1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,160 --> 00:00:16,000 Speaker 1: Hey therein Welcome to Tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 3 00:00:16,040 --> 00:00:19,479 Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio. And how 4 00:00:19,560 --> 00:00:22,520 Speaker 1: the tech are you? So it's time for a tech 5 00:00:22,560 --> 00:00:25,160 Speaker 1: stuff tidbits. I think this is probably gonna be pretty 6 00:00:25,200 --> 00:00:27,720 Speaker 1: long for tidbits, but let's just go with that. And 7 00:00:27,760 --> 00:00:30,840 Speaker 1: I got a message from way to Cold Mike on 8 00:00:30,880 --> 00:00:34,600 Speaker 1: Twitter asking for an episode about jail breaking, which is 9 00:00:34,640 --> 00:00:37,760 Speaker 1: a term I've not heard in quite some time, but 10 00:00:38,080 --> 00:00:41,920 Speaker 1: back in two thousand seven it really started to gain traction. 11 00:00:42,200 --> 00:00:45,880 Speaker 1: And of course we're not talking about breaking someone out 12 00:00:45,880 --> 00:00:50,440 Speaker 1: of a literal jail. Now, we're talking about using vulnerabilities 13 00:00:50,760 --> 00:00:54,400 Speaker 1: to break down the walls of an otherwise walled garden. 14 00:00:54,720 --> 00:00:59,560 Speaker 1: So first, let's set the stage. Let's say that you 15 00:00:59,640 --> 00:01:03,320 Speaker 1: are in charge of a tech company that produces a smartphone, 16 00:01:03,920 --> 00:01:07,080 Speaker 1: and part of your revenue comes from phone sales. Right, 17 00:01:07,200 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 1: you produce phones, they go to retailers. The retailers seldom 18 00:01:11,040 --> 00:01:15,000 Speaker 1: to customers. That's your revenue stream. However, you've also figured 19 00:01:15,040 --> 00:01:18,840 Speaker 1: out a way to increase your revenue by keeping a 20 00:01:18,920 --> 00:01:22,800 Speaker 1: tight control on what can and cannot be loaded onto 21 00:01:22,840 --> 00:01:27,840 Speaker 1: your smartphone, so you're acting as a kind of gatekeeper. UH. 22 00:01:27,880 --> 00:01:30,959 Speaker 1: You might also be acting as a payment processing service, 23 00:01:31,240 --> 00:01:35,520 Speaker 1: so you are in charge of determining what users can 24 00:01:35,680 --> 00:01:40,360 Speaker 1: download to your smartphone. UH. And anything that uses in 25 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:44,039 Speaker 1: app purchases has to go through your payment processing system, 26 00:01:44,080 --> 00:01:47,280 Speaker 1: so you can take a cut of all those transactions. 27 00:01:47,800 --> 00:01:50,440 Speaker 1: And yes, I am describing Apple here, but a lot 28 00:01:50,480 --> 00:01:53,640 Speaker 1: of companies do similar things. So this is all about 29 00:01:54,200 --> 00:01:57,720 Speaker 1: creating an ecosystem and then controlling as much of that 30 00:01:57,840 --> 00:02:01,560 Speaker 1: ecosystem as you possibly can in Now, this does not 31 00:02:01,640 --> 00:02:04,800 Speaker 1: always work, of course. For one thing, people have to 32 00:02:04,960 --> 00:02:08,040 Speaker 1: want to be part of that ecosystem in the first place. 33 00:02:08,120 --> 00:02:11,480 Speaker 1: Right if no one likes your product or thinks it's interesting, 34 00:02:11,800 --> 00:02:13,560 Speaker 1: no one's going to buy into it. And then it 35 00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:17,639 Speaker 1: doesn't matter if you control everything, because no one's entering 36 00:02:17,680 --> 00:02:20,600 Speaker 1: into your ecosystem in the first place. But we have 37 00:02:20,760 --> 00:02:24,360 Speaker 1: seen this time and again from tech companies, particularly those 38 00:02:24,400 --> 00:02:29,000 Speaker 1: that sell hardware, because if all you do is sell hardware, well, 39 00:02:29,040 --> 00:02:31,800 Speaker 1: then you only make money if folks are buying your stuff. 40 00:02:32,360 --> 00:02:34,519 Speaker 1: And if your stuff lasts, you know, at least a 41 00:02:34,560 --> 00:02:36,960 Speaker 1: couple of years, it might mean that you have some 42 00:02:37,200 --> 00:02:42,160 Speaker 1: pretty rough cycles like sales cycles, like if everyone is 43 00:02:42,200 --> 00:02:45,480 Speaker 1: convinced to buy your product right out of the gate, Yeah, 44 00:02:45,560 --> 00:02:47,480 Speaker 1: that's gonna be great for you in the short term, 45 00:02:47,720 --> 00:02:51,560 Speaker 1: but then a year later, maybe no one's buying a 46 00:02:51,600 --> 00:02:55,320 Speaker 1: new stuff because you know, the old thing still works great. 47 00:02:55,760 --> 00:02:59,000 Speaker 1: So this can really kind of lock you into a 48 00:02:59,000 --> 00:03:04,520 Speaker 1: a huff revenue cycle where you have big ups and downs. 49 00:03:04,680 --> 00:03:07,000 Speaker 1: That's not great for shareholders if you have to be 50 00:03:07,000 --> 00:03:11,960 Speaker 1: a publicly traded companies. So if you pair your hardware 51 00:03:12,560 --> 00:03:16,760 Speaker 1: with some kind of service, you can continue to charge 52 00:03:16,840 --> 00:03:20,840 Speaker 1: customers over and over over, you know, however long they 53 00:03:20,960 --> 00:03:24,160 Speaker 1: remain a customer. And we see this with printers and 54 00:03:24,240 --> 00:03:28,239 Speaker 1: toner cartridges, with famous examples being printers that can detect 55 00:03:28,320 --> 00:03:31,480 Speaker 1: whether or not the cartridge you've inserted is an official 56 00:03:31,560 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 1: one from that company or a third party knockoff, and 57 00:03:34,639 --> 00:03:37,000 Speaker 1: if it's a third party knockoff, it might just not 58 00:03:37,920 --> 00:03:40,880 Speaker 1: allow that to happen, like it'll lock the printer down. 59 00:03:41,680 --> 00:03:45,480 Speaker 1: We've seen this with coffee makers. Curig famously tried to 60 00:03:45,520 --> 00:03:49,600 Speaker 1: fight off attempts from other companies to create pods that 61 00:03:49,800 --> 00:03:53,520 Speaker 1: were compatible with curing coffee machines. Curi just wanted you 62 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:57,600 Speaker 1: to go through the curing system, and we've see it 63 00:03:57,640 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 1: in the right to repair movement with company. He's like 64 00:04:00,400 --> 00:04:03,640 Speaker 1: John Deere trying to force farmers to you know, lug 65 00:04:03,680 --> 00:04:07,200 Speaker 1: their expensive farming equipment to a license John Dear repair 66 00:04:07,240 --> 00:04:11,240 Speaker 1: shop rather than be able to do any maintenance themselves 67 00:04:11,400 --> 00:04:13,680 Speaker 1: or with a mechanic that they like to work