1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:27,360 Speaker 1: Ridiculous History is a production of I Heart Radio. Welcome 2 00:00:27,400 --> 00:00:30,560 Speaker 1: back to the show Ridiculous Historians. Thank you, as always 3 00:00:30,600 --> 00:00:33,520 Speaker 1: so much for tuning in. Let's give it up for 4 00:00:33,600 --> 00:00:36,080 Speaker 1: our one and only the Man, the Myth, the Legend 5 00:00:36,159 --> 00:00:41,320 Speaker 1: super producer, Mr Max Williams, who they called me Ben 6 00:00:41,800 --> 00:00:45,520 Speaker 1: and Noel. You and Max and I were having an 7 00:00:45,560 --> 00:00:48,920 Speaker 1: interesting conversation. I just wanted a gut check before we 8 00:00:49,080 --> 00:00:52,440 Speaker 1: rolled today. Where I was asking, I was asking all 9 00:00:52,440 --> 00:00:56,560 Speaker 1: of us is it St. Louis or St. Louis? And 10 00:00:56,720 --> 00:00:59,360 Speaker 1: we we all three are people who say St. Louis. 11 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:01,880 Speaker 1: I mean, I think it's St. Louis unless you're bugs 12 00:01:01,880 --> 00:01:04,160 Speaker 1: Bunny and you want to rhyme it with screwy and 13 00:01:04,200 --> 00:01:08,200 Speaker 1: and and say so long screwy cy and St. Louis. Otherwise, 14 00:01:08,240 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 1: I think it's sort of more of a not majoritan. 15 00:01:11,080 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: What do you call it? Like a slang or like 16 00:01:13,440 --> 00:01:17,000 Speaker 1: calling San Francisco Frisco, which people hate who live there, 17 00:01:17,680 --> 00:01:20,800 Speaker 1: or calling um New Orleans no LA. I think it's 18 00:01:20,840 --> 00:01:23,240 Speaker 1: a little more socially acceptable from people that live there. 19 00:01:23,760 --> 00:01:28,200 Speaker 1: What are some other examples? Hotlanta? People lay that here. Yeah, 20 00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:31,120 Speaker 1: people only call Atlanta here. A lot of people will 21 00:01:31,160 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 1: say Atlanta like U H L, A and and A. 22 00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:39,440 Speaker 1: But I think that's just a regional accent. I don't 23 00:01:39,440 --> 00:01:42,160 Speaker 1: think anybody's spelling it that way. I'll say A T 24 00:01:42,440 --> 00:01:45,200 Speaker 1: L in text form because saying it out loud it's 25 00:01:45,240 --> 00:01:48,080 Speaker 1: silly because it's obviously more or the same numbers than 26 00:01:48,280 --> 00:01:51,480 Speaker 1: Atlanta A t L. It's the same. But the A 27 00:01:51,960 --> 00:01:54,560 Speaker 1: no thank you, no thank you, we're not we're not 28 00:01:55,200 --> 00:01:59,720 Speaker 1: the O C. Yeah, I'll say the A if I'm 29 00:02:00,200 --> 00:02:03,400 Speaker 1: styling and I need to make sure things rhyme, but 30 00:02:03,600 --> 00:02:06,120 Speaker 1: a lot of stuff rhymes with Atlanta, so I usually 31 00:02:06,160 --> 00:02:10,239 Speaker 1: get by with that. We're saying this because we we 32 00:02:10,240 --> 00:02:14,679 Speaker 1: were curious. I don't know whether any of us have. 33 00:02:15,040 --> 00:02:17,800 Speaker 1: I've been to St. Louis. Um. I think we talked 34 00:02:17,840 --> 00:02:20,600 Speaker 1: about this in the past. The spirit thing there, right, 35 00:02:20,760 --> 00:02:27,280 Speaker 1: the spirit of right arch of some kind. Yeah. So St. 36 00:02:27,320 --> 00:02:33,639 Speaker 1: Louis is fascinating because it is divided across two states, 37 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:38,120 Speaker 1: which is neat right. It's uh, it's near the where 38 00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:43,000 Speaker 1: the Mississippi River and the Missouri rivers meet, and there's 39 00:02:43,160 --> 00:02:46,640 Speaker 1: East St. Louis, which I believe is in Illinois, but 40 00:02:46,720 --> 00:02:50,480 Speaker 1: I was on the Missouri side. That's interesting in general 41 00:02:50,520 --> 00:02:54,200 Speaker 1: about St. Louis and Missouri is like it's technically you're 42 00:02:54,240 --> 00:02:57,840 Speaker 1: getting into like the Midwest, but it's also still kind 43 00:02:57,880 --> 00:03:00,760 Speaker 1: of the South. So it's sort of like, you know, 44 00:03:01,080 --> 00:03:05,000 Speaker 1: um this limital space, you know, where like North meets 45 00:03:05,000 --> 00:03:09,280 Speaker 1: South or or or mid West meets South, and you 46 00:03:09,280 --> 00:03:12,000 Speaker 1: can you can see that reflected in the cuisine. You 47 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:14,320 Speaker 1: can see that reflected in the people, and and there's 48 00:03:14,360 --> 00:03:16,800 Speaker 1: a really interesting mix sort of like that that one 49 00:03:16,919 --> 00:03:19,640 Speaker 1: year between like you know, the eighties and the nineties 50 00:03:19,639 --> 00:03:22,440 Speaker 1: where everything still feels a little bit eighties but starts 51 00:03:22,480 --> 00:03:24,800 Speaker 1: to feel a little bit nineties. That's kind of what 52 00:03:24,800 --> 00:03:28,519 Speaker 1: what St. Louis says to me an interesting comparison. Yeah, 53 00:03:28,520 --> 00:03:30,959 Speaker 1: I mean I think about that with Cincinnati. So we've 54 00:03:30,960 --> 00:03:32,520 Speaker 1: been to a number of times as well, because it's 55 00:03:32,520 --> 00:03:34,640 Speaker 1: like right there, like you know, part of it's in Kentucky, 56 00:03:35,120 --> 00:03:36,720 Speaker 1: and it's like you get there and it's like, well, 57 00:03:36,920 --> 00:03:39,880 Speaker 1: technically I'm in the Midwest now, but it's really still 58 00:03:40,000 --> 00:03:43,160 Speaker 1: pretty southern here. Also talking about the Christine and they 59 00:03:43,160 --> 00:03:46,880 Speaker 1: have that terrible cuisine where they put Chilian spaghetti. It's 60 00:03:46,880 --> 00:03:49,040 Speaker 1: pretty Yeah, I was gonna I bought some of that 61 00:03:49,120 --> 00:03:52,600 Speaker 1: one time, and I guess maybe I didn't go to 62 00:03:52,640 --> 00:03:55,960 Speaker 1: the right place, but it just didn't didn't do it 63 00:03:56,000 --> 00:03:58,480 Speaker 1: all the way for me, tell me tell us which 64 00:03:58,760 --> 00:04:02,160 Speaker 1: place we should get that famous Cincinnati chili from. Also, 65 00:04:02,280 --> 00:04:05,760 Speaker 1: this reminds me I met someone who had lived in 66 00:04:05,840 --> 00:04:11,280 Speaker 1: Cincinnati who referred to their town as the Natty. Uh so, 67 00:04:11,360 --> 00:04:13,520 Speaker 1: I don't like that. I don't know if I like 68 00:04:13,640 --> 00:04:17,440 Speaker 1: that either. That reminds me of bad beer. But uh 69 00:04:17,480 --> 00:04:21,680 Speaker 1: but today's story is not about bad beer or confusing 70 00:04:21,760 --> 00:04:26,560 Speaker 1: chili and spaghetti combos. Instead, we are talking about St. 71 00:04:26,600 --> 00:04:30,000 Speaker 1: Louis in a way that might be new to many people, 72 00:04:30,040 --> 00:04:34,200 Speaker 1: including St. Louis residents. Uh No, this is something we 73 00:04:34,760 --> 00:04:39,320 Speaker 1: dive into pretty thoroughly in our upcoming book for Stuff 74 00:04:39,320 --> 00:04:42,520 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. St. Louis is a 75 00:04:42,560 --> 00:04:46,960 Speaker 1: lot of things, but once upon a time it was. 76 00:04:47,560 --> 00:04:51,360 Speaker 1: This is a true story, a secret testing ground for 77 00:04:51,400 --> 00:04:55,360 Speaker 1: some really sketchy stuff. That's right, It's in good company 78 00:04:55,760 --> 00:04:59,040 Speaker 1: among I believe Ben Savannah, Georgia. It was another