: was not the intention at the time. And this is

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Speaker 1: again according to Snowden, who gave an interview with Wired

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Speaker 1: and talked about this. So you know, I haven't actually

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Speaker 1: read any documents that directly link an say to this

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Speaker 1: event in Syria, but according to Snowden, that is what happened.

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Speaker 1: So so that is something I should stress. Yeah, So

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Speaker 1: that that's a great example. Another one Russia two thousand fourteen,

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Speaker 1: so very recent. Uh, there was a news story in

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Speaker 1: which it was reported that quote, Russian internet service providers

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Speaker 1: will be required to install equipment that would make it

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Speaker 1: possible to shut off Russia's access to the global Internet

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Speaker 1: in the event of an emergency. And uh, Dmitri Peskov,

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Speaker 1: who was Press secretary to a certain Vladimir Putin said

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Speaker 1: that there was no intention to isolate Russian users from

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Speaker 1: the global Internet. Uh. He playing to the inter Fact

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Speaker 1: news agency that the discussions will focus on the ways

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Speaker 1: to protect it from possible external actions, so essentially means

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Speaker 1: of protecting Russia from cyber attacks. Okay, whether from hacker

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Speaker 1: groups or from bash. There's there's also a possibility here

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Speaker 1: that might be that that might be apropos for this situation,

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Speaker 1: which is uh, financial catastrophes which you're shutting down an

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Speaker 1: Internet connection is a great way to shut down regular trade.

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Speaker 1: I'm sure it's also a criminal act. Yeah, well, and

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Speaker 1: the way I think of it is and this also

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Speaker 1: ties back. I'm sure we'll stress this again at the

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Speaker 1: end of the episode, that's shutting down the Internet. The

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Speaker 1: Internet we depend so heavily on it, not just for communications,

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Speaker 1: but for uh, for for trade, you know, for finances,

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Speaker 1: that doing doing something as drastic as shutting it down

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Speaker 1: would be disastrous. Even if you could argue that it

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Speaker 1: was justifiable, and even if it was for a short

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Speaker 1: amount of time, the consequences of that action would be

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Speaker 1: so tremendous as to probably in hindsight say that was

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Speaker 1: probably that was not the right thing to do. There's

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Speaker 1: a way, yeah, but well we'll talk more about that.

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Speaker 1: So so those are some of the other countries we talk.

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Speaker 1: There's also there's ongoing issues with Burundi um where there

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Speaker 1: have been some discussions about using various means to shut

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Speaker 1: down the ability for people to use Twitter and other

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Speaker 1: social media sites. But there are a lot of different

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Speaker 1: examples that there were examples during the incidents with Russia

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Speaker 1: and the Ukraine. I mean, there's just tons of different

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Speaker 1: examples around the world. And meanwhile, here in the United States,

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Speaker 1: we often think of ourselves, we Americans often think of

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Speaker 1: ourselves as sort of the the paragons of free speech

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Speaker 1: and our country value that's what our country was founded on,

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Speaker 1: one of the principles we were founded on. In that therefore,

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Speaker 1: you know, we have a really good foundation for fair

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Speaker 1: means of communication. Yeah, but the right to a free speech,

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Speaker 1: like I don't agree with you, but I will defend

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Speaker 1: to the death. So it sounds like, you know, we

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Speaker 1: would never mess around with that sort of thing. However, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: we've got a nice long history of actually putting it

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Speaker 1: into policy that we can totally that by we, I

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Speaker 1: mean the president can totally mess with things. I mean

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Speaker 1: this goes all the way back to the age of

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Speaker 1: the telegraph where the president, I think it was like

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Speaker 1: nineteen eighteen, where the president was was given the authority

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Speaker 1: in times of war and other major catastrophes, be able

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Speaker 1: to direct the use of the telegraph systems, so that

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Speaker 1: essentially superseding any other use of them and saying either

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Speaker 1: they need to be dedicated specifically for whatever, or shutdown

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Speaker 1: so that they can't be used for anything else. So yeah,

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Speaker 1: So that's that's a startling thing because we know that

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Speaker 1: this is the Communications Act, right, Well, that would be

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Speaker 1: the ninet that's the next one. The next one is

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Speaker 1: the Communications Act, which goes even further, right, Yeah, which

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Speaker 1: is says, uh, this was by f DR, I believe, right,

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Speaker 1: and this is control over the media. Uh. This this

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Speaker 1: gives like electronic communication in any end all forms. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: And this is one where there was argument for a

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Speaker 1: long time about whether or not the Internet falls under

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Speaker 1: this particular category. It's kind of in a parallel argument

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Speaker 1: to net neutrality. Yes, whether you can qualify the Internet

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Speaker 1: as a utility or another you know, a regulated uh

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Speaker 1: entity kind of like the the telephone industry, that sort

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Speaker 1: of stuff. Um, and it's it's related but not identical

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Speaker 1: to that. Obviously, there there are differences, big differences between

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Speaker 1: the two. But um. Nevertheless, some people say that this

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Speaker 1: Act gives the President the the explicit means to be

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Speaker 1: able to direct any kind of mass communication within the

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Speaker 1: United States for whatever purpose. If we're talking about a

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Speaker 1: time of war or other major event that threatens national security, right,

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Speaker 1: and it's also illegal for anyone to not help. Yes,

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Speaker 1: that's that's one of the that's one of the scary things.

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Speaker 1: And it also it also absolves any communications company of

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Speaker 1: any um legal proceedings to be pursued against it in

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Speaker 1: the wake of this. So, in other words, using modern examples,

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Speaker 1: if if the President of the United States goes to

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Speaker 1: A T and T and says shut it all down,

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Speaker 1: you know, Walter Peck style, and they flip the big

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Speaker 1: switch and all and all the A T and T

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Speaker 1: stuff goes offline, A T and T customers would not

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Speaker 1: be allowed to sue A T and T for that

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Speaker 1: because under this Act, A T and T is not

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Speaker 1: held responsible. They were they were following the rules as

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Speaker 1: laid out by the Act, and Uh, therefore they can't

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Speaker 1: be sued. Now, you might be able to bring some

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Speaker 1: sort of lawsuit against the government and try and have

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Speaker 1: the law changed, but you wouldn't, you know, under this

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Speaker 1: law you they would. They're like, listen, you know it

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Speaker 1: is the law that we were following. And again it's

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Speaker 1: four yeah. So uh. Meanwhile, so even if you, even

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Speaker 1: if you think the Internet is is um not beholden

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Speaker 1: to the same set of rules. Uh. In two thousand

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Speaker 1: and six that all became moot because that's when the

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Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security adopted a policy that is called

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Speaker 1: Standing Operating Procedure through oh three or s o P

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Speaker 1: three oh three. And before we came in here, Ben

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Speaker 1: and I had had a brief little exchange where I said,

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Speaker 1: how terrifying is it to think of this as standard

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Speaker 1: operating procedure? Right? Yes? Yeah? And and furthermore, how terrified

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Speaker 1: is it to wonder about the other three hundreds something? Yeah?

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Speaker 1: And that's assuming there weren't more after three oh three? Right?

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Speaker 1: What else? Like, are we in violation of s OP

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Speaker 1: for nineteen or Something's just a small tangent. This reminds

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Speaker 1: me of when I was in London with my wife

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Speaker 1: and we saw a sign that said no busting in

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Speaker 1: the London underground, which will come back to in just

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Speaker 1: a second, but in the London underground. And I turned

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Speaker 1: to my wife and said, what is it? And she said,

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Speaker 1: I don't know. Are we doing it? Like I sure

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Speaker 1: hope not, because there's because it's apparently against the law

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Speaker 1: and we could get fined. So and obviously, I mean

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Speaker 1: for those who don't know, busking is is public performance

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Speaker 1: of various types of asking for money in return for

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Speaker 1: public performance. But at the time we had no idea.

