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Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode it could happen here.

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Speaker 1: I'm your guest host of this episode where I'm hoping

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Speaker 1: to take a moment to discuss the commons, the principles

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Speaker 1: of successful commons management, and why sitting attempts to establish

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Speaker 1: the comments of field. My name, by the way, is

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Speaker 1: Andrew of the YouTube channel Andrewism. You can follow me

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Speaker 1: on YouTube dot com slash Andrewism. I'm joined here with

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Speaker 1: my two cool hosts that will be Garrison Davis Hello,

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Speaker 1: and James Stout. Hi. Awesome. But before I get into

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Speaker 1: exactly what makes the commons work, I least want to

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Speaker 1: discuss what exactly the comments are, because despite being you know,

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Speaker 1: common throughout human history, a lot of people can't imagine

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Speaker 1: how they might have worked what they are. Of course,

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Speaker 1: the commons is a very specific definition of particular context

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Speaker 1: of you know, feudalism and whatnot. But even outside of that,

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Speaker 1: the idea of the commons is essentially the resources accessible

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Speaker 1: to all members of society, the totality of the material

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Speaker 1: riches of that community or even of the world, regarded

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Speaker 1: as their whole inheritance, rather than being subject to inclosure

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Speaker 1: and to privatization. Even today, despite the process of inclosure,

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Speaker 1: which is with you of its own podcast episode or

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Speaker 1: series of podcast episodes or book. Even even today, they

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Speaker 1: are still you know, viable existing commons institutions, and they've

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Speaker 1: in some cases endured for well over how and years.

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Speaker 1: Most famously Helena Ostrom, the economists who explored the concept

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Speaker 1: in depth and de punct the tragedy of the Commons,

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Speaker 1: wrote in her book Governing the Commons that from you know,

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Speaker 1: the alpine meadows of Torbell, Switzerland, to the three million

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Speaker 1: hectares of Japanese for us, to the irrigation systems of

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Speaker 1: Spain and Philippines, the possibility of community of popular rather

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Speaker 1: than public or state or private or corporate ownership exists.

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Speaker 1: The possibility of communal ownership as opposed to capitalist or

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Speaker 1: state ownership exists. There's also the communal land of Chiapas

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Speaker 1: in Mexico after the successful Zapatista revolution, and of course,

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Speaker 1: as I discussed in previous episode, there are the commons

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Speaker 1: of Barbuda, where the entire island of the twin island

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Speaker 1: nation of Antigue and Barbuda is owned collectively by all

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Speaker 1: Barbudas and regarded as their collective heritage. These projects. Of course,

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Speaker 1: an art static the commons and Brobuda, for example, existed

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Speaker 1: for about a hundred years, but had some precedents prior

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Speaker 1: to that, and are now honestly being encroached upon. After

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Speaker 1: the soul shock doctrine of the hurricanes that ravaged the

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Speaker 1: island has opened up an opportunity for Antique Brobbuda's government

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Speaker 1: sort of swooping and privatized the land um for the

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Speaker 1: benefit of foreign companies and foreign resorts. So the Commons

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Speaker 1: is not this timeless internal institution that can't be interrupted,

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Speaker 1: that's never change um to in the case in cheap Us,

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Speaker 1: you know, they had similar projects, similar institutions prior to colonization.

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Speaker 1: Colonization ruled in and interrupted all that, and thanks to

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Speaker 1: the Zapleas Revolution they were able to institute some semblance

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Speaker 1: of that sort of commons institution, of that communal land

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Speaker 1: um for their collective benefits. They responwned to experience conditions,

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Speaker 1: to circumstances, to serve or in some cases to eventually

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Speaker 1: not to the people. But of course not all commons

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Speaker 1: are able to work, not all commons institutions operate effectively,

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Speaker 1: and she talks about why using various case studies to

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Speaker 1: illustrate her points. In the course of governing the commons,

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Speaker 1: she used, of course, the existence case studies to develop

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Speaker 1: cuitain principles that she believed make the commons work, the

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Speaker 1: principles that she found in common between Switzerland and Japan,

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Speaker 1: the Philippines and Spain, and then use those principles to

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Speaker 1: examine the common its institutions that didn't work, identified which

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Speaker 1: principles were missing from the equation. But I'm talking a

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Speaker 1: lot about what these principles about, these principles of successful

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Speaker 1: commons management, and I haven't broken down what they are exactly.

