WEBVTT - Bill Miller on the Classical Value Portfolio (Podcast)

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<v Speaker 1>This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>This week, on the podcast what Can I Say, you

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<v Speaker 1>are in for a treat, Bill Miller spends an hour

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<v Speaker 1>waxing eloquent on everything from why value investing has underperformed

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<v Speaker 1>and what you should do about it, the impact of

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<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve, why bitcoin is a fascinating technology as

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<v Speaker 1>well as a potential currency substitute, maybe for the dollar,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe for something else. This was really an unbelievable conversation.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't want to gush too much, but Bill Miller

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<v Speaker 1>is just one of these people who understands the way

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<v Speaker 1>markets work, who understands how to express what's going on

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<v Speaker 1>in an investment posture. Their funds run a one active share,

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<v Speaker 1>meaning there is zero closet index in going on, and

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<v Speaker 1>they have been one of the top performers since the

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<v Speaker 1>market bottomed oh eight oh nine after the financial crisis.

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<v Speaker 1>What can I say? This is just a tour to

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<v Speaker 1>force exposition on investing theory and practice in the real world.

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<v Speaker 1>Just unbelievable. So, with no further ado, my conversation with

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<v Speaker 1>Bill Miller. This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts

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<v Speaker 1>On Bloomberg Radio. My extra special guest this week is

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<v Speaker 1>Bill Miller. He formed the Miller Value Partners in as

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<v Speaker 1>both an r I A and an investment manager for

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<v Speaker 1>the Miller Value family of funds running about two billion

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<v Speaker 1>dollars and assets under management. Previously, he ran the leg

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<v Speaker 1>Mason's Capital Management Value Trust. After fees, the funds beat

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<v Speaker 1>the S and P five for fifteen consecutive years from

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<v Speaker 1>through two thousand and five. That is a feat that

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think has ever been matched. Bill Miller, Welcome

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<v Speaker 1>to Masters in Business. Thanks Barry, and it's great to

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<v Speaker 1>be here. I should say, welcome back. Our last conversation

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<v Speaker 1>was in let's talk a little bit about what's going

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<v Speaker 1>on in the world today. Early March, you went on

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<v Speaker 1>TV and said you were looking at one of the

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<v Speaker 1>best buying opportunities of your lifetime. That turned out to

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<v Speaker 1>be quite a prescient call. Tell us what you were

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<v Speaker 1>looking at that led to that conclusion, what was behind

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<v Speaker 1>the thought process. So one of the things that that

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<v Speaker 1>I'm quite confident of having done this for just about

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<v Speaker 1>forty years, is that nobody can predict the market with

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<v Speaker 1>any maybe maybe Jim Simons and Renaissance, but certainly not

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<v Speaker 1>Certland me, and certainly not basically anybody else that I've

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<v Speaker 1>come in contact with any consistent basis. So given that,

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<v Speaker 1>I think, I think one of the things that I

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<v Speaker 1>want to look at is just how the market has

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<v Speaker 1>behaved relative to its history. And in this case, what

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<v Speaker 1>we saw is the fastest decline from all time highs

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<v Speaker 1>to a to a bear market in history. And when

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<v Speaker 1>things happen that have never happened before, that always gets

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<v Speaker 1>my attention. I tend to be in the Howard Marks

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<v Speaker 1>camp that you can probably if you're lucky, recognize extreme points,

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<v Speaker 1>but other than that, you probably have no better than

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<v Speaker 1>a coin toss of trying to uh trying to predict

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<v Speaker 1>your guests regular cyclical turning points. So in this case,

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<v Speaker 1>it just seemed to me that the prices had gotten

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<v Speaker 1>so out of whack with anything other than very very

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<v Speaker 1>short term UH fundamentals, that that the probabilities were great

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<v Speaker 1>that if you had a time horizon longer than a

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<v Speaker 1>few weeks or a few months, that you would do

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<v Speaker 1>very very well. And I think that, you know, it

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<v Speaker 1>reminds me of two thousand and two thousand and eight,

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<v Speaker 1>when Warren Buffett wrote that Op ed and and he said,

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<v Speaker 1>by American stocks, That's what I'm doing. And if I

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<v Speaker 1>was at a meeting with Warren a couple of years

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<v Speaker 1>later and somebody said, Warren, how did you know that

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<v Speaker 1>was the right time him to buy stocks? And he said,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know time, I know price. He said that

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<v Speaker 1>those prices were completely dislocated from any type of long term,

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<v Speaker 1>long term reality unless you believe that the U. S

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<v Speaker 1>economy is going to be in a permanent depression. And

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<v Speaker 1>so I think that's the same thing that that. My

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<v Speaker 1>view was that those prices were very, very disconnected. And

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<v Speaker 1>if you look today, the markets had a big rally,

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<v Speaker 1>but look at those prices back on Marche and the

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<v Speaker 1>few days Africa. I mean, most things are up, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>from the lows, even if they're not back close to

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<v Speaker 1>their highs. So that was an extreme That was an

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<v Speaker 1>extreme point. So let's talk about both that moved down

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<v Speaker 1>and that move up. Not only fastest bear market, fastest

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<v Speaker 1>drop in history, but since those lows, markets are up

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<v Speaker 1>about in one of the fastest recoveries we've ever seen.

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<v Speaker 1>The common pushback I hear from people is the market

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<v Speaker 1>has gotten ahead of itself. We've gone too far, too fast.

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<v Speaker 1>What do you say to those folks, I'd say I'd

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<v Speaker 1>make one one comment and then one um observation. So

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<v Speaker 1>the comment is that if you go back and look

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<v Speaker 1>at bear markets and look at history, there tends to

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<v Speaker 1>be a rough symmetry between how long it took to

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<v Speaker 1>get to the lows and how long the recovery took.

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<v Speaker 1>So when you've had a very again this is the

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<v Speaker 1>sharpest in history, when you've had a very very dramatic drop,

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<v Speaker 1>you can go back to seven for example, in the

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<v Speaker 1>market crash. So the market, you know, after churning around

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<v Speaker 1>at the bottom for a while, it began a strong

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<v Speaker 1>recovery in nineteen and you know, made it back to

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<v Speaker 1>those highs in the not too in the not too

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<v Speaker 1>distant future. So this is not this is not unusual

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<v Speaker 1>compared to what we've seen before. Just so we don't

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<v Speaker 1>see these kinds of declines very often, and they tend

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<v Speaker 1>to be far enough apart that most people don't go

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<v Speaker 1>back and look at history. They just they just look

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<v Speaker 1>at their own their own reaction. So, um, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>with that said, I would say that, um that that

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<v Speaker 1>comment that which what you mentioned about people thinking the

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<v Speaker 1>market ahead of itself. The market disconnected from reality is

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<v Speaker 1>one of those things that I always puzzle at because

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<v Speaker 1>this is something that's actually pretty easy to analyze. And

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<v Speaker 1>the first part of it, the first part of it

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<v Speaker 1>is that if you before you can say the market

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<v Speaker 1>is disconnected from reality, you have to some belief or

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<v Speaker 1>evidence about what the connection is between the market and

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<v Speaker 1>economic reality. And the answer there is very clear, there

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<v Speaker 1>is no connection whatsoever. If you go back and look

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<v Speaker 1>at all the going back from thirty to like two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand and nineteen, and you look at the the annual

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<v Speaker 1>correlation between the market's return and the economic growth, the

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<v Speaker 1>answer there is I think that, uh that the correlation

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<v Speaker 1>coefficient is point zero nine, meaning it's random. There's zero

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<v Speaker 1>is exact random at there's point zero nine. So there's

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<v Speaker 1>basically no correlation whatsoever. If you look at rolling ten

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<v Speaker 1>year periods, so not just that you know, not just

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<v Speaker 1>that the annual periods, but rolling every rolling ten year

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<v Speaker 1>period from that same thing, the correlation is minus point four,

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<v Speaker 1>meaning there's a negative correlation between the economy and economic growth.

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<v Speaker 1>So the idea that this market is disconnected from reality

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<v Speaker 1>because it's actually gone up and economic growth is you

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<v Speaker 1>know was going down at the same time is very

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<v Speaker 1>consistent with history. And the second thing, and maybe may

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<v Speaker 1>be easier to understand, is that the market is a

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<v Speaker 1>as a forward looking indicator. It reflects people's expectations about

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<v Speaker 1>what's going to happen. It doesn't reflect what has happened

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<v Speaker 1>in the past. And so as I like to say

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<v Speaker 1>the market predicts the economy, the economy does not predict

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<v Speaker 1>the market. So the market bottom way before the economy.

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<v Speaker 1>The economy's bottoming, you know, in the in the second

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<v Speaker 1>quarter will be the you know, the economy's economy's bottom,

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<v Speaker 1>and the market bottom was in the first quarter, and

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<v Speaker 1>so I don't think there's anything out of whack with

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<v Speaker 1>what's going on. The market bought. If the market did

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<v Speaker 1>in fact bottom and the second quarter, as it appears

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<v Speaker 1>it did, then that means that it's getting better. And

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<v Speaker 1>so if it's getting better, then the market should be

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<v Speaker 1>reflecting that it's getting better. And if you look at

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<v Speaker 1>the current consensus, what you'd see is that that if

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<v Speaker 1>the market on an annual spasis in the second quarter

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<v Speaker 1>was down, maybe let's call it, and we don't know

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<v Speaker 1>what it is. Some of those numbers, like the housing

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<v Speaker 1>numbers yesterday, the consumer spending numbers were just way, way

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<v Speaker 1>better than people expected. But even if we're down thirty percent,

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<v Speaker 1>then what you would get would be normally speaking, and

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<v Speaker 1>I'm going out at Hymen's data here, which you have

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<v Speaker 1>third quarter and fourth quarter, and then if you just

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<v Speaker 1>get back to five nominal growth in the first quarter

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<v Speaker 1>of next year, you'd be back at all time highs

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<v Speaker 1>on GDP. So I don't think that the market is

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<v Speaker 1>ahead of itself. The only way the market ahead of

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<v Speaker 1>itself is if we have a very huge reversal in

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<v Speaker 1>what's going on. Namely, we have a we have a

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<v Speaker 1>so called second wave where they shut down the economy again.

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<v Speaker 1>But even though the cases, the case loads aren't looking

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<v Speaker 1>that great, um the death rates still falling, and I

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<v Speaker 1>think that we're not going to see a shutdown of

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<v Speaker 1>the economy. We may see you know, moderate changes in things,

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<v Speaker 1>but to shut down the old economy again the way

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<v Speaker 1>we did in you know, in March and April, I

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<v Speaker 1>don't think it's going to happen. So I would I

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<v Speaker 1>would be shocked if the if the mark retest those

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<v Speaker 1>old loaves. Let's talk a little bit about what's going

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<v Speaker 1>on today. In the world of investing, and you and

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<v Speaker 1>I were both around in the nineties. I have to

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<v Speaker 1>ask you about the rise of these robin Hood day traders.

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<v Speaker 1>What is this just a distraction or is this a

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<v Speaker 1>potential speculative frenzy. It's both. I mean I think that

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<v Speaker 1>there's it's it's a distraction in the sense of these

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<v Speaker 1>The number of people that are actually trading on robin

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<v Speaker 1>Hood is trivial in terms of numbers of people, of

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<v Speaker 1>the volume that they can do, uh, relative to the

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<v Speaker 1>overall market. Maybe they can have an impact on something

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<v Speaker 1>like Hurts and All or some of these smaller names.

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<v Speaker 1>But um, but I think the focus on that is

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<v Speaker 1>is misplaced unless it's just it's just years entered something

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<v Speaker 1>entertaining to entertaining to look at. As you remember, Barry

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<v Speaker 1>back in the back in the late ninety nineties, with

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<v Speaker 1>the you know, with dot com tech telecom bubble, the

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<v Speaker 1>day traders were everywhere, and they were there, weren't robin hoods,

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<v Speaker 1>and that was you know, ridge firms were raising their

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<v Speaker 1>raising their margin requirements, and so there was a there

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<v Speaker 1>was a lot more impact I think on the overall

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<v Speaker 1>markets behavior during that time than there is right now

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<v Speaker 1>the volumes were lower relative to the the number of

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<v Speaker 1>people that were trading and the way in which trading

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<v Speaker 1>was done. And uh, and now the volumes are huge

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<v Speaker 1>compared to what people in Robin Hood are day traders

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<v Speaker 1>are doing. I remember it as sort of a national pastime.

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<v Speaker 1>You couldn't walk into a restaurant a bar without seeing

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<v Speaker 1>the stock market on the TV. It's nothing remotely like

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<v Speaker 1>that today. Last we spoke you, you had a very

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<v Speaker 1>interesting quote that I have to ask your thoughts on.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh In you said, we are only halfway through the

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<v Speaker 1>shift from active to passive. Give us an update. Where

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<v Speaker 1>are we in that process? Do you still think lots

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<v Speaker 1>of fund managers or closet indexers and that this transition

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<v Speaker 1>is going to continue or or how is your thinking

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<v Speaker 1>on this? I think that you know, active management is

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<v Speaker 1>in secular decline. So just like newspapers have been in

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<v Speaker 1>secular decline for a long time, you know, once the

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<v Speaker 1>Internet got going, active management has been in a secular

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<v Speaker 1>decline and that's going to continue because most active managers

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<v Speaker 1>don't add value and most people, especially as the demographics

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<v Speaker 1>get older, people become more risk averse and so they're

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<v Speaker 1>they're happy to have tracking error if you're if you're

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<v Speaker 1>active managers way above the market, but if the managers

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<v Speaker 1>the market is a standard and you're below the market

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<v Speaker 1>for a couple of years and people take their money out.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, there was a statistic which you probably saw

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<v Speaker 1>that I was surprised at, which was that a fidelity

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<v Speaker 1>UH that basically of failities clients who were sixty five

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<v Speaker 1>and older took one of their money out of equities

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<v Speaker 1>in the first quarter of this year. So that gives

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<v Speaker 1>you a sense of both the risk aversion and how

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<v Speaker 1>fear spreads in the market, and also the fact that

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<v Speaker 1>the passive money still gets still as getting the flows.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, equity e t f s are getting flows,

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<v Speaker 1>but the at the average active manager you know is

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<v Speaker 1>getting consistent outflows. And of course we've seen this year

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<v Speaker 1>that that equity managers broadly defined equity mutual funds have

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<v Speaker 1>that big outflows, and bond funds have continue to get inflows.

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<v Speaker 1>So I think I think we've still got a ways

0:12:16.480 --> 0:12:18.440
<v Speaker 1>to go in that and uh. And so there's going

0:12:18.480 --> 0:12:22.160
<v Speaker 1>to be an uphill climb or swimming against the tide

0:12:22.240 --> 0:12:24.640
<v Speaker 1>or whatever. If you're an active manager, I would say

0:12:24.679 --> 0:12:27.480
<v Speaker 1>it's also that the hedge funds have also dropped into

0:12:27.559 --> 0:12:30.680
<v Speaker 1>that category. They're much earlier in the thing. But you know,

0:12:30.720 --> 0:12:32.679
<v Speaker 1>in a low anomenal rate of return world, where the

0:12:33.080 --> 0:12:36.439
<v Speaker 1>tenure interest rate of sixty basis points, somebody's going to

0:12:36.559 --> 0:12:38.800
<v Speaker 1>charge you know, one or one and a half or

0:12:38.840 --> 0:12:43.480
<v Speaker 1>two and twenty to manage your money and fiftent of

0:12:43.520 --> 0:12:45.880
<v Speaker 1>the profits, no matter how meager those profits are. That's

0:12:45.880 --> 0:12:48.760
<v Speaker 1>a losing proposition. So I think that also is is

0:12:49.040 --> 0:12:51.840
<v Speaker 1>the hedge fund world is probably a net net liquidation

0:12:51.880 --> 0:12:54.960
<v Speaker 1>as well. So you mentioned sixty basis points on the

0:12:55.040 --> 0:12:58.000
<v Speaker 1>ten year what do you make of the bond market

0:12:58.400 --> 0:13:01.400
<v Speaker 1>where it is is a talent us anything about inflation?