place 79 00:04:59,080 --> 00:05:04,039 Speaker 1: that the US military tested, you know, dispersal patterns or 80 00:05:04,120 --> 00:05:08,000 Speaker 1: just detested chemicals to determine dispersal patterns um on our 81 00:05:08,040 --> 00:05:10,279 Speaker 1: own people and then also, I believe there was another 82 00:05:10,320 --> 00:05:15,640 Speaker 1: one where we dumped like like malaria carrying mosquitoes and stuff. Yeah, 83 00:05:15,839 --> 00:05:19,400 Speaker 1: I just literally just it's it's wild. Um. Today, we're 84 00:05:19,400 --> 00:05:21,359 Speaker 1: not talking about either of those things. We are talking 85 00:05:21,360 --> 00:05:26,640 Speaker 1: about chemical agents, but we're specifically talking about government contractors literally, 86 00:05:26,760 --> 00:05:29,720 Speaker 1: you know, contractors hired by the U. S. Government spraying 87 00:05:29,960 --> 00:05:34,400 Speaker 1: zinc cadmium sulfide, which is a chemical powder that's mixed 88 00:05:34,400 --> 00:05:39,080 Speaker 1: with fluorescent particles um in order to track dispersal patterns 89 00:05:39,080 --> 00:05:41,640 Speaker 1: of chemicals. And they're not just spraying it on some 90 00:05:41,720 --> 00:05:45,240 Speaker 1: like remote island you know, testing site. They're literally spraying 91 00:05:45,279 --> 00:05:50,920 Speaker 1: it over populated areas in St. Louis. Yeah. Now, if 92 00:05:51,000 --> 00:05:55,719 Speaker 1: you are not a chemistry enthusiast or a chemist yourself, 93 00:05:56,080 --> 00:05:59,640 Speaker 1: you might not be familiar with what Nill just describes 94 00:05:59,720 --> 00:06:06,200 Speaker 1: zeke cadmian sulfide. It's odorless, insoluble, inorganic, and it's made 95 00:06:06,279 --> 00:06:10,279 Speaker 1: of zinc and cadmium sulfides, respectfully. It was first made 96 00:06:10,360 --> 00:06:14,320 Speaker 1: as a paint pigment and it has a bit of 97 00:06:14,400 --> 00:06:17,479 Speaker 1: fluorescence to it. This is what was really exciting to 98 00:06:17,640 --> 00:06:21,919 Speaker 1: Uncle Sam. They said, this will allow us to track 99 00:06:22,560 --> 00:06:26,560 Speaker 1: those dispersal patterns, so we can let this stuff out 100 00:06:26,760 --> 00:06:29,920 Speaker 1: and we can kind of map the way the wind 101 00:06:30,160 --> 00:06:36,240 Speaker 1: will move it. Uh, similar to how oceanographers use that 102 00:06:36,240 --> 00:06:40,839 Speaker 1: that famous rubber duck accident to trace ocean currents. You 103 00:06:40,880 --> 00:06:44,160 Speaker 1: remember that, Yeah, that, and also that's that's very true. 104 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:46,719 Speaker 1: Maybe to a lesser degree. There was like a massive 105 00:06:46,760 --> 00:06:51,039 Speaker 1: shipping container of legos that capsized about maybe you know, 106 00:06:51,320 --> 00:06:53,800 Speaker 1: half a decade ago, and that's been something that's also 107 00:06:53,880 --> 00:06:56,679 Speaker 1: been used to kind of track currents by seeing where 108 00:06:56,880 --> 00:07:01,080 Speaker 1: certain pieces end up washing up on on beaches. Yeah, 109 00:07:01,400 --> 00:07:04,320 Speaker 1: so this sprain by Uncle Sam was part of a 110 00:07:04,440 --> 00:07:11,840 Speaker 1: biological weapons program called Operation Large Area Coverage. So let's 111 00:07:12,480 --> 00:07:17,200 Speaker 1: let's talk about how this actually happened, how this all 112 00:07:17,280 --> 00:07:20,280 Speaker 1: went down. At first, when you hear that headline, it 113 00:07:20,400 --> 00:07:24,560 Speaker 1: sounds crazy. It sounds in no small part illegal, if 114 00:07:24,600 --> 00:07:28,320 Speaker 1: not just straight up dangerous. So we have to understand 115 00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:33,080 Speaker 1: this is a product of the growing Cold War, and 116 00:07:33,160 --> 00:07:38,040 Speaker 1: it starts way back in nineteen one. When people are 117 00:07:38,080 --> 00:07:43,960 Speaker 1: worried about foreign adversaries, you know, at that it's like 118 00:07:44,360 --> 00:07:50,360 Speaker 1: access powers. Maybe they're worried about foreign adversaries conducting biological 119 00:07:50,440 --> 00:07:55,640 Speaker 1: warfare in the United States and against other Allied forces. 120 00:07:55,720 --> 00:07:58,320 Speaker 1: So the U S Secretary of War at the time, 121 00:07:58,640 --> 00:08:03,360 Speaker 1: Henry Stimpson, ask the National Academy of Sciences for the 122 00:08:03,480 --> 00:08:10,240 Speaker 1: National Research Council to investigate all possible phases of biological warfare. 123 00:08:10,800 --> 00:08:14,360 Speaker 1: And as a result of this, like the first step 124 00:08:14,440 --> 00:08:17,920 Speaker 1: the Research Council takes is to make a committee of 125 00:08:18,240 --> 00:08:22,840 Speaker 1: nine Boffin's nine eggheads prominent scientists. This will be called 126 00:08:22,880 --> 00:08:27,520 Speaker 1: the War Bureau of Consultants Committee. And they work in 127 00:08:27,560 --> 00:08:31,200 Speaker 1: sort of a top secret sphere. They don't officially exist 128 00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:34,360 Speaker 1: to the public. I don't know what they tell their 129 00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:38,199 Speaker 1: partners they do. I'm a consultant. God only knows. You've 130 00:08:38,200 --> 00:08:39,719 Speaker 1: gotta be a really good liar to work in that 131 00:08:40,240 --> 00:08:43,839 Speaker 1: echelon of government, or have a partner that doesn't ask questions, 132 00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:49,280 Speaker 1: or both. But they worked assiduously to assemble a classified 133 00:08:49,280 --> 00:08:56,199 Speaker 1: report known as NASO UH and determined that biological warfare 134 00:08:56,559 --> 00:09:02,040 Speaker 1: was incredibly likely to take place and urged that defenses 135 00:09:02,160 --> 00:09:06,360 Speaker 1: be prepared for this eventuality. I guess it is probably 136 00:09:06,400 --> 00:09:08,800 Speaker 1: a word that the Boffins would have thrown around in 137 00:09:08,920 --> 00:09:12,640 Speaker 1: this document. It was in fact declassified in so we 138 00:09:12,679 --> 00:09:15,440 Speaker 1: can actually do a little reading from it. It goes 139 00:09:15,480 --> 00:09:18,320 Speaker 1: as such, the value of biological warfare will be a 140 00:09:18,320 --> 00:09:21,359 Speaker 1: debatable question until it has been clearly proven or disproven 141 00:09:21,400 --> 00:09:24,760 Speaker 1: by experience. The wide assumption is that any method which 142 00:09:24,800 --> 00:09:27,840 Speaker 1: appears to offer advantages to a nation at war will 143 00:09:27,840 --> 00:09:31,760 Speaker 1: be vigorously employed by that nation. There is but one 144 00:09:31,840 --> 00:09:35,440 Speaker 1: logical course to pursue, namely, to study the possibilities of 145 00:09:35,440 --> 00:09:38,600 Speaker 1: such warfare from every angle, make every preparation for reducing 146 00:09:38,600 --> 00:09:43,160 Speaker 1: its effectiveness, and thereby reduce the likelihood of its use. Okay, yeah, 147 00:09:43,240 --> 00:09:49,040 Speaker 1: so that makes sense. They're essentially saying it is inevitable 148 00:09:49,360 --> 00:09:53,120 Speaker 1: that someone will try to use this, and our enemies 149 00:09:53,200 --> 00:09:56,800 Speaker 1: are doubtlessly working on the same you know, with the 150 00:09:56,840 --> 00:10:00,320 Speaker 1: same set of facts we have. So we we have 151 00:10:00,520 --> 00:10:05,719 Speaker 1: to prepare. We have to know how this works. Secretary 152 00:10:05,840 --> 00:10:11,000 Speaker 1: Stimpson listens to the committee, he goes to President Roosevelt, 153 00:10:11,360 --> 00:10:15,560 Speaker 1: and he pitches it to Roosevelt. Roosevelt listens to him, 154 00:10:15,640 --> 00:10:20,679 Speaker 1: and so in May of two he says, all right, Stimpson, 155 00:10:21,080 --> 00:10:23,720 Speaker 1: you can chase this booning, right, you can pursue this 156 00:10:23,840 --> 00:10:27,200 Speaker 1: rabbit hole and see where it leads. I'm gonna make 157 00:10:27,440 --> 00:10:31,440 Speaker 1: a new organization for you inside the Federal Security agency. 