WEBVTT - How To Analyze An IPO

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Joe Wisenthal. My colleague and co host Tracy Elway

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<v Speaker 1>is out this week, so not going to be a

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<v Speaker 1>long introduction. But one of the big things that's going

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<v Speaker 1>to happen, at least expected to happen in markets in

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<v Speaker 1>t is the flotation of some pretty big, highly anticipated

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<v Speaker 1>I p O s, some of those Silicon Valley unicorns

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<v Speaker 1>that people have been talking about forever Uber lived Slack,

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<v Speaker 1>all of them plus more likely to go public uh

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<v Speaker 1>this year after a long wait. Of course, many of

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<v Speaker 1>them are huge, and they're going public at a stage

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<v Speaker 1>in life UH that is much later than many of

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<v Speaker 1>the big tech companies that are currently public when they

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<v Speaker 1>decided to go public or when they decided to do

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<v Speaker 1>their I p O. So I want to talk more

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<v Speaker 1>about the I p O market on today's episode, and

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<v Speaker 1>to discuss this I have with me Rhet Wallace. He

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<v Speaker 1>is the founder and CEO of triton Ai, a company

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<v Speaker 1>that analyzes I p O s for various proprietary measures,

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<v Speaker 1>and we're going to talk about the evolution of the

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<v Speaker 1>I p O market as well as how to analyze

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<v Speaker 1>an IPO because theoretically there might be people out there

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<v Speaker 1>looking at some of these that would like to have

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<v Speaker 1>some perspective on how to think about the value and

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<v Speaker 1>the investment appeal of these well known companies. So, Rhett,

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<v Speaker 1>thank you very much for joining us. Great to be here.

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<v Speaker 1>Thank you. Let's start with that question about why these

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<v Speaker 1>companies are so people say coming public much later in life.

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<v Speaker 1>So company is like Amazon and Microsoft and Apple. They

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<v Speaker 1>essentially became did their I p o s when they

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<v Speaker 1>were fairly tiny startups, at least by today's standards. What's

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<v Speaker 1>changed since then eighties to two thousand nineteen such that

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<v Speaker 1>these big companies are already produced billionaires and people have

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<v Speaker 1>gone on to great fortunes ever before floating a sheriff stock. Sure, well,

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<v Speaker 1>like most things, there are a couple of different narratives.

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<v Speaker 1>By way of explanation, what you will hear from people

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<v Speaker 1>in Silicon Valley is that founders don't like to take

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<v Speaker 1>their companies public because being a public company CEO is

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<v Speaker 1>kind of a pain in the neck. And so anybody

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<v Speaker 1>who's abut to comply with the sarbians Oxley Act and

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<v Speaker 1>other things that were imposed on publicly traded companies as

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<v Speaker 1>a protection against retail investors who buy their shares. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>if you have access to capital in the private markets,

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<v Speaker 1>it might be easier for you to stay private and

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<v Speaker 1>not expose your numbers, expose yourself to liability, and so forth.

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<v Speaker 1>So almost all of the reasons that you could think

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<v Speaker 1>of why a company wouldn't go public are regulatory there.

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<v Speaker 1>They stem from the changes in the regulations of the

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<v Speaker 1>securities business. And there's a long, geeky narrative that we

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<v Speaker 1>get into about that. When companies like Amazon and Netscape

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<v Speaker 1>and Yahoo went public on a couple of million dollars

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<v Speaker 1>of sales, and you know, earlier generations of companies like

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<v Speaker 1>Intel and so forth went public, you know, really as

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<v Speaker 1>soon as they got to revenue. That's because capital formation

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<v Speaker 1>happened in the public market. Let's actually, let's back up

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<v Speaker 1>for a second. Tell me about your firm and why

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<v Speaker 1>this is an area that you pursued. What is it

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<v Speaker 1>about I p O s that are interesting in general,

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<v Speaker 1>and what is your background that caused you or that

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<v Speaker 1>prompted you to go into analyzing them and providing the

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<v Speaker 1>service of breaking them down. Sure, well, it's I p

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<v Speaker 1>O s are a very good example of what came

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<v Speaker 1>after the Great Depression when the government decided to reform

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<v Speaker 1>the securities industry so that you didn't have a big

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<v Speaker 1>speculative bubble anymore of the kind that created the stock

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<v Speaker 1>market crash. And so the innovation at that moment was

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<v Speaker 1>that securities come with data stapling, the ten k's and

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<v Speaker 1>the ten queues, the regular are recurring reporting and disclosure

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<v Speaker 1>so investors would know what they are buying was the

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<v Speaker 1>great innovation after and that prompted a situation where companies,

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<v Speaker 1>if they wanted to trade stocks with each other or

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<v Speaker 1>have people by their shares, they had to be public.

