1 00:00:00,080 --> 00:00:02,560 Speaker 1: Hi, This is newt Twenty twenty is going to be 2 00:00:02,600 --> 00:00:05,080 Speaker 1: one of the most extraordinary election years of our lifetime. 3 00:00:05,720 --> 00:00:08,080 Speaker 1: I want to invite you to join my Inner Circle 4 00:00:08,520 --> 00:00:11,520 Speaker 1: as we discuss each twist and turn in the presidential race. 5 00:00:11,880 --> 00:00:16,120 Speaker 1: In my members only Inner Circle Club, you'll receive special 6 00:00:16,160 --> 00:00:21,040 Speaker 1: flash briefings, online events, and members only audio reports from 7 00:00:21,079 --> 00:00:23,680 Speaker 1: me and my team. Here is a special offer for 8 00:00:23,760 --> 00:00:28,080 Speaker 1: my podcast listeners. 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On this episode How Introduced You to Raleigh Flynn. 22 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:31,319 Speaker 1: Miss Flynn is a thirty year veteran of the Central 23 00:01:31,360 --> 00:01:37,080 Speaker 1: Intelligence Agency, where she held senior executive positions including Director 24 00:01:37,120 --> 00:01:41,040 Speaker 1: of the CIA's Leadership Academy, Associate Deputy Director of the 25 00:01:41,120 --> 00:01:45,200 Speaker 1: National counter Terrorism Center, Executive Director of the CIA counter 26 00:01:45,280 --> 00:01:50,480 Speaker 1: Terrorism Center, and Director of the Office of Foreign Intelligence Relationships. 27 00:01:50,480 --> 00:01:54,880 Speaker 1: She also has extensive overseas experience, including as chief of 28 00:01:54,920 --> 00:01:59,080 Speaker 1: station in major posts in Southeast Asia and Latin America, 29 00:01:59,160 --> 00:02:11,720 Speaker 1: and as a clandestine operations officer in Africa and Southeast Asia. 30 00:02:15,560 --> 00:02:19,839 Speaker 1: What led you decide you wanted to work for the CIA, Well, 31 00:02:19,880 --> 00:02:22,320 Speaker 1: it was sort of an accident. I came from a 32 00:02:22,400 --> 00:02:25,760 Speaker 1: family that served. My dad was Army Air Corps during 33 00:02:25,760 --> 00:02:31,840 Speaker 1: World War Two and career Forest Service officer. Shortly after college, 34 00:02:31,919 --> 00:02:34,720 Speaker 1: I went to work in book publishing. I was an 35 00:02:34,840 --> 00:02:38,600 Speaker 1: editor at Simon and Schuster, and I'd always wanted to 36 00:02:38,639 --> 00:02:41,800 Speaker 1: see the world. I grew up in California, small towns mostly, 37 00:02:42,360 --> 00:02:45,359 Speaker 1: and I'd never been east of Reno when I decided 38 00:02:45,440 --> 00:02:48,600 Speaker 1: is really probably the only person in history and an 39 00:02:48,600 --> 00:02:52,840 Speaker 1: act of rebellion went to Wellesley College rather than Berkeley. 40 00:02:53,000 --> 00:02:55,160 Speaker 1: So I'd always wanted to see the world. But I 41 00:02:55,240 --> 00:02:57,560 Speaker 1: was working in New York City at Simon and Schuster, 42 00:02:57,639 --> 00:03:00,160 Speaker 1: a job I liked. When I saw an ad the 43 00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:03,320 Speaker 1: op ed page of the Sunday New York Times, and 44 00:03:03,440 --> 00:03:06,760 Speaker 1: it said do you like adventure? Would you like to 45 00:03:06,760 --> 00:03:10,120 Speaker 1: see the world? Would you like to serve your country? 46 00:03:10,200 --> 00:03:12,760 Speaker 1: And I thought, well, yeah, that all sounds really good. 47 00:03:13,520 --> 00:03:16,080 Speaker 1: I sent away a cover letter and a resume to 48 00:03:16,120 --> 00:03:18,760 Speaker 1: the name and po box provided, And of course I 49 00:03:18,880 --> 00:03:21,400 Speaker 1: later learned that the name on the ad was not 50 00:03:21,480 --> 00:03:24,560 Speaker 1: a true name of any real person. But I really 51 00:03:24,560 --> 00:03:26,920 Speaker 1: didn't know what I was getting into till I signed 52 00:03:26,919 --> 00:03:29,960 Speaker 1: on the dotted line and signed a secrecy agreement. But 53 00:03:30,440 --> 00:03:34,640 Speaker 1: I knew I was going to be undercover, operating overseas, 54 00:03:34,760 --> 00:03:39,160 Speaker 1: and that all intrigued me. And I said, well, I'll 55 00:03:39,160 --> 00:03:41,720 Speaker 1: give this five years and see what this is. And 56 00:03:41,840 --> 00:03:45,960 Speaker 1: I ended up staying thirty. It was an extraordinarily rewarding 57 00:03:46,000 --> 00:03:48,920 Speaker 1: career and get up every day. You may not like 58 00:03:49,080 --> 00:03:51,800 Speaker 1: every day of your job, but you always feel pretty 59 00:03:51,800 --> 00:03:54,560 Speaker 1: good about saying I work to support the security of 60 00:03:54,600 --> 00:03:59,640 Speaker 1: the American people. So when you first began going overseas, 61 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:02,320 Speaker 1: nice him. You've been through a training program, Yes, a 62 00:04:02,480 --> 00:04:07,760 Speaker 1: rather extensive one that included how to do tradecraft effectively, 63 00:04:07,800 --> 00:04:12,400 Speaker 1: which is essentially to recruit and what we would call 64 00:04:12,600 --> 00:04:16,160 Speaker 1: clandestinely handle our sources or in the CIA we call 65 00:04:16,240 --> 00:04:20,120 Speaker 1: them agents or assets in such a way that you're 66 00:04:20,120 --> 00:04:23,160 Speaker 1: not going to get caught, because consequences for these folks 67 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:27,000 Speaker 1: who cooperate with the US government or the CIA can 68 00:04:27,040 --> 00:04:32,560 Speaker 1: be pretty dire, anything from arrest and imprisonment to execution. 