158 00:10:31,600 --> 00:10:38,600 Speaker 1: This organization will conduct the new U S Biological warfare program, 159 00:10:38,640 --> 00:10:41,840 Speaker 1: and we're gonna avoid any public concern about what could 160 00:10:41,920 --> 00:10:44,480 Speaker 1: happen to the US in the case of an attack 161 00:10:44,559 --> 00:10:48,560 Speaker 1: like this. And we're gonna talk a little bit about 162 00:10:48,640 --> 00:10:54,040 Speaker 1: this with the United Kingdom in Canada. Are cool allies, 163 00:10:54,400 --> 00:10:58,480 Speaker 1: and um, you know, we're we're maybe gonna do a 164 00:10:58,559 --> 00:11:03,679 Speaker 1: trade with our scientists amongst these three countries while this 165 00:11:03,800 --> 00:11:07,400 Speaker 1: is happening. Again, the American public doesn't know about this. 166 00:11:07,600 --> 00:11:12,160 Speaker 1: The American public won't learn about this until the mid nineties. Nineties, 167 00:11:12,200 --> 00:11:16,200 Speaker 1: that's how long it was a successful secret. So essentially, 168 00:11:16,200 --> 00:11:18,400 Speaker 1: they had a couple of aims. They wanted to learn 169 00:11:18,640 --> 00:11:24,360 Speaker 1: everything they could about the militarization or weaponization of pathogenic 170 00:11:24,720 --> 00:11:30,720 Speaker 1: micro organisms. Pathogenic just means capable of causing disease, So 171 00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:34,720 Speaker 1: all those little micro organisms that can get you sick 172 00:11:34,840 --> 00:11:37,800 Speaker 1: one way or another, that's what they're looking at. And 173 00:11:37,840 --> 00:11:40,880 Speaker 1: then in turn, they're using that knowledge to figure out 174 00:11:41,000 --> 00:11:45,720 Speaker 1: ways to defend against those things. And this is this 175 00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:49,199 Speaker 1: is a pretty good idea. This seems like day one stuff. 176 00:11:49,600 --> 00:11:53,840 Speaker 1: But they wanted to do it at scale. No, they said, look, 177 00:11:53,880 --> 00:11:56,960 Speaker 1: we can if our enemies are attacking. They're not gonna 178 00:11:57,080 --> 00:12:02,000 Speaker 1: try to, you know, dose one Johnny Blue Jeans over 179 00:12:02,280 --> 00:12:05,600 Speaker 1: in Illinois or something. They're going to try to dose 180 00:12:05,800 --> 00:12:10,720 Speaker 1: entire regions. So we need to understand how this biological 181 00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:15,560 Speaker 1: warfare works on a large scale. That's right. So the 182 00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:20,880 Speaker 1: United States Army Chemical Warfare Service took over this UM, 183 00:12:20,880 --> 00:12:24,079 Speaker 1: this operation in terms of being able to bring that 184 00:12:24,160 --> 00:12:27,160 Speaker 1: scale that you were describing ben um that is UH 185 00:12:27,360 --> 00:12:31,760 Speaker 1: scaling or the research and development program specifically, so in 186 00:12:31,880 --> 00:12:37,160 Speaker 1: Fort Dietrich, which is in Frederick, Maryland, they began their work. 187 00:12:38,040 --> 00:12:42,600 Speaker 1: So the question becomes at this point, why is St. 188 00:12:42,640 --> 00:12:52,520 Speaker 1: Louis a good site for this kind of testing. It's 189 00:12:52,520 --> 00:12:55,079 Speaker 1: a very interesting answer in fact, and really just kind 190 00:12:55,080 --> 00:12:58,600 Speaker 1: of an unfortunate coincidence for the people of St. Louis. 191 00:12:59,080 --> 00:13:03,520 Speaker 1: Apparently it was a very decent stand in for the 192 00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:07,679 Speaker 1: former Soviet Union, the kind of terrain and layout that 193 00:13:07,800 --> 00:13:11,640 Speaker 1: was very difficult to match in any American city. But St. 194 00:13:11,679 --> 00:13:13,960 Speaker 1: Louis had a lot going for it in terms of 195 00:13:14,080 --> 00:13:17,600 Speaker 1: the size of the buildings. Buildings in St. Louis for 196 00:13:17,640 --> 00:13:20,640 Speaker 1: a metro area, it's kind of unusual. They don't exceed 197 00:13:20,760 --> 00:13:26,880 Speaker 1: three stories. The number of industrial installations and infrastructure that 198 00:13:27,160 --> 00:13:30,960 Speaker 1: exists both in densely populated areas and in more sparsely 199 00:13:31,000 --> 00:13:36,040 Speaker 1: populated areas are very very analogous. Not to mention that 200 00:13:36,520 --> 00:13:39,800 Speaker 1: there was that ample pool because the quote from from 201 00:13:39,840 --> 00:13:43,680 Speaker 1: some of the documentation of qualified personnel there due to 202 00:13:44,080 --> 00:13:49,400 Speaker 1: a university um it being a university town. Yeah, and 203 00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:51,520 Speaker 1: that would be that would be personnel that would help 204 00:13:51,559 --> 00:13:55,600 Speaker 1: with doing field tests and pulling data and all that stuff. 205 00:13:55,640 --> 00:13:59,000 Speaker 1: So you know, Junior Boffin's right, there would be partially 206 00:13:59,040 --> 00:14:02,040 Speaker 1: in the know. They might not know the full extent 207 00:14:02,440 --> 00:14:05,680 Speaker 1: of things like Operation L a C. But they would 208 00:14:05,720 --> 00:14:08,720 Speaker 1: know something was up and they would probably be happy 209 00:14:08,720 --> 00:14:13,120 Speaker 1: to have a job, honestly. So this is where the 210 00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:17,559 Speaker 1: famous class is um of US society raises its ugly head. 211 00:14:19,440 --> 00:14:22,600 Speaker 1: The government tries to figure out the best place to 212 00:14:22,880 --> 00:14:26,600 Speaker 1: test in St. Louis, and they don't go to the 213 00:14:26,720 --> 00:14:31,360 Speaker 1: nicest neighborhoods spoiler alert. From the nineteen forties to the 214 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:36,760 Speaker 1: nineteen sixties, they focus on impoverished areas. And we're getting 215 00:14:36,800 --> 00:14:39,560 Speaker 1: a lot of this from an excellent book by Lisa 216 00:14:39,600 --> 00:14:43,640 Speaker 1: Martino Taylor, the author of Behind the Fog, How the 217 00:14:43,760 --> 00:14:48,720 Speaker 1: US Cold War radiological weapons program exposed innocent Americans, but 218 00:14:48,880 --> 00:14:52,520 Speaker 1: if a spoiler there. Uh. This was a top priority 219 00:14:52,600 --> 00:14:59,640 Speaker 1: for the government and they were targeting the most vulnerable 220 00:14:59,640 --> 00:15:03,760 Speaker 1: people in society. This extended, Like you mentioned all, there 221 00:15:03,760 --> 00:15:07,280 Speaker 1: were other cities. This extended to Nashville as well, where 222 00:15:07,280 --> 00:15:11,800 Speaker 1: pregnant women and UH folks and hospitals were targeted, as 223 00:15:11,840 --> 00:15:17,480 Speaker 1: well as minority populations wards of the state. The Nashville 224 00:15:17,520 --> 00:15:20,680 Speaker 1: series is is a little bit different. But let's let's 225 00:15:20,680 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: walk through some other programs where you get back to St. Louis. 