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<v Speaker 1>And so companies went public much earlier. If you you

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<v Speaker 1>know again geekily read like the biography of Rockefeller, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>before the crash, one of the reasons he was so

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<v Speaker 1>successful in investing is that he had access to information

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<v Speaker 1>that wasn't broadly available. That always helps, right, So information

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<v Speaker 1>has always been a key component of being successful as

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<v Speaker 1>an investor. And so the origin story of our firm

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<v Speaker 1>is that we saw what was happening that fewer and

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<v Speaker 1>fewer companies were going public, and that meant that more

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<v Speaker 1>and more of the interesting companies were private. And these

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<v Speaker 1>companies operated outside of the information regime of the Securities

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<v Speaker 1>Acts of the United States. The other thing that we

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<v Speaker 1>noticed is that all of the information architecture that was

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<v Speaker 1>installed as the operating system of the securities trading institutions

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<v Speaker 1>was developed in the nineteen thirties, So, like generally accepted

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<v Speaker 1>accounting principles, some people will tell you it's like, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>the perfect information that you could have about a company,

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<v Speaker 1>but it never existed until like Moses did not come

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<v Speaker 1>down from the mountain with gap company categorization, this standard

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<v Speaker 1>industrial classification system again like the nineteen thirties, and so

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<v Speaker 1>these pieces of data architecture haven't iterated an advanced so

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<v Speaker 1>we're still sort of stuck in the thirties with the

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<v Speaker 1>way companies are analyzed. So the origin story of our

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<v Speaker 1>company was we were looking for ways to be smart

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<v Speaker 1>about investing in companies that were generally private companies, and

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<v Speaker 1>the architecture that people used to look at public companies

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't particularly serviceable to that end, so we had to

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<v Speaker 1>build a new one. So obviously, when a company files

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<v Speaker 1>to go public, and it files, it's s one to

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<v Speaker 1>the sec the company engauges in the practice of putting

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<v Speaker 1>its numbers into a type of a structure that's similar

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<v Speaker 1>to other public companies are identical. It then has to correct.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a template that everyone has to adhere to. But

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<v Speaker 1>there's still the problem of investors haven't really gotten to

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<v Speaker 1>know these companies, and even within generally accepted accounting principles,

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<v Speaker 1>there's all kinds of idiosyncrasies and opinions and different approaches.

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<v Speaker 1>And companies that have been public for a while, people

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<v Speaker 1>become familiar with aspects of their business model and they

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<v Speaker 1>understand the moving parts, and that just doesn't exist yet,

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<v Speaker 1>certainly at the time of the S one filing. So

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<v Speaker 1>when you look at an S one filing, besides the

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<v Speaker 1>obvious the balance sheet and the income statement and the

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<v Speaker 1>cash flow statement, what else are you looking for when

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<v Speaker 1>you start to break down what you know looking at

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<v Speaker 1>these companies from the perspective of an investor. So our

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<v Speaker 1>point of view on companies is that a company is

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<v Speaker 1>really just a receptacle for different product lines. So our

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<v Speaker 1>trope example is that uber x and uber Eats live

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<v Speaker 1>inside the same company, but they're totally different businesses, completely

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<v Speaker 1>different product lines. So as companies go public much later

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<v Speaker 1>in their life, what it means is that the audit

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<v Speaker 1>of the consolidated entity disguises all of the individual operations

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<v Speaker 1>that are happening inside of a company that might have

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<v Speaker 1>a bike sharing you know business, and a scooter sharing

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<v Speaker 1>business and operates all over the world in different types

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<v Speaker 1>of jurisdictions, and so the bigger it is, the harder

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<v Speaker 1>it is to get your arms around it unless you

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<v Speaker 1>can see the detail. So that's that's really interesting points.

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<v Speaker 1>So if a company is just in the business of

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<v Speaker 1>making widgets, then you can have some sense of like, okay,

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<v Speaker 1>widgets cost the company this much to build, and raw

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<v Speaker 1>materials cost as much, and labor costs as muge, and

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<v Speaker 1>you sell the widgets for this much, and then you

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<v Speaker 1>look at the gap between costs and the sale and

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<v Speaker 1>you know something about the business. But with these big

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<v Speaker 1>companies and with new businesses that people don't understand and

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<v Speaker 1>sort of novel business models, simply so tracting costs from revenues,

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<v Speaker 1>it just doesn't tell you that much about the company.

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<v Speaker 1>The architecture of a digital company is just completely different

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<v Speaker 1>than the architecture of a nineteen thirties railroad or metals

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<v Speaker 1>and mining company. One of the things that you know,

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<v Speaker 1>for again, geeks that have spent a lot of time

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<v Speaker 1>studying how gap works and have suffered through accounting class

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<v Speaker 1>inventory accounting is one of the things that's like really

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<v Speaker 1>painful and the fiefold life folk kind of stuff. How

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<v Speaker 1>do you track the inventory of Facebook? Well, so then

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<v Speaker 1>that gets to the question, Okay, going back to the

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<v Speaker 1>Uber example, Obviously it's still probably mostly a car sharing company,

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<v Speaker 1>but in many different businesses, and they do also now

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<v Speaker 1>have several different lines and in some places they have scooters.

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<v Speaker 1>So how do you go about essentially trying to disassemble

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<v Speaker 1>the business from this consolidated these consolidated financial states. So

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<v Speaker 1>when we started out, we were looking for ways to

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<v Speaker 1>be smart about how to tell which dog walking app

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<v Speaker 1>is going to be better than the other dog walking apps,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, because you listen to the young entrepreneurs come

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<v Speaker 1>and pitch you a company, and it always sounds good,

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<v Speaker 1>but you don't have a comparative base of data. And

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<v Speaker 1>so the s I C code system was no use

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<v Speaker 1>to us whatsoever in how to categorize companies into the

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<v Speaker 1>bucket of dog walking apps and then figure out which

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<v Speaker 1>one was going to be the best dog walking app.

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<v Speaker 1>So we had to design an architecture that you could

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<v Speaker 1>get the apples and apples in the same buckets and

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<v Speaker 1>separate them from the oranges and the grab apples and

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<v Speaker 1>the tangerines and everything else. And so one of the

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<v Speaker 1>things that was fairly funny about this is if you

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<v Speaker 1>use a sort of you know, a top down E.