69 00:04:33,200 --> 00:04:35,960 Speaker 1: From your perspective, when you first want to receive, were 70 00:04:36,000 --> 00:04:39,560 Speaker 1: you covered or were you uncovered in terms of your 71 00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:43,560 Speaker 1: diplomatic status? Oh, I was very much undercover. In fact, 72 00:04:44,279 --> 00:04:48,560 Speaker 1: very few people knew my actual employer. I told my 73 00:04:48,640 --> 00:04:52,360 Speaker 1: father because I thought he would understand. I told a 74 00:04:52,400 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 1: couple of my siblings. I never told my mother. My 75 00:04:55,560 --> 00:05:00,320 Speaker 1: mother never knew where I worked. Really, yes, really, wasn't 76 00:05:00,320 --> 00:05:03,760 Speaker 1: she kind of mystified by the places you were traveling to. 77 00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:08,400 Speaker 1: Not really. She was a lovely woman, but she was 78 00:05:08,520 --> 00:05:12,520 Speaker 1: not particularly worldly. I don't think she would have understood 79 00:05:13,000 --> 00:05:16,680 Speaker 1: what the CIA was, and she might have worried unnecessarily, 80 00:05:17,600 --> 00:05:21,640 Speaker 1: and so I didn't tell her. So you've done your 81 00:05:21,680 --> 00:05:25,919 Speaker 1: initial training, you go overseas, and as your first phase, 82 00:05:26,000 --> 00:05:28,240 Speaker 1: are you actually out trying to recruit people or are 83 00:05:28,240 --> 00:05:31,280 Speaker 1: you trying to run agents that have already been recruited 84 00:05:31,480 --> 00:05:35,279 Speaker 1: both to succeed. In the CIA, recruitment is the coin 85 00:05:35,360 --> 00:05:38,000 Speaker 1: of the realm. One of the worst things they can 86 00:05:38,080 --> 00:05:43,200 Speaker 1: say about a case officer is can't recruit, and most 87 00:05:43,480 --> 00:05:47,800 Speaker 1: can't recruit. Recruiting as hard. It's akin to sales. It's 88 00:05:47,880 --> 00:05:52,080 Speaker 1: being able to ask, do the big ask, but also 89 00:05:52,120 --> 00:05:56,520 Speaker 1: persuade someone to commit espionage, to do something that can 90 00:05:56,560 --> 00:06:00,720 Speaker 1: potentially cause them harm if found out. Now, we're very 91 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:05,680 Speaker 1: professional about how we handle our sources, and we certainly 92 00:06:06,120 --> 00:06:11,360 Speaker 1: do everything humanly imaginable to protect them, but there's always 93 00:06:11,360 --> 00:06:15,920 Speaker 1: a risk. I was very much expected to recruit. In fact, 94 00:06:16,200 --> 00:06:20,240 Speaker 1: during my first tour, I was in Africa and my 95 00:06:20,360 --> 00:06:24,359 Speaker 1: boss was constantly looking at what are we doing to 96 00:06:24,440 --> 00:06:27,000 Speaker 1: get you a recruitment. You had to get at least 97 00:06:27,040 --> 00:06:29,720 Speaker 1: a recruitment or two in a first tour as a 98 00:06:29,720 --> 00:06:34,160 Speaker 1: case officer to be considered viable case officer for life. Now, 99 00:06:34,200 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 1: that might have been a little different if I were 100 00:06:36,320 --> 00:06:40,240 Speaker 1: a serving in a place like Moscow, where recruiting would 101 00:06:40,279 --> 00:06:43,240 Speaker 1: be much more difficult, but in most of the world, 102 00:06:43,640 --> 00:06:47,240 Speaker 1: as a first tour case officer. You're expected to recruit, 103 00:06:47,440 --> 00:06:52,480 Speaker 1: you're expected to handle sources clandestinely not getting caught, and 104 00:06:53,320 --> 00:06:56,839 Speaker 1: ye're very much required to write a lot of intelligence reports. 105 00:06:57,480 --> 00:06:59,520 Speaker 1: And do those come in the form of cables back 106 00:06:59,520 --> 00:07:03,000 Speaker 1: to Lane. That's exactly right. They do. They are what 107 00:07:03,040 --> 00:07:07,280 Speaker 1: we would call raw intelligence, as opposed to finished intelligence, 108 00:07:07,320 --> 00:07:12,320 Speaker 1: which are formal analytical pieces, which were probably what you 109 00:07:12,360 --> 00:07:14,560 Speaker 1: would have seen when you were Speaker of the House. 110 00:07:15,200 --> 00:07:20,480 Speaker 1: The raw intelligence reports are what comes from our sources, 111 00:07:20,560 --> 00:07:24,000 Speaker 1: and they get put together with other raw reports into 112 00:07:24,040 --> 00:07:29,240 Speaker 1: more analytical pieces, into what we call multisource intelligence. Some 113 00:07:29,800 --> 00:07:33,320 Speaker 1: raw intelligence reports they do get shared if there's something 114 00:07:34,280 --> 00:07:40,760 Speaker 1: particularly of interest or to particularly insightful raw intelligence report 115 00:07:40,920 --> 00:07:43,920 Speaker 1: from the horse's mouth, so to speak, it will get 116 00:07:43,960 --> 00:07:48,600 Speaker 1: shared very selectively with policymakers. You started during the late 117 00:07:48,640 --> 00:07:51,520 Speaker 1: phase of the Cold War, that's correct. I came in 118 00:07:51,520 --> 00:07:56,200 Speaker 1: in the early eighties part of the Reagan Casey hiring bump. 119 00:07:57,080 --> 00:07:59,800 Speaker 1: A lot of us were hired. The first part of 120 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:03,480 Speaker 1: my career was in Africa and Southeast Asia during the 121 00:08:03,480 --> 00:08:07,280 Speaker 1: Cold War. Well, your primary competitors in that sense, the 122 00:08:07,360 --> 00:08:09,960 Speaker 1: Russians and the Cubans, or who were you up against 123 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:14,200 Speaker 1: in Africa, the Russians, the Chinese and North Koreans, and 124 00:08:14,840 --> 00:08:19,920 Speaker 1: we considered members of the Warsaw countries legitimate targets for 125 00:08:20,040 --> 00:08:24,120 Speaker 1: recruitment as well. And then of course in Africa there 126 00:08:24,120 --> 00:08:29,239 Speaker 1: were Libyans, and we were always very interested in whatever 127 00:08:29,360 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 1: was going on in the region or the particular country 128 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:34,640 Speaker 1: we were in. Towards the end of my time in Africa, 129 00:08:35,040 --> 00:08:37,920 Speaker 1: in the late eighties, I was in Southern Africa, so 130 00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:42,280 Speaker 1: of course South Africa was a huge intelligence collection requirement, 131 00:08:42,600 --> 00:08:47,840 Speaker 1: and at that point we were collecting against the apartheid government. 132 00:08:48,360 --> 00:08:51,080 Speaker 1: We were collecting against everything. We were interested in what 133 00:08:51,160 --> 00:08:53,720 Speaker 1: the government was doing. We were also very interested in 134 00:08:53,760 --> 00:08:59,080 Speaker 1: the ANC because the ANC for years was very close 135 00:08:59,280 --> 00:09:03,320 Speaker 1: to the Russians, to Soviets. We were very interested also 136 00:09:03,520 --> 00:09:07,040 Speaker 1: in what was going on with various trade unions within 137 00:09:07,160 --> 00:09:12,000 Speaker 1: South Africa. That was the closest thing to civil society. 