226 00:15:23,160 --> 00:15:26,800 Speaker 1: So in Nashville, they actually injected about eight hundred and 227 00:15:26,840 --> 00:15:32,280 Speaker 1: twenty poor pregnant women with a mixture during their prenatal 228 00:15:32,440 --> 00:15:37,200 Speaker 1: care that included radioactive iron. They were not told this 229 00:15:37,280 --> 00:15:39,800 Speaker 1: was happening, by the way, and then later there would 230 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:42,440 Speaker 1: be blood tests performed to see how much of the 231 00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:45,200 Speaker 1: iron was absorbed by the mother and then how much 232 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:48,000 Speaker 1: was absorbed by the baby when the when the child 233 00:15:48,120 --> 00:15:52,720 Speaker 1: was born. There were also tests performed in Chicago and 234 00:15:52,840 --> 00:15:55,520 Speaker 1: San Francisco. UM. So it's not like this is just 235 00:15:55,640 --> 00:15:59,160 Speaker 1: being done in like flyover states. This is kind of 236 00:15:59,200 --> 00:16:01,960 Speaker 1: a national effort. You know, no one was really safe 237 00:16:02,400 --> 00:16:06,920 Speaker 1: in California. You had folks that were creating radiation fields 238 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:10,960 Speaker 1: inside of a building in North Hollywood High School and 239 00:16:11,000 --> 00:16:14,400 Speaker 1: that was in the fall of nineteen sixty one. You 240 00:16:14,480 --> 00:16:17,320 Speaker 1: also had similar stuff happening at the University of California 241 00:16:17,320 --> 00:16:19,960 Speaker 1: in l a and also at the l A p 242 00:16:20,200 --> 00:16:26,119 Speaker 1: D headquarters. This testing also extended to Chicago, Berkeley, Rochester, 243 00:16:26,480 --> 00:16:29,840 Speaker 1: um and oak Ridge, Tennessee. And this was all stuff 244 00:16:29,880 --> 00:16:35,040 Speaker 1: that was involving the use of plutonium to thirty nine. Yeah, 245 00:16:35,080 --> 00:16:40,240 Speaker 1: which you might recognize as not being a cool thing 246 00:16:40,280 --> 00:16:43,040 Speaker 1: to be around as a human being. That's what it's 247 00:16:43,120 --> 00:16:47,320 Speaker 1: maybe most famous for. But yeah, totally yeah, yeah, it's 248 00:16:47,720 --> 00:16:51,320 Speaker 1: double plus. I'm good for you, as or well would say. So. 249 00:16:51,400 --> 00:16:55,120 Speaker 1: Back to St. Louis. Operation l a C. That's the 250 00:16:55,160 --> 00:16:58,960 Speaker 1: street name for Large Area Coverage. It was the biggest 251 00:16:59,000 --> 00:17:03,840 Speaker 1: test ever by the Chemical Corps and it covered the 252 00:17:03,960 --> 00:17:06,879 Speaker 1: United States from the Rockies all the way out to 253 00:17:06,920 --> 00:17:10,960 Speaker 1: the Atlantic and then from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. 254 00:17:11,240 --> 00:17:18,000 Speaker 1: They were trying to prove the feasibility of covering large areas, 255 00:17:18,200 --> 00:17:22,320 Speaker 1: get it, covering large areas of a country with biological 256 00:17:22,320 --> 00:17:26,399 Speaker 1: warfare agents. And for a long time, a lot of 257 00:17:26,400 --> 00:17:31,600 Speaker 1: folks in academia and in the military totally believed this 258 00:17:31,720 --> 00:17:36,399 Speaker 1: was possible. But Operation L A C was the first 259 00:17:36,720 --> 00:17:41,159 Speaker 1: real proof. And it's what they did sound so weird 260 00:17:41,320 --> 00:17:45,880 Speaker 1: when you when you hear it out loud. The Army 261 00:17:46,080 --> 00:17:52,399 Speaker 1: went to low income areas of St. Louis, particularly a 262 00:17:52,480 --> 00:17:56,359 Speaker 1: high rise a housing est state and its schools, and 263 00:17:56,400 --> 00:17:59,800 Speaker 1: they would set up these motorized blowers to blow the 264 00:18:00,720 --> 00:18:06,840 Speaker 1: zinc cadmium sulfide stuff out, and they even like went mobile. 265 00:18:07,400 --> 00:18:11,720 Speaker 1: One of my favorite visions of this is some guy, 266 00:18:11,840 --> 00:18:14,680 Speaker 1: I guess they drew the short straw. Some guy literally 267 00:18:14,800 --> 00:18:17,680 Speaker 1: drove around a poor part of town in his station 268 00:18:17,720 --> 00:18:22,719 Speaker 1: wagon and he had his little chemical blower just running 269 00:18:22,760 --> 00:18:26,359 Speaker 1: out the back of his station wagon and people, I 270 00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:33,080 Speaker 1: guess people thought, man, you gotta fix your car, because, 271 00:18:33,480 --> 00:18:35,800 Speaker 1: like now, every time I see a car with a 272 00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:38,560 Speaker 1: lot of smoke coming out of the pipe on on 273 00:18:38,640 --> 00:18:41,439 Speaker 1: the interstate, just some little part of me, you guys, 274 00:18:41,480 --> 00:18:45,280 Speaker 1: some little part of me is thinking he is he 275 00:18:45,320 --> 00:18:49,800 Speaker 1: burning oil? Or is that on purpose? So at this 276 00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:54,080 Speaker 1: point you have local officials um being told that the 277 00:18:54,119 --> 00:18:58,560 Speaker 1: government is testing some sort of smoke screen um that 278 00:18:58,600 --> 00:19:00,879 Speaker 1: would be a benefit to the blow St. Louis that 279 00:19:00,920 --> 00:19:06,000 Speaker 1: would potentially shield them from being um, you know, sniped 280 00:19:06,080 --> 00:19:10,560 Speaker 1: by Russian sky attacks. Right. But then in Knights Any 281 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,440 Speaker 1: four there's a pivot and the government says the tests 282 00:19:13,480 --> 00:19:16,480 Speaker 1: are actually part of a biological weapons program. And St. 283 00:19:16,520 --> 00:19:19,680 Speaker 1: Louis was chosen for the reasons that we outlined earlier, 284 00:19:19,720 --> 00:19:24,640 Speaker 1: because of the similarity in terrain and uh, city planning roughly, 285 00:19:25,119 --> 00:19:27,480 Speaker 1: you know, the best they could do on American soil 286 00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:31,080 Speaker 1: to Russian cities that the US might one day attack. 287 00:19:31,720 --> 00:19:33,800 Speaker 1: And oh, by the way, the material that was being 288 00:19:33,840 --> 00:19:35,480 Speaker 1: spray it wasn't in finding spokes for me at all. 289 00:19:36,160 --> 00:19:40,200 Speaker 1: It was this toxic zinc acadmium soul fide stuff. Yeah, 290 00:19:40,440 --> 00:19:47,520 Speaker 1: not not not not great. Yeah, it was are bad folks. Uh. 291 00:19:47,800 --> 00:19:52,880 Speaker 1: The the army did this multiple times. Uh. They did 292 00:19:52,920 --> 00:19:54,919 Speaker 1: it in the fifties. They did it again in a 293 00:19:54,960 --> 00:19:58,879 Speaker 1: decade later. The local officials got their own smoke screen 294 00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:01,919 Speaker 1: of a story which was about creating a smoke screen. 