0:13:02.000 --> 0:13:07.239
<v Speaker 1>And what sort of support does that provide for equities

0:13:07.280 --> 0:13:11.600
<v Speaker 1>if yield on treasuries is practically nothing? Yeah, it's it's

0:13:11.640 --> 0:13:14.240
<v Speaker 1>really interesting that the current yield on the s n

0:13:14.280 --> 0:13:17.360
<v Speaker 1>P five hundred is about three times the yield on

0:13:17.600 --> 0:13:20.400
<v Speaker 1>the ten year treasury. And so one of those so

0:13:20.480 --> 0:13:23.080
<v Speaker 1>called no brainer trades to me would be, you know,

0:13:23.080 --> 0:13:26.160
<v Speaker 1>if you've got a ten year horizon uh in the market,

0:13:26.240 --> 0:13:28.640
<v Speaker 1>or even a five year horizon for that matter, you know,

0:13:28.840 --> 0:13:31.280
<v Speaker 1>go along the you know, an equity index fund and

0:13:31.280 --> 0:13:33.520
<v Speaker 1>and go short to five year ten year treasury would

0:13:33.520 --> 0:13:36.200
<v Speaker 1>seem to me a you know a thing will be

0:13:36.320 --> 0:13:39.160
<v Speaker 1>very difficult to lose any substantial amount of money. And again,

0:13:39.200 --> 0:13:42.200
<v Speaker 1>if the if the people were worried about inflation or right,

0:13:42.240 --> 0:13:44.360
<v Speaker 1>inflation isn't a problem for the next couple of years

0:13:44.360 --> 0:13:47.400
<v Speaker 1>for sure, but if it becomes a problem in year three, four, five,

0:13:47.480 --> 0:13:50.760
<v Speaker 1>and the yield curve starts shifting up significantly, then that

0:13:50.800 --> 0:13:52.480
<v Speaker 1>would be that would be kind of a home run,

0:13:53.480 --> 0:13:56.400
<v Speaker 1>a home run trade. So I think I think right now,

0:13:56.440 --> 0:13:58.720
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you know, interest rates, as my center runs

0:13:58.720 --> 0:14:02.840
<v Speaker 1>our income fund says, the data shows that interest rates

0:14:02.840 --> 0:14:05.520
<v Speaker 1>have have been falling in real terms for eight hundred years,

0:14:06.040 --> 0:14:07.679
<v Speaker 1>and so you don't want to better interest rates are

0:14:07.679 --> 0:14:09.840
<v Speaker 1>gonna rise. And and my return to that as well,

0:14:09.880 --> 0:14:11.720
<v Speaker 1>if you if you lived a thousand years, that would

0:14:11.720 --> 0:14:14.240
<v Speaker 1>be relevant. But what we see in the bond market

0:14:14.280 --> 0:14:16.000
<v Speaker 1>is that goes to these long cycles where we had

0:14:16.000 --> 0:14:18.080
<v Speaker 1>a thirty five year bear market in bonds, you know,

0:14:18.080 --> 0:14:22.560
<v Speaker 1>almost a full working career from one, and now I've

0:14:22.560 --> 0:14:25.280
<v Speaker 1>got a thirty eight year bolt market in bonds, and

0:14:25.360 --> 0:14:27.680
<v Speaker 1>they rates can't go much lower than where they are

0:14:27.760 --> 0:14:29.440
<v Speaker 1>right now. Maybe they're not going to go up a lot,

0:14:29.480 --> 0:14:32.640
<v Speaker 1>but uh, you're they're negative in real terms, and certainly

0:14:32.680 --> 0:14:36.360
<v Speaker 1>real terms after tax. So I think bonds are as

0:14:36.400 --> 0:14:42.040
<v Speaker 1>unattractive now as stocks were in September of night seven,

0:14:42.080 --> 0:14:47.440
<v Speaker 1>when than thirty year yielded nine percent and the stock

0:14:47.480 --> 0:14:50.880
<v Speaker 1>market yielded up about two point eight percent, and the

0:14:50.880 --> 0:14:53.280
<v Speaker 1>stock market traded at the highest pe since in nineteen

0:14:53.320 --> 0:14:56.240
<v Speaker 1>twenty nine, and so there was no reason to own

0:14:56.280 --> 0:14:59.240
<v Speaker 1>stocks then because the dividend yield on the divident growth

0:14:59.280 --> 0:15:02.280
<v Speaker 1>rate and stocks abou six. So if everything went well,

0:15:02.360 --> 0:15:05.640
<v Speaker 1>you'd get close to nine percent in stocks if valuations

0:15:05.680 --> 0:15:07.560
<v Speaker 1>didn't drop and they stayed at the at the all

0:15:07.600 --> 0:15:10.280
<v Speaker 1>time high. But otherwise, why why did it buy a

0:15:10.320 --> 0:15:12.680
<v Speaker 1>thirty year bonds and go home? And that was the

0:15:12.760 --> 0:15:14.080
<v Speaker 1>right thing to do then, and I think the right

0:15:14.080 --> 0:15:17.040
<v Speaker 1>thing to do now is to forget about bonds, except,

0:15:17.160 --> 0:15:19.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, except in a very rare instance that you

0:15:19.640 --> 0:15:23.000
<v Speaker 1>might think we have a deflationary bust, in which case, okay,

0:15:23.000 --> 0:15:26.720
<v Speaker 1>Ben Graham talked about having no less than of your

0:15:26.800 --> 0:15:30.720
<v Speaker 1>money and bonds, so PU quality corporates or something like that.

0:15:30.800 --> 0:15:34.240
<v Speaker 1>But I don't find bonds at all attractive now. Quite interesting.

0:15:34.560 --> 0:15:37.320
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned earlier some of the tech stocks of the nineties.

0:15:37.920 --> 0:15:40.840
<v Speaker 1>What do you make of the big five big cap

0:15:40.880 --> 0:15:45.400
<v Speaker 1>tech stocks? Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Google? Have they gotten

0:15:45.680 --> 0:15:49.680
<v Speaker 1>too big? And if so, is their risk of government

0:15:50.640 --> 0:15:54.440
<v Speaker 1>reregulation or even any trust enforcement. Yeah, I thought you're

0:15:54.440 --> 0:15:57.040
<v Speaker 1>gonna ask a slightly different question, which is, you know,

0:15:58.120 --> 0:16:00.640
<v Speaker 1>not have they gotten too big, but are they too expensive?

0:16:00.640 --> 0:16:03.239
<v Speaker 1>And what kind of you know, what kind of opportunities

0:16:03.280 --> 0:16:06.400
<v Speaker 1>are there? Well, there's certainly there's certainly cheaper than they

0:16:06.440 --> 0:16:11.080
<v Speaker 1>were in the radically cheaper, radically cheaper, So I'm not

0:16:11.080 --> 0:16:12.920
<v Speaker 1>even I'm not worried about We We own all of

0:16:12.960 --> 0:16:17.560
<v Speaker 1>them except for um, Netflix right now, so at which

0:16:17.560 --> 0:16:19.960
<v Speaker 1>we've owned with a larger show older and Netflix a

0:16:19.960 --> 0:16:22.200
<v Speaker 1>couple of different times, and that's the only one that

0:16:22.240 --> 0:16:25.480
<v Speaker 1>I think is expensive. Although I think if you've got

0:16:25.520 --> 0:16:27.960
<v Speaker 1>a longer term time rise and that will do that

0:16:28.000 --> 0:16:30.000
<v Speaker 1>will do fine as well. But you get back to

0:16:30.000 --> 0:16:32.800
<v Speaker 1>the late I mean, ge traded fifty times earnings and

0:16:32.880 --> 0:16:36.040
<v Speaker 1>home Depot traded at fifty times earnings. So uh, you know,

0:16:36.040 --> 0:16:39.239
<v Speaker 1>these stocks at this level don't look to me particularly

0:16:39.240 --> 0:16:41.560
<v Speaker 1>extended at all, even though they've done very very well

0:16:41.600 --> 0:16:44.440
<v Speaker 1>that they should have done well. Now the different question though,

0:16:44.920 --> 0:16:47.240
<v Speaker 1>where's the risk in them? Well, there's there's always risk

0:16:47.280 --> 0:16:49.640
<v Speaker 1>and and everything, and I think you hit at the

0:16:49.720 --> 0:16:52.760
<v Speaker 1>risk is uh, and I trust a reinterpretation of an

0:16:52.840 --> 0:16:55.520
<v Speaker 1>I trust. I don't think unless there's a Democrats sweep

0:16:56.040 --> 0:16:58.280
<v Speaker 1>that you'll get any significant change in the anti trust

0:16:58.400 --> 0:17:00.640
<v Speaker 1>laws like the Clayton Act of the Sherman Act, but

0:17:00.720 --> 0:17:05.240
<v Speaker 1>nothingtheless deftly changing the laws before courts can interpret things differently,

0:17:05.280 --> 0:17:08.240
<v Speaker 1>regulators can can come after the companies, and so I

0:17:08.240 --> 0:17:11.080
<v Speaker 1>do think the regulatory risk and the government risk is

0:17:11.160 --> 0:17:13.199
<v Speaker 1>high in these companies, but that's what you'd expect for

0:17:13.240 --> 0:17:16.639
<v Speaker 1>companies that are so dominant and so large, and you

0:17:16.680 --> 0:17:21.639
<v Speaker 1>know five of them, the S and P five. So yeah, Now,

0:17:21.640 --> 0:17:23.080
<v Speaker 1>I don't think the risk is so great that it

0:17:23.080 --> 0:17:26.879
<v Speaker 1>will significantly inhibit what you can earn from them. But

0:17:26.920 --> 0:17:29.199
<v Speaker 1>maybe they traded a multiple point or two lower, and

0:17:29.240 --> 0:17:32.240
<v Speaker 1>there'd be headline risk more I think than real risk. Now,

0:17:32.320 --> 0:17:34.840
<v Speaker 1>let's talk a little bit about some of the changes

0:17:34.920 --> 0:17:40.360
<v Speaker 1>we've seen in the industry, including what some people are

0:17:40.400 --> 0:17:43.359
<v Speaker 1>calling the death of value investing, which I have to

0:17:43.440 --> 0:17:47.040
<v Speaker 1>imagine you're gonna snicker at. What Why has value been

0:17:47.080 --> 0:17:50.480
<v Speaker 1>having such a difficult time and what does this mean

0:17:50.640 --> 0:17:54.520
<v Speaker 1>for people's portfolios. Yeah, it's a fascinating question, and there's

0:17:54.520 --> 0:17:57.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot of there's a lot of i'd say different

0:17:57.400 --> 0:18:00.040
<v Speaker 1>views on this. We've got a guy named Dan Is

0:18:00.040 --> 0:18:03.439
<v Speaker 1>said who runs i'll call it a pure value or

0:18:03.440 --> 0:18:06.400
<v Speaker 1>a classical value portfolio, which which is basically a low

0:18:06.480 --> 0:18:09.359
<v Speaker 1>price to tangible book, low pe low price to cash flow.

0:18:10.000 --> 0:18:11.879
<v Speaker 1>And as you might expect, he's been having a very

0:18:11.880 --> 0:18:14.840
<v Speaker 1>difficult time of it and and sends out a never

0:18:15.000 --> 0:18:18.359
<v Speaker 1>ending stream of emails about how extreme this is and

0:18:18.400 --> 0:18:20.240
<v Speaker 1>how it's never happened before and it's got to be

0:18:20.280 --> 0:18:22.639
<v Speaker 1>a snap back at all. And then you might have

0:18:22.680 --> 0:18:25.679
<v Speaker 1>seen Cliff Asness his work on the same thing about

0:18:25.680 --> 0:18:27.760
<v Speaker 1>how extreme this is, and he believes that you're going

0:18:27.800 --> 0:18:29.840
<v Speaker 1>to get a snap back. So where I come out

0:18:29.840 --> 0:18:32.800
<v Speaker 1>on this is I think that the odds are overwhelming

0:18:33.600 --> 0:18:38.239
<v Speaker 1>that that i'd say, value as traditionally understood will do

0:18:38.440 --> 0:18:42.439
<v Speaker 1>very well from roughly now until maybe a year or

0:18:42.440 --> 0:18:45.640
<v Speaker 1>two years from now. It could be longer. But why

0:18:45.680 --> 0:18:48.000
<v Speaker 1>I say that is that the value has led out

0:18:48.000 --> 0:18:50.680
<v Speaker 1>of every recession as far back as the data goes,

0:18:51.600 --> 0:18:54.520
<v Speaker 1>and the reason for that is that when companies, when

0:18:54.520 --> 0:18:57.840
<v Speaker 1>the economy peaks and goes down, value name just tend

0:18:57.880 --> 0:19:00.639
<v Speaker 1>to be more cyclical. They return on cap little drops,

0:19:01.119 --> 0:19:04.800
<v Speaker 1>and so their theoretical valuation just viavation drops and the

0:19:04.840 --> 0:19:08.160
<v Speaker 1>stocks underperform. And then we come out of a recession,

0:19:08.359 --> 0:19:12.160
<v Speaker 1>they're they're returning capital rises because they're more cyclical than

0:19:12.160 --> 0:19:16.639
<v Speaker 1>a Coca Cola or Amazon, and so therefore they outperformed.

0:19:17.240 --> 0:19:19.239
<v Speaker 1>And we've seen that right now. If you look at

0:19:19.240 --> 0:19:21.119
<v Speaker 1>the the over going to repeat that right now, if

0:19:21.160 --> 0:19:23.600
<v Speaker 1>you look at what happened, you know, going to March,

0:19:25.320 --> 0:19:29.600
<v Speaker 1>the tech names, the stay at home names, the secular winners,

0:19:30.160 --> 0:19:32.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, service now and Shopify, those kinds of things,

0:19:33.000 --> 0:19:35.840
<v Speaker 1>they killed the market. And uh, I mean, I'm some

0:19:35.880 --> 0:19:37.320
<v Speaker 1>of the guys that are really good at this, like

0:19:37.359 --> 0:19:41.200
<v Speaker 1>Dennis Lynch at Morgan Stanley or James Anderson at Bailey Gifford.

0:19:41.359 --> 0:19:43.240
<v Speaker 1>You know, the high high growth guys. I mean, they're

0:19:43.320 --> 0:19:46.720
<v Speaker 1>up in the for the year and you know, traditional

0:19:46.760 --> 0:19:48.639
<v Speaker 1>value guys are at the at the bottom of the page.

0:19:48.680 --> 0:19:51.760
<v Speaker 1>But since March, the value people have beaten the growth

0:19:51.840 --> 0:19:54.520
<v Speaker 1>people pretty handily. And uh, and I think that that's

0:19:54.600 --> 0:19:57.880
<v Speaker 1>because the economy, you know has been bottoming and then

0:19:58.000 --> 0:20:00.400
<v Speaker 1>the economy is going to start up. And so what

0:20:00.440 --> 0:20:02.040
<v Speaker 1>you what you see? I mean a day like yesterday,

0:20:02.080 --> 0:20:04.360
<v Speaker 1>the markets up one and a half percent, and most

0:20:04.400 --> 0:20:07.960
<v Speaker 1>of those growth all those growth names underperformed dramatically. So

0:20:08.240 --> 0:20:11.080
<v Speaker 1>I think in the in the relatively short run, meaning

0:20:11.119 --> 0:20:14.800
<v Speaker 1>now until the next year or two, the odds are

0:20:15.160 --> 0:20:19.679
<v Speaker 1>strong that value will outperform growth. But a little more,

0:20:19.720 --> 0:20:22.879
<v Speaker 1>a little more UH nuance here. The reason that value

0:20:22.880 --> 0:20:26.680
<v Speaker 1>has done so badly for ten years is that value

0:20:26.800 --> 0:20:31.359
<v Speaker 1>thrives in a in an environment of reversion to the means.

0:20:31.400 --> 0:20:33.840
<v Speaker 1>So the economy speeds up and then it peaks, then

0:20:33.880 --> 0:20:35.679
<v Speaker 1>it goes down at bottom. So you have this kind

0:20:35.720 --> 0:20:38.760
<v Speaker 1>of cyclicality. And if you look since the since the

0:20:38.760 --> 0:20:41.919
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis, since March of o nine, the economy for

0:20:42.000 --> 0:20:44.240
<v Speaker 1>ten years grew basically between one and a half and

0:20:44.240 --> 0:20:46.960
<v Speaker 1>two and a half percent, averaged about two percent with

0:20:47.080 --> 0:20:51.120
<v Speaker 1>low inflation, with UH, with the low interest rates, and

0:20:51.160 --> 0:20:54.480
<v Speaker 1>not a lot of cyclicality. And therefore that's an environment

0:20:54.480 --> 0:20:58.119
<v Speaker 1>where growth is going to thrive because low nominal growth

0:20:58.560 --> 0:21:00.720
<v Speaker 1>such as we're low real one and a half to

0:21:00.760 --> 0:21:04.880
<v Speaker 1>two basically, then if you grow fast like an Amazon

0:21:05.080 --> 0:21:09.440
<v Speaker 1>or a Google alphabet. Your your theoretical valuation is much

0:21:09.560 --> 0:21:11.720
<v Speaker 1>much greater than it is otherwise. I saw a thing

0:21:11.720 --> 0:21:13.480
<v Speaker 1>in the journey. You might have seen it last week

0:21:13.480 --> 0:21:17.200
<v Speaker 1>where somebody was looking at the academic literature and said

0:21:17.200 --> 0:21:19.399
<v Speaker 1>that if you if you run nest Lye through a

0:21:19.480 --> 0:21:22.639
<v Speaker 1>model of what the what the you know, the market

0:21:22.680 --> 0:21:24.680
<v Speaker 1>kind of looks like now with interest rates at six

0:21:24.760 --> 0:21:28.440
<v Speaker 1>year seventy basis points and low nominal growth from here,

0:21:28.440 --> 0:21:31.800
<v Speaker 1>then Nestle's worth fifty times earnings. And so I think

0:21:31.840 --> 0:21:34.600
<v Speaker 1>that's the that's the thing that would put value, you know,

0:21:34.760 --> 0:21:37.359
<v Speaker 1>back behind the eight ball, which is if growth in

0:21:37.359 --> 0:21:39.600
<v Speaker 1>the future is like growth in the last ten years,

0:21:40.119 --> 0:21:41.920
<v Speaker 1>so call it one and a half to two percent.

0:21:42.040 --> 0:21:44.800
<v Speaker 1>After we actually go to this high growth period, rebounding

0:21:45.280 --> 0:21:47.240
<v Speaker 1>and interest rates stay low. And by that I mean,

0:21:47.480 --> 0:21:49.399
<v Speaker 1>you know, the ten years, I don't know one and

0:21:49.440 --> 0:21:51.800
<v Speaker 1>a half or two and a half or then value

0:21:51.840 --> 0:21:54.000
<v Speaker 1>is going to have trouble again. So I think that's

0:21:54.000 --> 0:21:57.120
<v Speaker 1>the It's maybe a long winded answer, so it depends

0:21:57.119 --> 0:22:00.040
<v Speaker 1>a lot. It's context dependent. So if the world with

0:22:00.200 --> 0:22:02.800
<v Speaker 1>somewhat different, if the curve shifts upward, if inflation starts

0:22:02.800 --> 0:22:05.680
<v Speaker 1>to come back, then value will kill growth, and if

0:22:05.720 --> 0:22:08.600
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't, then growth will probably beat value again. So

0:22:08.640 --> 0:22:11.639
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned the stay at home stocks are doing well.

0:22:12.200 --> 0:22:17.439
<v Speaker 1>What industries and companies have been permanently impaired by the virus,

0:22:17.720 --> 0:22:24.280
<v Speaker 1>and where are the opportunities arising from this whole lockdown experience?

