WEBVTT - Thinking Sideways: GhostNet

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<v Speaker 1>Thinking Sideways is not brought you by the itch on

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<v Speaker 1>my right leg. Instead, it's brought you by crime Con.

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<v Speaker 1>That's right on June nine to June eleven at the

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<v Speaker 1>off your admission crime con dot com and sideways twenty

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<v Speaker 1>Thinking Sideways. I'll group the ideas, I don't know, stories

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<v Speaker 1>of things, we synthie don't know the answer tube. Hey guys,

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<v Speaker 1>welcome to another episode of Thinking Sideways, the podcast I

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<v Speaker 1>Am Devon, joined this week by Joe and Steve. This

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<v Speaker 1>week Okay, special episodes, Special episode starring uh, Steve and Joe.

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<v Speaker 1>I just want to know who the other two guys are,

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<v Speaker 1>because really, he's spreading crumbs all over my chair. It's

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<v Speaker 1>really annoying. From that ham sandwich, I think faster. I

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<v Speaker 1>kind of suspect we're being transitioned out, dude. Yeah, well,

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<v Speaker 1>hello retirement. This week we're going to talk about a

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<v Speaker 1>mystery that's going to make half of you really happy

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<v Speaker 1>and half of you turn off immediately. Um. And that's

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<v Speaker 1>an internet mystery, because everybody loves a mystery that's in

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<v Speaker 1>the tubes. I like them. I think they're super interesting.

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<v Speaker 1>Some of our listeners like them, but it turns out

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of our listeners hate them, and that's why

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<v Speaker 1>we're like not top rated in true crime. But I

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<v Speaker 1>should say this before you turn it off. There is

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<v Speaker 1>a little international intrigue involved. There's some spice stuff going on,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe German warfare, possible state actors involved or possibly not.

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<v Speaker 1>You know it doesn't it does a computer virus counters

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<v Speaker 1>term warfare? Yeah, I guess. I mean if Beatles do,

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<v Speaker 1>I guess you know why not? Right? All right? This

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<v Speaker 1>week we're going to talk about ghost net, which is

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<v Speaker 1>also yousing wa in Chinese, but we're going to call

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<v Speaker 1>it ghost net better not saying that a bunch of

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<v Speaker 1>times ghost I like it. It sounds like a movie

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<v Speaker 1>ready jump from the Lady at the top of the

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<v Speaker 1>stairs that is only seen like once a year. Ghost

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<v Speaker 1>kind of ghost, yes, kind of ghost. Fishing with a

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<v Speaker 1>net failed bad joke, yes, pretty bad. All right, I'll

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<v Speaker 1>get out of the way alright. In two thousand nine,

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<v Speaker 1>researchers from the Universe, City of Toronto's Monk Center and

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<v Speaker 1>the Cambridge University. From here on out, we're going to

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<v Speaker 1>refer to them as the info Wars Monitor concluded a

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<v Speaker 1>tenish month joint investigation that was requested by a representative

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<v Speaker 1>of the o h Hdlice of Office of His Holiness

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<v Speaker 1>the Dalai lama Um. And this this meeting took place,

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<v Speaker 1>The request took place in Geneva, which is a safe

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<v Speaker 1>space for for some people. The investigation under uncovered one

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<v Speaker 1>of the most widespread hack hacks in history, perhaps the

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<v Speaker 1>most widespread hack in history, certainly, I would say the

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<v Speaker 1>most widespread hack that we're aware of. That that we're

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<v Speaker 1>aware of, which means it was yeah, and that just

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<v Speaker 1>means that it wasn't the best hack but computer and

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<v Speaker 1>at least a hundred and three countries, yes you heard

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<v Speaker 1>me right, one hundred and three countries were affected, and

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<v Speaker 1>researchers think that it was almost individual hope. In general,

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<v Speaker 1>it is believed that China was the perpetrator of this attack,

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<v Speaker 1>but no one can be certain, and I have my doubts,

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<v Speaker 1>which is why I thought this would be a good mystery.

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<v Speaker 1>And these computers mostly belonged to embassies governmental ministries, and

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<v Speaker 1>then almost all of the Dali Lama's exile centers were

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<v Speaker 1>affected as well. And the thing is um. Even though

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<v Speaker 1>ghost net was discovered as recently as two thousand eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>at least one government UM Canada has uncovered an instance

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<v Speaker 1>of ghost net, or the bug that is referred to

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<v Speaker 1>as ghost net. UM. They discovered an instance of that

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<v Speaker 1>and it was in the Canadian official Finance department. Was

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<v Speaker 1>the was where the computer that was infected was discovered. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>This is, of course, according to an anonymous source, because

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<v Speaker 1>governments don't readily admit things like this, and the computer

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<v Speaker 1>was probably a hand me down from the Foreign ministry. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>probably are interested in the Canadian finances. I saw something about.

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<v Speaker 1>It was like a year or so after all this

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<v Speaker 1>got done, another one was found in India, and I

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<v Speaker 1>think another onrustration in Iran. So I mean it's it

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<v Speaker 1>keeps popping up. Yeah, despite the fact that and we'll

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<v Speaker 1>talk about in a little bit, we're going to kind

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<v Speaker 1>of delve into the wise and house of this um

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<v Speaker 1>and we'll talk about how why it was so prevalent

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<v Speaker 1>um and it's because it was a pretty dang good hack.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's jump in to the first how we're gonna

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<v Speaker 1>talk about tech. So we're going to talk about tech

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<v Speaker 1>cool and it's gonna be a little boring. I'm sorry.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't think it's boring, but I think a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of people are gonna thinks I see lots of I

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<v Speaker 1>see lots of joking, yoke opportunity in the title of

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<v Speaker 1>this that is the sub end. Yeah, I think the

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<v Speaker 1>work out well. So first we're going to talk about Trojans.

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<v Speaker 1>And for those of you who don't know, trojans are

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<v Speaker 1>giant horses that once roamed the land before shedding their

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<v Speaker 1>physical form and evolving into an internet based life form.

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<v Speaker 1>You left out the soldiers and sidde. Yeah, they reproduced

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<v Speaker 1>by sending out math emails and hoping that some duddy

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<v Speaker 1>dummy will download them, thus giving them access to anything

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<v Speaker 1>that the computers attached to and becoming mini Trojan's. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>that's how that works, right, that's what they are, not exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a cute description, but it's actually not the worst description.

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<v Speaker 1>I will agree with that. So everybody knows, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>what a trojan horses, right, I would hope. And so

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<v Speaker 1>basically this is just a trojan. Virus is a delivery system,

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<v Speaker 1>so that it's it's like a little hitt now like

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<v Speaker 1>the horse, you know, you know, you let it into

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<v Speaker 1>your city and then you just go to bed and

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<v Speaker 1>then overnight it's bits how some soldiers you know, kind

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<v Speaker 1>of like that. It's computer. It's bits out a little

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<v Speaker 1>line of code that builds itself like a virus. And

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<v Speaker 1>so this can be this can install trojans can install

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<v Speaker 1>anything from like small bits of spyware, two key logging tech,

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<v Speaker 1>two bugs that will totally completely take over your computer.

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<v Speaker 1>And in our case, the trojan known as ghost rat

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<v Speaker 1>and yes that is a zero instead of an oh.

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<v Speaker 1>Ghost rat and the ghost Rat allowed hackers to gain

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<v Speaker 1>total and real time control of any computer running Windows.

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<v Speaker 1>It only infected Windows computers, which is you know, was

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<v Speaker 1>one of the original selling points of max is that

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<v Speaker 1>they don't get infected. But that's unfortunately, Yeah, ghost Rat

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<v Speaker 1>could even utilize UM computers as surveillance machines by clandestinely

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<v Speaker 1>turning on the audio recorders and the cameras and camera. Yeah. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>and they could record both of those things, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>remotely or whatever. But basically, yeah, they would just turn

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<v Speaker 1>on the camera and the mic and be able to

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<v Speaker 1>totally surveil a room, any room that the computer is in. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's one of the origins of you know, people

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<v Speaker 1>like me, even though I have MAC put little pieces

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<v Speaker 1>of tape over their camera because you can turn the

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<v Speaker 1>camera on without the little light showing that the cameras

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<v Speaker 1>on being on, and then somebody surveilling you. If you

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<v Speaker 1>watch the TV show Black Mirror, season three, episode three

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<v Speaker 1>goes right down exactly what you're talking about in terms

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<v Speaker 1>of gathering information and using it against people. I was

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<v Speaker 1>going to say that if you watched Mr Robot, it's

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<v Speaker 1>like the first freaking episode has an instance of this,

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<v Speaker 1>and in that case, that hacker was gathering surveillance information

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<v Speaker 1>to blackmail people like they were gathering out with pictures

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<v Speaker 1>or somebody from blackmail somebody. UM. But there are obviously

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<v Speaker 1>larger implications and uses for surveying just survey. Yeah, that's

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<v Speaker 1>what there's one of the new smart TVs that has

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you can talk to it, Panasonic whatever do this,

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<v Speaker 1>and people have figured out how to hack those so

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<v Speaker 1>that they're just it's a it's a listening device. So

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<v Speaker 1>that was one of the things with connects to because

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<v Speaker 1>they's always recording. I don't want to think about I

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<v Speaker 1>just can't wait for this in the future courtroom drama

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<v Speaker 1>where Alexis brought in as a witness. Absolutely didn't just happen, ye,

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<v Speaker 1>did it? Apple? Well? Yeah, no, Actually I'm talking about

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<v Speaker 1>Alexa actually sitting in the witness box, you know. But

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<v Speaker 1>I think I but this kind of stuff, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>we have we've all heard of the Internet of things.

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<v Speaker 1>You get you connect your fridge and your TV and

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<v Speaker 1>your microwave and your toaster to the Internet, and then

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<v Speaker 1>you can control it from your smartphone. And it turns

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<v Speaker 1>out that's a really bad thing because this security and

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<v Speaker 1>the encryption on those devices turns out it's really really

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<v Speaker 1>bad because initially everybody was like, who's gonna hack your fridge?

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<v Speaker 1>Except we've seen those instances where there's the nanny cam

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<v Speaker 1>and the teddy Bear that you can use your smartphone

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<v Speaker 1>with and then somebody walks in the room and the

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<v Speaker 1>bear is talking and rush into the baby. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>like it's totally a thing because they just seemed so innocuous,

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<v Speaker 1>these little devices. I'm not a big believer in the

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<v Speaker 1>Internet of Things personally. Oh no, Internet of things is dumb. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I disagree. I like the Internet of Things. I think

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<v Speaker 1>that there's some improvements that can be made, certainly, but

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<v Speaker 1>I think that that's just part of you know, new

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<v Speaker 1>way of technology implementation. But but just another fun thing

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<v Speaker 1>in the news. It was in a just a week

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<v Speaker 1>or two ago, the cops bust to the guy with

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<v Speaker 1>the pacemaker because he was making his big alibi was

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<v Speaker 1>there was a fire and he was like, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>like struggling to escape from the fire or something. I

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<v Speaker 1>can't remember exactly what it was, but they managed to

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<v Speaker 1>download download information from his pacemaker, the pacemaker's record. The

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<v Speaker 1>pacemaker basically said, no, this guy's heart wasn't beating fast

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<v Speaker 1>at all. Oh my god, and yeah he was busted

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<v Speaker 1>and crazy. Yeah. So yeah, all these digital devices there,

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<v Speaker 1>they're recording the crap out of your life. Yeah. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>So anyway, long story short, that's why you should put

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<v Speaker 1>tape over your camera and don't say anything sensed eve

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<v Speaker 1>around your computer because it's listening all the time. I

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<v Speaker 1>don't have mine on. My camera's always exposed. I say

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<v Speaker 1>all kinds of things to my computer. I know. And

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<v Speaker 1>that's why people secretly have pictures of us. They have

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<v Speaker 1>even better pictures to Steve so ghost rat back to

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<v Speaker 1>the story, was a specific kind of trojan, and it

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<v Speaker 1>is most often referred to as an APT or an

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<v Speaker 1>advanced persistent threat. Often trojans will be sent out just

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<v Speaker 1>kind of you know, like those emails from Thenigerian Prince

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<v Speaker 1>just just yeah, really, just as many people as they

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<v Speaker 1>can possibly send them to on the hope that a

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<v Speaker 1>couple of people will be real dumb and infect their

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<v Speaker 1>computer and then they go for heavy payload real quick,

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<v Speaker 1>and then um they get eradicated from the computer. But

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers already have what they wanted. Oftentimes, as we

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<v Speaker 1>were talking about with you know, trying to get information

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<v Speaker 1>that you could blackmail somebody with, or you know, any

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<v Speaker 1>financial records or just passwords or things like that. UM

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<v Speaker 1>apt s, however, are pretty much the opposite of that.

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<v Speaker 1>Um They're usually targeted at one organization, be it a

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<v Speaker 1>corporation or government or ministry or something like that, and

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<v Speaker 1>they usually have inside intel on how to get into

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<v Speaker 1>the system. Pretty frequently apt s are executed with um

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<v Speaker 1>like old school espionage skills, stick in a USB, stick

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<v Speaker 1>in a computer, well, more like social engineering to get

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<v Speaker 1>to the point where that guy can stick that USB

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<v Speaker 1>stick in to a computer or even you know, so

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<v Speaker 1>that they know social engineering. You mean what Okay, so

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<v Speaker 1>social engineering is a term that generally refers to the

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<v Speaker 1>old school manipulation of people. Yeah, basically, yeah, but I

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<v Speaker 1>know what social engineering used to be called. But in

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<v Speaker 1>like special social engineering you're talking about, Actually it's still

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<v Speaker 1>the same thing, okay, Yeah, where you know, you try

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<v Speaker 1>you convince people to do things that they shouldn't necessarily

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<v Speaker 1>do by talking to them in person. I mean, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>it's similar to you know, you can call somebody and

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<v Speaker 1>and start a conversation with them and get information out

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<v Speaker 1>of them by pretending like you know what you're talking about.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, little things like that, Or you can dress

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<v Speaker 1>up like a janitor and pretend like you're supposed to

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<v Speaker 1>be in that corporate office and walk around and nine

0:13:56.400 --> 0:13:59.079
<v Speaker 1>times that attend, nobody's going to be like, hey, excuse me,

0:13:59.360 --> 0:14:01.480
<v Speaker 1>you're not the weal, guy, what are you doing here?

0:14:01.920 --> 0:14:03.480
<v Speaker 1>They're just going to ignore you, and you're going to

0:14:03.559 --> 0:14:06.640
<v Speaker 1>get away with doing a lot of research or intel

0:14:06.720 --> 0:14:10.480
<v Speaker 1>work or you know again sticking a USB in a

0:14:10.480 --> 0:14:13.240
<v Speaker 1>place that doesn't exist or it shouldn't exist. I mean,

0:14:13.320 --> 0:14:15.240
<v Speaker 1>and this is the other thing, right, is that let's

0:14:16.280 --> 0:14:20.840
<v Speaker 1>a lot of places say you should never put like

0:14:20.880 --> 0:14:22.680
<v Speaker 1>a used to b C d s or floppy disks

0:14:22.760 --> 0:14:24.800
<v Speaker 1>or anything like that that you don't know what it's

0:14:24.800 --> 0:14:27.760
<v Speaker 1>on it, don't put it in your computer because that

0:14:27.840 --> 0:14:30.960
<v Speaker 1>used to be a pretty standard delivery system for these

0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:33.920
<v Speaker 1>little bugs, because it would just install into your computer

0:14:33.960 --> 0:14:35.880
<v Speaker 1>and then all of a sudden, you've infected every People

0:14:35.880 --> 0:14:38.200
<v Speaker 1>would go to Starbucks and leave a flash drive and

0:14:38.280 --> 0:14:40.880
<v Speaker 1>some somebody would like, oh, who's flash dry? I don't know, Well,

0:14:40.920 --> 0:14:42.320
<v Speaker 1>let's see what's on it. Maybe I can find out

0:14:42.320 --> 0:14:47.160
<v Speaker 1>who belongs to. So they did a study of some

0:14:47.320 --> 0:14:49.480
<v Speaker 1>university recently where they left a bunch of the flash

0:14:49.560 --> 0:14:53.120
<v Speaker 1>drives just laying around campus and uh and if you downloaded,

0:14:53.120 --> 0:14:55.680
<v Speaker 1>you've got instructions on just bring it back to this department.