295 00:20:02,040 --> 00:20:06,399 Speaker 1: So it totally gave them plausible deniability to say, you 296 00:20:06,440 --> 00:20:09,600 Speaker 1: know what we're doing. Really, it's it's patriotic for you 297 00:20:09,640 --> 00:20:13,000 Speaker 1: to approve this, and it kind of puts you the 298 00:20:13,040 --> 00:20:18,080 Speaker 1: implication was you are at the forefront of technology we're 299 00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:22,320 Speaker 1: going to use to defend against Soviet attacks, which is, 300 00:20:22,640 --> 00:20:28,600 Speaker 1: you know, not true. So the we have to say 301 00:20:28,720 --> 00:20:31,760 Speaker 1: in defense of the folks in the US military and 302 00:20:31,840 --> 00:20:36,320 Speaker 1: and the and the associated halls of science at the time, 303 00:20:36,920 --> 00:20:42,439 Speaker 1: they were all under the impression that zinc cadmium sulfide 304 00:20:42,440 --> 00:20:45,840 Speaker 1: would be like firing a blank from a firearm, that 305 00:20:45,960 --> 00:20:49,680 Speaker 1: it would not actually harm people, you know what I mean. 306 00:20:49,760 --> 00:20:53,280 Speaker 1: Like if you for cat owners out there, one way 307 00:20:53,359 --> 00:20:56,880 Speaker 1: people sometimes try to modify a cat's behavior is by 308 00:20:56,960 --> 00:20:59,600 Speaker 1: spraying it with a little water bottle, right, and they 309 00:20:59,600 --> 00:21:03,040 Speaker 1: had You're dispersing water, but it's not gonna hurt the cat. 310 00:21:03,160 --> 00:21:07,200 Speaker 1: It's just unpleasant, irritating, Yeah, exactly, but it's not gonna 311 00:21:07,359 --> 00:21:09,480 Speaker 1: you know, it's not the same as spraying them with like, 312 00:21:09,920 --> 00:21:13,200 Speaker 1: you know, sulfuric acids. Say, it might look the same, 313 00:21:13,520 --> 00:21:15,760 Speaker 1: might sprits the same, but it does not act the same. 314 00:21:16,119 --> 00:21:19,919 Speaker 1: And that's basically the case here. Yeah. So, once the 315 00:21:20,080 --> 00:21:23,280 Speaker 1: testing on the good people of St. Louis is exposed 316 00:21:23,280 --> 00:21:28,600 Speaker 1: to Congress in nine, the public demands a health study, 317 00:21:28,680 --> 00:21:32,600 Speaker 1: which is totally reasonable. Uh, And this is where things 318 00:21:32,640 --> 00:21:37,040 Speaker 1: get sticky because when you think about it, the same 319 00:21:37,200 --> 00:21:41,920 Speaker 1: overall institution, the US government that is doing the testing 320 00:21:43,119 --> 00:21:46,800 Speaker 1: is the same institution that did the spraying back in 321 00:21:46,840 --> 00:21:50,240 Speaker 1: the day. So it should be no surprise that when 322 00:21:50,320 --> 00:21:55,280 Speaker 1: the National Research Council a few years later said, hey, 323 00:21:55,320 --> 00:21:59,399 Speaker 1: this chemical is dangerous at large, you know, large levels, 324 00:21:59,440 --> 00:22:04,280 Speaker 1: high level, but residents weren't exposed to levels high enough 325 00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:08,600 Speaker 1: to be harmful. It's no surprised that people didn't believe them, 326 00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:11,320 Speaker 1: and they thought it was a cover up rather than 327 00:22:11,880 --> 00:22:18,000 Speaker 1: a decent investigation. And the committee that came to this 328 00:22:18,160 --> 00:22:21,680 Speaker 1: conclusion even they said there wasn't a ton of research 329 00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:24,840 Speaker 1: and they had to rely on what little data they 330 00:22:24,920 --> 00:22:28,520 Speaker 1: knew from animal testing, which is not the same thing 331 00:22:28,560 --> 00:22:33,080 Speaker 1: as testing on humans. But what what else did they 332 00:22:33,119 --> 00:22:36,480 Speaker 1: find here? Like, what did they say about high doses 333 00:22:36,640 --> 00:22:39,960 Speaker 1: of this stuff? It's kind of scary. It's not a 334 00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:42,600 Speaker 1: good thing, that's for sure. Um. It is noted in 335 00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:46,439 Speaker 1: fact that high doses of cadmium that can happen in 336 00:22:46,560 --> 00:22:51,240 Speaker 1: long periods of exposure can actually cause serious problems internally 337 00:22:51,640 --> 00:22:55,679 Speaker 1: to your bones, your kidneys, and can even lead to 338 00:22:55,760 --> 00:23:00,159 Speaker 1: things like lung cancer. So this committee actually recommend end 339 00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:03,000 Speaker 1: of the Army, you know, do follow up studies of 340 00:23:03,000 --> 00:23:06,440 Speaker 1: the individual members of the community to determine how much 341 00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:08,879 Speaker 1: or if any or or you know, whether or not 342 00:23:09,000 --> 00:23:13,400 Speaker 1: zinc had been inhaled or zinc cadmium sulfide. Rather, so, 343 00:23:13,520 --> 00:23:17,399 Speaker 1: the committee actually recommended the Army do more studies, you know, 344 00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:20,959 Speaker 1: go a little deeper to figure out whether um inhaling 345 00:23:21,400 --> 00:23:26,120 Speaker 1: zinc cadmium sulfide causes it to break down into the 346 00:23:26,160 --> 00:23:31,240 Speaker 1: toxic components of cadmium um which actually are able to 347 00:23:31,240 --> 00:23:35,960 Speaker 1: be absorbed right into the blood and can produce severely 348 00:23:36,440 --> 00:23:40,560 Speaker 1: toxic effects in your internal organs um, including but not 349 00:23:40,680 --> 00:23:44,240 Speaker 1: limited to your lungs, as is often the case with 350 00:23:44,280 --> 00:23:47,480 Speaker 1: these kinds of things. Not really quite sure whether they 351 00:23:47,520 --> 00:23:52,200 Speaker 1: did that thing or not. Yeah, it's it sounds pretty 352 00:23:52,800 --> 00:23:55,320 Speaker 1: great at follow up, you know what I mean. They 353 00:23:55,440 --> 00:23:57,359 Speaker 1: like to put things to bed as quickly as possib right, 354 00:23:57,359 --> 00:23:59,320 Speaker 1: It's that clear if they actually did the follow up 355 00:23:59,359 --> 00:24:02,080 Speaker 1: study or just said they were going to do the 356 00:24:02,200 --> 00:24:05,840 Speaker 1: follow up study. We know again that these sprayers were 357 00:24:05,840 --> 00:24:10,760 Speaker 1: put in multiple locations. We also know that one of 358 00:24:10,760 --> 00:24:16,400 Speaker 1: the locations was, like we mentioned, a housing complex. It's 359 00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:20,760 Speaker 1: name was the pruitt Ego or Prudeigo Housing Complex. Ten 360 00:24:20,840 --> 00:24:24,800 Speaker 1: thousand people lived there. Of those ten thousand people, seventy 361 00:24:24,920 --> 00:24:29,040 Speaker 1: percent were children under the age of twelve, and they were, 362 00:24:29,240 --> 00:24:39,119 Speaker 1: you know, a ground zero for this. We started learning 363 00:24:39,160 --> 00:24:42,720 Speaker 1: more about this, we being the US public in two 364 00:24:42,760 --> 00:24:47,720 Speaker 1: thousand and twelve, when that sociology professor we mentioned earlier, 365 00:24:47,840 --> 00:24:54,600 Speaker 1: Lisa Martino Taylor, conducted a deep dive into what actually happened. 366 00:24:55,000 --> 00:25:00,280 Speaker 1: And she's based in St. Louis Community College, Merrimax. She's 367 00:25:00,280 --> 00:25:06,040 Speaker 1: familiar with the area. And Martino Taylor started saying, hey, 368 00:25:06,119 --> 00:25:11,159 Speaker 1: the Army might have also mixed radioactive particles with the 369 00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:15,920 Speaker 1: zinc cabinet in sulfide. She said there was no direct proof, 370 00:25:16,520 --> 00:25:20,520 Speaker 1: but what she did find was troubling enough that U. 371 00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:24,000 Speaker 1: S Senators from Missouri wrote to the Army Secretary of 372 00:25:24,040 --> 00:25:29,520 Speaker 1: the time, John McHugh in and demanded answers through a 373 00:25:29,680 --> 00:25:34,879 Speaker 1: Foyer request, a Freedom of Information Act request, and she 374 00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:37,840 Speaker 1: got some results. By the way, and the Army had 375 00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:41,720 Speaker 1: described this area at the time as quote a densely 376 00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:47,880 Speaker 1: populated slum district as that word that s word loaded, 377 00:25:48,200 --> 00:25:52,159 Speaker 1: you know, And here's the thing, Martina Taylor was not 378 00:25:52,680 --> 00:25:54,560 Speaker 1: said that she wasn't aware at the time of any 379 00:25:54,640 --> 00:25:58,840 Speaker 1: lawsuits filed by anyone that was affected by these tests. Uh. 380 00:25:58,880 --> 00:26:02,840 Speaker 1: There was actually one that was filed a month after 381 00:26:02,880 --> 00:26:05,520 Speaker 1: the statement, but up to that point she was not 382 00:26:05,600 --> 00:26:09,119 Speaker 1: aware and to our knowledge, there were not any lawsuits filed. 