138 00:09:12,320 --> 00:09:15,280 Speaker 1: The trade unions were real powerhouses, and I think we 139 00:09:15,320 --> 00:09:17,640 Speaker 1: can still see the remnants of that with Cero Rhyma 140 00:09:17,720 --> 00:09:20,760 Speaker 1: Posa as the President of South Africa now, who used 141 00:09:20,760 --> 00:09:22,959 Speaker 1: to be the head of the mine workers in these 142 00:09:23,000 --> 00:09:25,040 Speaker 1: early days, were you operating under your own name or 143 00:09:25,040 --> 00:09:28,640 Speaker 1: did you actually get a pseudonym and fake passports and 144 00:09:28,640 --> 00:09:36,679 Speaker 1: all that stuff. Yeah, I was operating in my own name. However, 145 00:09:37,120 --> 00:09:40,040 Speaker 1: when we do some operations, we do operate in alias, 146 00:09:40,080 --> 00:09:44,920 Speaker 1: and sometimes we have different kinds of documentation to support 147 00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:51,559 Speaker 1: both aliases that we're using. So absolutely, and particularly if 148 00:09:51,559 --> 00:09:57,319 Speaker 1: we're dealing with a source of perhaps indeterminate reliability, and 149 00:09:57,559 --> 00:10:01,320 Speaker 1: you always have to assume at some point a source 150 00:10:01,360 --> 00:10:05,480 Speaker 1: could be turned, you do your best not to expose 151 00:10:05,679 --> 00:10:10,480 Speaker 1: any information unnecessarily to that source. So in many cases, 152 00:10:10,720 --> 00:10:14,040 Speaker 1: my sources did not know my true name. When we 153 00:10:14,120 --> 00:10:17,240 Speaker 1: come back, Raleigh Flynn tells the story of being undercover 154 00:10:17,320 --> 00:10:38,959 Speaker 1: in Africa and facing a very dangerous situation. Are the 155 00:10:39,120 --> 00:10:42,760 Speaker 1: things that this many years later, are no longer classified. 156 00:10:42,760 --> 00:10:45,960 Speaker 1: We give us a couple examples of crazy things. I 157 00:10:45,960 --> 00:10:47,920 Speaker 1: remember one of the things that happened me early in 158 00:10:47,960 --> 00:10:52,040 Speaker 1: my career in Africa. I'm blonde and blue eyed, and 159 00:10:52,120 --> 00:10:56,520 Speaker 1: at the time I was in my twenties and I 160 00:10:56,559 --> 00:10:59,440 Speaker 1: was coming back from a source meeting, and I was driving. 161 00:11:00,080 --> 00:11:02,000 Speaker 1: The source was no longer with me, but I had 162 00:11:02,080 --> 00:11:07,000 Speaker 1: some documents from that source, and I was driving through 163 00:11:07,240 --> 00:11:09,800 Speaker 1: a market area. Now I had the documents. They were 164 00:11:09,960 --> 00:11:14,040 Speaker 1: very carefully concealed in a way that as long as 165 00:11:14,080 --> 00:11:17,920 Speaker 1: there wasn't heavy scrutiny, would not be found. But as 166 00:11:17,960 --> 00:11:21,239 Speaker 1: I was driving along, not very fast through a marketplace, 167 00:11:22,360 --> 00:11:25,680 Speaker 1: all of a sudden to the right of my car 168 00:11:25,960 --> 00:11:29,079 Speaker 1: came running. A little girl about five years old ran 169 00:11:29,160 --> 00:11:32,480 Speaker 1: into the side of my car, went with a huge 170 00:11:32,720 --> 00:11:37,880 Speaker 1: thump onto my windshield, passed out, was bleeding from the head, 171 00:11:38,040 --> 00:11:42,079 Speaker 1: and she was unconscious. I stopped the car. It was 172 00:11:42,160 --> 00:11:46,960 Speaker 1: quite shaken up, and I had about a split second 173 00:11:46,960 --> 00:11:50,760 Speaker 1: to decide what to do. At the time, I think 174 00:11:50,800 --> 00:11:53,880 Speaker 1: the standing orders, which I wasn't aware of because I 175 00:11:53,960 --> 00:11:56,680 Speaker 1: was fairly new in country, were to leave the scene, 176 00:11:57,640 --> 00:11:59,679 Speaker 1: but I didn't know that, and so I had a 177 00:11:59,720 --> 00:12:02,400 Speaker 1: split second to decide what's the right thing to do here. 178 00:12:02,480 --> 00:12:05,800 Speaker 1: Do I stop and try to help, Do I drive on? 179 00:12:06,640 --> 00:12:09,439 Speaker 1: Do I get out of there? Because if a mob 180 00:12:09,520 --> 00:12:12,199 Speaker 1: takes my car apart, they're going to find these documents 181 00:12:12,280 --> 00:12:16,480 Speaker 1: and probably figure out who they came from, which is 182 00:12:16,559 --> 00:12:18,959 Speaker 1: going to cause all kinds of problems for this source 183 00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:22,880 Speaker 1: of line. So in that split second, and I can't 184 00:12:22,960 --> 00:12:26,559 Speaker 1: say honestly that I went through all the ethical models 185 00:12:27,200 --> 00:12:30,000 Speaker 1: of decision making. It was more of a gut reaction. 186 00:12:30,679 --> 00:12:34,960 Speaker 1: I got out of the car, and fortunately the crowd 187 00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:39,120 Speaker 1: I think was not as hostile toward me as they 188 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:42,080 Speaker 1: might have been. I think they could see I was young. 189 00:12:42,280 --> 00:12:45,640 Speaker 1: I was very upset. So there were two gentlemen there, 190 00:12:46,000 --> 00:12:48,360 Speaker 1: two locals, and we put the little girl in my 191 00:12:48,480 --> 00:12:53,120 Speaker 1: car and I drove her to the hospital, and fortunately 192 00:12:53,440 --> 00:12:56,560 Speaker 1: she turned out to be just bruised up. She was fine. 193 00:12:56,679 --> 00:12:59,439 Speaker 1: She came to by the time I got to the hospital, 194 00:12:59,520 --> 00:13:02,920 Speaker 1: and then her parents came. I paid the hospital bill, 195 00:13:02,960 --> 00:13:06,760 Speaker 1: which was about seven dollars, and then a couple days later, 196 00:13:06,840 --> 00:13:08,920 Speaker 1: on advice of one of the locals, I went and 197 00:13:09,040 --> 00:13:11,160 Speaker 1: visited her and brought her a little toy and her 198 00:13:11,200 --> 00:13:14,400 Speaker 1: parents an envelope with a hundred dollars in it. But 199 00:13:14,559 --> 00:13:17,240 Speaker 1: that was the kind of thing that could happen in 200 00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:21,559 Speaker 1: those parts of the world. Traffic accidents which shouldn't be 201 00:13:21,600 --> 00:13:24,640 Speaker 1: a big deal, could all of a sudden spell life 202 00:13:24,720 --> 00:13:28,600 Speaker 1: or death for the source certainly, Or if the crowd 203 00:13:28,640 --> 00:13:32,160 Speaker 1: turned ugly, they could have gone after me very easily. 