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Speaker 1: So it's like that sort of thing, like are we

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Speaker 1: violating something? And and here's the deal. This particular standard

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Speaker 1: operating procedure was adopted pretty much in secrecy, right, Like

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Speaker 1: there's there's no there's no publicly available record of exactly

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Speaker 1: what what what sort of um situation has to be

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Speaker 1: in place in order for the Department of Homeland Security

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Speaker 1: to execute s OP three oh three, right or what

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Speaker 1: s sort of oversight? Yeah, yeah, there's there's no there's

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Speaker 1: no way for us to know because it's not published publicly. Uh,

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Speaker 1: and that that is a real issue of of some concern. Now, Um,

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Speaker 1: one thing I should say, said s OP three oh

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Speaker 1: three is not an Internet kill switch in the same

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Speaker 1: sense as you know, something that you would see in

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Speaker 1: North Korea or or whatever. It's UM, it's meant to

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Speaker 1: be localized, very much so, to the point where the

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Speaker 1: most of the language talks about using it to cut

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Speaker 1: off cellular service, mobile service, and wireless service within specific

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Speaker 1: areas like a tunnel or a bridge or maybe a municipality. Yeah, yeah, maybe.

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Speaker 1: And this, uh, this is strange because we know that

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Speaker 1: something like this has occurred right in San Francisco, right,

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Speaker 1: and before I talk about the San Francisco one, which

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Speaker 1: is extremely problematic. UM. The whole reason why this was

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Speaker 1: adopted in two thousand six stems from some attacks in

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Speaker 1: London that happened in two thousand five. We've got more

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Speaker 1: to say in this classic episode of tech stuff after

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Speaker 1: these quick messages. So in July of two thousand five,

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Speaker 1: there were the London underground bombings. On July seven, about

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Speaker 1: eight fifty in the morning in London time, UH, three

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Speaker 1: bombs in three different locations in the London London underground

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Speaker 1: system UH exploded within a minute of each other, like

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Speaker 1: within fifty seconds, all three had exploded. UH fifty two

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Speaker 1: civilians were well. There was a fourth one that exploded

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Speaker 1: an hour later on a double decker bus. So three

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Speaker 1: were on trains, one was on a double decker bus

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Speaker 1: and happened an hour later. Fifty two people were fifty

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Speaker 1: two civilians were killed. Uh seven people were injured, and

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Speaker 1: the four suicide bombers died as as well. I mean, um,

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Speaker 1: so the United States looked at this, and I also remember,

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Speaker 1: obviously this is also after nine eleven and two thousand one.

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Speaker 1: So the United States looks at this, and they the

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Speaker 1: Department of Homeland Security started looking into the possibility of

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Speaker 1: creating a system to shut down mobile and wireless service

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Speaker 1: in in the case that perhaps there was good reason

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Speaker 1: to suspect a coordinated terrorist attack on a system or

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Speaker 1: a municipality, the idea being that the bombers were using

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Speaker 1: cell phones to activate the bombs, to to detonate the bombs. Possible,

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Speaker 1: It is possible. I could not find anything official in

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Speaker 1: the investigation of the London attacks that definitively found that

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Speaker 1: the attackers use their mobile phones. It's just as possible,

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Speaker 1: or at least it is possible, maybe not just as possible.

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Speaker 1: It is possible that they all had their cell phones

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Speaker 1: on an alarm system to alert them of when they

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Speaker 1: needed to detonate, and then they used some of their

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Speaker 1: system because you know, if they're all using cell phones,

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Speaker 1: it's all it's all keyed into the satellites anyway, or

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Speaker 1: the cell the cell towers rather the cell tower service,

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Speaker 1: so um, you know, it's their time. Their clocks would

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Speaker 1: have all been synchronized already, so that's a possibility to

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Speaker 1: But assuming that they did use their mobile phones, then

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Speaker 1: the United States Department of Homeland Security was saying, well,

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Speaker 1: how can we create a system where we shut down

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Speaker 1: the ability for anyone to send a signal through these

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Speaker 1: wireless or mobile services, and that way we can prevent

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Speaker 1: any kind of attack of this nature from being carried

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Speaker 1: out the way it was intended. So that's kind of

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Speaker 1: the justification, or at least that's the justification that has

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Speaker 1: been alluded to by various parties involved. Now, yeah, you know,

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00:27:47,920 --> 00:27:50,399
Speaker 1: you were alluding to something that happened in San Francisco,

429
00:27:51,920 --> 00:27:57,600
Speaker 1: So that's uh, that was around two thousand and eleven. Uh.

430
00:27:58,119 --> 00:28:03,880
Speaker 1: In two thousand eleven, a group named EPIC. You might

431
00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:08,600
Speaker 1: recognize that the Electronic Privacy Information Center began pursuing this

432
00:28:09,000 --> 00:28:13,080
Speaker 1: DHS well, for the sake of coolness, I'll call it

433
00:28:13,119 --> 00:28:14,879
Speaker 1: a kill switch. But I think you did an excellent

434
00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:18,720
Speaker 1: job showing how it is a little different. Because government

435
00:28:18,720 --> 00:28:22,920
Speaker 1: officials in San Francisco disabled the cell phone system during

436
00:28:22,920 --> 00:28:26,520
Speaker 1: a protest. Yeah, it's a protest that happened on the

437
00:28:26,560 --> 00:28:31,159
Speaker 1: Bay Area Rapid Transitor BART in San Francisco. And what

438
00:28:31,200 --> 00:28:34,760
Speaker 1: had happened was UM there there were protests that were

439
00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:38,520
Speaker 1: related to an incident in which a BART officer, so

440
00:28:38,640 --> 00:28:43,880
Speaker 1: a law enforcement officer working with BART or BART UM

441
00:28:44,120 --> 00:28:48,560
Speaker 1: had shot and killed a homeless man. And so there

442
00:28:48,600 --> 00:28:54,360
Speaker 1: the the BART operators essentially shut down cell service and

443
00:28:54,600 --> 00:28:57,400
Speaker 1: certain areas of the BART system. So think of like

444
00:28:57,920 --> 00:29:01,480
Speaker 1: cell tower repeaters that are in various areas, they shut

445
00:29:01,480 --> 00:29:04,600
Speaker 1: those down, they turned them off, killing cell service in

446
00:29:04,640 --> 00:29:08,880
Speaker 1: those areas. Uh. And the essentially they were doing so

447
00:29:08,960 --> 00:29:14,800
Speaker 1: to prevent the organization of spontaneous protests on the BART system.

448
00:29:15,680 --> 00:29:20,680
Speaker 1: And they justified their decision by saying that they were

449
00:29:20,800 --> 00:29:26,120
Speaker 1: afraid that any kind of organized, organized protest would uh

450
00:29:26,320 --> 00:29:29,080
Speaker 1: bring the safety of other people into question, that it

451
00:29:29,120 --> 00:29:31,920
Speaker 1: would be too dangerous. Overcrowding was one of the things

452
00:29:31,920 --> 00:29:36,040
Speaker 1: that listed in their official response statement, right, and they

453
00:29:36,200 --> 00:29:39,280
Speaker 1: and also you'll see some differences in the language they're

454
00:29:39,360 --> 00:29:44,080
Speaker 1: choosing because EPIC and the protesters themselves, so this was

455
00:29:44,120 --> 00:29:46,840
Speaker 1: a this was going to be a peaceful protest, whereas

456
00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:51,240
Speaker 1: Bart says, this was going to be a disruptive activity,

457
00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:56,120
Speaker 1: right that it leads to unsafe conditions. So so essentially

458
00:29:56,120 --> 00:29:59,280
Speaker 1: you could say, well, what happened, and Bart pretty much

459
00:29:59,360 --> 00:30:03,959
Speaker 1: disabled continue doing what it's doing for the time being. Anyway, Uh,

460
00:30:04,520 --> 00:30:07,520
Speaker 1: there's nothing that came out of that as far as

461
00:30:07,640 --> 00:30:09,840
Speaker 1: you know, a like a slap on the wrist or anything.