383 00:26:09,440 --> 00:26:12,919 Speaker 1: She also said that the government hadn't paid for any 384 00:26:12,920 --> 00:26:18,320 Speaker 1: medical procedures or or or care or reparations of any kind. Uh, 385 00:26:18,359 --> 00:26:22,280 Speaker 1: nor was she aware of them even even issuing an apology, 386 00:26:22,480 --> 00:26:24,200 Speaker 1: which is another thing the government is not very good 387 00:26:24,200 --> 00:26:27,000 Speaker 1: at doing. Yeah, and you know, she continued to try 388 00:26:27,000 --> 00:26:30,320 Speaker 1: to reach out to the army herself and was essentially stonewalled, 389 00:26:30,400 --> 00:26:32,800 Speaker 1: another thing the army is quite good at doing. Yeah, 390 00:26:32,800 --> 00:26:37,640 Speaker 1: and you know exactly think about the brutal calculus that 391 00:26:37,760 --> 00:26:41,399 Speaker 1: the army engaged in here. The thing about a disadvantaged 392 00:26:41,480 --> 00:26:45,320 Speaker 1: population is one there there's less likely to be public blowback. 393 00:26:46,440 --> 00:26:49,040 Speaker 1: Maybe a poor choice of words for this episode, but 394 00:26:49,160 --> 00:26:52,840 Speaker 1: you get the gist to These are people who are 395 00:26:52,880 --> 00:26:56,439 Speaker 1: overwhelmingly not likely to have the means to pursue a 396 00:26:56,520 --> 00:27:00,560 Speaker 1: case in court in terms of time or money, so 397 00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:03,320 Speaker 1: it makes sense that they would target the most vulnerable. 398 00:27:03,880 --> 00:27:08,840 Speaker 1: Martino Taylor herself became involved due to a personal connection. 399 00:27:09,000 --> 00:27:14,240 Speaker 1: She had a colleague who grew up in the targeted area, 400 00:27:14,520 --> 00:27:18,480 Speaker 1: and this colleague contracted cancer later in life, leading Martino 401 00:27:18,520 --> 00:27:22,479 Speaker 1: Taylor to wonder if the testing had something to do 402 00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:27,240 Speaker 1: with that cancer in her adulthood. And the same day, 403 00:27:27,640 --> 00:27:32,720 Speaker 1: the very same day, another coworker told Martino Taylor that 404 00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:37,159 Speaker 1: she also had contracted cancer and she also lived in 405 00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:41,960 Speaker 1: that test area. So Bartino Taylor started researching this as 406 00:27:42,000 --> 00:27:47,879 Speaker 1: were her thesis at the University of Missouri, and she yeah, 407 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:51,639 Speaker 1: and it was a good thesis as they go. She 408 00:27:51,800 --> 00:27:55,720 Speaker 1: believes that the study was linked to the Manhattan Atomic 409 00:27:55,760 --> 00:27:59,400 Speaker 1: Bomb project and that a group of scientists from the project, 410 00:28:00,160 --> 00:28:06,600 Speaker 1: we're developing radiological weapons. In congressional study comes out that 411 00:28:06,720 --> 00:28:12,320 Speaker 1: confirms radiological testing, which is, uh, you know, it's like 412 00:28:12,359 --> 00:28:18,280 Speaker 1: biological warfare testing, but it's just with radiation and radioactive substances. 413 00:28:18,320 --> 00:28:22,960 Speaker 1: This congressional study confirmed that the testing occurred in Tennessee 414 00:28:22,960 --> 00:28:25,720 Speaker 1: and parts of the American West during the Cold War, 415 00:28:26,119 --> 00:28:30,440 Speaker 1: which leads her to believe it's reasonable to conclude, Uh, 416 00:28:30,480 --> 00:28:33,680 Speaker 1: there may have been a radiological component to the St. 417 00:28:33,760 --> 00:28:37,399 Speaker 1: Louis study, which means that even if zinc cadmium sulfide 418 00:28:37,560 --> 00:28:42,280 Speaker 1: is not itself as harmful in the amounts that people 419 00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:46,200 Speaker 1: encountered it, if there was radiological stuff mixed up in 420 00:28:46,240 --> 00:28:50,320 Speaker 1: that crazy, crazy aerosault smoothie, then that would have been 421 00:28:51,360 --> 00:28:54,080 Speaker 1: incredibly dangerous. Would that be nice if you just get 422 00:28:54,080 --> 00:28:56,640 Speaker 1: the airslized stabilities and just you know, squirt it right 423 00:28:56,640 --> 00:28:59,120 Speaker 1: into your mouth like whipped cream. Yeah, I've been I 424 00:28:59,160 --> 00:29:02,120 Speaker 1: think we're onto something. Maybe not, you know, leave out 425 00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:09,080 Speaker 1: the cadmium, perhaps, but the technology is not there yet. Good. 426 00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:11,960 Speaker 1: I mean, you know, it is hard to ariostolize a 427 00:29:12,120 --> 00:29:15,120 Speaker 1: thick slurrious mixture. Is slurrious the word? I'm gonna go 428 00:29:15,160 --> 00:29:18,320 Speaker 1: with it, this American english Man. Just get enough people 429 00:29:18,360 --> 00:29:21,400 Speaker 1: to say it as well, and then boom, tend to abulation. 430 00:29:21,840 --> 00:29:24,880 Speaker 1: I'm gonna start a change dot org petition to make 431 00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:29,920 Speaker 1: slurrious a word. Um So, mccaskell actually, uh, the Senator 432 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:34,200 Speaker 1: agreed that this was all kind of a little bit 433 00:29:34,360 --> 00:29:37,840 Speaker 1: sus uh said this quote. Given the nature of these experiments, 434 00:29:37,920 --> 00:29:40,720 Speaker 1: it's not surprising that Missouri's citizens still have questions and 435 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:44,080 Speaker 1: concerns about what exactly occurred and if there may have 436 00:29:44,200 --> 00:29:47,480 Speaker 1: been any negative health effects, um she said in a 437 00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:52,320 Speaker 1: statement from her office, UM are our hero scientist. Doctoral 438 00:29:52,680 --> 00:29:56,960 Speaker 1: fellow friend Martino Taylor said that again that these follow 439 00:29:57,040 --> 00:30:00,040 Speaker 1: up health studies should be performed, but it needs to 440 00:30:00,080 --> 00:30:04,200 Speaker 1: involved input from the community, from the people whose lives 441 00:30:04,200 --> 00:30:07,880 Speaker 1: are actually put at risk, you know, without their knowledge 442 00:30:08,520 --> 00:30:11,520 Speaker 1: by the government, and that they should their stakeholders in this. 443 00:30:11,880 --> 00:30:14,720 Speaker 1: They need to have a say, um and be you know, 444 00:30:15,600 --> 00:30:17,880 Speaker 1: part of the decision making process in terms of like 445 00:30:18,000 --> 00:30:21,080 Speaker 1: the tests and all of that stuff. And uh yeah, 446 00:30:21,160 --> 00:30:23,680 Speaker 1: she went on to say, their voices have not been heard. 