WEBVTT - Interview With Jeff deGraaf: Masters in Business (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>Look ahead, imagine more. Gain insight for your industry with

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<v Speaker 1>forward thinking advice from the professionals at Cone Resnick. Is

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<v Speaker 1>Cone Resnick dot com Slash Breakthrough. This is Master's in

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<v Speaker 1>Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. This week on

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<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business, we have a very special guest. His

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<v Speaker 1>name is Jeff de Graff and he is known as

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<v Speaker 1>a technicians technician. He has a storied career, most notably

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<v Speaker 1>his time as the chief technician at Lehman Brothers, where

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<v Speaker 1>he famously resigned pretty much the day of Lehman's all

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<v Speaker 1>time high. Jeff is now the founder and presidents and

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<v Speaker 1>chief technical strategist of Renaissance Macro, better known as ren Mack,

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<v Speaker 1>which is really an interesting shop that come binds both

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<v Speaker 1>macro analysis and technical analysis. In fact, one of the

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<v Speaker 1>things that makes Jeff so unique is the fact that

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<v Speaker 1>he has both a c f A and a CMT,

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<v Speaker 1>which means that he is very schooled in both fundamental

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<v Speaker 1>and technical analysis of of equities, and I think you'll

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<v Speaker 1>find his approach to be somewhat unique. The way ren

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<v Speaker 1>Mack was built to create its own unique database is

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<v Speaker 1>something that not a lot of companies can can lay

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<v Speaker 1>claim to UH, and it's part of the reason that

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<v Speaker 1>for the past decade or so he's been named one

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<v Speaker 1>of the top and and in fact has been ranked

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<v Speaker 1>number one by Institutional Investor for the space he covers. So,

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<v Speaker 1>without any further ado, here is my conversation with Jeff

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<v Speaker 1>de Graff this Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Radio. My special guest this week is Jeff Degraff.

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<v Speaker 1>He is the chairman and head technical analyst at Renaissance Macro.

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<v Speaker 1>He has quite the storied background. Started out at Merrill Lynch,

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<v Speaker 1>was at Lehman Brothers for a number of years, where

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<v Speaker 1>he was not only chief technician but also on the

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<v Speaker 1>firm's investment policy committee as a managing director. Moved to

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<v Speaker 1>I s I in two thousand and seven before launching

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<v Speaker 1>his own firm in two thousand and eleven. UH. He

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<v Speaker 1>is both a c f A and a CMT charterholder,

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<v Speaker 1>a member of the New York Society of Securities Analysts

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<v Speaker 1>and the m T A UH. He has been number

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<v Speaker 1>one ranked in Institutional Investor magazine for the last twelve years.

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<v Speaker 1>Ranked his number one technol analysts for the last eleven years.

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<v Speaker 1>And we know he's a great technician because he resigned

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<v Speaker 1>Lehman Brothers literally the day of the stocks all time high.

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<v Speaker 1>Jeff de Ra, Welcome to Bloomberg. Thank you for having me.

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<v Speaker 1>So I've been following your work for a number of years.

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<v Speaker 1>I have a lot of friends who are technicians, who

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<v Speaker 1>who have nothing but good things to say about you.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's jump right in to your background and talk

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit about what makes what you do a

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<v Speaker 1>little different than the average technicians. You describe yourself as

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<v Speaker 1>a macro analyst. What does that mean? Well, we um,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, we we really pride ourselves on looking at

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<v Speaker 1>the big picture and within that what I mean is

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<v Speaker 1>currencies and and bond markets and commodity markets and then

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<v Speaker 1>trying to put all the pieces together. I mean, I

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<v Speaker 1>think the world's always appolosible. That's why I love this business.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a it's a chess match, you know, and it's

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<v Speaker 1>never different. It's never the same thing the same right,

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<v Speaker 1>and so it's really it's it's you know, it's it's

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<v Speaker 1>upon us. Um. You know. This weekend, great example, I

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<v Speaker 1>go through about a thousand charts on the weekend, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and I put a pile of charts, UM in the

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<v Speaker 1>I need to figure this out pile, right, And there's

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<v Speaker 1>usually you know, five to ten Why do Chinese steel

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<v Speaker 1>stocks look good while the rest of the world doesn't, right,

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<v Speaker 1>And so you know, and then we we then start

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<v Speaker 1>to backtrack and figure out what's going on. So I think,

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<v Speaker 1>you know what what we do that's different is we

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<v Speaker 1>believe in fundamentals, but we start with the charts, and

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<v Speaker 1>I think that's the that's the difference. So that raises

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<v Speaker 1>an interesting question. You're both a c f A, which

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<v Speaker 1>stands for Chartered Financial Analysts, essentially the key to looking

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<v Speaker 1>at stocks on a fundamental basis, officially a c f

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<v Speaker 1>A charter holder which means you've gone per distance right

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<v Speaker 1>three tests, and a CMT Chartered Market technician. So that's

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<v Speaker 1>relatively unusual, having both fundamental abilities and technicals. What what

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<v Speaker 1>motivated you to go for both accreditation? Well, my my

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<v Speaker 1>my background is formal education is in finance, so obviously

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<v Speaker 1>that's more fundamental than technical. And and like everybody who

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<v Speaker 1>comes through any business school, it was you know, relatively

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<v Speaker 1>pooh pooed, uh, the art of technical analysis, UM, and

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<v Speaker 1>so I bought into that as I you know, was

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<v Speaker 1>searching for grades more than anything else. And UM, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>once I um got into the business, uh, it just

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<v Speaker 1>found um that the technicians who I appreciated, Bob Farrell,

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<v Speaker 1>who I grew up under, Steve Schaubin, who was my

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<v Speaker 1>mentor at at Lehman Brothers, and just a fantastic individual

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<v Speaker 1>and great technician. Um, I just I found that there

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<v Speaker 1>was something to what they were saying. In fact, it

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<v Speaker 1>was usually more prescient than what you're seeing out of

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<v Speaker 1>the out of the fundamental side. So I picked up

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<v Speaker 1>the Edwards and McGee book. I read it. Um, it

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<v Speaker 1>was interesting. I didn't you know, I didn't buy into

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<v Speaker 1>it wholeheartedly, but certainly there were you know, parts of

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<v Speaker 1>it that I appreciated and could see the light with. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>I thought the the books, the Wiser books UM or

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<v Speaker 1>the I think Schweizer, Swigger, UM, the Right Market Wizard books.

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<v Speaker 1>So I thought those were fantastic. And what that did

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<v Speaker 1>for me really solidified it was UM and I've always

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<v Speaker 1>been this type of person. It was about probability, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and the best way for me to manage risk and

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<v Speaker 1>thinking about it, whether it's at the poker table, the

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<v Speaker 1>blackjack table, or in the markets was through technical analysis,

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<v Speaker 1>and that just really hit me over the head. As

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<v Speaker 1>as to the type of discipline essentially counting cards in

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<v Speaker 1>the market, um is the last You start with the

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<v Speaker 1>evidence in the data, you lay out what's most likely,

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<v Speaker 1>least likely in everything in between, and that colors how

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<v Speaker 1>you see the markets. Yeah. Look, I I described a

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<v Speaker 1>little differently the difference between the pot odds and the

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<v Speaker 1>odds in my hand. Right, there's a certain probability of

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<v Speaker 1>pulling a card to complete an inside flush or an

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<v Speaker 1>inside straight. Pardon me, Um, if the opportunity to stay

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<v Speaker 1>in the pot is low enough and the the reward

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<v Speaker 1>is high enough. Absolutely those even though it might be

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<v Speaker 1>a very slim chance of pulling that straight, the chance

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<v Speaker 1>to stay in makes an awful lot of sense. And

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<v Speaker 1>that's how we think about You know, I took the

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<v Speaker 1>m T A course with Ralph Acampora, and one of

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<v Speaker 1>the lines that have stayed with me all these years

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<v Speaker 1>has been fundamentals tell you what to buy, Technicals tell

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<v Speaker 1>you when to buy. There's there's some truth to that.

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<v Speaker 1>I would I would add to that though, too. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, you know, it's just talking to somebody about this.

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<v Speaker 1>With gold, UM, oftentimes the technicals will tell you, um

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<v Speaker 1>what to buy, and maybe you don't know the fundamental story, right.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, if you think about when Apple first broke

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<v Speaker 1>out of this huge base formation, nobody had a clue

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<v Speaker 1>about the iPhone, and I mean it just was unbelievable,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, sort of the the the the the ramp

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<v Speaker 1>and the product and changing the world. Same thing with

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<v Speaker 1>gold today. You know, the gold trends have changed, UM,

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<v Speaker 1>and they changed in the first quarter for US. But

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<v Speaker 1>you know, some me asked me, well, is it uh? Currencies?

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<v Speaker 1>Is it uh? You know, negative interest rates. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>know officially what the answer is, but the charts are

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<v Speaker 1>telling you that something is out there that has a

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<v Speaker 1>high probability of continuing. Let me ask you a simple question.

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<v Speaker 1>What do most people misunderstand about technical analysis? I think,

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<v Speaker 1>and this will you know, This will uh send shivers

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<v Speaker 1>down to some people's spines. I think people believe that

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<v Speaker 1>technical analysis can predict the future, and I really don't

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<v Speaker 1>see it as that. I see technical analysis as identifying trends,

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<v Speaker 1>identifying opportunities within those trends, and taking advantage of them.

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<v Speaker 1>So to say it's predicting the future. I think is

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<v Speaker 1>is a little a little misguided. I'm very Rihults. You're

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<v Speaker 1>listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special

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<v Speaker 1>guest today is Jeff Degraff. He is the chairman and

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<v Speaker 1>head technical analyst. Is that your your property title? CEO

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<v Speaker 1>and chairman? And yeah. Renaissance macro a uh, pretty much

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<v Speaker 1>a global research shop that supports institutions, edge funds, commutual funds,

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<v Speaker 1>et cetera. Let's jump right in. Let's jump right in

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<v Speaker 1>why technicals work. And I think it's it's pretty interesting

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<v Speaker 1>for the lay person, for the average investor who might

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<v Speaker 1>be listening to this or some student in an NBA

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<v Speaker 1>course where they tell you this stuff doesn't work, Explain

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<v Speaker 1>what is technical analysis and why does it work? Well?

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<v Speaker 1>That there are definitely elements within technical analysis that I

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<v Speaker 1>would even say probably don't work, and I want to

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<v Speaker 1>be careful with some of those, and and and Elliott

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<v Speaker 1>wave Fibonacci, some of the more fringe stuff, or just

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<v Speaker 1>generally the patterns that some people there there are oscillations

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<v Speaker 1>that people sort of believe must mean revert. And that's

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<v Speaker 1>really you know, we've done a lot of work on that,

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<v Speaker 1>and that doesn't prove to be true. There there are

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<v Speaker 1>certain conditions that you can overlay to help create better

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<v Speaker 1>probabilities or opportunities. But really when it comes down to

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<v Speaker 1>for us is is technical analysis works because it's about

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<v Speaker 1>trend analysis. And if you think about just the world

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<v Speaker 1>in which we live, um, you know there are trends

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<v Speaker 1>in place everywhere, right, I mean earnings are generally trending,

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<v Speaker 1>um Uh, And so you know to expect that there's

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<v Speaker 1>sort of this randomness and earnings there there isn't right,

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<v Speaker 1>there generally is a trend. Now, there might be missed

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<v Speaker 1>opportunities in those earnings trends here and there, but for

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<v Speaker 1>the most part, uh, you know, a company's fundamental trajectory

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<v Speaker 1>will be a trend, and we're capturing that through price.

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<v Speaker 1>And the idea is that the markets are efficient and

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<v Speaker 1>so what you know, what I know from a fundamental

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<v Speaker 1>sense is probably already embedded in that price. And what

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<v Speaker 1>we're doing is we're just simply measuring that price, taking

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<v Speaker 1>that temperature and understanding or trying to understand whether or

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<v Speaker 1>not the probabilities are for good continuation in that price

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<v Speaker 1>or for a reversal in that price. So so the

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<v Speaker 1>baseline assumption is that a trend in place, that momentum

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<v Speaker 1>is going to continue until such time as something acts

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<v Speaker 1>to stop it. The probabilities, overwhelmingly, whether it's academic research

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<v Speaker 1>our own research, are that there's a persistence and trends

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<v Speaker 1>in the market. It's called momentum in a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>in a lot of academic studies. Um. And it drives

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<v Speaker 1>people nuts because quote unquote shouldn't work, right, But the

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<v Speaker 1>reality is is that it does and um, and that's

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<v Speaker 1>what we exploit. Well, why shouldn't it work. Let's let's

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<v Speaker 1>step back, because you're a big macro guy and you

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<v Speaker 1>look at things from both the fundamental technical quant an

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<v Speaker 1>economic perspective. Hey, every day people are earning money. That

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<v Speaker 1>money gets shoveled into their four oh one case and elsewhere. Ultimately,

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<v Speaker 1>there's only so many stocks in the universe that a

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<v Speaker 1>fund manager with a given uh sector or topic or

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<v Speaker 1>charge is going to buy. And so he's gonna go

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<v Speaker 1>back and keep buying his favorite names over and over.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's it's a great point that the academics

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<v Speaker 1>would say. Um, there's the efficient market hypothesis, which says

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<v Speaker 1>that the um. You know, the the weak form, the

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<v Speaker 1>strong form, that that information should already be discounted in

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<v Speaker 1>the market price. The reality is, is it just it

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<v Speaker 1>just isn't right. It's sort of kind of eventually more

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<v Speaker 1>or less efficient, but it's not instantly efficient. You have

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<v Speaker 1>there are too many people who have been consistently beating

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<v Speaker 1>the markets. I know the academics like to just shrug

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<v Speaker 1>it off and say outlawyers run off, but there are

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<v Speaker 1>just too many Howard marks and too many Warren buffets,

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<v Speaker 1>even though we're talking, you know, a few dozen, but

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<v Speaker 1>they shouldn't exist, and they do, and and that that

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<v Speaker 1>sort of begets that perfectly efficient thing. So what do

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<v Speaker 1>you think is more important? Trends or mean reversion without

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<v Speaker 1>question trend um If you look at mean reversion without

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<v Speaker 1>the presence of trend in other words, trying to identify

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<v Speaker 1>mean reversion without looking at first what the underlying trend

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<v Speaker 1>is um, it is quickly a recipe and a system

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<v Speaker 1>for losses um. The trends are historically um and this

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<v Speaker 1>is a crossed assets it's not just equities, but the

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<v Speaker 1>trends are historically prescient in giving you some foresight into

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<v Speaker 1>the next move higher and that's that can be anything

0:13:05.160 --> 0:13:08.120
<v Speaker 1>from intra day to to you know, long term, multi

0:13:08.200 --> 0:13:11.880
<v Speaker 1>multi year. You know what we find the sweet spot um,

0:13:11.960 --> 0:13:14.120
<v Speaker 1>And this isn't you know, I'm not I'm not breaking

0:13:14.120 --> 0:13:16.960
<v Speaker 1>any rules here or breaking any new ground. But we

0:13:17.040 --> 0:13:21.120
<v Speaker 1>find that from three months, uh, three months in other words,

0:13:21.160 --> 0:13:24.760
<v Speaker 1>one month, two months, three months, uh, the returns of

0:13:24.760 --> 0:13:28.160
<v Speaker 1>of equities over that period um tend to me mean reverting.

0:13:28.160 --> 0:13:30.760
<v Speaker 1>In other words, if I have strong one month performance,

0:13:30.800 --> 0:13:34.160
<v Speaker 1>the probability of me having another outperformance the next month

0:13:34.240 --> 0:13:36.920
<v Speaker 1>is actually pretty low. UM. If I start getting into

0:13:36.960 --> 0:13:39.719
<v Speaker 1>six month twelve month time frames and look out for

0:13:39.760 --> 0:13:42.480
<v Speaker 1>the next six to twelve months, that probability actually shifts

0:13:42.520 --> 0:13:45.640
<v Speaker 1>to being more momentum oriented. Right, So you want to

0:13:45.640 --> 0:13:47.559
<v Speaker 1>be careful when people talk about, well, I'm not a

0:13:47.559 --> 0:13:49.680
<v Speaker 1>trend foller, I'm not a momentum player. You know, you

0:13:49.760 --> 0:13:52.960
<v Speaker 1>really have to define what your time frame is because

0:13:53.000 --> 0:13:55.520
<v Speaker 1>if you're a swing trader, if you're a short term player,

0:13:55.600 --> 0:13:58.640
<v Speaker 1>then you can be anti momentum. But I wouldn't suggest that,

0:13:58.880 --> 0:14:01.559
<v Speaker 1>you know, you use twelve month or nine month momentum

0:14:02.000 --> 0:14:04.200
<v Speaker 1>and try to fade that. Historically that doesn't work out

0:14:04.200 --> 0:14:08.679
<v Speaker 1>for so long. How does valuation fit into into your analysis? Well,

0:14:08.720 --> 0:14:13.280
<v Speaker 1>let's let's take valuation and lump it with fundamental analysis.