0:14:55.720 --> 0:14:58.280
<v Speaker 1>They found that like half the people that pick these

0:14:58.280 --> 0:15:02.080
<v Speaker 1>things up stuck them into their computers. Yeah, yeah, unbelievable. Yeah. Well,

0:15:02.080 --> 0:15:04.880
<v Speaker 1>and that's where the kind of social engineering thing can

0:15:05.000 --> 0:15:07.760
<v Speaker 1>can come in handy rate is if you call if

0:15:07.800 --> 0:15:10.120
<v Speaker 1>you have a target, a high value target, you know, right,

0:15:10.280 --> 0:15:12.880
<v Speaker 1>is like the CEO of a company who has proven

0:15:12.920 --> 0:15:15.160
<v Speaker 1>to be maybe not as tech savvy as they should be,

0:15:15.400 --> 0:15:20.320
<v Speaker 1>and you know, yeah CEO of Sideways Co. And you

0:15:21.080 --> 0:15:24.440
<v Speaker 1>want to somehow infect that person's computer. Well, you can

0:15:24.560 --> 0:15:27.040
<v Speaker 1>go through the arduous process of trying to figure out

0:15:27.080 --> 0:15:29.960
<v Speaker 1>if there's a backdoor exploit tech wise where you can

0:15:30.000 --> 0:15:32.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, get into the pack of the mainframe, you know,

0:15:32.520 --> 0:15:37.040
<v Speaker 1>blah blah blah, or or even easier, right, you can

0:15:37.040 --> 0:15:40.440
<v Speaker 1>call his secretary and say, I am supposed to be

0:15:40.440 --> 0:15:43.000
<v Speaker 1>in this meeting with him. I'm so sorry, Or my

0:15:43.080 --> 0:15:44.760
<v Speaker 1>supervisor is supposed to be in my meet in this

0:15:44.840 --> 0:15:47.520
<v Speaker 1>meeting with your CEO and he's running late, and I

0:15:47.560 --> 0:15:50.160
<v Speaker 1>just need to know, like where they're meeting, please can

0:15:50.200 --> 0:15:52.960
<v Speaker 1>you tell me? And the secretary will take pity on

0:15:53.000 --> 0:15:57.240
<v Speaker 1>you if you tried enough times, and you'll and she'll say, oh,

0:15:57.240 --> 0:15:59.560
<v Speaker 1>they're meeting at the Starbucks. You'll go leave a flash

0:15:59.640 --> 0:16:04.600
<v Speaker 1>drive where he's going to find it, and and that's

0:16:04.640 --> 0:16:07.560
<v Speaker 1>like an old school kind of social engineering technique, right

0:16:07.600 --> 0:16:10.080
<v Speaker 1>where you you make somebody give pity on you and

0:16:10.240 --> 0:16:11.920
<v Speaker 1>there you go. But yeah, or you can send a

0:16:11.920 --> 0:16:13.680
<v Speaker 1>phishing email, which is what we're going to talk about

0:16:13.680 --> 0:16:18.520
<v Speaker 1>a little bit. So all of that to say that

0:16:18.520 --> 0:16:21.480
<v Speaker 1>that's one way that um A pt s are delivered

0:16:21.600 --> 0:16:24.800
<v Speaker 1>is by social engineering, and the other way is by

0:16:24.800 --> 0:16:30.960
<v Speaker 1>spending a lot of money or manpower to expose those

0:16:31.040 --> 0:16:35.600
<v Speaker 1>backdoor vulnerabilities that exist in all systems, and not necessarily backdoor,

0:16:35.640 --> 0:16:39.160
<v Speaker 1>but vulnerabilities that exist in like every single system. There's

0:16:39.160 --> 0:16:41.800
<v Speaker 1>always some way that a system is a little messed up.

0:16:42.800 --> 0:16:46.160
<v Speaker 1>It's not cheap route typically because on the dark web

0:16:46.240 --> 0:16:49.960
<v Speaker 1>you can buy a lot of different bits of script

0:16:50.040 --> 0:16:55.360
<v Speaker 1>and code or full on assault packages for systems, but

0:16:55.440 --> 0:16:58.320
<v Speaker 1>that's not a cheap endeavor. Yeah, it sounds like from

0:16:58.400 --> 0:17:02.480
<v Speaker 1>the research that I have been doing just around this project,

0:17:02.560 --> 0:17:06.520
<v Speaker 1>not for my own anything, don't worry. Um it sounds

0:17:06.600 --> 0:17:08.639
<v Speaker 1>like there are a lot of people who make a

0:17:08.680 --> 0:17:12.240
<v Speaker 1>lot of money basically make their living on finding these

0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:15.720
<v Speaker 1>exploits and not exploiting them and just putting it out

0:17:15.720 --> 0:17:18.679
<v Speaker 1>there on forums and saying, hey guys, just you know,

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:20.680
<v Speaker 1>I have a way to get into this goes to

0:17:20.720 --> 0:17:23.560
<v Speaker 1>the highest bidder and letting a bidding war happen, and

0:17:23.600 --> 0:17:25.680
<v Speaker 1>then you know, eventually somebody will say, I will give

0:17:25.680 --> 0:17:28.480
<v Speaker 1>you three million dollars for that one thing. And the

0:17:30.280 --> 0:17:34.320
<v Speaker 1>zero vulnerabilities. Yeah, zero dave vulnerabilities is the technical term

0:17:34.840 --> 0:17:37.320
<v Speaker 1>that I've been avoiding because I don't I don't know,

0:17:37.320 --> 0:17:38.760
<v Speaker 1>because I don't know how many people are going to

0:17:38.840 --> 0:17:42.359
<v Speaker 1>know it. Um And yeah, it's it's a lot of

0:17:42.359 --> 0:17:44.440
<v Speaker 1>manpower or a lot of money to go that route.

0:17:44.480 --> 0:17:48.480
<v Speaker 1>It's much easier just call somebody secretarian you know, and

0:17:48.640 --> 0:17:51.920
<v Speaker 1>fishing you know. Um. So yeah, the all of that

0:17:52.000 --> 0:17:55.280
<v Speaker 1>to say again that a p t S are typically

0:17:55.400 --> 0:18:00.479
<v Speaker 1>very well financed. It is a long term investment because

0:18:00.520 --> 0:18:05.040
<v Speaker 1>the goal is to surveil for a very long amount

0:18:05.040 --> 0:18:11.280
<v Speaker 1>of time. It's not to it's it's really quantity and

0:18:11.560 --> 0:18:18.040
<v Speaker 1>quality over just like sheer volume extracting volume. All I mean,

0:18:18.240 --> 0:18:20.200
<v Speaker 1>correct me if I'm wrong. This is the way I

0:18:20.320 --> 0:18:22.960
<v Speaker 1>understood a pt S, and tell me if I'm wrong.

0:18:22.960 --> 0:18:24.960
<v Speaker 1>Here is I looked at it is is there's two

0:18:25.000 --> 0:18:28.040
<v Speaker 1>types of ways to to rob a bank. There's the

0:18:28.160 --> 0:18:31.199
<v Speaker 1>smash and grab, where you go in you grab as

0:18:31.359 --> 0:18:35.120
<v Speaker 1>much as you can, and you run and whatever you get,

0:18:35.240 --> 0:18:40.840
<v Speaker 1>you get or your bank employee, and you just start

0:18:41.359 --> 0:18:45.600
<v Speaker 1>funneling funds and embezzling a thousand dollars a day and

0:18:45.680 --> 0:18:47.920
<v Speaker 1>do it for as long as you can, because chances

0:18:47.960 --> 0:18:49.720
<v Speaker 1>are you're not going to get noticed and you're gonna

0:18:49.720 --> 0:18:53.120
<v Speaker 1>get more long term, I would I would add it's

0:18:53.320 --> 0:18:56.600
<v Speaker 1>more like it's a subtler approach. It's more like somebody

0:18:56.640 --> 0:19:00.200
<v Speaker 1>getting a job out of bank to funnel five bucks

0:19:00.200 --> 0:19:04.119
<v Speaker 1>a day. Yeah, I mean a little tiny amount. I

0:19:04.160 --> 0:19:07.400
<v Speaker 1>mean like even just like dropping a roll of coins

0:19:07.480 --> 0:19:11.800
<v Speaker 1>into your purse every day for six or seven years

0:19:12.520 --> 0:19:15.200
<v Speaker 1>before you get caught, and then obviously like not spending

0:19:15.240 --> 0:19:18.360
<v Speaker 1>any money. So by the end of your process, you

0:19:18.359 --> 0:19:20.600
<v Speaker 1>you have a ton of money. You have a huge

0:19:20.720 --> 0:19:24.600
<v Speaker 1>value there. So that that's a really good analogy. Yeah, okay,

0:19:24.840 --> 0:19:26.720
<v Speaker 1>you have to have a lot of coins to make

0:19:26.720 --> 0:19:30.359
<v Speaker 1>it worth it. Remember all the quarters is ten bucks. Yeah,

0:19:30.440 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 1>so ten bucks a day for seven years, eight years,

0:19:34.760 --> 0:19:39.720
<v Speaker 1>that's what three thousand dollars a year as auxiliary income.

0:19:39.760 --> 0:19:43.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, that's like three thousand bucks a months, right,

0:19:43.960 --> 0:19:48.199
<v Speaker 1>My math skills are hideous six a year, Yeah, that's right. Right,

0:19:48.240 --> 0:19:51.760
<v Speaker 1>because ten all a day. Okay, never mind, that's more

0:19:51.800 --> 0:19:54.480
<v Speaker 1>than I thought. Yeah, okay, it was like it's only

0:19:54.520 --> 0:19:59.199
<v Speaker 1>three grand years. That's yeah. Yeah, it's not enough to

0:19:59.400 --> 0:20:05.400
<v Speaker 1>retire it. It's not nothing, especially as auxiliary income. Right. Yeah,

0:20:05.680 --> 0:20:08.000
<v Speaker 1>So this is kind of vague, and we've kind of

0:20:08.040 --> 0:20:10.520
<v Speaker 1>like gone in a bunch of different directions. But that's

0:20:10.560 --> 0:20:14.000
<v Speaker 1>because a pt s are pretty vague in nature, and

0:20:14.119 --> 0:20:18.280
<v Speaker 1>the way that they're deployed is oftentimes very different. Again,

0:20:18.400 --> 0:20:22.080
<v Speaker 1>because you don't want to be detected. Well let's say, yeah,

0:20:22.080 --> 0:20:24.040
<v Speaker 1>it's like an espionage you know, it's like you don't

0:20:24.040 --> 0:20:25.919
<v Speaker 1>want to protect your sources. You don't want people to

0:20:25.960 --> 0:20:28.919
<v Speaker 1>know that they've actually been penetrated. So you know, you

0:20:28.920 --> 0:20:31.240
<v Speaker 1>don't just when you get something and you get some information,

0:20:31.280 --> 0:20:33.200
<v Speaker 1>you don't just run out and act on it because

0:20:33.280 --> 0:20:38.240
<v Speaker 1>it tells the other side that, well, compromise. And I

0:20:38.240 --> 0:20:40.880
<v Speaker 1>would encourage our listeners to remember the thing that Joe

0:20:40.960 --> 0:20:43.720
<v Speaker 1>just said when we get into theories. That occurred to

0:20:43.760 --> 0:20:46.200
<v Speaker 1>me too, because I've read ahead a little bit too. Yeah,

0:20:46.480 --> 0:20:50.919
<v Speaker 1>that's good. I'm glad that you've read. Um. So, there

0:20:51.240 --> 0:20:55.920
<v Speaker 1>is a fifty three page report that was put out

0:20:55.920 --> 0:21:00.760
<v Speaker 1>by INFO War Monitor by Professor Ron Deep who's the

0:21:00.800 --> 0:21:04.439
<v Speaker 1>director at the Citizen Lab at the Monk Center for

0:21:04.520 --> 0:21:10.040
<v Speaker 1>International Studies at the University of Toronto, and Raffael Rojozinski,

0:21:10.400 --> 0:21:13.960
<v Speaker 1>I think, who's the principal and CEO at the SECTV Group.

0:21:14.280 --> 0:21:16.719
<v Speaker 1>I read all fifty three pages of this and let

0:21:16.720 --> 0:21:20.959
<v Speaker 1>me tell you, it was not easy reading. Read myself

0:21:22.000 --> 0:21:26.159
<v Speaker 1>good and I really deeply encourage if this is a

0:21:26.200 --> 0:21:29.440
<v Speaker 1>mystery that grabs you, you should read this whole report

0:21:29.480 --> 0:21:33.480
<v Speaker 1>because it's really interesting. But if you are just enjoying

0:21:33.560 --> 0:21:36.840
<v Speaker 1>listening to the sound of my voice, don't. I wouldn't

0:21:36.920 --> 0:21:39.080
<v Speaker 1>encourage you to read it. We will link it on

0:21:39.119 --> 0:21:41.560
<v Speaker 1>the website. I just played this episode over and over

0:21:41.600 --> 0:21:46.080
<v Speaker 1>and over again. Yeah. Um, so the next little bit

0:21:46.160 --> 0:21:48.320
<v Speaker 1>here we're gonna do is basically like a too long

0:21:48.400 --> 0:21:51.760
<v Speaker 1>didn't read of the fifty three pages of the report,

0:21:52.160 --> 0:21:54.760
<v Speaker 1>because I think it's important that we talked about the

0:21:54.840 --> 0:21:59.439
<v Speaker 1>report and the investigation that happened. The investigation took place

0:21:59.480 --> 0:22:03.199
<v Speaker 1>in two parts. One the first part from June to

0:22:03.240 --> 0:22:06.600
<v Speaker 1>November in two thousand eight, um, and then the second

0:22:06.720 --> 0:22:10.639
<v Speaker 1>part was December two thousand eight to March two thousand nine,

0:22:11.119 --> 0:22:14.680
<v Speaker 1>and again as I mentioned the whole you know, pushed

0:22:14.680 --> 0:22:16.720
<v Speaker 1>to do this was because there was a request from

0:22:16.760 --> 0:22:19.640
<v Speaker 1>the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. And yes,

0:22:19.680 --> 0:22:21.600
<v Speaker 1>I am going to say that every single time. I

0:22:21.680 --> 0:22:23.280
<v Speaker 1>read it that way in my head every time. So

0:22:23.320 --> 0:22:25.560
<v Speaker 1>I'm glad you gonna keep doing two the other way.