462
00:30:09,880 --> 00:30:13,040
Speaker 1: It was. It was essentially considered justified. And uh, and

463
00:30:13,120 --> 00:30:18,800
Speaker 1: it's particularly worrisome because it was in response to a protest,

464
00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:22,920
Speaker 1: not some sort of terrorist attack, the actual citizens of

465
00:30:22,960 --> 00:30:27,400
Speaker 1: the United States protesting something. And again, the First Amendment

466
00:30:27,440 --> 00:30:30,680
Speaker 1: gives us rights of free speech and assembly and and

467
00:30:30,680 --> 00:30:33,920
Speaker 1: and you could argue that this is a violation of

468
00:30:33,960 --> 00:30:38,160
Speaker 1: those rights. Um. And so this was definitely one of

469
00:30:38,200 --> 00:30:40,120
Speaker 1: those things that has been continuing to play out, and

470
00:30:40,160 --> 00:30:45,920
Speaker 1: that really gave EPIC the the the need to go

471
00:30:46,040 --> 00:30:49,320
Speaker 1: after Department of Homeland Security to say, all right, listen,

472
00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:54,080
Speaker 1: we need to know what are what are the guidelines

473
00:30:54,360 --> 00:30:57,880
Speaker 1: for s Op three oh three, What in what case

474
00:30:58,480 --> 00:31:03,840
Speaker 1: is it legal for the United States government to shut

475
00:31:03,880 --> 00:31:08,080
Speaker 1: off wireless or cellular service within an area? What? We

476
00:31:08,080 --> 00:31:10,840
Speaker 1: don't even know what the guidelines are, right, because we

477
00:31:11,320 --> 00:31:13,680
Speaker 1: the people as corney as is to say, it's true,

478
00:31:14,040 --> 00:31:17,160
Speaker 1: the citizenry of the US, as well as people visiting,

479
00:31:17,200 --> 00:31:20,000
Speaker 1: because of course it affects them to never had the

480
00:31:20,120 --> 00:31:23,800
Speaker 1: chance to find out what this was, what what this

481
00:31:23,880 --> 00:31:26,880
Speaker 1: actually happening. I think a lot of people here in

482
00:31:26,920 --> 00:31:30,360
Speaker 1: this country did not know that it could even be

483
00:31:30,480 --> 00:31:33,560
Speaker 1: a thing. Yeah, I mean, there was no public debate,

484
00:31:33,600 --> 00:31:37,160
Speaker 1: There was no public revelation of this. It was essentially

485
00:31:37,200 --> 00:31:41,200
Speaker 1: one of those behind closed doors deals, uh, which sounds

486
00:31:41,520 --> 00:31:44,480
Speaker 1: it's probably gonna sound pretty familiar to folks because we've

487
00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:46,720
Speaker 1: talked a lot, You and I particularly have talked a

488
00:31:46,760 --> 00:31:49,960
Speaker 1: lot about, uh, a lot of a lot of things

489
00:31:49,960 --> 00:31:52,480
Speaker 1: that are done in the name of national security that

490
00:31:53,800 --> 00:31:58,160
Speaker 1: get very much obvious skated, and the people who are

491
00:31:58,280 --> 00:32:03,160
Speaker 1: behind the policies argue that the obfuscation is necessary to

492
00:32:03,240 --> 00:32:08,320
Speaker 1: preserve the national security. And meanwhile, people who find it

493
00:32:08,400 --> 00:32:12,760
Speaker 1: to be an infringement upon liberties are saying, so you're

494
00:32:12,800 --> 00:32:16,320
Speaker 1: telling me you can't even tell me what the what

495
00:32:16,360 --> 00:32:21,240
Speaker 1: the parameters are, because that in itself is somehow endangering people.

496
00:32:21,280 --> 00:32:24,320
Speaker 1: How can knowing when you are allowed to do this

497
00:32:24,480 --> 00:32:27,640
Speaker 1: be a danger to anyone? And in fact, that's the

498
00:32:27,760 --> 00:32:30,760
Speaker 1: that's the key to the current argument. Right. So EPIC

499
00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:35,280
Speaker 1: essentially sues the Department of Homeland Security. First, there's a

500
00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:39,120
Speaker 1: Freedom of Information Act request, which Department of Homeland Security

501
00:32:39,240 --> 00:32:41,560
Speaker 1: is no, I'm not gonna We're not gonna tell you

502
00:32:41,760 --> 00:32:43,600
Speaker 1: what or we're going to tell you so little that

503
00:32:43,640 --> 00:32:47,160
Speaker 1: it means nothing anyway. Yeah, And so there was a

504
00:32:47,200 --> 00:32:51,920
Speaker 1: series of lawsuits, or our court cases rather, and in

505
00:32:52,000 --> 00:32:57,880
Speaker 1: one the courts found in favor of EPIC, and they said, excellent, DHS,

506
00:32:57,960 --> 00:32:59,920
Speaker 1: you've gotta tell us, you gotta tell us by this

507
00:33:00,080 --> 00:33:03,080
Speaker 1: date what the guidelines are for you to be able

508
00:33:03,120 --> 00:33:05,960
Speaker 1: to use this. This, by the way, isn't about repealing

509
00:33:06,160 --> 00:33:08,440
Speaker 1: s O p. Three oh three. This is just telling

510
00:33:08,520 --> 00:33:10,920
Speaker 1: us when it is allowed, when the government is allowed

511
00:33:10,960 --> 00:33:15,280
Speaker 1: to use s O P. Three oh three. So, uh,

512
00:33:15,440 --> 00:33:18,440
Speaker 1: DHS appeals, like you said, and the d C. District

513
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:22,160
Speaker 1: Court of Appeals found in favor of the Department of

514
00:33:22,160 --> 00:33:27,080
Speaker 1: Homeland Security. So now there's no longer this mandate that

515
00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:31,080
Speaker 1: the DHS has to give over all the guidelines, although

516
00:33:31,080 --> 00:33:33,000
Speaker 1: there was some time in April where it was going

517
00:33:33,040 --> 00:33:35,680
Speaker 1: to be said, Oh, the DHS is totally gonna talk

518
00:33:35,720 --> 00:33:40,600
Speaker 1: about at least give some information about when s OP

519
00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:44,920
Speaker 1: three oh three can be instituted and what it means,

520
00:33:45,240 --> 00:33:48,440
Speaker 1: what are the parameters, Hope springs eternal? Right, Yeah, still

521
00:33:48,440 --> 00:33:50,920
Speaker 1: haven't heard it yet. No, we still haven't. We still

522
00:33:50,960 --> 00:33:55,800
Speaker 1: haven't heard it. And it's it's fascinating because the things

523
00:33:55,880 --> 00:33:58,160
Speaker 1: that we don't know, it's kind of like a monster

524
00:33:58,320 --> 00:34:01,240
Speaker 1: in a Hitchcock film. The things that we don't know, uh,

525
00:34:01,440 --> 00:34:05,200
Speaker 1: may well be far more monstrous than what's actually going on.

526
00:34:05,800 --> 00:34:09,040
Speaker 1: You and I have talked a lot about how unnecessary

527
00:34:09,120 --> 00:34:14,960
Speaker 1: secrecy or obstucation breeds speculation and really crazy stuff. Yeah,

528
00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:20,799
Speaker 1: and it's and it ends up breeding distrust in in authority,

529
00:34:21,080 --> 00:34:24,560
Speaker 1: and that is not good either. So there comes a

530
00:34:24,600 --> 00:34:27,000
Speaker 1: point where you have to really weigh this and say,

531
00:34:27,040 --> 00:34:31,160
Speaker 1: all right, is it really I mean because because the

532
00:34:31,239 --> 00:34:33,800
Speaker 1: argument that the Department of Homeland Security has been making

533
00:34:33,920 --> 00:34:38,840
Speaker 1: is that the revelation of this information could potentially put

534
00:34:38,880 --> 00:34:45,160
Speaker 1: a human life at risk in danger, and the EPICS

535
00:34:45,200 --> 00:34:48,560
Speaker 1: response was how and the Department Homeland Security that saying

536
00:34:48,600 --> 00:34:51,400
Speaker 1: that would put a person's life in danger. So you're

537
00:34:51,400 --> 00:34:53,279
Speaker 1: saying so you're essentially saying you've got to get out

538
00:34:53,280 --> 00:34:56,040
Speaker 1: of jail free card here that if you play this

539
00:34:56,440 --> 00:35:00,640
Speaker 1: trumps everything else. That if you say that it could

540
00:35:00,680 --> 00:35:05,960
Speaker 1: potentially put some hypothetical person's life and danger, then you

541
00:35:06,080 --> 00:35:09,960
Speaker 1: have a way of getting out of any request for justification,

542
00:35:10,719 --> 00:35:16,440
Speaker 1: and that breeds even more contempt, right So it and

543
00:35:16,520 --> 00:35:19,040
Speaker 1: it could very well be that if there were some

544
00:35:19,840 --> 00:35:24,040
Speaker 1: disclosure of this information, we would say, I now understand

545
00:35:24,080 --> 00:35:26,319
Speaker 1: your justifications. Whether I agree with it or not as

546
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:29,239
Speaker 1: another matter, but I understand them, and I understand how

547
00:35:29,360 --> 00:35:32,160
Speaker 1: you could argue that it would potentially put someone's life

548
00:35:32,160 --> 00:35:35,440
Speaker 1: in danger. But seems kind of I mean, without knowing.