0:14:13.400 --> 0:14:17.640
<v Speaker 1>And and we would look at UM fundamental analysis as

0:14:18.160 --> 0:14:22.280
<v Speaker 1>UM one silo in what we call conditional factors. These

0:14:22.280 --> 0:14:25.160
<v Speaker 1>are things that tend to support a bull phase or

0:14:25.200 --> 0:14:27.480
<v Speaker 1>tend to support a bear phase. So you have these conditions,

0:14:27.560 --> 0:14:30.960
<v Speaker 1>valuation being one, UM that certainly would be more supportive

0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:34.280
<v Speaker 1>of a bull phase, presuming there's uh, there's good valuation.

0:14:34.520 --> 0:14:38.360
<v Speaker 1>I would put things like credit, sentiment, seasonality. All these

0:14:38.400 --> 0:14:42.040
<v Speaker 1>would be conditions that that support a bull or bear phase. UM.

0:14:42.120 --> 0:14:44.360
<v Speaker 1>Think about it. If you will like the amount of

0:14:44.400 --> 0:14:47.600
<v Speaker 1>gas in the tank, it sort of tells you how

0:14:47.640 --> 0:14:50.760
<v Speaker 1>far you can go. UM. The other side of that

0:14:51.040 --> 0:14:54.000
<v Speaker 1>is momentum and trend, and we think about that is

0:14:54.040 --> 0:14:56.640
<v Speaker 1>how hot the spark is in the engine. Each one

0:14:56.640 --> 0:15:00.640
<v Speaker 1>of these independently is useless, right, But it's the combination

0:15:00.760 --> 0:15:03.640
<v Speaker 1>of both that's important. So if I've got strong conditions,

0:15:03.640 --> 0:15:05.880
<v Speaker 1>if I've got a lot of barishness, I've got good valuation,

0:15:06.200 --> 0:15:09.560
<v Speaker 1>I've got seasonality, credit conditions are good, and I've got

0:15:09.560 --> 0:15:12.640
<v Speaker 1>that hot spark, I've got momentum, I've got trend. That's

0:15:12.640 --> 0:15:16.120
<v Speaker 1>a great combination. So for us, that's about position sizing, right,

0:15:16.160 --> 0:15:18.560
<v Speaker 1>that's a bigger call. That's something that we're more comfortable in,

0:15:18.640 --> 0:15:21.320
<v Speaker 1>will make a bigger bet with. If I've got the

0:15:21.680 --> 0:15:24.320
<v Speaker 1>market today, if I've got a hot spark, in other words,

0:15:24.320 --> 0:15:26.960
<v Speaker 1>we've got good trend, we've got good momentum, but the

0:15:27.440 --> 0:15:29.200
<v Speaker 1>way that we see the fuel in the tank is

0:15:29.200 --> 0:15:32.040
<v Speaker 1>being maybe a quarter full. I'll still play, but I

0:15:32.080 --> 0:15:35.000
<v Speaker 1>have to understand that the probabilities of this being an

0:15:35.000 --> 0:15:37.680
<v Speaker 1>O nine type of trend change or an OH three

0:15:37.680 --> 0:15:41.080
<v Speaker 1>type of trend change really are are are low. How

0:15:41.080 --> 0:15:44.600
<v Speaker 1>does sector work figure into your macro approach? Do you

0:15:44.640 --> 0:15:49.320
<v Speaker 1>look at specific market sectors technology, healthcare, energy? Absolutely? We

0:15:49.360 --> 0:15:51.840
<v Speaker 1>think you know, we're known for market calls. I mean,

0:15:51.840 --> 0:15:53.800
<v Speaker 1>that's sort of what people want to hear. But the

0:15:53.840 --> 0:15:55.840
<v Speaker 1>reality is the way that we really make money air

0:15:55.920 --> 0:15:59.720
<v Speaker 1>through sectors. And uh. We we look at sector relative performance,

0:15:59.720 --> 0:16:02.640
<v Speaker 1>we global relative performance. So we bring it all together

0:16:02.680 --> 0:16:07.240
<v Speaker 1>and find that there's a huge uh correlation between between

0:16:07.360 --> 0:16:10.880
<v Speaker 1>regional markets and the sectors um and so we'll we'll

0:16:11.000 --> 0:16:13.600
<v Speaker 1>use all that to identify where the best and where

0:16:13.640 --> 0:16:16.040
<v Speaker 1>the worst sectors are, and we quantify the process. We

0:16:16.080 --> 0:16:18.720
<v Speaker 1>have ways in which we've quantified, so it's not Jeff

0:16:18.760 --> 0:16:20.400
<v Speaker 1>de graph We can got, you know, in a bad

0:16:20.440 --> 0:16:23.600
<v Speaker 1>mood someday and saying everything looks terrible. Um, we haven't quantified,

0:16:23.640 --> 0:16:25.320
<v Speaker 1>so we can back test it, and we can give

0:16:25.360 --> 0:16:28.440
<v Speaker 1>people the confidence and assuredness that hey, if you follow

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:31.720
<v Speaker 1>this system, here's what you're looking at in terms of probabilities.

0:16:31.880 --> 0:16:34.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm Barry Rihults. You're listening to Masters in Business on

0:16:35.000 --> 0:16:39.080
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Radio. My special guests this week is Jeff DeGraf.

0:16:39.600 --> 0:16:44.360
<v Speaker 1>He is a technician extraordinaire and and I jokingly started

0:16:44.400 --> 0:16:47.960
<v Speaker 1>the show by saying he resigned Lehman Brothers pretty much

0:16:48.000 --> 0:16:50.760
<v Speaker 1>to the day of it's all time high. That's how

0:16:50.760 --> 0:16:53.800
<v Speaker 1>we know he's a really good technician. But that actually

0:16:53.880 --> 0:16:57.120
<v Speaker 1>is a true anecdote. You did move to I s

0:16:57.120 --> 0:17:00.800
<v Speaker 1>I pretty much early two oh seven thousand seven, when

0:17:01.120 --> 0:17:03.960
<v Speaker 1>February oh seven was my resignation, and that's pretty much

0:17:04.000 --> 0:17:06.000
<v Speaker 1>the top sick and it was the it was my

0:17:06.040 --> 0:17:08.439
<v Speaker 1>origination letter was the day after the high in the

0:17:08.440 --> 0:17:11.280
<v Speaker 1>stock price. So that's lucky, not good, But that is

0:17:11.280 --> 0:17:14.000
<v Speaker 1>a true story. I love that story that I've said

0:17:14.000 --> 0:17:15.960
<v Speaker 1>that to people and They're like, no, that can't be him,

0:17:15.960 --> 0:17:18.480
<v Speaker 1>Like no, no, he's a really good technician. He saw

0:17:18.560 --> 0:17:20.440
<v Speaker 1>that that trend break and he said that sad, I'm

0:17:20.440 --> 0:17:24.359
<v Speaker 1>out of here. Um. But it's kind of interesting because

0:17:24.400 --> 0:17:26.560
<v Speaker 1>you left for I s A. You were there for

0:17:26.600 --> 0:17:29.200
<v Speaker 1>a couple of years. Ed him and another guy who

0:17:29.320 --> 0:17:32.399
<v Speaker 1>thirty plush years number one ranked. We found him on

0:17:32.440 --> 0:17:35.720
<v Speaker 1>the show. He's great. But at a time when when

0:17:36.000 --> 0:17:40.959
<v Speaker 1>commission dollars are plumbering, when research budgets are really being constrained,

0:17:41.400 --> 0:17:44.840
<v Speaker 1>you decide to launch a new research farm, right, what

0:17:44.880 --> 0:17:49.080
<v Speaker 1>was the thinking like making that leap? Well, you know, look,

0:17:49.160 --> 0:17:53.720
<v Speaker 1>the research budgets are contracting, but when you're when you're

0:17:53.760 --> 0:17:57.439
<v Speaker 1>bloated and have you know, too much capacity, that's a

0:17:57.440 --> 0:18:00.119
<v Speaker 1>bigger problem. When you're starting with eight people, which we

0:18:00.200 --> 0:18:03.199
<v Speaker 1>did uh and are now up to um. You know,

0:18:03.280 --> 0:18:05.879
<v Speaker 1>that's a that's a different that's a different game. And

0:18:05.960 --> 0:18:09.760
<v Speaker 1>so you know, focusing on one of the keys to

0:18:09.880 --> 0:18:13.000
<v Speaker 1>starting ren MAC was, uh, we wanted to build a

0:18:13.000 --> 0:18:15.879
<v Speaker 1>world class database and you know, you just have to

0:18:15.880 --> 0:18:18.760
<v Speaker 1>do that yourself. You can't do it under another another

0:18:18.880 --> 0:18:21.280
<v Speaker 1>entity or you're basically building it for somebody else. And

0:18:21.320 --> 0:18:25.160
<v Speaker 1>so the idea was build a world class database, quantify

0:18:25.280 --> 0:18:28.800
<v Speaker 1>approach this in a much different way to work into

0:18:28.840 --> 0:18:32.920
<v Speaker 1>people's process so that they have another overlay look of

0:18:33.000 --> 0:18:35.960
<v Speaker 1>the street, spend its time and I don't falls them

0:18:35.960 --> 0:18:38.800
<v Speaker 1>for this on fundamental research and the nitty gritty the

0:18:38.840 --> 0:18:41.480
<v Speaker 1>quote unquote knowing the company is better than anybody else.

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:43.960
<v Speaker 1>But the reality is is not enough time is spent

0:18:44.560 --> 0:18:47.960
<v Speaker 1>in the process of just understanding what the macro environment is,

0:18:48.000 --> 0:18:50.520
<v Speaker 1>what the trends are. And so from our standpoint, we

0:18:50.520 --> 0:18:52.280
<v Speaker 1>want to be able to quantify that for people so

0:18:52.280 --> 0:18:54.720
<v Speaker 1>that they didn't have to become technicians, but they could

0:18:54.720 --> 0:18:56.720
<v Speaker 1>look at it and say, okay, I understand that the

0:18:56.800 --> 0:18:59.159
<v Speaker 1>risks are high in technology, that the opportunity set is

0:18:59.160 --> 0:19:02.520
<v Speaker 1>actually high and in adustrials and have some quantification around that.

0:19:02.760 --> 0:19:05.679
<v Speaker 1>And that's really what we provide. So n MAC is

0:19:05.840 --> 0:19:10.480
<v Speaker 1>creating a dimensional analysis that simply isn't available to from

0:19:10.480 --> 0:19:13.320
<v Speaker 1>other researches. Is that what sets you guys apart from

0:19:13.359 --> 0:19:15.800
<v Speaker 1>everyone else. Absolutely, I think that's that's that's a huge

0:19:15.800 --> 0:19:19.639
<v Speaker 1>part of it. And and how does one combine economics,

0:19:19.760 --> 0:19:24.040
<v Speaker 1>quant fundamentals and technicals in one package. Well, we we

0:19:24.080 --> 0:19:26.720
<v Speaker 1>don't do the fundamental side per se UM. We have

0:19:26.840 --> 0:19:29.400
<v Speaker 1>Neil Datta who does our our economic side, and that's Look,

0:19:29.440 --> 0:19:32.760
<v Speaker 1>there's a lot of high frequency data in economics and

0:19:32.760 --> 0:19:34.840
<v Speaker 1>and even more so when you think about the globe

0:19:35.280 --> 0:19:37.679
<v Speaker 1>UH and those are important data points. So what we

0:19:37.760 --> 0:19:40.600
<v Speaker 1>do is we use those data points UM, we test

0:19:40.640 --> 0:19:43.760
<v Speaker 1>those data points. We look at them within the context

0:19:43.800 --> 0:19:47.080
<v Speaker 1>of what's happening to trends to see if they're useful. Again,

0:19:47.200 --> 0:19:49.280
<v Speaker 1>some of those conditional factors that I spoke about in

0:19:49.280 --> 0:19:51.879
<v Speaker 1>the earlier segment UM and that's how we we we

0:19:52.000 --> 0:19:55.720
<v Speaker 1>marry it together in terms of this UM conditional elements.

0:19:55.880 --> 0:19:59.160
<v Speaker 1>One of the things that you're known for is changing

0:19:59.200 --> 0:20:02.080
<v Speaker 1>the weight of certain indicators depending on whether or not

0:20:02.119 --> 0:20:05.919
<v Speaker 1>we're in a bullish or bearish market. Few people managed

0:20:05.960 --> 0:20:09.120
<v Speaker 1>to do this. Well, how do you go about approaching that?

0:20:09.320 --> 0:20:11.239
<v Speaker 1>You have to quantify it. You can't do it by

0:20:11.240 --> 0:20:13.879
<v Speaker 1>the seat of your pants. You have to have UM,

0:20:13.880 --> 0:20:17.160
<v Speaker 1>a quantification of the discipline, and you have to test

0:20:17.200 --> 0:20:19.800
<v Speaker 1>that over time. And we've done that. And so a

0:20:19.840 --> 0:20:22.359
<v Speaker 1>big one for us is our trend model UM, where

0:20:22.440 --> 0:20:26.719
<v Speaker 1>we have basically a bullish bearish trend UM. It can

0:20:26.720 --> 0:20:28.520
<v Speaker 1>go neutral, but we don't really have a neutral state.

0:20:28.520 --> 0:20:30.520
<v Speaker 1>We'd like to have either black or white. And what

0:20:30.560 --> 0:20:32.480
<v Speaker 1>we find is that other indicators that if you looked

0:20:32.520 --> 0:20:35.440
<v Speaker 1>at over the entire spectrum of bullish and bearish might

0:20:35.480 --> 0:20:37.639
<v Speaker 1>not be worth a damn. But when you break it

0:20:37.680 --> 0:20:41.159
<v Speaker 1>down between bearish and bullish, UM, some indicators work very

0:20:41.240 --> 0:20:44.280
<v Speaker 1>very well in a bear state. Other indicators work very

0:20:44.359 --> 0:20:46.560
<v Speaker 1>very well in a bull state, but they don't work

0:20:46.600 --> 0:20:50.280
<v Speaker 1>well across those different states. So for us, the quantification

0:20:50.600 --> 0:20:52.960
<v Speaker 1>trend is a big one. The quantification of trend and

0:20:53.000 --> 0:20:56.879
<v Speaker 1>then understanding what conditions work within that trend are a

0:20:56.960 --> 0:20:58.720
<v Speaker 1>huge part of what we do. So what do you

0:20:58.760 --> 0:21:01.040
<v Speaker 1>do in a crisis? We saw the oh eight o

0:21:01.160 --> 0:21:04.840
<v Speaker 1>nine crisis ramping up. Essentially all the correlations went to

0:21:04.920 --> 0:21:08.399
<v Speaker 1>one and it seemed like you were either in bonds

0:21:08.560 --> 0:21:10.960
<v Speaker 1>or equity like products and there was nothing in between.

0:21:11.280 --> 0:21:13.960
<v Speaker 1>How do you analyze as those sort of circumstances. Well,

0:21:13.960 --> 0:21:17.280
<v Speaker 1>we we have ways to measure sentiment, which obviously was

0:21:17.800 --> 0:21:20.119
<v Speaker 1>a disaster. I mean people were apocalyptic as we like

0:21:20.200 --> 0:21:22.600
<v Speaker 1>to call it at the time. UM, we have ways

0:21:22.640 --> 0:21:26.159
<v Speaker 1>to measure the UM, the severity of the downtrend, the

0:21:26.280 --> 0:21:29.080
<v Speaker 1>risk adjusted returns UM, and we look at those and

0:21:29.080 --> 0:21:31.879
<v Speaker 1>when they're they're so bad, um believe it or not,

0:21:31.960 --> 0:21:34.119
<v Speaker 1>our system flags it. So we have an understanding that

0:21:34.119 --> 0:21:37.400
<v Speaker 1>there's probably some capitulation taking place. And then we look

0:21:37.400 --> 0:21:39.920
<v Speaker 1>at the credit markets. Credit markets are a huge part

0:21:39.960 --> 0:21:41.480
<v Speaker 1>of our input that I don't think a lot of

0:21:41.480 --> 0:21:44.080
<v Speaker 1>people pay as much attention to as they should. And look,

0:21:44.119 --> 0:21:48.000
<v Speaker 1>the credit markets made their low UH in November two

0:21:48.000 --> 0:21:51.080
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight, and we're healing for a good three

0:21:51.119 --> 0:21:54.040
<v Speaker 1>months prior to the equity low. Right, So when we

0:21:54.080 --> 0:21:56.600
<v Speaker 1>looked at that that combination of things going on, saying, boy,

0:21:56.640 --> 0:21:58.879
<v Speaker 1>credits getting better, but the equity markets are turning in

0:21:58.920 --> 0:22:02.560
<v Speaker 1>a new low. There some opportunity here. And while we

0:22:02.560 --> 0:22:05.040
<v Speaker 1>were warming up to equities again, we needed that spark.

0:22:05.080 --> 0:22:08.520
<v Speaker 1>We needed to see that that engine spark. And that's

0:22:08.560 --> 0:22:11.199
<v Speaker 1>what we saw in the early part of March of

0:22:11.240 --> 0:22:14.199
<v Speaker 1>that year with these big breath days in this thrust.