with. 68 00:04:14,280 --> 00:04:17,719 Speaker 1: All of these concepts are related to this idea of 69 00:04:17,800 --> 00:04:21,080 Speaker 1: locking customers into a model where they keep on paying 70 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:24,039 Speaker 1: to be part of this ecosystem. All right, So let's 71 00:04:24,040 --> 00:04:27,760 Speaker 1: go back to two thousand and seven. That's the year 72 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:31,600 Speaker 1: that Apple introduced the iPhone, and you may owe Ma 73 00:04:31,760 --> 00:04:34,279 Speaker 1: Drew Gees have forgotten what that was like. Things changing 74 00:04:34,320 --> 00:04:37,920 Speaker 1: so scoring nowadays and people quick to forget. Just give 75 00:04:37,920 --> 00:04:40,360 Speaker 1: me a shout out if you actually get that reference 76 00:04:41,120 --> 00:04:43,719 Speaker 1: and text stuff hsw on Twitter is the way to 77 00:04:43,720 --> 00:04:48,200 Speaker 1: do that. But when Apple first launched the iPhone, it 78 00:04:48,240 --> 00:04:51,720 Speaker 1: was before there was an app store. In fact, the 79 00:04:51,839 --> 00:04:55,599 Speaker 1: iPhone app store launched just a hair longer than a 80 00:04:55,680 --> 00:05:01,320 Speaker 1: year after the original iPhone debut, So the original iPhone 81 00:05:01,320 --> 00:05:04,280 Speaker 1: owners went more than a year if they bought it 82 00:05:04,320 --> 00:05:06,360 Speaker 1: on day one, they went more than a year without 83 00:05:06,400 --> 00:05:08,679 Speaker 1: any kind of App Store, no way to add stuff 84 00:05:08,680 --> 00:05:11,719 Speaker 1: to your phone. And it's not that the phone couldn't 85 00:05:12,279 --> 00:05:15,560 Speaker 1: support apps. It totally could, and in fact it came 86 00:05:15,600 --> 00:05:20,440 Speaker 1: standard with several Apple provided apps pre installed. But Apple 87 00:05:20,520 --> 00:05:23,400 Speaker 1: was building out the back end of that ecosystem, the 88 00:05:23,480 --> 00:05:27,640 Speaker 1: process by which app developers would submit applications for Apple 89 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:31,080 Speaker 1: to consider to include into the app store, and sometimes 90 00:05:31,080 --> 00:05:34,560 Speaker 1: Apple did, sometimes it didn't, and those early days in particular, 91 00:05:34,839 --> 00:05:37,520 Speaker 1: it was a pretty opaque process. There were times where 92 00:05:37,760 --> 00:05:41,279 Speaker 1: developers would get a rejection and not really understand why 93 00:05:41,320 --> 00:05:45,360 Speaker 1: they were rejected, especially if a very similar app would 94 00:05:45,760 --> 00:05:49,720 Speaker 1: then get accepted into the app Store. So they were 95 00:05:49,760 --> 00:05:53,120 Speaker 1: confusing days back then, and again that was a year 96 00:05:53,160 --> 00:05:57,400 Speaker 1: after the phone had actually launched. And you see, Apple 97 00:05:57,480 --> 00:06:01,640 Speaker 1: wanted and actually still wants, to control what sort of 98 00:06:01,680 --> 00:06:04,560 Speaker 1: stuff could appear on the iPhone, which, when you really 99 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:07,680 Speaker 1: break it down, is just a small portable computer that 100 00:06:07,800 --> 00:06:11,960 Speaker 1: happens to be combined with a phone, and computers are 101 00:06:12,000 --> 00:06:15,640 Speaker 1: designed to run software. But Steve Jobs, the co founder 102 00:06:15,640 --> 00:06:18,479 Speaker 1: of Apple, had long maintained a desire to restrict what 103 00:06:18,600 --> 00:06:22,400 Speaker 1: sort of stuff could run on his company's hardware, and 104 00:06:22,400 --> 00:06:25,280 Speaker 1: there are a lot of different reasons for this. One 105 00:06:25,320 --> 00:06:28,600 Speaker 1: of those reasons is just a desire for quality control. 106 00:06:29,279 --> 00:06:32,040 Speaker 1: If you take care to make sure that only approved 107 00:06:32,080 --> 00:06:35,760 Speaker 1: apps are allowed on your device, you can sidestep a 108 00:06:35,839 --> 00:06:38,719 Speaker 1: lot of the problems that can come about when junk 109 00:06:38,839 --> 00:06:42,240 Speaker 1: software hits a platform. If we think back to the 110 00:06:42,240 --> 00:06:46,000 Speaker 1: early nineteen eighties, we can remember the issues with video 111 00:06:46,040 --> 00:06:50,400 Speaker 1: game consoles and how a flood of really crappy games 112 00:06:50,440 --> 00:06:54,320 Speaker 1: contributed to an overall decline in popularity of consoles like 113 00:06:54,320 --> 00:06:59,800 Speaker 1: the Attar, and ultimately the video game industry as a 114 00:07:00,000 --> 00:07:04,360 Speaker 1: hole in the United States at least, crashed in Now, 115 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:07,560 Speaker 1: I'm not saying that crappy games caused the crash, but 116 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:11,200 Speaker 1: they were a contributing factor to it. So that's one 117 00:07:11,280 --> 00:07:14,520 Speaker 1: thing you don't want to have your platform flooded with junk. 118 00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:19,840 Speaker 1: But another reason is security. Computers run on code, and 119 00:07:19,920 --> 00:07:23,000 Speaker 1: if you are clever, you might figure out code that 120 00:07:23,080 --> 00:07:27,040 Speaker 1: can exploit a computer in some way. Now, when you're 121 00:07:27,040 --> 00:07:29,880 Speaker 1: talking about a computer that's also connected to a phone 122 00:07:30,480 --> 00:07:34,640 Speaker 1: or a WiFi network, exploits can go beyond affecting just 123 00:07:34,800 --> 00:07:37,800 Speaker 1: a single device, and we've seen exactly what can happen 124 00:07:38,120 --> 00:07:41,000 Speaker 1: with big stories like the Israeli company N s O 125 00:07:41,080 --> 00:07:46,200 Speaker 1: Group and the Pegasus product that that company produces. Pegasus 126 00:07:47,000 --> 00:07:50,120 Speaker 1: leverage the flaw on Apple's Eye Message that would allow 127 00:07:50,240 --> 00:07:53,920 Speaker 1: someone to gain remote access to another person's phone. All 128 00:07:53,920 --> 00:07:56,480 Speaker 1: it would take is for the attacker to send a 129 00:07:56,520 --> 00:07:59,840 Speaker 1: message to their target through I Message, So you just 130 00:08:00,000 --> 00:08:02,520 Speaker 1: had to have the target's phone number, and you just 131 00:08:02,600 --> 00:08:06,960 Speaker 1: sent the the attack through I message, and the target 132 00:08:06,960 --> 00:08:09,280 Speaker 1: wouldn't even have to click on a link or anything. 