0:22:30.320 --> 0:22:33.960
<v Speaker 1>Uh So June to November two tho. The first part

0:22:34.480 --> 0:22:38.200
<v Speaker 1>was an on site investigation in which investigators took time

0:22:38.240 --> 0:22:43.000
<v Speaker 1>to figure out what the typical computer and infosecurity practices

0:22:43.080 --> 0:22:46.919
<v Speaker 1>looked like at the organizations that were infected or that

0:22:46.960 --> 0:22:49.520
<v Speaker 1>they thought were infected. At this point, they didn't really

0:22:49.560 --> 0:22:51.959
<v Speaker 1>know how many were well, they didn't know what they

0:22:51.960 --> 0:22:53.480
<v Speaker 1>were dealing They didn't really know what they were dealing with,

0:22:53.520 --> 0:22:56.880
<v Speaker 1>but they were trying to identify. Is they're a good

0:22:56.880 --> 0:23:00.040
<v Speaker 1>password protocol. Is it possible that somebody just guessed on

0:23:00.160 --> 0:23:04.600
<v Speaker 1>passwords right that got this information? Is there a different

0:23:04.600 --> 0:23:08.160
<v Speaker 1>way that this information could be leaking? Is somebody inside

0:23:08.160 --> 0:23:12.280
<v Speaker 1>the office? Yeah? Or even you know, just things like

0:23:12.359 --> 0:23:15.720
<v Speaker 1>did somebody lose a computer and I didn't want to

0:23:15.720 --> 0:23:18.560
<v Speaker 1>admit it, or you know, are you guys not shredding

0:23:18.640 --> 0:23:22.120
<v Speaker 1>your sensitive document? You know, really just and suspicious things

0:23:22.160 --> 0:23:26.719
<v Speaker 1>were happening to. Yeah, the organization itself in terms of

0:23:27.040 --> 0:23:32.439
<v Speaker 1>reactions and preemptive reactions and stuff. Yeah, we're gonna talk

0:23:32.480 --> 0:23:35.879
<v Speaker 1>about that in a second, but them to ask for

0:23:35.920 --> 0:23:41.359
<v Speaker 1>the help. Yeah. But basically what the investigators or researchers

0:23:41.400 --> 0:23:44.320
<v Speaker 1>were trying to do at the get go was what

0:23:44.359 --> 0:23:47.679
<v Speaker 1>they used to do on ghost Hunters, right where when

0:23:47.760 --> 0:23:49.840
<v Speaker 1>they would like film something suspicious and they'd be like,

0:23:49.840 --> 0:23:53.640
<v Speaker 1>all right, how can we recreate this with like normal environments?

0:23:53.960 --> 0:23:56.439
<v Speaker 1>And then when they couldn't, they said, okay, there's a

0:23:56.440 --> 0:24:00.440
<v Speaker 1>ghost here. Or in our case, when they couldn't account for,

0:24:00.640 --> 0:24:04.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, the leaks that were happening, they said, computer okay,

0:24:04.240 --> 0:24:07.240
<v Speaker 1>it was the computer. Okay, something is wrong with your computers.

0:24:07.720 --> 0:24:11.719
<v Speaker 1>This part of the investigation was again primarily carried out

0:24:12.320 --> 0:24:15.439
<v Speaker 1>in the Tibetan government in exile, so at the office

0:24:15.480 --> 0:24:19.639
<v Speaker 1>of His Holiness the Dali lama Um. Since he hadn't

0:24:19.960 --> 0:24:23.399
<v Speaker 1>requested the investigation or his office had requested the investigation,

0:24:23.400 --> 0:24:25.400
<v Speaker 1>they were pretty sure that there was something going on there.

0:24:25.800 --> 0:24:32.040
<v Speaker 1>From their investigators designed their investigation this post November December.

0:24:32.680 --> 0:24:36.800
<v Speaker 1>They did intense on site interviews again to see if

0:24:36.800 --> 0:24:39.879
<v Speaker 1>there were any other reasons for leaks? Did you use

0:24:39.920 --> 0:24:45.199
<v Speaker 1>your computer to just tell us you probably look at

0:24:45.200 --> 0:24:48.680
<v Speaker 1>people's bank accounts? Probably did they take a close look

0:24:48.720 --> 0:24:51.440
<v Speaker 1>at the d L himself. That's what I'm wondering. What

0:24:51.840 --> 0:24:56.679
<v Speaker 1>was Yeah maybe, yeah, I somehow suspect not but maybe

0:24:58.800 --> 0:25:07.480
<v Speaker 1>interrogation so um okay. And then also from December two

0:25:07.840 --> 0:25:12.040
<v Speaker 1>eight till March two nine, investigators analyze the information that

0:25:12.080 --> 0:25:14.760
<v Speaker 1>had been gathered in the first phase UM and they

0:25:14.800 --> 0:25:17.720
<v Speaker 1>found some interesting stuff. Again, I'm not going to go

0:25:17.760 --> 0:25:20.280
<v Speaker 1>into great detail because I don't feel like I need

0:25:20.320 --> 0:25:23.840
<v Speaker 1>to talk for another hour, but I will say you

0:25:23.880 --> 0:25:26.439
<v Speaker 1>should read the report. It's all in there. Basically, they

0:25:26.480 --> 0:25:28.760
<v Speaker 1>were able to curate a list of systems that were

0:25:28.800 --> 0:25:35.680
<v Speaker 1>infected and with the with with ghost rapt and UH,

0:25:35.720 --> 0:25:38.320
<v Speaker 1>they were trying to see if they could figure out

0:25:39.200 --> 0:25:41.960
<v Speaker 1>who was perpetuating the attack. They were able to find

0:25:41.960 --> 0:25:45.880
<v Speaker 1>out that seventy of the servers from which the attack

0:25:46.000 --> 0:25:54.080
<v Speaker 1>was being sent were hosted in China. However, yeah, that

0:25:54.119 --> 0:25:57.880
<v Speaker 1>sounds right mostly, but yeah, primarily the China servers were

0:25:57.880 --> 0:26:00.760
<v Speaker 1>in chained, do I Primarily That doesn't necessarily mean that

0:26:00.840 --> 0:26:03.800
<v Speaker 1>China was involved or the government of China was involved.

0:26:03.800 --> 0:26:07.760
<v Speaker 1>Because you know, servers in like South Carolina were also

0:26:07.840 --> 0:26:12.119
<v Speaker 1>involved um as well as Sweden, South Korea, and Taiwan.

0:26:12.720 --> 0:26:15.720
<v Speaker 1>Most of these servers were set up on what's called

0:26:15.800 --> 0:26:21.440
<v Speaker 1>a dynamic domain name system, which is dynamic DNS or

0:26:22.119 --> 0:26:25.000
<v Speaker 1>d d NS C d n S, which Joe is

0:26:25.000 --> 0:26:26.760
<v Speaker 1>going to talk about a little bit so that you

0:26:26.840 --> 0:26:29.879
<v Speaker 1>can drink some water given to give devon or break

0:26:29.960 --> 0:26:33.400
<v Speaker 1>here and yeah, not much to talk about really, it's

0:26:33.400 --> 0:26:37.879
<v Speaker 1>really simple. I mean the main name services where there's

0:26:37.920 --> 0:26:40.600
<v Speaker 1>you got the name of your website dub dub dub

0:26:40.680 --> 0:26:43.960
<v Speaker 1>Devin dot com. But then you've got the actual IP address,

0:26:44.600 --> 0:26:47.000
<v Speaker 1>which is some numbers with dots in between them, usually

0:26:47.040 --> 0:26:49.400
<v Speaker 1>like three and then three and three and then three

0:26:49.520 --> 0:26:53.080
<v Speaker 1>two yeah or two or whatever. But yeah, and then

0:26:53.119 --> 0:26:56.600
<v Speaker 1>but since i P addresses are not necessarily permanent, it

0:26:56.720 --> 0:26:58.000
<v Speaker 1>used to be in the old days, it was kind

0:26:58.000 --> 0:27:00.040
<v Speaker 1>of a manually updated system, and then they had to

0:27:00.040 --> 0:27:02.040
<v Speaker 1>go something a little more automated. And now you've got

0:27:02.040 --> 0:27:08.320
<v Speaker 1>this system that's really flexible called dynamic don domain name services,

0:27:08.400 --> 0:27:11.479
<v Speaker 1>where uh so you plug a device into your network

0:27:11.520 --> 0:27:14.440
<v Speaker 1>at home and that's connected to your router so that

0:27:14.440 --> 0:27:17.159
<v Speaker 1>that device, like say it's a webcam is going to

0:27:17.240 --> 0:27:20.240
<v Speaker 1>have an IP address, right, and so well what do

0:27:20.240 --> 0:27:21.720
<v Speaker 1>you do? You got to set it up and you

0:27:21.760 --> 0:27:24.080
<v Speaker 1>know and like send an email to the Domain Name

0:27:24.160 --> 0:27:27.320
<v Speaker 1>Service guys and say, hey, would you recognize my IP

0:27:27.440 --> 0:27:29.760
<v Speaker 1>camera and sign it a name or an IP address?

0:27:29.960 --> 0:27:32.680
<v Speaker 1>Not not the way it works anymore. So now your

0:27:32.720 --> 0:27:34.880
<v Speaker 1>device gets in there, you've got software and your router

0:27:35.480 --> 0:27:37.600
<v Speaker 1>that sends out a ping and that gets and then

0:27:38.119 --> 0:27:42.320
<v Speaker 1>gets back from a remote server it's IP address, a

0:27:42.320 --> 0:27:45.959
<v Speaker 1>new IP address, and then your software sends out an

0:27:46.080 --> 0:27:51.240
<v Speaker 1>update to a DNS server that updates. They're essentially their catalog,

0:27:51.240 --> 0:27:55.240
<v Speaker 1>their directory that's got said Devin dot com. And then

0:27:55.240 --> 0:27:58.080
<v Speaker 1>it's got you know this, that's got this IP address

0:27:58.200 --> 0:28:00.960
<v Speaker 1>next to it. That's your new IP address them and

0:28:01.040 --> 0:28:03.720
<v Speaker 1>I presumably if you I guess, if you reboot that thing,

0:28:03.800 --> 0:28:06.240
<v Speaker 1>you might wind up with a new IP address. And

0:28:06.240 --> 0:28:08.000
<v Speaker 1>then so it's time for that thing to send out

0:28:08.040 --> 0:28:11.560
<v Speaker 1>a new update to the DNS server again. And so

0:28:11.880 --> 0:28:13.480
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of that going on right now, a

0:28:13.520 --> 0:28:16.960
<v Speaker 1>lot of updates being sent to these these dynamics, the

0:28:17.080 --> 0:28:20.800
<v Speaker 1>DNS services. So essentially the i p s are not

0:28:20.960 --> 0:28:24.400
<v Speaker 1>nearly as permanent as they were say ten years ago.

0:28:24.440 --> 0:28:27.160
<v Speaker 1>Would that be a correct a correct interpretation of that. Yeah,

0:28:27.240 --> 0:28:29.000
<v Speaker 1>although there are some you know, I mean, if you

0:28:29.040 --> 0:28:31.800
<v Speaker 1>want to, like you know, IBM S website, I'm pretty

0:28:31.880 --> 0:28:34.239
<v Speaker 1>much going to change pretty much that. I'm sure that's

0:28:34.280 --> 0:28:36.520
<v Speaker 1>pretty permanent. Yeah, but for a lot of us who

0:28:36.680 --> 0:28:39.920
<v Speaker 1>are always you know, getting new devices, changing providers maybe

0:28:40.000 --> 0:28:43.680
<v Speaker 1>or getting new devices and things and adding on devices

0:28:43.720 --> 0:28:47.080
<v Speaker 1>and stuff, then yeah, they're just constantly being updated. That way.

0:28:47.080 --> 0:28:50.080
<v Speaker 1>It makes it a lot more flexible and fast. So

0:28:50.120 --> 0:28:53.800
<v Speaker 1>that that that explains something that we've experienced internally, which

0:28:53.880 --> 0:28:56.000
<v Speaker 1>is one of us will get a new phone or

0:28:56.080 --> 0:28:59.480
<v Speaker 1>we'll update the OS on our phone, and internally we

0:28:59.560 --> 0:29:02.240
<v Speaker 1>have an l system that will alert us when somebody

0:29:02.280 --> 0:29:04.320
<v Speaker 1>knew is there, and that's that's the kind of thing.

0:29:04.360 --> 0:29:07.920
<v Speaker 1>And if anybody does that, you get that kind of notification.

0:29:07.920 --> 0:29:11.080
<v Speaker 1>It sounds like, if I'm understanding correctly, it's that very

0:29:11.200 --> 0:29:15.280
<v Speaker 1>simple to us. Now, very simple process is just simply

0:29:15.440 --> 0:29:18.200
<v Speaker 1>that d d S. Yeah, And of course there's a

0:29:18.240 --> 0:29:21.080
<v Speaker 1>reason you get that that notification is because d DNS

0:29:21.120 --> 0:29:24.680
<v Speaker 1>has been abused a lot, you know, by hackers and

0:29:24.760 --> 0:29:27.120
<v Speaker 1>such and so and so. Even though it's a great

0:29:27.160 --> 0:29:30.160
<v Speaker 1>thing it's very convenient, handy. It can be used to

0:29:30.200 --> 0:29:33.120
<v Speaker 1>like cover your tracks, for example, and then redirect people

0:29:33.160 --> 0:29:35.040
<v Speaker 1>to a server they don't even know that they're going to.

0:29:35.960 --> 0:29:38.560
<v Speaker 1>And so yeah, it's a it can be used for

0:29:38.560 --> 0:29:41.160
<v Speaker 1>sneaky purposes even though it's a very handy tool. And

0:29:41.240 --> 0:29:45.360
<v Speaker 1>so that is why it is suspicious that all of

0:29:45.360 --> 0:29:49.880
<v Speaker 1>these servers were d D and asked particularly what ten

0:29:49.960 --> 0:29:57.600
<v Speaker 1>years ago relatively new um, But it's not necessarily suspicious.

0:29:57.840 --> 0:30:00.400
<v Speaker 1>That makes sense. Yeah, and to me, yeah, now finally,

0:30:02.000 --> 0:30:04.200
<v Speaker 1>and the main target for this heck does seem to

0:30:04.240 --> 0:30:08.080
<v Speaker 1>be the office of His holiness, the Dali lama Um.

0:30:08.080 --> 0:30:11.960
<v Speaker 1>This is his personal office location. Well, there are a

0:30:12.000 --> 0:30:16.560
<v Speaker 1>government in exile, but it's not his governmental office. It's

0:30:16.640 --> 0:30:20.960
<v Speaker 1>his personal office, like the person who says, like, here's

0:30:20.960 --> 0:30:24.200
<v Speaker 1>your coffee, Do you need me to go buy you

0:30:24.760 --> 0:30:28.520
<v Speaker 1>new underwear? Like whatever? I mean. It's not like there's

0:30:28.640 --> 0:30:34.320
<v Speaker 1>huge secrets following through his home office. And that's probably

0:30:34.320 --> 0:30:37.440
<v Speaker 1>some interesting conversations going on in there there maybe, but

0:30:38.000 --> 0:30:41.880
<v Speaker 1>the payload would be much more if they were to

0:30:42.000 --> 0:30:45.640
<v Speaker 1>go through like the government or the government extile office

0:30:45.680 --> 0:30:48.560
<v Speaker 1>for instance, But we don't know that necessarily, and they're

0:30:48.560 --> 0:30:50.600
<v Speaker 1>not also doing that, I would think they would be.

0:30:50.680 --> 0:30:53.800
<v Speaker 1>So we are. We're getting ahead of ourselves in terms

0:30:53.800 --> 0:30:57.960
<v Speaker 1>of where else could it be. But yeah, exactly, so, yeah,

0:30:57.960 --> 0:30:59.600
<v Speaker 1>we'll get there and serious, I guess, And I think

0:30:59.600 --> 0:31:01.920
<v Speaker 1>that's really the right place to talk about that. UM,

0:31:01.960 --> 0:31:04.920
<v Speaker 1>So let's talk about the social engineering component of this.