0:22:14.320 --> 0:22:16.600
<v Speaker 1>That's the that's the spark that we needed to say, Hey,

0:22:16.840 --> 0:22:19.880
<v Speaker 1>these conditions are in place for what should be um

0:22:19.920 --> 0:22:23.480
<v Speaker 1>a pretty impressive rally. I'm Barry Ridholtz. You're listening to

0:22:23.600 --> 0:22:27.240
<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today

0:22:27.480 --> 0:22:31.560
<v Speaker 1>is Jeff DeGraf. He is the founder and CEO of

0:22:31.840 --> 0:22:36.439
<v Speaker 1>and head to technician at Renaissance Macro Analysis. Am I

0:22:36.480 --> 0:22:41.240
<v Speaker 1>pronouncing that right? We'll make it easy rend mac. Jeff

0:22:41.280 --> 0:22:44.560
<v Speaker 1>has been number one ranked by Institutional Investor magazine for

0:22:44.560 --> 0:22:49.240
<v Speaker 1>the past twelve years as both a technical and macro analyst,

0:22:49.600 --> 0:22:52.960
<v Speaker 1>probably best known for his years as the chief technician

0:22:53.080 --> 0:22:56.399
<v Speaker 1>at Lehman Brothers. Let's talk a little bit about the macro,

0:22:56.600 --> 0:22:59.560
<v Speaker 1>which is something that has been fascinating. It drives a

0:22:59.560 --> 0:23:03.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of new stories. It makes a great narrative. You know,

0:23:03.040 --> 0:23:06.480
<v Speaker 1>in my office we call certain people macro tourists. The

0:23:06.520 --> 0:23:10.040
<v Speaker 1>folks who dabble in macro. They have gotten killed over

0:23:10.040 --> 0:23:13.840
<v Speaker 1>the past few years. What what is that about? Well,

0:23:13.840 --> 0:23:16.639
<v Speaker 1>it's about opportunity and thinking that you know, you can

0:23:16.720 --> 0:23:20.160
<v Speaker 1>you can use the news environment to make money, which

0:23:20.200 --> 0:23:23.639
<v Speaker 1>is usually pretty difficult to the party. Yeah, getting back

0:23:23.680 --> 0:23:26.240
<v Speaker 1>to the discounting mechanism, right, so, um, you know, I

0:23:26.240 --> 0:23:30.439
<v Speaker 1>think that's one that's one area of of of trouble

0:23:30.560 --> 0:23:33.600
<v Speaker 1>or or this problematic Uh, you know, look, the macro.

0:23:34.080 --> 0:23:38.720
<v Speaker 1>The reason that we specialize in macro is because of

0:23:38.720 --> 0:23:41.800
<v Speaker 1>the street pays attention to their industry. They pay attention

0:23:41.840 --> 0:23:44.760
<v Speaker 1>to their individual stocks, and they pay attention to their models.

0:23:45.040 --> 0:23:48.280
<v Speaker 1>They don't really incorporate what's going on in the globe

0:23:48.320 --> 0:23:52.080
<v Speaker 1>and whether or not the central bank assets are expanding

0:23:52.200 --> 0:23:55.200
<v Speaker 1>or contracting, or you know, negative rates and the potential

0:23:55.200 --> 0:23:57.520
<v Speaker 1>impact of that. So what we're trying to do is

0:23:58.200 --> 0:24:01.119
<v Speaker 1>really cut out that niche and give the opportunity to

0:24:01.600 --> 0:24:03.920
<v Speaker 1>look for somebody who's got expertise and that who does

0:24:03.960 --> 0:24:06.199
<v Speaker 1>this on a daily basis, so that they can incorporate

0:24:06.240 --> 0:24:10.680
<v Speaker 1>that into their small little world which is really industry focused.

0:24:11.200 --> 0:24:14.000
<v Speaker 1>So we've seen a number of hedge fund players the

0:24:14.040 --> 0:24:17.760
<v Speaker 1>past few years really struggle. Warren Buffett just came out

0:24:18.160 --> 0:24:23.439
<v Speaker 1>at the annual seen Berkshire shareholder meeting in response to

0:24:23.480 --> 0:24:26.679
<v Speaker 1>a question said to people, Hey, it's a lot of

0:24:26.760 --> 0:24:30.280
<v Speaker 1>underperformance and it's a lot of excess fees. Uh, he's

0:24:30.320 --> 0:24:33.640
<v Speaker 1>not a fan. Why have hedge funds been having so

0:24:33.720 --> 0:24:37.400
<v Speaker 1>much difficulty in the present environment. Well, I think it's

0:24:37.440 --> 0:24:41.040
<v Speaker 1>been policy related. And if you look at the excess

0:24:41.040 --> 0:24:44.920
<v Speaker 1>returns on a volatility adjusted basis for for the S

0:24:45.000 --> 0:24:48.880
<v Speaker 1>and P right the pure index um, they've been one

0:24:48.880 --> 0:24:51.639
<v Speaker 1>of the five best periods that we've had since the

0:24:51.800 --> 0:24:55.600
<v Speaker 1>nineteen twenties. It's a generational rally. People afford it the

0:24:55.600 --> 0:24:59.160
<v Speaker 1>whole way up two hundred plus percent over six years.

0:24:58.920 --> 0:25:03.000
<v Speaker 1>That's a monster. You're also putting people into these index

0:25:03.080 --> 0:25:06.639
<v Speaker 1>products where they're looking at these returns, right, and they're saying, again,

0:25:06.720 --> 0:25:09.560
<v Speaker 1>why should I pay active management forget hedge funds, but

0:25:09.600 --> 0:25:11.919
<v Speaker 1>just active management when I can buy an index product

0:25:12.000 --> 0:25:14.719
<v Speaker 1>for fifteen basis points and called today and I'm actually

0:25:14.720 --> 0:25:18.439
<v Speaker 1>outperforming most people. And that's fine, that happens, But that

0:25:18.560 --> 0:25:21.920
<v Speaker 1>also happened at the end of right. That also happened

0:25:22.160 --> 0:25:24.520
<v Speaker 1>at the end of two thousand and seven. And so

0:25:24.680 --> 0:25:27.680
<v Speaker 1>when we look at our metrics of how much fuels

0:25:27.680 --> 0:25:30.159
<v Speaker 1>in the tank, this actually isn't the point where you

0:25:30.200 --> 0:25:33.080
<v Speaker 1>want to start endorsing indexes. This is the point where

0:25:33.080 --> 0:25:36.800
<v Speaker 1>you want to start endorsing active management hedge funds to

0:25:36.920 --> 0:25:40.280
<v Speaker 1>look for an opportunity set um that will produce something

0:25:40.320 --> 0:25:42.719
<v Speaker 1>that's better than what we think is is the the

0:25:42.760 --> 0:25:46.400
<v Speaker 1>excess returns on a volatility adjusted basis going forward. So,

0:25:46.400 --> 0:25:49.200
<v Speaker 1>so you mentioned some of the signals that were coming

0:25:49.200 --> 0:25:52.080
<v Speaker 1>from the credit market and elsewhere in oh eight oh nine,

0:25:52.760 --> 0:25:56.600
<v Speaker 1>you know what did how did you analyze the financial crisis.

0:25:56.640 --> 0:26:00.480
<v Speaker 1>What really stood out from that period that you're unique

0:26:00.560 --> 0:26:05.360
<v Speaker 1>way of looking at markets UH was insightful. I think

0:26:05.359 --> 0:26:07.560
<v Speaker 1>there are two things. The first was, if you remember

0:26:07.640 --> 0:26:11.560
<v Speaker 1>the UH, the internal hedge fund of bear Sterns blew up,

0:26:11.640 --> 0:26:14.720
<v Speaker 1>and we were seeing that summer of oh seventh exactly,

0:26:14.720 --> 0:26:16.800
<v Speaker 1>we're seeing that stress in the credit markets and the

0:26:16.800 --> 0:26:20.320
<v Speaker 1>swap markets, particularly ahead of time, and UM, you know,

0:26:20.320 --> 0:26:22.200
<v Speaker 1>it just worked its way down from tens to five

0:26:22.200 --> 0:26:25.400
<v Speaker 1>statoos and and then sort of went away and said, well,

0:26:25.400 --> 0:26:27.800
<v Speaker 1>what that's weird, Like there's always some you know, something

0:26:27.800 --> 0:26:29.960
<v Speaker 1>goes kaboom here and then two weeks later we you know,

0:26:29.960 --> 0:26:33.399
<v Speaker 1>we yeah, right right, and then boom, you know, it

0:26:33.480 --> 0:26:37.720
<v Speaker 1>happens UM. And then you have the continued deterioration UM

0:26:37.760 --> 0:26:40.760
<v Speaker 1>in these in these financials on the way down. So

0:26:41.000 --> 0:26:43.879
<v Speaker 1>you know, talking about big top formations and the things

0:26:43.960 --> 0:26:46.800
<v Speaker 1>that you know, sort of traditional technical analysis looks at

0:26:47.080 --> 0:26:51.040
<v Speaker 1>those were in place in a lot of these financials. UH.

0:26:51.080 --> 0:26:53.080
<v Speaker 1>In the in the mid part of two thousand and

0:26:53.080 --> 0:26:55.960
<v Speaker 1>seven and obviously extending into two thousand and eight, UM,

0:26:56.000 --> 0:26:57.919
<v Speaker 1>you had what was considered at the time the whale

0:26:58.119 --> 0:27:01.760
<v Speaker 1>of of bear Stern we rallied off of that into

0:27:01.760 --> 0:27:03.760
<v Speaker 1>the summer of oh eight, and then just you know,

0:27:03.960 --> 0:27:06.639
<v Speaker 1>with this lethargy started to roll over again, which was

0:27:06.720 --> 0:27:09.359
<v Speaker 1>the moment that you know, not all is well and

0:27:09.400 --> 0:27:11.280
<v Speaker 1>then there may be some other fish to come up

0:27:11.520 --> 0:27:14.560
<v Speaker 1>to the surface here as well. I recall August oh eight,

0:27:14.640 --> 0:27:17.440
<v Speaker 1>and you could just smell something was coming. It was.

0:27:17.560 --> 0:27:20.119
<v Speaker 1>It was one of those things where, gee, this just

0:27:20.560 --> 0:27:23.760
<v Speaker 1>I know that you're an evidence based guy. I like

0:27:23.880 --> 0:27:25.720
<v Speaker 1>to think I'm an evidence based guy. But it was

0:27:25.760 --> 0:27:28.480
<v Speaker 1>one of those moments over the past twenty years where

0:27:28.520 --> 0:27:31.280
<v Speaker 1>you could say, see something wicked this way comes. You

0:27:31.320 --> 0:27:33.199
<v Speaker 1>couldn't put a finger on it, but you knew it

0:27:33.240 --> 0:27:36.560
<v Speaker 1>was comment. And remember intra bank lending rates were spiking,

0:27:36.680 --> 0:27:40.480
<v Speaker 1>the library ois spread was spiking, the euro basis swaps,

0:27:40.640 --> 0:27:42.600
<v Speaker 1>so there were a lot of things that just said

0:27:42.600 --> 0:27:45.960
<v Speaker 1>the mechanism was having trouble, that there was there was

0:27:46.080 --> 0:27:50.320
<v Speaker 1>distrust amongst counterparties. Uh. And that's actually a much different

0:27:50.359 --> 0:27:53.000
<v Speaker 1>scenario than we have today. While the European banks don't

0:27:53.040 --> 0:27:56.240
<v Speaker 1>look good to us, the internal mechanism of that that

0:27:56.320 --> 0:27:59.280
<v Speaker 1>counterparty risk is actually in pretty good shape. You don't

0:27:59.280 --> 0:28:01.400
<v Speaker 1>have the same and in the gears that you had

0:28:01.440 --> 0:28:03.359
<v Speaker 1>in O eight oh nine. Now this just seems to

0:28:03.359 --> 0:28:06.040
<v Speaker 1>be almost more I don't want to use the word systemic,

0:28:06.080 --> 0:28:09.520
<v Speaker 1>but more sort of generational in terms of what's happening

0:28:09.520 --> 0:28:12.320
<v Speaker 1>to banks that the you know, the banking business has

0:28:12.359 --> 0:28:15.000
<v Speaker 1>just become a bad business. It's a secular change that

0:28:15.200 --> 0:28:18.359
<v Speaker 1>some of its technology, some of it's the new generation

0:28:18.440 --> 0:28:21.439
<v Speaker 1>coming up that is distrustful. But it doesn't seem to

0:28:21.520 --> 0:28:25.600
<v Speaker 1>be the same set sector that it was ten years ago, right, right,

0:28:25.600 --> 0:28:27.440
<v Speaker 1>And we actually think that that's one of the reasons

0:28:27.440 --> 0:28:30.120
<v Speaker 1>why we we looked at the starting Rendmack. We think

0:28:30.119 --> 0:28:33.359
<v Speaker 1>that there's still opportunity for good research. Um, you know,

0:28:33.400 --> 0:28:35.400
<v Speaker 1>particularly if you're willing to invest in it. The big

0:28:35.440 --> 0:28:37.399
<v Speaker 1>banks just don't have that much interest in doing that here,

0:28:37.560 --> 0:28:41.120
<v Speaker 1>not willing to put money and effort into into the research.

0:28:41.160 --> 0:28:44.600
<v Speaker 1>You would think that that's a potential cash cow for them,

0:28:44.800 --> 0:28:47.480
<v Speaker 1>or has the industry changed so much that it no

0:28:47.600 --> 0:28:51.640
<v Speaker 1>longer is well you know, Look, research was forever a

0:28:51.720 --> 0:28:54.960
<v Speaker 1>byproduct of banking, right, and the settlement in early two

0:28:54.960 --> 0:28:58.040
<v Speaker 1>thousand sort of drove a wedge between the official link

0:28:58.120 --> 0:29:01.120
<v Speaker 1>between those two. So Ever, since then, research has always

0:29:01.200 --> 0:29:03.920
<v Speaker 1>been considered a cost center. Right, So there's been this

0:29:04.040 --> 0:29:07.840
<v Speaker 1>juniorization of research taking place where people are swapping out

0:29:07.880 --> 0:29:10.480
<v Speaker 1>senior analysts for junior analysts just to have the coverage

0:29:10.720 --> 0:29:12.600
<v Speaker 1>helps the bank, but they don't have to pay for it.

0:29:13.120 --> 0:29:14.840
<v Speaker 1>You know, look, we we we still believe in good

0:29:14.880 --> 0:29:17.640
<v Speaker 1>old fashioned research and think that there's a premium to

0:29:17.640 --> 0:29:19.320
<v Speaker 1>be had for that. And you know, our business is

0:29:19.320 --> 0:29:22.040
<v Speaker 1>proving that that's true. Had a conversation with someone who

0:29:22.080 --> 0:29:26.360
<v Speaker 1>talked about how middle market and merchant banking has been

0:29:26.360 --> 0:29:29.920
<v Speaker 1>abandoned by the large banks if they've moved upstream, and

0:29:29.960 --> 0:29:33.800
<v Speaker 1>these guys are screaming for any sort of coverage uh,

0:29:34.400 --> 0:29:37.520
<v Speaker 1>transactional bankers and and there's a dearth there. I wonder

0:29:37.520 --> 0:29:41.320
<v Speaker 1>how much of an opportunity exists for either boutique or

0:29:41.920 --> 0:29:45.560
<v Speaker 1>purpose specific research shops like your own that can help

0:29:45.640 --> 0:29:48.040
<v Speaker 1>fill in the void. But we certainly hope. So so

0:29:48.120 --> 0:29:50.440
<v Speaker 1>let's talk a little bit about I. I where you've

0:29:50.480 --> 0:29:53.280
<v Speaker 1>been ranked twelve years running? Is that right? I think

0:29:53.320 --> 0:29:59.520
<v Speaker 1>that's right. That's an incredible track record tool mass to

0:29:59.720 --> 0:30:02.080
<v Speaker 1>what do you And for people who may not be

0:30:02.120 --> 0:30:07.680
<v Speaker 1>familiar with institutional investor, people, UH vote and they actually

0:30:07.760 --> 0:30:11.680
<v Speaker 1>vote based to some degree on their assets under management

0:30:11.760 --> 0:30:16.440
<v Speaker 1>and the commissions they spend. And they specifically say this

0:30:16.480 --> 0:30:19.200
<v Speaker 1>is our favorite economists. That what's been ed Hyman for

0:30:19.240 --> 0:30:22.200
<v Speaker 1>thirty five years running, the joke being he's actually not

0:30:22.200 --> 0:30:25.920
<v Speaker 1>an economist. Um, just play one on TV and you've

0:30:25.920 --> 0:30:30.320
<v Speaker 1>been numbered one for twelve years running as a macro

0:30:30.360 --> 0:30:33.640
<v Speaker 1>analysts and eleven years as a technolonalyst. Is that right?