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<v Speaker 1>S I. C. Level type categorization system, and you use

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<v Speaker 1>a word like transportation, what we found is that companies

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<v Speaker 1>like Uber bucketed into the same bucket as zip car, right.

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<v Speaker 1>But you look at it and you're like, okay, well,

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<v Speaker 1>Uber doesn't own any cars. Zip car owns thousands of

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<v Speaker 1>cars that they have to park, maintain, fuel, paint, all

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<v Speaker 1>that sort of stuff. So it's like, okay, even though

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<v Speaker 1>from a a sort of narrative perspective, these things look

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<v Speaker 1>the same, they're really not the same. So our response

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<v Speaker 1>to this was to flip everything upside down and to

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<v Speaker 1>look at how the thing works in terms of what

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<v Speaker 1>does the customer pay for and what does the customer

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<v Speaker 1>actually get. So in this example, if you're trying to

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<v Speaker 1>go to Brooklyn from Manhattan, you could rent a car

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<v Speaker 1>with zip car and drive it yourself, or you could

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<v Speaker 1>have Uber drive you there, and it just turns out

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<v Speaker 1>that the mechanics of the system that delivers a ride

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<v Speaker 1>versus the access to a car are totally different things.

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<v Speaker 1>So is there enough information straight from the s ones

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<v Speaker 1>or I guess zip car has been public for a

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<v Speaker 1>while right to actually perform that calculation, or do you

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<v Speaker 1>need to go elsewhere? Well, so what's great about it

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<v Speaker 1>is usually you don't need the s one to know

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<v Speaker 1>like how a zip car works, because zip car tells

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<v Speaker 1>you everything about how it works on their website. So

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<v Speaker 1>if you flip the thing upside down and look at

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<v Speaker 1>it like a user, it's actually not very difficult to

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<v Speaker 1>figure out how these mousetraps work. Now, one of the

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<v Speaker 1>things we've talked about, because we've talked on air on

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<v Speaker 1>TV before is sort of non financial statement characteristics of companies.

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<v Speaker 1>So people are interested in things like, you know, just

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<v Speaker 1>the level of transparency period, structural things like voting control.

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<v Speaker 1>What are the other things that you look at when

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<v Speaker 1>you analyze a private company or assumed to be public

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<v Speaker 1>company beyond just the numbers? Sure, well, one of the

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<v Speaker 1>things about GAP is that GAP translates everything into dollars.

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<v Speaker 1>So like the numbers, you see on a GAP pan

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<v Speaker 1>L are all dollar denominated, but most of the numbers

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<v Speaker 1>that are the most interesting about companies aren't dollar denominated,

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<v Speaker 1>like how many customers and how much do they pay?

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<v Speaker 1>And how long do they stick around? And where do

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<v Speaker 1>I get them from? And things just how many cars

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<v Speaker 1>they might have an inventory, for example, right, And so

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<v Speaker 1>there's a big debate that you could read about. Matt

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<v Speaker 1>Levin here is very articulate on the subject about non

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<v Speaker 1>gap reporting, and some people get kind of religious about

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<v Speaker 1>this and say that you shouldn't report things that aren't

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<v Speaker 1>gap because then companies aren't comparable anymore. But the problem

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<v Speaker 1>is that if you only have the P and L,

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<v Speaker 1>like for example, if you were looking at the Snap

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<v Speaker 1>I PO and you saw that Snap lost a billion

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<v Speaker 1>dollars in the trailing year, you don't know very much

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<v Speaker 1>about Snap. But the intuition that people have about that

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<v Speaker 1>company as well, I know my teenager can't put it down,

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<v Speaker 1>But you don't have the statement about how many teenagers

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<v Speaker 1>and how long they stick around. And what you definitely

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<v Speaker 1>don't have is the statement of how many advertisers and

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<v Speaker 1>how long they stick around, and how many salespeople it

0:12:46.160 --> 0:12:48.320
<v Speaker 1>takes to go get those advertisers to pay you and

0:12:48.360 --> 0:12:51.800
<v Speaker 1>so forth. So to us. Again, the numbers that matter

0:12:52.200 --> 0:12:55.680
<v Speaker 1>are the numbers that help you calculate the mechanics of

0:12:55.720 --> 0:12:58.800
<v Speaker 1>how the masse trap works, and those things are often

0:12:58.880 --> 0:13:00.880
<v Speaker 1>not disclosed in an US one at all, and you

0:13:00.960 --> 0:13:03.000
<v Speaker 1>need other ways to go get them. What do you

0:13:03.040 --> 0:13:06.439
<v Speaker 1>think you know? It's interesting you mentioned snap And maybe

0:13:06.440 --> 0:13:09.120
<v Speaker 1>this is a slight tangent or maybe not, but it

0:13:09.200 --> 0:13:12.400
<v Speaker 1>feels like there have been efforts with a lot of

0:13:12.400 --> 0:13:16.000
<v Speaker 1>these Internet companies to essentially standardize some of these non

0:13:16.000 --> 0:13:19.480
<v Speaker 1>financial metrics. So m a use monthly average users is

0:13:19.480 --> 0:13:22.200
<v Speaker 1>a popular way to compare them, but it feels like

0:13:22.280 --> 0:13:25.520
<v Speaker 1>the companies are really pushing back against that or like

0:13:25.640 --> 0:13:27.559
<v Speaker 1>to and they want to create their own bespoke ones

0:13:27.559 --> 0:13:29.760
<v Speaker 1>and they say, no, no, no, you can't compare our

0:13:29.920 --> 0:13:32.360
<v Speaker 1>m a US to facebooks or our d a used.

