WEBVTT - Episode 18: The Obscure Report That Spawned the ETF Industry

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another edition of the Odd Lots podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Joseph Wisenthal, Managing Editor Bloomberg Markets, and I'm Tracy Alloway,

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<v Speaker 1>Executive editor of Bloomberg Markets. So, Tracy, today we're going

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<v Speaker 1>to be it's like a special episode. We're talking to

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<v Speaker 1>one of our colleagues here, special edition of Odd Lot

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<v Speaker 1>We're gonna be talking about one of the most important

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<v Speaker 1>financial innovations of the modern era. Wouldn't you say? I

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<v Speaker 1>would definitely say so. Isn't it something like a three

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<v Speaker 1>trillion dollar industry? Is that right? And that industry is

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<v Speaker 1>the e T F And I think almost everybody at

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<v Speaker 1>this point who is aware of markets knows what e

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<v Speaker 1>t s are. Their exchange treated funds. You can use

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<v Speaker 1>them to make a bet on the STP as a whole.

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<v Speaker 1>You can use them to make a bet on gold,

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<v Speaker 1>and you can use them to do crazy stuff like

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<v Speaker 1>make a three x levered bet on junior gold. Miners

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<v Speaker 1>do that all the time. But it's like a basket

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<v Speaker 1>of things, right, and it trades like a single stock

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<v Speaker 1>on an exchange exactly right. And these e t f

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<v Speaker 1>s have been hoovering up assets, as you said, trillions

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<v Speaker 1>of dollars away from traditional funds, from traditional money managers,

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<v Speaker 1>and it doesn't look like they're slowing down anytime soon.

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<v Speaker 1>And not only that, they continue to innovate. So there

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<v Speaker 1>are more and more new kinds of e t F

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<v Speaker 1>s all the time. From what humble beginnings did the

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<v Speaker 1>e t F market come to us? This is the

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<v Speaker 1>fascinating thing. We're going to discuss with our colleague Eric Balcunas.

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<v Speaker 1>He has a new article out in Bloomberg Markets magazine

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<v Speaker 1>called the e t F Files, and that's based on

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<v Speaker 1>a new book that he's publishing. And so it turns out, Eric,

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<v Speaker 1>thanks for joining us, thank you for having me. So

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<v Speaker 1>the e t F, this monster innovation that's changing how

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<v Speaker 1>people invest, came out in a weird way. It came

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<v Speaker 1>out thanks to basically a memo, right yeah, memo, will

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<v Speaker 1>be putting it mildly at eight hundred and forty page

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<v Speaker 1>governed report is really where the seed for the e

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<v Speaker 1>t F was found. So what happened was in the

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<v Speaker 1>seven crash called Black Monday, right the worst, the worst

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<v Speaker 1>stock market crash in history. There was SEC spent four

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<v Speaker 1>months writing a report about what happened. They were trying

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<v Speaker 1>to figure out what really not the macro events that

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<v Speaker 1>caused selling, but what exacerbated the sell off that it

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<v Speaker 1>was so brutal, and Key tell us what did happen?

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<v Speaker 1>Because we can't pass up an opportunity to talk portfolio insurance.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry. Sure. So what they found was, when the

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<v Speaker 1>dark clouds were going over the market, institutions had all

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<v Speaker 1>started using something called portfolio insurance, which essentially was a

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<v Speaker 1>strategy that involved shorting futures right based on indices as

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<v Speaker 1>soon as the stocks they held started hitting a certain level.

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<v Speaker 1>So essentially what happened was on that day there were

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<v Speaker 1>just weren't that many buyers for the people trying to

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<v Speaker 1>sell insurance. Then on top of that, you had program

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<v Speaker 1>traders who were arbitrage in the futures to the individual stocks,

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<v Speaker 1>which involved buying the futures and then selling all five

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<v Speaker 1>hundred or how many of our hundred stocks at the

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<v Speaker 1>same time, right, So what happened was those program traders

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<v Speaker 1>stepped in and they were putting all the cell orders

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<v Speaker 1>on the individual stocks. That caused more panic and all

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<v Speaker 1>all of a sudden, Really what you had was all

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<v Speaker 1>these forces looking to sell individual stocks all at the

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<v Speaker 1>same time and that's when you had the crash. And

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<v Speaker 1>how much was the crash that day the crash it

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<v Speaker 1>was a five D eight point drop in one day.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, we've had like some flash crashes in recent years,

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<v Speaker 1>but that really puts it into perspective. It also reminds it.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, we've blamed high frequency trading and all kinds

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<v Speaker 1>of stuff on modern flash crashes, but you can get

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<v Speaker 1>some extraordinary moves. It seems about just about any area,

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<v Speaker 1>that's right. Yeah, Okay, So the SEC put out after

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<v Speaker 1>several months of studying that crash in they wrote an

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<v Speaker 1>eight hundred and forty page memo. And what was in

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<v Speaker 1>that memo that led to the e t F Sure

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<v Speaker 1>on chapter three, right deep into the into the actual

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<v Speaker 1>white paper memo, there was something where they talked about

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<v Speaker 1>if an alternative approach were to be examined, so they

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<v Speaker 1>used that language, and what they're basically saying was the

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<v Speaker 1>SEC was thinking that the futures market volatility and sell

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<v Speaker 1>off had transmitted to individual stocks. So they thought, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>if there was only a way to do basket trading,

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<v Speaker 1>so you didn't hit sell on five stocks at once,

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<v Speaker 1>but you hit sell on a basket and you had

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<v Speaker 1>market makers and specialists who were able to trade those baskets.

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<v Speaker 1>It might have provided a buffer in between the futures

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<v Speaker 1>market in Chicago, which the SEC doesn't have any regulation over,

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<v Speaker 1>and the individual stocks in New York, which they do.

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<v Speaker 1>So they just put it in there is maybe a

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<v Speaker 1>possible alternative approach. However, they did use the word product.

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<v Speaker 1>And then the two guys at the m X, who

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<v Speaker 1>were hungry for some more volume because that exchange was

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<v Speaker 1>really in third place at the time, read this and

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<v Speaker 1>really looked at it as a product propos Well from

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<v Speaker 1>the SEC. I mean, it's kind of a creative approach,

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<v Speaker 1>right to read an CEC paper on this huge negative

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<v Speaker 1>event in markets and think I have a product idea

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<v Speaker 1>out of that. Yeah, I mean the SEC does use

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<v Speaker 1>the word product and they say alternative approach. Remember they

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<v Speaker 1>worked at am X, right, So exchanges were really into

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<v Speaker 1>this report. Because I asked Stephen Bloom, who was one

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<v Speaker 1>of the two guys who read it, they said they

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<v Speaker 1>were riveted by every page. I thought, who would read

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<v Speaker 1>an eight d forty page government report, But they did,

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<v Speaker 1>and they you know, they got rewarded for reading every

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<v Speaker 1>word like that, So they were really excited. One of

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<v Speaker 1>the quotes that we found from him was that he

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<v Speaker 1>said he walked into his boss's office and said, here's

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<v Speaker 1>an opening. We can drive a truck through this exchange.