0:30:33.200 --> 0:30:36.040
<v Speaker 1>That that's quite a track record to what do you

0:30:37.040 --> 0:30:41.240
<v Speaker 1>to blame or credit that? Yeah? I guess what we

0:30:41.320 --> 0:30:43.560
<v Speaker 1>try to do is we try to be as intellectually

0:30:43.600 --> 0:30:47.040
<v Speaker 1>honest as we possibly can. Um. We are very very

0:30:47.040 --> 0:30:50.360
<v Speaker 1>committed to making people money. UM. That is I mean

0:30:50.400 --> 0:30:54.000
<v Speaker 1>that is job one as we see it, UM. And uh,

0:30:54.080 --> 0:30:55.959
<v Speaker 1>I think you know the other important part of it

0:30:56.040 --> 0:30:58.320
<v Speaker 1>is we we try to quantify the process. We try

0:30:58.320 --> 0:31:02.000
<v Speaker 1>to demystify the technical process. And so you know, if

0:31:02.080 --> 0:31:05.240
<v Speaker 1>you don't have a lot of technical experience, UM, we

0:31:05.280 --> 0:31:07.920
<v Speaker 1>don't try to use the jargon e words. We try

0:31:07.920 --> 0:31:11.040
<v Speaker 1>to say, hey, here's you know, here are the probabilities

0:31:11.120 --> 0:31:14.160
<v Speaker 1>of this taking place based on these these certain factors

0:31:14.240 --> 0:31:16.080
<v Speaker 1>of which they are technical. And so I think a

0:31:16.080 --> 0:31:19.160
<v Speaker 1>lot of that has to do with the quantification, the

0:31:19.200 --> 0:31:22.400
<v Speaker 1>demystification of the of the process. So I went out

0:31:22.400 --> 0:31:24.680
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter over the weekend and said, hey, I'm interviewing

0:31:24.760 --> 0:31:27.920
<v Speaker 1>Jeff degraph. Any questions and a few interesting things popped

0:31:28.000 --> 0:31:32.040
<v Speaker 1>up from from some technicians on Twitter. One of the

0:31:32.080 --> 0:31:35.560
<v Speaker 1>ones I liked was, how do you, as an analyst

0:31:35.720 --> 0:31:39.280
<v Speaker 1>put a new and intriguing lens on the macro review

0:31:39.400 --> 0:31:43.160
<v Speaker 1>when so much of it is is will trod uh Land,

0:31:43.280 --> 0:31:46.120
<v Speaker 1>So many people have have our covering macro. How do

0:31:46.160 --> 0:31:48.760
<v Speaker 1>you keep it fresh and interesting and valuable. Yeah, well,

0:31:48.840 --> 0:31:51.040
<v Speaker 1>we we rely on our database, and we rely on

0:31:51.600 --> 0:31:55.680
<v Speaker 1>our computer programmers, and um, we rely on the uh

0:31:55.840 --> 0:31:59.000
<v Speaker 1>quantification of the data. Um. I mean, I'll give you

0:31:59.040 --> 0:32:02.120
<v Speaker 1>a great example. We you know, our single stock database

0:32:02.240 --> 0:32:04.240
<v Speaker 1>goes back to the existence of the SMP, back to

0:32:04.280 --> 0:32:06.959
<v Speaker 1>the early nineteen sixties. So when we go through and

0:32:07.000 --> 0:32:09.800
<v Speaker 1>look out, hey, do do breakouts work? Do breakdowns work?

0:32:09.840 --> 0:32:11.880
<v Speaker 1>How does this, you know, play itself out? We're not

0:32:11.920 --> 0:32:14.360
<v Speaker 1>talking about the next or last ten years or fifteen years.

0:32:14.400 --> 0:32:17.000
<v Speaker 1>We're really talking about, you know, over longer than my

0:32:17.080 --> 0:32:20.320
<v Speaker 1>lifespan so far. Um, you know, the the beginning of

0:32:20.360 --> 0:32:23.800
<v Speaker 1>the SMP some fifty five plus years and so, Um,

0:32:23.840 --> 0:32:25.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, I think that's one of the things that

0:32:25.680 --> 0:32:28.560
<v Speaker 1>that differentiates us and puts a different spin on things,

0:32:28.640 --> 0:32:31.320
<v Speaker 1>is that when you get the work from us, you've

0:32:31.360 --> 0:32:34.080
<v Speaker 1>got the totality of work, and you know, we'll lay

0:32:34.080 --> 0:32:36.200
<v Speaker 1>it out and say, hey, this works or this doesn't work,

0:32:36.320 --> 0:32:39.960
<v Speaker 1>or this works, but only in these conditions, and um,

0:32:40.000 --> 0:32:42.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, not many people are doing that. We've been

0:32:42.600 --> 0:32:46.400
<v Speaker 1>speaking with Jeff DeGraf of ren Mack. Uh. Jeff, where

0:32:46.440 --> 0:32:48.200
<v Speaker 1>can people find your work if they want to read

0:32:48.240 --> 0:32:51.760
<v Speaker 1>more about what you guys do? Our website ww dot

0:32:51.760 --> 0:32:55.280
<v Speaker 1>ren mac dot com. If you enjoy this conversation, be

0:32:55.320 --> 0:32:58.360
<v Speaker 1>sure and check out our podcast extras, where we keep

0:32:58.400 --> 0:33:03.240
<v Speaker 1>the tape rolling and continue chatting about all things market related. Uh,

0:33:03.360 --> 0:33:06.360
<v Speaker 1>be sure and check out all of our previous conversations.

0:33:06.400 --> 0:33:10.959
<v Speaker 1>You can find them on Apple iTunes, SoundCloud and on

0:33:11.000 --> 0:33:14.720
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot com. Check out my daily column on Bloomberg

0:33:14.800 --> 0:33:18.440
<v Speaker 1>View dot com or follow me on Twitter at rit Halts.

0:33:18.560 --> 0:33:21.880
<v Speaker 1>I'm Barry Hults. You've been listening to Masters and Business

0:33:21.880 --> 0:33:25.480
<v Speaker 1>on Bloomberg Radio. Are you looking to take your business

0:33:25.480 --> 0:33:29.000
<v Speaker 1>to the next level? The accounting, tax and advisory professionals

0:33:29.000 --> 0:33:32.800
<v Speaker 1>from Cone Resnick can guide you. Cone Resnick delivers industry

0:33:32.800 --> 0:33:36.880
<v Speaker 1>expertise and forward thinking perspective that can help turn business

0:33:36.920 --> 0:33:43.160
<v Speaker 1>possibilities into business opportunities. Look ahead, gain insight, imagine more.

0:33:43.760 --> 0:33:46.440
<v Speaker 1>Is your business ready to break through? Learn more at

0:33:46.480 --> 0:33:53.280
<v Speaker 1>cone resnick dot com Slash Breakthrough cone Resnick Accounting, Tax Advisory.

0:33:53.440 --> 0:33:57.240
<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the podcast portion of our conversation, Jeff, thank

0:33:57.240 --> 0:33:58.920
<v Speaker 1>you so much for doing this. Now I get to

0:33:59.440 --> 0:34:03.440
<v Speaker 1>take off my headphones. I normally have these little headphones

0:34:03.480 --> 0:34:07.040
<v Speaker 1>that are very unobtrusive, but um, I wasn't in the

0:34:07.080 --> 0:34:10.520
<v Speaker 1>office Friday. I forgot to bring them in, so I'm

0:34:10.560 --> 0:34:13.080
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of a mess today. Um, really, thank

0:34:13.120 --> 0:34:15.160
<v Speaker 1>you so much for doing this. I have a few

0:34:15.160 --> 0:34:19.480
<v Speaker 1>people who are serious uh technicians. I think J. C.

0:34:19.680 --> 0:34:22.640
<v Speaker 1>Perett's how do you speak at an m T A

0:34:22.960 --> 0:34:25.720
<v Speaker 1>event might have been been here. He was like, dude,

0:34:25.840 --> 0:34:27.839
<v Speaker 1>so exciting to listen to Jeff. I'm like, all right,

0:34:27.840 --> 0:34:29.960
<v Speaker 1>give me a couple of questions. So some of those

0:34:30.040 --> 0:34:35.040
<v Speaker 1>questions were his, Um, you studied finance in college. Did

0:34:35.120 --> 0:34:37.680
<v Speaker 1>you know from day one you wanted to go right

0:34:37.719 --> 0:34:40.880
<v Speaker 1>into uh, right onto Wall Street? Yeah? Yeah, it was.

0:34:41.560 --> 0:34:45.480
<v Speaker 1>It was pretty easy. I like the I mean look,

0:34:45.480 --> 0:34:48.359
<v Speaker 1>I was trying to get out of Michigan so at

0:34:48.360 --> 0:34:53.560
<v Speaker 1>a kalamazoo kalamazoo. Um. But you know, I liked the

0:34:54.120 --> 0:34:57.920
<v Speaker 1>intellectual challenge. I like the lifestyle. I remember the first interview.

0:34:57.960 --> 0:35:00.759
<v Speaker 1>I was in Chicago looking at an opportunity and the

0:35:00.760 --> 0:35:04.879
<v Speaker 1>first interview, Um, the guy said, Uh, you'll never meet

0:35:05.120 --> 0:35:09.680
<v Speaker 1>an industry where there's the funniest and smartest people at

0:35:09.680 --> 0:35:13.120
<v Speaker 1>the same time. That's interesting. I said, sign me up.

0:35:13.560 --> 0:35:16.680
<v Speaker 1>You're right. So I enjoyed that. That that's really interesting.

0:35:16.719 --> 0:35:19.600
<v Speaker 1>There are a number of hilarious people in this industry.

0:35:19.760 --> 0:35:23.239
<v Speaker 1>Most people are not familiar with them. Um, but they're

0:35:23.239 --> 0:35:26.040
<v Speaker 1>out there and they definitely have a uh, there's some

0:35:26.040 --> 0:35:30.360
<v Speaker 1>sense of games. My my partner, uh, Josh Brown. People

0:35:30.360 --> 0:35:34.400
<v Speaker 1>don't realize this guy is hilarious, and people simply have

0:35:34.480 --> 0:35:37.000
<v Speaker 1>no idea how funny is although I think on Twitter

0:35:37.040 --> 0:35:40.279
<v Speaker 1>people have finally, uh finally figured that out. So you

0:35:40.320 --> 0:35:42.600
<v Speaker 1>go straight to Wall Street. You were Merrill Lynch in

0:35:42.600 --> 0:35:45.120
<v Speaker 1>the early days, is that right? Yea early days, and

0:35:45.160 --> 0:35:50.320
<v Speaker 1>then I moved over to Lehman Brothers under Steve Schaubin,

0:35:50.560 --> 0:35:53.000
<v Speaker 1>who had been at Meryl. So I knew Steve from

0:35:53.160 --> 0:35:57.480
<v Speaker 1>my Merril days. Uh started out doing international work at

0:35:57.560 --> 0:36:00.600
<v Speaker 1>Lehman Brothers and then moved into the hot seat in

0:36:00.600 --> 0:36:04.880
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand there as chief chief technician at Lehman.

0:36:04.960 --> 0:36:08.319
<v Speaker 1>So what were the golden days of Lehman Brothers? Like, Oh,

0:36:08.360 --> 0:36:13.120
<v Speaker 1>it was you know, I was too young to know better. Um, yeah,

0:36:13.360 --> 0:36:18.560
<v Speaker 1>I mean the eight to two thousand was just unbelievable.

0:36:19.280 --> 0:36:21.759
<v Speaker 1>It was it was. It was so much fun. It

0:36:21.840 --> 0:36:24.040
<v Speaker 1>was so fun to come into the to the office.

0:36:24.400 --> 0:36:29.879
<v Speaker 1>Lehman Brothers had a great culture. Um. So that was yeah, yeah, yeah,

0:36:29.920 --> 0:36:31.759
<v Speaker 1>I mean it was just it was and it was

0:36:31.880 --> 0:36:34.560
<v Speaker 1>the little train who thought they could right and so

0:36:34.760 --> 0:36:37.440
<v Speaker 1>just people were you know, hungry, and uh, it was

0:36:37.520 --> 0:36:39.640
<v Speaker 1>it was just it was fun. We were all climbing

0:36:39.640 --> 0:36:42.319
<v Speaker 1>in the right direction. Um, little train. There were the

0:36:42.360 --> 0:36:47.279
<v Speaker 1>fourth fourth largest investment bank. They dominated mortgage underwriting. They

0:36:47.320 --> 0:36:50.200
<v Speaker 1>were a substantial force for a long time. But remember

0:36:50.200 --> 0:36:53.080
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't a big deal until the mid offs, right,

0:36:53.120 --> 0:36:56.040
<v Speaker 1>so nobody realized until a little there were there were

0:36:56.040 --> 0:36:58.319
<v Speaker 1>early signs that there were issues there. Oh two oh

0:36:58.360 --> 0:37:02.480
<v Speaker 1>three things just got talk about looking at at data.

0:37:02.719 --> 0:37:06.440
<v Speaker 1>One of my favorite charts has always been UM meeting

0:37:06.480 --> 0:37:09.719
<v Speaker 1>income to Meetian home price. And I was looking at

0:37:09.719 --> 0:37:12.040
<v Speaker 1>this long before the collapse, and you could see you

0:37:12.080 --> 0:37:15.359
<v Speaker 1>were three standard deviations away from the norm. So either

0:37:15.440 --> 0:37:17.600
<v Speaker 1>everybody's going to get a raise or something bad is

0:37:17.640 --> 0:37:21.840
<v Speaker 1>going to happen. It was pretty much one or the other. Um.

0:37:22.440 --> 0:37:26.120
<v Speaker 1>Did you ever spend much time under Dick fold And

0:37:26.120 --> 0:37:27.960
<v Speaker 1>and meet meet him, work with him or was he

0:37:28.080 --> 0:37:29.719
<v Speaker 1>off in the corner office? I mean I meant him

0:37:29.719 --> 0:37:32.359
<v Speaker 1>a few times and it wasn't the big place. There wasn't. Yeah,

0:37:32.360 --> 0:37:37.279
<v Speaker 1>there wasn't daily interaction. Tell us about the research process there?

0:37:37.400 --> 0:37:40.520
<v Speaker 1>How How was that was pretty much traditional Wall Street

0:37:40.640 --> 0:37:44.160
<v Speaker 1>research at at Lehman, Yeah it was, but it was

0:37:44.360 --> 0:37:48.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, they were good, hungry young analysts. Um my

0:37:48.760 --> 0:37:54.000
<v Speaker 1>president now Steve hash who's president of of Ren mack Um,

0:37:54.160 --> 0:37:58.239
<v Speaker 1>actually ran the research department there. Um, we invested in

0:37:58.360 --> 0:38:00.680
<v Speaker 1>up in commerce. I mean we just believe in you know,

0:38:00.840 --> 0:38:05.440
<v Speaker 1>good smart young thinkers. And uh is another one was

0:38:05.440 --> 0:38:09.080
<v Speaker 1>was that Meryl Lordly and you brought him along as well? Absolutely,

0:38:09.120 --> 0:38:10.919
<v Speaker 1>So that's you know, that's how we think about the world.

0:38:10.960 --> 0:38:13.839
<v Speaker 1>Where where's the rest of your team from? Oh, it's

0:38:13.880 --> 0:38:16.000
<v Speaker 1>all over the map. Uh Some I s I sales

0:38:16.040 --> 0:38:18.040
<v Speaker 1>people a lot of people that have been just from

0:38:18.040 --> 0:38:21.600
<v Speaker 1>different parts of the of the business. Um, yeah, all

0:38:21.640 --> 0:38:25.640
<v Speaker 1>all different walks of life. So what's the plan for

0:38:26.440 --> 0:38:30.280
<v Speaker 1>a relatively you know, you're five years old just about

0:38:30.400 --> 0:38:34.680
<v Speaker 1>is that right? Relatively young, fast growing company. How do

0:38:34.719 --> 0:38:37.440
<v Speaker 1>you see this playing at for someone who's not yet fifty?

0:38:38.160 --> 0:38:41.160
<v Speaker 1>What do you want to do with this company? Uh? Look,

0:38:41.200 --> 0:38:44.839
<v Speaker 1>I'm I'm a big believer in the research process and

0:38:44.920 --> 0:38:47.520
<v Speaker 1>while others are sort of moving away from it, you know,

0:38:47.640 --> 0:38:50.320
<v Speaker 1>call it straw hats in January. I think that there's

0:38:50.440 --> 0:38:53.560
<v Speaker 1>opportunity there for the right people. It's not just plug

0:38:53.600 --> 0:38:55.080
<v Speaker 1>and play and you know, hope for the best. I

0:38:55.120 --> 0:38:56.480
<v Speaker 1>think you have to get the right people in there.

0:38:56.719 --> 0:38:58.560
<v Speaker 1>But there's still I mean, we see it in the business.

0:38:58.600 --> 0:39:04.160
<v Speaker 1>There's still a demand and for good, um, thoughtful analysts, right,

0:39:04.239 --> 0:39:07.680
<v Speaker 1>not just people that do stock research, but people that

0:39:08.200 --> 0:39:11.440
<v Speaker 1>think differently, do the hard work, roll up their sleeves,

0:39:11.480 --> 0:39:15.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, understand the company. There's there's there's interest there. Now,

0:39:15.280 --> 0:39:17.080
<v Speaker 1>what we're what we want to do and make sure

0:39:17.080 --> 0:39:19.480
<v Speaker 1>that we do with this is that it ties into

0:39:19.520 --> 0:39:23.360
<v Speaker 1>the macro play, right, So it's not just covering semiconductors,

0:39:23.400 --> 0:39:27.000
<v Speaker 1>but the semiconductors from a broader standpoint, and how and

0:39:27.080 --> 0:39:30.160
<v Speaker 1>what that means for the macro world. You know, there's

0:39:30.280 --> 0:39:33.640
<v Speaker 1>there's a thesis kicking around that following the early two

0:39:33.680 --> 0:39:37.280
<v Speaker 1>thousand analysts settlement with the New York State Attorney General.