133 00:08:09,480 --> 00:08:13,120 Speaker 1: So this was a zero click attack, and it would 134 00:08:13,160 --> 00:08:16,920 Speaker 1: turn the target's phone effectively into a surveillance device like 135 00:08:16,960 --> 00:08:20,320 Speaker 1: the the attacker could activate the camera or the microphone, 136 00:08:20,400 --> 00:08:22,920 Speaker 1: or just you know, scroll through all the stuff that 137 00:08:22,920 --> 00:08:25,720 Speaker 1: that person had been doing on that phone. And this 138 00:08:25,800 --> 00:08:27,920 Speaker 1: is the kind of stuff that Apple would rather not 139 00:08:28,040 --> 00:08:33,840 Speaker 1: happen for obvious reasons. And then there's the potential for revenue. 140 00:08:34,080 --> 00:08:36,800 Speaker 1: If you've got the final say on what can and 141 00:08:36,840 --> 00:08:40,040 Speaker 1: cannot go onto your platform, and if your platform is 142 00:08:40,080 --> 00:08:44,240 Speaker 1: really popular, then you can pretty much dictate terms to 143 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:47,680 Speaker 1: app developers. You have all the leverage the developers want 144 00:08:47,679 --> 00:08:49,760 Speaker 1: their apps to get in front of as many people 145 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:53,760 Speaker 1: as possible. If the people happen to really love your product, 146 00:08:54,120 --> 00:08:56,560 Speaker 1: well that means the app developers are going to want 147 00:08:56,559 --> 00:08:59,040 Speaker 1: to develop for you, even if you happen to put 148 00:08:59,080 --> 00:09:00,800 Speaker 1: a whole bunch of whops in front of them that 149 00:09:00,840 --> 00:09:03,720 Speaker 1: they have to jump through in the process. And Steve 150 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:08,040 Speaker 1: Jobs was a brilliant salesman. When he first announced the 151 00:09:08,080 --> 00:09:11,400 Speaker 1: iPhone back in early two thousand seven, six months before 152 00:09:11,400 --> 00:09:15,120 Speaker 1: the product would actually release, he had that audience eating 153 00:09:15,120 --> 00:09:18,160 Speaker 1: out of his hand. He highlighted some pretty cool features 154 00:09:18,200 --> 00:09:21,760 Speaker 1: that are standard in smartphones today, but they're really innovative. 155 00:09:21,800 --> 00:09:26,080 Speaker 1: Back in early two thousand seven and before two thousand seven, 156 00:09:26,120 --> 00:09:31,360 Speaker 1: smartphones were mostly clunky and utilitarian, mostly the stuff that 157 00:09:31,559 --> 00:09:34,559 Speaker 1: busy executives carried so that they could stay connected to 158 00:09:34,600 --> 00:09:38,240 Speaker 1: their calendars and email or you know us as a 159 00:09:38,280 --> 00:09:41,440 Speaker 1: status symbol so that other executives would know how executive 160 00:09:41,440 --> 00:09:46,280 Speaker 1: they were. That's some commentary there. But the iPhone was different. 161 00:09:46,320 --> 00:09:51,319 Speaker 1: It was sexy, It seemed futuristic and cool, and even 162 00:09:51,360 --> 00:09:54,440 Speaker 1: as a brand new product, a lot of people wanted it. 163 00:09:54,960 --> 00:09:58,000 Speaker 1: In the United States, initially you could only get an 164 00:09:58,000 --> 00:10:01,199 Speaker 1: iPhone if you got it on a T and T. 165 00:10:01,559 --> 00:10:05,280 Speaker 1: It was the only carrier that could carry the iPhone 166 00:10:05,400 --> 00:10:07,439 Speaker 1: initially in the United States, Apple and a T and 167 00:10:07,480 --> 00:10:10,280 Speaker 1: T had an exclusive deal that was to last a 168 00:10:10,280 --> 00:10:12,680 Speaker 1: couple of years here in the US. But even with 169 00:10:12,760 --> 00:10:16,319 Speaker 1: that restriction, a lot of people wanted in, but some 170 00:10:16,400 --> 00:10:20,400 Speaker 1: people wanted a little bit more. I'll explain when we 171 00:10:20,480 --> 00:10:30,720 Speaker 1: come back after this quick break. So, as I was saying, 172 00:10:30,720 --> 00:10:34,480 Speaker 1: there were some iPhone enthusiasts who thought the platform was awesome, 173 00:10:34,679 --> 00:10:38,320 Speaker 1: but they were not satisfied with the iPhone as it launched. 174 00:10:38,600 --> 00:10:40,960 Speaker 1: They knew that as a computer, you should be able 175 00:10:41,000 --> 00:10:44,840 Speaker 1: to load stuff onto it, programs, apps, in other words, 176 00:10:45,360 --> 00:10:49,600 Speaker 1: and the iPhone lacked certain features that most cell phones 177 00:10:49,600 --> 00:10:52,600 Speaker 1: already had, including a game. There was no game on 178 00:10:52,640 --> 00:10:55,600 Speaker 1: the original iPhone at all. You could go out and 179 00:10:55,600 --> 00:10:58,520 Speaker 1: buy a candy bar cell phone or a flip phone, 180 00:10:58,520 --> 00:11:00,520 Speaker 1: not a smartphone, just a self own and you would 181 00:11:00,520 --> 00:11:04,120 Speaker 1: get Snake on it at least, or Hangman or something. 182 00:11:04,559 --> 00:11:07,199 Speaker 1: But the iPhone didn't even have that. But what if 183 00:11:07,200 --> 00:11:11,160 Speaker 1: you could load programs onto the iPhone? While obviously Apple 184 00:11:11,400 --> 00:11:13,400 Speaker 1: did not want people to be able to do that, 185 00:11:13,800 --> 00:11:16,080 Speaker 1: the company was creating the framework so that it would 186 00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:19,760 Speaker 1: have this full control of that ecosystem. But in the meantime, 187 00:11:20,160 --> 00:11:23,839 Speaker 1: hackers were prodding the iPhones programming and finding ways around 188 00:11:23,840 --> 00:11:27,560 Speaker 1: the operating system's walled garden, and the goal was to 189 00:11:27,600 --> 00:11:30,480 Speaker 1: create a way in which the user could load unauthorized 190 00:11:30,480 --> 00:11:34,040 Speaker 1: apps onto their iPhone. On a technical level, what the 191 00:11:34,040 --> 00:11:37,880 Speaker 1: hackers wanted to do was get administrative level access to 192 00:11:37,960 --> 00:11:42,000 Speaker 1: the file systems of the iPhones operating system or iOS. 193 00:11:42,720 --> 00:11:46,240 Speaker 1: That is what jail breaking is. It is dismantling or 194 00:11:46,400 --> 00:11:49,760 Speaker 1: overcoming the restrictions placed on a piece of tech so 195 00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:53,280 Speaker 1: that you can load whatever you want onto it and 196 00:11:53,400 --> 00:11:56,080 Speaker 1: change it in whichever way you want. And in the 197 00:11:56,080 --> 00:11:58,800 Speaker 1: early days the iPhone, it also meant you could potentially 198 00:11:59,080 --> 00:12:02,320 Speaker 1: use an iPhone with a different carrier than whatever Apple's 199 00:12:02,360 --> 00:12:06,520 Speaker 1: official partner was in that region. This is more frequently 200 00:12:06,600 --> 00:12:09,959 Speaker 1: referred to as