204 00:13:32,880 --> 00:13:35,360 Speaker 1: I had another incident in Africa that happened. I had 205 00:13:35,360 --> 00:13:38,960 Speaker 1: a safe house meeting. We had our ways of using disguise, 206 00:13:39,160 --> 00:13:41,800 Speaker 1: but this was not a particularly high threat meeting, so 207 00:13:42,040 --> 00:13:45,760 Speaker 1: I was not in disguise, but I was walking and 208 00:13:46,000 --> 00:13:51,040 Speaker 1: doing a surveillance detection route toward my meeting, which means 209 00:13:51,040 --> 00:13:56,240 Speaker 1: sort of meandering around and making sure there's nobody following me. 210 00:13:56,720 --> 00:13:58,520 Speaker 1: When all of a sudden, I started to hear a 211 00:13:58,520 --> 00:14:01,800 Speaker 1: little motorbike behind me and a couple guys on it 212 00:14:01,960 --> 00:14:05,600 Speaker 1: making cat calls and following me and inviting me to 213 00:14:05,640 --> 00:14:09,319 Speaker 1: the movies. And I must have gone on for about 214 00:14:09,360 --> 00:14:13,359 Speaker 1: forty five minutes and I couldn't lose them, so I 215 00:14:13,400 --> 00:14:16,080 Speaker 1: didn't go to the meeting. I kept trying to lose them, 216 00:14:16,080 --> 00:14:18,400 Speaker 1: and I finally said, no, I can't go to the meeting. 217 00:14:19,120 --> 00:14:22,120 Speaker 1: So I aborted. And of course at the time I 218 00:14:22,160 --> 00:14:25,680 Speaker 1: worked for this very gruff chief of station, and the 219 00:14:25,760 --> 00:14:28,760 Speaker 1: next morning I went and told him what happened, and 220 00:14:28,880 --> 00:14:31,040 Speaker 1: he was very concerned about, well, did you go to 221 00:14:31,080 --> 00:14:32,880 Speaker 1: the meeting. No, I couldn't go to the meeting. I 222 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:35,200 Speaker 1: didn't want to drag these two young men with me, 223 00:14:36,400 --> 00:14:39,160 Speaker 1: and he said okay, and as I left, I could 224 00:14:39,200 --> 00:14:43,720 Speaker 1: hear him grumbling under his breath. Women case officers, So 225 00:14:43,840 --> 00:14:46,200 Speaker 1: in the old days, some of the old timers weren't 226 00:14:46,280 --> 00:14:48,800 Speaker 1: keen to have women working for them in this field. 227 00:14:49,040 --> 00:14:51,960 Speaker 1: So those are a couple of examples. There was a 228 00:14:51,960 --> 00:14:55,760 Speaker 1: TV show in FX called The Americans, which apparently was 229 00:14:55,800 --> 00:15:00,840 Speaker 1: inspired by the FBI actually arresting some deep agents that 230 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:04,160 Speaker 1: the Russians had put in years ago. And I think 231 00:15:04,160 --> 00:15:06,600 Speaker 1: the rest of about ten people, did you have much 232 00:15:06,600 --> 00:15:10,080 Speaker 1: sense on that side of the business of how much 233 00:15:10,200 --> 00:15:13,440 Speaker 1: we have to be concerned about other people trying to 234 00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:16,880 Speaker 1: penetrate US. I think we have to be deeply concerned 235 00:15:16,920 --> 00:15:24,680 Speaker 1: about it, and the Russians are very serious and concerning adversaries. 236 00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:26,920 Speaker 1: Beyond the Russians, I think there are a lot of 237 00:15:26,960 --> 00:15:30,600 Speaker 1: different countries as well as non state actors who are 238 00:15:30,600 --> 00:15:35,120 Speaker 1: interested in penetrating US perceive US as adversaries and threats. 239 00:15:35,120 --> 00:15:38,720 Speaker 1: So yes, absolutely, the Russians do do that. They have 240 00:15:38,800 --> 00:15:43,080 Speaker 1: what they call illegals, deep cover individuals who will live 241 00:15:43,240 --> 00:15:48,080 Speaker 1: inside a country and look like something they're not. Then 242 00:15:48,200 --> 00:15:51,520 Speaker 1: that's exactly what happened with the folks who were arrested 243 00:15:51,560 --> 00:15:55,480 Speaker 1: in twenty ten, who were in New York and the 244 00:15:55,760 --> 00:16:01,200 Speaker 1: mid Atlantic. They were deep cover posing as Americans. Given 245 00:16:01,200 --> 00:16:04,120 Speaker 1: the size of the Russian community in New York City, 246 00:16:04,800 --> 00:16:08,680 Speaker 1: who wouldn't be that hard to pose. I mean, we're 247 00:16:08,720 --> 00:16:11,960 Speaker 1: a very open society in that sense. Well, and the 248 00:16:12,080 --> 00:16:18,400 Speaker 1: Chinese historically have recruited within the Chinese diaspora, not only 249 00:16:18,440 --> 00:16:21,520 Speaker 1: in the United States but around the world, and so 250 00:16:22,040 --> 00:16:27,040 Speaker 1: their recruited sources blend in very well here. Now. From 251 00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:29,640 Speaker 1: the other side, though, we also had in terms of 252 00:16:29,640 --> 00:16:34,240 Speaker 1: recruitment with Aldred James and Robert Henson, people who were 253 00:16:34,280 --> 00:16:38,880 Speaker 1: clearly Americans, but who for their own reasons decided they 254 00:16:38,920 --> 00:16:44,280 Speaker 1: wanted to spy for the Russians. Absolutely, that's obviously a 255 00:16:44,320 --> 00:16:48,320 Speaker 1: concern counter intelligence. We have CIA and the FBI have 256 00:16:48,400 --> 00:16:53,520 Speaker 1: had large counter intelligence operations because that's always a potential risk. 257 00:16:53,720 --> 00:16:57,560 Speaker 1: And when you talk about things that were shocking, I 258 00:16:57,560 --> 00:17:01,200 Speaker 1: think when we learned that all James was spying for 259 00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:05,280 Speaker 1: the Russians, I think a lot were shocked. A lot 260 00:17:05,320 --> 00:17:08,880 Speaker 1: though when they thought about it, said, yeah, Aldo James was. 261 00:17:09,160 --> 00:17:12,919 Speaker 1: He had sort of the typical hallmarks of a spy 262 00:17:13,160 --> 