0:39:37.880 --> 0:39:41.440
<v Speaker 1>Part of the settlement was a mandate that large banks

0:39:41.520 --> 0:39:45.680
<v Speaker 1>funds independent third party research, and you and that that

0:39:45.719 --> 0:39:48.680
<v Speaker 1>mandate has now ended. So you had this huge boom

0:39:48.719 --> 0:39:53.440
<v Speaker 1>throughout the aughts of independent research, some of which was

0:39:53.480 --> 0:39:56.680
<v Speaker 1>pretty good, some of which was of dubious value, but hey,

0:39:56.719 --> 0:39:58.520
<v Speaker 1>there was a mandate and we had money to spend,

0:39:59.000 --> 0:40:01.920
<v Speaker 1>go spend it. That has run its course, and that

0:40:02.000 --> 0:40:05.640
<v Speaker 1>seems to be at least in part behind some of

0:40:05.680 --> 0:40:10.680
<v Speaker 1>the shakeout that's happened in the research space. But what's

0:40:10.800 --> 0:40:14.520
<v Speaker 1>left are the companies that people are sending research dollars to,

0:40:15.040 --> 0:40:17.920
<v Speaker 1>whether they have to or not. They're the companies they

0:40:18.160 --> 0:40:20.960
<v Speaker 1>find value at and want to buy purchase their research

0:40:21.480 --> 0:40:23.560
<v Speaker 1>U I s I. There's a run of them that

0:40:24.080 --> 0:40:26.160
<v Speaker 1>have have been around for a while and are likely

0:40:26.200 --> 0:40:30.080
<v Speaker 1>to continue being around. Which is a long winded way

0:40:30.200 --> 0:40:32.560
<v Speaker 1>to get to the question of how do you see

0:40:32.600 --> 0:40:36.920
<v Speaker 1>the rest of the shakeout in research playing out. I mean,

0:40:36.920 --> 0:40:39.040
<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a great question. I think you're gonna

0:40:39.160 --> 0:40:46.359
<v Speaker 1>end up with um with the traditional banks again moving

0:40:46.400 --> 0:40:50.200
<v Speaker 1>towards that juniorization and meaning they'll they'll swap out a

0:40:50.280 --> 0:40:53.680
<v Speaker 1>high paid senior analyst with a junior guy without a

0:40:53.680 --> 0:40:56.680
<v Speaker 1>lot of experience but doesn't demand a big check, and

0:40:56.760 --> 0:40:59.880
<v Speaker 1>so they still have coverage. But you know, it's not

0:41:00.640 --> 0:41:04.440
<v Speaker 1>it's not. Uh. I'm trying to think of a classic

0:41:04.560 --> 0:41:08.040
<v Speaker 1>example of an analyst who who was the axe on

0:41:08.040 --> 0:41:11.040
<v Speaker 1>a particular stock or in a particular sector. But Rick

0:41:11.120 --> 0:41:14.960
<v Speaker 1>Sherlan's on on Microsoft or Charlie Wolf on Apple. They're

0:41:15.000 --> 0:41:18.480
<v Speaker 1>handful of guys who knew it better than anybody. That

0:41:18.560 --> 0:41:20.520
<v Speaker 1>era seems to be coming to an end. Yeah, I

0:41:20.880 --> 0:41:23.080
<v Speaker 1>think so for the big banks, but there's still that

0:41:23.120 --> 0:41:26.360
<v Speaker 1>opportunity set for the independence right now, a number of

0:41:26.400 --> 0:41:29.960
<v Speaker 1>firms forget the macro space that that that we focus on.

0:41:30.080 --> 0:41:32.239
<v Speaker 1>But um, you've got it for media, You've got it

0:41:32.239 --> 0:41:35.360
<v Speaker 1>for industrials, you you've had it for financials. So you know,

0:41:35.400 --> 0:41:39.000
<v Speaker 1>even these silos, Um, Dana Telsey came out of Bear Sterns.

0:41:39.120 --> 0:41:45.480
<v Speaker 1>She's tag right on housing, Dana is on retail. So

0:41:45.640 --> 0:41:48.520
<v Speaker 1>people who have an expertise in the space that becomes

0:41:48.560 --> 0:41:51.480
<v Speaker 1>their area. That's right, That's right, that's that's kind of

0:41:51.800 --> 0:41:55.279
<v Speaker 1>that's kind of fascinating that that's we didn't really see

0:41:55.280 --> 0:41:58.560
<v Speaker 1>that twenty or so years ago, or did we UM

0:41:59.760 --> 0:42:02.040
<v Speaker 1>my letter writers and things. But I think there's there's

0:42:02.040 --> 0:42:06.399
<v Speaker 1>a few things there. One is that the the execution business, right,

0:42:06.440 --> 0:42:09.000
<v Speaker 1>having a broker dealing the execution business through technology has

0:42:09.000 --> 0:42:12.799
<v Speaker 1>gotten much simpler. Right, So this whole best execution I

0:42:12.800 --> 0:42:16.200
<v Speaker 1>mean Ren Mack, little old Renmac can provide UM the

0:42:16.239 --> 0:42:20.520
<v Speaker 1>best execution because we we basically use UM. The other

0:42:20.560 --> 0:42:22.920
<v Speaker 1>big banks al goes, right, so we we come in

0:42:23.000 --> 0:42:26.560
<v Speaker 1>and and and and uh sort of you know, from

0:42:26.600 --> 0:42:30.320
<v Speaker 1>a from a from a darker perspective from the outside,

0:42:30.320 --> 0:42:32.600
<v Speaker 1>people don't know exactly who's trading what, but you know,

0:42:32.680 --> 0:42:36.759
<v Speaker 1>we know from our desk, the you know. The The

0:42:36.800 --> 0:42:40.880
<v Speaker 1>other part of that is the the technology has allowed

0:42:40.920 --> 0:42:45.440
<v Speaker 1>distribution UM to be a lot cheaper than it was.

0:42:46.360 --> 0:42:48.959
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I remember when I started UM. We would

0:42:48.960 --> 0:42:52.440
<v Speaker 1>send faxes, you know, and it was priced per sheet,

0:42:52.840 --> 0:42:56.200
<v Speaker 1>per per recipient, right, So I mean there was a

0:42:56.239 --> 0:42:58.040
<v Speaker 1>there was a half a million dollars. I'm serious, there

0:42:58.080 --> 0:43:01.040
<v Speaker 1>was a half a million dollar cost and distributing our

0:43:01.120 --> 0:43:04.280
<v Speaker 1>research because we had to pay the long distance fee

0:43:04.560 --> 0:43:09.160
<v Speaker 1>and the facts fees. And you know, once the proliferation

0:43:09.160 --> 0:43:12.840
<v Speaker 1>of email came about, writing a program to just convert

0:43:12.880 --> 0:43:16.040
<v Speaker 1>that to a PDF and sending it out was simple,

0:43:16.160 --> 0:43:19.160
<v Speaker 1>so facts as you're really talking late eighties, early nineties.

0:43:19.200 --> 0:43:22.040
<v Speaker 1>By the mid nineties email was starting to pick up

0:43:22.040 --> 0:43:25.000
<v Speaker 1>a bit. It was but to have research done, you

0:43:25.000 --> 0:43:27.880
<v Speaker 1>know in a way that um, you know we're sending

0:43:27.920 --> 0:43:31.319
<v Speaker 1>big PDFs over That's exactly right, that's exactly right. That

0:43:31.400 --> 0:43:34.920
<v Speaker 1>was a bandwidth issue which wasn't solved bill after global

0:43:34.960 --> 0:43:38.800
<v Speaker 1>crossing in Metromedia, fiber collapsed and left all this dark

0:43:38.840 --> 0:43:41.719
<v Speaker 1>fibers that are so expensive to build free and or

0:43:41.760 --> 0:43:44.520
<v Speaker 1>at least cheap for everybody else to pick up on

0:43:44.520 --> 0:43:48.439
<v Speaker 1>on their bones. Except supply will create demand. And well

0:43:48.480 --> 0:43:52.360
<v Speaker 1>that's the story of every major technology boom is after

0:43:52.400 --> 0:43:55.440
<v Speaker 1>the bus, you have all this in expensive infrastructure. So

0:43:55.560 --> 0:43:58.960
<v Speaker 1>that leads to the obvious question, which you alluded to previously,

0:43:59.160 --> 0:44:05.760
<v Speaker 1>how has tech anology change the way you do business? Well? Uh,

0:44:06.000 --> 0:44:09.000
<v Speaker 1>doing business or doing analysis? I think there are two

0:44:09.040 --> 0:44:12.040
<v Speaker 1>different things, right, Um, you know, look, business has done

0:44:12.320 --> 0:44:14.239
<v Speaker 1>you know, in the same in the same way. I mean,

0:44:14.280 --> 0:44:17.239
<v Speaker 1>obviously it's relationships and you're you know, you understand what

0:44:17.239 --> 0:44:19.719
<v Speaker 1>the clients are looking for. And UM, I mean I

0:44:19.760 --> 0:44:22.600
<v Speaker 1>don't think that that will ever go aware certainly shouldn't UM.

0:44:22.640 --> 0:44:25.839
<v Speaker 1>In terms of the analysis, UM. You know, I think

0:44:25.920 --> 0:44:29.960
<v Speaker 1>one of the problems that you end up with is UM.

0:44:30.000 --> 0:44:33.120
<v Speaker 1>You know, you give people the opportunity to sort of

0:44:33.160 --> 0:44:35.759
<v Speaker 1>do things, and they think they can do it right,

0:44:35.840 --> 0:44:39.160
<v Speaker 1>and they don't have the background or the understanding, UM

0:44:39.200 --> 0:44:42.319
<v Speaker 1>to fully take advantage of what some of the technology

0:44:42.360 --> 0:44:45.400
<v Speaker 1>can do. UM. And so for instance, let me interrupt

0:44:45.440 --> 0:44:49.120
<v Speaker 1>you there. So in the mid to late nineties and

0:44:49.120 --> 0:44:52.080
<v Speaker 1>early two thousands, you could get all manner of charts

0:44:52.160 --> 0:44:57.759
<v Speaker 1>for free everywhere online, right, and everyone fancied themselves a technician.

0:44:58.400 --> 0:45:05.680
<v Speaker 1>Most were not. Right. So is that democratization by technology? UM?

0:45:05.800 --> 0:45:08.839
<v Speaker 1>Is that a problem that people actually think they could

0:45:08.840 --> 0:45:11.920
<v Speaker 1>do things when there's a handful of technicians who came

0:45:11.960 --> 0:45:14.160
<v Speaker 1>out of that era who are really good and a

0:45:14.280 --> 0:45:17.440
<v Speaker 1>number of people who you know, they they think they're technicians,

0:45:17.520 --> 0:45:22.000
<v Speaker 1>but they're just you know, exhibiting confirmation biased I have this.

0:45:22.080 --> 0:45:24.120
<v Speaker 1>Let me go find a chart that I own this,

0:45:24.400 --> 0:45:27.160
<v Speaker 1>let me find something that that confirms my prior position.

0:45:27.360 --> 0:45:28.640
<v Speaker 1>I think, I think, but I think that happens with

0:45:28.680 --> 0:45:30.839
<v Speaker 1>almost anything that's out there, right, I mean, I think

0:45:30.880 --> 0:45:33.960
<v Speaker 1>I can retile my bathroom. I can't retie my bathroom, right,

0:45:34.000 --> 0:45:35.879
<v Speaker 1>I mean that's there are YouTube videos that will show

0:45:35.920 --> 0:45:37.040
<v Speaker 1>you how to do it, but it's still not going

0:45:37.080 --> 0:45:38.359
<v Speaker 1>to look as good as if I pay the guy

0:45:38.400 --> 0:45:40.560
<v Speaker 1>to do it, right, And that's why you hire a problem,

0:45:40.680 --> 0:45:42.680
<v Speaker 1>right exactly. So it's the you know, it's really the

0:45:42.719 --> 0:45:46.160
<v Speaker 1>same thing in any in any business, and uh um,

0:45:46.200 --> 0:45:48.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, we we find we find similar you know,

0:45:48.719 --> 0:45:52.680
<v Speaker 1>similar situations. But you know what we're doing which is

0:45:52.719 --> 0:45:55.880
<v Speaker 1>so unique is again we're quantifying that process. So instead

0:45:55.880 --> 0:45:58.319
<v Speaker 1>of drawing a trend line or um, you know, saying

0:45:58.360 --> 0:46:02.920
<v Speaker 1>it's overbater over sold, we contextualize that and we show

0:46:03.440 --> 0:46:05.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, what that really means in terms of the

0:46:06.200 --> 0:46:08.480
<v Speaker 1>history and whether or not it's valuable. And that's what

0:46:09.120 --> 0:46:10.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, that's what the amateurs and frankly a lot

0:46:10.960 --> 0:46:13.160
<v Speaker 1>of the pros don't even do. And so um, that's

0:46:13.200 --> 0:46:17.200
<v Speaker 1>one thing that really sets us apart. So you're using technology,

0:46:18.120 --> 0:46:22.040
<v Speaker 1>um in a very significant way. You've built this database.

0:46:22.560 --> 0:46:24.920
<v Speaker 1>What did you use for sources to put that together?

0:46:24.960 --> 0:46:27.560
<v Speaker 1>How long did it take to clean up that database

0:46:27.600 --> 0:46:29.359
<v Speaker 1>to get it to do what you want? How many

0:46:29.360 --> 0:46:32.480
<v Speaker 1>different components are you tracking in that? Tell us a

0:46:32.520 --> 0:46:35.560
<v Speaker 1>little bit about the secret sauce um as much as

0:46:35.600 --> 0:46:38.640
<v Speaker 1>you're willing to write keeping it secret um. Look, it's

0:46:38.719 --> 0:46:41.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, we use great we use we use CRISP data,

0:46:41.760 --> 0:46:46.319
<v Speaker 1>CRISP price data um. And we've got that again going back,

0:46:46.960 --> 0:46:49.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, s and P ninety going back to the

0:46:49.080 --> 0:46:52.160
<v Speaker 1>mid the mid nineteen twenties and for people don't understand

0:46:52.239 --> 0:46:54.399
<v Speaker 1>Chris but comes out of the University of Chicago, if

0:46:54.640 --> 0:46:59.840
<v Speaker 1>memory serves, and really a deep and fairly clean database,

0:47:00.239 --> 0:47:04.160
<v Speaker 1>uh of of market information. I think it goes all

0:47:04.160 --> 0:47:07.000
<v Speaker 1>the way back to the twenties. Something thinking of the

0:47:07.120 --> 0:47:09.880
<v Speaker 1>SMP ninety back to the twenties, which is, whenever you

0:47:09.920 --> 0:47:15.080
<v Speaker 1>see the SMP five hundred quoted beyond it's it's the predecessor,

0:47:15.520 --> 0:47:18.600
<v Speaker 1>which was in the SNP five. Even the SMP five

0:47:18.680 --> 0:47:22.200
<v Speaker 1>hundred was in the SMP fire two. Sometime in the latent,

0:47:22.360 --> 0:47:26.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm trying to remember when they changed the waiting sector

0:47:27.680 --> 0:47:30.200
<v Speaker 1>that all went away in the eighties. Sometimes ye so

0:47:30.440 --> 0:47:32.880
<v Speaker 1>changes and and has certainly look at that, and we

0:47:32.880 --> 0:47:36.080
<v Speaker 1>look at the various waitings over time. UM. We use

0:47:36.080 --> 0:47:39.919
<v Speaker 1>option data UM for a big part of our sentiment work. UM.

0:47:39.960 --> 0:47:44.960
<v Speaker 1>We incorporate fundamental data UM from various various sources UM.

0:47:45.040 --> 0:47:48.279
<v Speaker 1>And then UM we also, which I think uniquely, we

0:47:48.320 --> 0:47:52.560
<v Speaker 1>bring in economic data so that we can see what

0:47:52.800 --> 0:47:56.080
<v Speaker 1>that looks like in relation to these other things that

0:47:56.120 --> 0:47:59.360
<v Speaker 1>we're looking at. Technically four stocks, Right, So does p

0:47:59.560 --> 0:48:03.160
<v Speaker 1>M I work cure does the UM you know, do

0:48:03.239 --> 0:48:07.239
<v Speaker 1>the UH the H four data from the FED? Does

0:48:07.360 --> 0:48:11.200
<v Speaker 1>that have any influence? And so UM always looking, always adding,

0:48:11.239 --> 0:48:14.799
<v Speaker 1>always building, and uh CFTC data we use that as well. So,

0:48:14.800 --> 0:48:18.840
<v Speaker 1>so let's talk about economic data. UM. What is actually

0:48:18.880 --> 0:48:22.360
<v Speaker 1>going on in terms of I'm not looking for a

0:48:22.400 --> 0:48:27.040
<v Speaker 1>forecast to the future historically, what is the correlation between

0:48:27.239 --> 0:48:29.840
<v Speaker 1>changes in the overall economy, either for the better or

0:48:29.920 --> 0:48:35.640
<v Speaker 1>wars and markets. I've always looked at markets leading economic data,

0:48:35.719 --> 0:48:39.839
<v Speaker 1>although not by as much as some people imagine. Well

0:48:39.880 --> 0:48:43.200
<v Speaker 1>that's true. I mean, look, economic data is certainly UM

0:48:43.640 --> 0:48:47.040
<v Speaker 1>less noisy believe it or not, UM, but it also lags.