unlocking, so it's related to, but slightly 201 00:12:10,000 --> 00:12:13,680 Speaker 1: different from, jail breaking. Sometimes the jail breaking process would 202 00:12:13,720 --> 00:12:17,559 Speaker 1: allow you to unlock your phone, but they weren't necessarily 203 00:12:17,600 --> 00:12:22,320 Speaker 1: always together. And while the term jailbreaking can apply to 204 00:12:22,480 --> 00:12:26,960 Speaker 1: any walled garden ecosystem, more often than not you would 205 00:12:27,040 --> 00:12:31,120 Speaker 1: encounter it in terms of Apple and specifically the iPhone 206 00:12:31,320 --> 00:12:34,720 Speaker 1: and to a lesser extent, the iPad and the and 207 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:38,720 Speaker 1: the iPod Touch. I almost totally forgot what the iPod 208 00:12:38,760 --> 00:12:40,840 Speaker 1: Touch was called, because it's been so long since I've 209 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:44,560 Speaker 1: seen an iPod and I think a big part of 210 00:12:44,600 --> 00:12:47,440 Speaker 1: the reason why we associate this mostly with Apple is 211 00:12:47,480 --> 00:12:51,640 Speaker 1: that Google, unlike Apple, when when they launched their Android 212 00:12:51,640 --> 00:12:55,400 Speaker 1: phone the following year, Google decided to give users the 213 00:12:55,400 --> 00:12:59,839 Speaker 1: option to load apps outside of the official Google App Store. 214 00:13:00,679 --> 00:13:04,400 Speaker 1: Now that's called sideloading. So you're heading off to the 215 00:13:04,559 --> 00:13:08,800 Speaker 1: side to load an app onto a device. You're not 216 00:13:08,840 --> 00:13:13,559 Speaker 1: going through the official you know, Android Store, and sometimes 217 00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:15,800 Speaker 1: you need to do that just for the purposes of 218 00:13:15,880 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 1: developing an app. Right, So let's say that you are 219 00:13:18,280 --> 00:13:21,440 Speaker 1: a developer. You're creating an app. The app is not 220 00:13:21,520 --> 00:13:24,160 Speaker 1: ready for full rollout, so you're not gonna submit it 221 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:27,280 Speaker 1: to the app Store yet, but it's beyond the initial 222 00:13:27,320 --> 00:13:29,560 Speaker 1: development phase and you want to run a beta test 223 00:13:29,640 --> 00:13:31,439 Speaker 1: to make sure that the app is doing what it's 224 00:13:31,440 --> 00:13:35,439 Speaker 1: supposed to do. So maybe you contact a relatively small 225 00:13:35,520 --> 00:13:38,439 Speaker 1: number of folks to participate in the beta and they 226 00:13:38,520 --> 00:13:41,240 Speaker 1: sideload the app. You send them like a direct link 227 00:13:41,559 --> 00:13:44,439 Speaker 1: to where they can download the app and they can 228 00:13:44,480 --> 00:13:47,120 Speaker 1: do that. Then you test out the app, You work 229 00:13:47,120 --> 00:13:49,600 Speaker 1: out what the bugs are if there are any you're 230 00:13:49,679 --> 00:13:51,760 Speaker 1: find it, and then once it's ready, then you can 231 00:13:51,800 --> 00:13:54,360 Speaker 1: submit it to the official store. That happens a lot, 232 00:13:54,640 --> 00:13:57,480 Speaker 1: but it does require that your testers have to go 233 00:13:57,559 --> 00:14:01,040 Speaker 1: into their settings and allow it does. By default, you 234 00:14:01,080 --> 00:14:04,040 Speaker 1: are not allowed to sideload apps, but you can change 235 00:14:04,080 --> 00:14:07,560 Speaker 1: that feature and Android. And then there are some developers 236 00:14:07,559 --> 00:14:11,360 Speaker 1: who just create apps that either they never submit to 237 00:14:11,360 --> 00:14:14,240 Speaker 1: the App Store or maybe the apps got rejected for 238 00:14:14,280 --> 00:14:17,480 Speaker 1: some reason, and in these cases, sideloading is really the 239 00:14:17,480 --> 00:14:22,920 Speaker 1: only way users can access those applications. Google's message was, hey, y'all, 240 00:14:23,760 --> 00:14:27,080 Speaker 1: this is risky, but you're all adults, so we're not 241 00:14:27,120 --> 00:14:29,920 Speaker 1: gonna stop you from doing this, but we do want 242 00:14:29,960 --> 00:14:34,440 Speaker 1: you to understand that it comes with potential consequences. You 243 00:14:34,480 --> 00:14:37,720 Speaker 1: need to know that. So Google was saying that sideloading 244 00:14:38,080 --> 00:14:40,040 Speaker 1: could lead to trouble, such as you know, you could 245 00:14:40,080 --> 00:14:43,040 Speaker 1: end up installing malware on your Android device, and that 246 00:14:43,280 --> 00:14:46,640 Speaker 1: does happen. But if you wanted the freedom it was 247 00:14:46,680 --> 00:14:48,760 Speaker 1: yours to have, you just had to change a couple 248 00:14:48,760 --> 00:14:52,600 Speaker 1: of settings on your phone. Apple, by contrast, said, the 249 00:14:52,680 --> 00:14:56,640 Speaker 1: world out there is a scary place. There are bad 250 00:14:56,680 --> 00:14:59,720 Speaker 1: people who will do bad things to your phone. And 251 00:14:59,760 --> 00:15:03,560 Speaker 1: so we shall protect you because you do not know better. 252 00:15:03,840 --> 00:15:07,840 Speaker 1: Trust in us. We know what you want before you do. 253 00:15:07,840 --> 00:15:10,760 Speaker 1: Do not worry what lies outside the official app store, 254 00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:15,320 Speaker 1: for nothing out there is worth your time, or something 255 00:15:15,880 --> 00:15:19,120 Speaker 1: like that. I might be paraphrasing anyway, a lot of 256 00:15:19,200 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: the hacker crowd felt that Apple's approach was very patronizing 257 00:15:23,600 --> 00:15:27,000 Speaker 1: and very Ivory tower ish. And you know, hackers aren't 258 00:15:27,040 --> 00:15:29,880 Speaker 1: super crazy about companies telling them what they can't do 259 00:15:30,000 --> 00:15:33,480 Speaker 1: with their stuff. That pretty much goes directly against the 260 00:15:33,520 --> 00:15:37,200 Speaker 1: hacker ethos. So you might wonder how long did it 261 00:15:37,240 --> 00:15:42,000 Speaker 1: take before someone found a way around Apple's iOS protections 262 00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:45,440 Speaker 1: that would allow you to install a new app on 263 00:15:45,560 --> 00:15:50,720 Speaker 1: the iPhone? And the answer is eleven days approximately, So 264 00:15:50,760 --> 00:15:53,560 Speaker 1: about a week and a half after the first iPhone launched, 265 00:15:53,880 --> 00:15:57,640 Speaker 1: hackers created a way to bypass the walled garden. Uh 266 00:15:57,960 --> 00:15:59,960 Speaker 1: one