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Speaker 1: So to get into that, the principles of successful commons management,

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Speaker 1: as followers number one, clearly defined boundaries. Boundaries in the

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Speaker 1: sense of having of those involved, the appropriators of the commons,

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Speaker 1: the people who directly access in the commons, having a

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Speaker 1: clear sense of structure and characteristics of the resource system itself,

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Speaker 1: whether it be through a scientific study or through generationally

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Speaker 1: preserved folk knowledge, as well as knowledge and a clear

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Speaker 1: sense of who is involved and withdrawn from and sustaining it.

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Speaker 1: Even if you know, even in the case where the

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Speaker 1: entire world has been common, where all land has been

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Speaker 1: returned to common land to the ownership of none and

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Speaker 1: everyone simultaneously in such a case. In individual instances of

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Speaker 1: common pool resources, whether it be a forest or a fishery,

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Speaker 1: or a lake or groundwater basin, the people most directly

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Speaker 1: access in those that that segment of the Commons, that system,

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Speaker 1: that common pool resource needs to have a clear sense

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Speaker 1: of exactly what that resource entails UM, the limits of

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Speaker 1: that resource, the renewability of that resource, UM, and who

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Speaker 1: is involved in withdrawing from and sustaining that resource, so

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Speaker 1: that they're able to collaborate. If you know, as in

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Speaker 1: the case with the tragedy of the Commons, everybody is

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Speaker 1: just this isolated actor, not communicate and at all not collaborating.

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Speaker 1: There's no collective institution in place to help them, you know,

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Speaker 1: work it out. You basically gonna end up in a

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Speaker 1: case like the targity of the Commons, where the system

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Speaker 1: is depleted because nobody has a sense of what anybody

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Speaker 1: else is doing. UM, there's no there's no open channel

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Speaker 1: of communication, which brings us, of course to collective decision

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Speaker 1: making power. That's the third principle. So I'm jumping ahead slightly,

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Speaker 1: but it flows better this way um having collective decision

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Speaker 1: making power over the commons, meaning there's an institution in

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Speaker 1: place that those who are drawing from the Commons are

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Speaker 1: able to come together and discuss the rules of the Commons.

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Speaker 1: How are they going to draw from the Commons, how

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Speaker 1: are they going to deal with the Commons, how they're

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Speaker 1: gonna deal with each other as they deal with the Commons,

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Speaker 1: and so on. And to afford the idea of rules

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Speaker 1: is not anti anarchists as a concept, um, just the

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Speaker 1: idea that there is not you know, popular inputs and

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Speaker 1: collective inputs and free association in place UM. And so

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Speaker 1: with consensus, with this institution of collective decision making power,

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Speaker 1: people be able to come up with and modify the

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Speaker 1: rules as it suits their situations, as it's as it

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Speaker 1: suits their shifting circumstances um. And of course, and this

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Speaker 1: is the second principle, that their appropriation and provision rules

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Speaker 1: of the Commons are compatible with local conditions. The whole

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Speaker 1: ideas that do not relying on any external authorities to

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Speaker 1: come up with these rules, to commit to these rules,

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Speaker 1: to bind themselves to these rules, even when the temptations

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Speaker 1: to violate those rules apply. So as a practice of

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Speaker 1: you know, developing community, you need to have some sense

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Speaker 1: of shared norms and developing those shared norms over time

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Speaker 1: regard and behavior, and of course, as in the case

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Speaker 1: in almost of all societies, of course, reputation and one's

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Speaker 1: reputation will play a rule. Um, if you are known

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Speaker 1: to be consistently violating the commons rules, of course they're

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Speaker 1: going to be social consequences to that. That's just a

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Speaker 1: natural consequence. Just because the commons exist doesn't mean that

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Speaker 1: people are free of the consequences of how they use

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Speaker 1: those comments. Just like in the case of the environment.