0:48:47.080 --> 0:48:49.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, there's a reason they are leading indicators coincidental

0:48:49.440 --> 0:48:53.560
<v Speaker 1>indicators and lagging indicators right and meaning leading the cycle

0:48:53.800 --> 0:48:56.720
<v Speaker 1>or lagging the cycle. And look, the reason that business

0:48:56.719 --> 0:48:58.360
<v Speaker 1>is so hard. If you can just look at economic

0:48:58.440 --> 0:49:01.840
<v Speaker 1>data and forecast the US in p correctly, it'd be easy.

0:49:02.520 --> 0:49:04.799
<v Speaker 1>It just it doesn't happen. Everybody's going to be rich,

0:49:04.960 --> 0:49:08.000
<v Speaker 1>right exactly. So you know what we look at is

0:49:08.440 --> 0:49:11.479
<v Speaker 1>historically the market has sniffed things out. Now, it's gotten

0:49:11.480 --> 0:49:13.719
<v Speaker 1>it wrong before. But as I like to say that,

0:49:13.800 --> 0:49:15.839
<v Speaker 1>you know, the market will fib but it won't be

0:49:16.480 --> 0:49:19.040
<v Speaker 1>a chronic liar, right, And so you know, it's a

0:49:19.120 --> 0:49:21.040
<v Speaker 1>great line. You have to be careful of that. But

0:49:21.280 --> 0:49:23.719
<v Speaker 1>the reality is that the market gets it right, and

0:49:23.760 --> 0:49:26.200
<v Speaker 1>the market gets it right better than the p m

0:49:26.239 --> 0:49:28.200
<v Speaker 1>I gets it right. It gets it right better than

0:49:28.239 --> 0:49:30.759
<v Speaker 1>the employment data gets it right, etcetera. So that's why

0:49:30.800 --> 0:49:33.759
<v Speaker 1>it's really important from our standpoint to you know, put

0:49:33.760 --> 0:49:36.480
<v Speaker 1>your ear on the track, understand or try to understand

0:49:36.560 --> 0:49:39.719
<v Speaker 1>you know what's coming down then the pipe. Um. But

0:49:40.080 --> 0:49:42.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, from our advantage point, it's a very difficult

0:49:42.800 --> 0:49:45.359
<v Speaker 1>and challenging environment trying to do that with just economic data.

0:49:46.040 --> 0:49:51.000
<v Speaker 1>And that's probably why so many people, uh always go

0:49:51.080 --> 0:49:54.600
<v Speaker 1>to the quote by Samuelson, which is, marketing indices have

0:49:54.760 --> 0:49:59.800
<v Speaker 1>forecast nine of the past four recessions markets will swing wildly.

0:50:00.000 --> 0:50:02.360
<v Speaker 1>They're noisy, but they're going to do a better job

0:50:02.520 --> 0:50:06.760
<v Speaker 1>than the average person scratching their chin and saying, here's

0:50:06.800 --> 0:50:09.640
<v Speaker 1>here's what this this month's non farm payer all means. Yeah.

0:50:09.680 --> 0:50:11.600
<v Speaker 1>But and let's you know, let's take it to the

0:50:11.600 --> 0:50:14.440
<v Speaker 1>next step to what do I really care about the

0:50:14.520 --> 0:50:19.120
<v Speaker 1>GDP number? If I'm invested in the SMP, I'm not right,

0:50:19.120 --> 0:50:21.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm not I'm not invested in I don't have a

0:50:21.680 --> 0:50:24.680
<v Speaker 1>GDP swap, right. In other words, GDP up over three

0:50:24.719 --> 0:50:26.560
<v Speaker 1>percent and I make money that has nothing to do

0:50:26.600 --> 0:50:28.160
<v Speaker 1>with that. I want to know what's going to happen

0:50:28.200 --> 0:50:30.799
<v Speaker 1>to the SMP, right, And so you know, maybe we're

0:50:30.840 --> 0:50:33.640
<v Speaker 1>not in recession, but you still have a correction or

0:50:33.680 --> 0:50:36.759
<v Speaker 1>bear market in the STP. That's important, right, And so

0:50:37.040 --> 0:50:41.360
<v Speaker 1>from our standpoint, you know, the work on uh, getting

0:50:41.400 --> 0:50:45.400
<v Speaker 1>the economy right. I get it from the perspective of

0:50:45.600 --> 0:50:48.399
<v Speaker 1>the nation, and certainly I appreciate that. But from the

0:50:48.440 --> 0:50:51.799
<v Speaker 1>perspective of the investor, what I'm really trying to do

0:50:51.920 --> 0:50:54.279
<v Speaker 1>is get the SNP right. You know, and the what

0:50:54.400 --> 0:50:57.439
<v Speaker 1>I can tell you is getting the economy right has

0:50:57.680 --> 0:51:01.040
<v Speaker 1>very little to do with getting the S P right historically.

0:51:01.160 --> 0:51:04.400
<v Speaker 1>That that is a theme that I've heard from guests

0:51:04.440 --> 0:51:07.399
<v Speaker 1>on the show for the past couple of years is well,

0:51:07.440 --> 0:51:10.239
<v Speaker 1>the economy is interesting and the market is interesting, and

0:51:10.280 --> 0:51:12.799
<v Speaker 1>on occasion they seem to be insane, but most of

0:51:12.800 --> 0:51:15.480
<v Speaker 1>the time one goes one way and the other is

0:51:15.520 --> 0:51:18.960
<v Speaker 1>just off uh in its own path, and and trying

0:51:18.960 --> 0:51:21.279
<v Speaker 1>to use the economy to forecast the market is just

0:51:21.320 --> 0:51:23.960
<v Speaker 1>a fool's Errand it certainly seems that way. We want

0:51:23.960 --> 0:51:25.560
<v Speaker 1>to know what's going on, there's no doubt about it,

0:51:25.600 --> 0:51:28.840
<v Speaker 1>but to to draw the link between the economy and

0:51:28.920 --> 0:51:31.920
<v Speaker 1>saying that that that's gonna mandate the S and P

0:51:32.120 --> 0:51:36.000
<v Speaker 1>does X good luck. So before I go to my

0:51:36.080 --> 0:51:39.320
<v Speaker 1>favorite questions, I asked all my guests one last Twitter question.

0:51:39.400 --> 0:51:43.040
<v Speaker 1>Someone had asked, so, why not manage a fund? Why

0:51:43.040 --> 0:51:45.960
<v Speaker 1>not run money or put together e t F Y

0:51:46.040 --> 0:51:48.200
<v Speaker 1>be an analyst? So I do this question all the time.

0:51:48.200 --> 0:51:49.600
<v Speaker 1>That's one of the reasons why we started run Back,

0:51:49.600 --> 0:51:51.200
<v Speaker 1>to be honest with you. So we we have a

0:51:51.480 --> 0:51:56.560
<v Speaker 1>small albeit small um. We have a rend Mack Capital Um,

0:51:56.560 --> 0:51:59.640
<v Speaker 1>where we haven't actively raised money, we have a ongoing

0:51:59.680 --> 0:52:02.760
<v Speaker 1>stress of you that's in that mostly partner money right now. Um,

0:52:02.800 --> 0:52:07.359
<v Speaker 1>but that's that's definitely uh, you know stage Renmack two

0:52:07.440 --> 0:52:10.640
<v Speaker 1>point oh, that's in that. In that zone, there are

0:52:10.719 --> 0:52:13.839
<v Speaker 1>people who left big firms to launch their own research shop.

0:52:14.360 --> 0:52:17.640
<v Speaker 1>Rich Bernstein probably most notable, who's now running you know,

0:52:17.719 --> 0:52:21.560
<v Speaker 1>three or four billion dollars. There's there's definitely a path

0:52:21.640 --> 0:52:25.480
<v Speaker 1>to that. And I love the idea of having that

0:52:25.560 --> 0:52:28.279
<v Speaker 1>pile of money which generates revenue which then can be

0:52:28.280 --> 0:52:32.799
<v Speaker 1>plowed right back into making the research faster, sexy, or

0:52:32.840 --> 0:52:34.680
<v Speaker 1>more interesting. There's a lot of stuff you can do

0:52:34.760 --> 0:52:37.600
<v Speaker 1>when you have that much a u M with a

0:52:37.640 --> 0:52:39.600
<v Speaker 1>fee on it. It just lets you plout right back

0:52:39.600 --> 0:52:41.359
<v Speaker 1>into the business. And we want to be careful. I mean,

0:52:41.400 --> 0:52:43.719
<v Speaker 1>obviously we don't want to have conflicts there. But what

0:52:43.800 --> 0:52:46.400
<v Speaker 1>we do is, you know, we eat our own cooking.

0:52:46.680 --> 0:52:49.960
<v Speaker 1>And um, it's a quantitative process. We think about it

0:52:50.040 --> 0:52:52.840
<v Speaker 1>very quantitatively. It's not you know, hey, I like that

0:52:52.880 --> 0:52:55.560
<v Speaker 1>idea or that, it's it's what is the system spit out?

0:52:55.800 --> 0:52:58.320
<v Speaker 1>How does that overlay with these things? And then here's

0:52:58.440 --> 0:53:02.040
<v Speaker 1>how we're managing that portfolio. So the question that always

0:53:02.120 --> 0:53:05.960
<v Speaker 1>used to come up on the old UM research desks

0:53:06.120 --> 0:53:09.640
<v Speaker 1>was idea generation. Hey, what's what's the idea of generation?

0:53:09.719 --> 0:53:12.719
<v Speaker 1>Machine looked like, you guys don't really do that. It's

0:53:12.800 --> 0:53:16.440
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty much spitting out from that database. Well, it's

0:53:16.480 --> 0:53:19.080
<v Speaker 1>idea generation is just not you know, it's just not

0:53:19.400 --> 0:53:21.799
<v Speaker 1>a noodling over it every single day and saying, hey,

0:53:21.840 --> 0:53:23.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, what are the what are this? What's this?

0:53:23.480 --> 0:53:26.960
<v Speaker 1>And that um it's looking at it now. It's important though,

0:53:27.000 --> 0:53:30.240
<v Speaker 1>is that you know, we we understand through our research

0:53:30.320 --> 0:53:34.680
<v Speaker 1>that there are points where UM, certain things will perform

0:53:34.840 --> 0:53:39.840
<v Speaker 1>better UM in certain environments. Right, So a great example, UM,

0:53:39.880 --> 0:53:42.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, shorts right here in this environment are not

0:53:42.560 --> 0:53:44.960
<v Speaker 1>performing well, and we actually track that on a daily

0:53:44.960 --> 0:53:46.920
<v Speaker 1>basis to see, hey, if you were to to be

0:53:46.960 --> 0:53:49.160
<v Speaker 1>a seller of a breakdown, what's the performance. I mean,

0:53:49.160 --> 0:53:52.279
<v Speaker 1>they're just they're just getting steamrolled. And that's actually an

0:53:52.280 --> 0:53:55.640
<v Speaker 1>important becomes an important market indicator. But it also gives

0:53:55.719 --> 0:53:58.680
<v Speaker 1>us some idea that the breakdowns in this environment have

0:53:58.760 --> 0:54:02.320
<v Speaker 1>actually been a source of alpha UM, that breakouts are working,

0:54:02.400 --> 0:54:05.879
<v Speaker 1>that overbought conditions aren't a place to be selling UM,

0:54:05.920 --> 0:54:08.960
<v Speaker 1>they're actually a reflection of the momentum. So our idea

0:54:09.040 --> 0:54:14.480
<v Speaker 1>generation is a combination of using some traditional and nontraditional

0:54:14.520 --> 0:54:18.640
<v Speaker 1>techniques frankly, but then overlaying those and understanding how those

0:54:18.719 --> 0:54:21.279
<v Speaker 1>work throughout history and where we should be at any

0:54:21.280 --> 0:54:23.719
<v Speaker 1>given point in time. So, I know, I say, the

0:54:23.800 --> 0:54:28.239
<v Speaker 1>show's UH tagline is no forecast, no stock picks. So

0:54:28.280 --> 0:54:32.400
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna ask this question slightly differently. I've been hearing

0:54:32.480 --> 0:54:36.520
<v Speaker 1>for I don't know, five six years, this rally is overboard,

0:54:36.640 --> 0:54:40.200
<v Speaker 1>it's artificial, it's fed induced. It's gonna end any day now,

0:54:40.480 --> 0:54:44.359
<v Speaker 1>or so I've heard every day for the past five years.

0:54:44.400 --> 0:54:47.600
<v Speaker 1>So where do you see us within the overall market cycle?

0:54:47.920 --> 0:54:52.440
<v Speaker 1>And where does this end? Or can this just continue

0:54:52.440 --> 0:54:56.319
<v Speaker 1>into such point as something comes along to stop it? Well, look,

0:54:56.360 --> 0:55:00.520
<v Speaker 1>I I view the world as this ever expanding UH

0:55:00.719 --> 0:55:04.680
<v Speaker 1>sample of the population, right, So you know the reality

0:55:04.760 --> 0:55:06.520
<v Speaker 1>is as well, we have really good data as good

0:55:06.560 --> 0:55:08.560
<v Speaker 1>or data is as good as anyone else is. You know,

0:55:08.800 --> 0:55:11.279
<v Speaker 1>the markets and rough rice back in the you know,

0:55:11.440 --> 0:55:14.919
<v Speaker 1>the Chinese in the fifteenth century. I don't have that data.

0:55:15.000 --> 0:55:17.640
<v Speaker 1>So maybe something happened that was completely different that you know,

0:55:17.680 --> 0:55:20.040
<v Speaker 1>would skew other things. But what I can tell you

0:55:20.080 --> 0:55:22.839
<v Speaker 1>is if you look over the last nine years UH,

0:55:22.880 --> 0:55:25.000
<v Speaker 1>and you look at risk adjusted returns for the SMP

0:55:25.400 --> 0:55:28.480
<v Speaker 1>versus the risk free rate, and you measure those, we

0:55:28.560 --> 0:55:32.080
<v Speaker 1>are in UM, you know, the ninety percentile of what

0:55:32.120 --> 0:55:34.960
<v Speaker 1>you'd expect for excess returns. If you look at those

0:55:35.000 --> 0:55:38.160
<v Speaker 1>other periods of time, the forward returns are not something

0:55:38.200 --> 0:55:39.960
<v Speaker 1>that you want to write home about. In fact, you'd

0:55:39.960 --> 0:55:42.799
<v Speaker 1>want to steer yourself towards that that active management, not

0:55:43.320 --> 0:55:47.400
<v Speaker 1>towards passive management. So I, you know, I view this

0:55:47.560 --> 0:55:52.359
<v Speaker 1>as the fuel in the tank is relatively slight UM.

0:55:52.560 --> 0:55:56.759
<v Speaker 1>But within that context, it's important to recognize that momentum

0:55:56.800 --> 0:56:00.640
<v Speaker 1>has been good. The trends for equities are positive UM.

0:56:00.719 --> 0:56:02.760
<v Speaker 1>And so while I think the path at least resistance

0:56:02.760 --> 0:56:04.759
<v Speaker 1>in the near term is higher by near term I

0:56:04.760 --> 0:56:08.240
<v Speaker 1>mean three to six, maybe twelve months UM, the amount

0:56:08.239 --> 0:56:10.799
<v Speaker 1>of fuel we have to really propel it at this

0:56:10.880 --> 0:56:14.400
<v Speaker 1>stage still seems to be relatively lacking. So this is

0:56:14.440 --> 0:56:17.920
<v Speaker 1>not in our view. This turn was not some historic

0:56:18.040 --> 0:56:21.480
<v Speaker 1>low that's going to provide UM, you know, very good

0:56:21.760 --> 0:56:24.960
<v Speaker 1>UH risk adjusted returns going forward. I think it's enough

0:56:25.000 --> 0:56:28.239
<v Speaker 1>to probably catch people off sides get people to reposition

0:56:28.719 --> 0:56:31.560
<v Speaker 1>and then you know, come back and uh and give

0:56:31.600 --> 0:56:34.640
<v Speaker 1>us a tougher environment. In two thousand and seventeen, what

0:56:34.840 --> 0:56:40.080
<v Speaker 1>is additional fuel that could keep the momentum going because

0:56:40.120 --> 0:56:44.520
<v Speaker 1>because it's we've seen profits sort of top out and

0:56:44.560 --> 0:56:48.440
<v Speaker 1>start to roll over a bit. Um. Energy prices never

0:56:48.640 --> 0:56:52.640
<v Speaker 1>low energy prices never really provided the too consumers that

0:56:52.719 --> 0:56:55.520
<v Speaker 1>they normally do. In theory, it help them pay down

0:56:55.560 --> 0:56:58.080
<v Speaker 1>some debt, a little cash in their pocket. But we

0:56:58.080 --> 0:57:01.440
<v Speaker 1>didn't see a surgeon retail spending UM. And we have

0:57:01.480 --> 0:57:04.960
<v Speaker 1>an election coming up in November. What could change the

0:57:05.080 --> 0:57:08.120
<v Speaker 1>dynamic that says, hey, this could go on for years,

0:57:08.200 --> 0:57:10.840
<v Speaker 1>not quarters, no great question. It's usually something in the

0:57:10.880 --> 0:57:14.320
<v Speaker 1>credit cycle, right so it could be QUEI four. I

0:57:14.360 --> 0:57:16.640
<v Speaker 1>don't think that's likely, but that's you know, let's let's

0:57:16.680 --> 0:57:20.520
<v Speaker 1>keep our our minds open. It could be fiscal stimulus UM,

0:57:20.720 --> 0:57:24.840
<v Speaker 1>which both sides have been talking about fairly uh consistently.