group of hackers that did this in that I'm 267 00:16:00,000 --> 00:16:03,560 Speaker 1: of time, we're cheekily referring to themselves as the iPhone 268 00:16:03,760 --> 00:16:07,960 Speaker 1: dev team, And initially they showed that through their process 269 00:16:08,120 --> 00:16:12,520 Speaker 1: they could install custom ringtones and custom wallpapers on the iPhone, 270 00:16:12,600 --> 00:16:15,120 Speaker 1: which is, you know, pretty small stuff, but a step 271 00:16:15,240 --> 00:16:18,320 Speaker 1: something that you could not do if you just had 272 00:16:18,360 --> 00:16:23,080 Speaker 1: an out of the box standard iPhone. Now there's no 273 00:16:23,120 --> 00:16:26,120 Speaker 1: real point in going into how they did this because 274 00:16:26,240 --> 00:16:30,040 Speaker 1: it gets extremely technical. Like some of the jail breaking 275 00:16:30,120 --> 00:16:35,440 Speaker 1: processes for various iOS versions would be more than a 276 00:16:35,520 --> 00:16:38,800 Speaker 1: hundred steps for you to complete in order to achieve 277 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:42,400 Speaker 1: the goal of jail breaking the phone. So it would 278 00:16:42,440 --> 00:16:45,600 Speaker 1: be pointless for me to go through all of those. 279 00:16:45,600 --> 00:16:47,760 Speaker 1: It would be meaningless for most of us, including me. 280 00:16:47,880 --> 00:16:50,040 Speaker 1: I'm not I don't need to talk down to anyone. 281 00:16:50,400 --> 00:16:52,200 Speaker 1: I would not understand what I was saying. I would 282 00:16:52,240 --> 00:16:54,800 Speaker 1: just be reciting something. It would be as if I 283 00:16:54,840 --> 00:16:57,880 Speaker 1: were saying something in a totally different language. And also, 284 00:16:58,840 --> 00:17:00,600 Speaker 1: most of all that is a ale of it now, 285 00:17:00,680 --> 00:17:04,560 Speaker 1: because you know, we're we're talking about a process that 286 00:17:04,600 --> 00:17:07,840 Speaker 1: we see in all forms across data security, which is 287 00:17:08,680 --> 00:17:12,080 Speaker 1: you get this see saw effect. So one moment, the 288 00:17:12,119 --> 00:17:14,840 Speaker 1: hackers have figured out how to exploit a system, so 289 00:17:14,880 --> 00:17:18,320 Speaker 1: the seesaw goes in their direction. The next moment, whatever 290 00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:21,159 Speaker 1: company is behind the system ends up pushing out an 291 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:25,920 Speaker 1: update that addresses that vulnerability see sauce switches. Then the 292 00:17:25,960 --> 00:17:28,800 Speaker 1: hackers get to work trying to crack that system. Switches again, 293 00:17:28,920 --> 00:17:31,200 Speaker 1: and so on, and this back and forth just keeps 294 00:17:31,240 --> 00:17:34,320 Speaker 1: on going. Pretty much, it will keep on going until 295 00:17:34,560 --> 00:17:37,719 Speaker 1: whatever the company is it's making the thing stops making 296 00:17:37,760 --> 00:17:41,760 Speaker 1: the thing. Um And of course some iOS updates would 297 00:17:41,800 --> 00:17:45,000 Speaker 1: end up taking longer to crack than others. I believe 298 00:17:45,280 --> 00:17:47,800 Speaker 1: that IO S fourteen, which is the most recent version, 299 00:17:47,960 --> 00:17:51,879 Speaker 1: took the longest amount of time to crack if we 300 00:17:51,960 --> 00:17:55,040 Speaker 1: ignore stuff like Apple TV, which took even longer. But 301 00:17:55,440 --> 00:18:00,159 Speaker 1: I'm mostly focusing on iPhones here, and Apple tried to 302 00:18:00,160 --> 00:18:04,520 Speaker 1: go a little bit scorched earth with their early response 303 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:09,080 Speaker 1: to to jail breaking. So the company aimed to brick 304 00:18:09,320 --> 00:18:11,800 Speaker 1: phones that had been altered. First, it sent on a 305 00:18:11,840 --> 00:18:14,800 Speaker 1: message that said, hey, you don't want to jail break 306 00:18:14,840 --> 00:18:18,960 Speaker 1: your phone because it could affect its functionality and it 307 00:18:19,000 --> 00:18:22,840 Speaker 1: could make it not function in the future. And then 308 00:18:23,080 --> 00:18:26,200 Speaker 1: the company, our outright went out to try and make 309 00:18:26,240 --> 00:18:30,920 Speaker 1: that happen by detecting and then breaking a phone that 310 00:18:31,040 --> 00:18:34,680 Speaker 1: had been altered. And breaking means that the company essentially 311 00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:38,479 Speaker 1: cuts off all functionality to the device and they render 312 00:18:38,520 --> 00:18:41,600 Speaker 1: it no more useful than a brick. And actually you 313 00:18:41,600 --> 00:18:44,000 Speaker 1: could argue it's less useful than a brick, because I 314 00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:46,960 Speaker 1: don't know if you've tried to build afford with iPhones, 315 00:18:47,640 --> 00:18:51,359 Speaker 1: but they are not stable. Hackers would release tools that 316 00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:54,120 Speaker 1: would allow users to jail break their phones and then 317 00:18:54,280 --> 00:18:58,160 Speaker 1: continue to update two newer versions of the iOS without 318 00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:00,560 Speaker 1: having their phones get bricked in the process. US for 319 00:19:00,640 --> 00:19:03,480 Speaker 1: some of those early ones, but again, this was constantly 320 00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:06,720 Speaker 1: a seesaw. Apple would see how the hackers would respond 321 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:08,760 Speaker 1: and change their approach, and then the hackers would do 322 00:19:08,800 --> 00:19:13,280 Speaker 1: the same. Now, the point that the hackers were aiming 323 00:19:13,320 --> 00:19:16,120 Speaker 1: for was always the same. Their goal was always the same, 324 00:19:16,160 --> 00:19:20,200 Speaker 1: which was to get that administrative access over the file system. Now, 325 00:19:20,200 --> 00:19:23,120 Speaker 1: the method to do that would change depending upon what 326 00:19:23,200 --> 00:19:26,120 Speaker 1: protections were in place, So again there's not much point 327 00:19:26,119 --> 00:19:28,960 Speaker 1: in going through any of them in great detail because 328 00:19:29,200 --> 00:19:35,360 Speaker 1: they would only be relevant to a specific iteration of iOS. Now, 329 00:19:35,400 --> 00:19:39,480 Speaker 1: the very early jail break methodologies we're pretty obtuse if 330 00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:42,800 Speaker 1: you were not technically savvy, chances are it would be 