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Speaker 1: You know, just because you can cut down all the

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Speaker 1: trees in the forest doesn't mean you're free of the

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Speaker 1: consequences from cutting on the trees of that forest. Your

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Speaker 1: actions are still going to have consequences, whether it be

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Speaker 1: environmental or social. There are of course limits, as there

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Speaker 1: as there are in any other aspect of life. But

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Speaker 1: of course simple norms regarding behavior or concerns about reputation

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Speaker 1: may help. But you're also going to need the fourth

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Speaker 1: and fifth principles established in some form effectively maintain social harmony.

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Speaker 1: The fourth principle is of course, monitoring, which is the

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Speaker 1: process of continuously evaluating the conditions of the common pool

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Speaker 1: resource itself as well as the behavior of the appropriators.

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Speaker 1: Now to monitoring. It's kind of spooky, right. It sounds

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Speaker 1: a little bit like Big brothers watching you kind of fight.

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Speaker 1: But that's not really the intention. It's just the idea

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Speaker 1: that it's just this this constant, informal process of looking

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Speaker 1: at and observing and collecting data on the conditions of

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Speaker 1: the commons, the conditions including how people behave with the

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Speaker 1: commons as well as the you know, commons themselves, the

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Speaker 1: resources themselves, how much of them we have, how quickly

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Speaker 1: they're being you know, renewed, that sort of thing. And

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Speaker 1: and through that process of each person, each appropriator of

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Speaker 1: the commons, institutions um monitoring the system continuously, you begin

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Speaker 1: to learn what rules work and what rules don't, and

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Speaker 1: so you can adapt your rules to suit the circumstances,

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Speaker 1: to suit how people actually behave, which is something that

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Speaker 1: centralized and hierarchical institutions have a bit of trouble doing.

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Speaker 1: Because when you have this horizontal common institution, you're able

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Speaker 1: to look at, okay, this is how things are going

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Speaker 1: so far, and let me we can we can now

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Speaker 1: talk about it we're constantly in this dialogue. We're all

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Speaker 1: able to contribute our information in this horizontal system and

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Speaker 1: adapt our rules and our behavior to suit. Whereas in

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Speaker 1: the pyramid structure of a hierarchical and centralized organization, but

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Speaker 1: further up the pyramid ecal yes, the more power there

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Speaker 1: is as centralized institutions tend to have, but also less

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Speaker 1: information because the narrowing of the pyramid leads to less

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Speaker 1: and less information from the bottom filtering up to the top.

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Speaker 1: And so when you have these centralized institutions, rules are

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Speaker 1: a lot more rigid because they're not able to respond

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Speaker 1: quickly and effectively and as informed as informedly um to

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Speaker 1: the situations as they arise. That's also why eight of

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Speaker 1: the planet's bio diversity is being protected by a very

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Speaker 1: small percentage of indigenous people because they are on the ground.

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Speaker 1: Because they are they're interact with the systems in real time,

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Speaker 1: they're able to respond directly and quickly to changes in

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Speaker 1: that part ability two changes in behavioral in order to

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Speaker 1: maintain and sustain that system. Whereas you find that a

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Speaker 1: lot of conservation projects, a lot of restoration projects, in

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Speaker 1: environmental frustoration projects are feeling you know, I recently read

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Speaker 1: an article about how a lot of these tree planting

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Speaker 1: initiatives that governments have been doing these days, while you know,

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Speaker 1: it gets them good, publicity gets them good, you know, social, social, political,

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Speaker 1: international clouds. When you go back one year, two years,

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Speaker 1: three years down the line, almost all, if not all,

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Speaker 1: the trees are dead. The communities living by these reforestation projects,

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Speaker 1: we're not involved in the process. They don't have any

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Speaker 1: say in the selection of the trees. In fact, the

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Speaker 1: trees aren't always even choosen in a coote into the

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Speaker 1: local conditions. They often isn't enough biodie flicity in terms

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Speaker 1: of the trees. I mean when it comes to a forest,

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Speaker 1: and that's what people don't understand. Forests are living organism.

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Speaker 1: You know, it's it has multiple layers, has multiple past.

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Speaker 1: You can just PLoP us at the trees down and

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Speaker 1: expect things to work out. Okay, you know, um James C.