0:57:25.400 --> 0:57:27.640
<v Speaker 1>Right now, we have the credit cycle is flat that

0:57:27.760 --> 0:57:31.800
<v Speaker 1>you know if you look at global central bank balance sheets, UM.

0:57:32.040 --> 0:57:34.560
<v Speaker 1>So we don't concern ourselves as much with the rates

0:57:34.680 --> 0:57:36.800
<v Speaker 1>as we do. What's happening to the composition of the

0:57:36.800 --> 0:57:39.600
<v Speaker 1>balance sheet, right, So an expanding balance sheet is obviously

0:57:39.640 --> 0:57:44.600
<v Speaker 1>credit creation. A contracting balance sheet is credit deterioration or destruction. UM.

0:57:44.760 --> 0:57:48.000
<v Speaker 1>Global balance sheets as we measure them are about flat

0:57:48.080 --> 0:57:50.120
<v Speaker 1>year over year, and that's actually one of the lowest

0:57:50.200 --> 0:57:53.200
<v Speaker 1>levels that we've seen in the last fifteen years. So

0:57:53.360 --> 0:57:57.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, changing that dynamic would be important. The Chinese

0:57:57.560 --> 0:58:01.200
<v Speaker 1>with the FX reserves stabilizing would be one part. UM.

0:58:01.440 --> 0:58:05.840
<v Speaker 1>Sovereign wealth funds not pulling UH their their wealth out

0:58:05.880 --> 0:58:09.160
<v Speaker 1>of of the U S asset markets UM, that would

0:58:09.160 --> 0:58:11.480
<v Speaker 1>be another point. UM. So you know, there's a lot

0:58:11.520 --> 0:58:13.560
<v Speaker 1>of different dynamics that take place with this, but credit

0:58:13.680 --> 0:58:15.919
<v Speaker 1>is usually at the forefront of it, and i'd say

0:58:15.920 --> 0:58:17.960
<v Speaker 1>non financial leverage that we as we look at it,

0:58:18.000 --> 0:58:20.320
<v Speaker 1>which is flattened here. If we can start to see

0:58:20.320 --> 0:58:23.040
<v Speaker 1>that uptick would be would be helpful as well. Last

0:58:23.320 --> 0:58:27.959
<v Speaker 1>politically related question, UM, we keep hearing and again both

0:58:27.960 --> 0:58:32.520
<v Speaker 1>sides talking about a tax holiday to repatriate some of

0:58:32.600 --> 0:58:36.040
<v Speaker 1>the tens of trillions of corporate dollars that are overseas.

0:58:36.600 --> 0:58:39.400
<v Speaker 1>UM does at least two trillion just out of the

0:58:39.480 --> 0:58:43.560
<v Speaker 1>SNP five and I've seen estimates as high as ten trillion.

0:58:44.320 --> 0:58:47.959
<v Speaker 1>If whoever gets elected in November passes something like that.

0:58:48.400 --> 0:58:50.720
<v Speaker 1>Is that a temporary blip. Does that have the potential

0:58:50.840 --> 0:58:54.360
<v Speaker 1>to stimulate the economy here? Does that hurt Europe and

0:58:54.440 --> 0:58:57.360
<v Speaker 1>Asia where the money might be sitting. What's the impact

0:58:57.400 --> 0:59:02.240
<v Speaker 1>of that big repatriation assuming it actually happens. Yeah, I mean, look,

0:59:02.280 --> 0:59:06.360
<v Speaker 1>when you when you withdraw UM money from one system

0:59:06.480 --> 0:59:09.280
<v Speaker 1>to another, there usually as a transfer there, right, And

0:59:09.320 --> 0:59:12.800
<v Speaker 1>so you're talking about tighter credit conditions and looser credit conditions.

0:59:13.240 --> 0:59:15.600
<v Speaker 1>And by the way, the thinking behind this just to

0:59:15.880 --> 0:59:19.360
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned infrastructure before the deal is the Democrats want

0:59:19.360 --> 0:59:23.840
<v Speaker 1>to big infrastructure bill, bridges, roads, electrical grid, etcetera. The

0:59:23.840 --> 0:59:28.080
<v Speaker 1>Republicans want to change the corporate tax rate and or

0:59:28.200 --> 0:59:31.240
<v Speaker 1>repatriate the overseas dollar, but temporary tax holiday, maybe you

0:59:31.280 --> 0:59:33.880
<v Speaker 1>take tax at at six percent, five percent, something like that.

0:59:34.120 --> 0:59:36.960
<v Speaker 1>So if there's a deal struck that that's where I

0:59:37.040 --> 0:59:39.200
<v Speaker 1>was leading from with that. I mean, that's you know,

0:59:39.280 --> 0:59:41.000
<v Speaker 1>is that a positive? Is that a negative? Is it

0:59:41.120 --> 0:59:44.400
<v Speaker 1>globally neutral viewed as a positive for the US? I

0:59:44.400 --> 0:59:46.360
<v Speaker 1>mean this is not my area of expertise, but any means,

0:59:46.360 --> 0:59:47.760
<v Speaker 1>but I would I would it as a positive for

0:59:47.800 --> 0:59:50.800
<v Speaker 1>the US. UM and then the question is is how

0:59:50.880 --> 0:59:53.560
<v Speaker 1>is that capital utilized? Right? Is it? You know, is

0:59:53.560 --> 0:59:58.880
<v Speaker 1>it really going into property, plant, equipment, R and D spending? Look,

0:59:58.920 --> 1:00:01.520
<v Speaker 1>I think the reality is the trajectory is the trajectory.

1:00:01.520 --> 1:00:05.280
<v Speaker 1>I don't think of a boon. Uh if if companies

1:00:05.320 --> 1:00:09.040
<v Speaker 1>thought that they could earn positive returns on projects, they

1:00:09.080 --> 1:00:10.840
<v Speaker 1>do it. I mean, for God's sakes, interest rates are

1:00:10.920 --> 1:00:12.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, next to nothing, So it's not it's not

1:00:12.840 --> 1:00:14.480
<v Speaker 1>a huge hurdle here. You don't see a lot of

1:00:14.480 --> 1:00:18.320
<v Speaker 1>CAPEX spending, although some people have have said that's misleading

1:00:18.320 --> 1:00:20.760
<v Speaker 1>when you look at it as a percentage of GDP

1:00:20.960 --> 1:00:24.400
<v Speaker 1>or as a percentage of other activity, it's actually at

1:00:24.400 --> 1:00:26.320
<v Speaker 1>a fairly high rate. I think you'd probably go to

1:00:26.400 --> 1:00:31.200
<v Speaker 1>corporate bybex really more so than than Capex. Really that

1:00:31.320 --> 1:00:33.840
<v Speaker 1>that would be interesting. Let's in the last fifteen minutes

1:00:33.920 --> 1:00:36.880
<v Speaker 1>or so, we have get to our standard questions. We

1:00:36.880 --> 1:00:40.840
<v Speaker 1>we talked about what you did before UH Wall Street,

1:00:40.880 --> 1:00:45.880
<v Speaker 1>which was college. Who are your early mentors Bob Ferrell,

1:00:46.400 --> 1:00:49.400
<v Speaker 1>uh Steve Shoubin. Let's talk about Bob Farrell a little

1:00:49.400 --> 1:00:52.520
<v Speaker 1>bit because Dave Rosenberg is a friend another guy who

1:00:52.520 --> 1:00:54.960
<v Speaker 1>has him as a mentor. I've had heard his name

1:00:55.000 --> 1:00:58.960
<v Speaker 1>come up from Ralph Akimpora has mentioned him. A number

1:00:58.960 --> 1:01:01.720
<v Speaker 1>of people have mentioned, well he was the first. Remember

1:01:01.720 --> 1:01:06.600
<v Speaker 1>he was the first one to actually um had a

1:01:06.640 --> 1:01:12.080
<v Speaker 1>technical analysis department and Marylands right back in the fifties

1:01:12.080 --> 1:01:15.920
<v Speaker 1>and sixties. Yeah. Um. And just a sweetheart of a

1:01:15.920 --> 1:01:21.480
<v Speaker 1>guy and very intuitive, a great amount of experience and

1:01:21.520 --> 1:01:24.480
<v Speaker 1>just understanding of the business. And what I really appreciated

1:01:25.120 --> 1:01:28.360
<v Speaker 1>about Bob's perspective is he lived and you know, didn't

1:01:28.360 --> 1:01:31.400
<v Speaker 1>grow up in but lived through um, you know, the

1:01:31.440 --> 1:01:35.040
<v Speaker 1>tumultuous times of the late sixties, the seventies and the

1:01:35.120 --> 1:01:39.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, I mean horrendous markets almost as bad as

1:01:39.560 --> 1:01:43.360
<v Speaker 1>though I don't know people risk adjusted. Absolutely it was right, um,

1:01:43.520 --> 1:01:47.080
<v Speaker 1>no doubt about it. So when you know, when you

1:01:47.160 --> 1:01:49.960
<v Speaker 1>have somebody who's gone through that, there's a perspective that

1:01:50.000 --> 1:01:52.040
<v Speaker 1>they bring. You know, I can read about it all

1:01:52.080 --> 1:01:55.040
<v Speaker 1>I want, but when you're living it, it's completely different. Right.

1:01:55.080 --> 1:01:58.640
<v Speaker 1>So this just a very unique perspective that um, you

1:01:58.640 --> 1:02:01.800
<v Speaker 1>know that I really appreciated and and found found useful.

1:02:02.080 --> 1:02:05.200
<v Speaker 1>Steve Schobin, who was started in the in the Mary

1:02:05.280 --> 1:02:08.200
<v Speaker 1>Lynch Technical Analysis Department, then left for Lehman brothers in

1:02:08.200 --> 1:02:10.800
<v Speaker 1>the mid nineties, who I eventually joined in the late

1:02:10.880 --> 1:02:17.040
<v Speaker 1>nineties at Lehman. UM was equally as um as intuitive

1:02:17.360 --> 1:02:20.200
<v Speaker 1>and Uh well he started a little later. I think

1:02:20.200 --> 1:02:23.800
<v Speaker 1>he started in sixty eight. UM had a very very

1:02:23.840 --> 1:02:27.720
<v Speaker 1>good perspective, and I worked more closely with Steve Um.

1:02:28.120 --> 1:02:36.120
<v Speaker 1>His ability to um understand and really synthesized things qualitatively

1:02:36.600 --> 1:02:40.960
<v Speaker 1>was unmatched from anybody I've worked with since. UM. He

1:02:41.080 --> 1:02:44.280
<v Speaker 1>just had a very good intuition about the market. And

1:02:44.640 --> 1:02:48.160
<v Speaker 1>I was far more quantitative than Steve, but his intuition.

1:02:48.200 --> 1:02:51.280
<v Speaker 1>I certainly learned a lot from uh in Uh in

1:02:51.360 --> 1:02:53.640
<v Speaker 1>my years working with him, and a great guy. So

1:02:53.880 --> 1:02:58.240
<v Speaker 1>beyond Steve, if you're out there beyond beyond mentors, what

1:02:58.320 --> 1:03:02.520
<v Speaker 1>other investors influenced your approach to the markets? Well, you know,

1:03:02.560 --> 1:03:06.400
<v Speaker 1>without being specific about people, I think, what's what's interesting

1:03:06.440 --> 1:03:10.000
<v Speaker 1>about the business, and you know, at whether it was

1:03:10.080 --> 1:03:13.400
<v Speaker 1>at Meryl or Lehman or even at Rehnmac now UM,

1:03:13.680 --> 1:03:17.520
<v Speaker 1>what I find is and very refreshing is it's the

1:03:17.720 --> 1:03:23.800
<v Speaker 1>people that UM are very very successful, who are interested

1:03:23.920 --> 1:03:26.720
<v Speaker 1>in our work. Right. In other words, it's not the

1:03:26.760 --> 1:03:29.919
<v Speaker 1>hotshot m b A who you know learned the same

1:03:29.960 --> 1:03:32.600
<v Speaker 1>thing that everybody does, that technical analysis is just a

1:03:32.640 --> 1:03:35.160
<v Speaker 1>bunch of bunk. You know, their quote unquote smarter than

1:03:35.160 --> 1:03:37.280
<v Speaker 1>the market, and they'll get it all figured out. It's

1:03:37.320 --> 1:03:40.880
<v Speaker 1>the season professional with the scars and the battle wounds

1:03:41.120 --> 1:03:44.800
<v Speaker 1>who are always interested in our perspective because they've seen

1:03:44.840 --> 1:03:47.480
<v Speaker 1>it before, right, they understand that there's something more to

1:03:47.560 --> 1:03:49.680
<v Speaker 1>the business. And you know, you can get into this

1:03:49.720 --> 1:03:52.040
<v Speaker 1>debate between art and science, and I get it, and

1:03:52.200 --> 1:03:55.040
<v Speaker 1>I do think that technical analysis probably relies too much

1:03:55.080 --> 1:03:59.160
<v Speaker 1>on art, fundamental analysis relies probably too much on science. Um.

1:03:59.680 --> 1:04:02.400
<v Speaker 1>We try to blend the two, right, taking the I

1:04:02.480 --> 1:04:05.400
<v Speaker 1>understand there's something here, let's try to quantify it and

1:04:05.600 --> 1:04:08.240
<v Speaker 1>do something around that. So um and look, even in

1:04:08.280 --> 1:04:11.200
<v Speaker 1>fundamental analysis, there's an art to understanding where the kink

1:04:11.280 --> 1:04:13.360
<v Speaker 1>in the hockey stick of growth is right, or what

1:04:13.440 --> 1:04:15.760
<v Speaker 1>the difference between K and G in terms of the

1:04:15.760 --> 1:04:18.160
<v Speaker 1>cost of capital and and the growth rate is. You know,

1:04:18.240 --> 1:04:20.560
<v Speaker 1>so there's there's an art to everything that that's done.

1:04:20.800 --> 1:04:22.680
<v Speaker 1>We just try to quantify it to the extent that

1:04:22.720 --> 1:04:25.120
<v Speaker 1>we can. Um And so you know, when I look

1:04:25.160 --> 1:04:28.520
<v Speaker 1>at the people that read our research and and that

1:04:28.760 --> 1:04:31.280
<v Speaker 1>I'm good friends with in the business. Um, you know,

1:04:31.320 --> 1:04:33.080
<v Speaker 1>there are people that I'm proud to have his clients.

1:04:33.080 --> 1:04:35.640
<v Speaker 1>I mean, they're they're they're successful people. And I think

1:04:35.880 --> 1:04:39.440
<v Speaker 1>you go back to the you know, to the Wizards

1:04:39.440 --> 1:04:41.760
<v Speaker 1>of Wall Street books, and you know, I learned a

1:04:41.800 --> 1:04:44.920
<v Speaker 1>lot from Richard Dennis and his Turtle system and just

1:04:45.040 --> 1:04:47.520
<v Speaker 1>the way that they think about things right and stand

1:04:48.160 --> 1:04:50.760
<v Speaker 1>people on it. It means it's quantitative and it's not

1:04:50.880 --> 1:04:53.160
<v Speaker 1>purely in art. There has to be rules you can

1:04:53.200 --> 1:04:55.160
<v Speaker 1>teach me. Yeah, And I think look, as as much

1:04:55.160 --> 1:04:57.400
<v Speaker 1>as anything, what we try to do is we try

1:04:57.440 --> 1:05:01.600
<v Speaker 1>to remain disciplined, right, And I think discipline is and

1:05:02.040 --> 1:05:05.640
<v Speaker 1>people in the business understand that, but it's underrated amongst

1:05:05.680 --> 1:05:08.320
<v Speaker 1>the investing public. I think, without question it's I think

1:05:08.360 --> 1:05:11.440
<v Speaker 1>that I think it's underrated amongst the entire street. Is

1:05:11.480 --> 1:05:15.440
<v Speaker 1>how how important and underutilized discipline is, right, And the

1:05:15.800 --> 1:05:18.520
<v Speaker 1>problem being is that when you quantify it, you also

1:05:18.600 --> 1:05:21.240
<v Speaker 1>quantify what your loss is going to be right, and

1:05:21.320 --> 1:05:23.479
<v Speaker 1>so you know that you're not always going to be right,

1:05:23.720 --> 1:05:25.480
<v Speaker 1>but you have to be willing to be wrong by

1:05:25.520 --> 1:05:27.480
<v Speaker 1>this much. And most people say, I don't want to

1:05:27.480 --> 1:05:29.520
<v Speaker 1>be wrong by this much right, And so instead of

1:05:29.600 --> 1:05:31.240
<v Speaker 1>quantifying it. They'll just do it by the seat of

1:05:31.280 --> 1:05:33.400
<v Speaker 1>their pants. So I can do it successfully, some can't.