00:17:18,760 Speaker 1: in that most spies most of them turn Snowdon being 263 00:17:18,800 --> 00:17:22,840 Speaker 1: an exception, or Chelsea Manning being an exception, most of 264 00:17:22,840 --> 00:17:25,760 Speaker 1: them turn in their forties. It's kind of when the 265 00:17:25,920 --> 00:17:31,439 Speaker 1: dream ends, when life presents itself. Aldo James had money problems, 266 00:17:31,520 --> 00:17:35,879 Speaker 1: he had a new wife with expensive taste, He was 267 00:17:35,920 --> 00:17:40,400 Speaker 1: a drunk. He had not done all that well in 268 00:17:40,480 --> 00:17:44,480 Speaker 1: his career. He was a GS fourteen, someone who probably 269 00:17:44,520 --> 00:17:47,639 Speaker 1: had the intellect to rise higher in the CIA, but 270 00:17:47,800 --> 00:17:52,480 Speaker 1: for his personal problems in his drinking and candidly his laziness, 271 00:17:52,920 --> 00:17:56,520 Speaker 1: didn't go as far as he might. There's a really 272 00:17:56,560 --> 00:18:00,040 Speaker 1: good article written by one of my former colleagues. He 273 00:18:00,119 --> 00:18:03,359 Speaker 1: is a psychologist at the CIA, Ursula Wilder, and she 274 00:18:03,520 --> 00:18:07,359 Speaker 1: looked at why spy. She wrote her article initially after 275 00:18:07,520 --> 00:18:10,600 Speaker 1: Alder James, but then she updated it recently and added 276 00:18:10,600 --> 00:18:14,080 Speaker 1: it to leakers. I'd like the model she uses for 277 00:18:14,200 --> 00:18:17,120 Speaker 1: looking at why people spy. And they have three things 278 00:18:17,119 --> 00:18:22,280 Speaker 1: in common. First is a predisposing personality disorder. You know, 279 00:18:22,320 --> 00:18:29,240 Speaker 1: there's some narcissism, psychopathy, sociopathy, feelings of grandiosity. And then 280 00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:34,640 Speaker 1: there's usually a triggering event and that can be career problems, 281 00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:40,960 Speaker 1: substance abuse, relationship problems, something like that pushes them over 282 00:18:41,000 --> 00:18:46,920 Speaker 1: the edge. But then finally there's opportunity. With Aldred James, 283 00:18:47,080 --> 00:18:50,359 Speaker 1: he was in the rare position. As part of his job, 284 00:18:50,480 --> 00:18:53,320 Speaker 1: he was expected to meet with the Russians, so he 285 00:18:53,320 --> 00:18:55,200 Speaker 1: could meet with him and look like he was doing 286 00:18:55,240 --> 00:19:00,119 Speaker 1: his job. Most people can't do that, But today are 287 00:19:00,200 --> 00:19:03,639 Speaker 1: the most concerning things to me is that there is 288 00:19:03,720 --> 00:19:09,760 Speaker 1: so much more opportunity, primarily because of technology. When Jonathan 289 00:19:09,840 --> 00:19:15,480 Speaker 1: Pollard was spying, he brought shopping bags full of paper documents. 290 00:19:16,160 --> 00:19:18,480 Speaker 1: Now you can bring so much more just on a 291 00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:21,720 Speaker 1: thumb drive if you're inclined to spy. So I find 292 00:19:21,760 --> 00:19:27,440 Speaker 1: that very worrisome. The cases like professionals like Games and Hansen, 293 00:19:28,520 --> 00:19:32,040 Speaker 1: Clearly the Russians had to also to some extent being 294 00:19:32,080 --> 00:19:36,800 Speaker 1: a recruiting business, absolutely, although both were volunteers. Didn't you 295 00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:39,800 Speaker 1: find in your own career though, that there were volunteers 296 00:19:39,800 --> 00:19:42,320 Speaker 1: who would occasionally walk up to you and say I 297 00:19:42,840 --> 00:19:46,520 Speaker 1: want to be helpful. Absolutely, And in fact I would 298 00:19:46,560 --> 00:19:50,720 Speaker 1: say that you never really recruit a Russian. You give 299 00:19:50,720 --> 00:19:54,560 Speaker 1: them an opportunity to volunteer, you know, be the sort 300 00:19:54,560 --> 00:19:57,560 Speaker 1: of person who is trustworthy, who they can count on, 301 00:19:58,320 --> 00:20:02,120 Speaker 1: particularly if you're talking about someone who's in a country 302 00:20:02,119 --> 00:20:07,360 Speaker 1: where even being seen with an American is potentially perceived 303 00:20:07,400 --> 00:20:12,159 Speaker 1: as espionage. They really have to recruit themselves ultimately and 304 00:20:12,160 --> 00:20:16,240 Speaker 1: then volunteer. We CIA officers just try to give them 305 00:20:16,280 --> 00:20:20,919 Speaker 1: opportunities to volunteer. For instance, when I was overseas, I 306 00:20:21,160 --> 00:20:26,600 Speaker 1: always on my business card put my home address because 307 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:29,280 Speaker 1: sometimes they don't want to go into the US embassy 308 00:20:29,680 --> 00:20:33,040 Speaker 1: too much security, too much possibility of people seeing them 309 00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:36,240 Speaker 1: and being seen on cameras. But I always put my 310 00:20:36,280 --> 00:20:39,120 Speaker 1: home address so they would know where to volunteer if 311 00:20:39,160 --> 00:20:41,919 Speaker 1: they were so inclined. And did people actually show up 312 00:20:41,960 --> 00:20:45,920 Speaker 1: at your home address once in a blue moon. Yes, 313 00:20:46,560 --> 00:20:48,719 Speaker 1: not always the ones you want, let me put it 314 00:20:48,760 --> 00:20:54,000 Speaker 1: that way, Yeah, not the ones you'd hoped for. Sefically 315 00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:58,959 Speaker 1: coming up find out what security issues keep a veteran 316 00:20:59,080 --> 00:21:21,040 Speaker 1: CIA agent up at night. Given all of your experience, 317 00:21:21,440 --> 00:21:24,280 Speaker 1: what keeps you up at night, what do you worry about? Well, 318 00:21:24,320 --> 00:21:27,119 Speaker 1: I worry about a few things. I worry about North Korea. 