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<v Speaker 1>In particular, MX was hurting, so they were really looking

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<v Speaker 1>for something. So they had their eyes wide open when

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<v Speaker 1>the report hit. I just want to pause and say,

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<v Speaker 1>I love that point that he who hears you, who

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<v Speaker 1>reads an eight hundred and forty page government white paper

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<v Speaker 1>and really notices all the details, there's a reward to

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<v Speaker 1>that they deserve to make money. Yeah, exactly, I think.

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<v Speaker 1>So Eric tell us about the product that they eventually

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<v Speaker 1>came up with. What were the actual beginnings, right, So

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<v Speaker 1>they thought, okay, well let's get a basket trading product. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>Their first idea was to go to Jack Bogel at

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<v Speaker 1>Vanguard and see if they could trade an SMP index

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<v Speaker 1>fund for from Vanguard. Jack Bogel met with Nate Most,

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<v Speaker 1>who Nate Most and Steve Bloom with the two guys

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<v Speaker 1>and basically said thank you, but no thank you. And

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<v Speaker 1>when I interviewed Jack Bogel, he said, Nate Most walked

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<v Speaker 1>into my office. I looked at his proposal. I said,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not interested anyway, but I will give you three

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<v Speaker 1>criticisms flaws that I think your product has that if

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<v Speaker 1>you fix them, might be better. So that's what Bogel claims.

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<v Speaker 1>So basically he said no, thank you, because Jack Bogel

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<v Speaker 1>wants nothing to do with trading anywhere near his funds.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, he's anti trading, and this would be a

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<v Speaker 1>product that would trade. So that was really where the

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<v Speaker 1>difference lies. So Nate Most said that that meeting got

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<v Speaker 1>him thinking about a way where you could trade a

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<v Speaker 1>fund but not drive up cast us and the fund

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<v Speaker 1>from people coming in and out of it. That was

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<v Speaker 1>the big problem. And this is where the I think

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<v Speaker 1>the value from Nate Most than the AMEX came in

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<v Speaker 1>to make the e t F more than what the

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<v Speaker 1>SEC called for. And that is that Nate Most was

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<v Speaker 1>seventy four years old and he used to be a

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<v Speaker 1>commodities trader, and he used to be president of the

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<v Speaker 1>Pacific Commodities Exchange, and he basically looked at the paradigm

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<v Speaker 1>of the commodities warehouse receipt, which is where you know,

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<v Speaker 1>palm oil or coco. You don't want to move the

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<v Speaker 1>merchandise back and forth. So what you do is you

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<v Speaker 1>store it in a warehouse, you get a receipt, then

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<v Speaker 1>you trade the receipt. That way you don't have to

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<v Speaker 1>move anything, and then he saves costs, and that saves costs.

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<v Speaker 1>Then you could gather up the receipts at any time,

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<v Speaker 1>go to the warehouse and get your commodities back. So

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<v Speaker 1>that that paradigm was then applied to the sort of

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<v Speaker 1>the SEC's general idea, and that really was the sort

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<v Speaker 1>of foundation of the et start. So let's just break

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<v Speaker 1>down what we've learned, because I think this is really fascinating.

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<v Speaker 1>And for those who don't know, Jack Vogel famous for

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<v Speaker 1>his belief in indexing not trading, the key to winning

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<v Speaker 1>and investments is low costs, and so theoretic at least

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<v Speaker 1>something like an SMP index fund could have appealed to him.

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<v Speaker 1>When he saw this product, he said, hey, this is

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<v Speaker 1>a trading vehicle. He's not into vehicles that make it

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<v Speaker 1>easy to get in and out of the market and

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<v Speaker 1>be there's too much costs involved in the internal running

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<v Speaker 1>of the fund. But when they solved that problem, it

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<v Speaker 1>still didn't really solve the fact that it's a trading vehicle.

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<v Speaker 1>But it did become a low cost product that people

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<v Speaker 1>can use to make a directional bet on the market

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<v Speaker 1>in a way that we didn't have before. Yeah. And

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<v Speaker 1>I think what it did was the meeting with Bogel,

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<v Speaker 1>even though it was never going to happen with him

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<v Speaker 1>because he was anti trading, the meeting pushed them to

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<v Speaker 1>think of something different. And that's where bringing this commodities

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<v Speaker 1>paradigm is why et f s can trade upwards of

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<v Speaker 1>eighteen trillion dollars a year. They trade all day long,

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<v Speaker 1>right uh. And if you look at like sp Y

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<v Speaker 1>for example, trades about billion dollars a day. That's the

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<v Speaker 1>big sp five, that's the big SMP. That's the one

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<v Speaker 1>that they first designed, these two guys. But yet someone

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<v Speaker 1>like my aunt Joyce could go into the SMP Spy

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<v Speaker 1>for ten years and that trading every day does not

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<v Speaker 1>bother or drive up costs for her long term investment.

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<v Speaker 1>And that is where the model really was something special.

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<v Speaker 1>And when you talk to the guy who was one

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<v Speaker 1>of the lawyers who wrote the market break report, the

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<v Speaker 1>SEC document, he said when he saw the proposal come

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<v Speaker 1>in from am X with this design, he was blown away.

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<v Speaker 1>It was way more than he thought when they were

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<v Speaker 1>writing it. So he thought this product would had much

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<v Speaker 1>more utility than even they thought when they said we

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<v Speaker 1>need something for a basket trading product. So hold on

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<v Speaker 1>one second. They borrowed the commodities warehouse idea with the

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<v Speaker 1>sort of trading receipts, but you still need a virtual

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<v Speaker 1>warehouse for the shares, right, how did that come about? Right?