0:31:05.320 --> 0:31:08.720
<v Speaker 1>It turns out this is not actually the first investigation

0:31:08.840 --> 0:31:14.480
<v Speaker 1>that info War Monitor, or at least people associated with

0:31:14.840 --> 0:31:18.360
<v Speaker 1>the Infowar Monitor UM had aided with. In regards to

0:31:18.400 --> 0:31:22.600
<v Speaker 1>the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In September

0:31:22.600 --> 0:31:25.600
<v Speaker 1>of two thousand two, Tibetan groups said that they were

0:31:25.840 --> 0:31:29.600
<v Speaker 1>targets of malware UM from China. They specified it was

0:31:29.640 --> 0:31:32.360
<v Speaker 1>from China. They said there was an attempt to spare

0:31:32.360 --> 0:31:35.520
<v Speaker 1>on their networks and otherwise disrupt their work, and they

0:31:35.520 --> 0:31:37.880
<v Speaker 1>were pretty much just brushed off. There wasn't like a

0:31:37.960 --> 0:31:42.200
<v Speaker 1>very intense investigation. And then in two thousand five, one

0:31:42.200 --> 0:31:44.959
<v Speaker 1>of the people who was deeply involved in the two

0:31:45.040 --> 0:31:50.760
<v Speaker 1>thousand eight nine investigation team decided to start archiving malware,

0:31:51.160 --> 0:31:56.400
<v Speaker 1>specifically specifically the malware attacks on the Tibetan organizations and

0:31:56.960 --> 0:32:00.520
<v Speaker 1>try to UM kind of assess their pay load like

0:32:00.640 --> 0:32:04.600
<v Speaker 1>what these malicious attacks were getting, so that actually was

0:32:05.240 --> 0:32:09.560
<v Speaker 1>very helpful in kind of tracking what might be new

0:32:09.600 --> 0:32:12.920
<v Speaker 1>and what what kind of things were happening UM and

0:32:12.960 --> 0:32:15.920
<v Speaker 1>how people were gaining access to the Office of His

0:32:16.000 --> 0:32:20.360
<v Speaker 1>Holiness the Dalai Lama. In early two thousand and eight

0:32:20.440 --> 0:32:24.160
<v Speaker 1>during the Beijing Olympics, this researcher that we were just

0:32:24.200 --> 0:32:27.600
<v Speaker 1>talking about was able to gain access to a control

0:32:27.680 --> 0:32:33.080
<v Speaker 1>server and then trace to the Office of His Holiness

0:32:33.080 --> 0:32:37.400
<v Speaker 1>the Dali Llama through the control server of the malware UM.

0:32:37.440 --> 0:32:40.600
<v Speaker 1>And like, just to clarify because people may not understand,

0:32:40.800 --> 0:32:46.960
<v Speaker 1>the control server is the server that the trojan, horse, virus, malware,

0:32:47.080 --> 0:32:49.400
<v Speaker 1>whatever we want to call it in the computer that's

0:32:49.440 --> 0:32:53.160
<v Speaker 1>infected is reporting to it's that's the control servers and

0:32:53.200 --> 0:32:56.600
<v Speaker 1>what it's squirting data too, Is that right? Yeah? Or

0:32:56.880 --> 0:33:00.640
<v Speaker 1>is the one that's controlling or making it, you know,

0:33:00.840 --> 0:33:03.040
<v Speaker 1>dance a fancy jig if that's what they tell it

0:33:03.080 --> 0:33:05.840
<v Speaker 1>to do. Basically, I don't think it necessarily scores. It's

0:33:05.880 --> 0:33:07.480
<v Speaker 1>if it's sending data out and they can sent it

0:33:07.520 --> 0:33:09.920
<v Speaker 1>to anywhere really all kinds of other places, but it's

0:33:09.920 --> 0:33:11.880
<v Speaker 1>the one that's telling it where to score the datah. Yeah,

0:33:11.880 --> 0:33:14.680
<v Speaker 1>it's just giving it orders yet. Okay, yes, so it's

0:33:14.760 --> 0:33:18.640
<v Speaker 1>the captain of this silly little robotic ship that we're on. Yeah,

0:33:18.960 --> 0:33:21.160
<v Speaker 1>and that's assuming that it really is a control server

0:33:21.280 --> 0:33:25.000
<v Speaker 1>and not some innocent computer that's been hijacked temporarily. Yeah,

0:33:25.040 --> 0:33:27.240
<v Speaker 1>that's so complicated trying to figure out these Internet things.

0:33:27.320 --> 0:33:30.480
<v Speaker 1>It is, it really is. UM. And so from this

0:33:30.760 --> 0:33:36.520
<v Speaker 1>historic kind of archiving of attacks and and successful malware

0:33:36.920 --> 0:33:40.680
<v Speaker 1>installations in you know, in the Tibetan government, Um, the

0:33:40.720 --> 0:33:44.800
<v Speaker 1>investigators were able to ascertain that the trojan emails that

0:33:44.840 --> 0:33:47.560
<v Speaker 1>were being sent out because that that was the chosen

0:33:47.640 --> 0:33:52.080
<v Speaker 1>method of getting malware onto computers for his the office

0:33:52.280 --> 0:33:55.080
<v Speaker 1>of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama. And they were getting

0:33:55.080 --> 0:33:57.440
<v Speaker 1>more and more sophisticated. You know. They started out by

0:33:57.480 --> 0:34:01.200
<v Speaker 1>being like, hey, open this attachment and then came to

0:34:01.480 --> 0:34:03.840
<v Speaker 1>this thing that I have a screenshot of here, um,

0:34:03.840 --> 0:34:06.800
<v Speaker 1>which was how ghost rat came. It was one of

0:34:06.800 --> 0:34:10.520
<v Speaker 1>the emails that came ghost rat. So it came from

0:34:10.600 --> 0:34:13.800
<v Speaker 1>quote unquote campaigns at free Tibet dot com, which is

0:34:13.840 --> 0:34:19.000
<v Speaker 1>an actual email address that was actually like utilized for

0:34:19.320 --> 0:34:22.840
<v Speaker 1>free Tibet, which would have actually had contact with people

0:34:22.920 --> 0:34:25.879
<v Speaker 1>in the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. So

0:34:26.160 --> 0:34:31.279
<v Speaker 1>I mean, like, by all intents and purposes, totally legit, right,

0:34:32.040 --> 0:34:34.440
<v Speaker 1>it would have been almost impossible to tell that it

0:34:34.520 --> 0:34:38.440
<v Speaker 1>wasn't from this actual campaign. And I say all of

0:34:38.480 --> 0:34:42.359
<v Speaker 1>this to say that it's totally reasonable that they got

0:34:42.360 --> 0:34:45.040
<v Speaker 1>infected because it was just like it would have been

0:34:45.040 --> 0:34:48.560
<v Speaker 1>impossible to tell. In fact, only eleven of thirty four

0:34:48.680 --> 0:34:51.880
<v Speaker 1>tested malware and anti virus softwares were able to detect

0:34:51.920 --> 0:34:56.759
<v Speaker 1>ghost rat. It was that deeply embedded in the little

0:34:57.080 --> 0:35:00.680
<v Speaker 1>as a trojan that I mean even most of the

0:35:00.719 --> 0:35:04.440
<v Speaker 1>software able to detect it or designed to detect it

0:35:04.640 --> 0:35:07.520
<v Speaker 1>were they were unable to do that, which is crazy.

0:35:07.920 --> 0:35:10.920
<v Speaker 1>It was it was sophisticated enough. It's super sophisticated. It

0:35:11.040 --> 0:35:13.040
<v Speaker 1>was a clever little rat. You know, rats are good

0:35:13.040 --> 0:35:17.640
<v Speaker 1>at hiding a little crevices, they are. Yeah. So this email, um,

0:35:17.719 --> 0:35:19.560
<v Speaker 1>I just put in here so we can look at

0:35:20.000 --> 0:35:23.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm just going to quickly describe this email just so

0:35:23.239 --> 0:35:25.800
<v Speaker 1>for you guys to be able to kind of visualize

0:35:25.840 --> 0:35:28.200
<v Speaker 1>what it would have looked like. It says it's from

0:35:28.280 --> 0:35:32.960
<v Speaker 1>campaigns at freed to bet dot org, not calm sorry. Um.

0:35:33.000 --> 0:35:36.400
<v Speaker 1>The subject is translation of Freedom Moment Movement I D

0:35:36.480 --> 0:35:40.440
<v Speaker 1>Book for Tibetans and Exile. And then it has basically

0:35:40.640 --> 0:35:44.440
<v Speaker 1>what is a format for a letter that's in the body,

0:35:44.840 --> 0:35:48.720
<v Speaker 1>and then it says attachment it's the same thing dot doc,

0:35:49.120 --> 0:35:52.280
<v Speaker 1>which would lead one to believe that, you know, here's

0:35:52.719 --> 0:35:56.799
<v Speaker 1>here's our English translation of this resource for you to

0:35:56.960 --> 0:35:59.439
<v Speaker 1>be using as a template. Right, here's what it looks

0:35:59.440 --> 0:36:02.120
<v Speaker 1>like in the body, and attached is a document that

0:36:02.160 --> 0:36:04.439
<v Speaker 1>you can edit because it's got places where you would

0:36:04.480 --> 0:36:07.759
<v Speaker 1>need to say, like this my name not you know,

0:36:07.800 --> 0:36:10.040
<v Speaker 1>insert your name here. Right. That's I mean, that's a

0:36:10.040 --> 0:36:13.520
<v Speaker 1>pretty high level of sophistication. I would fall for it,

0:36:13.520 --> 0:36:17.560
<v Speaker 1>to be totally honest with you, So, I mean, yeah,

0:36:17.719 --> 0:36:19.520
<v Speaker 1>I would fall for this, and I think you guys

0:36:19.600 --> 0:36:24.120
<v Speaker 1>probably would. If I actually read by emails, I would yeah,

0:36:24.320 --> 0:36:30.359
<v Speaker 1>And I know you don't, ye. So, um, you guys

0:36:30.400 --> 0:36:33.919
<v Speaker 1>ready for theories? I am cool. Well, we'll talk about

0:36:33.920 --> 0:36:36.560
<v Speaker 1>theories in a minute. It's everybody's favorite thing to hear

0:36:36.600 --> 0:36:43.040
<v Speaker 1>me say. Um. First, let's take a quick break. Add

0:36:43.040 --> 0:36:45.880
<v Speaker 1>that brown thing and the yellow thing. Now, put in

0:36:45.880 --> 0:36:48.880
<v Speaker 1>the squishy red thing, pour in the smelly white liquid,

0:36:49.200 --> 0:36:51.560
<v Speaker 1>stand there and wait for a bit. Now quickly cut

0:36:51.600 --> 0:36:53.960
<v Speaker 1>up the orange thing, another brown thing, and the sticky

0:36:53.960 --> 0:36:55.759
<v Speaker 1>green thing and the other green thing, and mess them

0:36:55.760 --> 0:36:59.560
<v Speaker 1>all together until they're unrecognizable. Oh and purry back over there,

0:36:59.560 --> 0:37:02.319
<v Speaker 1>because you're a red thing is smoking, which isn't a

0:37:02.360 --> 0:37:05.080
<v Speaker 1>good sign. Now take it all and dump it into

0:37:05.080 --> 0:37:07.600
<v Speaker 1>a pan and push it into the oven. Whatever you do,

0:37:07.600 --> 0:37:09.920
<v Speaker 1>don't forget to set the timer this time. Remember how

0:37:10.000 --> 0:37:12.320
<v Speaker 1>much smoke there was in the house last time you forgot.

0:37:12.800 --> 0:37:14.799
<v Speaker 1>And when the timer goes off, pull it out and

0:37:14.840 --> 0:37:18.239
<v Speaker 1>toss it onto the plates. When asked what it is,

0:37:18.600 --> 0:37:22.160
<v Speaker 1>just mumble a couple of syllables. When asked what that is,

0:37:22.760 --> 0:37:26.000
<v Speaker 1>just say French. Is this how it feels when you

0:37:26.040 --> 0:37:28.240
<v Speaker 1>try to make a meal from scratch? Well it doesn't

0:37:28.280 --> 0:37:31.560
<v Speaker 1>have to not. All ingredients are created equal, and thankfully,

0:37:31.800 --> 0:37:34.480
<v Speaker 1>for less than ten dollars a meal. Blue Apron delivers

0:37:34.520 --> 0:37:37.840
<v Speaker 1>delicious quality food courtesy of over a hundred and fifty

0:37:37.880 --> 0:37:42.000
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0:37:42.040 --> 0:37:44.279
<v Speaker 1>to your door. It's no wonder why they are the

0:37:44.360 --> 0:37:48.160
<v Speaker 1>number one fresh ingredient and recipe delivery service in the country.

0:37:48.480 --> 0:37:51.800
<v Speaker 1>Some of the meals available in April, which I had

0:37:51.880 --> 0:37:55.920
<v Speaker 1>and it was fantastic. Was the parmesan crusted chicken and

0:37:56.040 --> 0:37:59.920
<v Speaker 1>creamy fettuccini and roasted broccoli. Okay, well I don't actually

0:38:00.280 --> 0:38:02.040
<v Speaker 1>like broccoli, so I didn't eat that part, but the

0:38:02.040 --> 0:38:05.040
<v Speaker 1>rest of it was great. So check out this week's

0:38:05.040 --> 0:38:08.280
<v Speaker 1>menu and get your first three meals free with free

0:38:08.280 --> 0:38:11.960
<v Speaker 1>shipping by going to blue Apron dot com slash thinking.

0:38:12.360 --> 0:38:14.680
<v Speaker 1>You'll love how it good, it feels and taste to

0:38:14.760 --> 0:38:18.320
<v Speaker 1>create incredible home cooked meals with Blue Apron. So don't wait,

0:38:18.760 --> 0:38:23.000
<v Speaker 1>that's blue Apron dot com slash thinking Blue Apron a

0:38:23.000 --> 0:38:29.680
<v Speaker 1>better way to cook. So you stop burning things and

0:38:29.760 --> 0:38:34.399
<v Speaker 1>we're back. Hi, I'm not looking for that sandwich anymore. Yeah,

0:38:34.520 --> 0:38:37.000
<v Speaker 1>that other guy ate it now that I know that

0:38:37.320 --> 0:38:42.000
<v Speaker 1>dive ate it hat. That guy the worst TV is

0:38:42.040 --> 0:38:44.719
<v Speaker 1>the worst. He's right up there with oh such a

0:38:44.800 --> 0:38:46.920
<v Speaker 1>thing as new sandwiches do? I think it might be

0:38:46.920 --> 0:38:51.840
<v Speaker 1>time to move on. Um, So we're gonna do typical

0:38:52.040 --> 0:38:56.400
<v Speaker 1>Devon fashion. Right, We've got two headings. One is China

0:38:57.120 --> 0:39:00.720
<v Speaker 1>and one is not China. So let's talk about China first.