319 00:21:27,920 --> 00:21:35,840 Speaker 1: I worry mostly about accidents or miscalculations. We now have 320 00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:39,879 Speaker 1: enough countries in the world that have a nuclear or 321 00:21:40,119 --> 00:21:46,000 Speaker 1: WMD capability that I do fear accidents. I'm also worried 322 00:21:46,080 --> 00:21:51,320 Speaker 1: about non state actors getting their hands on WMD or 323 00:21:51,440 --> 00:21:56,320 Speaker 1: some mass form of attack. I'm less concerned about the 324 00:21:56,440 --> 00:22:01,960 Speaker 1: state actors. But again, there's always this possibility misinterpretation of signals, 325 00:22:02,760 --> 00:22:06,920 Speaker 1: So that does worry me. But in those cases, your 326 00:22:06,960 --> 00:22:12,320 Speaker 1: concerns are as much about our potentially misunderstanding or misjudging 327 00:22:13,560 --> 00:22:16,760 Speaker 1: as the other side. I would hope that we would 328 00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:20,320 Speaker 1: be more careful than some of our adversaries. Are you 329 00:22:20,440 --> 00:22:24,200 Speaker 1: concerned about as you get into more modern technologies and 330 00:22:25,040 --> 00:22:29,600 Speaker 1: the rise of artificial intelligence, etc. Are you concerned about 331 00:22:29,600 --> 00:22:32,520 Speaker 1: the degree to which we are vulnerable to more and 332 00:22:32,560 --> 00:22:37,960 Speaker 1: more penetration my systems we may not understand absolutely, and 333 00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:43,639 Speaker 1: I think both in terms of the ability to collect 334 00:22:43,640 --> 00:22:48,000 Speaker 1: information on us as well as to manipulate the information 335 00:22:48,640 --> 00:22:52,800 Speaker 1: and to damage our digital systems. We rely on these 336 00:22:52,840 --> 00:22:58,760 Speaker 1: digital systems for the running of hospitals, of our financial services. 337 00:22:59,160 --> 00:23:04,160 Speaker 1: I think also the potential threat of manipulation of our 338 00:23:04,200 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 1: election systems is very concerning, not just by the Russians 339 00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:10,080 Speaker 1: but by other actors who might want to do that, 340 00:23:10,880 --> 00:23:14,240 Speaker 1: and I think we saw just the beginning of that 341 00:23:14,600 --> 00:23:17,879 Speaker 1: in the last election. I mean, what was done seems 342 00:23:17,920 --> 00:23:22,440 Speaker 1: actually pretty crude, you know, just wholesale dumping of emails, 343 00:23:22,760 --> 00:23:27,640 Speaker 1: whereas if there had been more skillful, careful manipulation, they 344 00:23:27,680 --> 00:23:32,439 Speaker 1: could have really planted much more damaging information. You're going 345 00:23:32,520 --> 00:23:34,000 Speaker 1: to get to a point we actually have no way 346 00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:37,160 Speaker 1: of knowing if something you see on the internet's real 347 00:23:37,240 --> 00:23:42,560 Speaker 1: or not. Absolutely, the Pelosi tape, I mean, that was 348 00:23:42,600 --> 00:23:46,280 Speaker 1: really quite a crude production, but in the hands of 349 00:23:46,320 --> 00:23:49,679 Speaker 1: someone really skillful, it could have been very difficult to 350 00:23:49,720 --> 00:23:52,760 Speaker 1: determine whether it was genuine or not. What would you 351 00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:56,480 Speaker 1: say was the most shocking experience that you can actually 352 00:23:56,520 --> 00:23:59,359 Speaker 1: talk about even today. The arrest of Aldra James was 353 00:23:59,400 --> 00:24:04,000 Speaker 1: absolutely shocking. I had been in the service then at 354 00:24:04,040 --> 00:24:08,160 Speaker 1: that point twelve years and nothing like that had ever happened. 355 00:24:08,320 --> 00:24:10,680 Speaker 1: I think a lot of us were shocked by that. 356 00:24:11,200 --> 00:24:14,199 Speaker 1: We were a bit naive, I suppose, thinking this couldn't 357 00:24:14,200 --> 00:24:19,480 Speaker 1: happen to us. The deaths at Coast in Afghanistan, the 358 00:24:19,680 --> 00:24:24,240 Speaker 1: so called triple Agent attack, that was a huge shock 359 00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:27,240 Speaker 1: to the system when that happened. I had just left. 360 00:24:27,280 --> 00:24:30,119 Speaker 1: I was the executive director of the counter Terrorism Center, 361 00:24:30,119 --> 00:24:32,720 Speaker 1: and I was the National counter Terrorism Center at that point. 362 00:24:33,119 --> 00:24:37,240 Speaker 1: But I knew some of those people, and that was 363 00:24:37,280 --> 00:24:41,560 Speaker 1: shocking in that sense. Is it always, even though you've 364 00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:45,399 Speaker 1: intellectually no, it's a dangerous business. Is it always an 365 00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:48,960 Speaker 1: emotional shock when the danger actually shows up. We plan 366 00:24:49,040 --> 00:24:53,000 Speaker 1: our operations very carefully, particularly if we're in what we 367 00:24:53,040 --> 00:24:59,119 Speaker 1: would call denied areas, so we tried to anticipate the unanticipated, 368 00:24:59,440 --> 00:25:01,840 Speaker 1: and then when it happens, I think we are shocked. 369 00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:04,800 Speaker 1: The things that have shocked me were the deaths of 370 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:08,760 Speaker 1: officers doing operations. What was it like in the early 371 00:25:08,880 --> 00:25:14,600 Speaker 1: days to be a woman professional inside the agency when 372 00:25:14,640 --> 00:25:18,240 Speaker 1: I came in, I would say maybe one out of 373 00:25:18,400 --> 00:25:24,199 Speaker 1: eight case officers was female. Among the new employees they 374 00:25:24,240 --> 00:25:27,000 Speaker 1: were making, I think some effort to hire some women. 