549
00:35:35,600 --> 00:35:38,120
Speaker 1: It's impossible to say for sure, but it seems to me,

550
00:35:38,800 --> 00:35:43,240
Speaker 1: based upon my limited perspective, that's very difficult to justify.

551
00:35:43,440 --> 00:35:46,440
Speaker 1: I can't tell you when we can put this into

552
00:35:46,719 --> 00:35:50,360
Speaker 1: place because that could potentially put someone's life in danger,

553
00:35:51,239 --> 00:35:53,439
Speaker 1: because it's either going to be in place or it's

554
00:35:53,520 --> 00:35:56,160
Speaker 1: not going to be emblazing. This is not a matter

555
00:35:56,360 --> 00:35:59,160
Speaker 1: of degree so much as it is a matter of

556
00:36:00,400 --> 00:36:04,600
Speaker 1: pretty concrete facts. Yeah, Like, like, is you know, what

557
00:36:05,640 --> 00:36:09,440
Speaker 1: are you saying that that potential attacker would look at

558
00:36:09,440 --> 00:36:11,440
Speaker 1: the guidelines and say, all right, guys, as long as

559
00:36:11,440 --> 00:36:15,839
Speaker 1: we stay just within this, you can't shut down the communications.

560
00:36:15,960 --> 00:36:19,640
Speaker 1: Is that the argument? Which is weird? Right, because like, well,

561
00:36:19,760 --> 00:36:24,920
Speaker 1: so you can't even explain what the because I'm sure

562
00:36:25,080 --> 00:36:30,240
Speaker 1: it's vaguely worded everything is. So it can't be something

563
00:36:30,320 --> 00:36:36,240
Speaker 1: so specific that you know, a determined person could calculating

564
00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:39,400
Speaker 1: lee approach this in such a way where they almost

565
00:36:39,440 --> 00:36:42,000
Speaker 1: but don't quite trigger s Op three or three. Guys,

566
00:36:42,040 --> 00:36:47,799
Speaker 1: as long as we're there before seven thirty two, right, yeah,

567
00:36:47,840 --> 00:36:52,320
Speaker 1: because after that the switches all come on so really quickly.

568
00:36:52,360 --> 00:36:54,680
Speaker 1: To talk about the whole kill switch idea, like we said,

569
00:36:54,719 --> 00:36:57,520
Speaker 1: it's not a physical switch, right, This is a policy

570
00:36:57,600 --> 00:37:00,560
Speaker 1: that the government has and they went to the telecom

571
00:37:00,600 --> 00:37:05,520
Speaker 1: companies and said, this is what our policy is. In

572
00:37:05,560 --> 00:37:08,719
Speaker 1: the case of enacting s Op three oh three, we

573
00:37:08,800 --> 00:37:12,560
Speaker 1: are going to ask you, the telecom companies, to shut

574
00:37:12,640 --> 00:37:16,200
Speaker 1: down your service. And the telecom companies have agreed to

575
00:37:16,239 --> 00:37:19,359
Speaker 1: do this. So, in other words, again not not a

576
00:37:19,400 --> 00:37:22,200
Speaker 1: button that the government pushes, but if the government puts

577
00:37:22,239 --> 00:37:26,280
Speaker 1: the call out to a specific municipality, let's say Dallas, Texas,

578
00:37:26,800 --> 00:37:30,520
Speaker 1: and they say to all the different carriers WI wireless

579
00:37:30,600 --> 00:37:36,200
Speaker 1: and cellular carriers, shut off your service for this duration. Then,

580
00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:39,239
Speaker 1: assuming that they've all agreed to do so, they'll all

581
00:37:39,360 --> 00:37:42,560
Speaker 1: do that individually. Now this is where it gets complicated

582
00:37:42,600 --> 00:37:46,279
Speaker 1: because for for cellular service, it's not too hard because

583
00:37:46,280 --> 00:37:48,560
Speaker 1: there's so many limited players. There's just a limited number

584
00:37:48,560 --> 00:37:52,760
Speaker 1: of players, right, So with a limited number of players,

585
00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:57,120
Speaker 1: the government doesn't have to make a thousand phone calls

586
00:37:57,200 --> 00:37:59,879
Speaker 1: to get this happen. When you get into to rest

587
00:38:00,040 --> 00:38:03,920
Speaker 1: real internet service providers, it gets a lot more complicated.

588
00:38:03,920 --> 00:38:06,680
Speaker 1: Even though most of us have access to you know,

589
00:38:06,719 --> 00:38:10,120
Speaker 1: a couple of major ones, Um, there are smaller ones,

590
00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:13,560
Speaker 1: smaller one and there there, and some of them are

591
00:38:13,719 --> 00:38:17,120
Speaker 1: cooperatives too. Yeah. So uh yeah, I could see that

592
00:38:17,200 --> 00:38:19,280
Speaker 1: you have to all of a sudden, those thousand calls

593
00:38:19,320 --> 00:38:22,479
Speaker 1: you talked about earlier are are coming into play. Yeah,

594
00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:24,719
Speaker 1: and from why I understand s Op three O three

595
00:38:24,760 --> 00:38:27,440
Speaker 1: does not cover landlines. So if you have a landline,

596
00:38:27,640 --> 00:38:30,279
Speaker 1: that's not going to get shut off. Uh, and it

597
00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:34,720
Speaker 1: probably would have some difficulties shutting down any kind of

598
00:38:34,719 --> 00:38:40,200
Speaker 1: of internet service that was not wireless or cellular. Although

599
00:38:40,200 --> 00:38:42,440
Speaker 1: I imagine that you know, some of the big players

600
00:38:42,440 --> 00:38:46,040
Speaker 1: may already have agreements, like you know, I can't even

601
00:38:46,080 --> 00:38:48,640
Speaker 1: I won't name them. But let's say that a major

602
00:38:48,719 --> 00:38:53,200
Speaker 1: internet service provider has that that could effectively silence at

603
00:38:53,239 --> 00:38:55,799
Speaker 1: least a large enough percentage of the population to get

604
00:38:55,840 --> 00:38:59,840
Speaker 1: through whatever the problem happened, the perceived problem happens to

605
00:38:59,840 --> 00:39:02,600
Speaker 1: be right. Yeah, and and again like another thing that

606
00:39:02,760 --> 00:39:06,759
Speaker 1: kill switch is not is a permanent kill switch. This

607
00:39:06,960 --> 00:39:10,279
Speaker 1: is just for a little this at least in the US. Um,

608
00:39:10,600 --> 00:39:12,560
Speaker 1: you said you had a great way of seeing it

609
00:39:12,560 --> 00:39:15,799
Speaker 1: when we were off there earlier. Um, you said, it's

610
00:39:15,840 --> 00:39:19,000
Speaker 1: not a literal switch. It is a policy. Yeah, and

611
00:39:19,040 --> 00:39:23,680
Speaker 1: it's and it's a policy that is meant to to

612
00:39:23,800 --> 00:39:27,040
Speaker 1: endure as long as that state of emergency does whatever

613
00:39:27,160 --> 00:39:29,480
Speaker 1: what however that is defined, which again we don't know

614
00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:31,520
Speaker 1: because we haven't been able to read s Op three

615
00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:36,480
Speaker 1: oh three. But um, you know it's it's it's meant

616
00:39:36,520 --> 00:39:40,520
Speaker 1: to be temporary. The problem is the Bart example is

617
00:39:40,760 --> 00:39:44,240
Speaker 1: very troubling because of it being in response to a protest.