0:22:24.480 --> 0:22:26.880
<v Speaker 1>Is this going to change us or is this just

0:22:27.400 --> 0:22:32.240
<v Speaker 1>a temporary experience? So permanent is a long time, and

0:22:32.400 --> 0:22:35.000
<v Speaker 1>I would say that I'd said to that that nobody

0:22:35.200 --> 0:22:37.760
<v Speaker 1>has any idea because nobody knows what the future is

0:22:37.760 --> 0:22:40.760
<v Speaker 1>going to bring. I mean, people have talked about Bill Gates,

0:22:40.760 --> 0:22:43.280
<v Speaker 1>others have talked about going back years that we're going

0:22:43.320 --> 0:22:45.560
<v Speaker 1>to have another pandemic at some point. The problem is

0:22:45.680 --> 0:22:48.320
<v Speaker 1>you can't predict what that point is. And so at

0:22:48.320 --> 0:22:50.199
<v Speaker 1>the beginning of this year, no one was predicting a

0:22:50.240 --> 0:22:54.000
<v Speaker 1>pandemic this year, which has now radically upended all kinds

0:22:54.000 --> 0:22:57.800
<v Speaker 1>of things from the economy to growth rates too, you know,

0:22:58.040 --> 0:23:01.560
<v Speaker 1>access death rates, to change aging, industry norms, and all

0:23:01.600 --> 0:23:04.040
<v Speaker 1>of that kind of stuff. So if you look forward

0:23:04.080 --> 0:23:07.240
<v Speaker 1>and you say, what's what's permanently different, well, uh, there's

0:23:07.280 --> 0:23:09.240
<v Speaker 1>going to be nothing permanently different. If we have a

0:23:09.280 --> 0:23:11.800
<v Speaker 1>vaccine and the next and the relatively short term. By that,

0:23:11.840 --> 0:23:14.320
<v Speaker 1>I mean over the next six months to a year.

0:23:14.760 --> 0:23:17.639
<v Speaker 1>That's effective because if that happens and all of a sudden,

0:23:17.680 --> 0:23:20.280
<v Speaker 1>you can fly safely, you can travel on cruise ships safely,

0:23:20.560 --> 0:23:23.000
<v Speaker 1>you can gather, you can get sports, going sports, and

0:23:23.320 --> 0:23:26.040
<v Speaker 1>you can go in movie theaters and so the kind

0:23:26.080 --> 0:23:29.320
<v Speaker 1>of environment that we saw in January and February would

0:23:29.359 --> 0:23:32.080
<v Speaker 1>be right back on the table. Hip. On the other hand,

0:23:32.080 --> 0:23:35.080
<v Speaker 1>there is no vaccine, uh, And I'll also say it's

0:23:35.119 --> 0:23:38.480
<v Speaker 1>not just a vaccine. No vaccine and no effective treatment.

0:23:38.560 --> 0:23:40.119
<v Speaker 1>So maybe there won't be a vaccine. But if the

0:23:40.160 --> 0:23:43.840
<v Speaker 1>death rate for the COVID nineteen drops down or turns

0:23:43.840 --> 0:23:46.240
<v Speaker 1>out to be about the same as flu, then I

0:23:46.240 --> 0:23:49.880
<v Speaker 1>think there'll be a longer term uh, return to normalcy.

0:23:49.960 --> 0:23:52.120
<v Speaker 1>But well, we'll get back to that same normal thing.

0:23:52.920 --> 0:23:54.520
<v Speaker 1>That sort of point one and point two, which is

0:23:54.760 --> 0:23:58.159
<v Speaker 1>which I'll summarize shortly, is that the effect of this

0:23:58.560 --> 0:24:00.680
<v Speaker 1>is going has been to and I think it would

0:24:00.680 --> 0:24:03.439
<v Speaker 1>be permanent to accelerate trends that are already in place,

0:24:04.000 --> 0:24:08.679
<v Speaker 1>which means trends towards online shopping, for example. And also

0:24:09.080 --> 0:24:11.679
<v Speaker 1>it uncovered some things that we didn't know, namely that

0:24:12.240 --> 0:24:14.439
<v Speaker 1>a large number of people don't have to be in

0:24:14.480 --> 0:24:19.280
<v Speaker 1>an office building and in certain industries to be very productive.

0:24:19.400 --> 0:24:22.720
<v Speaker 1>And so I think James Gorman at at Morgan Stanley

0:24:22.720 --> 0:24:25.879
<v Speaker 1>and others have been fairly vocal about the fact that

0:24:25.920 --> 0:24:29.280
<v Speaker 1>the real estate footprint for you know, for financial services

0:24:29.280 --> 0:24:33.760
<v Speaker 1>companies is going to be significantly significantly different going forward.

0:24:33.800 --> 0:24:36.440
<v Speaker 1>So that I think that commercial real estate is potentially

0:24:36.480 --> 0:24:38.400
<v Speaker 1>exposed not in the near term, but over the over

0:24:38.400 --> 0:24:40.600
<v Speaker 1>the longer term. And again, a lot of stuff is

0:24:40.720 --> 0:24:42.240
<v Speaker 1>just just in the middle. We just don't know what

0:24:42.280 --> 0:24:44.560
<v Speaker 1>the answer is in I was on a Zoom call

0:24:44.680 --> 0:24:50.119
<v Speaker 1>when one of the participants were marveling over the new technologies,

0:24:50.160 --> 0:24:52.960
<v Speaker 1>and I had to point out, Hey, we've had FaceTime

0:24:53.080 --> 0:24:56.400
<v Speaker 1>and screen share and Google hangouts for years and years

0:24:56.400 --> 0:24:58.880
<v Speaker 1>and years. People just didn't have to use them. So

0:24:59.359 --> 0:25:04.080
<v Speaker 1>your point about the pre existing trends is very well made. Yeah,

0:25:04.080 --> 0:25:05.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I think it's I mean, I think that's

0:25:05.600 --> 0:25:07.639
<v Speaker 1>the That's about all I can say in confidence is

0:25:07.760 --> 0:25:12.040
<v Speaker 1>any trends that were in effect, we're probably accelerated because

0:25:12.040 --> 0:25:15.639
<v Speaker 1>of this. I couldn't agree more. Let's talk a little

0:25:15.640 --> 0:25:19.480
<v Speaker 1>bit about some of the things that you've seen change

0:25:20.119 --> 0:25:22.760
<v Speaker 1>over the course of your career. And I want to

0:25:22.800 --> 0:25:27.080
<v Speaker 1>start with something that is a little surprising. Let's talk

0:25:27.080 --> 0:25:32.240
<v Speaker 1>about cryptocurrency. How actively involved in the crypto world are

0:25:32.320 --> 0:25:35.200
<v Speaker 1>you and where do you see this going as either

0:25:35.240 --> 0:25:39.879
<v Speaker 1>a speculation or a potential asset class. It's interesting the

0:25:39.920 --> 0:25:42.040
<v Speaker 1>way you framed that, Barry, because if you if you

0:25:42.119 --> 0:25:45.719
<v Speaker 1>ask how actively I am and it are actively involved,

0:25:46.200 --> 0:25:48.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm not active at all. I have a very large

0:25:48.480 --> 0:25:53.240
<v Speaker 1>position personally in bitcoin. I think UH Financial Time set

0:25:53.280 --> 0:25:55.520
<v Speaker 1>Up did an analysis and as at least a couple

0:25:55.520 --> 0:25:58.119
<v Speaker 1>of years ago, if I've got their data right, they

0:25:58.119 --> 0:25:59.640
<v Speaker 1>weren't naming names, but I think it was a top

0:25:59.640 --> 0:26:03.040
<v Speaker 1>one holder of bitcoin UH in the world. And I haven't,

0:26:03.040 --> 0:26:05.760
<v Speaker 1>but I haven't. I haven't bought or sold a bitcoins

0:26:05.880 --> 0:26:08.840
<v Speaker 1>in years, so but I am I am holding it.

0:26:08.920 --> 0:26:10.520
<v Speaker 1>I haven't. I'm not trying to trade in my trend

0:26:10.560 --> 0:26:13.879
<v Speaker 1>a thing like that. And my view on cryptocurrencies was

0:26:13.960 --> 0:26:18.040
<v Speaker 1>and is that they are and I'm talking mainly about

0:26:18.080 --> 0:26:22.679
<v Speaker 1>bitcoin here. The other the other cryptocurrencies I think I

0:26:22.720 --> 0:26:25.879
<v Speaker 1>think are mostly mostly uninteresting. There are some that are interesting,

0:26:25.960 --> 0:26:28.879
<v Speaker 1>but mostly uninteresting. But I think it's a very interesting

0:26:28.920 --> 0:26:32.280
<v Speaker 1>technological experiment. We haven't seen any kind of thing like

0:26:32.359 --> 0:26:35.479
<v Speaker 1>this is kind of an innovation in in finance and

0:26:35.520 --> 0:26:39.040
<v Speaker 1>in money, really really in history. And and so I

0:26:39.080 --> 0:26:41.640
<v Speaker 1>think to bash it as many of the very prominent

0:26:41.760 --> 0:26:43.720
<v Speaker 1>people whose names I won't mention them, but I think

0:26:43.760 --> 0:26:46.399
<v Speaker 1>we all know who they are. What to bash it

0:26:46.600 --> 0:26:50.000
<v Speaker 1>is to is to I think without without Also I

0:26:50.000 --> 0:26:52.240
<v Speaker 1>think analyzing it in any kind of any kind of

0:26:52.280 --> 0:26:57.760
<v Speaker 1>care is is probably premature. And I do believe the

0:26:57.800 --> 0:26:59.800
<v Speaker 1>one I've changed my mind all one thing, which is

0:27:00.560 --> 0:27:02.400
<v Speaker 1>when I first got involved in bitcoin, and I think

0:27:02.440 --> 0:27:05.960
<v Speaker 1>my average cost on my bitcoins is around my initial

0:27:06.000 --> 0:27:08.359
<v Speaker 1>costs is around two hundred my average cost free three

0:27:08.400 --> 0:27:11.680
<v Speaker 1>hunds a bitcoin. And my view then was that it

0:27:11.880 --> 0:27:14.880
<v Speaker 1>was it was very, very risky. It had a non

0:27:15.000 --> 0:27:18.560
<v Speaker 1>trivial UH chance of going to zero, and my non

0:27:18.600 --> 0:27:22.359
<v Speaker 1>trivial alignment that you know, probably at least well so

0:27:22.920 --> 0:27:27.280
<v Speaker 1>unlike many investments UH with bitcoin, the higher it goes,

0:27:27.600 --> 0:27:31.000
<v Speaker 1>the less risky it is longer term. With other investments

0:27:31.040 --> 0:27:33.719
<v Speaker 1>with the stock, the higher it goes, unless that's being

0:27:33.800 --> 0:27:36.520
<v Speaker 1>driven totally by fundamentals, the risk here it gets, the

0:27:36.600 --> 0:27:39.159
<v Speaker 1>more expensive it gets. The risk here it gets whereas

0:27:39.200 --> 0:27:42.000
<v Speaker 1>here what's what's leading to the bitcoins price and you

0:27:42.040 --> 0:27:44.800
<v Speaker 1>know around nine thousand dollars right now is greater and

0:27:44.880 --> 0:27:48.400
<v Speaker 1>greater adoption. So we're seeing more and more institutions get involved.

0:27:48.920 --> 0:27:52.080
<v Speaker 1>What you're seeing is uh, you know, exchanges getting more

0:27:52.200 --> 0:27:55.480
<v Speaker 1>i'd say professionalized and not being quite the wild West.

0:27:55.520 --> 0:27:58.200
<v Speaker 1>So it's still pretty much the wild West, but we're

0:27:58.240 --> 0:28:00.800
<v Speaker 1>still early in that game. And the thing that encourages

0:28:00.880 --> 0:28:03.919
<v Speaker 1>me probably the most is that the venture capital firms,

0:28:03.960 --> 0:28:05.879
<v Speaker 1>the people who who you know, who make their living

0:28:06.320 --> 0:28:09.800
<v Speaker 1>trying to sort out which technologies are worthy of investing

0:28:09.840 --> 0:28:13.080
<v Speaker 1>in which aren't. Have Not every venture capital firm is

0:28:13.119 --> 0:28:15.840
<v Speaker 1>big in bitcoin, but many of the most prominent ones are,

0:28:16.400 --> 0:28:18.680
<v Speaker 1>And I think that's probably the thing that gives me

0:28:18.720 --> 0:28:22.040
<v Speaker 1>the greatest confidence is they're still putting new money into

0:28:22.119 --> 0:28:24.680
<v Speaker 1>this and raising new funds for this, and that increases

0:28:24.720 --> 0:28:28.040
<v Speaker 1>the probability that it works. And then secondarily to the

0:28:28.119 --> 0:28:31.159
<v Speaker 1>point is I think it's it's right now just just

0:28:31.320 --> 0:28:35.080
<v Speaker 1>a you know, a speculative vehicle. I think it could

0:28:35.160 --> 0:28:39.239
<v Speaker 1>become an asset class. I think it's most likely to be, uh,

0:28:39.600 --> 0:28:42.560
<v Speaker 1>you know what. One of the books, the titled Digital gold.

0:28:42.600 --> 0:28:45.600
<v Speaker 1>I think that's probably the most likely venue for it

0:28:45.680 --> 0:28:48.800
<v Speaker 1>to succeed at. And I think also that one of

0:28:48.840 --> 0:28:51.000
<v Speaker 1>the things that's gotten some attention, as you probably know,

0:28:51.200 --> 0:28:53.360
<v Speaker 1>is that Paul Tutor Jones is put close to I

0:28:53.400 --> 0:28:56.600
<v Speaker 1>think now he's close to two of his funds in bitcoin,

0:28:57.240 --> 0:28:59.760
<v Speaker 1>and other people like Stan Dructon Miller. I don't believe

0:28:59.760 --> 0:29:03.560
<v Speaker 1>on owns bitcoin or great value. I don't believe owns bitcoin.

0:29:04.200 --> 0:29:07.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure. But but they they are bullish on

0:29:07.560 --> 0:29:11.160
<v Speaker 1>gold because of the massive stimulus, the massive money printing,

0:29:11.360 --> 0:29:13.479
<v Speaker 1>printing a nut that their bullets, because they think going

0:29:13.520 --> 0:29:16.600
<v Speaker 1>to runaway inflation. They just believe the probabilities of gold

0:29:16.680 --> 0:29:19.480
<v Speaker 1>doing well, and gold has done well, are increasing. And

0:29:19.800 --> 0:29:22.240
<v Speaker 1>my my view is that if gold does well in

0:29:22.240 --> 0:29:24.400
<v Speaker 1>the next five to ten years, bitcoin will do a

0:29:24.480 --> 0:29:26.920
<v Speaker 1>lot better because it has many advantages that gold doesn't have.

0:29:27.720 --> 0:29:30.200
<v Speaker 1>So I would I would say that, you know, if

0:29:30.240 --> 0:29:32.800
<v Speaker 1>I were to advise people, which I don't do that

0:29:33.000 --> 0:29:35.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of thing, but what I did was I put

0:29:35.560 --> 0:29:37.840
<v Speaker 1>about one percent of my liquid net worth and bitcoin,

0:29:38.000 --> 0:29:40.040
<v Speaker 1>and I would say for people who are interested in it,

0:29:40.840 --> 0:29:43.840
<v Speaker 1>that's an interesting way to go because anybody can afford

0:29:43.880 --> 0:29:46.640
<v Speaker 1>to lose one percent of their liquid net worth and

0:29:46.960 --> 0:29:48.360
<v Speaker 1>uh and if you can't, then you ought to be

0:29:48.440 --> 0:29:51.960
<v Speaker 1>in cash or in short term short term government bonds,

0:29:52.320 --> 0:29:54.240
<v Speaker 1>any of anybody that own stocks and afford to lose

0:29:54.280 --> 0:29:57.360
<v Speaker 1>one percent. So, but the right hand tail of the distribution,

0:29:57.480 --> 0:30:01.680
<v Speaker 1>if it works, is many many times at the current price.

0:30:02.120 --> 0:30:06.680
<v Speaker 1>Quite fascinating. So you mentioned it's a technology digital gold

0:30:06.760 --> 0:30:12.120
<v Speaker 1>as well. Is this a potential currency and a potential

0:30:12.360 --> 0:30:17.480
<v Speaker 1>alternative to the dollar, And regardless of bitcoin, is the

0:30:17.560 --> 0:30:20.720
<v Speaker 1>almighty dollar going to continue to be the almighty dollar

0:30:20.760 --> 0:30:25.880
<v Speaker 1>into the foreseeable future? What potentially could dethrone the dollar

0:30:26.000 --> 0:30:29.160
<v Speaker 1>as as the world's reserve currency. Yeah, that's a really

0:30:29.240 --> 0:30:34.120
<v Speaker 1>interesting and important question because a guy wrote a book

0:30:34.160 --> 0:30:36.680
<v Speaker 1>on the dollar called, you know, Exorbitant Privilege, you know,

0:30:36.800 --> 0:30:39.960
<v Speaker 1>some years ago. And the dollar has been a huge,

0:30:40.120 --> 0:30:42.520
<v Speaker 1>huge benefit as the reserve currency for the U S.

0:30:42.600 --> 0:30:45.760
<v Speaker 1>It's why we don't, you know, suffer the problems of

0:30:46.240 --> 0:30:49.080
<v Speaker 1>countries that you have to use dollars and and and

0:30:49.240 --> 0:30:52.800
<v Speaker 1>so we'll we'll be vulnerable to runs on their own

0:30:52.840 --> 0:30:55.840
<v Speaker 1>currency and in favor of the in favor of the dollar.