447 00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:28,000 Speaker 1: Seems pretty clear that that's the case, wouldn't you say, Ben, Yeah, 448 00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:33,480 Speaker 1: I think it's very clear that their voices haven't been heard. 449 00:30:34,480 --> 00:30:38,560 Speaker 1: We need to have direct input from people who live 450 00:30:38,720 --> 00:30:41,400 Speaker 1: in those areas. Her book, by the way, it was 451 00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:44,640 Speaker 1: published just a few years ago in seventeen in August. 452 00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:46,360 Speaker 1: It was a follow up to that two thousand and 453 00:30:46,360 --> 00:30:50,760 Speaker 1: twelve dissertation. It's legit, you know, I've looked into it 454 00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:55,960 Speaker 1: as well, Like obviously no one's making up stories here. 455 00:30:56,640 --> 00:31:02,520 Speaker 1: Her report triggered and Army investigate and the Army in 456 00:31:02,640 --> 00:31:05,600 Speaker 1: a stunning plot twist, Max, I don't know what a 457 00:31:05,640 --> 00:31:16,520 Speaker 1: sarcastic sound. Cue is but sorry, that was smart. Yeah, 458 00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:29,160 Speaker 1: you're welcome, thanks, absolutely ridiculous. There it is, there, it 459 00:31:29,280 --> 00:31:33,160 Speaker 1: is okay. In a stunning plot wist. The Army investigation 460 00:31:33,240 --> 00:31:38,640 Speaker 1: found no evidence that the testing was a threat, and 461 00:31:38,920 --> 00:31:41,680 Speaker 1: this is an ongoing event. When you think about it, 462 00:31:41,760 --> 00:31:45,160 Speaker 1: history is never as far away nor as distant as 463 00:31:45,240 --> 00:31:51,480 Speaker 1: people often assume. There are potential victims who are alive today. 464 00:31:51,560 --> 00:31:55,720 Speaker 1: For example, from a Business Insider article that are old 465 00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:59,600 Speaker 1: pal Gabe found by Jim Salter. There are people like 466 00:31:59,680 --> 00:32:03,600 Speaker 1: dor Spates. She was a child when her father suddenly 467 00:32:03,640 --> 00:32:08,080 Speaker 1: died in n and Spates in her family alone, and 468 00:32:08,120 --> 00:32:11,600 Speaker 1: she's watched four siblings die of cancer. She herself is 469 00:32:11,640 --> 00:32:16,960 Speaker 1: a cervical cancer survivor. And because she was born in 470 00:32:17,040 --> 00:32:21,200 Speaker 1: that housing development I mentioned earlier at the top floor, 471 00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:26,960 Speaker 1: of course, she's wondering if the Army spewing hundreds and 472 00:32:27,080 --> 00:32:30,240 Speaker 1: hundreds of pounds of this sulfite into the air had 473 00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:34,040 Speaker 1: an effect on her family. Four of her eleven siblings 474 00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:37,200 Speaker 1: signed from cancer. By the way, that's not a normal number. 475 00:32:37,240 --> 00:32:40,360 Speaker 1: That's not a normal ratio. No, it's not. And this 476 00:32:40,440 --> 00:32:43,680 Speaker 1: also comes from the article that Ben referenced earlier from 477 00:32:43,720 --> 00:32:47,440 Speaker 1: the AP writer Jim Salter, The Army sprays St. Louis 478 00:32:47,440 --> 00:32:51,040 Speaker 1: with toxic aerosol during a just revealed nineteen fifties tests 479 00:32:51,200 --> 00:32:52,960 Speaker 1: came out in two thousands twelve. So this really is, 480 00:32:53,280 --> 00:32:58,960 Speaker 1: you know, relatively new information that is not terribly terribly surprising. 481 00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:01,920 Speaker 1: And again, you know, ben Um, I did my session 482 00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:03,880 Speaker 1: for the Stuff they Don't Want You to Know audiobook 483 00:33:03,920 --> 00:33:05,840 Speaker 1: the other day, and a couple of the chapters that 484 00:33:05,880 --> 00:33:09,160 Speaker 1: I read were from the section on chemical weapons and 485 00:33:09,360 --> 00:33:13,320 Speaker 1: UM testing and UM. It is very eye opening and 486 00:33:13,400 --> 00:33:21,360 Speaker 1: very disturbing. It happens more than you would think throughout history. Yes, agreed, agreed, unfortunately, 487 00:33:21,520 --> 00:33:24,200 Speaker 1: and you know, you can make all sorts of arguments 488 00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:29,360 Speaker 1: about a greater good, you know, that's those are the 489 00:33:29,440 --> 00:33:32,440 Speaker 1: arguments that are made in the halls of power pretty 490 00:33:32,480 --> 00:33:35,440 Speaker 1: often with stuff like this, the idea that we're going 491 00:33:35,480 --> 00:33:39,800 Speaker 1: to do our best not to hurt innocent people and privately, 492 00:33:40,520 --> 00:33:43,400 Speaker 1: never said in public, rarely said in public, but privately, 493 00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:46,560 Speaker 1: the idea is, if a few people do get hurt, 494 00:33:47,000 --> 00:33:52,320 Speaker 1: that's still better than millions dying in a biological warfare attack. 495 00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:56,200 Speaker 1: It's it's true, I mean, okay, it's it's you know, 496 00:33:56,240 --> 00:33:59,840 Speaker 1: it's people in this level of government, and then with 497 00:34:00,000 --> 00:34:02,240 Speaker 1: this amount of power, they certainly do have to make 498 00:34:02,240 --> 00:34:06,640 Speaker 1: some difficult decisions. I'm not saying I'm not justifying the 499 00:34:06,680 --> 00:34:10,000 Speaker 1: decisions that they actually make, but um, I am saying 500 00:34:10,040 --> 00:34:13,040 Speaker 1: that it's obviously, you know, a bit of a devil's 501 00:34:13,080 --> 00:34:15,839 Speaker 1: bargain there that you have to make oftentimes when you're 502 00:34:15,840 --> 00:34:21,120 Speaker 1: in that situation. But you know, sometimes I think they 503 00:34:21,200 --> 00:34:24,480 Speaker 1: go a little bit overboard. Let's just say, with testing 504 00:34:24,840 --> 00:34:27,280 Speaker 1: and looking for scenarios that may or may not actually 505 00:34:27,280 --> 00:34:30,960 Speaker 1: play out. And you know, to what degree are they 506 00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:34,839 Speaker 1: allowing kind of like paranoia and and the anxiety of 507 00:34:34,880 --> 00:34:39,239 Speaker 1: a perceived threat cause them to actually harm their own citizens? 508 00:34:40,640 --> 00:34:42,239 Speaker 1: I don't know what. What do you think? Man? This 509 00:34:42,280 --> 00:34:44,279 Speaker 1: is something that you dig into quite a lot, like 510 00:34:44,960 --> 00:34:47,080 Speaker 1: could you put yourself in the position of of a 511 00:34:47,120 --> 00:34:49,399 Speaker 1: person like that? And then is there another is there 512 00:34:49,400 --> 00:34:53,520 Speaker 1: an alternative to this? Are these easy solutions that are 513 00:34:53,680 --> 00:34:56,560 Speaker 1: the most the lowest hanging fruit, that require like a 514 00:34:56,560 --> 00:34:58,560 Speaker 1: certain degree of callousness to be able to say, like, 515 00:34:58,600 --> 00:35:00,759 Speaker 1: you know what, we've already got a Weston ground right 516 00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:03,719 Speaker 1: here in St. Louis. Let's just do that we need 517 00:35:03,760 --> 00:35:05,920 Speaker 1: to save some money and not worry about like building 518 00:35:05,960 --> 00:35:09,600 Speaker 1: some kind of like simulation. Yeah, well, here's the question 519 00:35:09,840 --> 00:35:13,440 Speaker 1: I think that should be posed to those folks. If 520 00:35:13,480 --> 00:35:17,040 Speaker 1: this stuff is so safe, why aren't you testing it 521 00:35:17,160 --> 00:35:19,799 Speaker 1: over your part of town? You know what I mean? 522 00:35:20,160 --> 00:35:23,439 Speaker 1: That's the question for the scientists and the general's uh, 523 00:35:23,520 --> 00:35:28,560 Speaker 1: and the secretaries various and subjury. It's kind of like 524 00:35:28,600 --> 00:35:34,040 Speaker 1: the question for a lot of very powerful business tycoons. 