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<v Speaker 1>So there, right, there's no warehouse, right, So instead of

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<v Speaker 1>a warehouse is called a custodian. So State Street was

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<v Speaker 1>one of the first obvious places they went, and so

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<v Speaker 1>that's became the custodian for the stock. So the custodian

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<v Speaker 1>is the virtual warehouse that and today every et F

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<v Speaker 1>needs a custodian to store those stocks or bonds or

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<v Speaker 1>whatever holding. And that is what makes the e t

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<v Speaker 1>F slightly different than a derivative. Some people say E

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<v Speaker 1>t s are a type of derivative. The fact is

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<v Speaker 1>that these stocks that are in the spy or any

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<v Speaker 1>E t F our literal picture, and they're literally stored

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<v Speaker 1>in a warehouse just happens to be a custodian's electronic

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<v Speaker 1>But the fact is those are receipts for those physical

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<v Speaker 1>they're physically backed and that that's what makes some difference

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<v Speaker 1>in like a futures contract and tell us how those

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<v Speaker 1>stocks actually get in the virtual warehouse, if you will,

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<v Speaker 1>because that's a process that's really important for e t S,

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<v Speaker 1>right sure, It's called the creation redemption process. And this

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<v Speaker 1>is where I sometimes teach courses on e t S

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<v Speaker 1>where the students get really like confused and bored. I'll

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<v Speaker 1>be honest. That's why are our listeners are not going

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<v Speaker 1>to give our Our listeners are very sophisticated, wonky people,

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<v Speaker 1>and this is the part they're going to be most

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<v Speaker 1>excited about. So well, and that's why I went into

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<v Speaker 1>the story of how the first t t F came about,

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<v Speaker 1>because when I tell the story, people get it more. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>when I explain the commodities visual, they understand it. So

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<v Speaker 1>the way creation redemption works is an authorized participant, which

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<v Speaker 1>is a gigantic bank connected to the system with you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of money. Basically they are Every et F

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<v Speaker 1>has several aps that are assigned to it. When a

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<v Speaker 1>new creation is done, the AP will hand in the basket,

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<v Speaker 1>which is say five s in the SMP into the

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<v Speaker 1>state into the issure state Street and in return they

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<v Speaker 1>get fifty shares of spy and that would be like

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<v Speaker 1>the receipts. Then they sell those on the exchange, and

0:11:26.200 --> 0:11:28.439
<v Speaker 1>that's where those receipts will trade. And then if there's

0:11:28.440 --> 0:11:31.640
<v Speaker 1>a redemption, the same thing will happen. They'll take spy shares,

0:11:32.080 --> 0:11:35.080
<v Speaker 1>hand them into State Street and get their five stocks back.

0:11:35.280 --> 0:11:37.440
<v Speaker 1>And then that is sort of the creation redempture process,

0:11:37.480 --> 0:11:40.559
<v Speaker 1>which I sort of equate to the flux capacitor from

0:11:40.559 --> 0:11:43.079
<v Speaker 1>Back to the Future. You know it's in that movie.

0:11:43.080 --> 0:11:46.040
<v Speaker 1>It's how time travel works. What I just described is

0:11:46.080 --> 0:11:49.240
<v Speaker 1>how the e t F has been so resilient in

0:11:49.360 --> 0:11:53.080
<v Speaker 1>several market stress events. And I think, you know, people

0:11:53.120 --> 0:11:54.760
<v Speaker 1>are waiting for them to blow up, but that what

0:11:54.840 --> 0:11:56.760
<v Speaker 1>I just described does make them, I think a little

0:11:56.800 --> 0:11:59.319
<v Speaker 1>more resilient than people think who are sort of just

0:11:59.400 --> 0:12:02.319
<v Speaker 1>learning about them. So what actually motivates the a p

0:12:02.559 --> 0:12:06.480
<v Speaker 1>s to bring their shares and things to this warehouse

0:12:06.520 --> 0:12:09.000
<v Speaker 1>and get the sort of the E t F share

0:12:09.000 --> 0:12:11.880
<v Speaker 1>in return? Right, the AP gets a small cut from

0:12:11.880 --> 0:12:13.640
<v Speaker 1>a spread when they deal with the market makers, and

0:12:13.679 --> 0:12:16.679
<v Speaker 1>they also are able to do arbitrage, and arbitrage sounds

0:12:16.679 --> 0:12:19.320
<v Speaker 1>like a bad dirty word, but it's actually really effective

0:12:19.360 --> 0:12:22.559
<v Speaker 1>for e t s because if the basket, if the stocks,

0:12:22.720 --> 0:12:24.599
<v Speaker 1>if the e t F price starts to go a

0:12:24.640 --> 0:12:28.560
<v Speaker 1>little higher than the value of the stocks, the AP

0:12:28.720 --> 0:12:30.840
<v Speaker 1>can arbitrage by handing in the e t F shares

0:12:31.000 --> 0:12:33.280
<v Speaker 1>and buying the underlyings or vice versa. So they can

0:12:33.320 --> 0:12:36.520
<v Speaker 1>always arbitrage the e t F versus the basket by

0:12:36.559 --> 0:12:39.720
<v Speaker 1>using the creative redemption process. That in effect is a

0:12:39.840 --> 0:12:43.280
<v Speaker 1>natural economic motive for them to keep the price close

0:12:43.320 --> 0:12:45.640
<v Speaker 1>to the n A V. And that's a huge difference

0:12:45.679 --> 0:12:48.120
<v Speaker 1>on e t F compared to close end funds, which

0:12:48.160 --> 0:12:50.559
<v Speaker 1>don't have that ability to create and redeem new shares

0:12:50.559 --> 0:12:54.160
<v Speaker 1>any time, because clothes and funds are limited shares outstanding,

0:12:54.160 --> 0:12:57.480
<v Speaker 1>so that there's always massive premiums or discounts. That is

0:12:57.520 --> 0:13:00.160
<v Speaker 1>one sort of way the E t F evolved. These

0:13:00.200 --> 0:13:03.240
<v Speaker 1>then fun to you know, improve that model, because if

0:13:03.240 --> 0:13:06.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm an authorized participant and I see a huge difference

0:13:06.440 --> 0:13:08.760
<v Speaker 1>between the underlying shares and the share of the E

0:13:08.840 --> 0:13:10.960
<v Speaker 1>t F, I'm gonna want to come in and take

0:13:10.960 --> 0:13:13.240
<v Speaker 1>advantage of that and try to arbitrage it. Out right,

0:13:13.320 --> 0:13:15.880
<v Speaker 1>it's free money, it's a risk free profit for that

0:13:16.040 --> 0:13:18.600
<v Speaker 1>APay right, and that you know, again everybody wins. Again,

0:13:18.600 --> 0:13:21.600
<v Speaker 1>that economic incentive is crucial, and that is the secret

0:13:21.640 --> 0:13:24.600
<v Speaker 1>sauce that keeps everything going and makes the regular retail

0:13:24.640 --> 0:13:26.600
<v Speaker 1>investors get a price that's really close to the fair

0:13:26.679 --> 0:13:28.800
<v Speaker 1>value of those of the basket of stocks. All right,

0:13:28.880 --> 0:13:31.440
<v Speaker 1>let's go back to the stories. So now we understand

0:13:31.480 --> 0:13:35.479
<v Speaker 1>we have this the SPY which still trading, the gigantic

0:13:36.040 --> 0:13:40.360
<v Speaker 1>SPI index fund. They launch it, how does how did

0:13:40.360 --> 0:13:44.000
<v Speaker 1>it go? How did they do it attracting people do

0:13:44.200 --> 0:13:47.600
<v Speaker 1>trade it? And how did that work out? Right? So well,

0:13:47.640 --> 0:13:50.199
<v Speaker 1>first I had to wait four years to get SEC approval.