0:13:35.920 --> 0:13:39.240
<v Speaker 1>Twitter recently announced that they were going to for the

0:13:39.320 --> 0:13:43.440
<v Speaker 1>first time start revealing d a use daily average users.

0:13:43.480 --> 0:13:45.880
<v Speaker 1>They're no longer going to report monthly average users, but

0:13:45.960 --> 0:13:49.120
<v Speaker 1>even their d A numbers, they're calling them m d

0:13:49.280 --> 0:13:53.080
<v Speaker 1>a U s monetize herble daily average users to distinguish

0:13:53.160 --> 0:13:55.240
<v Speaker 1>from users who they probably are gonna make any money

0:13:55.240 --> 0:13:58.040
<v Speaker 1>from so their m d a us are going up anyway.

0:13:58.080 --> 0:14:00.360
<v Speaker 1>The point is, what is your view on this. Do

0:14:00.440 --> 0:14:03.880
<v Speaker 1>companies have an incentive to sort of try to break

0:14:03.880 --> 0:14:06.760
<v Speaker 1>out of the standardized comparable numbers and come up with

0:14:06.800 --> 0:14:09.040
<v Speaker 1>their own sort of vanity metrics that are always going

0:14:09.120 --> 0:14:11.280
<v Speaker 1>up into the right? Yeah? I think you know, the

0:14:11.320 --> 0:14:15.480
<v Speaker 1>world doesn't divide on this, Like people don't like accountability, right,

0:14:15.520 --> 0:14:18.520
<v Speaker 1>so if you don't have to be accountable to particular metrics,

0:14:19.000 --> 0:14:21.800
<v Speaker 1>you'd rather not. One of the things that's interesting about

0:14:21.840 --> 0:14:25.400
<v Speaker 1>what's happened in capital formation right now is that private

0:14:25.400 --> 0:14:29.040
<v Speaker 1>company investors have access to all this information, all the

0:14:29.080 --> 0:14:33.160
<v Speaker 1>real information, not the fake you know, monetize herbal daily

0:14:33.200 --> 0:14:35.480
<v Speaker 1>average users that you know. They can see all of

0:14:35.480 --> 0:14:37.520
<v Speaker 1>that sort of stuff, and they have a real sense

0:14:37.560 --> 0:14:40.560
<v Speaker 1>of how those mechanics work. Once you arrive in public

0:14:40.560 --> 0:14:44.240
<v Speaker 1>company lands, many of those numbers are not disclosed anymore.

0:14:44.280 --> 0:14:47.600
<v Speaker 1>So you find a situation where as capital is forming

0:14:47.600 --> 0:14:50.000
<v Speaker 1>around these companies, the investors that put up the money

0:14:50.240 --> 0:14:54.440
<v Speaker 1>have much better access to information, so more transparent situation,

0:14:54.920 --> 0:14:58.280
<v Speaker 1>but an a liquid situation, and then you trade liquidity

0:14:58.320 --> 0:15:00.960
<v Speaker 1>for transparency in the sense that the look. Investors don't

0:15:01.000 --> 0:15:03.040
<v Speaker 1>really get to learn any of the you know, the

0:15:03.080 --> 0:15:05.560
<v Speaker 1>way that the mouse trap works, but at least they

0:15:05.560 --> 0:15:08.160
<v Speaker 1>can sell the stock. And so that's the trade. As

0:15:08.160 --> 0:15:10.600
<v Speaker 1>far as your question about the standardization, and sorry to

0:15:10.600 --> 0:15:15.680
<v Speaker 1>go on so long, using like an ad supported companies

0:15:15.720 --> 0:15:20.560
<v Speaker 1>metrics to analyze the subscription business is just not very helpful.

0:15:21.160 --> 0:15:24.080
<v Speaker 1>So like engagement metrics, for example, people ask us about

0:15:24.080 --> 0:15:26.600
<v Speaker 1>our engagement metrics, which I always laugh because I think

0:15:26.680 --> 0:15:29.600
<v Speaker 1>engagement is bad. We want our users to figure out

0:15:29.640 --> 0:15:32.160
<v Speaker 1>the answer in as little time as possible because I'm

0:15:32.200 --> 0:15:34.640
<v Speaker 1>not trying to serve. And add to that, right, so

0:15:34.760 --> 0:15:37.000
<v Speaker 1>each company is different. This is what we spent years

0:15:37.040 --> 0:15:39.600
<v Speaker 1>doing is developing an architecture so that you can understand

0:15:39.600 --> 0:15:41.320
<v Speaker 1>what kind of company you're looking at and look at

0:15:41.320 --> 0:15:44.040
<v Speaker 1>the appropriate metrics to do So, going back to what

0:15:44.080 --> 0:15:48.480
<v Speaker 1>you were saying about the trade between liquidity and transparency,

0:15:48.520 --> 0:15:51.600
<v Speaker 1>we had a recent episode a few months ago. We

0:15:51.600 --> 0:15:55.040
<v Speaker 1>were talking to um a VC and he was arguing

0:15:55.320 --> 0:15:58.720
<v Speaker 1>that one of the things that made this period in