618
00:39:44,280 --> 00:39:46,799
Speaker 1: Even if you can argue convincingly that no, it was

619
00:39:46,840 --> 00:39:50,600
Speaker 1: meant because we didn't want the overcrowding and endangerment of lives.

620
00:39:51,360 --> 00:39:53,960
Speaker 1: The at least, the perception is that you're trying to

621
00:39:54,120 --> 00:40:00,799
Speaker 1: stop people from actually expressing, uh, their their displeasure with authority.

622
00:40:01,440 --> 00:40:04,279
Speaker 1: And that's not what the United States is supposed to

623
00:40:04,360 --> 00:40:08,120
Speaker 1: be about. It's it's in fact antithetical to what are

624
00:40:08,120 --> 00:40:12,560
Speaker 1: our founding principles are supposed to be. And on top

625
00:40:12,640 --> 00:40:15,160
Speaker 1: of that, there's another sort of kill switch I want

626
00:40:15,200 --> 00:40:18,000
Speaker 1: to talk about very briefly. This one is one that's

627
00:40:18,160 --> 00:40:24,160
Speaker 1: installed directly into smartphones. So in California, in two thousand fourteen,

628
00:40:24,160 --> 00:40:28,200
Speaker 1: there was a law that was passed that requires uh

629
00:40:28,440 --> 00:40:32,040
Speaker 1: smartphone uh smartphones being sold in the state to have

630
00:40:32,120 --> 00:40:35,800
Speaker 1: some form of kill switch that would allow the remote

631
00:40:36,040 --> 00:40:41,719
Speaker 1: deactivation and wiping of that phone. Yeah. The thought being

632
00:40:41,760 --> 00:40:47,440
Speaker 1: that this is meant to help prevent, to help disincentivize

633
00:40:47,600 --> 00:40:50,799
Speaker 1: people from stealing smartphones, because the being that if you've

634
00:40:50,800 --> 00:40:53,400
Speaker 1: had your smartphone stolen, you can have it bricked so

635
00:40:53,440 --> 00:40:55,360
Speaker 1: that you don't have to worry about someone getting access

636
00:40:55,400 --> 00:40:58,480
Speaker 1: to your data. They can't use your phone anymore. And

637
00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:01,399
Speaker 1: the idea being that if this is, if this is mandated,

638
00:41:01,560 --> 00:41:04,760
Speaker 1: then stealing a smartphone makes no sense in California anyway,

639
00:41:04,840 --> 00:41:08,279
Speaker 1: because the chances are it's going to be turned into

640
00:41:08,280 --> 00:41:12,759
Speaker 1: a useless piece of plastic in your hands. Um. But

641
00:41:12,920 --> 00:41:18,680
Speaker 1: the fear is that it allows other entities remote access

642
00:41:18,719 --> 00:41:23,920
Speaker 1: to your phone, to turn it off, to wipe the stuff.

643
00:41:24,400 --> 00:41:28,960
Speaker 1: So that what if it were a case of, um,

644
00:41:29,000 --> 00:41:35,279
Speaker 1: you know, citywide riots, and there was the call to

645
00:41:35,400 --> 00:41:38,359
Speaker 1: all right, let's you know, we're not just shutting down

646
00:41:38,400 --> 00:41:41,319
Speaker 1: the system, we're wiping the phones, which sounds like it's

647
00:41:41,440 --> 00:41:48,319
Speaker 1: a truly ridiculous overstepping of bounds. But the point is

648
00:41:48,400 --> 00:41:52,799
Speaker 1: that organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation have said this

649
00:41:53,160 --> 00:41:56,600
Speaker 1: opens the door to that possibility. Anytime you have the

650
00:41:56,600 --> 00:42:00,760
Speaker 1: opportunity for another entity to have some form of access

651
00:42:00,800 --> 00:42:02,719
Speaker 1: to your phone. That's a problem with security, it's a

652
00:42:02,760 --> 00:42:07,239
Speaker 1: problem with privacy. It's a problem with individual liberties. And

653
00:42:07,360 --> 00:42:11,120
Speaker 1: you're you are arguing for the safety of a system

654
00:42:11,160 --> 00:42:14,160
Speaker 1: as opposed to the safety of the person. That's a

655
00:42:14,440 --> 00:42:17,359
Speaker 1: very that's a very good distinction. I'm glad you made it,

656
00:42:17,400 --> 00:42:19,880
Speaker 1: because when we talked about some of this stuff, this

657
00:42:19,960 --> 00:42:23,880
Speaker 1: is just a brief tangent. You remember when, um, do

658
00:42:23,960 --> 00:42:27,080
Speaker 1: you remember when there was the big hubbub about having

659
00:42:27,840 --> 00:42:31,960
Speaker 1: uh having e books from Amazon? How Amazon can control

660
00:42:32,040 --> 00:42:36,120
Speaker 1: them remotely? Yeah, because they they had a particular copy

661
00:42:36,760 --> 00:42:39,719
Speaker 1: I can't remember what well, oh yeah, it was so

662
00:42:39,800 --> 00:42:45,120
Speaker 1: ironic copy of and then they remotely wiped that copy

663
00:42:45,160 --> 00:42:49,600
Speaker 1: from anyone who bought it, which which just sorry, how

664
00:42:49,640 --> 00:42:53,120
Speaker 1: many how many slightly paranoid people just locked themselves in

665
00:42:53,160 --> 00:42:55,920
Speaker 1: their house and started nailing up planks along the door.

666
00:42:56,040 --> 00:42:58,040
Speaker 1: And the only book I can think of that would

667
00:42:58,040 --> 00:43:02,000
Speaker 1: have been equally ironic would have been Fair Night. Yeah,

668
00:43:02,880 --> 00:43:06,720
Speaker 1: be virtually burning the book. So so this, of course,

669
00:43:06,760 --> 00:43:10,120
Speaker 1: this gives us, um, you know, this gives anybody concern,

670
00:43:10,200 --> 00:43:13,279
Speaker 1: and it's not it's not necessarily crazy or paranoid to

671
00:43:13,320 --> 00:43:16,880
Speaker 1: say that if this access occurs, I love that against

672
00:43:16,920 --> 00:43:20,400
Speaker 1: safety of the system over the safety of the individual.

673
00:43:20,520 --> 00:43:23,080
Speaker 1: But I bring the Amazon thing up because I wanted

674
00:43:23,120 --> 00:43:25,760
Speaker 1: to get to a point. You had said it wasn't

675
00:43:25,880 --> 00:43:31,200
Speaker 1: just a state sponsored thing all the time. Yeah, yeah, No,

676
00:43:31,480 --> 00:43:33,920
Speaker 1: it's like, well, I mean, like looking at something like

677
00:43:34,000 --> 00:43:37,920
Speaker 1: bart you know or if you could you know that

678
00:43:37,920 --> 00:43:42,480
Speaker 1: that's a that's the transportation system in San Francisco. That

679
00:43:42,560 --> 00:43:45,000
Speaker 1: wasn't like the state of California. So I see what

680
00:43:45,040 --> 00:43:49,640
Speaker 1: you're saying. Yeah, so that was a problem. But okay, yeah,

681
00:43:49,680 --> 00:43:52,920
Speaker 1: you know that is scary. Yeah, because it's it's and

682
00:43:52,920 --> 00:43:55,000
Speaker 1: and apparently it's fine. We have to be nicer to

683
00:43:55,160 --> 00:43:58,359
Speaker 1: the market drivers. Man. Yeah, I uh, I mean, I'm

684
00:43:58,400 --> 00:44:01,320
Speaker 1: not saying that's why I to work, but I'm not

685
00:44:01,320 --> 00:44:06,200
Speaker 1: not saying no, I'm not I'm being ridiculous. But the

686
00:44:06,560 --> 00:44:10,040
Speaker 1: other thing I wanted to mention is that Ben and

687
00:44:10,080 --> 00:44:13,160
Speaker 1: I are of a very particular opinion obviously about this.