0:30:55.880 --> 0:31:00.120
<v Speaker 1>You might remember back in nineteen uh two seven two

0:31:00.160 --> 0:31:03.800
<v Speaker 1>thousand seven and eight that Warren Buffet and Paul Krugman,

0:31:03.880 --> 0:31:05.920
<v Speaker 1>when asked what they thought the risk was to the

0:31:06.000 --> 0:31:09.080
<v Speaker 1>overall market, they both mentioned the current account deficit and

0:31:09.160 --> 0:31:11.960
<v Speaker 1>said they were concerned about a dollar collapse and people

0:31:11.960 --> 0:31:14.200
<v Speaker 1>would lose confidence in the dollar because of our massive

0:31:14.240 --> 0:31:18.560
<v Speaker 1>current account and growing current account deficits and and so uh.

0:31:18.840 --> 0:31:20.560
<v Speaker 1>It turned out the current account deficit, it wasn't a

0:31:20.600 --> 0:31:23.360
<v Speaker 1>problem at all. The housing market was a problem. But

0:31:23.640 --> 0:31:26.760
<v Speaker 1>and when the when the global financial crisis came, people

0:31:26.840 --> 0:31:30.080
<v Speaker 1>didn't sell dollars, they bought dollars. So I think that

0:31:30.240 --> 0:31:32.800
<v Speaker 1>that gives you a sense of of of how powerful

0:31:32.840 --> 0:31:36.200
<v Speaker 1>the dollar is right now. The issue though, is that,

0:31:36.640 --> 0:31:40.400
<v Speaker 1>um that we're in competition with the Chinese globally, and

0:31:40.520 --> 0:31:42.920
<v Speaker 1>the Chinese economy will be bigger than ours at some point,

0:31:43.680 --> 0:31:47.120
<v Speaker 1>and the Chinese are experimenting and I think going to

0:31:47.240 --> 0:31:50.520
<v Speaker 1>come up with a with a cryptocurrency that will be

0:31:50.760 --> 0:31:53.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, that the Chinese government will back, and part

0:31:53.960 --> 0:31:55.160
<v Speaker 1>of the reason they want to do that is to

0:31:55.240 --> 0:31:58.720
<v Speaker 1>try and undermine the dollar. So I would guess also

0:31:58.840 --> 0:32:00.880
<v Speaker 1>that the US will all so at some point have

0:32:01.000 --> 0:32:03.320
<v Speaker 1>a you know, have a fedbacked cryptocurrency. And maybe some

0:32:03.400 --> 0:32:06.800
<v Speaker 1>other the other reserve currencies as well. So I think

0:32:06.840 --> 0:32:11.520
<v Speaker 1>that's a potential significant change that as it evolves, that

0:32:11.600 --> 0:32:14.240
<v Speaker 1>would also put a lot more attention on bitcoin. And

0:32:14.360 --> 0:32:17.840
<v Speaker 1>of course, the big advantage of bitcoin is that it's permissionless,

0:32:18.360 --> 0:32:22.680
<v Speaker 1>it's decentralized, it can't be hacked, and it can't be debased,

0:32:23.480 --> 0:32:26.080
<v Speaker 1>and and so I think that difference between a government

0:32:26.200 --> 0:32:30.560
<v Speaker 1>backed currency, even if it's a cryptocurrency, and one that

0:32:31.520 --> 0:32:34.880
<v Speaker 1>is basically independent its whole, its whole way of operation,

0:32:35.040 --> 0:32:38.760
<v Speaker 1>is independent of any government, would would be beneficial to bitcoin.

0:32:39.280 --> 0:32:42.320
<v Speaker 1>So it doesn't happen a collapse is just the Bitcoin

0:32:42.400 --> 0:32:45.680
<v Speaker 1>would benefit from the differentiated aspect of it to whatever

0:32:46.080 --> 0:32:49.040
<v Speaker 1>other sorts of cryptocurrencies or payment systems come around. You

0:32:49.240 --> 0:32:54.200
<v Speaker 1>call bitcoin digital gold, I've been calling it libertarian gold.

0:32:54.480 --> 0:32:59.640
<v Speaker 1>And I can't see that crowd getting behind certainly not

0:32:59.760 --> 0:33:05.640
<v Speaker 1>be on a federal reserve that crypto and essentially planned

0:33:06.400 --> 0:33:10.880
<v Speaker 1>um regime like China. I can't imagine the libertarians buying

0:33:10.960 --> 0:33:16.000
<v Speaker 1>into that. Do you really think a Chinese cryptocurrency has

0:33:16.320 --> 0:33:20.600
<v Speaker 1>a chance to capture the imagination of at least the

0:33:20.680 --> 0:33:24.040
<v Speaker 1>early adopters in that space. Um Let me let me

0:33:24.400 --> 0:33:26.200
<v Speaker 1>resort this out. You know, if you look back at

0:33:26.240 --> 0:33:29.520
<v Speaker 1>bitcoin when it got started in who it's initial enthusiasts were,

0:33:30.040 --> 0:33:34.480
<v Speaker 1>it was basically libertarians, people that hate to fed, inflationists,

0:33:34.640 --> 0:33:37.000
<v Speaker 1>hard money people, all that kind of stuff that they

0:33:37.120 --> 0:33:41.840
<v Speaker 1>provided the early impetus and the emotion, uh to get

0:33:41.920 --> 0:33:44.360
<v Speaker 1>behind it because it checked a lot of their boxes.

0:33:45.080 --> 0:33:48.080
<v Speaker 1>So if you think of bitcoin as as a favorite

0:33:48.120 --> 0:33:51.640
<v Speaker 1>of the libertarians, you know, as as a politicized thing,

0:33:52.320 --> 0:33:54.760
<v Speaker 1>which I think it is to a minor extent, much

0:33:54.800 --> 0:33:57.280
<v Speaker 1>miner than it used to be before. No, the libertarians

0:33:57.280 --> 0:34:02.560
<v Speaker 1>are never going to get behind a sponsored cryptocurrency, much

0:34:02.640 --> 0:34:06.280
<v Speaker 1>less a Chinese sponsored cryptocurrency. But they're a relatively small

0:34:06.440 --> 0:34:09.680
<v Speaker 1>part of what, you know, what drives the global economic system.

0:34:10.320 --> 0:34:11.640
<v Speaker 1>And I think the rest of it is going to

0:34:11.680 --> 0:34:15.000
<v Speaker 1>be just based on practicality and it doesn't work and

0:34:15.320 --> 0:34:17.920
<v Speaker 1>uh and doesn't solve some kind of financial need, and

0:34:18.000 --> 0:34:20.160
<v Speaker 1>we'll just have to see that again. It's early, it's

0:34:20.200 --> 0:34:23.200
<v Speaker 1>early days in this, you know. Friedrich Hyak wrote a

0:34:23.239 --> 0:34:26.520
<v Speaker 1>wrote a monograph called the de Nationalization of Money where

0:34:26.760 --> 0:34:30.320
<v Speaker 1>he argued that there should be you know, the basically

0:34:30.560 --> 0:34:33.600
<v Speaker 1>money's money is plural, should compete with each other, and

0:34:33.800 --> 0:34:35.520
<v Speaker 1>any banks should be able to issue its own money.

0:34:35.560 --> 0:34:38.200
<v Speaker 1>Any company should issue its own money, and then the

0:34:38.440 --> 0:34:40.480
<v Speaker 1>market will sort out which ones are valuable in which

0:34:40.520 --> 0:34:42.000
<v Speaker 1>ones aren't. We had that in the United States for

0:34:42.000 --> 0:34:44.440
<v Speaker 1>about thirty years. Didn't work out too well enough in

0:34:44.480 --> 0:34:46.479
<v Speaker 1>the nineteenth century, but it doesn't mean that it can't

0:34:46.560 --> 0:34:48.200
<v Speaker 1>work some version of it in the future. And I

0:34:48.280 --> 0:34:50.480
<v Speaker 1>think that's part of what part of the direction that

0:34:50.560 --> 0:34:52.880
<v Speaker 1>this is going right now. So let me shift gears

0:34:52.920 --> 0:34:55.239
<v Speaker 1>on you a little bit. I have to bring up

0:34:55.320 --> 0:35:00.280
<v Speaker 1>something I'm fascinated by. You made a seventy five million

0:35:00.320 --> 0:35:05.120
<v Speaker 1>dollar donation to Johns Hopkins University, your alma mater, to

0:35:05.280 --> 0:35:08.080
<v Speaker 1>the philosophy department, turned out to be the largest ever

0:35:08.200 --> 0:35:13.960
<v Speaker 1>gift to a philosophy department. Explain what motivated that. Tell

0:35:14.080 --> 0:35:19.120
<v Speaker 1>us about your thinking behind that gift. Sure, So I

0:35:19.160 --> 0:35:23.520
<v Speaker 1>went to grad school at Hopkins, got a chef in

0:35:23.520 --> 0:35:27.200
<v Speaker 1>of the PhD program there in the mid nineteen seventies,

0:35:27.800 --> 0:35:30.040
<v Speaker 1>and after I get out of the Army, and and

0:35:30.320 --> 0:35:35.000
<v Speaker 1>I was at my mindset on I'm becoming a college professor,

0:35:35.920 --> 0:35:38.279
<v Speaker 1>and that was a very bad time, just like his

0:35:38.560 --> 0:35:40.120
<v Speaker 1>right now, it's just been a bad time. For like

0:35:40.239 --> 0:35:42.759
<v Speaker 1>four years to get a pH d in a in

0:35:43.600 --> 0:35:46.239
<v Speaker 1>the humanities, whether it be English or philosophy or French

0:35:46.320 --> 0:35:48.960
<v Speaker 1>or whatever the case may be. And so when it

0:35:49.000 --> 0:35:51.040
<v Speaker 1>finally became clear to me that that was not going

0:35:51.120 --> 0:35:53.279
<v Speaker 1>to be uh, something that made a lot of sense,

0:35:53.520 --> 0:35:56.640
<v Speaker 1>I would probably a vagabond bouncing from college to college.

0:35:57.560 --> 0:35:59.920
<v Speaker 1>I then shifted gears. I've always been interested in markets,

0:36:00.000 --> 0:36:03.040
<v Speaker 1>and so I was fortunate to get a job initially

0:36:03.360 --> 0:36:05.720
<v Speaker 1>at a private company and then moved into their treasury

0:36:05.800 --> 0:36:07.440
<v Speaker 1>function and manage some money for them, and then went

0:36:07.480 --> 0:36:12.040
<v Speaker 1>to like Mason. And the thing is I look back

0:36:12.400 --> 0:36:15.800
<v Speaker 1>on was the thing that probably was the most useful,

0:36:15.880 --> 0:36:19.399
<v Speaker 1>practically useful thing to me, much more useful than being

0:36:19.400 --> 0:36:22.680
<v Speaker 1>an economics major undergrad and you know, learn money and

0:36:22.760 --> 0:36:25.000
<v Speaker 1>banking and all that kind of stuff, and the you know,

0:36:25.080 --> 0:36:28.279
<v Speaker 1>the equation of exchange on vv equals p Q, where

0:36:28.320 --> 0:36:33.160
<v Speaker 1>the the analytical habits of thought and the critical analytical

0:36:33.280 --> 0:36:36.440
<v Speaker 1>skills that you learn uh in philosophy, which is very

0:36:36.520 --> 0:36:40.640
<v Speaker 1>rigorous and UH and in some cases highly quantitative. Although

0:36:40.640 --> 0:36:43.560
<v Speaker 1>I would I wasn't particularly attracted to that part. But

0:36:43.719 --> 0:36:45.839
<v Speaker 1>I my view is that I would not have had

0:36:45.880 --> 0:36:49.360
<v Speaker 1>anything like the success that I've had in capital markets

0:36:50.040 --> 0:36:52.920
<v Speaker 1>had I not had that philosophical training, because part of

0:36:52.960 --> 0:36:56.200
<v Speaker 1>it is that that you're always trying to figure out

0:36:56.280 --> 0:36:58.920
<v Speaker 1>what's wrong with your view and not trying to press

0:36:58.920 --> 0:37:01.720
<v Speaker 1>your view about what's right. A lot of people in markets,

0:37:01.800 --> 0:37:05.719
<v Speaker 1>as you're undoubtedly aware, have very strong views about lots

0:37:05.760 --> 0:37:08.040
<v Speaker 1>of things. You know, I mean, lots of very smart

0:37:08.080 --> 0:37:10.040
<v Speaker 1>people were short Tesla and thought it was a fraud.

0:37:10.480 --> 0:37:12.600
<v Speaker 1>Lots of very smart people thought that Amazon was going

0:37:12.640 --> 0:37:15.440
<v Speaker 1>to go bust Baron's caught it Amazon dot Com. But

0:37:15.560 --> 0:37:17.200
<v Speaker 1>when you get you know, when you get kind of

0:37:17.239 --> 0:37:18.879
<v Speaker 1>the bit in your teeth and have a strong view

0:37:18.920 --> 0:37:22.120
<v Speaker 1>on that, you tend to ignore countervailing information and look

0:37:22.200 --> 0:37:25.920
<v Speaker 1>for confirmation, and all kinds of psychological things come to play.

0:37:26.160 --> 0:37:28.879
<v Speaker 1>And one of the things that going through the drill

0:37:28.960 --> 0:37:32.680
<v Speaker 1>and grad school philosophy UH, at least at Hopkins UH

0:37:33.560 --> 0:37:35.279
<v Speaker 1>was imparted to me that you've got to hold all

0:37:35.320 --> 0:37:37.320
<v Speaker 1>that stuff back because you're what you're really trying to

0:37:37.400 --> 0:37:39.719
<v Speaker 1>do is get at what's called the argument to the

0:37:39.800 --> 0:37:42.560
<v Speaker 1>best explanation. So what what's what's going on here? Not

0:37:42.719 --> 0:37:43.920
<v Speaker 1>what do I want to go on or what do

0:37:44.040 --> 0:37:46.480
<v Speaker 1>my beliefs tell me. But you know, you've got to

0:37:46.520 --> 0:37:48.759
<v Speaker 1>consider all evidence from every angle. So it's like a

0:37:49.200 --> 0:37:53.280
<v Speaker 1>Rubik's cube look at things. And that was enormously helpful

0:37:53.320 --> 0:37:54.560
<v Speaker 1>to me, and I would say that it was it

0:37:54.680 --> 0:37:57.120
<v Speaker 1>was part of why you know, we bought Google, and

0:37:57.160 --> 0:37:58.920
<v Speaker 1>the second by the biggest buyer Google on the I

0:37:59.040 --> 0:38:01.160
<v Speaker 1>p OH, the big buyer of Amazon on the I

0:38:01.320 --> 0:38:03.200
<v Speaker 1>p O. And so a lot of those names that

0:38:03.239 --> 0:38:05.759
<v Speaker 1>have been among our biggest winners have been due to

0:38:05.880 --> 0:38:09.520
<v Speaker 1>I think the analytical skills that I developed in grad school.

0:38:09.520 --> 0:38:11.960
<v Speaker 1>And I thought it was a useful way to to

0:38:12.520 --> 0:38:14.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, to pay that back because I think the

0:38:14.239 --> 0:38:17.560
<v Speaker 1>more people that are exposed to philosophy, so Hopkins Department

0:38:17.600 --> 0:38:19.480
<v Speaker 1>were more than double as as a result of the

0:38:19.480 --> 0:38:22.120
<v Speaker 1>size of this, and they've already hired, you know, last

0:38:22.120 --> 0:38:24.960
<v Speaker 1>few years there several distinguished philosophers. So I think I

0:38:25.000 --> 0:38:30.080
<v Speaker 1>think it'll be good as more students at Hopkins take philosophy.

0:38:30.120 --> 0:38:31.919
<v Speaker 1>And also I just thought it was good to shine

0:38:31.920 --> 0:38:34.560
<v Speaker 1>a light on the value of philosophy, and especially when

0:38:34.600 --> 0:38:37.560
<v Speaker 1>people are thinking about stems so much, uh, you know,

0:38:37.640 --> 0:38:40.520
<v Speaker 1>and and and using your education to get a job.

0:38:41.239 --> 0:38:44.279
<v Speaker 1>I think that's fine but I think that actually that

0:38:44.360 --> 0:38:47.520
<v Speaker 1>the humanities have a practical value as well as you know,

0:38:47.640 --> 0:38:49.839
<v Speaker 1>as an intellectual value to people as well. So one

0:38:49.880 --> 0:38:53.640
<v Speaker 1>of the things that's kind of intriguing watching people who

0:38:53.680 --> 0:38:59.080
<v Speaker 1>are not epidemiologists tracked all the data is that we're

0:38:59.120 --> 0:39:03.400
<v Speaker 1>testing so many more people today that we're finding lots

0:39:03.440 --> 0:39:08.879
<v Speaker 1>of asymptomatic um people who are infected or asymptomatic um

0:39:09.280 --> 0:39:12.439
<v Speaker 1>people who are currently infected. So that's driving the death

0:39:12.560 --> 0:39:16.000
<v Speaker 1>rate down, and then the number of people under fifty

0:39:16.080 --> 0:39:18.759
<v Speaker 1>and under forty who seem to be getting it, who

0:39:18.840 --> 0:39:23.400
<v Speaker 1>have a much better prognosis um for surviving. Those are

0:39:23.480 --> 0:39:29.480
<v Speaker 1>really making the mortality rates looked better than they did

0:39:29.560 --> 0:39:32.720
<v Speaker 1>in the beginning, when we really only fact out about

0:39:32.800 --> 0:39:35.239
<v Speaker 1>who had it based on whether they went to the

0:39:35.280 --> 0:39:38.879
<v Speaker 1>hospital or died, right right, Yeah, I mean, it's it's

0:39:39.640 --> 0:39:41.320
<v Speaker 1>it's interesting. I'm on the I'm on the board of

0:39:41.400 --> 0:39:44.279
<v Speaker 1>Johns Hopkins, which is kind of, um, you know, ground

0:39:44.400 --> 0:39:46.600
<v Speaker 1>zero for all the data on this kind of stuff.