1:05:33.600 --> 1:05:36.480
<v Speaker 1>I'd rather quantify it and say, hey, here's where I am,

1:05:36.560 --> 1:05:39.520
<v Speaker 1>here's my risk profile. Now what can I do to

1:05:39.760 --> 1:05:42.560
<v Speaker 1>maybe further mitigate that, or how do you know, how

1:05:42.600 --> 1:05:45.240
<v Speaker 1>can I position it so that I'm I'm willing to

1:05:45.280 --> 1:05:48.200
<v Speaker 1>accept that and move on knowing that what I call

1:05:48.360 --> 1:05:50.360
<v Speaker 1>terminal wealth is going to be far better than if

1:05:50.400 --> 1:05:52.480
<v Speaker 1>I were to just index or something along those lines.

1:05:52.760 --> 1:05:54.720
<v Speaker 1>The quote I read this week, and I don't remember where,

1:05:54.760 --> 1:05:57.800
<v Speaker 1>what book or what publication I read this was we

1:05:57.920 --> 1:06:01.880
<v Speaker 1>learned nothing from our winners. It's our losers that teach us.

1:06:02.080 --> 1:06:05.880
<v Speaker 1>And there's those battle scars. You don't get those. The

1:06:05.920 --> 1:06:08.320
<v Speaker 1>worst thing that can happen to a nubie investor is

1:06:08.640 --> 1:06:10.920
<v Speaker 1>a winning streak. They learned nothing from it, and they

1:06:10.920 --> 1:06:14.960
<v Speaker 1>start to think they're they're brilliant. You mentioned Turtle Traders

1:06:15.120 --> 1:06:18.520
<v Speaker 1>and and market Wizards. That's the perfect transition to the

1:06:18.560 --> 1:06:22.000
<v Speaker 1>next question. By the way, we've had Schwager on he's fantastic,

1:06:22.320 --> 1:06:24.160
<v Speaker 1>and I don't know if you know Mike Koval's book

1:06:24.560 --> 1:06:29.560
<v Speaker 1>Total Traders. He was really interesting. He's been entranced by

1:06:29.720 --> 1:06:33.600
<v Speaker 1>Dennis's concept of let's raise them the way they raise

1:06:34.360 --> 1:06:38.120
<v Speaker 1>turtles in these farms in Singapore which are used as

1:06:38.160 --> 1:06:40.560
<v Speaker 1>a as a food source. If we can raise turtles,

1:06:40.600 --> 1:06:42.960
<v Speaker 1>we can raise traders. And and let's so let's talk

1:06:42.960 --> 1:06:45.880
<v Speaker 1>about some of your favorite books. The first book I

1:06:45.920 --> 1:06:49.400
<v Speaker 1>read in when I got into the business was Market Wizards,

1:06:49.440 --> 1:06:53.240
<v Speaker 1>and it was absolutely fascinating. You imply, um, you enjoyed

1:06:53.280 --> 1:06:55.760
<v Speaker 1>the book as well. Yeah, at least two of them.

1:06:55.760 --> 1:06:58.680
<v Speaker 1>I think there's three in order read to Market Wizards,

1:06:58.680 --> 1:07:02.280
<v Speaker 1>New Market Wizards, and head Fun Wizards. Think yet, but

1:07:02.680 --> 1:07:05.320
<v Speaker 1>so be it? Um, you know that that to me,

1:07:05.360 --> 1:07:09.680
<v Speaker 1>I thought was sort of bringing theoretical to reality. Right,

1:07:09.720 --> 1:07:12.440
<v Speaker 1>there's always the difference of you know, up on the chalkboard,

1:07:12.480 --> 1:07:14.840
<v Speaker 1>it looks nice, but you know, in the trenches, how

1:07:14.840 --> 1:07:16.720
<v Speaker 1>does this really play out? And that was you know,

1:07:16.840 --> 1:07:19.200
<v Speaker 1>using both you had fundamental traders there, you had technical

1:07:19.240 --> 1:07:22.240
<v Speaker 1>traders there get some that did a combination. Uh, and

1:07:22.280 --> 1:07:24.720
<v Speaker 1>obviously all did it disciplined. By the way, what you

1:07:24.760 --> 1:07:27.200
<v Speaker 1>mentioned is a theme that runs throughout the whids to

1:07:27.560 --> 1:07:32.360
<v Speaker 1>every you absolutely have to have it without question. What

1:07:32.360 --> 1:07:36.440
<v Speaker 1>what other books are standouts to you that either were influential,

1:07:36.880 --> 1:07:40.720
<v Speaker 1>or just that you really enjoyed a great deal. I mean,

1:07:40.760 --> 1:07:43.040
<v Speaker 1>this is probably a little bit more controversial, but I

1:07:43.080 --> 1:07:48.520
<v Speaker 1>will say that i've i've certainly um internalized the thought

1:07:48.560 --> 1:07:53.920
<v Speaker 1>process of the Austrian cycle of economics. UM. Not that

1:07:53.960 --> 1:07:56.520
<v Speaker 1>it's always right, I wouldn't, I wouldn't think about it

1:07:56.560 --> 1:07:59.720
<v Speaker 1>that way, but in terms of sort of grounding yourself

1:07:59.760 --> 1:08:02.520
<v Speaker 1>and understanding that trees don't grow to the sky. You

1:08:02.560 --> 1:08:04.439
<v Speaker 1>can't dig your way to China no matter how hard

1:08:04.440 --> 1:08:08.080
<v Speaker 1>you try. I think it's just a good understanding not

1:08:08.160 --> 1:08:11.560
<v Speaker 1>only of credit of money UH and the influence on

1:08:11.600 --> 1:08:14.840
<v Speaker 1>the economy over time and the business cycle. No, no

1:08:14.880 --> 1:08:17.960
<v Speaker 1>doubt about that. UM any other books before we move

1:08:18.000 --> 1:08:21.439
<v Speaker 1>on to our two favorite questions, I think any book

1:08:21.439 --> 1:08:26.480
<v Speaker 1>on market history is fantastic, just to again try to internalize,

1:08:26.640 --> 1:08:29.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, and understand what Bob Ferrell knew from living it.

1:08:30.560 --> 1:08:33.280
<v Speaker 1>The more you can understand the history of the markets,

1:08:33.320 --> 1:08:36.200
<v Speaker 1>the more you'll find that things aren't aren't changing, they're

1:08:36.200 --> 1:08:38.040
<v Speaker 1>staying the same. Give me a few I have a

1:08:38.080 --> 1:08:40.040
<v Speaker 1>few favorites of my own, and the reminiscence of a

1:08:40.080 --> 1:08:45.080
<v Speaker 1>stock operators classic the same around the same period that

1:08:45.160 --> 1:08:47.760
<v Speaker 1>came out. You would appreciate this if you haven't read this.

1:08:48.439 --> 1:08:51.479
<v Speaker 1>I'm fond of talking about Richard Wykoff's How I Trade

1:08:51.479 --> 1:08:56.759
<v Speaker 1>Stocks and Bonds. If you swap out telephone wire for Internet,

1:08:56.920 --> 1:09:00.000
<v Speaker 1>It's like it was written yesterday. Absolutely, it's amazing more

1:09:00.000 --> 1:09:05.160
<v Speaker 1>and changed the question. I've recently started, um actually fondly

1:09:05.720 --> 1:09:10.840
<v Speaker 1>reading the minutes from Federal Reserve meetings, really because the

1:09:10.880 --> 1:09:15.320
<v Speaker 1>same thing right back, way back, way back to the thirties, right,

1:09:15.479 --> 1:09:18.320
<v Speaker 1>no kidding, because you'll find that they're you know, we

1:09:18.400 --> 1:09:20.640
<v Speaker 1>like to think that they're they're driving silly cars and

1:09:20.680 --> 1:09:22.640
<v Speaker 1>wearing wool suits in the summer, and they don't have

1:09:22.640 --> 1:09:25.800
<v Speaker 1>a clue. I mean, they're very thoughtful there as as

1:09:25.840 --> 1:09:28.160
<v Speaker 1>of course they are, right. The Lords of Banking really

1:09:28.160 --> 1:09:32.800
<v Speaker 1>makes that clear that book. Really, if you thought these

1:09:32.840 --> 1:09:35.559
<v Speaker 1>are just a bunch of idiots flailing about, that will

1:09:35.600 --> 1:09:38.280
<v Speaker 1>disabuse you of those notes. And and remember at the time,

1:09:38.360 --> 1:09:41.559
<v Speaker 1>their technology that they had was superior to anything that

1:09:41.600 --> 1:09:44.760
<v Speaker 1>they had thirty years prior. Right, So it's not like

1:09:45.040 --> 1:09:47.559
<v Speaker 1>we're suddenly so much smarter because of all this stuff.

1:09:47.680 --> 1:09:49.880
<v Speaker 1>It's just, you know, there are certain things that are

1:09:49.920 --> 1:09:52.719
<v Speaker 1>just unknowable and and you find that in the business,

1:09:52.800 --> 1:09:56.519
<v Speaker 1>So I think that's interesting. Um there's a good book

1:09:56.600 --> 1:10:02.320
<v Speaker 1>called UMU, A Nation of Deadbeats, which which is a

1:10:03.280 --> 1:10:05.640
<v Speaker 1>just a very good history. I'm not a fan of

1:10:05.680 --> 1:10:08.840
<v Speaker 1>the title, but it's a very good history of the

1:10:09.000 --> 1:10:14.720
<v Speaker 1>US economic cycles boom busts, and takes us through with

1:10:14.760 --> 1:10:17.599
<v Speaker 1>a lot of interesting anecdotes about the you know, how

1:10:17.640 --> 1:10:20.040
<v Speaker 1>the green bag became the green back, and and just

1:10:20.160 --> 1:10:24.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, some interesting anecdotes about the US specifically. That

1:10:24.240 --> 1:10:26.439
<v Speaker 1>title reminded me of a book I used for research

1:10:26.520 --> 1:10:30.200
<v Speaker 1>some years ago about the nineteenth century banking in the

1:10:30.240 --> 1:10:33.960
<v Speaker 1>United States called a Nation of counterfeiters, and all these

1:10:33.960 --> 1:10:37.960
<v Speaker 1>banks would issue these notes wildcatting and eventually walk away

1:10:38.000 --> 1:10:41.000
<v Speaker 1>from him. Eventually, that's why we ended up with a

1:10:41.000 --> 1:10:44.120
<v Speaker 1>federal reserve. So our last two questions my favorite two

1:10:44.200 --> 1:10:47.720
<v Speaker 1>questions I asked all of my guests. So a millennial

1:10:47.920 --> 1:10:51.240
<v Speaker 1>or a recent college graduate comes to you and says, hey, Jeff,

1:10:51.280 --> 1:10:55.200
<v Speaker 1>I'm thinking about going into finance. What sort of advice

1:10:55.240 --> 1:10:58.040
<v Speaker 1>would you give them? Just get experience, get your feet wet,

1:10:58.120 --> 1:11:00.759
<v Speaker 1>get your feet wet, get your feet wet. The second,

1:11:00.920 --> 1:11:05.080
<v Speaker 1>and from from my perspective, UM I really don't hire

1:11:05.080 --> 1:11:07.840
<v Speaker 1>people unless you're programmers. You have to have just a

1:11:07.880 --> 1:11:11.160
<v Speaker 1>solid understanding of programming because that's really where the power is,

1:11:11.320 --> 1:11:14.280
<v Speaker 1>you know. Um. So you know, if you're coming out

1:11:14.360 --> 1:11:16.920
<v Speaker 1>and you're you're committed to the business and you want

1:11:16.920 --> 1:11:19.040
<v Speaker 1>to show the commitment to the business as a you know,

1:11:19.080 --> 1:11:22.640
<v Speaker 1>as a young fresh graduate, I'd say getting rolled in

1:11:22.680 --> 1:11:24.959
<v Speaker 1>the c f A program as soon as you possibly

1:11:24.960 --> 1:11:27.000
<v Speaker 1>can show that this is where you want to be.

1:11:27.560 --> 1:11:31.240
<v Speaker 1>Obviously it's more specific than than an NBA program. Um.

1:11:31.320 --> 1:11:35.679
<v Speaker 1>In fact of my my alma mater I um uh,

1:11:35.720 --> 1:11:38.400
<v Speaker 1>you know, I really encouraged the students to to get

1:11:38.439 --> 1:11:40.679
<v Speaker 1>their feet wet with the cf A program while they're

1:11:40.680 --> 1:11:43.600
<v Speaker 1>in college and then you know, just gives them a

1:11:43.720 --> 1:11:47.000
<v Speaker 1>leg up as they get out. Um to understand, um,

1:11:47.040 --> 1:11:49.400
<v Speaker 1>you know to prospective employers that hey, I'm serious about

1:11:49.400 --> 1:11:52.360
<v Speaker 1>this business and I've invested my resources and time to

1:11:52.680 --> 1:11:57.040
<v Speaker 1>do this. Um. But programming history and just you know, commitment,

1:11:57.200 --> 1:12:00.720
<v Speaker 1>get involved. And our final question, what is it that

1:12:00.800 --> 1:12:03.880
<v Speaker 1>you know about investing today? You wish you knew twenty

1:12:03.920 --> 1:12:06.639
<v Speaker 1>something years ago when you began. That's a great question,

1:12:06.720 --> 1:12:10.600
<v Speaker 1>I think, um, instead of I knew about this, but

1:12:10.640 --> 1:12:12.680
<v Speaker 1>how about the appreciation of this. I think it is

1:12:12.720 --> 1:12:15.000
<v Speaker 1>probably a better word way to think about it is

1:12:15.040 --> 1:12:20.479
<v Speaker 1>the absolute power of compound interest, right. I mean, you know,

1:12:20.640 --> 1:12:22.360
<v Speaker 1>you can look at the tables, you can do all

1:12:22.400 --> 1:12:25.519
<v Speaker 1>the forward valuation calculations you want and see how you

1:12:25.520 --> 1:12:28.719
<v Speaker 1>can tune a thousand dollars into something you know, extraordinary.

1:12:28.760 --> 1:12:33.000
<v Speaker 1>But the power of living for twenty years and seeing

1:12:33.040 --> 1:12:37.680
<v Speaker 1>that work is astounding, and I think it's underappreciated by

1:12:37.800 --> 1:12:42.639
<v Speaker 1>the masses. Humans have a hard time conceptualizing long periods

1:12:42.640 --> 1:12:45.000
<v Speaker 1>of time. And I'm not talking eons and billions of

1:12:45.080 --> 1:12:48.800
<v Speaker 1>years on an astronomical level, just your own lifetime. Hey,

1:12:48.840 --> 1:12:51.200
<v Speaker 1>if I do this for thirty years, here's the net.

1:12:51.840 --> 1:12:54.120
<v Speaker 1>My father in law was in town this weekend. He

1:12:54.200 --> 1:12:58.000
<v Speaker 1>showed me a picture of his his Mustang that was

1:12:58.040 --> 1:13:00.880
<v Speaker 1>brand new when he bought it in ninety five, and

1:13:00.960 --> 1:13:02.519
<v Speaker 1>he said, I just saw it an eBay for a

1:13:02.520 --> 1:13:05.840
<v Speaker 1>little under a hundred thousand dollars and so, I you know,

1:13:05.920 --> 1:13:08.680
<v Speaker 1>I did the quick math on it, and uh, it

1:13:08.760 --> 1:13:11.600
<v Speaker 1>worked out to about a seven and a half annualized

1:13:11.680 --> 1:13:14.000
<v Speaker 1>rate of return. It would have done better in the market,

1:13:14.040 --> 1:13:16.760
<v Speaker 1>just right. But you know, but now that it seem

1:13:16.840 --> 1:13:19.479
<v Speaker 1>like a little better, but it seems like a big number,

1:13:19.520 --> 1:13:21.640
<v Speaker 1>and you know that's the beauty of compounding. You just

1:13:21.680 --> 1:13:25.919
<v Speaker 1>don't realize what, Hey, sixty five mustang, you're talking almost

1:13:25.960 --> 1:13:29.080
<v Speaker 1>fifty years ago, more than fifty years ago. That that's

1:13:29.400 --> 1:13:32.080
<v Speaker 1>a fascinating thing. Well, Jeff, thank you so much for

1:13:32.080 --> 1:13:35.200
<v Speaker 1>doing this experisode. Generous with your time. I'm sure people,

1:13:35.439 --> 1:13:38.880
<v Speaker 1>especially the technicians out there, are going to be fascinated

1:13:38.920 --> 1:13:42.000
<v Speaker 1>by this. Uh. If you've enjoyed this conversation, be sure

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<v Speaker 1>and look up an Inch or down an Inch on

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<v Speaker 1>Apple iTunes and you can see the other ninety or

1:13:46.960 --> 1:13:51.640
<v Speaker 1>so um conversations we've had with various notables in the

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<v Speaker 1>financial industry. I would be remiss if I did not

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<v Speaker 1>thank my booker and audio engineer, Taylor Riggs for helping

1:14:00.800 --> 1:14:04.080
<v Speaker 1>to organize this. Uh. My head of research is Michael

1:14:04.120 --> 1:14:07.280
<v Speaker 1>bat Nick, and Charlie Vollmer is our producer. You've been

1:14:07.320 --> 1:14:11.719
<v Speaker 1>listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio look Ahead,

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<v Speaker 1>imagine more, gain insight for your industry with forward thinking

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<v Speaker 1>advice from the professionals at Cone Resnick. Is your business

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<v Speaker 1>ready to break through? Find out more at Cone Resnick

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<v Speaker 1>dot com. Slash breakthrough