688
00:44:14,360 --> 00:44:16,879
Speaker 1: We are not coming at this from an unbiased point

689
00:44:16,880 --> 00:44:18,600
Speaker 1: of view. But I should also point out that the

690
00:44:18,640 --> 00:44:22,640
Speaker 1: United Nations is on our side of this argument. The UN,

691
00:44:23,280 --> 00:44:26,360
Speaker 1: or at least a group of experts within the United Nations,

692
00:44:26,400 --> 00:44:29,520
Speaker 1: So I shouldn't say the whole organization collectively have said this,

693
00:44:29,680 --> 00:44:33,120
Speaker 1: but uh, experts within the UN have come out to

694
00:44:33,160 --> 00:44:36,480
Speaker 1: say that the use of any sort of communications kill

695
00:44:36,520 --> 00:44:40,760
Speaker 1: switches a violation of human rights, even in a time

696
00:44:40,880 --> 00:44:46,719
Speaker 1: of war or or strife, that it is impermissible under

697
00:44:46,760 --> 00:44:52,839
Speaker 1: international human rights law. Really. Yeah, so that's first off,

698
00:44:52,840 --> 00:44:57,480
Speaker 1: I'm startled that that is not what I was expecting,

699
00:44:57,600 --> 00:45:01,719
Speaker 1: especially that kind of language, any of that language. But

700
00:45:02,520 --> 00:45:06,560
Speaker 1: I you know, Okay, I keep thinking about when we

701
00:45:06,640 --> 00:45:10,640
Speaker 1: did our Area fifty one podcast, right, and we had

702
00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:13,640
Speaker 1: I think one of the best uh we have. We

703
00:45:13,680 --> 00:45:16,480
Speaker 1: have one of the best cases where national security, as

704
00:45:16,560 --> 00:45:19,160
Speaker 1: vague as it may be, as a real and present thing,

705
00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:23,560
Speaker 1: it could have led to It could have maybe led

706
00:45:23,600 --> 00:45:26,080
Speaker 1: to a nuclear war at some point, you know, had

707
00:45:26,160 --> 00:45:28,719
Speaker 1: the secret snupping kept. But this is very this is

708
00:45:28,840 --> 00:45:33,240
Speaker 1: very different. Um. I just I want to be careful

709
00:45:33,360 --> 00:45:37,759
Speaker 1: to acknowledge both sides. Like, is is it possible that

710
00:45:37,800 --> 00:45:43,800
Speaker 1: there would be a situation where shutting off regional cells

711
00:45:43,880 --> 00:45:46,960
Speaker 1: systems or internet access is the best thing to do.

712
00:45:47,160 --> 00:45:49,920
Speaker 1: It's hard to imagine. I can't think of one because

713
00:45:50,080 --> 00:45:54,240
Speaker 1: because the again, the consequences of that are so severe,

714
00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:59,680
Speaker 1: and the immediate consequences involved panic, because now you no

715
00:45:59,719 --> 00:46:03,239
Speaker 1: longer have your We take it for granted that we

716
00:46:03,360 --> 00:46:08,360
Speaker 1: have these phones that allow us an incredible access to

717
00:46:08,440 --> 00:46:12,359
Speaker 1: the Internet and to various forms of communication, even if

718
00:46:12,360 --> 00:46:15,720
Speaker 1: most of us just use it for texting. We still

719
00:46:15,760 --> 00:46:18,759
Speaker 1: we take that for granted. So imagine that that has

720
00:46:18,760 --> 00:46:22,320
Speaker 1: been completely taken away. Imagine that it's during a time

721
00:46:22,640 --> 00:46:26,320
Speaker 1: of of unease for whatever you know. However, that's defined.

722
00:46:26,880 --> 00:46:30,200
Speaker 1: So if you are in the middle of that situation

723
00:46:30,880 --> 00:46:35,400
Speaker 1: and you know, one of your earliest UH impulses is

724
00:46:35,440 --> 00:46:38,680
Speaker 1: probably going to be to touch base with somebody else

725
00:46:39,120 --> 00:46:41,640
Speaker 1: to either find out what's going on or make sure

726
00:46:41,680 --> 00:46:45,160
Speaker 1: they're okay or both right, and then you have no

727
00:46:45,280 --> 00:46:49,480
Speaker 1: means of doing that because the system has been shut down,

728
00:46:49,600 --> 00:46:51,920
Speaker 1: and you don't even know if the system has been

729
00:46:51,920 --> 00:46:55,360
Speaker 1: shut down or if something else has happened to cause

730
00:46:55,400 --> 00:46:58,360
Speaker 1: it to not work. You can't know. There's no way

731
00:46:58,400 --> 00:47:00,200
Speaker 1: to know when you are in the middle of that

732
00:47:00,320 --> 00:47:06,320
Speaker 1: situation that would incite panic. Right, it seems like it

733
00:47:06,360 --> 00:47:09,719
Speaker 1: would make the situation worse. I can't imagine it making

734
00:47:09,760 --> 00:47:13,920
Speaker 1: it better. Stay tuned for the exciting conclusion of this

735
00:47:14,000 --> 00:47:17,160
Speaker 1: tex Stuff classic episode right after we take this break.

736
00:47:25,400 --> 00:47:27,919
Speaker 1: If you're not aware of what is happening, it makes

737
00:47:27,960 --> 00:47:31,040
Speaker 1: it far more terrifying. If you are aware of what's

738
00:47:31,360 --> 00:47:36,680
Speaker 1: what is happening, it's going to very much change your

739
00:47:36,719 --> 00:47:40,960
Speaker 1: perception of authority if it wasn't already one of suspicion,

740
00:47:41,360 --> 00:47:46,200
Speaker 1: because now you're you're thinking your decision to shut this

741
00:47:46,360 --> 00:47:49,160
Speaker 1: down in order to potentially save people. First of all,

742
00:47:49,239 --> 00:47:53,120
Speaker 1: you can't without something horrible happening. You can't say that

743
00:47:53,160 --> 00:47:57,200
Speaker 1: you necessarily saved anyone. Right. This is the worst part

744
00:47:57,200 --> 00:47:59,320
Speaker 1: of the world here. The worst part of the world

745
00:47:59,360 --> 00:48:03,839
Speaker 1: is saying if it works. The reason why. The only

746
00:48:03,840 --> 00:48:05,480
Speaker 1: thing we have to show that it works is that

747
00:48:05,600 --> 00:48:10,520
Speaker 1: nothing awful happened, nothing happened, right, And if nothing awful happened,

748
00:48:10,520 --> 00:48:12,880
Speaker 1: then you have the question of, well, was it necessary

749
00:48:12,960 --> 00:48:17,200
Speaker 1: to do this drastic step to make sure nothing awful

750
00:48:17,239 --> 00:48:21,080
Speaker 1: happen or would nothing awful have happened anyway? Right? Yeah,

751
00:48:21,080 --> 00:48:23,719
Speaker 1: It's very, very difficult to prove that kind of thing.