0:39:01.440 --> 0:39:04.320
<v Speaker 1>As in, you mean China is responsible, that's what you

0:39:04.360 --> 0:39:07.759
<v Speaker 1>mean by China responsible or China not responsible. I just

0:39:07.760 --> 0:39:10.680
<v Speaker 1>want to talk about China. Well, okay, let's talk about

0:39:10.680 --> 0:39:13.960
<v Speaker 1>the end. Let's talk about the history of China. Yeah. Actually,

0:39:14.560 --> 0:39:16.680
<v Speaker 1>let's talk about the history of China a little bit,

0:39:16.719 --> 0:39:20.320
<v Speaker 1>because we don't give us a lot of Actually, well,

0:39:20.440 --> 0:39:22.480
<v Speaker 1>it is actually a little pertinent to this case, and

0:39:22.640 --> 0:39:25.520
<v Speaker 1>that I mean, I'm hoping I guess at least that

0:39:25.640 --> 0:39:29.000
<v Speaker 1>most of you would already know why China might be

0:39:29.040 --> 0:39:34.280
<v Speaker 1>responsible for an attack of malicious nature on the exile

0:39:34.400 --> 0:39:38.400
<v Speaker 1>government of Tibet or the office of His Holiness the

0:39:38.480 --> 0:39:42.120
<v Speaker 1>Dali Lama. But if you don't, let me educate you

0:39:42.160 --> 0:39:45.279
<v Speaker 1>a little bit. Well, there's sticks, Yeah, there's the there's

0:39:45.320 --> 0:39:48.600
<v Speaker 1>bumper stickers, so that's a bigger and there's the flags,

0:39:48.600 --> 0:39:52.719
<v Speaker 1>which I've seen all over town. Yeah, so that they

0:39:52.800 --> 0:39:59.160
<v Speaker 1>don Yeah, they're doing it. They're totally working, really working

0:39:59.160 --> 0:40:02.839
<v Speaker 1>really well. No, Okay, So Tibet and China have been

0:40:02.840 --> 0:40:07.440
<v Speaker 1>fighting pretty much since like um ever, thirteen sixty eight

0:40:08.040 --> 0:40:10.480
<v Speaker 1>I think is the date. So it's generally accepted that

0:40:10.640 --> 0:40:14.319
<v Speaker 1>prior to thirteen sixty eight, Tibet and China were two

0:40:14.360 --> 0:40:19.640
<v Speaker 1>different places. And then it's also generally accepted that since

0:40:19.840 --> 0:40:24.960
<v Speaker 1>nineteen fifty nine with um will help from the CIA

0:40:24.960 --> 0:40:31.680
<v Speaker 1>and stuff that became a part of the People's Republic

0:40:31.719 --> 0:40:40.600
<v Speaker 1>of China. Yeah. Yeah, there's a huge debate that happens

0:40:40.600 --> 0:40:43.000
<v Speaker 1>around this. I would say it's similar to the debate

0:40:43.040 --> 0:40:49.480
<v Speaker 1>around the whole Palestine and Israel thing, but generally less bloody. Yeah, exactly,

0:40:49.800 --> 0:40:54.879
<v Speaker 1>because monks are much less likely to throw bombs accurate, Yes,

0:40:55.160 --> 0:41:01.719
<v Speaker 1>I mean correct, Yeah, it resistance through peace, yeah yeah,

0:41:01.760 --> 0:41:05.000
<v Speaker 1>but yeah, but essentially, yeah, the Chinese want that wanted

0:41:05.040 --> 0:41:07.680
<v Speaker 1>basically to run the place, and so they've been colonizing

0:41:07.680 --> 0:41:10.200
<v Speaker 1>and moving their population and kind of suppressing the native

0:41:10.239 --> 0:41:14.879
<v Speaker 1>culture of that. Yeah, that's that's not like colonialism at all,

0:41:15.600 --> 0:41:19.320
<v Speaker 1>not at all. So the Dali Lama is pretty central

0:41:19.360 --> 0:41:21.760
<v Speaker 1>to this, as he is functionally the leader of Tibet.

0:41:22.440 --> 0:41:27.319
<v Speaker 1>I think we're on our Dali Lama. I'm sorry, I

0:41:27.320 --> 0:41:29.960
<v Speaker 1>don't think we are as of today's recording. As of

0:41:30.040 --> 0:41:32.960
<v Speaker 1>today's recording, well, and if and if our current fourteenth

0:41:33.000 --> 0:41:37.000
<v Speaker 1>Doali Lama is to believe believed, he will probably be

0:41:37.080 --> 0:41:40.040
<v Speaker 1>the last. But more on that another time. Um. But

0:41:40.280 --> 0:41:42.839
<v Speaker 1>you know, the government is in exile and they are

0:41:42.880 --> 0:41:50.799
<v Speaker 1>not recognized as a government by pretty much any government. Yeah. Uh.

0:41:50.840 --> 0:41:53.759
<v Speaker 1>And so there's this kind of although it's kind of

0:41:53.800 --> 0:41:56.000
<v Speaker 1>a David and Goliath thing, right, I mean, there's this

0:41:56.160 --> 0:42:00.279
<v Speaker 1>giant China who's saying, no, Tibet, you're part of us,

0:42:00.440 --> 0:42:03.680
<v Speaker 1>and then literally the rest of their world is saying no, no, Tibet,

0:42:03.760 --> 0:42:07.440
<v Speaker 1>you're part of China, and Tibet's like but no. And

0:42:07.520 --> 0:42:12.400
<v Speaker 1>so somehow China should be responsible for this attack on

0:42:12.440 --> 0:42:15.680
<v Speaker 1>this tiny little thing. That is kind of I mean,

0:42:16.280 --> 0:42:22.600
<v Speaker 1>there's yeah, so I guess that's that's the reason why,

0:42:23.040 --> 0:42:25.319
<v Speaker 1>although I don't I don't really buy into that, but

0:42:25.719 --> 0:42:30.040
<v Speaker 1>I know that, you know, the Chinese, for example, the

0:42:30.040 --> 0:42:32.440
<v Speaker 1>whole Taiwan is has been going on for many decades,

0:42:32.520 --> 0:42:34.640
<v Speaker 1>and really, when you think about it, why the hell

0:42:34.680 --> 0:42:36.600
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't the Taiwan ease go their own way? I know

0:42:36.640 --> 0:42:38.680
<v Speaker 1>they claimed to be China too, but you know, what

0:42:38.760 --> 0:42:40.279
<v Speaker 1>the hell they want to They want to live on

0:42:40.320 --> 0:42:42.440
<v Speaker 1>their island and then have their gig. Why the hell not.

0:42:42.560 --> 0:42:45.440
<v Speaker 1>But for some reason, the mainland's very touchy about it,

0:42:45.600 --> 0:42:47.719
<v Speaker 1>you know. I mean, I but I agree the same

0:42:47.880 --> 0:42:51.120
<v Speaker 1>with Tbet, but I mean politics aside, it's kind of

0:42:51.200 --> 0:42:54.319
<v Speaker 1>it's odd to me that somebody would say, there's this

0:42:54.680 --> 0:43:01.640
<v Speaker 1>giant country that has functionally one debate, right, there is

0:43:01.719 --> 0:43:05.560
<v Speaker 1>functionally no debate on whether Tibet is its own thing

0:43:05.680 --> 0:43:09.040
<v Speaker 1>or not. And yet they are still thinking, Oh, you

0:43:09.080 --> 0:43:12.959
<v Speaker 1>know what would be fun, Let's infect all of these

0:43:12.960 --> 0:43:16.320
<v Speaker 1>computers all around the globe just to like see what's

0:43:16.320 --> 0:43:21.000
<v Speaker 1>going on. I I don't know. So basically powerless organization.

0:43:21.080 --> 0:43:25.280
<v Speaker 1>Basically it's they're they're going after what is essentially somebody

0:43:25.280 --> 0:43:28.520
<v Speaker 1>who has no pull anymore. Well, there's some religious pull,

0:43:28.600 --> 0:43:34.080
<v Speaker 1>but governmental politically, there's very little. I do actually think

0:43:34.120 --> 0:43:36.640
<v Speaker 1>that the Chinese are keeping an eye on in the

0:43:36.680 --> 0:43:43.279
<v Speaker 1>dollar Lama and the government nextile China's paranoid. But so

0:43:43.400 --> 0:43:46.800
<v Speaker 1>let's talk about some of the evidence that people present

0:43:46.880 --> 0:43:51.000
<v Speaker 1>to support that China was in charge of these are

0:43:51.040 --> 0:43:54.040
<v Speaker 1>responsible for these attacks. By the way, I just realized

0:43:54.400 --> 0:43:57.400
<v Speaker 1>this entire episode is going to get us banned in China.

0:43:56.880 --> 0:44:08.680
<v Speaker 1>Oh sorry, Chinese listeners, Dan, I already bought my Yeah,

0:44:10.480 --> 0:44:12.480
<v Speaker 1>I can't do my I can't do my episode about

0:44:12.480 --> 0:44:17.640
<v Speaker 1>the Fallen Gong anymore. So, uh, China, it turns out

0:44:17.880 --> 0:44:21.600
<v Speaker 1>actually acted on some information that was most likely gathered

0:44:21.680 --> 0:44:24.880
<v Speaker 1>from ghost Rat. The Office of his holiness, the Dalai

0:44:24.960 --> 0:44:30.680
<v Speaker 1>Lama sent an invitation to a diplomat, and China pretty

0:44:30.800 --> 0:44:37.120
<v Speaker 1>much immediately contacted said diplomat and said, um, hey, we

0:44:37.200 --> 0:44:39.719
<v Speaker 1>heard that the Dalai Lama invited you to this thing.

0:44:40.080 --> 0:44:44.000
<v Speaker 1>Don't go. And wasn't there an instance where they had

0:44:44.080 --> 0:44:49.160
<v Speaker 1>internally talked about sending somebody to China and China preemptively

0:44:49.280 --> 0:44:53.520
<v Speaker 1>denied any possible visa or travel requests or something like that.

0:44:53.920 --> 0:44:57.520
<v Speaker 1>And then there was another instance where a woman who

0:44:57.680 --> 0:45:00.719
<v Speaker 1>was Chinese who was living in Taiwan on wanted to

0:45:00.760 --> 0:45:03.359
<v Speaker 1>go back and visit her family in China, and when

0:45:03.400 --> 0:45:07.960
<v Speaker 1>she tried to cross over, some border governmental officials presented

0:45:08.000 --> 0:45:11.160
<v Speaker 1>her with like year's worth of chat logs of hers

0:45:11.239 --> 0:45:13.480
<v Speaker 1>and said like, you can't come in here, or you

0:45:13.520 --> 0:45:16.640
<v Speaker 1>have to stop interacting with people. But that one there

0:45:16.800 --> 0:45:20.520
<v Speaker 1>was something that they could have gotten, the information could

0:45:20.560 --> 0:45:23.880
<v Speaker 1>have Yes, that's true, Um, they could have. So actually,

0:45:23.920 --> 0:45:26.000
<v Speaker 1>let's just talk about this real quick. Um. One of

0:45:26.000 --> 0:45:31.280
<v Speaker 1>the researchers that was on the Info War Monitor research

0:45:31.440 --> 0:45:36.000
<v Speaker 1>team was a white hat hacker. You guys know what

0:45:36.040 --> 0:45:39.640
<v Speaker 1>a white hat hackers? Good guy. It's somebody who um,

0:45:39.680 --> 0:45:43.440
<v Speaker 1>a company would pay to expose their zero day vulnerabilities

0:45:43.480 --> 0:45:45.080
<v Speaker 1>and their back doors and things like that so that

0:45:45.120 --> 0:45:49.440
<v Speaker 1>they can patch them before black hat hackers can actually

0:45:49.480 --> 0:45:53.399
<v Speaker 1>infiltrate ye infiltrate their system. Basically, he's the guy that

0:45:53.480 --> 0:45:56.600
<v Speaker 1>you pay to come rob your house so he can

0:45:56.600 --> 0:45:59.600
<v Speaker 1>tell you how he robbed your house so that you

0:46:00.000 --> 0:46:03.000
<v Speaker 1>off leaving that window open. Oh, it's like that. It

0:46:03.040 --> 0:46:07.120
<v Speaker 1>takes a criminal show or whatever like that, except for

0:46:07.239 --> 0:46:09.560
<v Speaker 1>on computers. Would I would like to have been on

0:46:09.600 --> 0:46:11.600
<v Speaker 1>that show. You know, it's like, Okay, I'm gonna break

0:46:11.600 --> 0:46:13.439
<v Speaker 1>into his house by driving my car through the wall.

0:46:14.280 --> 0:46:16.400
<v Speaker 1>That show was so dumb because he would walk up

0:46:16.400 --> 0:46:23.040
<v Speaker 1>and like doors and locked. Great. So one of these

0:46:23.120 --> 0:46:28.720
<v Speaker 1>researchers was a white hat hacker named Nart Villaneus, and

0:46:29.120 --> 0:46:32.680
<v Speaker 1>he's actually the guy who figured out this other thing

0:46:33.000 --> 0:46:35.000
<v Speaker 1>that we were just talking about, and that is that

0:46:35.239 --> 0:46:40.000
<v Speaker 1>China was spying on their citizens with um the Chinese

0:46:40.040 --> 0:46:45.279
<v Speaker 1>state sponsored version of Skype. Who would have guessed that,

0:46:45.360 --> 0:46:49.520
<v Speaker 1>but they were like basically logging every single conversation and

0:46:49.600 --> 0:46:52.520
<v Speaker 1>chat that was happening through this system and keeping it

0:46:52.560 --> 0:46:55.000
<v Speaker 1>on file to use against their citizens if they ever

0:46:55.040 --> 0:46:59.040
<v Speaker 1>needed to. Basically, like what everybody says is like the

0:46:59.160 --> 0:47:01.640
<v Speaker 1>n s A is doing was actually happening in China.

0:47:02.320 --> 0:47:06.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm not surprised me neither. So this guy not. When

0:47:06.160 --> 0:47:10.680
<v Speaker 1>he was looking at the code for ghost rat and

0:47:10.800 --> 0:47:14.960
<v Speaker 1>during this investigation, found this string of twenty two characters

0:47:15.239 --> 0:47:18.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, in the malicious file. And I don't know why,

0:47:18.800 --> 0:47:23.919
<v Speaker 1>but he literally searched Google for it. But it gets better,

0:47:24.440 --> 0:47:28.480
<v Speaker 1>literally searched Google for it, and even more mind boggling,

0:47:28.840 --> 0:47:33.080
<v Speaker 1>Google actually returned something to him. They actually the search

0:47:33.160 --> 0:47:36.960
<v Speaker 1>found something, and Google sent him to a group of

0:47:37.000 --> 0:47:40.759
<v Speaker 1>computers off the coast of China that was unsecured and

0:47:40.840 --> 0:47:46.120
<v Speaker 1>without a password and basically housed the dashboard that let

0:47:46.280 --> 0:47:49.600
<v Speaker 1>him control all of the computers that were infected by

0:47:49.600 --> 0:47:52.359
<v Speaker 1>ghost rat. M hmm, that's interesting. I know I heard

0:47:52.360 --> 0:47:54.480
<v Speaker 1>about that too, and it does seem like they would

0:47:54.520 --> 0:47:59.399
<v Speaker 1>secure that it does so they were basically what Nart

0:47:59.440 --> 0:48:03.000
<v Speaker 1>did is he gave. He did He left a little

0:48:03.040 --> 0:48:07.040
<v Speaker 1>piece of bait, Yeah, a little honeypot for the hackers

0:48:07.040 --> 0:48:10.520
<v Speaker 1>to make sure that what he was viewing was actually

0:48:10.560 --> 0:48:13.160
<v Speaker 1>what he thought he was viewing. Um, they took the

0:48:13.200 --> 0:48:16.319
<v Speaker 1>bait and so on March twelve, two nine, he was

0:48:16.360 --> 0:48:19.000
<v Speaker 1>able to briefly gain control of one of the hackers

0:48:19.040 --> 0:48:23.400
<v Speaker 1>computers um and he watched a series of commands. Presumably

0:48:23.440 --> 0:48:27.759
<v Speaker 1>somebody in China was entering rummaging through the files that

0:48:27.760 --> 0:48:32.160
<v Speaker 1>were left in this honeypot, finding nothing, the hacker disappeared,

0:48:32.520 --> 0:48:36.480
<v Speaker 1>but they were able to find this little dashboard. We

0:48:36.560 --> 0:48:39.759
<v Speaker 1>have a dashboard on our website, right, it's you know,

0:48:39.800 --> 0:48:43.239
<v Speaker 1>the back end kind of controlling, and the entire dashboard

0:48:43.320 --> 0:48:46.239
<v Speaker 1>was in Chinese. And you know, they were able to,

0:48:46.320 --> 0:48:49.839
<v Speaker 1>like I said, manipulate the more than twelve hundred almost

0:48:50.680 --> 0:48:54.080
<v Speaker 1>computers that were infected by Ghostrat. At that point I

0:48:54.160 --> 0:48:55.880
<v Speaker 1>was reading about that, I was like, they went to

0:48:56.040 --> 0:48:58.239
<v Speaker 1>sort of a lengthy trial and error process trying to

0:48:58.280 --> 0:49:01.319
<v Speaker 1>figure out when all these different things did because it

0:49:01.360 --> 0:49:04.439
<v Speaker 1>was all in Chinese. That's kind of surprised. They never

0:49:04.840 --> 0:49:11.359
<v Speaker 1>just didn't go find somebody who spoke Chinese. But you know,

0:49:11.440 --> 0:49:14.600
<v Speaker 1>for me, I know, I'm presenting this as evidence for

0:49:14.680 --> 0:49:18.799
<v Speaker 1>it being China, but that just seems so dang convenient,

0:49:19.520 --> 0:49:23.200
<v Speaker 1>doesn't it. So they so let me just make sure

0:49:23.320 --> 0:49:26.640
<v Speaker 1>before because I have some questions and maybe some pros

0:49:26.680 --> 0:49:30.400
<v Speaker 1>and cons to this theory. But they traced it was

0:49:30.440 --> 0:49:33.440
<v Speaker 1>through Nort I think is his name. He was the

0:49:33.440 --> 0:49:36.640
<v Speaker 1>one who figured out that the servers were in chang

0:49:36.680 --> 0:49:39.080
<v Speaker 1>Do or wherever it was it was. It was not

0:49:39.200 --> 0:49:41.160
<v Speaker 1>chind Do, that one. That one was on off the coast.