375 00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:30,320 Speaker 1: Women are really good at intelligence. They can do some 376 00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:33,359 Speaker 1: things men can't. Men can do some things they can't, 377 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:37,440 Speaker 1: but women just don't raise the same kind of suspicion 378 00:25:37,480 --> 00:25:39,919 Speaker 1: as men. You can put two women sitting on a 379 00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:43,600 Speaker 1: park bench chatting, can sit there all afternoon and nobody 380 00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:46,960 Speaker 1: will think anything about it. But put two men on 381 00:25:47,040 --> 00:25:50,679 Speaker 1: a park bench, and people start wondering, what are they 382 00:25:50,720 --> 00:25:53,960 Speaker 1: doing there? Why are they there? I think women are 383 00:25:54,119 --> 00:25:58,160 Speaker 1: very good at intelligence, in part because people don't notice them, 384 00:25:58,520 --> 00:26:01,280 Speaker 1: and in part because they're different. I found that quite 385 00:26:01,320 --> 00:26:04,800 Speaker 1: often I could get meetings with people that my male 386 00:26:05,119 --> 00:26:09,320 Speaker 1: counterparts couldn't, simply because I was a little different. The CIA, 387 00:26:09,440 --> 00:26:12,440 Speaker 1: I think, is trying very hard to bring in more 388 00:26:12,480 --> 00:26:15,399 Speaker 1: women and put them into senior places. One of the 389 00:26:15,480 --> 00:26:18,879 Speaker 1: issues we did have is of the women who came 390 00:26:19,040 --> 00:26:23,600 Speaker 1: in with me, most of them opted out, and they 391 00:26:23,640 --> 00:26:26,640 Speaker 1: either opted out by leaving the CIA, or they opted 392 00:26:26,640 --> 00:26:29,879 Speaker 1: out by moving into other career tracks where they weren't 393 00:26:29,920 --> 00:26:34,399 Speaker 1: involved in overseas clandestine operations. And a lot of that 394 00:26:34,480 --> 00:26:37,960 Speaker 1: had to do with work life balance, and I think 395 00:26:38,200 --> 00:26:42,639 Speaker 1: it's a career where it's not always family friendly. You know, 396 00:26:42,720 --> 00:26:44,560 Speaker 1: I would have to go out at night and I 397 00:26:44,560 --> 00:26:48,240 Speaker 1: couldn't necessarily tell my husband where I was going, and 398 00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:53,080 Speaker 1: that's not easy on spouses. So I think women are 399 00:26:53,200 --> 00:26:59,199 Speaker 1: very good at clandestine operations, but it's not a life 400 00:26:59,280 --> 00:27:03,840 Speaker 1: that really enhances your work life balance. On another topic, 401 00:27:04,000 --> 00:27:06,880 Speaker 1: when I first came to the CIA, it was very 402 00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:11,399 Speaker 1: much a white male, conservative place, and I had a 403 00:27:11,440 --> 00:27:13,720 Speaker 1: girlfriend who came in with me, and we were very 404 00:27:13,720 --> 00:27:16,879 Speaker 1: good friends. And I remember one time, this would have 405 00:27:16,880 --> 00:27:19,720 Speaker 1: been about nineteen eighty two, she and I were on 406 00:27:19,800 --> 00:27:23,000 Speaker 1: an elevator and we were giggling about something and there 407 00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:26,480 Speaker 1: was a very conservative gentleman on the elevator with us, 408 00:27:27,280 --> 00:27:30,000 Speaker 1: and we rode several floors together, and when it came 409 00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:32,240 Speaker 1: time to get off, he turned back to us and 410 00:27:32,320 --> 00:27:37,120 Speaker 1: he said, Valley girls at CIA. I never thought i'd 411 00:27:37,119 --> 00:27:40,119 Speaker 1: see the day, so we were sort of an anomaly. 412 00:27:40,680 --> 00:27:44,160 Speaker 1: I think the CIA has learned, though, that the nature 413 00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:47,199 Speaker 1: of the business, and it being a worldwide business, that 414 00:27:47,359 --> 00:27:51,399 Speaker 1: diversity helps us do our business. We need people who 415 00:27:51,480 --> 00:27:54,920 Speaker 1: can look like all the nationalities of the world and 416 00:27:55,280 --> 00:27:59,680 Speaker 1: speak languages. So the CIA is a much much more 417 00:27:59,720 --> 00:28:02,080 Speaker 1: to her place than it used to be. Was your 418 00:28:02,160 --> 00:28:05,480 Speaker 1: husband aware that you were at the agency before you 419 00:28:05,520 --> 00:28:09,000 Speaker 1: get married? He was, but I didn't tell him right away. 420 00:28:09,040 --> 00:28:12,240 Speaker 1: When we started dating, and we were dating in Africa, 421 00:28:12,280 --> 00:28:14,879 Speaker 1: of all places. He was a naval officer, so we 422 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:17,800 Speaker 1: had a clearance, but because I was undercover, I just 423 00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:20,879 Speaker 1: didn't willy nilly tell anyone. I went out on a 424 00:28:20,960 --> 00:28:23,920 Speaker 1: date with where I worked. So he and I had 425 00:28:23,920 --> 00:28:26,800 Speaker 1: been dating a while, and it was only when it 426 00:28:26,880 --> 00:28:31,440 Speaker 1: became pretty clear that we were going to probably get 427 00:28:31,480 --> 00:28:35,600 Speaker 1: married that I did tell him, And I think he 428 00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:37,920 Speaker 1: would have liked to have heard sooner, but by then 429 00:28:37,960 --> 00:28:43,360 Speaker 1: he was committed. Right that he was committed my children. Likewise, 430 00:28:43,480 --> 00:28:46,080 Speaker 1: I have two children. I did not tell them while 431 00:28:46,080 --> 00:28:49,520 Speaker 1: we were overseas. But when we came back from overseas 432 00:28:49,600 --> 00:28:52,800 Speaker 1: and they were in middle school at an age where 433 00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:56,360 Speaker 1: they could keep a secret and at a point where 434 00:28:56,680 --> 00:29:01,200 Speaker 1: they could understand what it meant, I told them and 435 00:29:01,240 --> 00:29:03,920 Speaker 1: they were both pretty surprised. They thought I had some 436 00:29:04,000 --> 00:29:09,719 Speaker 1: boring office job. It's slightly less shocking that they wouldn't 437 00:29:09,720 --> 00:29:13,440 Speaker 1: have noticed. I remember once my daughter, or she must 438 00:29:13,480 --> 00:29:15,800 Speaker 1: have been about in first grade, when the kids put 439 00:29:15,800 --> 00:29:18,840 Speaker 1: together little books with their family, and they draw pictures 440 00:29:18,840 --> 00:29:23,360 Speaker 1: of themselves and their family. Here's my dad, here's my mom. 441 00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:28,120 Speaker 1: She has a boring office job, you know. And when 442 00:29:28,120 --> 00:29:31,080 