331 00:19:43,720 --> 00:19:46,280 Speaker 1: two in the weeds for you to manage. And when 332 00:19:46,320 --> 00:19:49,119 Speaker 1: I say you, I also mean me. I am I 333 00:19:49,160 --> 00:19:52,359 Speaker 1: am certain After I've looked at just a few of 334 00:19:52,400 --> 00:19:55,639 Speaker 1: the early methods, where I was reading the list of 335 00:19:55,680 --> 00:19:58,520 Speaker 1: steps and everything, I would have looked at those instructions 336 00:19:58,560 --> 00:20:00,960 Speaker 1: and said, yeah, no, this is too complicated. I'll just 337 00:20:01,000 --> 00:20:04,719 Speaker 1: wait till Apple finally releases a snake game. But if 338 00:20:04,760 --> 00:20:07,760 Speaker 1: you were more comfortable with code, and there are plenty 339 00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:10,879 Speaker 1: of people who are, then it was totally doable. Some 340 00:20:10,920 --> 00:20:13,760 Speaker 1: of the hackers would release instructions on how they managed 341 00:20:13,920 --> 00:20:17,480 Speaker 1: to crack Apple's code. Others would just show proof that 342 00:20:17,560 --> 00:20:20,160 Speaker 1: they had done it, like they would show the results, 343 00:20:20,440 --> 00:20:22,480 Speaker 1: but they wouldn't explain how they did it. They would 344 00:20:22,560 --> 00:20:25,800 Speaker 1: keep the method secret and that would, in their minds, 345 00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:30,440 Speaker 1: hopefully prevent Apple from patching that vulnerability so quickly. Now, 346 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:33,639 Speaker 1: some hackers would go so far as to release tools 347 00:20:33,680 --> 00:20:36,440 Speaker 1: that would do the jailbreaking for the user, and that 348 00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:41,600 Speaker 1: would significantly simplify things. When the group Poneage Tool released 349 00:20:41,680 --> 00:20:45,080 Speaker 1: the second version of their jailbreaking tool, this time it 350 00:20:45,240 --> 00:20:48,159 Speaker 1: was targeting the iPhone three G, which I guess I 351 00:20:48,160 --> 00:20:52,560 Speaker 1: should remind you was the second iPhone. They also introduced 352 00:20:52,760 --> 00:20:56,439 Speaker 1: a tool called City that have been developed by someone else, 353 00:20:57,280 --> 00:21:00,200 Speaker 1: and I'll talk more about that after we come act 354 00:21:00,200 --> 00:21:10,640 Speaker 1: from this quick break. Okay, I left off with Sidia. 355 00:21:10,840 --> 00:21:15,560 Speaker 1: Sidia is spelled c Y d I A and it 356 00:21:15,680 --> 00:21:19,080 Speaker 1: served a few different purposes. For one thing, it was 357 00:21:19,119 --> 00:21:22,240 Speaker 1: a facilitator for jail breaking, so it made it easier 358 00:21:22,280 --> 00:21:25,960 Speaker 1: for users to jail break devices. But for another, it 359 00:21:26,080 --> 00:21:30,520 Speaker 1: was a kind of forbidden app store. Uh. It was 360 00:21:30,560 --> 00:21:34,600 Speaker 1: a way to find apps that were not covered in 361 00:21:34,720 --> 00:21:37,960 Speaker 1: Apple's official app store, and it would allow you to 362 00:21:38,000 --> 00:21:42,120 Speaker 1: download them. Actually, technically, Sidia came out before Apple had 363 00:21:42,240 --> 00:21:45,679 Speaker 1: launched its App store, so for a while, if you 364 00:21:45,720 --> 00:21:48,840 Speaker 1: wanted to download apps to your iPhone, the only way 365 00:21:48,880 --> 00:21:52,480 Speaker 1: to do it was through Cidia or to hunt around 366 00:21:52,480 --> 00:21:55,919 Speaker 1: in different hacker forms and find them yourself. But Sidia 367 00:21:56,160 --> 00:22:01,200 Speaker 1: made that process much easier. So yeah, Sidia predated the 368 00:22:01,440 --> 00:22:05,840 Speaker 1: iPhone app store by a short while, not like, not 369 00:22:05,960 --> 00:22:08,560 Speaker 1: like by a significant amount, but by a month or so. 370 00:22:09,320 --> 00:22:11,960 Speaker 1: And then Apple opened up its app store and had 371 00:22:12,000 --> 00:22:15,520 Speaker 1: its quote unquote official approach where developers had to submit 372 00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:18,639 Speaker 1: through Apple's process in order to get approved and have 373 00:22:18,760 --> 00:22:22,159 Speaker 1: their app carried in the store. Now City was the 374 00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:25,240 Speaker 1: brainchild of a hacker named Jay Freeman who used the 375 00:22:25,280 --> 00:22:29,080 Speaker 1: handle Saric s A U r I K. He introduced 376 00:22:29,160 --> 00:22:33,080 Speaker 1: Citia around two thousand eighth But, like I said, before 377 00:22:33,119 --> 00:22:37,080 Speaker 1: the app store launched and Another hacker named George Hots 378 00:22:37,160 --> 00:22:42,040 Speaker 1: a k A. Geo Hots or Geo Hot was unlocking 379 00:22:42,040 --> 00:22:45,359 Speaker 1: in jail breaking phones too. He had first become known 380 00:22:45,720 --> 00:22:48,800 Speaker 1: for not just software hacks, but actually opening up the 381 00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:53,280 Speaker 1: original iPhone and changing the circuitry slightly. Uh. He did 382 00:22:53,320 --> 00:22:57,639 Speaker 1: that using an eyeglasses screwdriver, a guitar pick, and a 383 00:22:57,680 --> 00:23:01,480 Speaker 1: soldering iron, which meant that he could switch over the 384 00:23:01,520 --> 00:23:03,480 Speaker 1: iPhone so that he would not have to use a 385 00:23:03,560 --> 00:23:05,600 Speaker 1: T and T. He he switched it so you could 386 00:23:05,680 --> 00:23:09,919 Speaker 1: use any simcard, and he was using a T Mobile simcards, 387 00:23:09,960 --> 00:23:12,200 Speaker 1: so he could use the original iPhone on the T 388 00:23:12,320 --> 00:23:15,480 Speaker 1: Mobile network, which was kind of a neat hack and 389 00:23:15,840 --> 00:23:18,760 Speaker 1: it was something that a lot of people also ended 390 00:23:18,800 --> 00:23:22,600 Speaker 1: up being interested in learning how to do. Another important 391 00:23:22,600 --> 00:23:26,480 Speaker 1: tool in the early days of jailbreaking was jailbreak Meat 392 00:23:26,600 --> 00:23:29,440 Speaker 1: two point oh. So there was the second version, obviously 393 00:23:29,560 --> 00:23:32,800 Speaker 1: second full version of this tool, and it debuted a 394 00:23:32,840 --> 00:23:35,440 Speaker 1: few years after the iPhone had come out. But this 395 00:23:35,520 --> 00:23:39,040 Speaker 1: was a web based tool and that really simplified thinks. 