525 00:35:34,680 --> 00:35:40,080 Speaker 1: If indeed your factory isn't polluting anything, why don't you 526 00:35:40,160 --> 00:35:42,560 Speaker 1: live down the river? Right? Why don't you live in 527 00:35:42,600 --> 00:35:45,160 Speaker 1: that part of town? So I think the in a 528 00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:51,560 Speaker 1: very real way, their choice of disadvantaged populations, however they 529 00:35:51,680 --> 00:35:56,640 Speaker 1: rationalized it gives lie to the claims about safety. They 530 00:35:56,719 --> 00:35:59,719 Speaker 1: knew what was up, and this is this is just 531 00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:03,400 Speaker 1: one instance, like you said, Noel, of multiple other times 532 00:36:03,440 --> 00:36:07,120 Speaker 1: the US has tested chemical weaponry in one form or 533 00:36:07,160 --> 00:36:10,440 Speaker 1: another on civilians. We talked about some other times. You 534 00:36:10,480 --> 00:36:13,360 Speaker 1: can learn about even more times stuff like this occurred 535 00:36:13,680 --> 00:36:17,560 Speaker 1: in our upcoming book for a different show, uh stuff 536 00:36:17,560 --> 00:36:20,520 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know, publishing in October. You 537 00:36:20,560 --> 00:36:23,680 Speaker 1: can pre order now, But in the meantime we promise 538 00:36:23,760 --> 00:36:26,280 Speaker 1: We're gonna get to something a little bit less depressing 539 00:36:26,719 --> 00:36:31,360 Speaker 1: in a future episode. We have some of the most 540 00:36:31,440 --> 00:36:36,839 Speaker 1: exciting episodes I think we've ever done, coming very very soon. 541 00:36:36,880 --> 00:36:39,120 Speaker 1: Like like, I think we've mentioned that we're jazz about 542 00:36:39,160 --> 00:36:42,600 Speaker 1: our new research buddies, Jeff and Zach. They have been 543 00:36:42,640 --> 00:36:46,520 Speaker 1: churning out some incredible stories, digging deep and finding us 544 00:36:46,520 --> 00:36:48,920 Speaker 1: some really really fascinating stuff. And I think all of 545 00:36:48,960 --> 00:36:51,279 Speaker 1: you ridiculous storians out there are going to love them 546 00:36:51,280 --> 00:36:53,400 Speaker 1: as well. Um, and I think we're also gonna you 547 00:36:53,400 --> 00:36:57,880 Speaker 1: guys are gonna meet Jeff and Zach personally very soon. Yes, yes, 548 00:36:58,000 --> 00:37:01,160 Speaker 1: that is a ridiculous history. Geary and t uh So. 549 00:37:01,320 --> 00:37:04,160 Speaker 1: Thank you to Jeff and Zach. Thank you, of course 550 00:37:04,640 --> 00:37:07,440 Speaker 1: to our main man on the audio ones and twos, 551 00:37:07,640 --> 00:37:11,440 Speaker 1: Mr Max Williams. Thanks to Alex Williams who composed the soundtrack. 552 00:37:11,840 --> 00:37:15,319 Speaker 1: Thanks to Casey Pegram, and folks, we do still talk 553 00:37:15,360 --> 00:37:18,200 Speaker 1: with Jonathan Strickland, a k a. The Quister. Saw some 554 00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:21,719 Speaker 1: questions about that on Facebook. Don't worry, we'll be returning soon. 555 00:37:21,960 --> 00:37:24,560 Speaker 1: It's just a little weird for us now in our 556 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:30,840 Speaker 1: nomadic phase, right as we moved from office to office. Yeah, 557 00:37:30,840 --> 00:37:33,560 Speaker 1: I may have mentioned as well that I recently moved 558 00:37:33,640 --> 00:37:37,120 Speaker 1: the house. Um, I bought a house recently. It's very 559 00:37:37,120 --> 00:37:39,200 Speaker 1: excited about, and I have a studio in my basement. 560 00:37:39,640 --> 00:37:41,880 Speaker 1: It's still a little bit crazy and chaotic, though, so 561 00:37:41,920 --> 00:37:44,400 Speaker 1: I kind of feel like I'm squatting and someone else's 562 00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:47,600 Speaker 1: creepy basement. But soon it will be full of rainbow 563 00:37:47,719 --> 00:37:51,040 Speaker 1: colored lights and art and and music and and all 564 00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:53,160 Speaker 1: of the all of those good things. But until then, 565 00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:54,640 Speaker 1: I kind of feel like a bit of a cave troll. 566 00:37:55,800 --> 00:37:59,320 Speaker 1: You are the opposite of a cave troll, my friend. 567 00:38:00,040 --> 00:38:03,600 Speaker 1: We do have a question for everybody, if you, if 568 00:38:03,640 --> 00:38:07,000 Speaker 1: you have a story like this in your pastor and 569 00:38:07,080 --> 00:38:09,880 Speaker 1: your family, um, whatever your neck of the global woods 570 00:38:09,920 --> 00:38:13,560 Speaker 1: might be, would you mind letting us know. We would 571 00:38:13,640 --> 00:38:15,680 Speaker 1: love to hear it. You can find us on Facebook 572 00:38:15,760 --> 00:38:19,680 Speaker 1: as ridiculous historians. You can also find us on social media, 573 00:38:19,960 --> 00:38:24,200 Speaker 1: not just as a show, but as individuals. Mr Noel Brown, 574 00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:27,319 Speaker 1: I hear you're blowing up those instagrams. I don't know 575 00:38:27,320 --> 00:38:30,320 Speaker 1: about blowing up. I'm that's more of a slow burn, really, 576 00:38:30,560 --> 00:38:34,719 Speaker 1: But you can't find me slowly burning on Instagram where 577 00:38:34,760 --> 00:38:38,200 Speaker 1: I am at? How now Noel Brown, how about you, sir, Yeah, 578 00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:41,880 Speaker 1: that's true. You can find me doing an Operation Large 579 00:38:42,040 --> 00:38:46,240 Speaker 1: Internet Area coverage over on Instagram where at Ben Bolling 580 00:38:46,280 --> 00:38:48,720 Speaker 1: b w L I N you can get a preview 581 00:38:48,840 --> 00:38:51,920 Speaker 1: for all the secret projects I'm working on. There are 582 00:38:52,000 --> 00:38:55,520 Speaker 1: more and more these these past few weeks. By going 583 00:38:55,520 --> 00:38:58,000 Speaker 1: to Twitter where I'm at Ben Bowling h s w 584 00:38:58,719 --> 00:39:02,120 Speaker 1: uh coming from my tear rble jokes and spoilers and 585 00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:06,560 Speaker 1: stay for what La Musk calls the best part of Twitter, 586 00:39:07,080 --> 00:39:09,840 Speaker 1: Mr Max Williams. Yes, you can find me on Twitter 587 00:39:09,920 --> 00:39:12,279 Speaker 1: at at a t L underscore Max Williams, where I'll 588 00:39:12,280 --> 00:39:14,640 Speaker 1: be trolling bands Operation what is? What is? What was 589 00:39:14,680 --> 00:39:21,040 Speaker 1: that acronym LAK Internet Internet Large Internet Area Coverage. Yes, yeah, 590 00:39:21,080 --> 00:39:23,600 Speaker 1: I'll be trolling Operation LAK. So yeah, find me on 591 00:39:23,600 --> 00:39:27,120 Speaker 1: there at a t L underscore Max Williams. We'll see 592 00:39:27,160 --> 00:39:36,640 Speaker 1: you next time, folks. For more podcasts for my Heart Radio, 593 00:39:36,719 --> 00:39:39,360 Speaker 1: visit the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever 594 00:39:39,480 --> 00:39:41,040 Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.