0:49:41.160 --> 0:49:42.880
<v Speaker 1>It was on an island off the coast China. But

0:49:43.440 --> 0:49:47.200
<v Speaker 1>so it was in China, and so they figured that out.

0:49:47.239 --> 0:49:51.600
<v Speaker 1>But in all of their investigations of this of ghost

0:49:51.760 --> 0:49:54.799
<v Speaker 1>ghost Raight or ghost net, did were they able to

0:49:54.840 --> 0:50:00.319
<v Speaker 1>tell what the initial source of the infection was. No,

0:50:01.239 --> 0:50:03.680
<v Speaker 1>not as far as I can tell, because that I mean,

0:50:03.880 --> 0:50:05.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't know either. I didn't see any By the

0:50:05.560 --> 0:50:07.839
<v Speaker 1>time they found it, it was all over the place. Yeah,

0:50:07.880 --> 0:50:10.560
<v Speaker 1>And so that I mean, I think the thing of

0:50:10.760 --> 0:50:15.040
<v Speaker 1>ghost rat is that it it wasn't necessarily how you

0:50:15.280 --> 0:50:18.120
<v Speaker 1>are You may be thinking of it a different way.

0:50:18.360 --> 0:50:21.759
<v Speaker 1>You know, on TV, like one computer gets infected and

0:50:21.760 --> 0:50:24.000
<v Speaker 1>then it gets into the server and infects everything on

0:50:24.040 --> 0:50:29.120
<v Speaker 1>the servers rats and that makes ghost net right. But

0:50:29.680 --> 0:50:35.640
<v Speaker 1>the infection on this didn't necessarily spread from single like

0:50:35.719 --> 0:50:38.759
<v Speaker 1>you know, patient zero to server out to the things

0:50:38.800 --> 0:50:42.399
<v Speaker 1>on the server. It may have and I suspect did

0:50:42.600 --> 0:50:46.480
<v Speaker 1>on many occasions, they were single infection points. I was

0:50:46.520 --> 0:50:48.560
<v Speaker 1>introduced in a lot of places. I guess I was

0:50:48.600 --> 0:50:51.400
<v Speaker 1>just trying to figure out if they could catalog what

0:50:51.480 --> 0:50:54.719
<v Speaker 1>the earliest was, was to try and figure out where

0:50:54.719 --> 0:50:56.399
<v Speaker 1>it came from, because I don't think they were able

0:50:56.480 --> 0:51:00.200
<v Speaker 1>to ascertain how long ghost Net had been on any

0:51:00.239 --> 0:51:04.319
<v Speaker 1>given unit. Okay, yeah, no, no, that That's what I

0:51:04.360 --> 0:51:08.840
<v Speaker 1>was after because it makes me wonder if you know, well,

0:51:09.760 --> 0:51:14.640
<v Speaker 1>could somebody have been leaving a breadcrumb trail back to

0:51:15.120 --> 0:51:19.120
<v Speaker 1>a dummy server that is in China. So that's where

0:51:19.320 --> 0:51:23.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm like, well, maybe it isn't actually China's fault. But

0:51:24.000 --> 0:51:25.600
<v Speaker 1>but then I look at it and the other side

0:51:25.640 --> 0:51:27.359
<v Speaker 1>is that there's a lot of stuff that happens in

0:51:27.440 --> 0:51:34.040
<v Speaker 1>China that is done based on societal pressures. Do you

0:51:34.080 --> 0:51:38.680
<v Speaker 1>remember it's um did you guys ever read the about

0:51:38.680 --> 0:51:42.600
<v Speaker 1>the Great Chinese Famine? You know, Mao does this thing.

0:51:42.719 --> 0:51:44.719
<v Speaker 1>He says, we've got to we've got to do all

0:51:44.760 --> 0:51:47.360
<v Speaker 1>this stuff, we gotta make all this food, and people,

0:51:47.760 --> 0:51:52.640
<v Speaker 1>not wanting to look shameful to Mao, overestimate how much

0:51:52.640 --> 0:51:56.320
<v Speaker 1>they can make, and because they're falling short, that creates

0:51:56.360 --> 0:51:59.719
<v Speaker 1>this giant famine. And I wonder if the same thing

0:52:00.000 --> 0:52:05.000
<v Speaker 1>couldn't happen from an informational perspective of the whoever's in

0:52:05.120 --> 0:52:09.840
<v Speaker 1>charge says, listen, you have to infect you know, a hundred,

0:52:09.960 --> 0:52:13.040
<v Speaker 1>let's say just five hundred. Can you get five Oh,

0:52:13.080 --> 0:52:15.640
<v Speaker 1>we could definitely get eight hundred and get all kinds

0:52:15.640 --> 0:52:19.520
<v Speaker 1>of information. So they're they're just bombarding all these computers

0:52:19.560 --> 0:52:23.600
<v Speaker 1>that have no useful information. But the idea is they're

0:52:23.640 --> 0:52:29.200
<v Speaker 1>being They're telling their superiors we have infected x thousands,

0:52:29.239 --> 0:52:33.000
<v Speaker 1>and we are monitoring x thousands, and we're getting all

0:52:33.080 --> 0:52:35.879
<v Speaker 1>this great data, when indeed it turns out they're not

0:52:35.960 --> 0:52:39.919
<v Speaker 1>really getting anything of note, they're working really hard for it.

0:52:40.880 --> 0:52:42.600
<v Speaker 1>Did you see where I'm going with this? Is like

0:52:42.880 --> 0:52:46.440
<v Speaker 1>it could be a campaign just to look like it's

0:52:46.440 --> 0:52:51.000
<v Speaker 1>a successful campaign. Well, another another thing that could be is, uh,

0:52:51.040 --> 0:52:53.279
<v Speaker 1>you know, it could just be sending a message. I mean,

0:52:53.600 --> 0:52:57.080
<v Speaker 1>given their behavior, if it was a Chinese uh, and

0:52:57.160 --> 0:53:00.719
<v Speaker 1>given the fact that they essentially kind of established this

0:53:00.840 --> 0:53:03.600
<v Speaker 1>network that would be great for intelligence gathering, and then

0:53:03.600 --> 0:53:07.000
<v Speaker 1>it just kind of like blew their own network. Maybe

0:53:07.040 --> 0:53:09.640
<v Speaker 1>it was just all about sending a message. It might

0:53:09.680 --> 0:53:11.680
<v Speaker 1>have been a They got this on a lot of

0:53:11.680 --> 0:53:13.719
<v Speaker 1>computers in a lot of different places. And then just

0:53:13.800 --> 0:53:16.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, send a message to Dalai Lama and the

0:53:16.680 --> 0:53:20.000
<v Speaker 1>government and ext silence says, hey, we can watch everything

0:53:20.040 --> 0:53:23.759
<v Speaker 1>you do, and you know it's just another bullying technique. Yeah,

0:53:23.960 --> 0:53:29.120
<v Speaker 1>I mean they do watch officially. Unofficially, I guess actually

0:53:29.440 --> 0:53:31.520
<v Speaker 1>they do watch a lot of stuff. But I also

0:53:31.560 --> 0:53:33.759
<v Speaker 1>think that's too much data to watch. And that's why

0:53:33.800 --> 0:53:37.160
<v Speaker 1>I just wonder if this is an oddball, off handed

0:53:37.200 --> 0:53:43.799
<v Speaker 1>campaign to just look like they're watching even more foreign computers.

0:53:44.239 --> 0:53:46.560
<v Speaker 1>So look, we we can control it, because China has

0:53:46.600 --> 0:53:48.800
<v Speaker 1>said we're going to go to war on the internet,

0:53:48.800 --> 0:53:51.399
<v Speaker 1>even though officially they say they don't do that. There's

0:53:51.440 --> 0:53:55.240
<v Speaker 1>all kinds of reporting, the lots of lots of research

0:53:55.280 --> 0:53:58.120
<v Speaker 1>and development on that stuff. Yeah, so it it makes

0:53:58.160 --> 0:54:01.560
<v Speaker 1>me wonder if maybe it is is just this weirdo

0:54:01.800 --> 0:54:05.000
<v Speaker 1>thing that is going on, which if it's somebody who

0:54:05.040 --> 0:54:08.000
<v Speaker 1>doesn't is it very good at it and they're like, well,

0:54:08.000 --> 0:54:10.040
<v Speaker 1>we've got it, We've got infect as many as we can.

0:54:10.600 --> 0:54:13.279
<v Speaker 1>They may be not dotting all of their eyes and

0:54:13.280 --> 0:54:16.120
<v Speaker 1>crossing all of their tease, which means that would explain

0:54:16.480 --> 0:54:20.239
<v Speaker 1>for me at least why that, um what was it?

0:54:20.280 --> 0:54:25.600
<v Speaker 1>The control panel site was not password protected because they

0:54:25.600 --> 0:54:27.600
<v Speaker 1>were just they were just oblivious to the fact that

0:54:27.640 --> 0:54:30.759
<v Speaker 1>they could get traced. Well, I mean, I guess a

0:54:30.760 --> 0:54:35.640
<v Speaker 1>few counterpoints there, right. One is, um, this, as mentioned,

0:54:35.920 --> 0:54:42.239
<v Speaker 1>was an incredibly sophisticated trojan horse, and I get like,

0:54:42.320 --> 0:54:46.320
<v Speaker 1>genuinely cannot imagine the kind of person who can design

0:54:46.360 --> 0:54:51.640
<v Speaker 1>a trojan horse that is basically undetectable for the majority

0:54:51.880 --> 0:54:56.719
<v Speaker 1>of the malar softwares out there, but doesn't know, Hey,

0:54:56.920 --> 0:55:00.239
<v Speaker 1>maybe put a password on your dashboard that control rolls

0:55:00.239 --> 0:55:04.320
<v Speaker 1>all of those things. Secondly, they were able to trace

0:55:04.360 --> 0:55:06.920
<v Speaker 1>back to a lot of servers as mentioned, because they

0:55:07.000 --> 0:55:09.440
<v Speaker 1>knew where the servers were and all of those were

0:55:09.440 --> 0:55:12.960
<v Speaker 1>heavily encrypted except for this one, right, And so like

0:55:13.239 --> 0:55:16.200
<v Speaker 1>for there to have been just this one off just

0:55:16.320 --> 0:55:21.520
<v Speaker 1>for me seems more suspicious that it isn't than it is.

0:55:21.600 --> 0:55:25.840
<v Speaker 1>Does that make sense? It doesn't that it isn't China,

0:55:25.920 --> 0:55:28.000
<v Speaker 1>that it's like a red herring than it is. But

0:55:28.120 --> 0:55:31.680
<v Speaker 1>but it also makes me think of the October what

0:55:31.840 --> 0:55:38.279
<v Speaker 1>is this stupid that website? October one? Thank you could

0:55:38.360 --> 0:55:41.480
<v Speaker 1>not keep the number straight? Yes, okay, do you remember

0:55:41.520 --> 0:55:44.920
<v Speaker 1>in the beginning I found in the source code that

0:55:45.360 --> 0:55:48.480
<v Speaker 1>they were they were reflected from another site for like

0:55:48.880 --> 0:55:52.400
<v Speaker 1>a couple of days. Is their tester before they loaded

0:55:52.440 --> 0:55:55.040
<v Speaker 1>it all actually on their server, so I could see

0:55:55.040 --> 0:55:57.000
<v Speaker 1>it being the same thing, is what we set up

0:55:57.000 --> 0:56:00.320
<v Speaker 1>this control panel, it was our tester will pick set

0:56:00.400 --> 0:56:03.319
<v Speaker 1>later and we'll delete that and remove that. But let's

0:56:03.360 --> 0:56:07.840
<v Speaker 1>work on this and then you completely space it out.

0:56:07.040 --> 0:56:11.880
<v Speaker 1>I see that happen with major companies all the time.

0:56:12.760 --> 0:56:14.840
<v Speaker 1>You know, we set up the dummy log in the

0:56:15.160 --> 0:56:19.040
<v Speaker 1>test environment, and then we linked to the real environment

0:56:19.120 --> 0:56:21.960
<v Speaker 1>and forget to kill that link, and so somebody can

0:56:22.000 --> 0:56:24.320
<v Speaker 1>get in through. I mean, there's all kinds of stuff

0:56:24.360 --> 0:56:27.640
<v Speaker 1>like that. Yeah, that's fair. Stakes do get made. They do,

0:56:27.960 --> 0:56:30.359
<v Speaker 1>But I don't think it's trying to I think it's

0:56:30.360 --> 0:56:34.080
<v Speaker 1>somebody else. Well that's a big question. I actually don't

0:56:34.120 --> 0:56:35.640
<v Speaker 1>know who else. I think who is. I just think

0:56:35.640 --> 0:56:38.919
<v Speaker 1>it's not China because I really, I really think it's

0:56:38.960 --> 0:56:43.680
<v Speaker 1>just way too freaking convenient for me. I just think

0:56:43.680 --> 0:56:46.640
<v Speaker 1>it's too convenient, especially because, as you were saying, right,

0:56:47.000 --> 0:56:51.560
<v Speaker 1>if your goal is a long standing intelligence gathering operation

0:56:52.600 --> 0:56:55.480
<v Speaker 1>and you see an invitation go out to this person,

0:56:56.040 --> 0:57:00.120
<v Speaker 1>you are not going to go to that person and say, hey,

0:57:00.160 --> 0:57:03.600
<v Speaker 1>by the way that email that literally just came through,

0:57:04.239 --> 0:57:07.839
<v Speaker 1>don't accept it. You're gonna just you know, maybe even

0:57:07.880 --> 0:57:10.080
<v Speaker 1>wait a couple of days, like use some kind of

0:57:10.120 --> 0:57:13.720
<v Speaker 1>intelligence there where somebody who's competent in that role would

0:57:13.719 --> 0:57:17.120
<v Speaker 1>do that would wait, Yeah, somebody who's incompetent and doesn't

0:57:17.120 --> 0:57:20.880
<v Speaker 1>know how to handle that information would react. Or somebody

0:57:20.880 --> 0:57:23.920
<v Speaker 1>who was handed that information again as a red herring,

0:57:24.280 --> 0:57:27.240
<v Speaker 1>will react to that information versus somebody who knows the

0:57:27.320 --> 0:57:31.200
<v Speaker 1>kind of resources that were plugged into getting that information. Right.

0:57:31.280 --> 0:57:33.280
<v Speaker 1>But it's also a nice way to cover up another

0:57:33.320 --> 0:57:37.600
<v Speaker 1>intelligence source. Yeah, if you have actually spies and rats

0:57:37.760 --> 0:57:41.440
<v Speaker 1>within the organization, then you know you've got this thing here.