0:13:50.280 --> 0:13:51.880
<v Speaker 1>SEC did not know what to do with this. They

0:13:51.920 --> 0:13:55.320
<v Speaker 1>were even though they suggested the reason it took four years.

0:13:55.640 --> 0:13:59.000
<v Speaker 1>It had to go through which is the strictest of regulations.

0:13:59.400 --> 0:14:04.040
<v Speaker 1>So finally got approval under the that's what regulates mutual funds.

0:14:04.320 --> 0:14:06.160
<v Speaker 1>So when it came out in ninety three, it had

0:14:06.200 --> 0:14:08.120
<v Speaker 1>a good first day. They had a lot of hype.

0:14:08.120 --> 0:14:10.320
<v Speaker 1>They had a large spider hanging from the ceiling and

0:14:10.720 --> 0:14:14.240
<v Speaker 1>the trade a million shares, but a spider because because

0:14:14.480 --> 0:14:20.680
<v Speaker 1>they're called the Standard and Poors Depository receipts with acronym spider.

0:14:20.840 --> 0:14:23.960
<v Speaker 1>And back to the commodity warehouse receipts. Depository receipts is

0:14:23.960 --> 0:14:26.240
<v Speaker 1>even in the name of Spider, which kind of connects

0:14:26.240 --> 0:14:29.560
<v Speaker 1>to the commodities warehouse receipts. But they traded a million shares,

0:14:29.600 --> 0:14:32.480
<v Speaker 1>but then it dwindled down. But even more, ETFs don't

0:14:32.520 --> 0:14:35.320
<v Speaker 1>offer brokers any commission to sell them. It's why people

0:14:35.400 --> 0:14:37.320
<v Speaker 1>like them, it's why they're so low cost. But it

0:14:37.360 --> 0:14:40.200
<v Speaker 1>also inhibited some of the early sales growth. So what

0:14:40.280 --> 0:14:42.600
<v Speaker 1>happened it was some true believers who really thought, wow,

0:14:42.640 --> 0:14:44.760
<v Speaker 1>this is a great product. They were doing guerilla marketing.

0:14:45.240 --> 0:14:47.520
<v Speaker 1>When it really came back after like two years, they

0:14:47.520 --> 0:14:50.000
<v Speaker 1>were almost thinking of closing it. It It traded eighteen thousand

0:14:50.000 --> 0:14:53.960
<v Speaker 1>shares one day about five months after launching, which is

0:14:54.280 --> 0:14:57.560
<v Speaker 1>that's that's like less than the Global X Solar Energy

0:14:57.600 --> 0:15:00.240
<v Speaker 1>e t F trades today, So it was not trading all.

0:15:00.400 --> 0:15:02.800
<v Speaker 1>So you had people who were just out there figuring

0:15:02.800 --> 0:15:05.800
<v Speaker 1>out ways to sell it, and some institutions caught on.

0:15:05.880 --> 0:15:09.880
<v Speaker 1>But really what happened was the nineties kicked in was

0:15:09.960 --> 0:15:12.640
<v Speaker 1>like an epic year for the market, so just buying

0:15:12.680 --> 0:15:15.400
<v Speaker 1>the SMP became a big deal, and then that really

0:15:15.440 --> 0:15:18.040
<v Speaker 1>was the supreme catalyst and it never looked back at

0:15:18.040 --> 0:15:22.240
<v Speaker 1>doubled assets every year after. How important was the rise

0:15:22.600 --> 0:15:26.520
<v Speaker 1>of sort of discount retail brokerages online brokerages in the

0:15:26.560 --> 0:15:29.080
<v Speaker 1>mid nineties, you know, in terms of you mentioned that

0:15:29.120 --> 0:15:31.560
<v Speaker 1>there was no brokerage commission on these things. But once

0:15:31.640 --> 0:15:35.280
<v Speaker 1>people got into this idea during the nineties market boom

0:15:35.320 --> 0:15:39.200
<v Speaker 1>of investing for themselves and trading, did that help their rise? Yeah?

0:15:39.240 --> 0:15:41.840
<v Speaker 1>It did, believe it or not. Though institutions were some

0:15:41.880 --> 0:15:44.640
<v Speaker 1>of the first early buyers, like pensions, And there's even

0:15:44.680 --> 0:15:47.800
<v Speaker 1>a story about a rich Seattle investors in the mid

0:15:47.880 --> 0:15:50.600
<v Speaker 1>nineties and the guy was like, he's very, very wealthy

0:15:50.640 --> 0:15:52.720
<v Speaker 1>from Seattle. You guys could probably guess who it is

0:15:53.480 --> 0:15:56.520
<v Speaker 1>like to use spy because they could buy options on

0:15:56.560 --> 0:16:00.160
<v Speaker 1>it to protect their position. So the first adopted as

0:16:00.160 --> 0:16:02.840
<v Speaker 1>were big institutions. Because some of the institutions like using

0:16:02.840 --> 0:16:06.160
<v Speaker 1>in play who is the investor? I think it's Bill Gates,

0:16:06.160 --> 0:16:08.440
<v Speaker 1>but he wouldn't tell me. I'm just thinking what they

0:16:08.440 --> 0:16:10.280
<v Speaker 1>think that he got he was into them for his

0:16:10.360 --> 0:16:13.200
<v Speaker 1>personal investments. Yes, interesting, yeah, but we don't know that.

0:16:13.520 --> 0:16:16.880
<v Speaker 1>We don't know. That's the second. Very wealthy is why

0:16:16.920 --> 0:16:19.200
<v Speaker 1>I thought and from Seattle. Maybe Paul Allen, I don't

0:16:19.200 --> 0:16:21.240
<v Speaker 1>know one of those guys, probably Steve Jobs isn't that

0:16:21.320 --> 0:16:24.840
<v Speaker 1>rich yet, but I don't think that's right. He was

0:16:24.920 --> 0:16:28.920
<v Speaker 1>from California. Well, okay, wait, so we've told the story.

0:16:29.080 --> 0:16:31.440
<v Speaker 1>We're now at this point where you know, the s

0:16:31.480 --> 0:16:34.520
<v Speaker 1>p Y e t F is trading like twenty five

0:16:34.560 --> 0:16:38.000
<v Speaker 1>billion worth of shares a day. But beyond just the

0:16:38.040 --> 0:16:41.280
<v Speaker 1>story of that particular e t F, we've also had

0:16:41.320 --> 0:16:44.200
<v Speaker 1>the entire industry kind of grow around it. We have

0:16:44.280 --> 0:16:46.640
<v Speaker 1>all these new kinds of e t F. Tell us

0:16:46.640 --> 0:16:50.520
<v Speaker 1>about what's changed since the early days when you look

0:16:50.560 --> 0:16:52.840
<v Speaker 1>at it. You know, in the SEC commissioner who was

0:16:52.880 --> 0:16:55.720
<v Speaker 1>around in the late eighties who I interviewed, he said, well,

0:16:55.720 --> 0:16:59.880
<v Speaker 1>we didn't envision anything non stock baskets. We thought just

0:17:00.080 --> 0:17:03.320
<v Speaker 1>some stock baskets would really help with the stock market volatility.