0:39:46.600 --> 0:39:50.000
<v Speaker 1>And we have a call on COVID every Easter every

0:39:50.040 --> 0:39:52.239
<v Speaker 1>week now it's now it's every other week. But yeah,

0:39:52.320 --> 0:39:54.200
<v Speaker 1>that was that was one of the things that came

0:39:54.280 --> 0:39:56.440
<v Speaker 1>up in the call this morning, which is, if you

0:39:56.440 --> 0:39:58.480
<v Speaker 1>look at like Florida, for example, you're getting a huge

0:39:58.520 --> 0:40:04.200
<v Speaker 1>increase in in case aces um. Before Florida reopened, the

0:40:04.320 --> 0:40:09.120
<v Speaker 1>average age of somebody with COVID was sixty two. And

0:40:09.320 --> 0:40:12.160
<v Speaker 1>since it's reopened, with all that jump in cases, the

0:40:12.239 --> 0:40:16.279
<v Speaker 1>average age of cases since then is thirty five. And

0:40:16.480 --> 0:40:19.040
<v Speaker 1>if you look at them the data on mortality of

0:40:19.160 --> 0:40:23.279
<v Speaker 1>people who are thirty five, then their mortality, their chance

0:40:23.360 --> 0:40:26.640
<v Speaker 1>of dying is point zero zero zero five. So basically

0:40:26.960 --> 0:40:30.439
<v Speaker 1>it's basically almost nothing. So I think that's what that's

0:40:30.480 --> 0:40:32.400
<v Speaker 1>what you're seeing, and that the press doesn't do a

0:40:32.520 --> 0:40:35.320
<v Speaker 1>very good job of sorting out the various you know,

0:40:35.560 --> 0:40:37.879
<v Speaker 1>ways in which you can you can carve up these

0:40:38.600 --> 0:40:41.279
<v Speaker 1>carve up these statistics. So it's and as you said,

0:40:41.360 --> 0:40:44.120
<v Speaker 1>the more talent that the number of people that apparently

0:40:44.600 --> 0:40:47.040
<v Speaker 1>are asymptomatic in this I think the CDC said the

0:40:47.080 --> 0:40:49.480
<v Speaker 1>other day that it's probably ten times a number of

0:40:49.520 --> 0:40:51.600
<v Speaker 1>people that actually have had the you know, I have

0:40:51.719 --> 0:40:54.760
<v Speaker 1>to have tested positives that would be, you know, instead

0:40:54.760 --> 0:40:57.120
<v Speaker 1>of two million people that have had it, it's twenty

0:40:57.160 --> 0:40:59.759
<v Speaker 1>seven million people. And the CDC said it could be

0:40:59.800 --> 0:41:02.880
<v Speaker 1>as any fifty times that, which means that mortality is

0:41:03.040 --> 0:41:06.520
<v Speaker 1>very very low, and the aggregate and if you look

0:41:06.560 --> 0:41:09.279
<v Speaker 1>at them and carving it by age, I think it's

0:41:09.320 --> 0:41:13.120
<v Speaker 1>only six percent of the people who have died from COVID.

0:41:13.360 --> 0:41:16.080
<v Speaker 1>We're actually in the labor force. So people that are

0:41:16.080 --> 0:41:18.279
<v Speaker 1>in the labor force the very little, you know, very

0:41:18.320 --> 0:41:21.440
<v Speaker 1>little problem, which again makes that makes the cost of

0:41:21.480 --> 0:41:24.400
<v Speaker 1>shutting down the economy to try and protect people who are,

0:41:24.520 --> 0:41:27.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, in their seventies or eighties, instead of isolating

0:41:27.560 --> 0:41:29.880
<v Speaker 1>those people and trying to have them make sure that

0:41:30.000 --> 0:41:33.520
<v Speaker 1>they don't you know, they're they're not mixing like people

0:41:33.600 --> 0:41:36.279
<v Speaker 1>my age over seventy years old. That makes perfect sense,

0:41:36.320 --> 0:41:38.400
<v Speaker 1>But keeping everybody out of the labor force who has

0:41:38.440 --> 0:41:40.440
<v Speaker 1>very little risk doesn't make much sense at all. So

0:41:40.920 --> 0:41:43.560
<v Speaker 1>I won't spoil the surprise for Johns Hopkins, but I

0:41:43.640 --> 0:41:46.399
<v Speaker 1>suspect there's a big pile of bitcoin coming their way

0:41:47.200 --> 0:41:50.239
<v Speaker 1>sometime over the next few decades. Um, But let's just

0:41:50.360 --> 0:41:53.879
<v Speaker 1>keep that between us. So, so if you mentioned, um,

0:41:54.320 --> 0:41:59.560
<v Speaker 1>how philosophy has impacted the way you approach investing, how

0:42:00.200 --> 0:42:05.480
<v Speaker 1>has your philosophy about investing changed over the past few decades.

0:42:05.560 --> 0:42:08.960
<v Speaker 1>It's hard to imagine the Bill Miller of leg Mason

0:42:09.360 --> 0:42:13.280
<v Speaker 1>as a buyer of bitcoin. I suspect your thinking seems

0:42:13.360 --> 0:42:19.000
<v Speaker 1>to have evolved over that time period. Yeah, i'd say, uh, actually,

0:42:19.080 --> 0:42:20.640
<v Speaker 1>I was still an employee of like Mason when I

0:42:20.719 --> 0:42:23.920
<v Speaker 1>made the when I made the bitcoin, the first bitcoin purchase.

0:42:24.960 --> 0:42:29.600
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, I guess my my thinking changed mostly around

0:42:30.760 --> 0:42:34.800
<v Speaker 1>and then it's I'd say, it hasn't changed much since

0:42:34.880 --> 0:42:37.880
<v Speaker 1>that point in time. So what happened was that we

0:42:38.000 --> 0:42:43.000
<v Speaker 1>started the Value Trust in two and by six it

0:42:43.160 --> 0:42:45.200
<v Speaker 1>was the single best performing fund in the country of

0:42:45.280 --> 0:42:48.440
<v Speaker 1>the last you know, five five years. So we were

0:42:48.520 --> 0:42:51.960
<v Speaker 1>number one in fidelity. Mitchellan Fund were number two. And

0:42:52.080 --> 0:42:55.000
<v Speaker 1>then when the economy peaked, and so we got wet

0:42:55.080 --> 0:42:57.759
<v Speaker 1>hit in the crash, not not terribly, but because we

0:42:57.800 --> 0:42:59.880
<v Speaker 1>had a lot of cash going into the crash, the

0:43:00.120 --> 0:43:05.719
<v Speaker 1>two thousand crashes that we back. Yeah yeah, yeah. So

0:43:06.480 --> 0:43:10.279
<v Speaker 1>but when we had that recession, we then had a

0:43:11.600 --> 0:43:16.000
<v Speaker 1>terrible year in nine and we lost half our assets

0:43:16.040 --> 0:43:19.279
<v Speaker 1>in the funds. And so I went back to look

0:43:19.360 --> 0:43:23.440
<v Speaker 1>at the history of value investing as traditionally conceived and

0:43:23.640 --> 0:43:25.839
<v Speaker 1>concluded that what people thought about it and the way

0:43:25.880 --> 0:43:28.840
<v Speaker 1>it was portrayed in the press and and you know

0:43:29.000 --> 0:43:31.880
<v Speaker 1>popularly was wrong and that the academic research did not

0:43:32.719 --> 0:43:36.800
<v Speaker 1>did not support that view. And namely, the value investing

0:43:36.960 --> 0:43:39.480
<v Speaker 1>was in some way or other superior to growth investing

0:43:40.000 --> 0:43:43.160
<v Speaker 1>on on some on some fundamental basis, which probably psychological.

0:43:43.800 --> 0:43:45.560
<v Speaker 1>And it was the case that just because stocks had

0:43:45.560 --> 0:43:46.960
<v Speaker 1>a low key year, low price to book or low

0:43:47.000 --> 0:43:49.640
<v Speaker 1>prast cash flow, that just that typically meant that they

0:43:49.680 --> 0:43:51.839
<v Speaker 1>had a low return on capital, or or were highly

0:43:51.880 --> 0:43:54.800
<v Speaker 1>capital intensive, or they had a lot of debt. And

0:43:55.160 --> 0:43:57.239
<v Speaker 1>unless one of those things are many of the things changed,

0:43:57.239 --> 0:43:59.520
<v Speaker 1>they did now perform. They just were just statistically cheap.

0:44:00.440 --> 0:44:02.719
<v Speaker 1>So we began to put a lot more effort on

0:44:03.400 --> 0:44:07.000
<v Speaker 1>integrating what the academic research showed about investing with what

0:44:07.280 --> 0:44:10.360
<v Speaker 1>the practicalities of investing were. And the key thing was

0:44:10.480 --> 0:44:13.600
<v Speaker 1>to focus on return on capital through a cycle. So

0:44:13.880 --> 0:44:16.279
<v Speaker 1>what we went from doing was was getting away from

0:44:16.680 --> 0:44:21.080
<v Speaker 1>uh generally accepted accounting principles gap measures and looked at

0:44:21.200 --> 0:44:25.719
<v Speaker 1>measures of economic value. And so we focused on h

0:44:26.040 --> 0:44:29.759
<v Speaker 1>free cash flow, yield, return uninvested capital, and companies that

0:44:29.840 --> 0:44:31.880
<v Speaker 1>could earn that through recycle. That was that was the

0:44:31.960 --> 0:44:35.799
<v Speaker 1>big change, and that hasn't really changed very much since then.

0:44:35.840 --> 0:44:38.560
<v Speaker 1>I'd say the only thing which is changed since then

0:44:38.760 --> 0:44:41.880
<v Speaker 1>is an understanding which I've talked about earlier in the interview,

0:44:41.960 --> 0:44:46.319
<v Speaker 1>about when value does well and when growth does well,

0:44:47.080 --> 0:44:49.719
<v Speaker 1>so that you know, the so called value can underperform

0:44:49.800 --> 0:44:52.520
<v Speaker 1>for long periods of time if the economy has very

0:44:52.560 --> 0:44:55.520
<v Speaker 1>low volatility and low nominal growth rates. So I think

0:44:55.600 --> 0:44:57.600
<v Speaker 1>that's the that's the other change which would cause us,

0:44:58.160 --> 0:45:01.160
<v Speaker 1>which has caused us to to un til differently. So

0:45:01.440 --> 0:45:03.560
<v Speaker 1>in the in the Opportunity Fund that I run with

0:45:03.640 --> 0:45:06.880
<v Speaker 1>my colleague Samantha maclamore, you know, since the March o

0:45:07.040 --> 0:45:09.000
<v Speaker 1>nine bottom through two thousand nineteen, we're in the top

0:45:09.040 --> 0:45:11.480
<v Speaker 1>one percent of all funds. And that's partly due to

0:45:11.520 --> 0:45:13.960
<v Speaker 1>the stuff that I just I covered in some some

0:45:14.120 --> 0:45:19.080
<v Speaker 1>psychological things that we believed about people's first conversion and

0:45:19.280 --> 0:45:22.239
<v Speaker 1>misperception of risk, which I think will repeat again in

0:45:22.360 --> 0:45:26.960
<v Speaker 1>this in this current post pandemic environment. So it's funny

0:45:26.960 --> 0:45:31.919
<v Speaker 1>because when we had our last interview in I think

0:45:32.239 --> 0:45:38.120
<v Speaker 1>a large segment of the fund following world had figured well,

0:45:38.239 --> 0:45:41.120
<v Speaker 1>Bill Millers washed up and left for dead, and I

0:45:41.320 --> 0:45:45.759
<v Speaker 1>saw some data that had you as the top performing

0:45:45.880 --> 0:45:49.800
<v Speaker 1>fund for one three five years. This is all post

0:45:49.920 --> 0:45:53.920
<v Speaker 1>o nine UM. So clearly whatever you learned in ninety

0:45:54.080 --> 0:45:59.600
<v Speaker 1>and applied after the financial crisis UM seems to be working.

0:46:00.480 --> 0:46:04.400
<v Speaker 1>It raises a couple of interesting questions. Let me ask

0:46:04.520 --> 0:46:09.839
<v Speaker 1>about oh eight oh nine. Why did value um underperform

0:46:10.000 --> 0:46:14.080
<v Speaker 1>heading into the financial crisis? And what was it that

0:46:14.440 --> 0:46:18.640
<v Speaker 1>so many people missed in the spreadsheet that was evident

0:46:18.960 --> 0:46:21.960
<v Speaker 1>if you look at books like The Big Short or

0:46:22.000 --> 0:46:25.960
<v Speaker 1>the movie you are just how crazy the home flipping

0:46:26.120 --> 0:46:30.160
<v Speaker 1>epidemic had become. Why was it so challenging to see

0:46:30.239 --> 0:46:33.000
<v Speaker 1>that if you were looking at at balance sheets as

0:46:33.040 --> 0:46:36.799
<v Speaker 1>opposed to the real estate listings. Yeah, I'd say that. Um,

0:46:37.640 --> 0:46:40.480
<v Speaker 1>there's a there's a line that Charlie Munder Warren Bucket's

0:46:40.520 --> 0:46:43.920
<v Speaker 1>partner said, and I think it's two thousand nine, because

0:46:43.960 --> 0:46:47.879
<v Speaker 1>you know, he had just hired uh, Todd and Ted

0:46:48.320 --> 0:46:52.000
<v Speaker 1>to come start managing money for Berkshire maybe a year

0:46:52.040 --> 0:46:56.840
<v Speaker 1>or two earlier. And and they were asked at the

0:46:56.880 --> 0:46:59.320
<v Speaker 1>annual meeting, you know, did the guys that you hire

0:47:00.000 --> 0:47:04.200
<v Speaker 1>did they outperform in this in this bear market? And

0:47:04.520 --> 0:47:07.759
<v Speaker 1>uh and Buffett said no, they you know, they underperformed

0:47:07.840 --> 0:47:10.920
<v Speaker 1>and and uh and somebody said, well, what you know,

0:47:11.320 --> 0:47:12.960
<v Speaker 1>what do you think you know they did wrong? And

0:47:13.360 --> 0:47:15.600
<v Speaker 1>the implication that you know where they where they messed

0:47:15.640 --> 0:47:20.680
<v Speaker 1>things up, and and Charlitan Winker said, he said, he said, well,

0:47:20.760 --> 0:47:22.359
<v Speaker 1>he says the way that I look at this, he says,

0:47:22.400 --> 0:47:23.920
<v Speaker 1>I think the market estim he was down thirty eight

0:47:23.960 --> 0:47:26.759
<v Speaker 1>percent or something got in two thousand and eight. Charlie said,

0:47:27.200 --> 0:47:28.960
<v Speaker 1>in my view, he said, if you weren't down at least,

0:47:29.840 --> 0:47:32.359
<v Speaker 1>then you didn't know what you were doing. I thought

0:47:32.400 --> 0:47:34.880
<v Speaker 1>was it was a clever line. And I think that

0:47:34.960 --> 0:47:38.479
<v Speaker 1>the issue that you know, in retrospect that I looked

0:47:38.480 --> 0:47:41.680
<v Speaker 1>at was that there were there were structural things that

0:47:41.800 --> 0:47:44.560
<v Speaker 1>I missed. The stock market never got really expensive in

0:47:44.640 --> 0:47:48.120
<v Speaker 1>the sense of you know, times earning is an expensive

0:47:48.120 --> 0:47:51.279
<v Speaker 1>relative to to UH two rates. And part of the

0:47:51.320 --> 0:47:52.960
<v Speaker 1>reason was that the market had kind of picked up

0:47:53.000 --> 0:47:55.640
<v Speaker 1>that there was a risk there and it was, you know,

0:47:55.719 --> 0:47:58.319
<v Speaker 1>it was an asset based risk. And most almost all

0:47:58.400 --> 0:48:03.800
<v Speaker 1>recessions are due to liquidity UH implosion, so you know,

0:48:03.920 --> 0:48:07.040
<v Speaker 1>fet titans, that discount rate goes up, the economy goes

0:48:07.080 --> 0:48:09.600
<v Speaker 1>into recession, that kind of thing. But it's basically the

0:48:10.480 --> 0:48:13.640
<v Speaker 1>raising interest rates, and there they typically weren't you know,

0:48:14.640 --> 0:48:17.400
<v Speaker 1>debt financed assets that were such a large part of

0:48:17.440 --> 0:48:19.640
<v Speaker 1>the economy that it could it could be a risk

0:48:19.680 --> 0:48:22.399
<v Speaker 1>of the financial system. And I think that's what that's

0:48:22.440 --> 0:48:24.640
<v Speaker 1>what I missed then. So there were in fact, the

0:48:24.680 --> 0:48:30.880
<v Speaker 1>academic research didn't even uh distinguish between balance sheet based

0:48:31.120 --> 0:48:35.120
<v Speaker 1>recessions and income statement recessions, and it does now, And

0:48:35.200 --> 0:48:36.960
<v Speaker 1>I think that's that's one of the one of the

0:48:37.000 --> 0:48:39.759
<v Speaker 1>things you've got to be careful looking at and the

0:48:39.960 --> 0:48:41.920
<v Speaker 1>overall economy is what what kind of problem are we

0:48:42.080 --> 0:48:44.360
<v Speaker 1>seeing in the in the financial system, And there the

0:48:44.400 --> 0:48:47.960
<v Speaker 1>financial system wasn't was at risk of complete collapse. If

0:48:47.960 --> 0:48:50.760
<v Speaker 1>the FETE hadn't hadn't put PARP in there, the banking

0:48:50.840 --> 0:48:53.480
<v Speaker 1>system could easily have collapsed. And that's just not the

0:48:53.680 --> 0:48:55.959
<v Speaker 1>not the case now that the FET has acted much faster,

0:48:56.120 --> 0:48:58.719
<v Speaker 1>and it's a very different sort of problem that we're

0:48:58.719 --> 0:49:01.400
<v Speaker 1>facing from what we what we've before that problem was

0:49:01.480 --> 0:49:04.719
<v Speaker 1>a banking system based problem, and the banking system is

0:49:04.719 --> 0:49:07.360
<v Speaker 1>actually probably one of the strongest parts of the economy

0:49:07.440 --> 0:49:09.440
<v Speaker 1>right now, so very very different now from from that.