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Speaker 1: Scott talks about this in Seeing like a state. You

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Speaker 1: can't just in these states they start these sort of

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Speaker 1: forestry projects. They try to legible, legibilize, you know, these forests,

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Speaker 1: these simple rules and organizations, and you cut out all

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Speaker 1: the fluff, all the shrubbery, all the other plans that

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Speaker 1: are competing Coote and coote, you end up with a

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Speaker 1: dead system, you know, they put the system that is

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Speaker 1: very fragile, is not able to respond to changes in

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Speaker 1: the environments they rise because it does not have the

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Speaker 1: buffer as of a complex web of life in place.

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Speaker 1: Indigenous groups and really anybody who is grounded in the

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Speaker 1: local context is able to most effectively engage and respond

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Speaker 1: because they have access to that information, because they're able

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Speaker 1: to see the shocks to the system, the buffers, what works,

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Speaker 1: what doesn't. Human culturists are able to, you know, to

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Speaker 1: have these intensive systems because they are constantly monitoring coming

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Speaker 1: full circle here, constantly monitoring the feedback that they're getting

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Speaker 1: from their systems. And of course there's a fifth principle.

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Speaker 1: You know, in these sort of situations, you're still going

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Speaker 1: to have a couple opportunistic people, maybe attempt may be

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Speaker 1: tempted to take advantage of the trust presence in the

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Speaker 1: group um. And when I say opportunistic people, I don't

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Speaker 1: mean to create this other, this old group. I just

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Speaker 1: mean us in the sense of, you know, you have,

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Speaker 1: like we all do, moments of weakness, right, and then

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Speaker 1: those moments of weakness, it can be easy for some

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Speaker 1: to falter, and in that falter and jeopardize the security

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Speaker 1: of the system as a whole, and so the fifth

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Speaker 1: Prince will successful. Common spanagement is the practice of accountability

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Speaker 1: and systems of accountability through graduated sanctions. Of course, empathy

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Speaker 1: needs to maintain throughout the process. And I don't think

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Speaker 1: that every infraction must automatically responded to with sanctions. Like again,

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Speaker 1: I'm not trying to do something, it's just obviously when

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Speaker 1: you have a system that has and I know I'm

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Speaker 1: reference to nine like a right finger, but yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I think it's fine reference nine correctly as opposed to

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Speaker 1: like someone who hasn't read it or read anything else

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Speaker 1: that he wrote. Yeah, yeah, we can take it. But

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Speaker 1: you know, obviously, not every situation gonna respond to its sanctions. Obviously,

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Speaker 1: empathation remunitae throughout the process. Um, But when you have

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Speaker 1: a system in which a lot of people are dependent

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Speaker 1: on the sustainability not just people living right now, but

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Speaker 1: generations to come, and that's not something we accustomed to

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Speaker 1: thinking about, but generations still coming out and think about

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Speaker 1: with these sort of commons institutions, you can't do as

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Speaker 1: the capitalists do and just let people do whatever with

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Speaker 1: minimal if any environmental protections with minimal if any like

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Speaker 1: standards in place. Yes, infractions varying severity and stuff, But

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Speaker 1: when the livelihood of the entire community is that state,

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Speaker 1: you know, things can be so easy. When infractions are

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Speaker 1: just you know, temporary deviations or unthreatening to the overall

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Speaker 1: survival of the CPR, then you know, tolerance can be high.

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Speaker 1: But it depends on the circumstance. And that's why it

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Speaker 1: really is important that the prior four principles or in place.

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Speaker 1: You know, you have the clearly defined boundaries, you have

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Speaker 1: the rules of the commons established by collective decision making

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Speaker 1: power over the commons, with a constant process of monitoring

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Speaker 1: in place. Because again, the responsiveness of the people on

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Speaker 1: the ground is a lot more in tune with the

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Speaker 1: conditions of the commons and with the needs of the

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Speaker 1: people themselves, because they are the people. And the fifth

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Speaker 1: principle and the fourth principle, all the other principles would

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Speaker 1: be nothing without the sixth principle, which is the presence

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Speaker 1: of conflict resolution mechanism. Humans are kind of human, you know,

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Speaker 1: we make mistakes. We have disagreements, and it needs to

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Speaker 1: be some sort of means of discussing and resolving conflict

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Speaker 1: in a healthy and effective way. There are a lot

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Speaker 1: of processes in place UM. A lot of communities, Galterian

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Speaker 1: communities throughout history have used some sort of system of mediation. UM.