396 00:23:39,160 --> 00:23:41,359 Speaker 1: So to use it, all you would have to do 397 00:23:41,480 --> 00:23:44,639 Speaker 1: is take your iPhone, use Safari. You would visit a 398 00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:48,840 Speaker 1: specific website that hosted the jailbreak meat tool. There'd be 399 00:23:48,840 --> 00:23:52,320 Speaker 1: a little button on your screen you click on that. Actually, 400 00:23:52,320 --> 00:23:57,200 Speaker 1: you would technically swipe to unlock, and the site would 401 00:23:57,240 --> 00:24:01,040 Speaker 1: handle the rest. It would initiate the process that would 402 00:24:01,359 --> 00:24:03,879 Speaker 1: jail break your phone within a few minutes, and you 403 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:06,919 Speaker 1: would have administrator level access to your file system. And 404 00:24:07,040 --> 00:24:12,520 Speaker 1: Apple took all jailbreaking attempts seriously, but jailbreak me two 405 00:24:12,520 --> 00:24:17,560 Speaker 1: point oh was particularly vital for Apple to tackle because 406 00:24:17,600 --> 00:24:20,960 Speaker 1: for the first time, users who had no real tech 407 00:24:21,119 --> 00:24:24,680 Speaker 1: savvy in them could take advantage of a jailbreaking tool, 408 00:24:25,040 --> 00:24:28,399 Speaker 1: which meant Apple could technically lose its tight grip on 409 00:24:28,440 --> 00:24:32,560 Speaker 1: its carefully designed ecosystem. Now anyone could jail break their 410 00:24:32,600 --> 00:24:35,639 Speaker 1: phone if they wanted to. So the company pushed out 411 00:24:35,680 --> 00:24:38,480 Speaker 1: a security update pretty quickly that made the jail break 412 00:24:38,520 --> 00:24:41,600 Speaker 1: me two point oh attack ineffective. But then we just 413 00:24:41,640 --> 00:24:45,280 Speaker 1: go back to that seesaw approach. Apple would also try 414 00:24:45,320 --> 00:24:49,120 Speaker 1: to use the law as a way to discourage jail breaking. Uh. 415 00:24:49,160 --> 00:24:53,600 Speaker 1: The company argued that jail breaking violated copyright law, but 416 00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:58,160 Speaker 1: the courts ruled the jailbreaking wasn't illegal and it might 417 00:24:58,359 --> 00:25:01,680 Speaker 1: violate the end user license agree amant or you LA 418 00:25:01,960 --> 00:25:05,119 Speaker 1: but you LA's aren't quite the same thing as legal documents, 419 00:25:05,640 --> 00:25:11,840 Speaker 1: despite how companies often treat them as such. So jailbreaking 420 00:25:11,880 --> 00:25:15,320 Speaker 1: is not illegal necessarily. I guess it depends on where 421 00:25:15,320 --> 00:25:17,960 Speaker 1: you are. In the United States, it's not illegal, But 422 00:25:18,040 --> 00:25:21,240 Speaker 1: jailbreaking has sort of had a decline now. This is 423 00:25:21,320 --> 00:25:26,200 Speaker 1: mostly because Apple really pushes out updates pretty quickly these days, 424 00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:30,159 Speaker 1: so the exploits don't remain viable for very long. So 425 00:25:30,200 --> 00:25:32,680 Speaker 1: if you publish that you've found a way to jail 426 00:25:32,680 --> 00:25:36,280 Speaker 1: break a phone, then the timer is on right because 427 00:25:36,320 --> 00:25:39,760 Speaker 1: Apple researchers are going to be struggling to find a 428 00:25:39,840 --> 00:25:43,399 Speaker 1: way to patch those vulnerabilities. But there are still people 429 00:25:43,560 --> 00:25:47,919 Speaker 1: out there who are working on effectively jailbreaking iPhones, and 430 00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:50,199 Speaker 1: some of them are white hat hackers. So these are 431 00:25:50,200 --> 00:25:53,160 Speaker 1: people who are looking for vulnerabilities so that they can 432 00:25:53,200 --> 00:25:56,159 Speaker 1: tell Apple and Apple can then patch those holes and 433 00:25:56,280 --> 00:25:59,159 Speaker 1: keep the system protected. Some of them are, you know, 434 00:25:59,240 --> 00:26:03,480 Speaker 1: either working for Apple directly or contracted with Apple. Some 435 00:26:03,520 --> 00:26:07,080 Speaker 1: people are just claiming bug bounties. This is when a 436 00:26:07,119 --> 00:26:10,360 Speaker 1: company offers up a reward if someone finds a vulnerability 437 00:26:10,400 --> 00:26:13,480 Speaker 1: in their products. So you might come forward and say, hey, 438 00:26:13,560 --> 00:26:17,160 Speaker 1: I found this vulnerability. Here's what I did. Here's the vulnerability. 439 00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:19,920 Speaker 1: And then in return, the company says, thank you, here 440 00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:24,320 Speaker 1: is a bucket full of cash because you just saved 441 00:26:24,359 --> 00:26:28,600 Speaker 1: us untold amounts of money by pointing out this vulnerability. 442 00:26:28,680 --> 00:26:30,800 Speaker 1: And then you have some black hat hackers out there 443 00:26:31,240 --> 00:26:35,040 Speaker 1: who might be trying to jail break iPhones on behalf 444 00:26:35,080 --> 00:26:38,359 Speaker 1: of an organization or a company or a government that 445 00:26:38,440 --> 00:26:40,760 Speaker 1: would really like to be able to exploit the Apple 446 00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:43,880 Speaker 1: user base. Of the NSO group out of Israel comes 447 00:26:43,920 --> 00:26:47,800 Speaker 1: to mind here. That is a company that was looking 448 00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:53,399 Speaker 1: to exploit a vulnerability within the iPhone ecosystem that it 449 00:26:53,440 --> 00:26:57,800 Speaker 1: could then sell as a product to customers. Those customers 450 00:26:57,840 --> 00:27:03,040 Speaker 1: typically were authoritarian governments. So not great. But one of 451 00:27:03,040 --> 00:27:06,920 Speaker 1: the big reasons to jail break might end up not being, 452 00:27:07,960 --> 00:27:10,840 Speaker 1: you know, important, It might be moot before much longer. 