Speaker 1: she doesn't do that, she's a housewife. I saw that, 443 00:29:31,120 --> 00:29:34,600 Speaker 1: and I kind of laughed. That's a great story when 444 00:29:34,640 --> 00:29:38,440 Speaker 1: you think about what obviously you valued and found very 445 00:29:38,520 --> 00:29:42,880 Speaker 1: very fulfilling, both as a profession as a career. What 446 00:29:43,080 --> 00:29:47,840 Speaker 1: is it you wish the American people understood about the 447 00:29:47,920 --> 00:29:52,400 Speaker 1: intelligence community at large and the CIA in particular. I 448 00:29:52,480 --> 00:29:58,440 Speaker 1: wish they understood we operate under law. Before I came 449 00:29:58,520 --> 00:30:02,360 Speaker 1: to CIA, worked at Simon and Schuster book Publishing. At 450 00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:04,760 Speaker 1: book publishing, I worked with a lot of really smart, 451 00:30:04,960 --> 00:30:09,320 Speaker 1: really creative people. People I enjoyed the biggest difference. When 452 00:30:09,360 --> 00:30:12,680 Speaker 1: I came to government to the CIA, also worked with creative, 453 00:30:12,840 --> 00:30:17,360 Speaker 1: very smart people, very dedicated people. The biggest difference was 454 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:21,280 Speaker 1: they were ethical. The people I worked with at CIA, 455 00:30:21,960 --> 00:30:26,840 Speaker 1: huge huge emphasis is put on integrity. In fact, if 456 00:30:26,880 --> 00:30:32,080 Speaker 1: you are found to lack integrity, it's a career killer 457 00:30:32,520 --> 00:30:34,600 Speaker 1: because so much of what you do you do out 458 00:30:34,600 --> 00:30:38,160 Speaker 1: on your own when nobody's looking, and if you are 459 00:30:38,640 --> 00:30:42,960 Speaker 1: inventing stories or not telling the truth, that's the end 460 00:30:43,000 --> 00:30:48,360 Speaker 1: of your career. I wish they could understand the dedication 461 00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:53,880 Speaker 1: that people in the intelligence community and at the CIA 462 00:30:54,200 --> 00:30:58,200 Speaker 1: have and how committed they are to the mission, but 463 00:30:58,440 --> 00:31:02,040 Speaker 1: also with a commitment to doing it in a lawful way. 464 00:31:02,760 --> 00:31:05,480 Speaker 1: I think when you watch the movies, we all come 465 00:31:05,520 --> 00:31:09,800 Speaker 1: across a sort of rogue operators, and while there is 466 00:31:09,840 --> 00:31:14,760 Speaker 1: a certain case officer personality, they would probably call us cowboys, 467 00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:18,760 Speaker 1: we operate under the law. From your perspective, it sounds 468 00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:21,200 Speaker 1: simulate if somebody come up to you today who was 469 00:31:21,680 --> 00:31:25,360 Speaker 1: in the early twenties and said is this a career 470 00:31:25,480 --> 00:31:30,520 Speaker 1: worth pursuing, that you really found it very fulfilling. I 471 00:31:30,560 --> 00:31:34,680 Speaker 1: think I can say without hesitation that joining the CIA 472 00:31:34,840 --> 00:31:37,080 Speaker 1: was one of the decisions I made in my life. 473 00:31:37,800 --> 00:31:41,400 Speaker 1: That's after thirty years of looking back. I won't say 474 00:31:41,440 --> 00:31:44,880 Speaker 1: that every day of my time at the CIA was 475 00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:49,920 Speaker 1: a pleasure. I was in some uncomfortable situations, but overall, 476 00:31:49,920 --> 00:31:53,400 Speaker 1: the trajectory I think was positive. I like to feel 477 00:31:53,440 --> 00:31:58,040 Speaker 1: like I did some service to our country, and it's 478 00:31:58,120 --> 00:32:02,239 Speaker 1: that bottom line of protect the American people. You are 479 00:32:02,280 --> 00:32:11,280 Speaker 1: a real joy to talk to. Well, thank you, Thank 480 00:32:11,320 --> 00:32:14,120 Speaker 1: you to my guest Raleigh Flynn. You can read more 481 00:32:14,120 --> 00:32:17,680 Speaker 1: about the Central Intelligence Agency and Raleigh Flynn's life as 482 00:32:17,680 --> 00:32:21,680 Speaker 1: a leader in intelligence on our show page at newtsworld 483 00:32:21,760 --> 00:32:26,400 Speaker 1: dot com. Newtsworld is produced by Westwood One. Our executive 484 00:32:26,400 --> 00:32:30,800 Speaker 1: producers Debbie Myers, and our producer is Garnsey Slump. Our 485 00:32:30,920 --> 00:32:34,960 Speaker 1: editor is Robert Barowski, and our researcher is Rachel Peterson. 486 00:32:35,560 --> 00:32:38,760 Speaker 1: Our guest booker is Grace Davis. The artwork for the 487 00:32:38,800 --> 00:32:43,120 Speaker 1: show was created by Steve Pendley. The music was composed 488 00:32:43,160 --> 00:32:46,720 Speaker 1: by Joey Salvia. Special thanks the team at Ginger Sweet 489 00:32:46,800 --> 00:32:51,720 Speaker 1: sixty and Westwood One's John Wardock and Robert Mathers. Please 490 00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:55,760 Speaker 1: email me with your comments at newt at newtsworld dot 491 00:32:55,760 --> 00:32:59,080 Speaker 1: com if you've been enjoying Newtsworld. I hope you'll go 492 00:32:59,080 --> 00:33:02,400 Speaker 1: to Apple podcast and both rate us with five stars 493 00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:05,120 Speaker 1: and give us a review so others can learn what 494 00:33:05,160 --> 00:33:10,360 Speaker 1: it's all about. On the next episode of New World, 495 00:33:11,040 --> 00:33:14,400 Speaker 1: advances in genetic testing are changing the way we approach 496 00:33:14,440 --> 00:33:18,360 Speaker 1: our personalized healthcare. On the next episode, we'll walk through 497 00:33:18,400 --> 00:33:22,960 Speaker 1: the process of genetic counseling, testing and results and what 498 00:33:23,040 --> 00:33:25,880 Speaker 1: they mean for our future. I think a huge potential 499 00:33:25,960 --> 00:33:30,640 Speaker 1: to start incorporating genomics into that risk calculation to help 500 00:33:30,720 --> 00:33:34,800 Speaker 1: better identify patients at risk for a lot of different conditions. 501 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:47,240 Speaker 1: I'm new Gingrich. This is new Tworld, the Westwood one 502 00:33:47,240 --> 00:33:48,320 Speaker 1: podcast network.