0:15:58.800 --> 0:16:03.760
<v Speaker 1>market unique is that whereas in the past, uh illiquidity

0:16:03.840 --> 0:16:07.080
<v Speaker 1>was a penalty for a company and a private company

0:16:07.200 --> 0:16:10.240
<v Speaker 1>had to offer a bigger premium to get um private

0:16:10.280 --> 0:16:13.480
<v Speaker 1>capital because that was more locked in. These days, people

0:16:13.480 --> 0:16:16.880
<v Speaker 1>are paying a premium for access, in his view, to

0:16:17.240 --> 0:16:20.120
<v Speaker 1>a liquid companies. Maybe they didn't want to have to

0:16:20.200 --> 0:16:22.760
<v Speaker 1>mark their books day to day, or maybe there was

0:16:22.880 --> 0:16:26.040
<v Speaker 1>some sort of prestige value of being in a lift

0:16:26.200 --> 0:16:29.240
<v Speaker 1>or an uber that caused people to overpay. Do you

0:16:29.320 --> 0:16:32.600
<v Speaker 1>see that that the sort of traditional discount that would

0:16:32.640 --> 0:16:35.640
<v Speaker 1>have in the past come along with private equity stock

0:16:36.080 --> 0:16:38.520
<v Speaker 1>has flipped. So I'm gonna give you two answers to

0:16:38.600 --> 0:16:41.800
<v Speaker 1>that question. One, just to verify with data the claim

0:16:41.920 --> 0:16:45.080
<v Speaker 1>that people pay a premium. Over the last five years,

0:16:45.080 --> 0:16:47.480
<v Speaker 1>the I p O s that we've looked at tend

0:16:47.560 --> 0:16:51.040
<v Speaker 1>to trade up in the first half of the first

0:16:51.080 --> 0:16:54.080
<v Speaker 1>year that they're public and then in general trade down

0:16:54.120 --> 0:16:57.440
<v Speaker 1>again below the ip O price. Right, so public public

0:16:57.480 --> 0:16:59.880
<v Speaker 1>market investors. And that's not just that that's over the

0:17:00.040 --> 0:17:02.360
<v Speaker 1>US five years. So it's not just we're not just

0:17:02.400 --> 0:17:05.960
<v Speaker 1>looking at effect and it's not just DOLLI Bober or whatever.

0:17:06.000 --> 0:17:08.720
<v Speaker 1>It's you know, a hundred and fifty odd transactions. And

0:17:08.760 --> 0:17:11.360
<v Speaker 1>so what happens is as a capital markets matter, these

0:17:11.400 --> 0:17:14.200
<v Speaker 1>things come out. They you know, the I p O prices,

0:17:14.280 --> 0:17:16.400
<v Speaker 1>it begins to trade. You get the famous pop which

0:17:16.400 --> 0:17:18.959
<v Speaker 1>some people love and some people hate, and in general,

0:17:19.040 --> 0:17:21.840
<v Speaker 1>these things trade up for a while and then large

0:17:21.840 --> 0:17:24.760
<v Speaker 1>amounts of shares are unlocked and people stop paying attention

0:17:24.800 --> 0:17:26.640
<v Speaker 1>and they change the channel and they look at something else,

0:17:26.640 --> 0:17:29.879
<v Speaker 1>and then they trade down. And so it's definitely true

0:17:30.440 --> 0:17:33.320
<v Speaker 1>that private market investors have paid a premium. Like the

0:17:33.359 --> 0:17:36.800
<v Speaker 1>guys who bought the last round of those deals could

0:17:36.840 --> 0:17:38.960
<v Speaker 1>end up underwater if they didn't sell, but they could sell,

0:17:39.600 --> 0:17:43.000
<v Speaker 1>so it's unclear if they've been penalized for paying that

0:17:43.040 --> 0:17:45.400
<v Speaker 1>premium because they had a moment where they probably could

0:17:45.400 --> 0:17:48.040
<v Speaker 1>have made made a profit on the trade. But in

0:17:48.080 --> 0:17:50.200
<v Speaker 1>general it's not a good trade for the broad base

0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:52.560
<v Speaker 1>of shareholders. So that's out of number one. But item

0:17:52.640 --> 0:17:55.800
<v Speaker 1>number two, why do people pay a premium for this?

0:17:56.320 --> 0:17:59.160
<v Speaker 1>And the answer we think is because if you want

0:17:59.200 --> 0:18:02.760
<v Speaker 1>to invest in growth companies, you have to pay the price.

0:18:03.200 --> 0:18:06.200
<v Speaker 1>And so if you are a long only manager who's

0:18:06.240 --> 0:18:08.399
<v Speaker 1>managing a growth fund, who has a carve out that

0:18:08.440 --> 0:18:12.280
<v Speaker 1>allows you to invest in Uber Lift, whatever, your ability

0:18:12.320 --> 0:18:15.399
<v Speaker 1>to set prices very limited, but you want to participate

0:18:15.440 --> 0:18:18.359
<v Speaker 1>in those deals, and as more and more capital has

0:18:18.400 --> 0:18:22.159
<v Speaker 1>flowed into this place. What happens when there's more demanded supply,

0:18:22.280 --> 0:18:24.800
<v Speaker 1>prices go up. So it's kind of like it's a

0:18:24.880 --> 0:18:27.320
<v Speaker 1>function of the fact that, even if we're just looking

0:18:27.320 --> 0:18:30.440
<v Speaker 1>in public markets, we know that the growth factor has

0:18:30.440 --> 0:18:33.680
<v Speaker 1>done extremely well in recent years, and that's just even

0:18:33.720 --> 0:18:37.760
<v Speaker 1>more exacerbated in the ultra high growth private area. So

0:18:37.800 --> 0:18:40.520
<v Speaker 1>that could explain at least part of this premium. Sure.