0:49:09.800 --> 0:49:11.640
<v Speaker 1>So since you brought up the FED, I have to

0:49:11.760 --> 0:49:17.560
<v Speaker 1>ask I've heard people complain about FED interventions FED support

0:49:17.640 --> 0:49:20.520
<v Speaker 1>of the stock market. Not only is the FED buying

0:49:21.040 --> 0:49:24.600
<v Speaker 1>e t F the buying specific bonds. What do you

0:49:24.719 --> 0:49:27.480
<v Speaker 1>make of the FED action? How does it influence your

0:49:27.560 --> 0:49:30.759
<v Speaker 1>views of the market, and do you do anything to

0:49:31.040 --> 0:49:35.719
<v Speaker 1>position your portfolio to either withstand or take advantage of

0:49:35.840 --> 0:49:39.360
<v Speaker 1>whatever the FED is doing. Yes, so I think that

0:49:40.280 --> 0:49:43.640
<v Speaker 1>I'm puzzled a little bit at people's views, you know,

0:49:43.719 --> 0:49:46.200
<v Speaker 1>who have again a strong view about the FED ought

0:49:46.239 --> 0:49:48.840
<v Speaker 1>to do this, the FED ought to do that, you know,

0:49:48.960 --> 0:49:50.360
<v Speaker 1>and this is the right thing, doing the wrong thing

0:49:50.440 --> 0:49:53.200
<v Speaker 1>to do. I mean, my main issue is I don't

0:49:53.239 --> 0:49:56.000
<v Speaker 1>really care what my personal view is about what the

0:49:56.200 --> 0:49:58.759
<v Speaker 1>what the FED ought to do or whatnot or will do.

0:49:59.440 --> 0:50:00.920
<v Speaker 1>My view is I need to figure out what it

0:50:01.000 --> 0:50:03.759
<v Speaker 1>is they are doing and what the impact of that's

0:50:03.800 --> 0:50:05.440
<v Speaker 1>likely to be, quit apart in what I think that

0:50:05.520 --> 0:50:08.080
<v Speaker 1>they ought to do. And I think that also people

0:50:08.120 --> 0:50:09.640
<v Speaker 1>kind of forget about why we have a FED in

0:50:09.719 --> 0:50:11.719
<v Speaker 1>the first place, and why we have a FED in

0:50:11.760 --> 0:50:14.360
<v Speaker 1>the first place was we had recurrent banking prices and

0:50:14.480 --> 0:50:18.320
<v Speaker 1>collapses and severe recessions or short depressions back throughout the

0:50:18.400 --> 0:50:21.400
<v Speaker 1>nineteenth century and we needed it. We needed instead of

0:50:21.440 --> 0:50:23.800
<v Speaker 1>a central clearing house, which is the way banking system

0:50:23.840 --> 0:50:28.120
<v Speaker 1>worked is having actually a a lender of last resort

0:50:28.200 --> 0:50:30.279
<v Speaker 1>similar to what the you know, the Bank of England was,

0:50:31.000 --> 0:50:34.160
<v Speaker 1>and that you know that worked out. Okay, I'd say,

0:50:34.239 --> 0:50:36.160
<v Speaker 1>I think it's working so much better now because we

0:50:36.239 --> 0:50:38.319
<v Speaker 1>know a lot more now about how that stuff works.

0:50:39.040 --> 0:50:43.200
<v Speaker 1>And I still think that people fundamentally misunderstand what the

0:50:43.239 --> 0:50:45.600
<v Speaker 1>power of the FED, even though there's a famous line,

0:50:45.600 --> 0:50:48.239
<v Speaker 1>don't fight the FED, but underestimate the power of it

0:50:48.280 --> 0:50:50.400
<v Speaker 1>and how it fits into the overall economies. This one

0:50:50.560 --> 0:50:53.680
<v Speaker 1>one's brief thing. Well you'll remember this very well, and

0:50:53.760 --> 0:50:56.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm surprised that, you know, people still don't pay the

0:50:56.480 --> 0:50:59.600
<v Speaker 1>attention to this. When the FED finally got its self

0:50:59.640 --> 0:51:02.840
<v Speaker 1>and gear in two thousand and eight, uh and really

0:51:02.960 --> 0:51:06.319
<v Speaker 1>began acting as a lender of last sort of backstopping

0:51:06.480 --> 0:51:10.280
<v Speaker 1>facilities and swap lines with the overseas banks and central banks.

0:51:11.040 --> 0:51:13.640
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that was that was what ended along with

0:51:13.719 --> 0:51:16.600
<v Speaker 1>the TARP, that's what ended the financial crisis and saved

0:51:16.640 --> 0:51:19.880
<v Speaker 1>the banking you know, save the banking system. But people,

0:51:20.080 --> 0:51:22.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, lots and lots of people said that we

0:51:22.640 --> 0:51:24.880
<v Speaker 1>were going to have inflation, and look at all this

0:51:25.000 --> 0:51:27.520
<v Speaker 1>money printing, and that was completely wrong. And but I

0:51:27.600 --> 0:51:31.480
<v Speaker 1>think that same basic group that was wrong says the

0:51:31.520 --> 0:51:33.880
<v Speaker 1>same thing again without having any idea about why they

0:51:33.920 --> 0:51:36.800
<v Speaker 1>were wrong. Then, so uh, again, I don't have a

0:51:36.920 --> 0:51:39.239
<v Speaker 1>I don't have a view, certainly not a dogmatic view,

0:51:39.239 --> 0:51:41.440
<v Speaker 1>but I don't have a view about what whether we're

0:51:41.440 --> 0:51:43.120
<v Speaker 1>gonna have inflation or not. All I know is we

0:51:43.160 --> 0:51:46.120
<v Speaker 1>don't have inflation now and uh, and we're not gonna

0:51:46.120 --> 0:51:48.680
<v Speaker 1>have inflation probably the next year or two after that,

0:51:49.360 --> 0:51:51.680
<v Speaker 1>who knows. But I do think that the Fed did

0:51:51.760 --> 0:51:53.600
<v Speaker 1>exactly the right thing, which is why the why the

0:51:53.640 --> 0:51:56.920
<v Speaker 1>stock market bottom as quickly as it did, and it

0:51:57.040 --> 0:52:00.600
<v Speaker 1>moved much much faster than this time than it did before.

0:52:00.880 --> 0:52:03.800
<v Speaker 1>But it moved so fast now because it understood before

0:52:04.800 --> 0:52:09.120
<v Speaker 1>what the consequences were of moving slowly. So I think

0:52:09.160 --> 0:52:11.640
<v Speaker 1>that the interesting thing now is that Chairman Powell has

0:52:11.680 --> 0:52:16.600
<v Speaker 1>said that they will not um increase rates until they

0:52:16.640 --> 0:52:21.160
<v Speaker 1>are convinced that that we're on a sustainable growth path,

0:52:22.160 --> 0:52:27.719
<v Speaker 1>and that they won't increase rates until the realized inflation rate,

0:52:27.800 --> 0:52:32.800
<v Speaker 1>not their forecast, but the realized inflation rate is above

0:52:32.840 --> 0:52:36.640
<v Speaker 1>two on a symmetrical basis, And since it's only been

0:52:36.640 --> 0:52:39.480
<v Speaker 1>above two two quarters in the last ten years. We

0:52:39.520 --> 0:52:41.319
<v Speaker 1>don't know when they're going to start the symmetry, maybe

0:52:41.480 --> 0:52:43.839
<v Speaker 1>as of you know what two eighteen, when they change

0:52:43.880 --> 0:52:47.319
<v Speaker 1>there what's called their reaction function. But you're gonna they're

0:52:47.320 --> 0:52:49.400
<v Speaker 1>gonna let inflation run in my opinion, based on what

0:52:49.480 --> 0:52:51.279
<v Speaker 1>they said, must they change their mind at three to

0:52:51.360 --> 0:52:53.960
<v Speaker 1>four percent for a while. So you're looking at the

0:52:54.000 --> 0:52:56.399
<v Speaker 1>case where interest rates are going to be very very

0:52:56.480 --> 0:52:59.840
<v Speaker 1>low and no problem at all, um, no competition at

0:52:59.880 --> 0:53:02.759
<v Speaker 1>all for equities for several years. And I think that

0:53:03.080 --> 0:53:05.760
<v Speaker 1>that leads you to the view that if the economy

0:53:05.800 --> 0:53:08.000
<v Speaker 1>is then going to grow, um, you need to be

0:53:08.120 --> 0:53:11.839
<v Speaker 1>long equities again sat a strate line. But I think

0:53:11.880 --> 0:53:15.000
<v Speaker 1>that that even now where are we now, it's what

0:53:15.080 --> 0:53:17.840
<v Speaker 1>we're doing right now. It's actually interesting enough to me

0:53:17.920 --> 0:53:21.719
<v Speaker 1>following the two thousand nine playbook. So if you think

0:53:21.719 --> 0:53:25.439
<v Speaker 1>about it, the the market bottomed in two thousand nine

0:53:25.640 --> 0:53:29.040
<v Speaker 1>in March, in early March. This market bottomed in late March.

0:53:29.840 --> 0:53:31.879
<v Speaker 1>The market had a big rally in two thousand nine

0:53:32.000 --> 0:53:36.200
<v Speaker 1>into June. That's what this market did. The market had

0:53:36.239 --> 0:53:38.799
<v Speaker 1>a ten percent correction. Then that's what this market did,

0:53:39.640 --> 0:53:41.960
<v Speaker 1>and then it continued to rally throughout the rest of

0:53:42.040 --> 0:53:44.560
<v Speaker 1>the year. And again I don't I don't prect the market.

0:53:44.600 --> 0:53:47.400
<v Speaker 1>I can't predict the market, but certainly that's the that

0:53:47.560 --> 0:53:50.239
<v Speaker 1>appears to be the direction that things are going right now.

0:53:51.080 --> 0:53:54.719
<v Speaker 1>And uh, and so I think that it wouldn't It

0:53:54.800 --> 0:53:58.960
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't surprise me if the overall if the overall market

0:53:59.200 --> 0:54:02.960
<v Speaker 1>hit new highs some time, you know, late this year

0:54:03.200 --> 0:54:05.560
<v Speaker 1>or early next year, which I think would probably a

0:54:05.600 --> 0:54:08.480
<v Speaker 1>surprise to most people. But if the economy is coming

0:54:08.520 --> 0:54:10.960
<v Speaker 1>back faster and there's not gonna be any inflation, and

0:54:11.040 --> 0:54:13.200
<v Speaker 1>I said, it's not going to raise rates and we

0:54:13.239 --> 0:54:15.080
<v Speaker 1>can have a new HID and GDP by the first

0:54:15.160 --> 0:54:17.080
<v Speaker 1>quarter of next year, I can't see a reason why

0:54:17.120 --> 0:54:19.560
<v Speaker 1>the market wouldn't be an all time high. Then quite interesting.

0:54:20.120 --> 0:54:24.040
<v Speaker 1>I have to circle back and ask you another valuation question,

0:54:24.560 --> 0:54:27.960
<v Speaker 1>because this has been an internal debate in my firm

0:54:28.280 --> 0:54:31.719
<v Speaker 1>and there is no resolution of it. But I'm fascinated

0:54:31.800 --> 0:54:35.920
<v Speaker 1>by your perspective. If we look back over the past

0:54:36.719 --> 0:54:40.759
<v Speaker 1>call a century of of equity valuations, there has been

0:54:40.880 --> 0:54:46.080
<v Speaker 1>a gradual increase in what investors are willing to pay

0:54:46.719 --> 0:54:48.880
<v Speaker 1>for a dollar of earnings and I don't mean just

0:54:49.000 --> 0:54:53.279
<v Speaker 1>like a cyclical move during a bullmarket. I mean over

0:54:53.400 --> 0:54:58.240
<v Speaker 1>the past many decades um, going back to the twenty

0:54:58.360 --> 0:55:01.759
<v Speaker 1>nine crash. And some people have argued that it is

0:55:01.880 --> 0:55:07.680
<v Speaker 1>a function of how much less capital intensive companies are today.

0:55:07.760 --> 0:55:12.360
<v Speaker 1>You think about railroads or auto manufacturers versus you know,

0:55:12.400 --> 0:55:16.040
<v Speaker 1>a couple of guys a laptop and a Amazon web services.

0:55:16.880 --> 0:55:22.759
<v Speaker 1>Are companies today more deserving of higher valuations than the material,

0:55:22.920 --> 0:55:27.080
<v Speaker 1>labor and capital intensive companies of last century or is

0:55:27.120 --> 0:55:30.840
<v Speaker 1>that just an excuse for higher pe ratios. Oh, I

0:55:30.880 --> 0:55:33.680
<v Speaker 1>would think that you know that absolutely. I mean not

0:55:33.760 --> 0:55:37.239
<v Speaker 1>every company is deserving of that. But if you look

0:55:37.280 --> 0:55:40.000
<v Speaker 1>at the valuations of I would say, the companies that

0:55:40.680 --> 0:55:43.920
<v Speaker 1>dominated the top the largest companies in the US and

0:55:44.000 --> 0:55:47.120
<v Speaker 1>the you know, the forties of the fifties or even

0:55:47.160 --> 0:55:50.799
<v Speaker 1>in the early nineteen sixties, and look at their financial characteristics,

0:55:50.840 --> 0:55:53.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, their return on capital, their free cash flow generation,

0:55:53.960 --> 0:55:56.759
<v Speaker 1>their debt levels, um. And then look at companies that

0:55:56.880 --> 0:55:59.560
<v Speaker 1>those same characteristics today. They are not any more expensive

0:55:59.640 --> 0:56:02.000
<v Speaker 1>today than they were back in the you know, fifties

0:56:02.120 --> 0:56:06.239
<v Speaker 1>or sixties, and accept the interest rates are lower, uh,

0:56:06.600 --> 0:56:09.520
<v Speaker 1>which would make them moderately more expensive. But what's really

0:56:09.560 --> 0:56:11.279
<v Speaker 1>different is that you know, the top the companies are

0:56:11.320 --> 0:56:14.000
<v Speaker 1>the biggest companies in the US right now. They're radically

0:56:14.080 --> 0:56:18.680
<v Speaker 1>different financial characteristics and growth rates. And also I would say, um,

0:56:19.719 --> 0:56:22.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, moats around them. I mean, no one's gonna

0:56:22.080 --> 0:56:25.640
<v Speaker 1>catch up with with Amazon, or with or with Google

0:56:26.440 --> 0:56:28.920
<v Speaker 1>or with Facebook. In my opinion, no one's gonna be

0:56:29.120 --> 0:56:34.640
<v Speaker 1>big bigger than in global uh streaming than Netflix. So

0:56:34.960 --> 0:56:40.960
<v Speaker 1>those companies competitive advantage period is much longer than you

0:56:41.000 --> 0:56:44.000
<v Speaker 1>know than a company like General Motors and which faced

0:56:44.560 --> 0:56:47.839
<v Speaker 1>foreign competition and now faces other kinds of competition from

0:56:48.080 --> 0:56:50.719
<v Speaker 1>from electric cars and stuff like that. So yeah, I

0:56:50.840 --> 0:56:54.160
<v Speaker 1>think it's I don't think it's a hard to explain

0:56:54.160 --> 0:56:56.400
<v Speaker 1>at all. I think it fits righting with with financial

0:56:56.440 --> 0:56:59.799
<v Speaker 1>theory would tell you quite fascinating. I've covered a ton

0:56:59.880 --> 0:57:04.360
<v Speaker 1>of stuff Before we go to our speed round questions.

0:57:04.440 --> 0:57:08.719
<v Speaker 1>I have one last question for you, and it's about

0:57:08.800 --> 0:57:12.360
<v Speaker 1>the cost of active management. Last we had a conversation

0:57:12.440 --> 0:57:15.440
<v Speaker 1>about this. You had said it's it's too high and

0:57:15.560 --> 0:57:18.960
<v Speaker 1>doesn't deliver enough value for what it costs. What are

0:57:19.000 --> 0:57:22.400
<v Speaker 1>your thoughts today? The prices have come down fairly dramatically,

0:57:22.960 --> 0:57:25.800
<v Speaker 1>both for management and for trading, which is more or

0:57:25.880 --> 0:57:29.280
<v Speaker 1>less cost less. What are your thoughts on on the

0:57:29.400 --> 0:57:33.240
<v Speaker 1>state of the industry and what it costs to be

0:57:34.000 --> 0:57:37.040
<v Speaker 1>an investor if you're working with a professional manager. Yeah,

0:57:37.080 --> 0:57:39.960
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I think I stand by what I said before.

0:57:40.800 --> 0:57:44.760
<v Speaker 1>Is that, um, that the issue isn't that The issue

0:57:44.880 --> 0:57:47.480
<v Speaker 1>is the cost relative to the value that you're getting.