752
00:48:23,880 --> 00:48:27,080
Speaker 1: And even if we were in some sort of hyper

753
00:48:28,719 --> 00:48:33,560
Speaker 1: hypothetical excuse me, hypothetical nonlinear time space where we could

754
00:48:33,600 --> 00:48:36,920
Speaker 1: see both both effects at once, it sounds like it

755
00:48:37,000 --> 00:48:40,520
Speaker 1: comes down to, um. You know, the only really compelling

756
00:48:40,800 --> 00:48:45,040
Speaker 1: explanation would be the idea of remote detonated bombs, the

757
00:48:45,520 --> 00:48:50,600
Speaker 1: original justification, and then giving that the idea being that

758
00:48:50,640 --> 00:48:55,000
Speaker 1: we're taking the trigger mechanism away, and that is you know,

759
00:48:55,400 --> 00:49:00,239
Speaker 1: it's it's an instantaneous decision, it's an emergency situation. We

760
00:49:00,280 --> 00:49:02,759
Speaker 1: are doing it so that we can save lives in

761
00:49:02,800 --> 00:49:05,520
Speaker 1: that instant It is not meant to be any kind

762
00:49:05,560 --> 00:49:08,439
Speaker 1: of ongoing situation is not meant to be a means

763
00:49:08,480 --> 00:49:12,560
Speaker 1: of silencing people. It's literally meant to save lives. I

764
00:49:12,560 --> 00:49:16,160
Speaker 1: can kind of understand that, but again, I mean why

765
00:49:16,239 --> 00:49:21,200
Speaker 1: can I could certainly understand the motivation, particularly in the

766
00:49:21,239 --> 00:49:26,120
Speaker 1: post nine eleven, post London bombing's world, but I'm not

767
00:49:26,560 --> 00:49:32,600
Speaker 1: entirely certain that that execution would prevent the misuse of

768
00:49:32,640 --> 00:49:36,560
Speaker 1: that system. As the Snowdon leaks have shown us, these

769
00:49:36,600 --> 00:49:40,719
Speaker 1: systems that were put in place, arguably for noble reasons,

770
00:49:41,040 --> 00:49:46,440
Speaker 1: have already been subjugated to incredible misuse. Right, Yeah, and

771
00:49:46,480 --> 00:49:50,200
Speaker 1: even at its best, you're not really removing the trigger.

772
00:49:50,480 --> 00:49:54,480
Speaker 1: You're trading an explosion for a possible riot, yeah, you know,

773
00:49:54,600 --> 00:49:59,239
Speaker 1: which which can have effects that maybe as devastating. And

774
00:49:59,640 --> 00:50:01,840
Speaker 1: really this is all I mean, the Snowden leaks, this

775
00:50:01,960 --> 00:50:05,040
Speaker 1: is all kind of round wound up together. This this

776
00:50:05,120 --> 00:50:09,480
Speaker 1: world we live in that is largely a response to

777
00:50:09,960 --> 00:50:13,640
Speaker 1: a horrible terrorist attack that took place in our past

778
00:50:14,440 --> 00:50:18,640
Speaker 1: and is now defining our present. So it's it's I

779
00:50:18,640 --> 00:50:21,479
Speaker 1: mean again, it's it's the sort of stuff you read

780
00:50:21,480 --> 00:50:25,000
Speaker 1: in those science fiction dystopias where you realize that the

781
00:50:25,040 --> 00:50:28,000
Speaker 1: horrible world that the characters live in probably did not

782
00:50:28,160 --> 00:50:33,880
Speaker 1: spontaneously turn into this totalitarian dystopia. It was something that

783
00:50:34,000 --> 00:50:39,120
Speaker 1: happened by degrees because of well meaning but misled people

784
00:50:39,200 --> 00:50:43,839
Speaker 1: putting in policies in place that ultimately did not do

785
00:50:43,920 --> 00:50:46,359
Speaker 1: what they were intended to do or did more than

786
00:50:46,400 --> 00:50:49,799
Speaker 1: what they were intended to do. So, um, you know,

787
00:50:49,920 --> 00:50:53,360
Speaker 1: I am totally in favor of learning more about s

788
00:50:53,400 --> 00:50:57,960
Speaker 1: Op three oh three and finding out what what actually

789
00:50:58,080 --> 00:51:03,279
Speaker 1: is allowed versus not allowed, and maybe get some more

790
00:51:03,320 --> 00:51:06,560
Speaker 1: information of how this bart use of turning off cell

791
00:51:06,960 --> 00:51:11,799
Speaker 1: systems was truly justified. That to me is still very problematic.

792
00:51:12,800 --> 00:51:15,799
Speaker 1: I mean, having been on Martha during some of the

793
00:51:15,840 --> 00:51:20,120
Speaker 1: worst busiest moments, I can understand a need to try

794
00:51:20,160 --> 00:51:22,560
Speaker 1: and do some crowd control, but I don't think that's

795
00:51:22,560 --> 00:51:26,120
Speaker 1: the right way to do it. Yeah. Yeah. Also, also,

796
00:51:26,239 --> 00:51:28,160
Speaker 1: to be fair, I'd love to hear that stuff too,

797
00:51:28,200 --> 00:51:32,319
Speaker 1: because if we don't, we're speculating, which is fun, but

798
00:51:32,480 --> 00:51:35,640
Speaker 1: it's not. It's not. You know, you're not You're nowhere

799
00:51:35,680 --> 00:51:39,040
Speaker 1: closer necessarily to the truth. You could be going down

800
00:51:39,120 --> 00:51:41,840
Speaker 1: the wrong pathway you're assumed, you could be assuming the

801
00:51:41,880 --> 00:51:45,399
Speaker 1: absolute worst, and it could turn out that you are

802
00:51:45,520 --> 00:51:48,880
Speaker 1: completely off base. But if if you act upon those assumptions,

803
00:51:48,960 --> 00:51:50,880
Speaker 1: it doesn't really matter if you're off base or not.

804
00:51:51,000 --> 00:51:55,280
Speaker 1: You're still doing something that is probably pretty drastic and terrible.

805
00:51:55,400 --> 00:51:59,760
Speaker 1: So if we're speculating, then I think let's go big

806
00:52:00,040 --> 00:52:03,120
Speaker 1: and elder I was going. I was going with the

807
00:52:03,239 --> 00:52:06,719
Speaker 1: n w O. Not not the New World Order as

808
00:52:06,800 --> 00:52:10,000
Speaker 1: in the actual like like kind of like the the

809
00:52:09,520 --> 00:52:13,080
Speaker 1: the supposed New World Order that's controlling the whole world.

810
00:52:13,080 --> 00:52:17,160
Speaker 1: I'm talking about the w c W Wrestling faction, you know,

811
00:52:17,239 --> 00:52:20,840
Speaker 1: Scott Hall, Kevin Nash, and Hull Cogan the n w O.

812
00:52:21,120 --> 00:52:24,840
Speaker 1: Yeahl Hogan, I think, uh little known fact the inventor

813
00:52:24,880 --> 00:52:27,439
Speaker 1: of the SIMSIP. Yeah, yeah, it is a very little

814
00:52:27,520 --> 00:52:30,680
Speaker 1: known fact because because we made it up. Yeah you

815
00:52:30,760 --> 00:52:35,279
Speaker 1: heard it here first. But anyway, so you know, the

816
00:52:35,360 --> 00:52:38,319
Speaker 1: reason why I love to have this discussion and I

817
00:52:38,360 --> 00:52:41,960
Speaker 1: was very very happy to see your suggestion of it, Ben,

818
00:52:42,480 --> 00:52:45,920
Speaker 1: is because I think it does raise some very important

819
00:52:46,000 --> 00:52:50,560
Speaker 1: questions about one our dependence upon technology, and that's our

820
00:52:50,880 --> 00:52:54,080
Speaker 1: you know, become our primary means of communication, to a

821
00:52:54,160 --> 00:52:56,720
Speaker 1: point where sometimes you can make jokes about a couple

822
00:52:56,840 --> 00:52:59,520
Speaker 1: texting each other across from a table from one another,

823
00:53:00,200 --> 00:53:04,279
Speaker 1: you know, uh too. It raises the the question of

824
00:53:05,600 --> 00:53:09,440
Speaker 1: how do you balance security versus liberty, which has been

825
00:53:09,480 --> 00:53:12,400
Speaker 1: a question throughout the history of the world, not just

826
00:53:12,440 --> 00:53:16,520
Speaker 1: the United States. Um, and where's that balance? Some people

827
00:53:16,560 --> 00:53:20,400
Speaker 1: would argue that liberty is the most important, and some

828
00:53:20,400 --> 00:53:22,640
Speaker 1: people would argue, well, you know, you've got to really

829
00:53:22,719 --> 00:53:25,719
Speaker 1: consider security because we're in a much much more complicated

830
00:53:25,719 --> 00:53:29,360
Speaker 1: world now than we were two hundred years ago. That's

831
00:53:29,400 --> 00:53:33,319
Speaker 1: a valid point. And also just that it was good

832
00:53:33,400 --> 00:53:35,520
Speaker 1: to be able to sit down and talk about how

833
00:53:35,520 --> 00:53:39,640
Speaker 1: a kill switch is really an an agreement among multiple