0:18:40.600 --> 0:18:43.280
<v Speaker 1>I mean, if you were a growth investor in you know,

0:18:43.320 --> 0:18:47.200
<v Speaker 1>the ninety nineties, you would be investing in companies publicly

0:18:47.600 --> 0:18:50.320
<v Speaker 1>that we're young, and you'd be buying you know, Amazon

0:18:50.680 --> 0:18:54.120
<v Speaker 1>or you know Yahoo or the globe dot Com, right,

0:18:54.400 --> 0:18:56.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, you buy the good and the bad. But

0:18:56.080 --> 0:18:58.040
<v Speaker 1>you get to do all of that in the public market. Now,

0:18:58.080 --> 0:19:01.119
<v Speaker 1>all of that capital formation and all of that value

0:19:01.160 --> 0:19:04.439
<v Speaker 1>appreciation happens in the private market, and the guys with

0:19:04.520 --> 0:19:07.479
<v Speaker 1>large pools of capital want to participate in that. But

0:19:07.520 --> 0:19:10.040
<v Speaker 1>what it's also done is created a situation where larger

0:19:10.080 --> 0:19:14.440
<v Speaker 1>pools of capital, the vision funds for example, have formed

0:19:14.800 --> 0:19:18.960
<v Speaker 1>to participate in that trade. I'm glad you mentioned the

0:19:19.000 --> 0:19:22.520
<v Speaker 1>I p o s prior to the bubble, because obviously

0:19:22.640 --> 0:19:25.440
<v Speaker 1>everyone knows you'd be rich if you had bought into

0:19:25.480 --> 0:19:27.520
<v Speaker 1>that Amazon i p O, but you would have lost

0:19:27.520 --> 0:19:29.360
<v Speaker 1>all your money if you bought into the Globe dot

0:19:29.400 --> 0:19:33.560
<v Speaker 1>Com i p O. People bemoan the decline of I

0:19:33.720 --> 0:19:36.760
<v Speaker 1>p o s for precisely because they have memories of

0:19:36.840 --> 0:19:39.680
<v Speaker 1>Amazon and Microsoft in their mind, and they say, well,

0:19:39.920 --> 0:19:42.119
<v Speaker 1>the stock market used to be this avenue where people

0:19:42.160 --> 0:19:44.760
<v Speaker 1>could make a lot of money investing in these companies.

0:19:44.800 --> 0:19:48.120
<v Speaker 1>Now that's closed off to anyone who doesn't have access,

0:19:48.160 --> 0:19:50.040
<v Speaker 1>but of course there is. It does seem like there's

0:19:50.080 --> 0:19:53.480
<v Speaker 1>a lot of hindsight bias because most of them, most

0:19:53.520 --> 0:19:55.880
<v Speaker 1>companies are more like the Globe, right. Sure, well, Mary

0:19:55.880 --> 0:19:58.240
<v Speaker 1>Meeker has a great statistic that was in her deck

0:19:58.280 --> 0:20:01.399
<v Speaker 1>for a long time after the bust that two of

0:20:01.440 --> 0:20:05.080
<v Speaker 1>the companies that went public during that moment in our

0:20:05.119 --> 0:20:09.000
<v Speaker 1>culture created more than the returns. So it's just so

0:20:09.119 --> 0:20:12.879
<v Speaker 1>the vast majority of them were total flow totally adds.

0:20:12.920 --> 0:20:15.679
<v Speaker 1>You know, well, if you were in the two that

0:20:15.800 --> 0:20:19.520
<v Speaker 1>compensated for you know, the negative jacurb. Right, So it's

0:20:20.240 --> 0:20:22.280
<v Speaker 1>the vast majority were a bust and more money was

0:20:22.359 --> 0:20:25.119
<v Speaker 1>lost than made in aggregate. Right, So you had to

0:20:25.119 --> 0:20:27.040
<v Speaker 1>be very very picky to not be one of the

0:20:27.080 --> 0:20:29.119
<v Speaker 1>losers is the decline of the I p O a

0:20:29.200 --> 0:20:31.840
<v Speaker 1>bad thing. It's bens. I mean, if you were a

0:20:31.840 --> 0:20:35.359
<v Speaker 1>retail investor and in hindsight you're totally convinced that you

0:20:35.359 --> 0:20:38.199
<v Speaker 1>would have absolutely put your life savings into Uber if

0:20:38.200 --> 0:20:40.359
<v Speaker 1>you'd been able to buy it, you know, five years ago,

0:20:40.920 --> 0:20:44.159
<v Speaker 1>then it's a bad thing. But one of the reasons

0:20:44.200 --> 0:20:46.360
<v Speaker 1>that the bar has been raised so much for companies

0:20:46.400 --> 0:20:50.399
<v Speaker 1>to go public is to protect retail investors from themselves. Right,

0:20:50.480 --> 0:20:53.320
<v Speaker 1>Retail investors fueled a lot of the bubble that happened.