0:57:41.440 --> 0:57:45.000
<v Speaker 1>It's like our guy is close to being unmasked. Okay,

0:57:45.000 --> 0:57:48.760
<v Speaker 1>well we'll unmask our our computer penetration thing here, which

0:57:48.800 --> 0:57:52.200
<v Speaker 1>would account for that, and that keeps our guys safe.

0:57:52.480 --> 0:57:54.600
<v Speaker 1>So that's another way. This is like the whole that's

0:57:54.600 --> 0:57:56.600
<v Speaker 1>the thing about the whole intelligence business. You know, it

0:57:56.640 --> 0:58:00.640
<v Speaker 1>gets complicated, it's very complete. It's entirely possible to well.

0:58:00.680 --> 0:58:02.600
<v Speaker 1>And this is why I asked earlier as if they

0:58:02.600 --> 0:58:05.720
<v Speaker 1>were able to determine who was one of the early

0:58:05.720 --> 0:58:10.120
<v Speaker 1>infections was because it would be very clever to me

0:58:10.720 --> 0:58:15.880
<v Speaker 1>to infect yourself in one of your non vital computers

0:58:15.880 --> 0:58:20.680
<v Speaker 1>in the early batches, to make yourself look like a victim.

0:58:20.760 --> 0:58:25.440
<v Speaker 1>And it's found. Oh my gosh, you know, look at us,

0:58:25.720 --> 0:58:28.680
<v Speaker 1>We're a victim, just like everybody else. This is so weird.

0:58:28.760 --> 0:58:31.320
<v Speaker 1>They hacked this oddball computer. Oh look at this, We've

0:58:31.360 --> 0:58:33.840
<v Speaker 1>got all this grain inflating everybody. Nobody'll look at us

0:58:34.000 --> 0:58:36.560
<v Speaker 1>on the way telling the world, Hey, we're important. Obviously

0:58:36.600 --> 0:58:41.720
<v Speaker 1>we're very important. But if it's the long game, you

0:58:41.840 --> 0:58:44.960
<v Speaker 1>don't tell anybody. You just keep pulling the information and

0:58:45.120 --> 0:58:48.720
<v Speaker 1>using what you're gathering, like you're talking about, but nobody

0:58:48.760 --> 0:58:52.160
<v Speaker 1>looks at you. Investigate. I think Joe suggesting that Tibet

0:58:52.280 --> 0:58:55.920
<v Speaker 1>infected their own systems to make themselves look more important

0:58:55.920 --> 0:58:58.480
<v Speaker 1>than they are. See, I don't think. I don't think that.

0:58:58.600 --> 0:59:00.640
<v Speaker 1>I don't think that the office of his Holy List

0:59:00.680 --> 0:59:03.200
<v Speaker 1>of Dalai Lama would do that because it's to me

0:59:03.760 --> 0:59:07.640
<v Speaker 1>a little counter to what I understand their goals and

0:59:07.720 --> 0:59:10.480
<v Speaker 1>missions are. But maybe you're right, Maybe it is a

0:59:10.640 --> 0:59:13.960
<v Speaker 1>last ditch effort to to to buy for attention. I

0:59:14.000 --> 0:59:16.680
<v Speaker 1>don't know, or there are other reasons, you know, I

0:59:16.720 --> 0:59:18.840
<v Speaker 1>don't think that they're necessarily behaving like a bunch of

0:59:18.840 --> 0:59:21.640
<v Speaker 1>shallow and monks there. And you know, that's the way

0:59:21.640 --> 0:59:23.720
<v Speaker 1>the world is, you know, sometimes the shortest path that's

0:59:23.720 --> 0:59:25.920
<v Speaker 1>through the mud, you know, even if you're like, you know,

0:59:26.040 --> 0:59:30.640
<v Speaker 1>his holdiness of Dalai Lama. So let's just briefly talk

0:59:30.680 --> 0:59:33.360
<v Speaker 1>about the other people that it has been suggested it

0:59:33.400 --> 0:59:37.640
<v Speaker 1>could be. One is a uh as you were suggesting, Steve,

0:59:37.720 --> 0:59:42.480
<v Speaker 1>kind of patriotic hackers who aren't actually state sponsored, but

0:59:43.000 --> 0:59:46.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, are are hacking on behalf of China for instance, right.

0:59:46.760 --> 0:59:49.000
<v Speaker 1>Or Russia. I mean, we see this with a lot

0:59:49.040 --> 0:59:53.080
<v Speaker 1>of Russia, lots of patriotic hackers in Russia and America

0:59:53.160 --> 0:59:56.040
<v Speaker 1>as well. Um, and so then the next one would

0:59:56.040 --> 0:59:59.800
<v Speaker 1>be Russia. I don't know why, but Russia does seem

0:59:59.840 --> 1:00:04.920
<v Speaker 1>like posters. Maybe that's because maybe it's because I'm American

1:00:05.000 --> 1:00:07.680
<v Speaker 1>and I've been raised to believe that. But I think

1:00:07.880 --> 1:00:14.120
<v Speaker 1>pretty much everybody, well, I mean I think everybody. Yeah,

1:00:14.200 --> 1:00:16.800
<v Speaker 1>and again I don't see the benefit. It's not like

1:00:16.800 --> 1:00:20.080
<v Speaker 1>Tibet is going to bomb China, right, I mean, there's

1:00:20.080 --> 1:00:24.040
<v Speaker 1>not a lot of resources there. But but hey, I mean,

1:00:24.160 --> 1:00:27.560
<v Speaker 1>maybe they just want to create or foster instability in

1:00:27.560 --> 1:00:29.760
<v Speaker 1>the area, and that's a pretty good way to do it.

1:00:29.880 --> 1:00:33.400
<v Speaker 1>But but ghost at is was I mean, what they

1:00:33.480 --> 1:00:37.640
<v Speaker 1>found in those third less just shy of computers. They

1:00:37.640 --> 1:00:41.760
<v Speaker 1>were all computers that were in I'm going to use

1:00:41.800 --> 1:00:44.400
<v Speaker 1>the word network though it's not computer network, but they

1:00:44.400 --> 1:00:49.080
<v Speaker 1>were in the same kind of political network. They were.

1:00:49.120 --> 1:00:54.800
<v Speaker 1>They were embassy computers and stuff like that, right, So

1:00:55.200 --> 1:00:58.080
<v Speaker 1>they had a reason to be communicating, which means that

1:00:58.120 --> 1:01:01.440
<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a rather small pool to spread the

1:01:01.520 --> 1:01:05.920
<v Speaker 1>infection across, but that doesn't mean that that infection hadn't

1:01:06.040 --> 1:01:10.800
<v Speaker 1>also been dropped in other pools that had different spheres

1:01:10.840 --> 1:01:14.800
<v Speaker 1>of contact than what the office of His Holiness the

1:01:14.880 --> 1:01:18.040
<v Speaker 1>Dalai Lama had, because he's gonna have a very small

1:01:18.040 --> 1:01:21.320
<v Speaker 1>group of people to contact, whereas you know, Billy the

1:01:21.360 --> 1:01:24.400
<v Speaker 1>manager at kmart is going to have all of the

1:01:24.520 --> 1:01:28.200
<v Speaker 1>kmart employees and and regional guys to talk to. You Like,

1:01:28.440 --> 1:01:31.120
<v Speaker 1>it's spheres of inference. So this thing could be all

1:01:31.200 --> 1:01:34.000
<v Speaker 1>over and nobody would really know. It might still be

1:01:34.040 --> 1:01:36.440
<v Speaker 1>all over. It might just be that they didn't want

1:01:36.480 --> 1:01:38.640
<v Speaker 1>to put it at a seminar into everywhere. It was

1:01:38.680 --> 1:01:41.200
<v Speaker 1>just the Dalai Lama's office had the crappiest security in

1:01:41.200 --> 1:01:45.440
<v Speaker 1>the world, and that's became ground zero for the infection.

1:01:45.760 --> 1:01:50.320
<v Speaker 1>So what's the theory that stems from that? I guess

1:01:50.320 --> 1:01:52.520
<v Speaker 1>what I'm getting at is, I don't I'm this is

1:01:52.560 --> 1:01:56.360
<v Speaker 1>for it's not necessarily China. Is that this this bomb

1:01:56.400 --> 1:01:58.960
<v Speaker 1>could have been dropped in a whole lot of small

1:01:59.040 --> 1:02:03.280
<v Speaker 1>ponds and it just happens to be that we founded

1:02:03.840 --> 1:02:09.440
<v Speaker 1>on this one group computer group that all are connected

1:02:09.520 --> 1:02:14.520
<v Speaker 1>and have a connection to China because of that. Got it? Okay?

1:02:14.560 --> 1:02:19.960
<v Speaker 1>Another possibility is the CIA, because again see everything right,

1:02:20.000 --> 1:02:22.880
<v Speaker 1>they're kind of pot stirs, just like Russia. And then

1:02:23.400 --> 1:02:28.640
<v Speaker 1>the final kind of idea is UM a stateless for

1:02:28.840 --> 1:02:32.240
<v Speaker 1>profit group. Although again, you know, if we're gonna go

1:02:32.280 --> 1:02:38.200
<v Speaker 1>run with Steve's theory, that makes more sense. But like, yeah,

1:02:38.520 --> 1:02:41.200
<v Speaker 1>the office of His Holiness, the Dali Lama, Like I

1:02:41.240 --> 1:02:44.000
<v Speaker 1>don't really get the profit there, But the Dalai Lama's

1:02:44.040 --> 1:02:47.480
<v Speaker 1>office could have been an accident. Yeah, that's yeah, if

1:02:47.480 --> 1:02:49.720
<v Speaker 1>we're going to run with that, I mean, it's it's random.

1:02:49.760 --> 1:02:52.840
<v Speaker 1>Who do I get if I land in Joe's computer

1:02:52.960 --> 1:02:55.760
<v Speaker 1>and I get all of Joe's contacts and Joe's contact

1:02:56.240 --> 1:03:01.120
<v Speaker 1>all our jobless schmucks. Well, then I get no valuable information.

1:03:01.160 --> 1:03:03.600
<v Speaker 1>But I land in Devon's inbox, and I get on

1:03:03.680 --> 1:03:06.680
<v Speaker 1>Devon's computer, and Devon's connected to a whole bunch of

1:03:06.720 --> 1:03:11.920
<v Speaker 1>high level ceo as. Whoo, I just hit the jackpot, baby. Yeah. Well,

1:03:11.960 --> 1:03:15.840
<v Speaker 1>I mean with the one exception of the sophistication of

1:03:15.880 --> 1:03:19.840
<v Speaker 1>the phishing emails, right, I mean, that's seriously targeted at

1:03:20.120 --> 1:03:22.840
<v Speaker 1>the office of His holiness, the Dalai Lama and the

1:03:22.880 --> 1:03:26.200
<v Speaker 1>Free to Bet Society at large list It is very

1:03:26.280 --> 1:03:29.160
<v Speaker 1>likely that that email was copied from an email that

1:03:29.440 --> 1:03:34.920
<v Speaker 1>some official source connected to the organization sent out. So

1:03:35.440 --> 1:03:37.560
<v Speaker 1>anybody can get a hold of those kind of emails

1:03:37.560 --> 1:03:39.919
<v Speaker 1>through the dark. Well, hey, I get these things from

1:03:40.120 --> 1:03:43.800
<v Speaker 1>Viacom all the time, and I send out emails looking

1:03:43.840 --> 1:03:49.440
<v Speaker 1>like Viacom or PayPal. We all get those faux PayPal emails. Yeah,

1:03:49.480 --> 1:03:53.080
<v Speaker 1>but they're not half as sophist kid as these ones are. Actually,

1:03:53.120 --> 1:03:56.840
<v Speaker 1>I've been getting some really good ones lately. I've seen

1:03:56.920 --> 1:03:59.800
<v Speaker 1>some really good phishing scams. That's how you're telling us

1:03:59.800 --> 1:04:02.120
<v Speaker 1>that all of our money is gone. No, no, no,

1:04:02.560 --> 1:04:04.480
<v Speaker 1>it is not from the New Gold Teeth that I

1:04:04.560 --> 1:04:08.400
<v Speaker 1>have in my grill either not at all. Okay, yeah, so,

1:04:08.440 --> 1:04:11.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean again I don't really see the benefit. But

1:04:11.680 --> 1:04:15.800
<v Speaker 1>a stateless, kind of for profit hacking group would make

1:04:15.840 --> 1:04:18.160
<v Speaker 1>sense to me. I don't really see it either. I mean,

1:04:18.480 --> 1:04:20.520
<v Speaker 1>what would they be doing. They could steal their data

1:04:20.560 --> 1:04:24.400
<v Speaker 1>and then ransom, which happens occasionally system and ransom, and

1:04:24.440 --> 1:04:26.040
<v Speaker 1>they haven't done that. So yeah, I don't know where

1:04:26.080 --> 1:04:29.440
<v Speaker 1>exactly where the profit comes down. I mean, although again,

1:04:29.640 --> 1:04:31.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, the fact that these servers are kind of

1:04:31.720 --> 1:04:33.920
<v Speaker 1>all over the world does speak to the fact that

1:04:33.960 --> 1:04:36.360
<v Speaker 1>it could be a you know, a vast reaching organization

1:04:36.360 --> 1:04:41.320
<v Speaker 1>of people. But again, why so, I well, I don't

1:04:41.320 --> 1:04:44.600
<v Speaker 1>think it's China. I don't know who I think it is.

1:04:45.240 --> 1:04:48.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna go with Russia because this Mirka and I

1:04:48.360 --> 1:04:50.600
<v Speaker 1>have to blame everything on the Russians. There you go.

1:04:51.280 --> 1:04:53.439
<v Speaker 1>It's awfully hard to tell me. Right now, we've got

1:04:53.440 --> 1:04:57.160
<v Speaker 1>the big, you know, the so called Russian hacking scandal

1:04:57.400 --> 1:05:01.560
<v Speaker 1>right here in America, and it's probably entirely bogus. I mean,

1:05:01.600 --> 1:05:03.200
<v Speaker 1>there's no it's hard to say because it was just

1:05:03.240 --> 1:05:06.360
<v Speaker 1>this revelation the CIA has techniques and software that allow

1:05:06.520 --> 1:05:08.600
<v Speaker 1>them to do all kinds of hacking and leave Russian

1:05:08.640 --> 1:05:11.200
<v Speaker 1>fingerprints behind and the little traces that looked like it

1:05:11.280 --> 1:05:14.200
<v Speaker 1>might have been the Ruskies. Uh, it's it's hard to

1:05:14.200 --> 1:05:16.040
<v Speaker 1>tell if that if there was any hacking at all,

1:05:16.120 --> 1:05:18.720
<v Speaker 1>and said maybe somebody didn't just leak a bunch of information.

1:05:19.040 --> 1:05:22.320
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's just impossible to tell. Well, and there's

1:05:22.360 --> 1:05:25.000
<v Speaker 1>there's there's a whole another way that this could be

1:05:25.080 --> 1:05:30.160
<v Speaker 1>anybody other than China, and that is through Um, you

1:05:30.200 --> 1:05:34.800
<v Speaker 1>guys have heard of mirrors, server mirrors, So for folks

1:05:34.880 --> 1:05:36.960
<v Speaker 1>that don't know, this is how you get stuff off

1:05:37.040 --> 1:05:39.400
<v Speaker 1>the Internet is there's a server that's got it, but

1:05:39.440 --> 1:05:42.280
<v Speaker 1>there's a server somewhere which is a mirror image of it.