0:17:03.360 --> 0:17:06.720
<v Speaker 1>But now you've got fixed income ETFs. You've got gold

0:17:06.840 --> 0:17:08.680
<v Speaker 1>g l D was a game changer. That was the

0:17:08.720 --> 0:17:10.720
<v Speaker 1>first commodities et F. Now you've got a hundred and

0:17:10.720 --> 0:17:14.520
<v Speaker 1>fifty commodities ETFs. Fixed income. As you know, we've discussed

0:17:14.520 --> 0:17:17.520
<v Speaker 1>this several times. It's a hot topic because bonds don't

0:17:17.560 --> 0:17:20.639
<v Speaker 1>trade like stocks. So now you're taking something antiquated and

0:17:20.760 --> 0:17:23.000
<v Speaker 1>over the counter and putting it in a stock like vehicle,

0:17:23.000 --> 0:17:26.040
<v Speaker 1>and that's created some concerns. And then you've gotten things

0:17:26.080 --> 0:17:29.320
<v Speaker 1>like leverage ets which whold total return swaps, or oil

0:17:29.400 --> 0:17:32.280
<v Speaker 1>futures that hold you know, literally hold futures contracts, and

0:17:32.520 --> 0:17:34.359
<v Speaker 1>now you're basically buying an et F that is like

0:17:34.359 --> 0:17:38.480
<v Speaker 1>your personal oil futures trader. So they've expanded into every

0:17:38.560 --> 0:17:41.840
<v Speaker 1>asset class and what I call standardization, just like a

0:17:41.960 --> 0:17:44.679
<v Speaker 1>ubs port or a gas bump is standardized, you know

0:17:44.800 --> 0:17:47.880
<v Speaker 1>that need for consumers. The e t F has basically

0:17:47.920 --> 0:17:50.440
<v Speaker 1>made everything trade like a stock, which means you can

0:17:50.440 --> 0:17:53.240
<v Speaker 1>see the pricing, you can buy it easily, and it's

0:17:53.240 --> 0:17:56.439
<v Speaker 1>taxed like everything else. So that kind of standardization, I

0:17:56.480 --> 0:17:59.080
<v Speaker 1>think is one of the big reasons people like using

0:17:59.119 --> 0:18:01.959
<v Speaker 1>them and for a long time, or you know, when

0:18:02.000 --> 0:18:03.359
<v Speaker 1>I think of e t F, so I think of

0:18:03.440 --> 0:18:07.480
<v Speaker 1>something really simple like SMP gold, but something sort of

0:18:07.600 --> 0:18:12.040
<v Speaker 1>underlying is passive. But increasingly the composition changes and they're

0:18:12.119 --> 0:18:13.960
<v Speaker 1>active e t f s and their e t F

0:18:14.080 --> 0:18:17.760
<v Speaker 1>based on formulas where the where the stocks are changing. Right, Yeah,

0:18:17.840 --> 0:18:21.200
<v Speaker 1>that's a whole thing called smart beta also slightly controversial,

0:18:21.240 --> 0:18:24.320
<v Speaker 1>but basically the early products were just you know, their

0:18:24.359 --> 0:18:27.320
<v Speaker 1>market cap weighted beta one they call you know whatever.

0:18:27.359 --> 0:18:30.920
<v Speaker 1>That very simple understand So some people came along and said, hey, look,

0:18:31.119 --> 0:18:35.240
<v Speaker 1>academics have studied what factors active managers rely on to

0:18:35.280 --> 0:18:38.679
<v Speaker 1>get alpha, such as tilting to small caps, tilting to value,

0:18:38.680 --> 0:18:42.439
<v Speaker 1>tilting to volatility momentum, and they've taken these tilts and

0:18:42.480 --> 0:18:45.520
<v Speaker 1>they've put them into rule based passive products. And so

0:18:45.800 --> 0:18:48.880
<v Speaker 1>smart beta is sort of fills the void that existed

0:18:48.920 --> 0:18:51.840
<v Speaker 1>between pure active and pure passive, and that's a four

0:18:51.920 --> 0:18:54.240
<v Speaker 1>hundred billion dollars section of the e t F world,

0:18:54.640 --> 0:18:56.359
<v Speaker 1>and that is where you're getting a lot of the

0:18:56.359 --> 0:18:59.640
<v Speaker 1>new players like Goldman, Sachs and JP Morgan. They think

0:18:59.680 --> 0:19:02.359
<v Speaker 1>smart BATA is the future because there's ten trillion dollars

0:19:02.359 --> 0:19:04.560
<v Speaker 1>in active mutual funds right now and a lot of

0:19:04.560 --> 0:19:06.240
<v Speaker 1>that money is going to go away because the mutual

0:19:06.280 --> 0:19:09.120
<v Speaker 1>fund structure. So they think that a smart beta will

0:19:09.160 --> 0:19:10.960
<v Speaker 1>be a place where a lot of the new assets

0:19:11.000 --> 0:19:13.640
<v Speaker 1>will go from the money that's coming over from pure

0:19:13.640 --> 0:19:15.359
<v Speaker 1>active because they want to try to beat the market,

0:19:15.440 --> 0:19:17.240
<v Speaker 1>but they don't want to pay the fees and they

0:19:17.240 --> 0:19:19.320
<v Speaker 1>want something that's easy to trade, and they don't want

0:19:19.320 --> 0:19:21.800
<v Speaker 1>to capital gains taxes either. So smart beta e t

0:19:22.000 --> 0:19:24.680
<v Speaker 1>f s are in some people's eyes, a real interesting

0:19:24.800 --> 0:19:27.080
<v Speaker 1>arm of the e t F expansion. Well, can we

0:19:27.119 --> 0:19:30.440
<v Speaker 1>talk more about how the sort of active fund management

0:19:30.520 --> 0:19:34.200
<v Speaker 1>or mutual fund industry feels about e t F s.

0:19:34.320 --> 0:19:39.120
<v Speaker 1>Uh I gather not so positive necessarily probably not. I mean,

0:19:39.119 --> 0:19:41.120
<v Speaker 1>if you're an active mutual fund, you've got to make

0:19:41.119 --> 0:19:44.040
<v Speaker 1>a decision do I ride the gravy train? Because if

0:19:44.040 --> 0:19:45.520
<v Speaker 1>you look at the fees, like you know, I look

0:19:45.520 --> 0:19:48.439
<v Speaker 1>at my mom's statements sometimes and I'm just I'm stunned

0:19:48.440 --> 0:19:50.600
<v Speaker 1>at how much she pays and the load she already

0:19:50.600 --> 0:19:54.040
<v Speaker 1>paid for mutual fund in a Class A share. So

0:19:54.080 --> 0:19:57.040
<v Speaker 1>they're making so much more money than e t f

0:19:57.080 --> 0:19:59.160
<v Speaker 1>s even though ETFs are growing, so it's a gravy train.

0:19:59.240 --> 0:20:03.000
<v Speaker 1>Still they have to ask themselves, do I cannibalize myself

0:20:03.040 --> 0:20:04.919
<v Speaker 1>to survive in the future. Do I just ride this

0:20:05.000 --> 0:20:08.359
<v Speaker 1>until it's over? And you can see some are struggling

0:20:08.359 --> 0:20:10.680
<v Speaker 1>with that question. PIMCO is a good example of one

0:20:10.680 --> 0:20:13.040
<v Speaker 1>that said, look, we've got to get involved. So they

0:20:13.080 --> 0:20:15.960
<v Speaker 1>came in with active etf they've been somewhat successful, and

0:20:16.000 --> 0:20:18.960
<v Speaker 1>then other companies have come in with smart beta versions

0:20:19.000 --> 0:20:21.679
<v Speaker 1>of their active products. So a lot of these firms

0:20:21.680 --> 0:20:23.320
<v Speaker 1>are trying to figure that out. For sure, it's a

0:20:23.320 --> 0:20:26.880
<v Speaker 1>big it's a big deal intellectually, I wonder so you

0:20:26.880 --> 0:20:31.040
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned these different factors that people have discovered leads

0:20:31.080 --> 0:20:35.120
<v Speaker 1>to outperformance, like momentum factors, so stocks that exhibit strong

0:20:35.160 --> 0:20:39.360
<v Speaker 1>momentum tend to outperform, or sometimes people say value stocks

0:20:39.480 --> 0:20:44.160
<v Speaker 1>or stocks with strong balance shoes, whatever it is. But well,

0:20:44.200 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 1>these factors, like once it becomes so cheap to play

0:20:47.800 --> 0:20:51.680
<v Speaker 1>these strategies, do they cease to be useful? Like are

0:20:51.760 --> 0:20:54.600
<v Speaker 1>people who for a long time have been investing these

0:20:54.640 --> 0:20:57.639
<v Speaker 1>in these strategies worried that now that everyone can just

0:20:57.640 --> 0:21:00.280
<v Speaker 1>press a button and instantly get momentum and that of

0:21:00.320 --> 0:21:04.800
<v Speaker 1>having to say find it themselves will ruin the strategy itself. Sure,

0:21:04.920 --> 0:21:08.200
<v Speaker 1>I think that is largely based on the herd mentality

0:21:08.200 --> 0:21:12.040
<v Speaker 1>as well. You know, momentum. Everybody can make money by

0:21:12.080 --> 0:21:14.880
<v Speaker 1>all piling into momentum stuff that's rights work. I see

0:21:14.920 --> 0:21:16.960
<v Speaker 1>it happened with low voltility all the time. Low ball

0:21:17.040 --> 0:21:19.000
<v Speaker 1>has a big ear and then it has a bad

0:21:19.080 --> 0:21:20.520
<v Speaker 1>year and then it has a big year in a

0:21:20.520 --> 0:21:22.560
<v Speaker 1>bad year, and it kind of swings like a pendulum.

0:21:23.040 --> 0:21:25.879
<v Speaker 1>And you actually know how ETFs trying to solve that problem,

0:21:25.880 --> 0:21:28.360
<v Speaker 1>which is called multi factory t f s where they

0:21:28.440 --> 0:21:31.639
<v Speaker 1>switch from the different factors based on market signals. So

0:21:32.280 --> 0:21:34.280
<v Speaker 1>they got all, this is another strand on the smart

0:21:34.359 --> 0:21:37.919
<v Speaker 1>beta evolution line. And so yeah, people are concerned with

0:21:37.960 --> 0:21:40.959
<v Speaker 1>which factor by using when, and but then generally like

0:21:41.000 --> 0:21:44.720
<v Speaker 1>a dividend, DTF dividend is a factor that is something

0:21:44.760 --> 0:21:46.840
<v Speaker 1>that just general retail investors like, they're not trying to

0:21:46.840 --> 0:21:50.600
<v Speaker 1>time anything, they just want dividend. Little less vultility wouldn't

0:21:50.600 --> 0:21:52.879
<v Speaker 1>scrifice a little upside. So some of these factors can

0:21:52.920 --> 0:21:55.040
<v Speaker 1>actually be used in the long term, not just trying

0:21:55.040 --> 0:21:57.320
<v Speaker 1>to play it and beat the market. Let's go back

0:21:57.320 --> 0:21:59.560
<v Speaker 1>to the very beginning of our story, because we had

0:21:59.600 --> 0:22:03.480
<v Speaker 1>the sc SEE put out this report that somehow years

0:22:03.520 --> 0:22:07.879
<v Speaker 1>down the line managed to spawn a huge, huge industry.

0:22:08.480 --> 0:22:10.760
<v Speaker 1>And nowadays we see the SEC talking about e t

0:22:10.920 --> 0:22:14.399
<v Speaker 1>f s in a slightly different light. Right, you've touched

0:22:14.400 --> 0:22:18.080
<v Speaker 1>on it before. We've seen worries and concerns about e

0:22:18.160 --> 0:22:20.840
<v Speaker 1>t f s. Uh, the liquid wrapper that might not

0:22:20.920 --> 0:22:23.479
<v Speaker 1>be suitable for all sorts of assets. Yeah. The the

0:22:23.600 --> 0:22:26.560
<v Speaker 1>SEC has two main areas of focus where they literally

0:22:26.560 --> 0:22:29.760
<v Speaker 1>have written rule proposals. I think that's the most important thing.

0:22:30.200 --> 0:22:33.359
<v Speaker 1>One is on liquidity, right, so they've written some strict

0:22:33.400 --> 0:22:34.760
<v Speaker 1>rules that e t s will have to be able

0:22:34.760 --> 0:22:37.359
<v Speaker 1>to sell off a certain amount of assets that within

0:22:37.480 --> 0:22:40.639
<v Speaker 1>fifteen days. That would affect how you'll bond. ETFs might

0:22:40.680 --> 0:22:43.679
<v Speaker 1>have affected some emerging market funds. Uh, there's gonna be

0:22:43.720 --> 0:22:46.920
<v Speaker 1>some negotiations. Black Rock is lobbying them relentlessly, I'm sure,

0:22:47.240 --> 0:22:49.400
<v Speaker 1>and so the final rule might not be as hardcore

0:22:49.440 --> 0:22:52.000
<v Speaker 1>as the proposal. But that's one and then the other

0:22:52.040 --> 0:22:54.560
<v Speaker 1>one is derivatives. They have a rule that would essentially

0:22:54.560 --> 0:22:57.520
<v Speaker 1>limit the amount of leverage to one fifty, which would

0:22:57.560 --> 0:23:01.120
<v Speaker 1>really at some leverage gts have a way to work

0:23:01.119 --> 0:23:03.320
<v Speaker 1>around it, but largely that would inhibit a lot of

0:23:03.359 --> 0:23:05.480
<v Speaker 1>three times, especially and maybe some of the two times.

0:23:06.000 --> 0:23:08.720
<v Speaker 1>And then beyond that are e t F where they

0:23:08.800 --> 0:23:12.040
<v Speaker 1>move three x the underlying automatically, so you could buy

0:23:12.160 --> 0:23:15.159
<v Speaker 1>a three x financial stocks one and if the banks

0:23:15.280 --> 0:23:17.639
<v Speaker 1>rise one percent in a day, theoretically the e t

0:23:17.800 --> 0:23:20.560
<v Speaker 1>F rises three percent that day. That's right. Every day

0:23:20.640 --> 0:23:22.560
<v Speaker 1>that the three times doesn't work over the long term,

0:23:22.560 --> 0:23:24.280
<v Speaker 1>but per day that that's what they promised. But the

0:23:24.320 --> 0:23:27.120
<v Speaker 1>other two areas that they have looked at was one

0:23:27.200 --> 0:23:30.679
<v Speaker 1>is August last year, which ironically was called Black Monday.

0:23:30.720 --> 0:23:33.480
<v Speaker 1>To right, it was referring to that as Black Monday,

0:23:33.600 --> 0:23:35.840
<v Speaker 1>and uh e t f s were all involved in that,

0:23:35.960 --> 0:23:38.119
<v Speaker 1>and that's why this whole Black Monday to Black Monday.

0:23:38.160 --> 0:23:40.359
<v Speaker 1>It's kind of ironic, h that the e t F

0:23:40.480 --> 0:23:42.399
<v Speaker 1>was designed to kind of counter one Black Monday, and

0:23:42.400 --> 0:23:44.320
<v Speaker 1>there they are in the next one, right, because people

0:23:44.359 --> 0:23:46.520
<v Speaker 1>are concerned about the ability of e t f s

0:23:46.560 --> 0:23:50.640
<v Speaker 1>to actually function and track their underlying stocks and assets

0:23:50.720 --> 0:23:54.320
<v Speaker 1>in an environment of intense volatility. August, though, can be

0:23:54.320 --> 0:23:56.919
<v Speaker 1>explained pretty easily. I've looked into it. It's really about

0:23:56.960 --> 0:24:00.480
<v Speaker 1>the halting that the exchange has so on Black Monday, basically,

0:24:00.680 --> 0:24:04.159
<v Speaker 1>market makers came in, stocks were halted, and if a

0:24:04.200 --> 0:24:07.359
<v Speaker 1>market maker can't figure out the real time value and

0:24:07.400 --> 0:24:10.080
<v Speaker 1>it needs all the stocks prices to figure that value out,

0:24:10.480 --> 0:24:12.000
<v Speaker 1>it has to widen it spread on the e t

0:24:12.119 --> 0:24:13.960
<v Speaker 1>F because it doesn't know where you are. The aps

0:24:14.000 --> 0:24:16.960
<v Speaker 1>in as well, just just in order to protect themselves

0:24:16.960 --> 0:24:19.359
<v Speaker 1>from risks. So a market maker needs to know the

0:24:19.400 --> 0:24:22.200
<v Speaker 1>actual real time, inter day net asset value of the stocks.

0:24:22.200 --> 0:24:24.200
<v Speaker 1>And if all the stocks aren't having pricing because are halted,

0:24:24.720 --> 0:24:26.520
<v Speaker 1>that's a chain reaction that makes it harder for e

0:24:26.600 --> 0:24:28.560
<v Speaker 1>t F to trade. So if you look at Nastact

0:24:28.560 --> 0:24:30.440
<v Speaker 1>that day, e t F traded fine because they didn't

0:24:30.480 --> 0:24:33.200
<v Speaker 1>have the same halting rules that Nicey did, and Bondy

0:24:33.280 --> 0:24:35.720
<v Speaker 1>TF traded fine that day because they weren't halted. So,

0:24:36.080 --> 0:24:39.080
<v Speaker 1>in essence, August was a little bit of a complicated issue,

0:24:39.119 --> 0:24:41.480
<v Speaker 1>but certainly a concern. And then the other fourth area

0:24:41.480 --> 0:24:44.400
<v Speaker 1>that SEC is concerned with is just complex products. We've

0:24:44.400 --> 0:24:46.639
<v Speaker 1>described a little bit today, multi factor e t f s.

0:24:46.720 --> 0:24:48.640
<v Speaker 1>They even brought up the millennial e t F which

0:24:48.640 --> 0:24:52.720
<v Speaker 1>we uh, which you and I know about, that's designed

0:24:52.720 --> 0:24:56.480
<v Speaker 1>to track stocks that theoretically millennials, as they get older

0:24:56.480 --> 0:24:59.040
<v Speaker 1>and spend more money, will do well. Eric, I guess

0:24:59.119 --> 0:25:02.200
<v Speaker 1>the big question and I have, and maybe Joe has

0:25:02.240 --> 0:25:04.760
<v Speaker 1>after listening to all of this, is do you think

0:25:04.760 --> 0:25:07.760
<v Speaker 1>e t f s have been a net positive for

0:25:07.920 --> 0:25:11.520
<v Speaker 1>investors or a net negative? Well, I'm a net positive.

0:25:11.520 --> 0:25:14.240
<v Speaker 1>I've studied hedge funds, mutual funds and clothed and funds.

0:25:14.280 --> 0:25:17.280
<v Speaker 1>I've been in fund data for fifteen years, and when

0:25:17.280 --> 0:25:20.000
<v Speaker 1>I was assigned ETFs in two thousand and six, I

0:25:20.119 --> 0:25:22.320
<v Speaker 1>quickly started to, you know, sniff around them, like, wow,

0:25:22.320 --> 0:25:25.040
<v Speaker 1>these things are really useful. They're they're fully funded and

0:25:25.040 --> 0:25:27.199
<v Speaker 1>approved by the SEC N of the nine gives them

0:25:27.240 --> 0:25:29.800
<v Speaker 1>some security. So I do think their net positive. I

0:25:29.840 --> 0:25:31.760
<v Speaker 1>think I don't think any of the things that I

0:25:31.800 --> 0:25:34.160
<v Speaker 1>just mentioned or the SEC is looking at, is really

0:25:34.200 --> 0:25:36.359
<v Speaker 1>the thing I would be concerned with. I think a

0:25:36.359 --> 0:25:39.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of that is um them reacting to media. Uh,

0:25:39.080 --> 0:25:41.199
<v Speaker 1>there's some concerns there, But the big concern for me

0:25:41.720 --> 0:25:43.840
<v Speaker 1>is I would feel the same way as Bogel does.

0:25:44.359 --> 0:25:46.680
<v Speaker 1>They trade eighteen trillion dollars a year, but they only

0:25:46.680 --> 0:25:50.680
<v Speaker 1>have two trillion assets. That's n turnover. Put that in perspective.

0:25:50.680 --> 0:25:53.160
<v Speaker 1>Stocks only turn over two d and fifty percent a year,

0:25:53.440 --> 0:25:55.239
<v Speaker 1>so E t f s trade three times more. So

0:25:55.640 --> 0:25:57.560
<v Speaker 1>when you trade, all you do is work over money

0:25:57.600 --> 0:26:00.119
<v Speaker 1>to Wall Street. So I think that for investors, if

0:26:00.119 --> 0:26:02.880
<v Speaker 1>they get hooked on trading too much, I think that's

0:26:02.880 --> 0:26:05.080
<v Speaker 1>probably a losing scenario. So that would be my That

0:26:05.080 --> 0:26:08.680
<v Speaker 1>would be maybe the net negative. Structurally, you'd say their

0:26:08.720 --> 0:26:11.679
<v Speaker 1>sound and they are low cost vehicles. But if the

0:26:11.720 --> 0:26:14.640
<v Speaker 1>net result is it people get hooked on trading them,

0:26:14.760 --> 0:26:17.160
<v Speaker 1>that undermines their benefit, is what you're saying, and that

0:26:17.160 --> 0:26:19.479
<v Speaker 1>that's their choice. I just think if a retail investor

0:26:19.560 --> 0:26:22.160
<v Speaker 1>starts trading, like we just talked about millennials loving the

0:26:22.200 --> 0:26:24.680
<v Speaker 1>three x crude oil e T n H, then yeah,

0:26:24.720 --> 0:26:26.359
<v Speaker 1>I think people could get hurt and that would leave

0:26:26.400 --> 0:26:29.000
<v Speaker 1>a bad experience for that customer. We are like so

0:26:29.119 --> 0:26:34.080
<v Speaker 1>into that. Thank you very much. Eric bolcons fascinating discussion.

0:26:34.119 --> 0:26:37.280
<v Speaker 1>Thank you so, Joe. We just learned a whole lot

0:26:37.320 --> 0:26:39.119
<v Speaker 1>about the origins of e t f s. Would you

0:26:39.160 --> 0:26:42.200
<v Speaker 1>think I thought it's fascinating. I mean it, guess when

0:26:42.240 --> 0:26:45.120
<v Speaker 1>it comes to financial products, you just sort of take

0:26:45.160 --> 0:26:48.159
<v Speaker 1>them for granted that they exist sometimes and you forget

0:26:48.160 --> 0:26:51.760
<v Speaker 1>that someone had to invent them, someone had to design

0:26:51.800 --> 0:26:55.399
<v Speaker 1>the mutual funds, someone had to design various structures of

0:26:55.400 --> 0:26:57.560
<v Speaker 1>bonds that exist, and of course et f s are

0:26:57.600 --> 0:27:00.239
<v Speaker 1>no exception. And I love that it was discus ord

0:27:00.320 --> 0:27:04.560
<v Speaker 1>in this gigantic SEC memo that was by mind numbing

0:27:04.600 --> 0:27:07.480
<v Speaker 1>to the vast majority of the population. I really like

0:27:07.560 --> 0:27:10.880
<v Speaker 1>the idea of the whole thing kind of coming full circle.

0:27:11.400 --> 0:27:14.840
<v Speaker 1>We had them spring from this SEC memo, and now

0:27:14.880 --> 0:27:17.240
<v Speaker 1>we see the SEC kind of worried that maybe the

0:27:17.240 --> 0:27:21.160
<v Speaker 1>structure has been applied to things that aren't appropriate for it, right,

0:27:21.240 --> 0:27:23.639
<v Speaker 1>like the idea in the beginning, Okay, we're gonna make

0:27:23.680 --> 0:27:26.439
<v Speaker 1>this incredibly simple product. It's going to be good for

0:27:26.520 --> 0:27:29.800
<v Speaker 1>market stability, very low fees. And now you have these

0:27:29.800 --> 0:27:35.480
<v Speaker 1>incredibly increasingly complex mutual funds, actively manage mutual funds, triple

0:27:35.560 --> 0:27:39.240
<v Speaker 1>lever mutual funds, mutual funds where the underlying assets aren't

0:27:39.240 --> 0:27:41.399
<v Speaker 1>particularly liquid, and now you have all these people like,

0:27:41.440 --> 0:27:44.760
<v Speaker 1>oh what, what, where's this going? E t s for

0:27:44.960 --> 0:27:48.080
<v Speaker 1>every single need you could possibly imagine, And it seems

0:27:48.200 --> 0:27:50.480
<v Speaker 1>like the evolution of E t f s is not

0:27:50.640 --> 0:27:53.560
<v Speaker 1>slowing down anytime soon. So well, I have to check

0:27:53.600 --> 0:27:55.400
<v Speaker 1>back in on this story in ten years and see

0:27:55.400 --> 0:27:58.040
<v Speaker 1>where it is. Yeah, we will, And in the meantime,

0:27:58.160 --> 0:28:00.720
<v Speaker 1>our listeners can go and read the full article over

0:28:00.760 --> 0:28:03.840
<v Speaker 1>in Bloomberg Markets Magazine or on Bloomberg dot com. And

0:28:04.000 --> 0:28:05.639
<v Speaker 1>Eric has a whole book coming out on E t

0:28:05.760 --> 0:28:09.439
<v Speaker 1>F So if you really want to dive more into it,

0:28:09.520 --> 0:28:12.040
<v Speaker 1>you should check out his book for sure. All Right,

0:28:12.160 --> 0:28:14.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm Joe, Why isn't Thal? Thanks for listening to The

0:28:14.640 --> 0:28:17.280
<v Speaker 1>Odd Lots Podcast. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:28:17.320 --> 0:28:19.919
<v Speaker 1>the Stalwart and I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me

0:28:20.000 --> 0:28:23.160
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter at Tracy Alloway and you can also follow

0:28:23.359 --> 0:28:26.280
<v Speaker 1>Eric at Eric Balcunas. Thanks for listening.