0:20:53.320 --> 0:20:55.840
<v Speaker 1>There are other structural reasons why the Internet bubble happened,

0:20:56.160 --> 0:20:58.399
<v Speaker 1>but there was a huge amount of demands in the

0:20:58.440 --> 0:21:01.320
<v Speaker 1>same way that people now spect laid in cryptocurrencies and

0:21:01.359 --> 0:21:03.680
<v Speaker 1>other things like that. Because it was perceived to be

0:21:03.760 --> 0:21:07.359
<v Speaker 1>an easy buck, people are always gonna look for actions.

0:21:08.160 --> 0:21:11.919
<v Speaker 1>Let's uh talk about Okay, So as of this moment,

0:21:12.040 --> 0:21:14.480
<v Speaker 1>when we're recording and we don't know any day now,

0:21:14.520 --> 0:21:17.000
<v Speaker 1>we could get s one filings from some of these

0:21:17.000 --> 0:21:22.800
<v Speaker 1>companies that we mentioned, so Uber and Lived and Slack

0:21:22.840 --> 0:21:25.199
<v Speaker 1>and a bunch of others that we could get for

0:21:25.240 --> 0:21:29.680
<v Speaker 1>the first time public data on these companies. So when

0:21:29.720 --> 0:21:31.720
<v Speaker 1>these come out. What are going to be the first

0:21:31.720 --> 0:21:34.679
<v Speaker 1>things that you look at and what should people listening

0:21:34.680 --> 0:21:38.520
<v Speaker 1>at home what should they start to look at specifically? Um, well,

0:21:38.640 --> 0:21:41.879
<v Speaker 1>us first, our our system is just to take it

0:21:41.920 --> 0:21:44.720
<v Speaker 1>apart and do the sort of fifteen point inspection on

0:21:44.800 --> 0:21:48.480
<v Speaker 1>these things. So does the math makes sense? Like does

0:21:48.520 --> 0:21:51.159
<v Speaker 1>this company make money? Is one of the things that

0:21:51.200 --> 0:21:53.479
<v Speaker 1>we've talked about, you know, on TV before. There are

0:21:53.520 --> 0:21:57.719
<v Speaker 1>times where will put companies numbers into our model machine

0:21:57.840 --> 0:21:59.880
<v Speaker 1>and we'll look at it and see like, jeez, there's

0:21:59.880 --> 0:22:03.680
<v Speaker 1>no setting of the model that produces a profit ever. Right,

0:22:03.720 --> 0:22:06.399
<v Speaker 1>So that's a really low low score as far as

0:22:06.440 --> 0:22:08.240
<v Speaker 1>the earnings power of the company. But we also look

0:22:08.240 --> 0:22:11.760
<v Speaker 1>at the management team. We look at the founder. When

0:22:11.760 --> 0:22:15.160
<v Speaker 1>you say look at the management team, were okay? Uh

0:22:15.400 --> 0:22:17.360
<v Speaker 1>paused there for a second. So how do you score

0:22:18.040 --> 0:22:20.440
<v Speaker 1>in theory a manage the quality of a management team.

0:22:20.600 --> 0:22:23.120
<v Speaker 1>They're the things that you think that you would think

0:22:23.160 --> 0:22:25.639
<v Speaker 1>to do if you wrote out a rigorous system, like

0:22:25.800 --> 0:22:28.040
<v Speaker 1>have they done it before? How long have they worked together?

0:22:28.200 --> 0:22:30.160
<v Speaker 1>Have they worked in places that you've heard of before?

0:22:30.200 --> 0:22:32.280
<v Speaker 1>Were they successful there? Did they go to schools that

0:22:32.320 --> 0:22:35.280
<v Speaker 1>you've heard of before? Right? Do they have advanced degrees,

0:22:36.119 --> 0:22:39.240
<v Speaker 1>you know. And then when you toggle to the founder

0:22:39.320 --> 0:22:43.360
<v Speaker 1>aspect of the management team, sometimes you see total control

0:22:43.400 --> 0:22:45.600
<v Speaker 1>of the founders, which tends to be great because they're

0:22:45.640 --> 0:22:48.040
<v Speaker 1>highly invested and have a lot of skin in the game. Sometimes,

0:22:48.040 --> 0:22:50.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, like for example a Twitter, you see like

0:22:50.880 --> 0:22:53.760
<v Speaker 1>the company is totally post founder, and that means that

0:22:53.800 --> 0:22:57.280
<v Speaker 1>the management team has economics that are heavily weighted towards

0:22:57.320 --> 0:22:59.600
<v Speaker 1>the upside, but doesn't have a lot of pain associated

0:22:59.600 --> 0:23:02.640
<v Speaker 1>with the Dow Todd So founder power is very important.

0:23:02.960 --> 0:23:05.760
<v Speaker 1>The quality of the board, the quality investors is interesting.

0:23:05.760 --> 0:23:08.159
<v Speaker 1>How famous is it? Like faym and buzz is one

0:23:08.160 --> 0:23:10.119
<v Speaker 1>of the things that we score. Companies that nobody has

0:23:10.119 --> 0:23:12.520
<v Speaker 1>ever heard of, you know, do do less well than

0:23:12.560 --> 0:23:14.640
<v Speaker 1>companies that are well known. Okay, so you have all

0:23:14.680 --> 0:23:19.600
<v Speaker 1>these factors fifteen different We have fifteen different scores that

0:23:19.680 --> 0:23:23.160
<v Speaker 1>will roll up into the summary score. Fifteen different scores,

0:23:23.359 --> 0:23:26.720
<v Speaker 1>and so in your experience the aggregate, higher scoring companies

0:23:26.760 --> 0:23:28.679
<v Speaker 1>do better than the lower one way better. Otherwise you

0:23:28.680 --> 0:23:31.920
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't have a business or totally right. But shockingly, because

0:23:31.920 --> 0:23:34.800
<v Speaker 1>there are times where we get the score because you know,

0:23:34.880 --> 0:23:36.359
<v Speaker 1>we see it when it comes out of the machine.