0:57:48.360 --> 0:57:50.560
<v Speaker 1>And I think that that issue is not so much

0:57:50.880 --> 0:57:54.400
<v Speaker 1>a question of the skills of active management as it

0:57:54.640 --> 0:57:59.360
<v Speaker 1>is the the risk controls or the structural impediments that

0:57:59.480 --> 0:58:04.120
<v Speaker 1>they have what are partly institutional and partly legal. So

0:58:04.600 --> 0:58:06.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, if you the investment comp in the act

0:58:06.560 --> 0:58:10.400
<v Speaker 1>of all kinds of restrictions about how you can construct portfolios,

0:58:10.920 --> 0:58:13.280
<v Speaker 1>which which don't exist in the hedge fund world for sure,

0:58:13.960 --> 0:58:18.120
<v Speaker 1>And then the business side of investment management is such

0:58:18.240 --> 0:58:22.680
<v Speaker 1>that the reality of client behavior is that you know,

0:58:22.760 --> 0:58:24.960
<v Speaker 1>they tend to be, especially in the current environment, risk

0:58:25.040 --> 0:58:28.480
<v Speaker 1>and volatility phobic, and if you have tracking error on

0:58:28.560 --> 0:58:32.400
<v Speaker 1>the downside, that that represents a business risk, which kind

0:58:32.440 --> 0:58:36.160
<v Speaker 1>of leads you then to more of a closet indexing approach.

0:58:36.200 --> 0:58:37.840
<v Speaker 1>And the only way that approach can work is with

0:58:38.320 --> 0:58:41.360
<v Speaker 1>lower cost than it currently has and an ability to

0:58:41.440 --> 0:58:43.720
<v Speaker 1>kind of serve the market just ahead of the market,

0:58:43.760 --> 0:58:46.520
<v Speaker 1>which I think is very difficult. So the challenge active

0:58:46.560 --> 0:58:51.320
<v Speaker 1>management has is to actually have a portfolio construction dynamic

0:58:52.200 --> 0:58:56.160
<v Speaker 1>which which has high active share with the professical actors share,

0:58:56.200 --> 0:59:00.680
<v Speaker 1>meaning your portfolio can't look exactly like your benchmark. If

0:59:00.720 --> 0:59:03.840
<v Speaker 1>your portfolio looks like your benchmark exactly, then you're gonna

0:59:03.880 --> 0:59:06.040
<v Speaker 1>underform your benchmark. If your cost or higher, you can't

0:59:06.280 --> 0:59:10.240
<v Speaker 1>do anything else. So that means just mathematically that your

0:59:10.280 --> 0:59:15.480
<v Speaker 1>probabilities of increasing about performing grow as you diverge from

0:59:15.520 --> 0:59:19.520
<v Speaker 1>your benchmark. But also the that tracking error can also

0:59:19.600 --> 0:59:21.560
<v Speaker 1>go on the downside, and said, that's the big challenges

0:59:21.600 --> 0:59:25.080
<v Speaker 1>to try and try and mitigate that downside tracking error

0:59:25.120 --> 0:59:28.280
<v Speaker 1>relative to the upside tracking error as we'll call it.

0:59:28.480 --> 0:59:30.680
<v Speaker 1>And then and that's the case, then that's how you

0:59:30.760 --> 0:59:33.400
<v Speaker 1>can add value because you'll outperform over time. And of

0:59:33.440 --> 0:59:35.880
<v Speaker 1>course lower costs are always helpful. Last we spoke, I

0:59:35.960 --> 0:59:39.560
<v Speaker 1>recall your active share was amongst the highest in the industry.

0:59:40.120 --> 0:59:42.400
<v Speaker 1>What are you running for an active share for for

0:59:42.560 --> 0:59:45.680
<v Speaker 1>your funds at at Miller value? The way it's the

0:59:45.760 --> 0:59:50.800
<v Speaker 1>way that it's captive, it's roughly around among the highest

0:59:50.800 --> 0:59:52.480
<v Speaker 1>in the country. Still, that's what we've done for a

0:59:52.560 --> 0:59:55.640
<v Speaker 1>long time. So and so it causes causes angst. It

0:59:55.760 --> 0:59:59.320
<v Speaker 1>causes angst when we have a you know, a year

0:59:59.360 --> 1:00:03.360
<v Speaker 1>where we're behind the market fairly dramatically, but we can

1:00:03.400 --> 1:00:07.240
<v Speaker 1>always come back quickly. In two thousand eighteen, which is interesting,

1:00:07.400 --> 1:00:10.240
<v Speaker 1>in August of two thousand and I'm sorry yet two

1:00:10.280 --> 1:00:13.640
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eighteen, August two thousand eighteen, UM, I'm say

1:00:13.680 --> 1:00:19.560
<v Speaker 1>two nine. Obviously two thousand nineteen, UM, we were I

1:00:19.640 --> 1:00:24.800
<v Speaker 1>think I think eight hundred basis points or nine basis

1:00:24.840 --> 1:00:29.480
<v Speaker 1>points behind the market, and we ended up two hundred

1:00:29.600 --> 1:00:31.480
<v Speaker 1>three hundred ahead of the market. So we made up

1:00:31.520 --> 1:00:34.200
<v Speaker 1>like eleven basis points in a quarter in a month.

1:00:35.320 --> 1:00:37.360
<v Speaker 1>And I think that that's you. And the reason for

1:00:37.440 --> 1:00:41.080
<v Speaker 1>that is that the FED changes reaction function. The market

1:00:41.120 --> 1:00:43.520
<v Speaker 1>wasn't worried then about a recession, and so all of

1:00:43.600 --> 1:00:46.400
<v Speaker 1>the fear that drove the two thousand eighteen fourth quarter

1:00:46.560 --> 1:00:50.920
<v Speaker 1>decline dissipated. And I think that's the kind of thing

1:00:51.040 --> 1:00:54.000
<v Speaker 1>that you're actually starting to see right now in the market.

1:00:54.040 --> 1:00:56.920
<v Speaker 1>You look at the people that led I mentioned earlier

1:00:57.000 --> 1:01:00.920
<v Speaker 1>in the first quarter and Uh, they just killed it.

1:01:01.160 --> 1:01:03.480
<v Speaker 1>But now I think that, I mean we're we're now.

1:01:03.640 --> 1:01:07.200
<v Speaker 1>I think, uh, we're less behind now, even though we

1:01:07.240 --> 1:01:10.960
<v Speaker 1>had a stronger bear market decline uh this year than

1:01:11.000 --> 1:01:13.680
<v Speaker 1>we did back in two thousand and nineteen and the

1:01:13.880 --> 1:01:15.880
<v Speaker 1>early part of the year. So we're less behind now

1:01:15.920 --> 1:01:19.960
<v Speaker 1>than we were August of two thousand and nineteen. So

1:01:20.040 --> 1:01:22.520
<v Speaker 1>I feel pretty good about our about our our kansas

1:01:22.560 --> 1:01:24.800
<v Speaker 1>of doing well again this year. So one of the

1:01:24.880 --> 1:01:28.720
<v Speaker 1>things you've said before that relates directly to that is

1:01:29.240 --> 1:01:33.560
<v Speaker 1>volatility is the price you pay for performance. I assume

1:01:33.680 --> 1:01:37.040
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna expect volatility, You're gonna expect big draw downs

1:01:37.520 --> 1:01:40.960
<v Speaker 1>like you saw in eighteen. How do you manage your

1:01:41.040 --> 1:01:44.040
<v Speaker 1>client base? How do you manage the institutions you deal

1:01:44.120 --> 1:01:47.960
<v Speaker 1>with when all of a sudden during a quarterly review,

1:01:48.080 --> 1:01:51.800
<v Speaker 1>Hey we're down eight or nine percent behind our benchmark?

1:01:52.240 --> 1:01:55.160
<v Speaker 1>Is that a challenge to juggle and or do people

1:01:55.320 --> 1:01:58.880
<v Speaker 1>understand that you want the upside, you gotta deal with

1:01:58.920 --> 1:02:01.880
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of down. So when things get well.

1:02:01.960 --> 1:02:06.120
<v Speaker 1>When I when I bought the ownership and what was

1:02:06.200 --> 1:02:12.800
<v Speaker 1>then called LMM from like Mason, I brought the mutual

1:02:12.880 --> 1:02:16.800
<v Speaker 1>funds along, but I did not bring the institutional business along,

1:02:17.560 --> 1:02:20.440
<v Speaker 1>and so we don't we don't really take we have

1:02:20.560 --> 1:02:24.120
<v Speaker 1>some separate accounts, but we don't really take institutional business.

1:02:24.160 --> 1:02:27.120
<v Speaker 1>We're not that we won't take it, but that we uh,

1:02:27.440 --> 1:02:30.000
<v Speaker 1>we're not actively trying to grow it, and we're only

1:02:30.080 --> 1:02:33.080
<v Speaker 1>interested in having clients that really understand that point that

1:02:33.120 --> 1:02:36.480
<v Speaker 1>you just made that you're going to get volatility, and

1:02:36.640 --> 1:02:38.920
<v Speaker 1>we're trying we try and monetize the volatility. So what

1:02:39.040 --> 1:02:40.640
<v Speaker 1>we want to do is if the market goes down

1:02:40.680 --> 1:02:43.360
<v Speaker 1>a lot, you know, as it did in in March

1:02:43.480 --> 1:02:47.040
<v Speaker 1>of this year, we will we will reorient the portfolio

1:02:47.400 --> 1:02:49.480
<v Speaker 1>around to try and take advantage of when it comes back,

1:02:50.120 --> 1:02:52.360
<v Speaker 1>and as it goes higher, we want to trim the

1:02:52.960 --> 1:02:55.800
<v Speaker 1>stuff that has done really well and then moved out

1:02:55.840 --> 1:02:58.360
<v Speaker 1>into stuff that would tend to be more resilient on

1:02:58.520 --> 1:03:01.120
<v Speaker 1>the on the down side. But we don't have that.

1:03:01.360 --> 1:03:03.960
<v Speaker 1>Even though we obviously you know the papers every day

1:03:04.000 --> 1:03:07.760
<v Speaker 1>what we're doing, and we have quarterly calls and meetings,

1:03:08.280 --> 1:03:12.800
<v Speaker 1>we don't have those quarterly institutional meetings that we used

1:03:12.840 --> 1:03:16.320
<v Speaker 1>to have, and those those were more challenging because um,

1:03:16.800 --> 1:03:18.840
<v Speaker 1>every institution has got a different way of thinking about

1:03:19.040 --> 1:03:20.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, risk and reward and what they're looking for.

1:03:21.080 --> 1:03:23.080
<v Speaker 1>I think I think, you know, I've been doing this

1:03:23.160 --> 1:03:26.800
<v Speaker 1>long enough that most of our clients understand that that's

1:03:26.840 --> 1:03:30.120
<v Speaker 1>what comes with the territory, and so we really haven't,

1:03:30.240 --> 1:03:33.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, uh, suffered much in the way of redemptions

1:03:33.080 --> 1:03:35.480
<v Speaker 1>in the last several years. In fact, we have, you know,

1:03:35.560 --> 1:03:37.040
<v Speaker 1>I don't know if we have net inflows now. Our

1:03:37.040 --> 1:03:39.200
<v Speaker 1>income fund definitely has net inflows so far this year,

1:03:39.240 --> 1:03:42.080
<v Speaker 1>and the other funds if we if we have outflows,

1:03:42.120 --> 1:03:44.680
<v Speaker 1>it's it's not much, which is kind of unusual, you know,

1:03:44.800 --> 1:03:47.560
<v Speaker 1>for for an active mutual fund. Quite interesting. I have

1:03:47.640 --> 1:03:50.280
<v Speaker 1>a million other questions for you, but I've kept you

1:03:50.360 --> 1:03:53.840
<v Speaker 1>for an hour so far, so rather than take up

1:03:53.880 --> 1:03:55.920
<v Speaker 1>too much of your time, we'll have you back when

1:03:56.000 --> 1:03:58.720
<v Speaker 1>we're finally done with lockdown, and let's jump to our

1:03:59.360 --> 1:04:02.280
<v Speaker 1>speed round, our our favorite questions we ask all of

1:04:02.360 --> 1:04:05.919
<v Speaker 1>our guests, and since you mentioned Netflix, let's start there.

1:04:06.280 --> 1:04:08.280
<v Speaker 1>Tell us what you're streaming these days? What are you

1:04:08.360 --> 1:04:11.920
<v Speaker 1>watching on either Netflix or Amazon Prime, or or what

1:04:12.000 --> 1:04:15.080
<v Speaker 1>are you listening to in terms of podcasts or or

1:04:15.160 --> 1:04:18.000
<v Speaker 1>anything like that. It's a really easy question because the

1:04:18.040 --> 1:04:21.320
<v Speaker 1>answer is nothing, So I don't. Really, I don't. I don't.

1:04:21.360 --> 1:04:24.959
<v Speaker 1>I don't listen to podcasts. Yeah, I don't. I don't

1:04:25.040 --> 1:04:29.600
<v Speaker 1>stream anything. Uh, I don't watch television, especially since baseball

1:04:29.640 --> 1:04:31.440
<v Speaker 1>season is on hold. That's about the only time I

1:04:31.520 --> 1:04:35.040
<v Speaker 1>had the television television turned on. So I'm I'm I'm

1:04:35.200 --> 1:04:38.680
<v Speaker 1>very out of touch with with all of that, you know,

1:04:38.800 --> 1:04:42.720
<v Speaker 1>all of that stuff. So I'm much more focused on, um,

1:04:43.480 --> 1:04:47.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, reading than I am on on listening. So

1:04:47.560 --> 1:04:50.560
<v Speaker 1>let's jump to that question. Uh, tell us about what

1:04:50.680 --> 1:04:53.439
<v Speaker 1>you're reading these days, and and mentioned some of your

1:04:53.880 --> 1:04:59.320
<v Speaker 1>favorite books. Sure, so I just Um, I just finished

1:05:00.640 --> 1:05:04.480
<v Speaker 1>Thomas Man's The Magic Mountain, great classic that I haven't uh,

1:05:04.840 --> 1:05:09.400
<v Speaker 1>that I had not read before. Um. I'm currently reading, uh,

1:05:10.560 --> 1:05:14.920
<v Speaker 1>the eight page biography of Frederick Douglas, the you know,

1:05:15.000 --> 1:05:20.360
<v Speaker 1>the African American the nineteenth century. Um. I'm working my

1:05:20.640 --> 1:05:24.800
<v Speaker 1>way through Ralph Waldo Emerson's selected works. I just finished Nature,

1:05:24.840 --> 1:05:28.240
<v Speaker 1>the first book that he the first book that he published,

1:05:29.080 --> 1:05:33.280
<v Speaker 1>and um, and then I read a biography of Frank Ramsey,

1:05:33.400 --> 1:05:36.960
<v Speaker 1>the great polymatic genius philosopher who most people haven't heard

1:05:36.960 --> 1:05:39.640
<v Speaker 1>of because he died at age. But that's about a

1:05:39.640 --> 1:05:43.120
<v Speaker 1>six hundred page bio that I've that I've just you know,

1:05:43.960 --> 1:05:46.760
<v Speaker 1>just finished. And in terms of um, was it one

1:05:46.760 --> 1:05:48.480
<v Speaker 1>of the question favorite books? Is that the other question

1:05:48.840 --> 1:05:54.400
<v Speaker 1>all time favorite? Sure? Yeah? So? Uh? In fiction, I

1:05:54.440 --> 1:06:01.360
<v Speaker 1>would say Brothers, Karamazov, m Warren, Peace, Moby Dick. I

1:06:01.480 --> 1:06:06.160
<v Speaker 1>mentioned Magic Mountain, which was great, Um Conrad's Heart of Darkness,

1:06:06.400 --> 1:06:10.680
<v Speaker 1>and then Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian. And then in uh,

1:06:11.240 --> 1:06:14.520
<v Speaker 1>since I have you know when to grad school and philosophy, uh,

1:06:14.760 --> 1:06:17.920
<v Speaker 1>David Humes treat Us on Human Nature, William James Varieties

1:06:18.080 --> 1:06:23.360
<v Speaker 1>of Religious Experience and Pragmatism. Uh, John Dewey's Essays and

1:06:23.400 --> 1:06:28.440
<v Speaker 1>Experimental Logic. Uh, Schopenhauer's The World Has Will and Representation,

1:06:28.560 --> 1:06:33.040
<v Speaker 1>and then anything by Wittgenstein and finance stuff. Reminiscence of

1:06:33.080 --> 1:06:35.120
<v Speaker 1>the Stock Operator is something I used to read every year,

1:06:35.160 --> 1:06:36.959
<v Speaker 1>but since I've got it about memorized, I can skip

1:06:37.000 --> 1:06:41.200
<v Speaker 1>a year or two. And Robert Skidelsi's three volume biography

1:06:41.240 --> 1:06:43.000
<v Speaker 1>or John Maynard Keynes is a you know is A

1:06:43.240 --> 1:06:46.400
<v Speaker 1>is a masterpiece, I think quite fascinating. Tell us about

1:06:46.400 --> 1:06:49.920
<v Speaker 1>your mentors, who influenced your career, who helped make you

1:06:50.160 --> 1:06:52.840
<v Speaker 1>the Bill Miller you are today, um well, I mentioned

1:06:52.880 --> 1:06:55.280
<v Speaker 1>earlier that I think that a large part of that

1:06:55.720 --> 1:07:00.360
<v Speaker 1>has to do with the Hopkins Philosophy Department. And I

1:07:00.400 --> 1:07:03.120
<v Speaker 1>actually had a chance when I when I gave that gift,

1:07:04.360 --> 1:07:06.880
<v Speaker 1>one of the one of their their leading lights and

1:07:06.920 --> 1:07:09.800
<v Speaker 1>philosophy as a philosopher's science, named Peter Atchinstein as Peters

1:07:09.800 --> 1:07:12.120
<v Speaker 1>in his mid eighties right now, but he was president Press,

1:07:12.160 --> 1:07:13.560
<v Speaker 1>he was he was chairman of the department when I

1:07:13.600 --> 1:07:17.200
<v Speaker 1>got when I got admitted in nineteen seventy four, ninety

1:07:18.280 --> 1:07:23.080
<v Speaker 1>and and I I said to Peter, I said, you know,

1:07:23.800 --> 1:07:25.680
<v Speaker 1>I said, what was that? I said, Peter, I was

1:07:25.840 --> 1:07:28.920
<v Speaker 1>certainly not qualified to be, you know, admitted to Hopkins.