1:05:42.840 --> 1:05:44.920
<v Speaker 1>And this is how our podcast gets out. Is it's

1:05:44.960 --> 1:05:47.520
<v Speaker 1>what's called the CD and a content delivery network, and

1:05:47.560 --> 1:05:50.440
<v Speaker 1>there's servers all over that a mirror each other, so

1:05:50.480 --> 1:05:53.520
<v Speaker 1>that not everybody is pulling the data from the same

1:05:53.600 --> 1:05:57.920
<v Speaker 1>server a k A. What happened to us for about

1:05:58.080 --> 1:06:00.400
<v Speaker 1>six or nine months at one point because I didn't

1:06:00.480 --> 1:06:04.840
<v Speaker 1>understand how the Internet work. Well, there's mirror servers, but

1:06:05.240 --> 1:06:07.959
<v Speaker 1>I found out that there is also what is known

1:06:08.200 --> 1:06:11.320
<v Speaker 1>as a witness server, and have you heard of this before.

1:06:12.040 --> 1:06:14.800
<v Speaker 1>So he said yes. You said no, I said yes.

1:06:14.840 --> 1:06:17.280
<v Speaker 1>He said now, okay, so explain it to Joe. Okay.

1:06:17.280 --> 1:06:21.520
<v Speaker 1>So the way I understand what a witness Oh yeah,

1:06:21.560 --> 1:06:25.520
<v Speaker 1>that won't get me in trouble. Y okay to him.

1:06:25.840 --> 1:06:30.120
<v Speaker 1>So what I understand, sir, is that a witness server

1:06:30.360 --> 1:06:34.040
<v Speaker 1>is a server that watches a group of servers. So

1:06:34.080 --> 1:06:36.520
<v Speaker 1>it's one of them should be the primary server, and

1:06:36.560 --> 1:06:40.160
<v Speaker 1>it watches all the others, and if something happens or

1:06:40.280 --> 1:06:44.080
<v Speaker 1>goes wrong with the main server, that's uh, it will

1:06:44.200 --> 1:06:47.439
<v Speaker 1>tell them, oh, switch to server number two. That's called

1:06:47.520 --> 1:06:51.160
<v Speaker 1>fail over. So it's directing the it's saying, oh, you're

1:06:51.240 --> 1:06:53.640
<v Speaker 1>number one. You get the majority of the traffic now,

1:06:54.280 --> 1:06:57.520
<v Speaker 1>and you need to mirror and look like server three,

1:06:57.560 --> 1:07:00.600
<v Speaker 1>four and five need to look like server one. But

1:07:00.920 --> 1:07:04.320
<v Speaker 1>what I don't know is if it's possible to have

1:07:04.600 --> 1:07:08.600
<v Speaker 1>a server in the network that the mirror is controlling,

1:07:09.000 --> 1:07:14.640
<v Speaker 1>but the other mirrors do not know exist. So theoretically

1:07:14.640 --> 1:07:17.640
<v Speaker 1>all the mirrors should know. What you know that they

1:07:17.680 --> 1:07:21.960
<v Speaker 1>have five compatriots, but there could be a dark sixth

1:07:22.000 --> 1:07:24.760
<v Speaker 1>compatriots out there. I mean, frankly, I'm sure that there's

1:07:24.800 --> 1:07:28.000
<v Speaker 1>ways to mirror the witness I mean, or to spoof

1:07:28.040 --> 1:07:30.720
<v Speaker 1>it actually would be a better term, so that you

1:07:30.800 --> 1:07:34.360
<v Speaker 1>could just take over a whole set of servers and

1:07:34.480 --> 1:07:38.760
<v Speaker 1>just kick the old guy offline and say, oh, hey, guys, sorry,

1:07:39.200 --> 1:07:43.880
<v Speaker 1>I just renewed my I P here. I am I'm dynamics.

1:07:43.960 --> 1:07:46.240
<v Speaker 1>So it's happening a lot here, I am, I'm in

1:07:46.360 --> 1:07:48.680
<v Speaker 1>control of you. Now do all these changes and oops,

1:07:48.680 --> 1:07:50.640
<v Speaker 1>we're going to switch over to the server over here.

1:07:51.120 --> 1:07:53.600
<v Speaker 1>Server one, which has got all the content on it

1:07:53.680 --> 1:07:59.360
<v Speaker 1>is theoretically supposedly no longer online script runs. It shoots

1:07:59.400 --> 1:08:02.160
<v Speaker 1>all its day DA out, but officially it's off of

1:08:02.240 --> 1:08:04.800
<v Speaker 1>its group network, so when it comes back in, the

1:08:04.800 --> 1:08:07.520
<v Speaker 1>group doesn't know it's done. It like there's a whole

1:08:07.720 --> 1:08:12.600
<v Speaker 1>bunch of really simple and really complex and clever ways

1:08:13.320 --> 1:08:16.599
<v Speaker 1>that that kind of server arrangement could drop off. And

1:08:16.640 --> 1:08:18.439
<v Speaker 1>then it looks like it's you know, the service are

1:08:18.439 --> 1:08:21.479
<v Speaker 1>all housed in these places, and the one guy that

1:08:21.520 --> 1:08:26.160
<v Speaker 1>we don't know about in Virginia is the site that

1:08:26.240 --> 1:08:29.479
<v Speaker 1>all of that data is getting shot to. Yeah, I know,

1:08:29.840 --> 1:08:33.400
<v Speaker 1>which is why I I'm I'm totally on board with

1:08:33.520 --> 1:08:36.680
<v Speaker 1>the theory that it is not China I feel like

1:08:36.720 --> 1:08:40.439
<v Speaker 1>they are the easy, easy answer. Yeah. Well again, I'm

1:08:40.439 --> 1:08:43.160
<v Speaker 1>not sure who the hell else would be interested. But

1:08:43.240 --> 1:08:45.960
<v Speaker 1>even even there's a lot of other political powers who

1:08:45.960 --> 1:08:50.400
<v Speaker 1>would love to have information to potentially leverage. I mean,

1:08:50.439 --> 1:08:52.439
<v Speaker 1>look at what we did. We we tracked all kinds

1:08:52.479 --> 1:08:56.400
<v Speaker 1>of stupid stuff for fifty years in the intelligence community.

1:08:56.520 --> 1:08:58.880
<v Speaker 1>That was for not but it was all for the

1:08:58.880 --> 1:09:02.200
<v Speaker 1>hope that maybe one day that would pay off. Well.

1:09:02.240 --> 1:09:05.000
<v Speaker 1>And if they were really smart hackers who were doing

1:09:05.040 --> 1:09:07.800
<v Speaker 1>some kind of spoofing or server spoofing or anything like that,

1:09:08.280 --> 1:09:11.200
<v Speaker 1>and you were targeting Tibet, of course you would say

1:09:11.240 --> 1:09:13.920
<v Speaker 1>that everything was in China because it's the easy target

1:09:14.240 --> 1:09:17.200
<v Speaker 1>from Tibet. So and if it was you know, if

1:09:17.200 --> 1:09:21.920
<v Speaker 1>it was Palestine and Israel. So if they were to

1:09:21.920 --> 1:09:25.760
<v Speaker 1>find this in Palestine, everybody would say, well, obviously it's

1:09:25.840 --> 1:09:28.799
<v Speaker 1>Israel who's doing this. So you would leave the bread crumbs.

1:09:29.160 --> 1:09:32.320
<v Speaker 1>Let's say, look it was them, it's their fault. Nobody

1:09:32.360 --> 1:09:35.920
<v Speaker 1>notices where my system is shooting the external data to,

1:09:36.240 --> 1:09:39.080
<v Speaker 1>you know, although you know, and that could be very

1:09:39.400 --> 1:09:41.519
<v Speaker 1>very much true. Although I'm not sure that the Chinese

1:09:41.520 --> 1:09:44.360
<v Speaker 1>would really give a damn about covering their tracks I

1:09:44.400 --> 1:09:48.439
<v Speaker 1>think that the Tibetan's going to do well. But it's

1:09:48.479 --> 1:09:50.800
<v Speaker 1>not the Tibetans that they'd be worried about, Joe. They

1:09:50.840 --> 1:09:54.400
<v Speaker 1>would be worried about reprisals or reprimands from from other

1:09:54.840 --> 1:09:57.519
<v Speaker 1>government bodies. And maybe those aren't the right where, you know,

1:09:57.880 --> 1:10:00.719
<v Speaker 1>but they don't want I mean to a degree their

1:10:00.960 --> 1:10:06.960
<v Speaker 1>brazen really care about public opinion. But to another extent

1:10:07.240 --> 1:10:10.559
<v Speaker 1>they have to play by some of the set rules,

1:10:10.800 --> 1:10:13.760
<v Speaker 1>whether they want to or not. Well, so I mean

1:10:13.840 --> 1:10:17.960
<v Speaker 1>that's the That's the thing, right, is that like they

1:10:17.960 --> 1:10:22.880
<v Speaker 1>functionally aren't covering their tracks. I mean they are being clandestine, right,

1:10:22.960 --> 1:10:26.799
<v Speaker 1>They are hiding a little bit that you know, if

1:10:26.840 --> 1:10:29.400
<v Speaker 1>if they were the people who did this, right, they

1:10:29.439 --> 1:10:33.040
<v Speaker 1>have hidden this on people's computers, but everything tracks back

1:10:33.080 --> 1:10:36.120
<v Speaker 1>to them, that tracks back to servers in China. So

1:10:36.160 --> 1:10:38.839
<v Speaker 1>it can't be proved to be government. They're not government servis.

1:10:39.479 --> 1:10:41.559
<v Speaker 1>But so it's not as though there's some you know,

1:10:41.600 --> 1:10:44.880
<v Speaker 1>they were like spoofing or like buying server space and

1:10:44.920 --> 1:10:47.639
<v Speaker 1>like other places to hide the fact that it was China. Again,

1:10:47.680 --> 1:10:51.240
<v Speaker 1>if it was China, right, the their servers right there,

1:10:51.280 --> 1:10:54.639
<v Speaker 1>they track right back to China. They're on Chinese soil,

1:10:54.720 --> 1:10:58.160
<v Speaker 1>therefore they must be sanctioned by China. I'm the only

1:10:58.160 --> 1:11:01.360
<v Speaker 1>thing they're hiding is the thing that has to be

1:11:01.400 --> 1:11:04.519
<v Speaker 1>hidden to get information. So I guess I don't see

1:11:04.560 --> 1:11:07.640
<v Speaker 1>them actually covering their tracks if it is them, but

1:11:07.760 --> 1:11:12.400
<v Speaker 1>I don't. I don't think it's them. Okay, So yeah,

1:11:13.320 --> 1:11:15.800
<v Speaker 1>a new question again. It could be a lot of people.

1:11:15.880 --> 1:11:19.320
<v Speaker 1>Could be the CIA, just for the sheer freaking hell

1:11:19.400 --> 1:11:22.000
<v Speaker 1>of it. Yeah, I think it's probably the Chinese did

1:11:22.000 --> 1:11:24.519
<v Speaker 1>it just for the heck of it. Could be some intern,

1:11:25.320 --> 1:11:29.439
<v Speaker 1>some CI A intern. Hey, I wrote this program, boss, Yeah,

1:11:29.600 --> 1:11:33.759
<v Speaker 1>just send it out to somebody. See, holy crap, it works.

1:11:34.200 --> 1:11:36.920
<v Speaker 1>Speaking of interns, are we sure that Justin isn't the

1:11:37.080 --> 1:11:40.519
<v Speaker 1>one who did this? Probably was, Yeah, I don't know.

1:11:40.560 --> 1:11:43.599
<v Speaker 1>I've seen him trying to type on his phone, that's true. Okay,

1:11:43.720 --> 1:11:46.680
<v Speaker 1>anything else, for the good of the order of this podcast,

1:11:49.640 --> 1:11:54.000
<v Speaker 1>what are we ordering? I'd like a new sandwich chips um. So,

1:11:54.280 --> 1:11:56.200
<v Speaker 1>as I said, we're going to post the link to

1:11:56.280 --> 1:11:59.720
<v Speaker 1>the fifty three page pdf UM as well some other

1:11:59.800 --> 1:12:03.559
<v Speaker 1>link on the website. That website is Thinking Sideways podcast

1:12:03.640 --> 1:12:06.639
<v Speaker 1>dot com. You can also find links to merch there.

1:12:06.840 --> 1:12:10.400
<v Speaker 1>If you want to buy, like a sticker or a

1:12:10.560 --> 1:12:13.519
<v Speaker 1>shirt or or anything like that, you can do that. There.

1:12:13.920 --> 1:12:18.400
<v Speaker 1>We are on iTunes. You can basically download and listen

1:12:18.439 --> 1:12:21.800
<v Speaker 1>to us anywhere or stream us anywhere. And frankly, if

1:12:21.840 --> 1:12:23.320
<v Speaker 1>you've gotten to this point and you don't know how

1:12:23.320 --> 1:12:25.280
<v Speaker 1>to listen to us, then I need you to write

1:12:25.360 --> 1:12:29.679
<v Speaker 1>us an email because I'd like to know that. Um.

1:12:29.720 --> 1:12:33.760
<v Speaker 1>But if whatever service you're using allows you to subscribe,

1:12:33.800 --> 1:12:35.920
<v Speaker 1>you should do that. If it allows you to leave

1:12:36.000 --> 1:12:38.400
<v Speaker 1>a rating and a review, you should do that. A

1:12:39.120 --> 1:12:41.439
<v Speaker 1>child how to do that if they're the one who

1:12:41.439 --> 1:12:45.080
<v Speaker 1>brought you here, um, five star ratings. By the way,

1:12:45.280 --> 1:12:48.439
<v Speaker 1>we're on social media. We've got Facebook page and a group.

1:12:48.479 --> 1:12:50.920
<v Speaker 1>If you're looking for discussion, join the group. If you're

1:12:51.840 --> 1:12:54.479
<v Speaker 1>looking for I actually don't know why anyone would like

1:12:54.479 --> 1:13:00.360
<v Speaker 1>our page, so an interesting links, interesting links in our ssodes,

1:13:00.600 --> 1:13:03.519
<v Speaker 1>So like the page, joined the group. We're on Twitter.

1:13:03.560 --> 1:13:06.960
<v Speaker 1>We're Thinking Sideways. We also have a subreddit that's a

1:13:07.000 --> 1:13:10.720
<v Speaker 1>little sleepy right now, but that's Thinking Sideways. There's a

1:13:10.760 --> 1:13:15.599
<v Speaker 1>trend here. You can email us Thinking Sideways podcast at

1:13:15.680 --> 1:13:20.320
<v Speaker 1>gmail dot com. We take suggestions, we take feedback, we

1:13:20.439 --> 1:13:25.160
<v Speaker 1>take general praise. We take questions, we take you name it,

1:13:25.200 --> 1:13:29.840
<v Speaker 1>we take it. Money. No, we don't take money anymore, money, photographs,

1:13:30.160 --> 1:13:33.599
<v Speaker 1>anything you want to send us, we'll take it. That's fine,

1:13:33.680 --> 1:13:37.760
<v Speaker 1>and we'll probably respond even nine percent of the time

1:13:37.760 --> 1:13:42.040
<v Speaker 1>we did. H Yeah, as long as you're not sending

1:13:42.120 --> 1:13:45.360
<v Speaker 1>us ghost rat, we're good. Please don't send us. Appreciate that.

1:13:46.040 --> 1:13:48.840
<v Speaker 1>All of that having been said, I think we're going

1:13:48.880 --> 1:13:52.120
<v Speaker 1>to go ahead and ghost on out of here. Me

1:13:52.160 --> 1:13:55.479
<v Speaker 1>and my USB drive. What I was waiting for one

1:13:55.479 --> 1:13:59.960
<v Speaker 1>of you to do the Monty Python clickity clack, coconut

1:14:00.080 --> 1:14:07.040
<v Speaker 1>horse noise for the Trojan chicken. The Trojan Chicken. Yeah, okay,

1:14:07.040 --> 1:14:08.040
<v Speaker 1>bye guys. By