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Speaker 1: There's also arbitration, which chance be more common in state societies.

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Speaker 1: And they are also new models and methods of justice

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Speaker 1: being established and drawn from from the past as well

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Speaker 1: that we can look into. But they are conflict resolution mechanisms.

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Speaker 1: They have to be in place the successful comments management.

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Speaker 1: We live in a society, and society includes conflict. Conflict

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Speaker 1: is not always necessarily a bad thing, but it's a

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Speaker 1: thing and you ignore it and expected to go away.

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Speaker 1: The seventh principle is the freedom to organize, and this

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Speaker 1: principle is, you know, the basis upon which the other

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Speaker 1: principles arrest. In some places, people have a lot of

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Speaker 1: autonomy to self organize free of state control. In other

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Speaker 1: places they don't. In other places, there's a lot of

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Speaker 1: state encroachment on the commons because that has been the

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Speaker 1: mission of the state to further their ten drils. In

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Speaker 1: every sphere of life and existence. So obviously the end goal,

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Speaker 1: but one of the end goals the complete abolition of

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Speaker 1: the state, and obviously the process upon which we reached

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Speaker 1: those end goals would require pre figurative politics in the

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Speaker 1: sense of establishing the institutions that we want in the

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Speaker 1: future society in the here and now and building that

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Speaker 1: dual poll capacity to provide a competitive excuse the capitalists terminology,

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Speaker 1: but a competitive model that can you know, compete with,

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Speaker 1: rise from and separately from eventually replace um the existing systems,

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Speaker 1: and that's the process of social revolution. Have a video

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Speaker 1: coming up on that in December. Lastly, and this does

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Speaker 1: not apply to every instance of commons management, but in

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Speaker 1: some cases you need the eighth and finale principle for

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Speaker 1: successful commons management, and that is nested enterprises, which is,

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Speaker 1: you know, basically the same principle as an anarchist confederation.

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Speaker 1: You know, if a particular community is access in a

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Speaker 1: commons institution that other communities are access in, or if

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Speaker 1: the commons that a group of communities are access in

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Speaker 1: a part of a larger regional commons or archipelogic commons

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Speaker 1: or continental commons, then he wants to have means of

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Speaker 1: collaboration partom up of course, part of organizations, but you know,

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Speaker 1: maintain the power the local level while coordinating these larger

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Speaker 1: scaled commons and ensuring that there's a smooth running and

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Speaker 1: smooth communication between the appropriators, you know, the people involved.

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Speaker 1: These principles very clearly differentiate between success and the failure cases.

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Speaker 1: To reiterate the commons and the principle of successful commons

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Speaker 1: management as follows, clearly defined boundaries, rules compatible with local conditions,

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Speaker 1: collective decision making power to establish those rules, monitoring to

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Speaker 1: ensure that those rules are compatible with people and conditions.

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Speaker 1: Graduated sanctions to ensure that rules are kept up with

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Speaker 1: and the commons are protected from potential threats, conflict resolution

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Speaker 1: mechanisms because humans are going to human freedom to organize,

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Speaker 1: particularly in the fragilely stages of establishing these projects and

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Speaker 1: nested enterprises confederation from the bottom up. In certain failure cases,

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Speaker 1: we see that, you know, none of the principles apply um.