1:07:28.960 --> 1:07:31.160
<v Speaker 1>I wouldn't even I wouldn't need a philosophy undergraduate major.

1:07:31.200 --> 1:07:35.080
<v Speaker 1>And Hopkins is one of the only schools of quality

1:07:35.120 --> 1:07:37.560
<v Speaker 1>schools in the country that would take somebody that did

1:07:37.640 --> 1:07:41.680
<v Speaker 1>not have, you know, a philosophy undergraduate background. What Hopkins

1:07:41.720 --> 1:07:43.680
<v Speaker 1>did was they said, if you didn't have a philosophy background,

1:07:43.720 --> 1:07:46.960
<v Speaker 1>you had to send in three examples of your philosophical work,

1:07:48.000 --> 1:07:51.080
<v Speaker 1>so you know, without making a long story or making

1:07:51.400 --> 1:07:54.040
<v Speaker 1>making a long actually making a long story short Peter

1:07:54.200 --> 1:07:56.800
<v Speaker 1>just said, well, you know, we're a small department. Uh,

1:07:57.280 --> 1:08:00.880
<v Speaker 1>we would only admit you know, h five or six

1:08:01.440 --> 1:08:04.160
<v Speaker 1>people in the PhD program every year. And he said,

1:08:04.200 --> 1:08:05.840
<v Speaker 1>and we always tried to have one of those people

1:08:05.880 --> 1:08:08.440
<v Speaker 1>be what we considered a higher risk person, like they

1:08:08.480 --> 1:08:10.360
<v Speaker 1>probably couldn't get anywhere else, but there was there was

1:08:10.400 --> 1:08:12.800
<v Speaker 1>some promise there that we saw and if we got lucky,

1:08:12.840 --> 1:08:16.840
<v Speaker 1>then uh, you know, they might they might uh shed

1:08:16.920 --> 1:08:18.759
<v Speaker 1>some light or do some good for the philosophy department.

1:08:19.400 --> 1:08:21.560
<v Speaker 1>So and he said, and we really got lucky with you.

1:08:21.760 --> 1:08:23.880
<v Speaker 1>So I thought that was I thought that was a

1:08:23.920 --> 1:08:28.479
<v Speaker 1>good one. But you were the Philosophy Department's volatility tread Yeah,

1:08:28.560 --> 1:08:32.680
<v Speaker 1>exactly right, exactly right. Uh. And then you know, my uh,

1:08:33.320 --> 1:08:36.439
<v Speaker 1>my initial partner at like Mason Ernie Kenney had died

1:08:36.479 --> 1:08:41.000
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand ten adage ninety two, classic value investor,

1:08:41.160 --> 1:08:44.360
<v Speaker 1>and so we we fit very well intellectually. But he

1:08:44.479 --> 1:08:48.439
<v Speaker 1>was also open to new ways of of thinking and uh,

1:08:48.560 --> 1:08:50.600
<v Speaker 1>and so we were also able. I think I was

1:08:50.640 --> 1:08:52.840
<v Speaker 1>able to work with him on some of the things

1:08:52.880 --> 1:08:54.479
<v Speaker 1>that we talked about earlier, in terms of return on

1:08:54.560 --> 1:08:57.280
<v Speaker 1>capital and stuff like that. And I'd say, the thing

1:08:57.320 --> 1:09:01.280
<v Speaker 1>that he that he taught me most was that he

1:09:01.439 --> 1:09:03.760
<v Speaker 1>was he was like probably the most optimistic person in

1:09:03.840 --> 1:09:05.559
<v Speaker 1>the world, and he had a very long time horizon

1:09:06.400 --> 1:09:08.639
<v Speaker 1>and uh, and so what I learned from him over

1:09:09.640 --> 1:09:12.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, how long we worked together, you know, twenty

1:09:12.120 --> 1:09:15.720
<v Speaker 1>five years or something like that. Actually third over thirty years. Uh,

1:09:16.479 --> 1:09:17.960
<v Speaker 1>what I learned from him is that you know that

1:09:18.080 --> 1:09:21.160
<v Speaker 1>generally speaking, having an optimistic take on things in a

1:09:21.240 --> 1:09:23.760
<v Speaker 1>long term time horizon there's a lot that's a lot

1:09:23.840 --> 1:09:25.880
<v Speaker 1>more First, it's a lot more fun, and second, it

1:09:26.080 --> 1:09:28.479
<v Speaker 1>gives you a lot better results than having a short

1:09:28.560 --> 1:09:30.840
<v Speaker 1>term time horizon and getting all negative about all the

1:09:30.840 --> 1:09:32.720
<v Speaker 1>stuff that's going wrong when the market are in the world.

1:09:32.800 --> 1:09:35.040
<v Speaker 1>So that was that was very helpful to me as well.

1:09:35.960 --> 1:09:37.800
<v Speaker 1>And then of course Chip Mason, who who's stuck with

1:09:37.920 --> 1:09:41.880
<v Speaker 1>me when I had you know, had occasional bad bad

1:09:42.000 --> 1:09:44.240
<v Speaker 1>year or two, that's you know, he he also had

1:09:44.240 --> 1:09:47.360
<v Speaker 1>a long term time horizon and understood that underperformance comes

1:09:47.400 --> 1:09:50.280
<v Speaker 1>with the territory. So instead of making a change after

1:09:50.400 --> 1:09:52.280
<v Speaker 1>you after your three year record goes behind the market,

1:09:52.360 --> 1:09:54.080
<v Speaker 1>he just said, you know, this is a long term

1:09:54.439 --> 1:09:55.880
<v Speaker 1>this is a long term debt we're making and we're

1:09:55.880 --> 1:09:57.680
<v Speaker 1>just gonna stay with it. So that that was very

1:09:57.720 --> 1:09:59.360
<v Speaker 1>helpful to me, and I've worked out okay for leg

1:09:59.400 --> 1:10:01.960
<v Speaker 1>to what sort of advice would you give a recent

1:10:02.120 --> 1:10:06.920
<v Speaker 1>college graduate who is considering a career in asset management? Well,

1:10:06.920 --> 1:10:09.320
<v Speaker 1>I would give the same advice to a well, first

1:10:09.320 --> 1:10:13.000
<v Speaker 1>of all, the slightly different answer here. So if they're

1:10:13.000 --> 1:10:17.920
<v Speaker 1>considering a career in asset management, then I would say,

1:10:18.040 --> 1:10:21.479
<v Speaker 1>understand that a lot of asset management is in secular

1:10:21.560 --> 1:10:26.479
<v Speaker 1>decline relative to quantitative strategies and and UH and passive strategy.

1:10:26.560 --> 1:10:28.120
<v Speaker 1>So it's a lot harder than if you're in an

1:10:28.200 --> 1:10:32.240
<v Speaker 1>industry which um is in secular advance, which it was

1:10:32.320 --> 1:10:33.800
<v Speaker 1>when I when I get into it. So that's that's

1:10:33.840 --> 1:10:35.360
<v Speaker 1>a big difference. It makes it a lot, makes it

1:10:35.360 --> 1:10:38.880
<v Speaker 1>a lot harder. But but in general I would say

1:10:39.000 --> 1:10:41.519
<v Speaker 1>that to him or her the same thing I would

1:10:41.520 --> 1:10:44.240
<v Speaker 1>say to anybody that was, you know, getting a job,

1:10:45.280 --> 1:10:48.320
<v Speaker 1>which is that I think the worst advice that people

1:10:48.400 --> 1:10:50.360
<v Speaker 1>can get and getting a job is that you'll read about, oh,

1:10:50.400 --> 1:10:53.120
<v Speaker 1>you didn't take control of your career. You need to

1:10:53.160 --> 1:10:54.960
<v Speaker 1>make sure you get what's coming to you. You need

1:10:55.040 --> 1:10:56.560
<v Speaker 1>to make sure that you know no one's going to

1:10:56.600 --> 1:10:57.880
<v Speaker 1>care about you the way you do, so you need

1:10:57.920 --> 1:10:59.280
<v Speaker 1>to make sure that you fight for all this stuff.

1:10:59.280 --> 1:11:02.040
<v Speaker 1>And I think that's terrible advice because I think that

1:11:02.240 --> 1:11:05.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, for me, generally speaking, what you would want

1:11:05.320 --> 1:11:08.320
<v Speaker 1>and what you know. The way I tried to manage

1:11:08.360 --> 1:11:11.320
<v Speaker 1>my career is that your job, no matter what your

1:11:11.360 --> 1:11:14.599
<v Speaker 1>job is, your job is to add value to your employer. Uh.

1:11:14.640 --> 1:11:17.000
<v Speaker 1>It's not to try and extract value from them and

1:11:17.200 --> 1:11:19.080
<v Speaker 1>and and get into your pocket. Your job is to

1:11:19.120 --> 1:11:21.280
<v Speaker 1>add value to them. And then you can get some

1:11:21.360 --> 1:11:23.240
<v Speaker 1>of that value part of it if you're doing that.

1:11:24.120 --> 1:11:27.880
<v Speaker 1>And and so maybe contrary to what people think, being

1:11:28.000 --> 1:11:31.679
<v Speaker 1>underpaid is a very powerful position to be in because

1:11:31.840 --> 1:11:34.080
<v Speaker 1>if you're if you're adding more value than you're costing,

1:11:34.160 --> 1:11:36.240
<v Speaker 1>then you're a very valuable employee and you're you're going

1:11:36.280 --> 1:11:39.040
<v Speaker 1>to be treated well if you're if your employers rational,

1:11:39.760 --> 1:11:42.519
<v Speaker 1>and uh, I mean nobody nobody got fired for creating

1:11:42.560 --> 1:11:45.800
<v Speaker 1>too much value for their employer, and nobody keeps a

1:11:45.880 --> 1:11:47.960
<v Speaker 1>job very long if they're getting paid more than their worth.

1:11:48.600 --> 1:11:51.080
<v Speaker 1>So being moderately underpaid is is a really good thing.

1:11:51.200 --> 1:11:53.400
<v Speaker 1>And then other things I'd say, which are probably not

1:11:54.600 --> 1:11:58.120
<v Speaker 1>terribly unusual, I think you want to basically, you know,

1:11:58.200 --> 1:12:01.479
<v Speaker 1>have a good positive attitude all the time. You want

1:12:01.520 --> 1:12:05.240
<v Speaker 1>to do what your job is with with uh, with

1:12:05.560 --> 1:12:08.720
<v Speaker 1>alacrity and a sense of urgency, and you want to

1:12:08.800 --> 1:12:11.479
<v Speaker 1>be you know, simultaneously, you know, a good subordinate to

1:12:11.560 --> 1:12:13.640
<v Speaker 1>your boss, a good boss to your subordinates, and a

1:12:13.680 --> 1:12:16.080
<v Speaker 1>good colleague to your colleagues. That would be the core

1:12:16.160 --> 1:12:19.800
<v Speaker 1>of my advice. Fascinating stuff and our final question, what

1:12:19.880 --> 1:12:23.880
<v Speaker 1>do you know about investing theory and practice today that

1:12:24.080 --> 1:12:27.280
<v Speaker 1>you wish you knew forty years ago when you were

1:12:27.400 --> 1:12:30.479
<v Speaker 1>first getting started. The thing that the thing that I

1:12:30.600 --> 1:12:35.280
<v Speaker 1>am constantly um realizing and I think I've got it

1:12:35.360 --> 1:12:38.080
<v Speaker 1>internalized now, but it's been after forty years. Is that,

1:12:39.000 --> 1:12:42.960
<v Speaker 1>um that the that the markets and the world and

1:12:43.040 --> 1:12:45.560
<v Speaker 1>the economy is so much more complicated than you have

1:12:45.640 --> 1:12:50.600
<v Speaker 1>any idea, And it's and so having dogmatic views and

1:12:50.760 --> 1:12:53.400
<v Speaker 1>pontificating about the world this way or this is going

1:12:53.439 --> 1:12:55.760
<v Speaker 1>to happen, or the Hong Kong peg is going to

1:12:55.840 --> 1:12:57.640
<v Speaker 1>do this, or the Chinese You're going to do that

1:12:58.280 --> 1:13:00.200
<v Speaker 1>is a complete waste of time, because no, but he

1:13:00.280 --> 1:13:03.040
<v Speaker 1>has any idea what's going to happen in the in

1:13:03.120 --> 1:13:05.280
<v Speaker 1>the future. There are certain things that you know. And

1:13:05.320 --> 1:13:08.240
<v Speaker 1>then psychologically, what what you find out is that you know,

1:13:08.240 --> 1:13:10.840
<v Speaker 1>if you make five predictions and and you know two

1:13:10.960 --> 1:13:13.080
<v Speaker 1>or right and three or wrong, you'll you'll remember the

1:13:13.200 --> 1:13:14.920
<v Speaker 1>two or right, and the three that we're wrong, you'll

1:13:14.920 --> 1:13:19.200
<v Speaker 1>blame on something else. So I think that I think

1:13:19.240 --> 1:13:23.280
<v Speaker 1>that there's a lot of psychological barriers and problems that

1:13:23.360 --> 1:13:25.360
<v Speaker 1>people need to overcome. And I would say just being

1:13:26.120 --> 1:13:28.559
<v Speaker 1>you know, I'd say, being as skeptical and as humble

1:13:28.600 --> 1:13:30.320
<v Speaker 1>as you can be with respect to what you think

1:13:30.400 --> 1:13:32.920
<v Speaker 1>you know. And uh. And the other thing is that

1:13:33.160 --> 1:13:35.439
<v Speaker 1>that again I've found helpful to me, I would say,

1:13:35.520 --> 1:13:37.040
<v Speaker 1>other people be helpful. But I get to ask a lot,

1:13:37.120 --> 1:13:38.800
<v Speaker 1>what do you worry about in the market? What do

1:13:38.840 --> 1:13:42.559
<v Speaker 1>you worry about? And my answer, which might sound institution

1:13:42.680 --> 1:13:45.639
<v Speaker 1>but it's true, is that I don't really worry about anything.

1:13:46.400 --> 1:13:52.519
<v Speaker 1>Because the entire world of investors and commentators are always

1:13:52.560 --> 1:13:54.760
<v Speaker 1>worried about everything. Every time you turn into television recently,

1:13:55.000 --> 1:13:56.840
<v Speaker 1>this is gonna go wrong. That's gonna worry about this,

1:13:56.880 --> 1:13:59.080
<v Speaker 1>and worried about that. The market's overvalue, there's too much.

1:13:59.120 --> 1:14:01.320
<v Speaker 1>This is so with all those people worrying about it.

1:14:01.360 --> 1:14:03.680
<v Speaker 1>There's lots of there's lots of there's no shorts of

1:14:03.720 --> 1:14:06.080
<v Speaker 1>people worrying about things, and so what I try and

1:14:06.120 --> 1:14:08.759
<v Speaker 1>do is focus on where are the opportunities in the market,

1:14:09.320 --> 1:14:12.400
<v Speaker 1>given whatever the market appears to be, and not you know,

1:14:12.760 --> 1:14:15.240
<v Speaker 1>doing a bunch of wailing and handering about how things

1:14:15.280 --> 1:14:17.280
<v Speaker 1>are going to get worse or this is a terrible situation.

1:14:18.000 --> 1:14:20.040
<v Speaker 1>So I'd say that probably goes back to my old,

1:14:20.160 --> 1:14:22.559
<v Speaker 1>you know, late partner Ernie, who you would always say, well,

1:14:22.600 --> 1:14:24.640
<v Speaker 1>let's let's let's see if there's anything positive in the

1:14:24.680 --> 1:14:26.439
<v Speaker 1>stuff that we can figure out. We've got We've got

1:14:26.479 --> 1:14:28.479
<v Speaker 1>plenty of negativism that we can we can always, we

1:14:28.560 --> 1:14:31.840
<v Speaker 1>can always count on being around. Thank you, Bill for

1:14:31.920 --> 1:14:34.560
<v Speaker 1>being so generous with your time. Man. That was just

1:14:34.960 --> 1:14:39.560
<v Speaker 1>fascinating stuff, really really good stuff. If you enjoy this conversation,

1:14:40.000 --> 1:14:42.719
<v Speaker 1>well be should check out all the other three hundred

1:14:42.800 --> 1:14:45.840
<v Speaker 1>such podcasts we've done over the past six years. You

1:14:45.920 --> 1:14:51.360
<v Speaker 1>can find that at iTunes, Spotify, Google, Overcast, Stitcher, wherever

1:14:51.680 --> 1:14:55.280
<v Speaker 1>your finer podcasts are sold. We love your comments, feedback

1:14:55.280 --> 1:14:58.559
<v Speaker 1>and suggestions right to us at m IB podcast at

1:14:58.560 --> 1:15:02.280
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot net. Check out my weekly column at Bloomberg

1:15:02.360 --> 1:15:05.679
<v Speaker 1>dot com Slash Opinion. Sign up for our daily reads

1:15:05.800 --> 1:15:08.320
<v Speaker 1>at Ridoltz dot com. Be sure to give us a

1:15:08.400 --> 1:15:12.200
<v Speaker 1>review at Apple iTunes. Follow me on Twitter at rid Halts.

1:15:12.960 --> 1:15:14.920
<v Speaker 1>I would be remiss if I did not thank the

1:15:15.040 --> 1:15:19.160
<v Speaker 1>Cracks staff that helps put these conversations together each week.

1:15:19.640 --> 1:15:24.080
<v Speaker 1>Maroufo is our audio engineer. Michael Boyle is my producer.

1:15:24.439 --> 1:15:27.960
<v Speaker 1>A Tico val Brun is our project manager. Michael Batnick

1:15:28.080 --> 1:15:31.439
<v Speaker 1>is my head of research. I'm Barry Ridholtz. You've been

1:15:31.520 --> 1:15:34.719
<v Speaker 1>listening to pastors in business on Bloomberg Radio