453 00:27:11,280 --> 00:27:15,200 Speaker 1: Because we've recently seen court systems around the world push 454 00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:19,159 Speaker 1: back against companies like Apple and arguing that the walled 455 00:27:19,160 --> 00:27:23,800 Speaker 1: garden approach is inherently anti competitive and that companies should 456 00:27:23,840 --> 00:27:28,440 Speaker 1: allow customers to use alternatives to the company store as 457 00:27:28,480 --> 00:27:33,080 Speaker 1: it were now. If those policies become law, then companies 458 00:27:33,119 --> 00:27:37,040 Speaker 1: like Apple will be legally bound, at least in some regions, 459 00:27:37,119 --> 00:27:40,720 Speaker 1: to allow users to access other app stores besides the 460 00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:43,560 Speaker 1: official one. Now, that's one of the big reasons Apple 461 00:27:43,560 --> 00:27:46,480 Speaker 1: has been putting up such a tough legal battle recently 462 00:27:46,560 --> 00:27:50,920 Speaker 1: to resist this trend, because alternatives would mean Apple would 463 00:27:50,960 --> 00:27:54,639 Speaker 1: be potentially left out of that lucrative revenue loop that 464 00:27:54,720 --> 00:27:59,440 Speaker 1: it currently occupies. Developers could potentially use alternatives to Apple's 465 00:27:59,480 --> 00:28:03,080 Speaker 1: payments service, and Apple would no longer get automatic cut 466 00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:09,640 Speaker 1: out of an app purchases. Okay, quick recap. When we're 467 00:28:09,680 --> 00:28:12,840 Speaker 1: talking about jail breaking, we're really getting into the ethos 468 00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:15,959 Speaker 1: of what it is to be a classic hacker. And 469 00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:20,760 Speaker 1: the classical hacker is not necessarily interested in profiting off 470 00:28:20,760 --> 00:28:25,200 Speaker 1: the system or stealing information or stealing money or anything 471 00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:29,320 Speaker 1: like that. They're more interested in learning how stuff works 472 00:28:29,640 --> 00:28:33,000 Speaker 1: and how they might be able to get stuff to 473 00:28:33,119 --> 00:28:35,560 Speaker 1: do something other than what it was designed to do. 474 00:28:36,280 --> 00:28:39,440 Speaker 1: They love the learning process and the sense of achievement 475 00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:41,680 Speaker 1: they get when they figure out the system or how 476 00:28:41,720 --> 00:28:46,560 Speaker 1: to make it do something unexpected. They are not necessarily malicious, 477 00:28:47,000 --> 00:28:51,120 Speaker 1: though they often can be mischievous, and hackers frequently feel 478 00:28:51,800 --> 00:28:55,080 Speaker 1: that any computer platform should be open to run any 479 00:28:55,160 --> 00:28:58,200 Speaker 1: software that it's capable of running. So, in other words, 480 00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:01,920 Speaker 1: systems should not be well hold off and locked away. 481 00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:05,040 Speaker 1: So if a hacker buys a smartphone, the hacker probably 482 00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:08,000 Speaker 1: wants to be able to load anything they want onto 483 00:29:08,040 --> 00:29:11,960 Speaker 1: that phone without any restrictions. And it really comes down 484 00:29:11,960 --> 00:29:15,960 Speaker 1: to control. Does the company that made the product control 485 00:29:16,080 --> 00:29:19,000 Speaker 1: what you can do on it or does the owner 486 00:29:19,280 --> 00:29:23,760 Speaker 1: who purchased the device have that control? And hackers typically 487 00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:29,360 Speaker 1: think it should be the second camp. Apple feels the opposite. Now, finally, 488 00:29:30,160 --> 00:29:33,840 Speaker 1: should you jail break your device? Well, I would actually 489 00:29:33,880 --> 00:29:38,240 Speaker 1: advise against it unless you really know what you're doing. 490 00:29:39,200 --> 00:29:42,560 Speaker 1: While jailbroken devices can frequently do lots of stuff that 491 00:29:42,600 --> 00:29:46,560 Speaker 1: the bog standard version cannot do. Like there are people 492 00:29:46,600 --> 00:29:49,160 Speaker 1: who jail broke their iPhones and were able to access 493 00:29:49,840 --> 00:29:52,360 Speaker 1: things that the iPhone wouldn't be able to do for ages, 494 00:29:52,440 --> 00:29:54,920 Speaker 1: like copy and paste, which is such a basic thing. 495 00:29:55,000 --> 00:29:58,000 Speaker 1: And you think, well, you mean iPhones at one point 496 00:29:58,080 --> 00:30:01,320 Speaker 1: didn't have copy paste. Yeah, once upon a time they didn't, 497 00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:03,840 Speaker 1: and people complained about it, and the only people who 498 00:30:03,880 --> 00:30:06,320 Speaker 1: were using copy and paste on iPhones were the hackers 499 00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:10,479 Speaker 1: who had jailbroken their devices. However, even though you might 500 00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:12,640 Speaker 1: be able to do stuff like that. It comes with 501 00:30:12,680 --> 00:30:15,280 Speaker 1: a lot of risks. You might find your device has 502 00:30:15,320 --> 00:30:19,040 Speaker 1: been bricked, or it might have been compromised by malware 503 00:30:19,080 --> 00:30:21,440 Speaker 1: if you downloaded an app and it turns out it 504 00:30:21,520 --> 00:30:25,800 Speaker 1: was hosting malicious code. So Apple was not lying when 505 00:30:25,840 --> 00:30:30,120 Speaker 1: the company said that jailbreaking isn't safe. It is not safe. Now, 506 00:30:30,160 --> 00:30:34,040 Speaker 1: if you know what you're doing, you can navigate jail 507 00:30:34,080 --> 00:30:37,880 Speaker 1: breaking without it running, you know, into too much trouble. 508 00:30:38,280 --> 00:30:41,720 Speaker 1: That is possible, but your return on investment might be 509 00:30:41,840 --> 00:30:45,840 Speaker 1: pretty low these days. Still, the hackers out there who 510 00:30:45,840 --> 00:30:48,640 Speaker 1: feel the circuitry they own should be able to do 511 00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:54,800 Speaker 1: whatever it technically is capable of doing, that might be enough. Okay, 512 00:30:54,920 --> 00:30:58,200 Speaker 1: that's it for this tech stuff tidbits on jail breaking. 513 00:30:58,840 --> 00:31:03,680 Speaker 1: Thank you so much for that suggestion. I really appreciate it. 514 00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:06,600 Speaker 1: That again was from Way Too Cold Mike on Twitter. 515 00:31:07,160 --> 00:31:09,920 Speaker 1: Thanks again. If you have suggestions for topics I should 516 00:31:09,960 --> 00:31:13,280 Speaker 1: cover on future episodes of Text Stuff, please reach out 517 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:17,240 Speaker 1: to me. The handle is text stuff HSW on Twitter, 518 00:31:17,880 --> 00:31:26,240 Speaker 1: and I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff 519 00:31:26,320 --> 00:31:29,520 Speaker 1: is an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from 520 00:31:29,520 --> 00:31:33,280 Speaker 1: My Heart Radio, visit the I heart radio, app, Apple podcasts, 521 00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:35,400 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.