834
00:53:39,760 --> 00:53:43,520
Speaker 1: parties and not not a big red button or a

835
00:53:43,520 --> 00:53:49,719
Speaker 1: physical switch as much fun slash, horror, horrific reality. That

836
00:53:49,760 --> 00:53:52,640
Speaker 1: would be right. I hope it's made by ACME. I

837
00:53:52,680 --> 00:53:55,440
Speaker 1: hope while Coyote has one. I think, you know, like,

838
00:53:55,480 --> 00:53:57,759
Speaker 1: if we were writing an SNL skit at this point,

839
00:53:58,160 --> 00:53:59,960
Speaker 1: we would just we would have the point where President

840
00:54:00,000 --> 00:54:02,480
Speaker 1: Obama had had switched it over to the clapper or

841
00:54:02,520 --> 00:54:05,440
Speaker 1: something like that, like I want to show you that

842
00:54:05,520 --> 00:54:08,160
Speaker 1: I'm gonna turn off all the Internet in Kansas, black clap,

843
00:54:08,200 --> 00:54:11,839
Speaker 1: and that's it. You know, Yeah, that would be uh,

844
00:54:11,880 --> 00:54:15,040
Speaker 1: that would be my SNL skit right there, which which

845
00:54:15,080 --> 00:54:17,160
Speaker 1: like five people would be like that's brilliant and everyone

846
00:54:17,200 --> 00:54:19,040
Speaker 1: else was like wow, I was really waiting until the

847
00:54:19,160 --> 00:54:21,319
Speaker 1: musical guests came on. That's how bad that sketch was.

848
00:54:21,520 --> 00:54:25,279
Speaker 1: So Lord, if you're listening, we have a couple of

849
00:54:25,320 --> 00:54:28,600
Speaker 1: sketches of our sleeve. Yeah. Sure, you're a big fan

850
00:54:28,640 --> 00:54:31,399
Speaker 1: of our shows. And then I realized, you know, I'm

851
00:54:31,440 --> 00:54:34,520
Speaker 1: absolutely certain that the competition to get sketches on the

852
00:54:34,520 --> 00:54:39,759
Speaker 1: air and the SNL writer's room is probably pretty low key, right, Yeah, yeah,

853
00:54:39,840 --> 00:54:43,200
Speaker 1: I think it's I mean just you just have to

854
00:54:43,239 --> 00:54:46,120
Speaker 1: like mail them. Yeah, so, uh so, yeah, call us,

855
00:54:46,520 --> 00:54:49,840
Speaker 1: we're available, We're in the book. Uh anything else you

856
00:54:49,840 --> 00:54:53,080
Speaker 1: wanted to say about about kill Switches SP three oh three?

857
00:54:53,120 --> 00:54:56,440
Speaker 1: I mean I realized that this also, this conversation has

858
00:54:56,480 --> 00:54:58,719
Speaker 1: also been filled with a lot of the triol on

859
00:54:58,800 --> 00:55:02,080
Speaker 1: my part. Well, it's a it is a it is

860
00:55:02,120 --> 00:55:06,080
Speaker 1: a troubling thing, and I really appreciate talking about it

861
00:55:06,120 --> 00:55:10,480
Speaker 1: because again, you are our texpert, and you're the person

862
00:55:10,640 --> 00:55:13,680
Speaker 1: I think who is most likely to have like you have.

863
00:55:13,920 --> 00:55:18,440
Speaker 1: You definitely are opinionated, but you take great pains to

864
00:55:18,680 --> 00:55:23,000
Speaker 1: separate what is what your opinion is uh, from what

865
00:55:23,120 --> 00:55:26,680
Speaker 1: the facts are, right, and I appreciate that I think

866
00:55:26,800 --> 00:55:31,160
Speaker 1: the listeners do to um. But I'm on the same

867
00:55:31,200 --> 00:55:34,680
Speaker 1: page with you here, man, because it is a troubling thing.

868
00:55:34,760 --> 00:55:37,880
Speaker 1: And oh M, full disclosure, ladies and gentlemen, don't forget

869
00:55:37,920 --> 00:55:42,000
Speaker 1: that Jonathan and I both work in an Internet related field,

870
00:55:42,440 --> 00:55:44,960
Speaker 1: so of course we want, we have, we have a

871
00:55:45,040 --> 00:55:48,000
Speaker 1: vested interest in this thing called the Internet still being

872
00:55:48,400 --> 00:55:51,319
Speaker 1: readily available. I mean, if it's not, then we're out

873
00:55:51,320 --> 00:55:53,799
Speaker 1: of a job. But I mean, you know, it's it

874
00:55:53,800 --> 00:55:56,080
Speaker 1: has become such a centralized point in our life that

875
00:55:56,280 --> 00:55:59,920
Speaker 1: it is. It is very difficult to imagine a worthy

876
00:56:00,160 --> 00:56:05,439
Speaker 1: justification of shutting it off, um, apart from the possibility

877
00:56:05,640 --> 00:56:09,480
Speaker 1: of preventing an immediate disaster from happening and having it

878
00:56:10,080 --> 00:56:14,719
Speaker 1: last a relatively short time, however short that might be.

879
00:56:14,760 --> 00:56:17,439
Speaker 1: It might it might be several hours, depending upon what's

880
00:56:17,480 --> 00:56:20,360
Speaker 1: going on and how to stop it. Um. But apart

881
00:56:20,400 --> 00:56:23,000
Speaker 1: from that extraordinary set of circumstances, which again we don't

882
00:56:23,040 --> 00:56:25,879
Speaker 1: know necessarily, is all that s op three oh three

883
00:56:25,960 --> 00:56:29,400
Speaker 1: covers um. Yeah, it's it's hard to it's hard to

884
00:56:29,440 --> 00:56:32,160
Speaker 1: even wrap my mind around when you would make that

885
00:56:32,200 --> 00:56:36,200
Speaker 1: call because again, the consequences are just so devastating. I mean,

886
00:56:37,000 --> 00:56:42,640
Speaker 1: if nothing else, you really invite the the real possibility

887
00:56:42,760 --> 00:56:46,080
Speaker 1: that voters are not going to be happy. So I mean,

888
00:56:46,120 --> 00:56:50,239
Speaker 1: if if you are, if you're serving in some you

889
00:56:50,280 --> 00:56:52,840
Speaker 1: know position where you are going to be re elected

890
00:56:52,960 --> 00:56:57,320
Speaker 1: or not re elected, making that call as a tough one, right,

891
00:56:57,680 --> 00:57:00,640
Speaker 1: you're going to take people off. And that was the

892
00:57:00,719 --> 00:57:04,399
Speaker 1: tech Stuff classic episode, the Internet kill Switch. I gotta

893
00:57:04,440 --> 00:57:07,200
Speaker 1: get Ben back on this show. Occasionally he has me

894
00:57:07,280 --> 00:57:10,360
Speaker 1: on Ridiculous History. If you don't know, I play his

895
00:57:10,480 --> 00:57:13,800
Speaker 1: arch nemesis, the Quizster on that show once in a while,

896
00:57:14,480 --> 00:57:16,320
Speaker 1: and um, you know, it's good to have your arch

897
00:57:16,400 --> 00:57:18,640
Speaker 1: nemesis pop on your own show once in a while.

898
00:57:18,720 --> 00:57:20,400
Speaker 1: Keeps you on your toes. So I should probably get

899
00:57:20,440 --> 00:57:23,440
Speaker 1: him back here at some point. If you have suggestions

900
00:57:23,440 --> 00:57:25,760
Speaker 1: for topics I should cover in future episodes of tech Stuff,

901
00:57:25,760 --> 00:57:28,080
Speaker 1: please reach out to me on Twitter. The handle for

902
00:57:28,120 --> 00:57:31,360
Speaker 1: the show is tech Stuff H s W. I'll talk

903
00:57:31,400 --> 00:57:40,280
Speaker 1: to you again really soon. Text Stuff is an I

904
00:57:40,400 --> 00:57:43,920
Speaker 1: Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from I Heart Radio,

905
00:57:44,240 --> 00:57:47,400
Speaker 1: visit the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever

906
00:57:47,520 --> 00:57:49,000
Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows,