1 00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:12,240 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 2 00:00:12,320 --> 00:00:13,720 Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. 3 00:00:13,760 --> 00:00:15,400 Speaker 2: I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 4 00:00:15,440 --> 00:00:18,239 Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and how the 5 00:00:18,320 --> 00:00:21,080 Speaker 1: tech are you? It is time for a classic. 6 00:00:20,640 --> 00:00:23,360 Speaker 2: Episode, and this one is a bit of a sobering one. 7 00:00:23,640 --> 00:00:25,640 Speaker 2: It is called Close but. 8 00:00:25,760 --> 00:00:26,880 Speaker 1: No Nuclear War. 9 00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:30,360 Speaker 2: It originally published on May seventeenth, twenty seventeen, and it's 10 00:00:30,400 --> 00:00:34,199 Speaker 2: all about some close calls the world got into a 11 00:00:34,200 --> 00:00:36,360 Speaker 2: few times over the last few decades. 12 00:00:37,000 --> 00:00:41,080 Speaker 1: Enjoy. Let's go to basic science on this one. So 13 00:00:41,120 --> 00:00:44,000 Speaker 1: I'm going to start fundamental. I know you guys know this, 14 00:00:44,120 --> 00:00:46,160 Speaker 1: but I feel like it's always important to start from 15 00:00:46,159 --> 00:00:49,800 Speaker 1: the base and build your way up. So you probably 16 00:00:49,920 --> 00:00:53,280 Speaker 1: are familiar with this from elementary school science and atom 17 00:00:53,440 --> 00:00:56,760 Speaker 1: consists of a nucleus orbited by one or more electrons, 18 00:00:56,760 --> 00:01:00,720 Speaker 1: and the nucleus contains one or more protons and possibly 19 00:01:00,960 --> 00:01:05,560 Speaker 1: some neutrons. Electrons have a negative charge, protons have a 20 00:01:05,600 --> 00:01:08,440 Speaker 1: positive charge, and neutrons have no charge at all because 21 00:01:08,480 --> 00:01:11,640 Speaker 1: their credit is bad. Now, if you know the rules 22 00:01:12,160 --> 00:01:16,520 Speaker 1: about electromagnetic charges, you remember that opposites attract and the 23 00:01:16,760 --> 00:01:21,640 Speaker 1: same charges repel each other. So that raises a question, 24 00:01:22,160 --> 00:01:25,040 Speaker 1: how can an atom have a nucleus with two or 25 00:01:25,080 --> 00:01:28,319 Speaker 1: more protons in it and not just break apart? If 26 00:01:28,319 --> 00:01:33,720 Speaker 1: you have two positively charged particles sub atomic particles protons 27 00:01:34,440 --> 00:01:36,399 Speaker 1: that close to each other, how come they don't just 28 00:01:36,440 --> 00:01:40,600 Speaker 1: push against each other and the nucleus just pop splits apart. 29 00:01:40,680 --> 00:01:42,600 Speaker 1: And then we would just end up with hydrogen atoms, 30 00:01:42,600 --> 00:01:45,319 Speaker 1: because a hydrogen atom is just a proton and an electron, 31 00:01:45,560 --> 00:01:49,920 Speaker 1: your basic hydrogen atom. That would all make sense, right 32 00:01:50,000 --> 00:01:53,800 Speaker 1: if the entire universe was just hydrogen. Why do we 33 00:01:53,920 --> 00:01:59,080 Speaker 1: have nucleuses or nuclei I should say nuclei with multiple protons. Well, 34 00:01:59,120 --> 00:02:02,240 Speaker 1: to answer this question, we have to turn to the 35 00:02:02,280 --> 00:02:06,400 Speaker 1: Standard Model of physics, which is mostly how we think 36 00:02:06,440 --> 00:02:11,640 Speaker 1: the universe works. Mostly, the Standard model doesn't quite incorporate everything. 37 00:02:11,680 --> 00:02:16,000 Speaker 1: It doesn't explain absolutely everything. Gravity is a big mystery 38 00:02:16,040 --> 00:02:17,800 Speaker 1: with the Standard model. We consider it one of the 39 00:02:17,800 --> 00:02:21,520 Speaker 1: four fundamental forces, but we don't really have all the 40 00:02:21,600 --> 00:02:26,600 Speaker 1: mechanisms explained under the Standard Model of physics. It does, however, 41 00:02:26,639 --> 00:02:28,480 Speaker 1: give us a pretty good idea of what's going on. 42 00:02:28,600 --> 00:02:32,040 Speaker 1: It's held up to lots of experimentation and observations, so 43 00:02:32,080 --> 00:02:35,160 Speaker 1: The standard model says that stuff like protons and neutrons 44 00:02:35,200 --> 00:02:40,240 Speaker 1: are made up of even smaller particles called quarks, which 45 00:02:40,280 --> 00:02:42,440 Speaker 1: is not as I learned the sound made by a Dirk. 46 00:02:43,960 --> 00:02:46,880 Speaker 1: Quarks are the smallest building block we know of right now, 47 00:02:46,919 --> 00:02:49,639 Speaker 1: and you can't split them up into smaller things. That's 48 00:02:49,639 --> 00:02:52,120 Speaker 1: as small as you can get, at least as far 49 00:02:52,280 --> 00:02:56,160 Speaker 1: as we know at the moment. Anyway, there's a force 50 00:02:56,200 --> 00:03:02,160 Speaker 1: that holds these quark particles together to form larger particles 51 00:03:02,160 --> 00:03:06,919 Speaker 1: called hadrons, among which are protons and neutrons. Those are 52 00:03:06,919 --> 00:03:09,840 Speaker 1: both types of hadrons. There are lots and lots of 53 00:03:09,880 --> 00:03:12,840 Speaker 1: other ones as well, and this force is called the 54 00:03:13,000 --> 00:03:17,600 Speaker 1: strong nuclear force. It's also what binds nuclei together so 55 00:03:17,639 --> 00:03:19,680 Speaker 1: that they don't go splitting up all over the place, 56 00:03:20,000 --> 00:03:22,959 Speaker 1: and out of the four fundamental forces of our universe, 57 00:03:23,440 --> 00:03:27,320 Speaker 1: this is the strongest. However, it also takes effect over 58 00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:31,920 Speaker 1: the smallest distance. The range is incredibly small. It's on 59 00:03:31,919 --> 00:03:35,680 Speaker 1: the sub atomic scale, so while it's very strong, it 60 00:03:35,720 --> 00:03:41,320 Speaker 1: doesn't reach very far. There's also a weak nuclear force. 61 00:03:41,680 --> 00:03:45,960 Speaker 1: The physicist Enrico Fermi theorized that the weak nuclear force 62 00:03:46,800 --> 00:03:49,760 Speaker 1: was what he was observing when he saw certain atoms 63 00:03:49,840 --> 00:03:54,080 Speaker 1: undergoing what is called beta decay. Has nothing to do 64 00:03:54,160 --> 00:03:58,760 Speaker 1: with Siamese fish. Beta decay is about a neutron or 65 00:03:58,800 --> 00:04:04,280 Speaker 1: a proton atoms nucleus switching sides. Essentially, a neutron will 66 00:04:04,360 --> 00:04:07,160 Speaker 1: change it into a proton, and it will expel an 67 00:04:07,240 --> 00:04:10,520 Speaker 1: electron in the process, so you've got a neutrally charged particle, 68 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:14,280 Speaker 1: it expels an electron. It becomes positive as a result, 69 00:04:14,440 --> 00:04:17,200 Speaker 1: And to make matters a bit more confusing, we call 70 00:04:17,279 --> 00:04:21,080 Speaker 1: this electron that gets expelled a beta particle, so it 71 00:04:21,160 --> 00:04:25,600 Speaker 1: is an electron, but specifically a beta particle. Another subatomic 72 00:04:25,680 --> 00:04:30,000 Speaker 1: particle also forms in this process. It's called an antineutrino. 73 00:04:31,640 --> 00:04:36,480 Speaker 1: So this type of beta decay is called beta minus decay. However, 74 00:04:36,520 --> 00:04:39,680 Speaker 1: there's also a beta plus decay. That's when you have 75 00:04:39,800 --> 00:04:43,360 Speaker 1: the opposite happen, where a proton becomes a neutron as 76 00:04:43,360 --> 00:04:46,800 Speaker 1: opposed to a neutron becoming a proton. Beta plus decay 77 00:04:47,760 --> 00:04:51,680 Speaker 1: products include not just the brand new neutron. It also 78 00:04:51,720 --> 00:04:56,320 Speaker 1: includes a subatomic particle called a positron and a neutrino. 79 00:04:56,760 --> 00:05:00,359 Speaker 1: So you get antineutrinos and electrons with one, and you 80 00:05:00,360 --> 00:05:04,440 Speaker 1: get positrons and neutrinos, with the other anyway weak. The 81 00:05:04,480 --> 00:05:08,200 Speaker 1: nuclear force explains this process of nuclear decay, this particular 82 00:05:08,240 --> 00:05:10,679 Speaker 1: type of nuclear decay. They're a couple of others as well. 83 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:15,440 Speaker 1: So when atoms decay, one of the byproducts is also energy. 84 00:05:15,480 --> 00:05:18,920 Speaker 1: They give off energy as they decay, they radiate it. 85 00:05:19,200 --> 00:05:23,279 Speaker 1: So this is the source of radiation. That's why we 86 00:05:23,320 --> 00:05:28,800 Speaker 1: call it nuclear radiation. Not all atoms do this because 87 00:05:28,839 --> 00:05:31,360 Speaker 1: some of them are perfectly stable. That means that they're 88 00:05:31,360 --> 00:05:33,680 Speaker 1: not going to decay into some other form because they're 89 00:05:33,720 --> 00:05:38,719 Speaker 1: already stable. They're not there's nothing for them to get 90 00:05:38,960 --> 00:05:41,560 Speaker 1: more stable. It's kind of like if you were to have, 91 00:05:42,680 --> 00:05:47,200 Speaker 1: you know, a stack of things and they fall over 92 00:05:47,600 --> 00:05:50,680 Speaker 1: to a certain point, they're not going to fall anymore 93 00:05:51,440 --> 00:05:53,960 Speaker 1: because they're flat against the ground. That's as far as 94 00:05:54,000 --> 00:05:59,840 Speaker 1: they go. That's kind of the same idea. Now, in 95 00:06:00,080 --> 00:06:03,839 Speaker 1: the case of nuclear weapons, the elements we use, their 96 00:06:03,880 --> 00:06:08,400 Speaker 1: atoms need just the right push in order to have 97 00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:12,520 Speaker 1: their nuclei split, and when that happens, the split nuclei 98 00:06:12,600 --> 00:06:15,919 Speaker 1: shoot off a few neutrons, and that ultimately is the 99 00:06:15,960 --> 00:06:20,480 Speaker 1: secret sauce to nuclear weapons. So here's how it all works. Well, 100 00:06:20,560 --> 00:06:24,400 Speaker 1: let's say you get yourself a whole bunch of a 101 00:06:24,400 --> 00:06:29,600 Speaker 1: particular large, unstable atom. Let's say, for argument's sake, it's oh, 102 00:06:29,680 --> 00:06:33,000 Speaker 1: I don't know, uranium two thirty five, which is essentially 103 00:06:33,040 --> 00:06:39,320 Speaker 1: weaponized uranium. It also actually it's out there in nature. 104 00:06:39,360 --> 00:06:41,719 Speaker 1: It is not the most common form of uranium in 105 00:06:41,800 --> 00:06:47,560 Speaker 1: nature because it is by its very nature unstable. It 106 00:06:47,600 --> 00:06:51,320 Speaker 1: will decay on its own over a very long period 107 00:06:51,400 --> 00:06:54,400 Speaker 1: of time. The more common form of uranium in nature 108 00:06:54,440 --> 00:06:57,479 Speaker 1: is uranium two thirty eight, but for weapons you want 109 00:06:57,600 --> 00:07:03,039 Speaker 1: uranium two thirty five. It's an isope of uranium. Isotopes 110 00:07:03,080 --> 00:07:05,760 Speaker 1: are forms of an element that have the same number 111 00:07:05,760 --> 00:07:08,400 Speaker 1: of protons, because if you change the number of protons, 112 00:07:08,440 --> 00:07:11,600 Speaker 1: you change the element itself, so it has to have 113 00:07:11,640 --> 00:07:14,560 Speaker 1: the exact same number of protons from isotope to isotope, 114 00:07:14,560 --> 00:07:19,760 Speaker 1: but has a different number of neutrons. So, as another example, 115 00:07:19,880 --> 00:07:23,280 Speaker 1: carbon twelve is a type of carbon that has six 116 00:07:23,360 --> 00:07:27,440 Speaker 1: protons and six neutrons. Carbon fourteen is different. It's got 117 00:07:27,480 --> 00:07:32,080 Speaker 1: six protons and eight neutrons. It's also radioactive, meaning it 118 00:07:32,120 --> 00:07:36,000 Speaker 1: will decay into a more stable form or another a 119 00:07:36,000 --> 00:07:38,400 Speaker 1: more stable atom, and give off energy in that process 120 00:07:38,440 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 1: as well. As some neutrons. So uranium two thirty five 121 00:07:42,280 --> 00:07:46,000 Speaker 1: has ninety two protons and one hundred forty three neutrons. 122 00:07:46,760 --> 00:07:49,000 Speaker 1: The half life of uranium two thirty five is seven 123 00:07:49,080 --> 00:07:54,760 Speaker 1: hundred million years now half life. What that means is 124 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:57,400 Speaker 1: that if you had a chunk of uranium two thirty five, 125 00:07:57,720 --> 00:07:59,400 Speaker 1: so you've got a whole bunch of these uranium two 126 00:07:59,440 --> 00:08:04,200 Speaker 1: thirty five atoms, it's statistically probable that after seven hundred 127 00:08:04,240 --> 00:08:07,600 Speaker 1: million years past, half of those atoms would decay have 128 00:08:07,720 --> 00:08:12,280 Speaker 1: decayed to other more stable atoms. Statistically speaking, this is 129 00:08:12,320 --> 00:08:17,280 Speaker 1: all about probability, not about a definite future. That's the 130 00:08:17,320 --> 00:08:20,960 Speaker 1: thing you have to remember about half life. It's about probability, 131 00:08:21,120 --> 00:08:26,120 Speaker 1: not definitive outcomes. Uranium two thirty eight, that more common 132 00:08:26,200 --> 00:08:28,680 Speaker 1: form of uranium I talked about, has a half life 133 00:08:28,680 --> 00:08:33,160 Speaker 1: of four point five billion years. So while uranium two 134 00:08:33,200 --> 00:08:35,520 Speaker 1: thirty five is seven hundred million years half life, that's 135 00:08:35,559 --> 00:08:39,360 Speaker 1: a long long time, I mean, particularly for human species. Right, 136 00:08:39,440 --> 00:08:42,760 Speaker 1: four point five billion years leaves it in the dust. 137 00:08:43,920 --> 00:08:46,800 Speaker 1: All right, So back to uranium two thirty five. Fermine 138 00:08:46,960 --> 00:08:50,840 Speaker 1: was able to create a controlled nuclear reaction using uranium 139 00:08:50,840 --> 00:08:52,480 Speaker 1: two thirty five. So what he did was he took 140 00:08:52,520 --> 00:08:56,199 Speaker 1: a He took low speed neutrons and fired them at 141 00:08:56,400 --> 00:08:59,160 Speaker 1: atoms of uranium two thirty five in order to break 142 00:08:59,200 --> 00:09:04,280 Speaker 1: the isotope part splitting it. That's what we call nuclear fission. 143 00:09:04,720 --> 00:09:08,480 Speaker 1: We're splitting an atom. In this process, the atom gives 144 00:09:08,520 --> 00:09:12,440 Speaker 1: off heat and radiation as well as generating new atoms. Right, 145 00:09:12,520 --> 00:09:17,079 Speaker 1: because you split it into two or more components. Also 146 00:09:17,120 --> 00:09:19,840 Speaker 1: in that process, it shoots off some extra neutrons, so 147 00:09:19,880 --> 00:09:23,160 Speaker 1: those go spinning off. Now that means that if you 148 00:09:23,280 --> 00:09:25,720 Speaker 1: had enough uranium two thirty five, and you had a 149 00:09:25,800 --> 00:09:28,920 Speaker 1: means of making sure those neutrons that gave off could 150 00:09:28,960 --> 00:09:33,439 Speaker 1: hit those other atoms of uranium two thirty five, you 151 00:09:33,520 --> 00:09:38,120 Speaker 1: could continue this reaction. It becomes a chain reaction. The 152 00:09:38,240 --> 00:09:41,679 Speaker 1: neutrons that get fired off hit other uranium two thirty 153 00:09:41,679 --> 00:09:47,479 Speaker 1: five atoms, which then produce more free neutrons flying outward, 154 00:09:47,559 --> 00:09:50,120 Speaker 1: which can hit more uranium two thirty five atoms, and 155 00:09:50,120 --> 00:09:52,400 Speaker 1: so on and so forth. And each time you're doing this, 156 00:09:52,400 --> 00:09:55,280 Speaker 1: it's generating more and more heat and energy and radiation. 157 00:09:56,360 --> 00:09:57,960 Speaker 1: And thus, if you were to do this in an 158 00:09:58,040 --> 00:10:01,000 Speaker 1: uncontrolled way, you get a bomb. If you do it 159 00:10:01,040 --> 00:10:03,760 Speaker 1: in a controlled way, you can have a nuclear power plant. 160 00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:07,840 Speaker 1: Our power plants are based off nuclear fission because that's 161 00:10:07,880 --> 00:10:12,080 Speaker 1: the type of nuclear power we have found to be sustainable. 162 00:10:12,360 --> 00:10:16,319 Speaker 1: Right now, there's a real push to make nuclear fusion 163 00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:21,160 Speaker 1: a sustainable means of generating electricity, but right now it 164 00:10:21,240 --> 00:10:24,480 Speaker 1: is very difficult to create a sustainable version of that. 165 00:10:24,520 --> 00:10:29,040 Speaker 1: We can we can start nuclear fusion, but generally speaking, 166 00:10:29,320 --> 00:10:31,960 Speaker 1: we tend to put as much or more energy into 167 00:10:32,000 --> 00:10:34,960 Speaker 1: the system as we're getting out of it, and so 168 00:10:35,160 --> 00:10:37,800 Speaker 1: that doesn't really work if you want a sustainable form 169 00:10:37,840 --> 00:10:42,400 Speaker 1: of generating electricity. If you're spending more than you take in, 170 00:10:43,440 --> 00:10:49,960 Speaker 1: you go broke eventually. Anyway, this uncontrolled chain reaction could 171 00:10:50,000 --> 00:10:52,960 Speaker 1: be more of a bomb situation, although to be fair, 172 00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:57,120 Speaker 1: in nuclear weapons it's still very much a controlled system. 173 00:10:57,520 --> 00:11:00,640 Speaker 1: It's just controlled in a way to release annormous amount 174 00:11:00,679 --> 00:11:02,920 Speaker 1: of energy in a very destructive way. 175 00:11:03,160 --> 00:11:06,800 Speaker 2: We'll be back with more about close calls with nuclear war, 176 00:11:07,280 --> 00:11:09,920 Speaker 2: a fun filled topic after these quick messages. 177 00:11:19,679 --> 00:11:23,200 Speaker 1: Now, this requires enriched uranium. It requires a lot of 178 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:26,400 Speaker 1: uranium two thirty five. You need a really high concentration 179 00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:29,560 Speaker 1: of uranium two thirty five because uranium two thirty eight 180 00:11:29,640 --> 00:11:34,720 Speaker 1: doesn't accept neutrons as readily. So if you shoot neutrons 181 00:11:34,800 --> 00:11:37,760 Speaker 1: at uranium two thirty five, you're it's much easier to 182 00:11:37,800 --> 00:11:39,880 Speaker 1: split that than if you were to fire it off 183 00:11:39,880 --> 00:11:43,800 Speaker 1: at uranium two thirty eight. So weapons grade uranium is 184 00:11:43,800 --> 00:11:47,959 Speaker 1: typically about ninety percent uranium two thirty five. This is 185 00:11:48,000 --> 00:11:51,280 Speaker 1: a much higher concentration than you would find out in nature. 186 00:11:52,440 --> 00:11:54,640 Speaker 1: So with these nuclear bombs, you have to make sure 187 00:11:54,679 --> 00:11:58,760 Speaker 1: that the fuel is kept in separate subcritical masses to 188 00:11:58,800 --> 00:12:03,320 Speaker 1: prevent premature detonation. So you obviously don't want this thing 189 00:12:03,360 --> 00:12:05,600 Speaker 1: to go off before you intend it to, or else 190 00:12:05,640 --> 00:12:09,040 Speaker 1: you're going to destroy yourself. To make it explode, you 191 00:12:09,080 --> 00:12:11,920 Speaker 1: need the bomb to achieve what is called critical mass. 192 00:12:13,000 --> 00:12:15,400 Speaker 1: This is the minimum amount of mass you need of 193 00:12:15,480 --> 00:12:19,520 Speaker 1: fissionable material to create a nuclear chain reaction sufficient enough 194 00:12:19,520 --> 00:12:23,080 Speaker 1: to act as a weapon. So over at HowStuffWorks dot Com, 195 00:12:23,120 --> 00:12:26,000 Speaker 1: we have an article all about this about how nuclear 196 00:12:26,040 --> 00:12:30,360 Speaker 1: weapons work, and it contains a really helpful analogy. It says, 197 00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:33,839 Speaker 1: imagine that the fissionable material, the stuff that you are 198 00:12:33,880 --> 00:12:37,760 Speaker 1: going to split, is represented as a bunch of marbles 199 00:12:37,840 --> 00:12:41,120 Speaker 1: inside a circle. If the marbles are really close together, 200 00:12:41,400 --> 00:12:43,679 Speaker 1: then you shoot a marble into that circle, it's going 201 00:12:43,720 --> 00:12:45,680 Speaker 1: to hit against a couple of other marbles. If you've 202 00:12:45,760 --> 00:12:48,600 Speaker 1: used enough force, it's going to create a little chain reaction. 203 00:12:49,040 --> 00:12:52,160 Speaker 1: That's what we're talking about with fissionable material and a 204 00:12:52,240 --> 00:12:55,880 Speaker 1: nuclear bomb. But if you fire a marble off into 205 00:12:55,880 --> 00:12:58,800 Speaker 1: a circle and all the individual marbles are further apart 206 00:12:58,840 --> 00:13:01,520 Speaker 1: from each other, it's less likely that you're going to 207 00:13:01,559 --> 00:13:05,360 Speaker 1: be able to set off that nuclear chain reaction because 208 00:13:05,720 --> 00:13:09,720 Speaker 1: even if you hit another marble, it's far enough away 209 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:14,240 Speaker 1: from its fellow marbles that you're not likely to make 210 00:13:14,280 --> 00:13:19,920 Speaker 1: it a consistent, persistent nuclear chain reaction. And so that's 211 00:13:19,960 --> 00:13:23,640 Speaker 1: really the difference between critical and subcritical masses. Now. To 212 00:13:23,679 --> 00:13:27,679 Speaker 1: start the whole reaction, nuclear weapons typically use a pellet 213 00:13:27,720 --> 00:13:31,680 Speaker 1: of polonium and beryllium separated by a piece of foil. 214 00:13:32,760 --> 00:13:35,360 Speaker 1: When the subcritical masses come together, as in when a 215 00:13:35,400 --> 00:13:37,800 Speaker 1: bomb is set to detonate, and more about that in 216 00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:41,800 Speaker 1: a second, it causes the polonium to emit alpha particles, 217 00:13:42,240 --> 00:13:45,400 Speaker 1: and an alpha particle, in case you're curious, is a 218 00:13:45,480 --> 00:13:47,880 Speaker 1: pair of protons and a pair of neutrons that are 219 00:13:47,880 --> 00:13:52,319 Speaker 1: bound together. The alpha particles make contact with a beryllium, 220 00:13:52,559 --> 00:13:56,199 Speaker 1: which cause it to transform into an isotope of beryllium 221 00:13:56,240 --> 00:14:00,400 Speaker 1: and emit neutrons. So the beryllium changes into a different 222 00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:03,400 Speaker 1: type of beryllium, a different isotope of beryllium, and it 223 00:14:03,440 --> 00:14:06,680 Speaker 1: ejects these neutrons as part of it. Those ejected neutrons 224 00:14:06,679 --> 00:14:09,439 Speaker 1: then become the starting point for the nuclear chain reaction. 225 00:14:11,400 --> 00:14:17,760 Speaker 1: Now surrounding your enriched uranium two thirty five is a 226 00:14:17,880 --> 00:14:22,880 Speaker 1: casing called a tamper. That's what's designed to contain the 227 00:14:23,000 --> 00:14:25,880 Speaker 1: energy of the nuclear fission until it's time to release 228 00:14:25,960 --> 00:14:30,040 Speaker 1: it in the form of the nuclear explosion. And typically 229 00:14:30,120 --> 00:14:34,000 Speaker 1: it's uranium two thirty eight that ends up redirecting those 230 00:14:34,040 --> 00:14:37,120 Speaker 1: free neutrons back into the core so that they can 231 00:14:37,520 --> 00:14:42,600 Speaker 1: more efficiently impact other uranium two thirty five atoms, and 232 00:14:42,640 --> 00:14:45,680 Speaker 1: it aids in the continuation of fission. The more fissionable 233 00:14:45,720 --> 00:14:48,760 Speaker 1: material gets activated, the more efficient the bomb is, and 234 00:14:48,760 --> 00:14:52,640 Speaker 1: the bigger the explosion you get as a result. Now, 235 00:14:52,680 --> 00:14:55,360 Speaker 1: one way to detonate a nuclear weapon is with the 236 00:14:55,480 --> 00:15:00,560 Speaker 1: uranium bullet method. So typically you have the tamper, which 237 00:15:01,600 --> 00:15:04,200 Speaker 1: you know as this container of some sort kind of 238 00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:06,400 Speaker 1: like it's usually kind of a cylinder shape because you're 239 00:15:06,440 --> 00:15:09,360 Speaker 1: fitting it inside a larger form factor of a bomb, 240 00:15:09,960 --> 00:15:12,840 Speaker 1: and that's what's made of uranium two thirty eight. Inside 241 00:15:12,840 --> 00:15:16,640 Speaker 1: of this you have a sphere of uranium two thirty five, 242 00:15:16,680 --> 00:15:20,720 Speaker 1: and in the center of the sphere is your neutron generator, 243 00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:23,840 Speaker 1: in other words, your little pellet of polonium and brillium. 244 00:15:25,040 --> 00:15:28,480 Speaker 1: You've got a tube leading down into the center of 245 00:15:28,560 --> 00:15:31,760 Speaker 1: the sphere. At the other end of the tube are 246 00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:35,240 Speaker 1: some explosives, and inside the tube is a bullet of 247 00:15:35,400 --> 00:15:39,200 Speaker 1: uranium two thirty five. So when it's time to detonate 248 00:15:39,240 --> 00:15:43,480 Speaker 1: the bomb, you explode the explosives. These are conventional explosives, 249 00:15:43,480 --> 00:15:47,360 Speaker 1: not nuclear explosives. That propels the uranium two thirty five 250 00:15:47,400 --> 00:15:51,960 Speaker 1: bullet and a very high rate down the tube, colliding 251 00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:57,880 Speaker 1: with the pellet and thus initiating the neutron generator, which 252 00:15:57,880 --> 00:16:02,560 Speaker 1: shoots out neutrons and thus starts to fission the uranium 253 00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:09,200 Speaker 1: two thirty five. This fissioning activity happens in an instant, 254 00:16:09,360 --> 00:16:11,960 Speaker 1: like the fraction of a fraction of a fraction of 255 00:16:12,000 --> 00:16:14,920 Speaker 1: a second, but in that fraction each time this is 256 00:16:14,960 --> 00:16:18,680 Speaker 1: happening so so fast that energy builds and builds and 257 00:16:18,680 --> 00:16:20,640 Speaker 1: builds and builds, until it's greater than what the bomb 258 00:16:20,720 --> 00:16:27,040 Speaker 1: itself can contain. And then it explodes. It takes place 259 00:16:28,480 --> 00:16:34,840 Speaker 1: so fast that it's like billions of a second. You 260 00:16:34,920 --> 00:16:38,080 Speaker 1: want to be super careful with that, obviously, because it's 261 00:16:38,160 --> 00:16:41,960 Speaker 1: a massive amount of destruction. Now, there's another method for 262 00:16:42,080 --> 00:16:47,720 Speaker 1: detonating a nuclear weapon called the implosion method, in which 263 00:16:47,800 --> 00:16:51,320 Speaker 1: high explosives around the tamper. So again that uranium two 264 00:16:51,320 --> 00:16:58,040 Speaker 1: thirty eight, typically explosive surrounding it create a powerful shock 265 00:16:58,080 --> 00:17:01,200 Speaker 1: wave when they go off. So the explosive go off 266 00:17:01,640 --> 00:17:07,640 Speaker 1: creates a shockwave generated into the center of this that 267 00:17:07,720 --> 00:17:11,640 Speaker 1: compresses the tamper and thus compresses the fissionable core inside 268 00:17:11,680 --> 00:17:15,080 Speaker 1: the tamper, and that triggers the fissioning reaction, and you 269 00:17:15,160 --> 00:17:18,960 Speaker 1: get the same result as the one I mentioned earlier. Now, 270 00:17:19,000 --> 00:17:22,280 Speaker 1: in World War Two, we dropped two atomic bombs. We 271 00:17:22,400 --> 00:17:25,280 Speaker 1: the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. One 272 00:17:25,320 --> 00:17:28,840 Speaker 1: of them called Little Boy, and that was a uranium 273 00:17:28,840 --> 00:17:31,439 Speaker 1: bullet style bomb. The other was called Fat Man, and 274 00:17:31,480 --> 00:17:34,360 Speaker 1: that was an implosion style bomb, and it also used 275 00:17:34,359 --> 00:17:37,639 Speaker 1: plutonium two thirty nine as its core, not uranium, but 276 00:17:37,680 --> 00:17:42,159 Speaker 1: plutonium two thirty nine. Later, a guy named Edward Teller, 277 00:17:42,200 --> 00:17:45,760 Speaker 1: who we've talked about on tech stuff before, improved the 278 00:17:45,880 --> 00:17:49,960 Speaker 1: yield of nuclear weapons using what is called the boosting method. 279 00:17:50,760 --> 00:17:55,920 Speaker 1: This combines fusion reactions with fission bombs. The fusion reactions 280 00:17:55,960 --> 00:18:00,440 Speaker 1: would create the neutrons which then would trigger the fission 281 00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:04,320 Speaker 1: reactions at a really high rate, so more efficiently, so 282 00:18:04,359 --> 00:18:08,680 Speaker 1: you get more of the fissionable material to split, thus 283 00:18:08,720 --> 00:18:12,720 Speaker 1: generating more energy, and nearly ninety percent of American nuclear 284 00:18:12,760 --> 00:18:16,680 Speaker 1: weapons follow that particular design. But then you've also got 285 00:18:16,800 --> 00:18:20,200 Speaker 1: fusion bombs. Now, fusion is when you fuse two atoms 286 00:18:20,240 --> 00:18:23,479 Speaker 1: together and you still get a big release of energy 287 00:18:23,560 --> 00:18:31,200 Speaker 1: in this process. Essentially, these bombs fuse hydrogen isotopes including 288 00:18:31,640 --> 00:18:36,320 Speaker 1: deuterium and tritium together and that ends up releasing an 289 00:18:36,440 --> 00:18:38,679 Speaker 1: enormous amount of energy. So to explode a bomb of 290 00:18:38,760 --> 00:18:42,440 Speaker 1: this type, you reverse the roles of fusion and fission. 291 00:18:42,720 --> 00:18:44,480 Speaker 1: You know, I just mentioned that to make a really 292 00:18:44,920 --> 00:18:48,640 Speaker 1: efficient fission bomb, you could incorporate fusion into it as 293 00:18:48,640 --> 00:18:51,000 Speaker 1: well well. In this case, you're talking about using fission 294 00:18:51,080 --> 00:18:54,520 Speaker 1: reactions in order to fuel a fusion reaction, which will 295 00:18:54,560 --> 00:18:59,320 Speaker 1: generate the massive amount of energy for the bomb. So 296 00:18:59,400 --> 00:19:03,439 Speaker 1: the fission bomb would create an implosion shockwave, kind of 297 00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:06,680 Speaker 1: like the explosives I talked about in the previous example 298 00:19:06,720 --> 00:19:11,280 Speaker 1: with fat Man, and in that shockwave you would also 299 00:19:11,280 --> 00:19:13,639 Speaker 1: get a release of X rays. That's one of the 300 00:19:13,680 --> 00:19:16,160 Speaker 1: types of energy you would get as a release from 301 00:19:16,400 --> 00:19:20,280 Speaker 1: a fission reaction. The X rays will end up heating 302 00:19:20,320 --> 00:19:23,200 Speaker 1: the tamper, which you still have, just like you would 303 00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:25,920 Speaker 1: with the other types of nuclear weapons, and that would 304 00:19:25,960 --> 00:19:29,760 Speaker 1: still be uranium two thirty eight typically inside of which 305 00:19:29,840 --> 00:19:34,000 Speaker 1: is a fuel of lithium deuteride, and that would end 306 00:19:34,080 --> 00:19:36,000 Speaker 1: up heating up because of the X rays. The X 307 00:19:36,080 --> 00:19:40,240 Speaker 1: rays heat up the lithium deuteride. The shockwave would compress 308 00:19:40,320 --> 00:19:42,920 Speaker 1: the lithium deuteride by a factor of like thirty It's 309 00:19:43,040 --> 00:19:47,600 Speaker 1: crazy how compressed it gets. And also inside the tamper 310 00:19:47,640 --> 00:19:50,920 Speaker 1: is a plutonium rod which would start to fission as 311 00:19:50,920 --> 00:19:53,680 Speaker 1: a result of all this, and that would release more 312 00:19:53,720 --> 00:19:57,760 Speaker 1: heat more neutrons. Those neutrons would combine with the compressed 313 00:19:57,800 --> 00:20:02,560 Speaker 1: lithium deuteride to fuel to create tritium, so you would 314 00:20:02,640 --> 00:20:06,680 Speaker 1: then have enough temperature and pressure to support fusion reactions. 315 00:20:06,720 --> 00:20:10,000 Speaker 1: That's one of the problems with nuclear fusion power plants 316 00:20:10,400 --> 00:20:12,800 Speaker 1: is that you have to create such an intense amount 317 00:20:12,920 --> 00:20:16,120 Speaker 1: of pressure and temperature that the energy you pour in 318 00:20:16,440 --> 00:20:19,320 Speaker 1: is equal to or greater than the energy you're getting 319 00:20:19,359 --> 00:20:23,000 Speaker 1: out of the actual fusion. Well, in a bomb, that's 320 00:20:23,040 --> 00:20:25,760 Speaker 1: not so much a concern. You want to generate as 321 00:20:25,840 --> 00:20:27,960 Speaker 1: much of this heat and pressure as you possibly can, 322 00:20:28,880 --> 00:20:32,960 Speaker 1: so because the fission reactions are creating that tremendous amount 323 00:20:33,200 --> 00:20:36,080 Speaker 1: of heat and pressure, nuclear fusion can actually occur, and 324 00:20:36,119 --> 00:20:41,159 Speaker 1: you start getting tritium deuterium and deuterium deuterium reactions, and 325 00:20:41,160 --> 00:20:44,520 Speaker 1: that generates even more heat and more radiation, which is 326 00:20:44,640 --> 00:20:48,120 Speaker 1: enough to induce fission in the uranium two thirty eight tamper. 327 00:20:49,720 --> 00:20:52,919 Speaker 1: So remember the uranium two thirty eight tamper doesn't typically 328 00:20:53,400 --> 00:20:57,439 Speaker 1: fission in most of these bombs, it requires so much 329 00:20:57,560 --> 00:20:59,840 Speaker 1: energy to do that. But these fusion bombs can actually 330 00:21:00,080 --> 00:21:02,600 Speaker 1: eat that kind of energy. The combination of all that 331 00:21:02,720 --> 00:21:06,199 Speaker 1: energy is enormous, and then the bomb explodes, releasing it 332 00:21:06,600 --> 00:21:11,359 Speaker 1: into the environment. Now, at the point of explosion, you 333 00:21:11,400 --> 00:21:16,439 Speaker 1: would easily imagine there's an intense release of an incredible 334 00:21:16,440 --> 00:21:19,840 Speaker 1: amount of heat, and the blast also creates a really 335 00:21:19,880 --> 00:21:22,760 Speaker 1: powerful pressure wave moving outward from the point of explosion. 336 00:21:23,720 --> 00:21:27,199 Speaker 1: Then on top of that, you've got the radiation, the 337 00:21:27,320 --> 00:21:30,680 Speaker 1: energy being radiated out like gamma rays and other very 338 00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:34,720 Speaker 1: harmful forms of radiation, followed by radiation fallout, which is 339 00:21:34,760 --> 00:21:41,080 Speaker 1: typically radioactive dust and debris that originated inside the bomb itself. 340 00:21:42,920 --> 00:21:46,520 Speaker 1: Stuff close to the hypocenter, which is another term for 341 00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:51,720 Speaker 1: ground zero, would be vaporized because of the temperatures involved. 342 00:21:51,760 --> 00:21:55,760 Speaker 1: We're talking three hundred million degrees celsius or five hundred 343 00:21:55,840 --> 00:22:00,840 Speaker 1: million degrees fahrenheit. Further out from the center, the pressure 344 00:22:00,840 --> 00:22:05,000 Speaker 1: wave could cause entire buildings to collapse because it's so powerful, 345 00:22:05,400 --> 00:22:09,040 Speaker 1: and the heat is still intense enough to cause fatalities. 346 00:22:09,080 --> 00:22:12,280 Speaker 1: It's hot enough to burn people alive even if you're 347 00:22:12,280 --> 00:22:15,600 Speaker 1: not right there at the point of explosion. The further 348 00:22:15,640 --> 00:22:19,680 Speaker 1: out you go, the less effect those initial events will have. 349 00:22:19,800 --> 00:22:22,480 Speaker 1: The heat will become less intense the further out, The 350 00:22:22,520 --> 00:22:25,520 Speaker 1: pressure wave less effective further out, but there are a 351 00:22:25,560 --> 00:22:29,320 Speaker 1: lot of secondary problems that could still be life threatening, 352 00:22:29,359 --> 00:22:33,480 Speaker 1: including things like fallout, radiation fallouts going to spread really 353 00:22:33,520 --> 00:22:36,919 Speaker 1: far and will continue to spread based upon prevailing winds 354 00:22:36,920 --> 00:22:40,600 Speaker 1: of the area, and also stuff like fires. The heat 355 00:22:40,680 --> 00:22:42,320 Speaker 1: is going to be hot enough to generate a lot 356 00:22:42,320 --> 00:22:44,600 Speaker 1: of fires in a lot of areas, and that could 357 00:22:44,640 --> 00:22:51,679 Speaker 1: end up being a very prevalent and immediate danger to you. 358 00:22:53,359 --> 00:23:01,520 Speaker 1: So that's cheerful. Right. Nuclear weapons are terrifying, There's no 359 00:23:01,640 --> 00:23:05,200 Speaker 1: question about it. They can wak devastation greater than anything 360 00:23:05,280 --> 00:23:08,680 Speaker 1: humans have ever witnessed. And since World War Two, many 361 00:23:08,800 --> 00:23:11,320 Speaker 1: have worked really hard to make sure no more nuclear 362 00:23:11,320 --> 00:23:14,760 Speaker 1: weapons see use ever again. But we've had a whole 363 00:23:14,800 --> 00:23:18,800 Speaker 1: lot of close calls, and I'm gonna go more into 364 00:23:18,880 --> 00:23:21,800 Speaker 1: that in just a minute, but first, let's take a 365 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:33,280 Speaker 1: quick break to thank our sponsor. All Right, We're gonna 366 00:23:33,320 --> 00:23:39,719 Speaker 1: start with probably the closest we've ever been to getting 367 00:23:39,760 --> 00:23:46,000 Speaker 1: into a full on nuclear confrontation. There were other events 368 00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:48,240 Speaker 1: that happened before this, and there are other events that 369 00:23:48,280 --> 00:23:50,520 Speaker 1: happened after this, and I'll cover some of those later on, 370 00:23:50,600 --> 00:23:53,840 Speaker 1: but let's start with the granddaddy, the big one. That 371 00:23:53,880 --> 00:23:58,160 Speaker 1: would be October nineteen sixty two, when the United States 372 00:23:58,280 --> 00:24:02,400 Speaker 1: of America and the then Soviet Union were at the 373 00:24:02,440 --> 00:24:05,880 Speaker 1: height of the Cold War. So you had these two 374 00:24:05,960 --> 00:24:09,680 Speaker 1: powerful countries standing in opposition to each other, and both 375 00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:13,359 Speaker 1: were building up their respective militaries and arsenals in an 376 00:24:13,359 --> 00:24:16,080 Speaker 1: effort to stay on top or at least not fall 377 00:24:16,160 --> 00:24:21,760 Speaker 1: behind their great rival. It's a pretty terrifying time for everybody, 378 00:24:22,040 --> 00:24:24,720 Speaker 1: whether you lived in the Soviet Union or the United 379 00:24:24,720 --> 00:24:28,520 Speaker 1: States or one of countless other nations that felt helpless 380 00:24:28,560 --> 00:24:34,160 Speaker 1: because these two giants were posturing against each other. And 381 00:24:35,440 --> 00:24:37,960 Speaker 1: one could argue, we're sort of returning to that kind 382 00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:40,520 Speaker 1: of world now, but that's really a discussion for a 383 00:24:40,560 --> 00:24:44,720 Speaker 1: different show anyway. In October nineteen sixty two, an event 384 00:24:44,760 --> 00:24:49,440 Speaker 1: called the Cuban Missile Crisis happened. This was a nuclear 385 00:24:49,560 --> 00:24:52,440 Speaker 1: game of chess between the White House and the Kremlin, 386 00:24:53,200 --> 00:24:55,359 Speaker 1: and it was the closest the United States and the 387 00:24:55,440 --> 00:24:59,480 Speaker 1: USSR ever got to a full fledged nuclear conflict on 388 00:24:59,560 --> 00:25:04,399 Speaker 1: both sides. This at least, this was the closest anyone 389 00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:09,680 Speaker 1: got that wasn't the creation of a computational error. More 390 00:25:09,720 --> 00:25:12,000 Speaker 1: on those types of close calls in a little bit. 391 00:25:13,480 --> 00:25:15,520 Speaker 1: So to catch you guys up on some history in 392 00:25:15,560 --> 00:25:18,840 Speaker 1: case you don't know about the Cuban Missile crisis, the 393 00:25:18,880 --> 00:25:22,600 Speaker 1: government in Cuba was Communist and that was something that 394 00:25:22,600 --> 00:25:26,359 Speaker 1: made the United States government really nervous. So the US 395 00:25:26,400 --> 00:25:30,320 Speaker 1: attempted to overthrow the Cuban government. But that was a 396 00:25:30,320 --> 00:25:33,640 Speaker 1: total disaster. That was the Bay of Pigs invasion, as 397 00:25:33,640 --> 00:25:37,880 Speaker 1: well as some other events that were around that time. Meanwhile, 398 00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:41,879 Speaker 1: the Soviet Union had reached an agreement with Cuba. The 399 00:25:41,920 --> 00:25:47,200 Speaker 1: Soviet Union would install nuclear missiles and nuclear aircraft nuclear 400 00:25:47,240 --> 00:25:51,640 Speaker 1: capable aircraft in Cuba as a deterrent to US invasions, 401 00:25:52,040 --> 00:25:54,439 Speaker 1: and it would also serve as a handy launchpad for 402 00:25:54,520 --> 00:25:57,200 Speaker 1: a strike against the US should things devolve into a 403 00:25:57,280 --> 00:26:01,000 Speaker 1: nuclear war. Now, the United States got wind of that plan, 404 00:26:01,720 --> 00:26:05,240 Speaker 1: and President Kennedy issued a warning to the Soviet Union 405 00:26:05,359 --> 00:26:09,360 Speaker 1: and essentially said, hey, stop putting stuff in Cuba. Man, 406 00:26:09,920 --> 00:26:15,600 Speaker 1: it's not cool, especially nuclear stuff, all right. On October fourteenth, 407 00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:19,600 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, American spy aircraft captured images of what 408 00:26:19,720 --> 00:26:24,640 Speaker 1: was clearly medium and intermediate range ballistic nuclear missile sites 409 00:26:24,760 --> 00:26:28,400 Speaker 1: under construction in Cuba, and they were close to being finished. 410 00:26:28,680 --> 00:26:31,280 Speaker 1: They were on the fast track, and thus the Cuban 411 00:26:31,320 --> 00:26:36,480 Speaker 1: Missile crisis was born. Kennedy ordered what he called a 412 00:26:36,600 --> 00:26:41,000 Speaker 1: naval quarantine on Cuba on October twenty second. Now this 413 00:26:41,160 --> 00:26:44,679 Speaker 1: was essentially a blockade, except they didn't call it a blockade. 414 00:26:44,760 --> 00:26:48,000 Speaker 1: They gave it the name quarantine because blockade suggests an 415 00:26:48,040 --> 00:26:50,760 Speaker 1: act of war, and they didn't want that to be 416 00:26:50,880 --> 00:26:53,879 Speaker 1: the case. And it's amazing to me how word choice 417 00:26:53,880 --> 00:26:57,040 Speaker 1: can somehow make two things that are essentially the same 418 00:26:57,680 --> 00:27:02,240 Speaker 1: legally distinct. But I digress. The Soviet Union wasn't just 419 00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:05,240 Speaker 1: trying to poke the United States in this case. It 420 00:27:05,280 --> 00:27:08,359 Speaker 1: wasn't just an instance of them saying we're trying to 421 00:27:08,400 --> 00:27:11,560 Speaker 1: get the edge on you. The Soviets were concerned because 422 00:27:11,560 --> 00:27:15,600 Speaker 1: the United States had Jupiter missile systems stationed in Turkey, 423 00:27:16,680 --> 00:27:19,840 Speaker 1: so they were within striking range of the Soviet Union, 424 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:24,160 Speaker 1: and the Soviet Union wanted those missiles out of Turkey. 425 00:27:25,359 --> 00:27:28,919 Speaker 1: Installing missiles in Cuba would kind of level things out, 426 00:27:29,840 --> 00:27:36,520 Speaker 1: but simultaneous, simultaneously rather escalate tensions, you know that super fun, 427 00:27:36,560 --> 00:27:40,840 Speaker 1: awesome combo. So while you had the president of the 428 00:27:40,920 --> 00:27:43,680 Speaker 1: United States and the premiere of the Soviet Union arguing 429 00:27:43,880 --> 00:27:46,000 Speaker 1: with each other and trying to convince each other to 430 00:27:46,080 --> 00:27:51,040 Speaker 1: back off, things were getting really really tense around and 431 00:27:51,160 --> 00:27:55,760 Speaker 1: inside Cuba. And what most folks didn't know for a 432 00:27:55,800 --> 00:27:59,320 Speaker 1: really long time was that the area around Cuba was 433 00:27:59,400 --> 00:28:05,440 Speaker 1: host to four secret submarines. Soviet submarines armed with nuclear 434 00:28:05,520 --> 00:28:10,240 Speaker 1: tipped torpedoes, and these submarines were told to use those 435 00:28:10,359 --> 00:28:15,119 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons in the event that the Americans attacked Cuba 436 00:28:15,160 --> 00:28:18,760 Speaker 1: and attempt another invasion, which was an option that the 437 00:28:18,760 --> 00:28:21,959 Speaker 1: White House was seriously considering at the time, and several 438 00:28:21,960 --> 00:28:27,120 Speaker 1: of the President's advisors were actually advocating for an air 439 00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:30,600 Speaker 1: strike against Cuba. So imagine if that air strike had happened, 440 00:28:31,080 --> 00:28:35,080 Speaker 1: and these submarine commanders were following orders that would have 441 00:28:35,200 --> 00:28:39,640 Speaker 1: initiated a nuclear strike against the United States, and then 442 00:28:39,720 --> 00:28:44,640 Speaker 1: October twenty seventh, nineteen sixty two happened. So conditions were 443 00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:48,480 Speaker 1: not great. Cuba, in case you're not aware, is much 444 00:28:48,520 --> 00:28:52,680 Speaker 1: warmer than the USSR, and the submarines were ill equipped 445 00:28:52,720 --> 00:28:56,520 Speaker 1: to deal with that heat. They ran on diesel engines, 446 00:28:57,160 --> 00:29:00,600 Speaker 1: and they had battery power as well, and accasionally they 447 00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:03,880 Speaker 1: would have to resurface to recharge their batteries. The air 448 00:29:03,880 --> 00:29:06,680 Speaker 1: conditioning systems were not very good on these submarines, and 449 00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:09,720 Speaker 1: they would fail pretty frequently, so it would get stiflingly 450 00:29:09,880 --> 00:29:13,320 Speaker 1: hot and stuffy inside of them. And then you had 451 00:29:13,400 --> 00:29:18,880 Speaker 1: this constant tension of aggression surrounding these crews, plus the 452 00:29:18,920 --> 00:29:22,200 Speaker 1: directive that you were to launch a nuclear attack against 453 00:29:23,160 --> 00:29:25,800 Speaker 1: one of the most powerful nations on the planet in 454 00:29:25,840 --> 00:29:30,080 Speaker 1: the event of any sort of military aggression against Cuba, 455 00:29:31,480 --> 00:29:35,480 Speaker 1: and it was pretty much a cocktail for disaster. On 456 00:29:35,560 --> 00:29:38,120 Speaker 1: top of that, you would know that any attack you 457 00:29:38,160 --> 00:29:42,160 Speaker 1: made against the United States would be returned against the 458 00:29:42,200 --> 00:29:45,640 Speaker 1: Soviet Union, there would be a retaliatory strike, and that 459 00:29:45,680 --> 00:29:49,920 Speaker 1: this would initiate a full global conflict. So it was 460 00:29:50,400 --> 00:29:55,560 Speaker 1: serious business. Now. Making matters worse than that, as if 461 00:29:55,640 --> 00:29:57,800 Speaker 1: you can imagine such a thing, was the fact that 462 00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:02,080 Speaker 1: the Soviet subs didn't have any con tact with their headquarters. 463 00:30:02,160 --> 00:30:05,680 Speaker 1: They could not get in contact with Moscow. The best 464 00:30:05,720 --> 00:30:09,400 Speaker 1: they could manage was picking up radio signals from a 465 00:30:09,440 --> 00:30:14,120 Speaker 1: civilian broadcast station in Florida, So they're getting all their 466 00:30:14,200 --> 00:30:18,880 Speaker 1: news from a US source in Florida, not from headquarters. 467 00:30:20,640 --> 00:30:25,080 Speaker 1: American forces eventually spotted the submarines, so they did what 468 00:30:25,480 --> 00:30:30,520 Speaker 1: was under the rules for Americans at the time, which 469 00:30:30,600 --> 00:30:34,080 Speaker 1: was if they spotted submarines in the area, they set 470 00:30:34,120 --> 00:30:40,360 Speaker 1: off signaling charges. Now, signaling charge is an explosive, so 471 00:30:40,400 --> 00:30:44,239 Speaker 1: they were setting off explosives in the ocean near the submarines. Now, 472 00:30:44,280 --> 00:30:46,960 Speaker 1: the purpose of the explosions was not to cause any 473 00:30:47,040 --> 00:30:49,640 Speaker 1: damage to the submarines. They were supposed to be harmless, 474 00:30:49,680 --> 00:30:51,400 Speaker 1: and in fact they were in this case harmless. They 475 00:30:51,400 --> 00:30:54,160 Speaker 1: did not cause damage to the submarines. What they're supposed 476 00:30:54,200 --> 00:30:56,560 Speaker 1: to do is essentially be the equivalent of knocking on 477 00:30:56,640 --> 00:31:00,640 Speaker 1: someone's door saying, hey, I know your home. Come to 478 00:31:00,680 --> 00:31:03,320 Speaker 1: the door, except in this case it's hey, I know 479 00:31:03,360 --> 00:31:08,000 Speaker 1: you're in there surface, because otherwise we're going to consider 480 00:31:08,040 --> 00:31:13,720 Speaker 1: it a threat. So obviously increasing tensions even further. So 481 00:31:14,160 --> 00:31:17,520 Speaker 1: you would imagine that setting explosions off near nuclear armed 482 00:31:17,560 --> 00:31:21,440 Speaker 1: submarines is potentially a disastrous idea, and it could have been. 483 00:31:21,800 --> 00:31:24,920 Speaker 1: But no one fired any nuclear weapons at that stage, 484 00:31:24,920 --> 00:31:29,560 Speaker 1: and that's amazing. It was super close. Tensions could not 485 00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:34,680 Speaker 1: have been higher without any actual fighting U but no 486 00:31:34,760 --> 00:31:39,760 Speaker 1: one pulled the trigger on that. Now, the US had 487 00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:43,040 Speaker 1: moved to def Con three earlier in October. So deaf 488 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:47,240 Speaker 1: con stands for defense condition, and there are five levels 489 00:31:47,440 --> 00:31:49,960 Speaker 1: of deaf con and they get worse the lower the 490 00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:56,040 Speaker 1: number is, so Defcon five is the best. Defcon one 491 00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:59,360 Speaker 1: is the most dangerous. So the lower the number, the 492 00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:03,000 Speaker 1: closer the un US is to maximum combat readiness. So 493 00:32:03,040 --> 00:32:05,400 Speaker 1: In other words, Defcon one means the US is ready 494 00:32:05,440 --> 00:32:09,560 Speaker 1: to commit some massive military power in an act of war. 495 00:32:11,240 --> 00:32:16,800 Speaker 1: Level three means increase enforce readiness above normal readiness. So 496 00:32:16,920 --> 00:32:19,240 Speaker 1: that was the level they were at earlier in October, 497 00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:23,520 Speaker 1: was an increased level of readiness. As I recorded this, 498 00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:28,320 Speaker 1: we stand at Defcon four. Defcon four means normal increased 499 00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:33,800 Speaker 1: intelligence and strengthened security measures, so normal readiness, but we're 500 00:32:33,840 --> 00:32:36,920 Speaker 1: paying way more attention than we would be at Defcon five. 501 00:32:37,760 --> 00:32:42,240 Speaker 1: Defcon five just means normal peacetime readiness. Sure would be 502 00:32:42,320 --> 00:32:45,160 Speaker 1: nice to be there, but for the United States, the 503 00:32:45,200 --> 00:32:49,520 Speaker 1: actions of North Korea and Russia recently have made this complicated. 504 00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:52,200 Speaker 1: So we've been at Defcon four, oh in China two 505 00:32:52,160 --> 00:32:56,840 Speaker 1: to some extent. Anyway, by October twenty seventh, the United 506 00:32:56,840 --> 00:33:00,360 Speaker 1: States had decided to bump this up to Defcon level two, 507 00:33:01,600 --> 00:33:04,960 Speaker 1: which is further increase in force readiness but less than 508 00:33:05,040 --> 00:33:10,680 Speaker 1: maximum readiness, which I don't know how you determined that. 509 00:33:11,080 --> 00:33:13,400 Speaker 1: If you just ask people, Hey, are you guys ready, 510 00:33:13,600 --> 00:33:15,360 Speaker 1: And if they say yes, and you say are you 511 00:33:15,400 --> 00:33:17,320 Speaker 1: as ready as you can be and they say no, 512 00:33:17,680 --> 00:33:23,040 Speaker 1: then I guess maybe that's it. Anyway, I would say, 513 00:33:23,240 --> 00:33:25,600 Speaker 1: if we were to translate this, this would come into 514 00:33:26,560 --> 00:33:29,280 Speaker 1: you know, yo hold me back, bro level. That would 515 00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:31,760 Speaker 1: be essentially what Defcon level two is is YO hold 516 00:33:31,760 --> 00:33:34,200 Speaker 1: me back. So you're ready to swing your fist, but 517 00:33:34,240 --> 00:33:38,360 Speaker 1: you're not actively swinging your fist. And it shows that 518 00:33:38,360 --> 00:33:41,720 Speaker 1: the tensions were really at a high point. So it 519 00:33:41,800 --> 00:33:44,680 Speaker 1: was not a sure thing that cooler heads would actually 520 00:33:44,760 --> 00:33:48,200 Speaker 1: prevail on that day in October on those Soviet submarines. 521 00:33:48,880 --> 00:33:51,400 Speaker 1: I'm thankful they did, though, but it was never a 522 00:33:51,440 --> 00:33:56,440 Speaker 1: sure thing. Now, in the end, Soviets remove their missiles 523 00:33:56,480 --> 00:34:00,200 Speaker 1: and bombers from Cuba and later the United States of 524 00:34:00,240 --> 00:34:04,239 Speaker 1: their Jupiter missile installations from Turkey, and apparently that had 525 00:34:04,240 --> 00:34:06,080 Speaker 1: been the plan the whole time. The United States was 526 00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:09,960 Speaker 1: already planning on removing those missile installations in Turkey, which 527 00:34:10,080 --> 00:34:13,040 Speaker 1: was one of the demands the Soviet Union had had, saying, hey, 528 00:34:13,520 --> 00:34:14,960 Speaker 1: if we're going to pull out a Cuba, you got 529 00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:19,359 Speaker 1: to pull out Turkey. But the US didn't agree upon 530 00:34:19,400 --> 00:34:23,160 Speaker 1: it as a point of negotiation, even though they had 531 00:34:23,200 --> 00:34:28,520 Speaker 1: already planned on doing that. So that was interesting that 532 00:34:28,560 --> 00:34:31,319 Speaker 1: the US had planned on removing those missiles, but they 533 00:34:31,400 --> 00:34:33,560 Speaker 1: did not agree to having that be part of the 534 00:34:33,640 --> 00:34:38,480 Speaker 1: terms to settle this crisis, maybe because it might have 535 00:34:38,560 --> 00:34:41,279 Speaker 1: made the country look weak or something. I don't know. 536 00:34:41,320 --> 00:34:44,560 Speaker 1: I don't pretend to understand global politics. The point is 537 00:34:44,600 --> 00:34:47,759 Speaker 1: that both the United States and the USSR backed off 538 00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:50,640 Speaker 1: from the button and opened up a channel of communication 539 00:34:50,719 --> 00:34:53,759 Speaker 1: that still exists to this day, this hotline between the 540 00:34:54,400 --> 00:34:57,200 Speaker 1: Kremlin and the White House, though there are times when 541 00:34:57,239 --> 00:35:01,560 Speaker 1: one site isn't that eager to take the other side's calls. Oh, 542 00:35:01,600 --> 00:35:03,600 Speaker 1: and by backed off, I don't mean that things calmed 543 00:35:03,680 --> 00:35:07,480 Speaker 1: down right away. The US Strategic Air Command or SAC 544 00:35:08,080 --> 00:35:11,280 Speaker 1: remained at deaf Con two from October twenty third, nineteen 545 00:35:11,360 --> 00:35:16,120 Speaker 1: sixty two to November fifteenth, nineteen sixty five, so more 546 00:35:16,160 --> 00:35:20,680 Speaker 1: than three years. Only then did it quote unquote posture 547 00:35:20,800 --> 00:35:26,200 Speaker 1: down to deaf Con three because it was scary. Now. 548 00:35:26,239 --> 00:35:28,319 Speaker 1: I recorded a few other shows that also tie into 549 00:35:28,360 --> 00:35:32,120 Speaker 1: this same era in various ways. For example, the space 550 00:35:32,239 --> 00:35:36,640 Speaker 1: race was largely an extension of the Cold War. In fact, 551 00:35:36,680 --> 00:35:38,719 Speaker 1: you could argue that without the Cold War we never 552 00:35:38,719 --> 00:35:41,840 Speaker 1: would have been to the moon. Both the Soviet Union 553 00:35:41,920 --> 00:35:44,879 Speaker 1: and the United States were racing to send people into 554 00:35:44,960 --> 00:35:47,640 Speaker 1: space and to the moon, and it was in part 555 00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:50,880 Speaker 1: an effort to prove that they that their country was 556 00:35:50,920 --> 00:35:54,640 Speaker 1: technologically superior to the rival country. But there was also 557 00:35:54,680 --> 00:35:58,440 Speaker 1: an element of intimidation involved. So essentially, if you could 558 00:35:58,480 --> 00:36:01,920 Speaker 1: send a rocket into orbit, you could also send a 559 00:36:02,040 --> 00:36:05,279 Speaker 1: rocket all the way around the Earth and hit a 560 00:36:05,360 --> 00:36:08,880 Speaker 1: target on the other side, like say the United States 561 00:36:08,880 --> 00:36:11,000 Speaker 1: from the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union from the 562 00:36:11,080 --> 00:36:15,480 Speaker 1: United States. So in part, the space race was a 563 00:36:15,520 --> 00:36:20,360 Speaker 1: way of saying, hey, we have the capability of wiping 564 00:36:20,400 --> 00:36:24,640 Speaker 1: you off the planet, so don't push us. The thing 565 00:36:24,800 --> 00:36:30,320 Speaker 1: was both sides were making that argument at the same time. Again, 566 00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:33,520 Speaker 1: absolutely terrifying, although we got some awesome stuff out of it. 567 00:36:33,600 --> 00:36:36,319 Speaker 1: I mean, the space race gave us tons of technology 568 00:36:36,520 --> 00:36:40,560 Speaker 1: and pushed our scientific understanding of our solar system quite 569 00:36:40,560 --> 00:36:43,840 Speaker 1: a bit, so it's not like it was all bad, 570 00:36:44,320 --> 00:36:49,520 Speaker 1: but the motivations behind it were largely motivated by politics 571 00:36:49,560 --> 00:36:54,839 Speaker 1: and military goals. Luckily we were able to leverage that 572 00:36:55,200 --> 00:37:02,640 Speaker 1: into ways that were not indirectly connected to conflict. But yeah, 573 00:37:03,000 --> 00:37:08,279 Speaker 1: once the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into orbit. Sputnik was 574 00:37:08,600 --> 00:37:11,839 Speaker 1: the satellite, the first man made satellite in orbit around 575 00:37:11,880 --> 00:37:14,960 Speaker 1: the Earth. All it did was really beep, but amateur 576 00:37:15,320 --> 00:37:17,880 Speaker 1: radio operators in the United States picked up the beeping, 577 00:37:17,960 --> 00:37:21,320 Speaker 1: and it caused quite a bit of panic because suddenly 578 00:37:21,360 --> 00:37:24,080 Speaker 1: everyone realized that if the Soviet Union could launch something 579 00:37:24,120 --> 00:37:26,600 Speaker 1: into orbit, they could probably launch something all the way 580 00:37:26,760 --> 00:37:32,040 Speaker 1: to the United States. The innerconnal in the intercontinental Ballistic 581 00:37:32,080 --> 00:37:38,560 Speaker 1: missile or ICBM was essentially born at that point. Anyway, 582 00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:41,640 Speaker 1: let's go back to close calls with nuclear war, because 583 00:37:41,640 --> 00:37:43,480 Speaker 1: that's really what we're here to talk about. And let's 584 00:37:43,560 --> 00:37:47,279 Speaker 1: jump ahead to November ninth, nineteen seventy nine. That's when 585 00:37:47,320 --> 00:37:51,400 Speaker 1: the North American Aerospace Defense Headquarters, or NORAD for short, 586 00:37:51,800 --> 00:37:56,319 Speaker 1: went bonkers. I would say that they went ballistic, but 587 00:37:56,400 --> 00:37:59,200 Speaker 1: luckily they didn't, because that would have been a terrible, 588 00:37:59,320 --> 00:38:04,520 Speaker 1: terrifying punt. In that case, according to the computer systems 589 00:38:04,560 --> 00:38:08,040 Speaker 1: over at NOORAD, a huge missile attack from the Soviet 590 00:38:08,160 --> 00:38:11,440 Speaker 1: Union was on its way to targets within the United States. 591 00:38:11,880 --> 00:38:14,919 Speaker 1: And this is what we often in the technology world 592 00:38:14,960 --> 00:38:18,080 Speaker 1: would call a bad thing. So nor AD was following 593 00:38:18,120 --> 00:38:20,800 Speaker 1: protocol and they sent an alert to high level command 594 00:38:20,880 --> 00:38:24,279 Speaker 1: posts and the tippy top of US military leadership, and 595 00:38:24,320 --> 00:38:28,480 Speaker 1: immediately the command was given to put ICBM crews on 596 00:38:28,520 --> 00:38:33,640 Speaker 1: the highest possible alert, and nuclear bomber crews were scrambled 597 00:38:33,680 --> 00:38:37,520 Speaker 1: to their aircraft to prepare for takeoff. The airborne command Post, 598 00:38:37,760 --> 00:38:40,239 Speaker 1: which is the aircraft that the President of the United 599 00:38:40,239 --> 00:38:43,000 Speaker 1: States is supposed to be a board in the event 600 00:38:43,080 --> 00:38:46,400 Speaker 1: of a massive attack. This is what creates a mobile 601 00:38:46,680 --> 00:38:50,800 Speaker 1: base of operations. It took off, so the airborne Command 602 00:38:50,840 --> 00:38:54,640 Speaker 1: Post took off into the atmosphere. The President wasn't on 603 00:38:54,680 --> 00:38:57,160 Speaker 1: it at the time, which seems like a bit of 604 00:38:57,200 --> 00:39:01,879 Speaker 1: an oversight, but it did take off. So for more 605 00:39:01,960 --> 00:39:07,160 Speaker 1: than five incredibly tense minutes, United States operators were scouring 606 00:39:07,239 --> 00:39:11,360 Speaker 1: satellite data to confirm that the Soviets had indeed launched 607 00:39:11,480 --> 00:39:15,480 Speaker 1: missiles against the United States. They had the information from 608 00:39:15,520 --> 00:39:21,120 Speaker 1: the NORAD computers, but they wanted, obviously to confirm that 609 00:39:21,160 --> 00:39:25,440 Speaker 1: information with satellite data, but they couldn't find any data 610 00:39:25,480 --> 00:39:30,279 Speaker 1: to confirm it. United States leaders decided magnanimously not to 611 00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:33,120 Speaker 1: launch a full scale retaliation, which is a good thing 612 00:39:33,160 --> 00:39:35,960 Speaker 1: because it would have turned out that they would have 613 00:39:36,000 --> 00:39:39,360 Speaker 1: been committing a first strike. There was nothing to retaliate against. 614 00:39:40,600 --> 00:39:43,440 Speaker 1: So what the heck actually happened? And the answer is 615 00:39:43,480 --> 00:39:47,960 Speaker 1: pretty crazy, and it sounds like something from a movie 616 00:39:48,040 --> 00:39:50,960 Speaker 1: like Airplane. It sounds like a deleted scene from a 617 00:39:52,200 --> 00:39:56,520 Speaker 1: disaster spoof movie. What had happened was a technician had 618 00:39:56,600 --> 00:40:01,120 Speaker 1: inserted a training tape into an operational nor AD computer. 619 00:40:02,200 --> 00:40:07,200 Speaker 1: The training tape contained various scenarios on it, including one 620 00:40:07,239 --> 00:40:10,400 Speaker 1: in which the Soviet Union launches a full scale missile 621 00:40:10,400 --> 00:40:13,799 Speaker 1: attack against the United States. And this was just to 622 00:40:13,920 --> 00:40:16,839 Speaker 1: run simulations, to run what would happen in this case 623 00:40:16,880 --> 00:40:20,160 Speaker 1: and how effective would a retaliatory strike be. That's all 624 00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:22,640 Speaker 1: it was. But it was being run on an operational 625 00:40:22,680 --> 00:40:26,080 Speaker 1: nor AD computer, which interpreted this to mean the Soviet 626 00:40:26,120 --> 00:40:28,880 Speaker 1: Union had actually launched an attack, not that it was 627 00:40:28,880 --> 00:40:34,040 Speaker 1: a simulation. So a training tape very nearly started World 628 00:40:34,040 --> 00:40:38,600 Speaker 1: War Three. In nineteen seventy nine, the United States wisely 629 00:40:38,640 --> 00:40:42,120 Speaker 1: decided that it would be a really good idea to 630 00:40:42,160 --> 00:40:44,480 Speaker 1: make sure nor AD computers would not be able to 631 00:40:44,560 --> 00:40:48,920 Speaker 1: run training tapes in the future, and so they NERFD it. Essentially, 632 00:40:48,960 --> 00:40:53,239 Speaker 1: they removed that ability for nor AD computers to run 633 00:40:53,320 --> 00:40:57,200 Speaker 1: these simulations. Now, I've got a lot more to talk 634 00:40:57,239 --> 00:40:59,840 Speaker 1: about as far as FOSSE alarms and close calls go. 635 00:41:00,080 --> 00:41:02,440 Speaker 1: But before I jump into that, last section. Let's take 636 00:41:02,440 --> 00:41:14,319 Speaker 1: another quick break to thank our sponsor. So these sort 637 00:41:14,360 --> 00:41:18,200 Speaker 1: of things happen really rarely, right, please. 638 00:41:19,360 --> 00:41:19,440 Speaker 2: Not. 639 00:41:19,560 --> 00:41:23,480 Speaker 1: According to Marshall Shulman, who was a State Department advisor, 640 00:41:23,840 --> 00:41:27,080 Speaker 1: he said that false alerts would happen fairly regularly, which 641 00:41:27,120 --> 00:41:31,440 Speaker 1: is absolutely terrifying, and in fact said they happen regularly 642 00:41:31,600 --> 00:41:35,280 Speaker 1: enough that handling them almost became a matter of routine, 643 00:41:35,360 --> 00:41:38,399 Speaker 1: which is troubling all by itself. And that's what Shulman said. 644 00:41:38,400 --> 00:41:41,680 Speaker 1: He said, it's almost terrifying to see the level of 645 00:41:41,719 --> 00:41:45,440 Speaker 1: complacency in dealing with these because they happened that frequently. 646 00:41:46,520 --> 00:41:49,560 Speaker 1: I mean, you want your team to respond calmly in 647 00:41:49,640 --> 00:41:53,080 Speaker 1: the wake of an alert because you want to make 648 00:41:53,120 --> 00:41:56,280 Speaker 1: sure that they are going through the steps to verify 649 00:41:56,400 --> 00:41:59,640 Speaker 1: that it is in fact at what it seems to be. 650 00:42:00,080 --> 00:42:04,120 Speaker 1: You don't want them acting on misinformation. At the same time, 651 00:42:04,560 --> 00:42:06,839 Speaker 1: you don't want them to fall victim to boy who 652 00:42:06,840 --> 00:42:10,680 Speaker 1: cried Wolfe scenarios where they don't take it seriously enough. 653 00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:13,680 Speaker 1: So you want to balance there, and according to Shulman, 654 00:42:13,960 --> 00:42:18,280 Speaker 1: the complacency issue was getting to be a bit troubling 655 00:42:18,320 --> 00:42:22,120 Speaker 1: for him. Now, just so you don't go thinking that 656 00:42:22,160 --> 00:42:26,200 Speaker 1: the United States was alone and having faulty systems. Let 657 00:42:26,200 --> 00:42:29,240 Speaker 1: me tell you about September twenty sixth, nineteen eighty three. 658 00:42:30,040 --> 00:42:32,840 Speaker 1: That is when a Soviet satellite, part of an early 659 00:42:32,920 --> 00:42:37,040 Speaker 1: detection system for missile launches, sent down a message indicating 660 00:42:37,080 --> 00:42:41,160 Speaker 1: the United States had fired a nuclear missile, and then 661 00:42:41,200 --> 00:42:46,799 Speaker 1: another nuclear missile, and then three more nuclear missiles, so 662 00:42:47,239 --> 00:42:50,280 Speaker 1: it might have looked like an initial attack with five 663 00:42:50,360 --> 00:42:55,040 Speaker 1: missiles heading toward the Soviet Union. Now, tensions were already 664 00:42:55,160 --> 00:42:59,239 Speaker 1: high across the Soviet Union and the United States for 665 00:42:59,360 --> 00:43:04,600 Speaker 1: other reasons. Earlier that month, the Soviet Union had shot 666 00:43:04,680 --> 00:43:09,279 Speaker 1: down a South Korean passenger plane thinking that it was 667 00:43:09,400 --> 00:43:12,239 Speaker 1: a military plane invading their airspace, and that's not what 668 00:43:12,320 --> 00:43:17,040 Speaker 1: it was. So it was a tragic accident. But there 669 00:43:17,080 --> 00:43:18,840 Speaker 1: was also a lot of worry that the United States 670 00:43:18,840 --> 00:43:24,120 Speaker 1: could potentially retaliate for this, and so the first reaction 671 00:43:24,200 --> 00:43:26,520 Speaker 1: could have been that this was the US's response to 672 00:43:26,719 --> 00:43:31,719 Speaker 1: that act. Now, the man in charge over at a 673 00:43:32,480 --> 00:43:36,440 Speaker 1: early detection center in the Soviet Union was Lieutenant Colonel 674 00:43:36,480 --> 00:43:40,520 Speaker 1: Stanislav Petrov, and he held the authority to launch a 675 00:43:40,520 --> 00:43:45,879 Speaker 1: retaliatory strike, but he didn't exercise this authority he deduced 676 00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:49,680 Speaker 1: that a genuine attack on the Soviet Union from the 677 00:43:49,760 --> 00:43:53,360 Speaker 1: United States would involve hundreds of missiles, not just five. 678 00:43:54,040 --> 00:43:56,160 Speaker 1: He said, if you're going to start a war, you 679 00:43:56,200 --> 00:44:00,359 Speaker 1: wouldn't launch only five missiles. It wouldn't be an enough 680 00:44:00,920 --> 00:44:03,800 Speaker 1: of a quantity to knock out enough of the Soviet 681 00:44:03,880 --> 00:44:07,560 Speaker 1: Union's capability to retaliate, so it would just be inviting 682 00:44:07,600 --> 00:44:12,880 Speaker 1: worldwide destruction. So Petrov said, I'm pretty sure this isn't real. 683 00:44:13,560 --> 00:44:16,319 Speaker 1: I'm gonna stake my life and my reputation on it, 684 00:44:17,040 --> 00:44:20,839 Speaker 1: and he was right. So then they began to investigate 685 00:44:20,920 --> 00:44:25,080 Speaker 1: what was the cause of this false alarm, because that 686 00:44:25,200 --> 00:44:29,160 Speaker 1: is what it turned out to be. So the cause 687 00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:33,279 Speaker 1: was the satellite itself. It had misidentified a reflection from 688 00:44:33,320 --> 00:44:36,839 Speaker 1: the top of some clouds. The sun was hitting these 689 00:44:36,880 --> 00:44:39,759 Speaker 1: clouds at just the right angle for the reflection to 690 00:44:39,840 --> 00:44:43,440 Speaker 1: hit the satellite, and the position the orientation of the 691 00:44:43,440 --> 00:44:46,120 Speaker 1: satellite with respect to the United States made it look 692 00:44:46,200 --> 00:44:50,600 Speaker 1: like this was coming from known US missile launch sites, 693 00:44:51,440 --> 00:44:57,560 Speaker 1: So the satellite misidentified the reflections as missile launches, and 694 00:44:57,600 --> 00:45:00,880 Speaker 1: really the satellite was in a good orbit to avoid 695 00:45:00,960 --> 00:45:04,520 Speaker 1: this kind of misunderstanding. The problem was it was just 696 00:45:04,560 --> 00:45:09,360 Speaker 1: the perfect set of circumstances. It was the equinox, the 697 00:45:09,440 --> 00:45:12,440 Speaker 1: sun was setting, and the satellite was in a position 698 00:45:12,480 --> 00:45:14,560 Speaker 1: at just the right time with clouds in the right 699 00:45:14,600 --> 00:45:19,720 Speaker 1: position to cause this confusion. And normally it wouldn't have happened, 700 00:45:19,760 --> 00:45:21,960 Speaker 1: and any other time of the year, the angles wouldn't 701 00:45:21,960 --> 00:45:26,360 Speaker 1: have been right. It was just a coincidence. Fortunately, because 702 00:45:26,440 --> 00:45:29,680 Speaker 1: there was a human being in charge who had the 703 00:45:29,840 --> 00:45:34,840 Speaker 1: capacity to question the results presented by the satellite, we 704 00:45:34,960 --> 00:45:38,440 Speaker 1: didn't see a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union launched 705 00:45:38,440 --> 00:45:43,640 Speaker 1: at the United States as a result. Sometimes a science 706 00:45:43,680 --> 00:45:46,799 Speaker 1: experiment runs the risk of plunging us into nuclear conflict, 707 00:45:47,480 --> 00:45:52,120 Speaker 1: so that's exciting. So for example, there was the Black 708 00:45:52,200 --> 00:45:55,800 Speaker 1: Brant twelve rocket, which was a cooperative effort between the 709 00:45:55,880 --> 00:46:00,880 Speaker 1: United States and Norway. It launched out of Norway along 710 00:46:00,920 --> 00:46:04,719 Speaker 1: the coastline of Norway, and it had a mission to 711 00:46:05,000 --> 00:46:08,720 Speaker 1: send up a probe essentially to study the northern lights, 712 00:46:08,800 --> 00:46:14,400 Speaker 1: the Aurora borealis. Norway had picked up the phone to 713 00:46:14,480 --> 00:46:17,759 Speaker 1: call up their Russian neighbors and say, hey, by the way, 714 00:46:17,760 --> 00:46:21,239 Speaker 1: we're going to launch this satellite, so don't freak out, 715 00:46:21,880 --> 00:46:23,560 Speaker 1: but we're going to do it on such and such 716 00:46:23,560 --> 00:46:26,839 Speaker 1: a day, at such and such a time, and so 717 00:46:26,960 --> 00:46:30,280 Speaker 1: Russia knew about this. The only problem was that information 718 00:46:30,440 --> 00:46:33,800 Speaker 1: never got to the people in charge of the early 719 00:46:33,840 --> 00:46:38,480 Speaker 1: warning detection systems, so they had no knowledge of a 720 00:46:38,600 --> 00:46:46,800 Speaker 1: planned scientific rocket launch. Instead, they had radar detectors looking 721 00:46:46,920 --> 00:46:50,600 Speaker 1: at their screens and saying, it appears that a missile 722 00:46:50,680 --> 00:46:54,680 Speaker 1: has launched, potentially from a United States submarine and on 723 00:46:54,719 --> 00:46:57,520 Speaker 1: a trajectory that could take it to the Soviet Union. 724 00:46:58,880 --> 00:47:03,760 Speaker 1: So there was immediately a reaction that this could potentially 725 00:47:03,800 --> 00:47:07,000 Speaker 1: be an early attack, and in fact there was worry 726 00:47:07,000 --> 00:47:09,799 Speaker 1: that perhaps this was a warhead meant to explode to 727 00:47:09,920 --> 00:47:15,759 Speaker 1: knockout radar detection so that we can then have an 728 00:47:15,960 --> 00:47:19,280 Speaker 1: entire full blown attack follow it and the radar systems 729 00:47:19,280 --> 00:47:23,719 Speaker 1: would be down. In the meantime, the word went up 730 00:47:23,760 --> 00:47:26,759 Speaker 1: to the Krivlin and Boris Yeltsin went so far as 731 00:47:26,800 --> 00:47:30,480 Speaker 1: to activate his nuclear football. The nuclear football is a 732 00:47:30,480 --> 00:47:36,719 Speaker 1: device that leaders used to authorize a nuclear strike. Other 733 00:47:36,840 --> 00:47:41,000 Speaker 1: radar centers and Russian satellites couldn't find any evidence of 734 00:47:41,040 --> 00:47:45,520 Speaker 1: any other missile preparations, so there was no other corroborating 735 00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:48,400 Speaker 1: evidence to suggest that this was in fact a legitimate 736 00:47:49,120 --> 00:47:52,399 Speaker 1: missile strike aimed at the United States. So this led 737 00:47:52,400 --> 00:47:55,600 Speaker 1: the Russians to conclude it wasn't actually an attack, and 738 00:47:55,680 --> 00:47:58,560 Speaker 1: eventually the word got out that this was a scientific 739 00:47:58,600 --> 00:48:03,879 Speaker 1: mission that had previous authorization and that Russia had been 740 00:48:04,120 --> 00:48:06,719 Speaker 1: in communication with Norway the whole time. It just never 741 00:48:06,760 --> 00:48:11,279 Speaker 1: got to the military side. Whoopsie Daisy almost went to 742 00:48:11,280 --> 00:48:15,000 Speaker 1: full nuclear war over that. And you probably heard the 743 00:48:15,000 --> 00:48:18,319 Speaker 1: story about how a flock of birds nearly initiated World 744 00:48:18,320 --> 00:48:22,000 Speaker 1: War III. That was actually an oversimplification of what had happened. 745 00:48:22,080 --> 00:48:26,160 Speaker 1: It was a story that actually predates the Cuban missile crisis. 746 00:48:26,280 --> 00:48:29,360 Speaker 1: This goes back to the Suez Canal crisis in Egypt. 747 00:48:29,880 --> 00:48:32,719 Speaker 1: The Suez Canal had proven to be critical during both 748 00:48:32,760 --> 00:48:36,520 Speaker 1: World War One and World War Two, and so lots 749 00:48:36,520 --> 00:48:39,600 Speaker 1: of different entities wanted to have control over the canal 750 00:48:40,320 --> 00:48:45,960 Speaker 1: for strategic purposes. This included the Soviet Union, Egypt, and 751 00:48:46,400 --> 00:48:49,960 Speaker 1: the United Kingdom. So you had a lot of tensions 752 00:48:50,000 --> 00:48:53,960 Speaker 1: in the area, and the whole conflict is way too 753 00:48:54,000 --> 00:48:57,360 Speaker 1: complex to get into. I'm pretty sure the stuff you 754 00:48:57,360 --> 00:49:00,239 Speaker 1: missed in history class hosts have talked to about the 755 00:49:00,239 --> 00:49:04,520 Speaker 1: Suez Canal crisis in the past, and like I said, 756 00:49:04,560 --> 00:49:08,759 Speaker 1: it gets super complicated, but I can talk about a 757 00:49:08,800 --> 00:49:11,879 Speaker 1: series of coincidental events that nearly led us to World 758 00:49:11,920 --> 00:49:16,160 Speaker 1: War Three. It happened on November fifth, nineteen fifty six. 759 00:49:16,800 --> 00:49:22,560 Speaker 1: NORAD detected these coincidental events, which collectively looked like it 760 00:49:22,560 --> 00:49:25,600 Speaker 1: could have been a big aggressive move by the Soviet Union, 761 00:49:25,680 --> 00:49:29,720 Speaker 1: like an actual massing to attack other areas of Europe 762 00:49:29,719 --> 00:49:33,959 Speaker 1: and possibly launched attacks against the United States. Those coincidences 763 00:49:34,040 --> 00:49:38,000 Speaker 1: included a fleet of ships Soviet ships moving from the 764 00:49:38,000 --> 00:49:41,240 Speaker 1: Black Sea to the Aegean Sea. There were a large 765 00:49:41,280 --> 00:49:46,520 Speaker 1: number of MiG jets reported flying over Syria. There was 766 00:49:46,560 --> 00:49:50,440 Speaker 1: a report of a British bomber being shot down also 767 00:49:50,520 --> 00:49:54,560 Speaker 1: in Syria, and then there was an unknown number of 768 00:49:54,680 --> 00:49:59,480 Speaker 1: unidentified aircraft detected over Turkey. But each of those events 769 00:49:59,480 --> 00:50:02,320 Speaker 1: turned out to not be that big of a deal 770 00:50:02,800 --> 00:50:06,239 Speaker 1: once the details were learned, so it's fortunate that no 771 00:50:06,280 --> 00:50:10,760 Speaker 1: one thought those collective events actually amounted to a full attack. 772 00:50:11,239 --> 00:50:14,000 Speaker 1: The fleet maneuver turned out to just be a routine 773 00:50:14,120 --> 00:50:16,640 Speaker 1: exercise among the Soviet fleet. It had nothing to do 774 00:50:16,680 --> 00:50:19,880 Speaker 1: with any sort of aggressive act. The group of MiGs 775 00:50:20,160 --> 00:50:22,640 Speaker 1: was much smaller than had been reported. It wasn't like 776 00:50:22,680 --> 00:50:27,960 Speaker 1: one hundred jets. It was actually a typical escort detail. 777 00:50:29,000 --> 00:50:32,960 Speaker 1: The British bomber hadn't been shot down, the aircraft had 778 00:50:32,960 --> 00:50:35,000 Speaker 1: suffered a mechanical failure and they had to make an 779 00:50:35,000 --> 00:50:40,040 Speaker 1: emergency landing in Syria. And the mysterious aircraft flying over 780 00:50:40,080 --> 00:50:44,319 Speaker 1: Turkey turned out to be a flock of swans, which 781 00:50:44,360 --> 00:50:47,360 Speaker 1: after a lengthy questioning, turned out not to be Soviet agents. 782 00:50:49,000 --> 00:50:51,840 Speaker 1: And let me give you one last example of a 783 00:50:51,880 --> 00:50:56,120 Speaker 1: close call. There are more besides this one, by the way, 784 00:50:56,200 --> 00:50:59,920 Speaker 1: lots more, but here's one last one. On June third, ninth, 785 00:51:00,920 --> 00:51:04,759 Speaker 1: defense displays at the Pentagon, the White House and a 786 00:51:04,880 --> 00:51:10,240 Speaker 1: NORAD flipped out. Now they had a display of four digits, 787 00:51:10,280 --> 00:51:14,080 Speaker 1: which usually read as zero zero zero zero, just four 788 00:51:14,200 --> 00:51:18,680 Speaker 1: zero straight across. These were numbers to indicate any nuclear 789 00:51:18,719 --> 00:51:21,600 Speaker 1: missiles that had been detected as being launched. So you 790 00:51:21,640 --> 00:51:24,480 Speaker 1: want to see all zeros. There's any number besides a 791 00:51:24,600 --> 00:51:29,200 Speaker 1: zero on that display, that's a big problem. The counters 792 00:51:29,200 --> 00:51:32,920 Speaker 1: began to show the number two instead of zero, indicating 793 00:51:32,920 --> 00:51:36,880 Speaker 1: a massive missile attack, and so to be certain, bomber 794 00:51:36,920 --> 00:51:39,760 Speaker 1: crews were given orders to prepare their aircraft and missile 795 00:51:39,840 --> 00:51:43,080 Speaker 1: launch systems began to warm up for a retaliatory strike, 796 00:51:43,560 --> 00:51:46,040 Speaker 1: while the top brass tried to figure out if this 797 00:51:46,200 --> 00:51:50,200 Speaker 1: was in fact for real z's or not. Luckily, said 798 00:51:50,239 --> 00:51:55,040 Speaker 1: brass determined that it was not for realsy's and they 799 00:51:55,440 --> 00:51:59,160 Speaker 1: ordered everyone to stand down. As a result, three days later, 800 00:51:59,320 --> 00:52:01,600 Speaker 1: the same thing had happen again, and again everyone got 801 00:52:01,640 --> 00:52:05,719 Speaker 1: prepared for a massive retaliatory strike, and two false alarms 802 00:52:05,719 --> 00:52:08,759 Speaker 1: that could cause a nuclear apocalypse warranted a full look 803 00:52:08,880 --> 00:52:12,640 Speaker 1: at the system. Technicians trace the problem to a single 804 00:52:12,800 --> 00:52:16,440 Speaker 1: computer chip, just one computer chip in the entire system 805 00:52:16,880 --> 00:52:21,440 Speaker 1: that wasn't wired correctly. So replacing that chip solved the 806 00:52:21,480 --> 00:52:23,920 Speaker 1: problem and they stopped having this issue with the display 807 00:52:24,239 --> 00:52:29,320 Speaker 1: giving a false indicator of missile launches. That one faulty 808 00:52:29,440 --> 00:52:33,520 Speaker 1: chip could have resulted in a nuclear war or at 809 00:52:33,560 --> 00:52:37,640 Speaker 1: least a nuclear strike, which is absolutely terrifying. So what 810 00:52:37,760 --> 00:52:41,319 Speaker 1: is the moral of the story here, Well, one thing 811 00:52:41,360 --> 00:52:45,040 Speaker 1: is that nuclear weapons are super duper scary. I'd love 812 00:52:45,080 --> 00:52:46,680 Speaker 1: to see them become a thing of the past, but 813 00:52:47,239 --> 00:52:50,640 Speaker 1: they're incredibly powerful and all it takes is one critical 814 00:52:50,800 --> 00:52:54,880 Speaker 1: error to cause untold amounts of damage or precipitate a 815 00:52:54,920 --> 00:52:59,520 Speaker 1: globally catastrophic series of events. But another lesson to take 816 00:52:59,560 --> 00:53:01,759 Speaker 1: here is that we at least have been fortunate so 817 00:53:01,960 --> 00:53:05,720 Speaker 1: far to have people calm enough to reevaluate a situation 818 00:53:05,840 --> 00:53:09,279 Speaker 1: before committing the ultimate act of warfare. It sure would 819 00:53:09,320 --> 00:53:12,320 Speaker 1: be nice if it weren't necessary to say, thank goodness, 820 00:53:12,360 --> 00:53:14,359 Speaker 1: we have the right folks in the right place at 821 00:53:14,360 --> 00:53:19,239 Speaker 1: the wrong time, but thank goodness we do have them. 822 00:53:19,480 --> 00:53:23,520 Speaker 2: That's it for the classic episode close but no Nuclear War. 823 00:53:24,200 --> 00:53:27,600 Speaker 2: I guess the takeaway from all this is, despite the 824 00:53:27,640 --> 00:53:31,400 Speaker 2: close calls, we never had a nuclear war. So that's 825 00:53:31,400 --> 00:53:34,040 Speaker 2: something that we should hold on to. I hope you 826 00:53:34,040 --> 00:53:37,359 Speaker 2: are all well. I'll talk to you again really soon. 827 00:53:43,760 --> 00:53:48,440 Speaker 1: Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, 828 00:53:48,760 --> 00:53:52,480 Speaker 1: visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen 829 00:53:52,480 --> 00:53:57,319 Speaker 1: to your favorite shows.