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Speaker 1: For example, in the book eleanor Austrom references these two

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Speaker 1: Turkish fisheries, the bay of his Mirror and boardroom, where

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Speaker 1: there was severe rent dissipation continuing unabated. Of course, the

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Speaker 1: book was written a while ago, so I'm not sure

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Speaker 1: how the situation has evolved since then. But rent dissipation

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Speaker 1: is basically a circumstance in which the commons cornpool resources

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Speaker 1: are being depleted severely and the sustainability of those comments

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Speaker 1: are at stake. And so with all those principles in place,

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Speaker 1: to all that doesn't happened. Um you get a situation

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Speaker 1: like what's going on? But what was going on in

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Speaker 1: the Bay of His Mirror and put in the Kirin

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Speaker 1: the oil irrigation project in Sri Lanka, they did have

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Speaker 1: clayer boundaries, that one principle in place, but the other

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Speaker 1: principles were not. In Mojave, California, they did have the

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Speaker 1: institution of collective choice, they did have contact resolution mechanisms,

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Speaker 1: and they did have the recognized right to organize, but

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Speaker 1: the other principles are not in place, and so that

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Speaker 1: institution was also a failure. Or we could look at

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Speaker 1: the case in the Mabella fishery also in Sri Lanka,

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Speaker 1: where renticipation had become a very severe problem, particularly after

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Speaker 1: nine Now, they did have rules in place, they did

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Speaker 1: have a monitoring system, but unfortunately, you know, despite having

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Speaker 1: those rules, is probably having you know, regulating regulating the

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Speaker 1: access to the beach and the use of the beach

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Speaker 1: scenes and the control of the number of nets to

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Speaker 1: be used. I mean, they really did try. It wasn't

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Speaker 1: a problem of ignorance the issuers that although they were

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Speaker 1: aware of the consequences of adding too many nets and

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Speaker 1: drawing too much from the fishery, the issue became that

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Speaker 1: the appropriators, the fishermen themselves, they don't have the autonomy

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Speaker 1: to make an enforce the rules of the fishery that

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Speaker 1: was deprived of them, and so the institution was not

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Speaker 1: able to sustain itself in the long term. So in

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Speaker 1: all these cases, you know, no more of the three

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Speaker 1: design principles actually characterized any of these cases, and so

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Speaker 1: they were unable to solve the problems that they faced.

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Speaker 1: They're of course also issues where they are viable but

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Speaker 1: fragile common system where you know, they have more of

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Speaker 1: the principles in place, but they still lack all of them.

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Speaker 1: So awesome Sri Lanka. There's a gal oil where boundaries

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Speaker 1: and membership would clay designated, where rules have been devised

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Speaker 1: and monitored, where collective choice arenas have been set up,

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Speaker 1: but they you know did not have the autonomy and

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Speaker 1: they do not have collect conflict resolution mechanisms in place,

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Speaker 1: and so the institution is not as as robust as

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Speaker 1: it could be. Of course, when it comes to the

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Speaker 1: Commons and existing institutions, existing fragile institutions exist in successful institutions,

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Speaker 1: existing failures of institutions. That does not necessarily need to

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Speaker 1: limit all imagination of possibilities, but it's good to be

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Speaker 1: informed as to what has worked in the past and

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Speaker 1: what hasn't. We can still imagine future scenarios and experiments

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Speaker 1: and how they might play out. But the point is

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Speaker 1: if we're trying to reinstate the Commons, we need to

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Speaker 1: understand what makes them work, at least what has made

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Speaker 1: them work in the past and in the present. More

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Speaker 1: information of the Commons and also the potential of library economy,

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Speaker 1: you can check out my videos on the Commons and

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Speaker 1: the library economy on my channel YouTube dot com slash Andurism.

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Speaker 1: You can also check out Eleanor Ostrom's book Governing the Commons,

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Speaker 1: as well as a book called Eleanor Ostrom's Rules for Radicals,

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Speaker 1: which I haven't read yet, but I felt it was

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Speaker 1: pretty good. If you like what I do. You'd like

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Speaker 1: to support me, you could follow me on pitture dot

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Speaker 1: com slash same true and on Twitter com slash underscore

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Speaker 1: same true. That's all I have for today. It could

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Speaker 1: Happen here piece. It could Happen Here as a production

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Speaker 1: of cool Zone Media. For more podcasts from Zone Media,

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Speaker 1: visit our website cool zone media dot com, or check

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Speaker 1: us out on the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

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Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can find sources

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Speaker 1: for It could Happen Here, updated monthly at cool zone

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Speaker 1: media dot com slash sources. Thanks for listening,