0:23:36.520 --> 0:23:38.120
<v Speaker 1>We look at it and we're like, man, that can't

0:23:38.119 --> 0:23:41.119
<v Speaker 1>be right. So it's always interesting to us, like maybe

0:23:41.119 --> 0:23:43.040
<v Speaker 1>this will be the one that we we you know,

0:23:43.080 --> 0:23:45.440
<v Speaker 1>have to rebuild the whole system one. I think here's

0:23:45.480 --> 0:23:48.760
<v Speaker 1>sort of my final question, or the key question I

0:23:48.840 --> 0:23:52.800
<v Speaker 1>have is do the do high scores say you should

0:23:52.840 --> 0:23:56.640
<v Speaker 1>invest in this company? Or is it if you invested

0:23:56.720 --> 0:24:01.359
<v Speaker 1>in every company with high scores and shorted or avoided

0:24:01.359 --> 0:24:03.800
<v Speaker 1>all the companies and low scores, would that be a

0:24:03.840 --> 0:24:06.040
<v Speaker 1>superior strategy? You know? Do you see what I'm Do

0:24:06.040 --> 0:24:08.200
<v Speaker 1>you see? Like? Yeah, so the aggregate trade is always

0:24:08.200 --> 0:24:11.720
<v Speaker 1>better unless you are so good that you can sniper

0:24:11.720 --> 0:24:15.239
<v Speaker 1>shot the singular winner. But that's incredibly hard to do.

0:24:15.480 --> 0:24:18.359
<v Speaker 1>But the premise of the scoring system is essentially that

0:24:18.760 --> 0:24:21.520
<v Speaker 1>on aggregate you'll strip out a lot of noise and

0:24:21.600 --> 0:24:24.560
<v Speaker 1>be much more likely to have a winning portfolio of

0:24:24.600 --> 0:24:27.280
<v Speaker 1>I p O s with the higher scoring companies. Not

0:24:27.400 --> 0:24:30.400
<v Speaker 1>only that, so that's certainly true if you're an institutional investorent.

0:24:30.400 --> 0:24:33.439
<v Speaker 1>Most of our customers are institutions that buy at the

0:24:33.480 --> 0:24:36.879
<v Speaker 1>I p O price, and so the returns are you know,

0:24:36.960 --> 0:24:39.160
<v Speaker 1>three times better if you buy the high scores than

0:24:39.200 --> 0:24:41.760
<v Speaker 1>the low scores. But if you buy the first trade,

0:24:41.960 --> 0:24:44.800
<v Speaker 1>if you're a retail investor buying high scores versus low scores,

0:24:44.840 --> 0:24:46.920
<v Speaker 1>this is the difference between making money and losing money.

0:24:47.160 --> 0:24:50.480
<v Speaker 1>Got it. Well, it should be a very interesting year

0:24:50.640 --> 0:24:54.200
<v Speaker 1>for I p o s as mentioned, and looking forward

0:24:54.200 --> 0:24:56.280
<v Speaker 1>to seeing over the coming years how your scores do.

0:24:56.520 --> 0:24:58.840
<v Speaker 1>I think we have a week or two before it

0:24:58.880 --> 0:25:02.600
<v Speaker 1>comes and then well I'm on vacation next week. It's

0:25:02.600 --> 0:25:05.040
<v Speaker 1>a good time for it. Hopefully, I'm really hoping I

0:25:05.119 --> 0:25:07.080
<v Speaker 1>don't miss all these, but then I'll be back in hopefully.

0:25:07.119 --> 0:25:09.400
<v Speaker 1>I think you're good six weeks. All right? Great Rott

0:25:09.440 --> 0:25:11.760
<v Speaker 1>Wallace of Tried and Ai, thank you very much for

0:25:11.880 --> 0:25:27.720
<v Speaker 1>coming out Odd Lot. Thanks for having me here. Well,

0:25:27.800 --> 0:25:30.560
<v Speaker 1>normally I would do a little outro with Tracy here

0:25:30.560 --> 0:25:33.240
<v Speaker 1>and we would talk about what a great conversation that was.

0:25:33.560 --> 0:25:36.359
<v Speaker 1>But I actually think that was a great conversation and

0:25:36.400 --> 0:25:38.840
<v Speaker 1>I love this topic and I'm looking forward to all

0:25:38.920 --> 0:25:40.520
<v Speaker 1>the I p o s this year and seeing how

0:25:40.640 --> 0:25:43.840
<v Speaker 1>they do. So this has been another episode of the

0:25:43.840 --> 0:25:47.080
<v Speaker 1>Odd Lots podcast. I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me

0:25:47.200 --> 0:25:50.080
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter at the Stalwart, and you should follow our

0:25:50.119 --> 0:25:52.760
<v Speaker 1>co host on Twitter even though she wasn't here, Tracy

0:25:52.800 --> 0:25:56.080
<v Speaker 1>Alloway at Tracy Alloway and you should follow our producer

0:25:56.240 --> 0:25:59.560
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter tow for four Heads. He's at four Heads

0:25:59.560 --> 0:26:02.760
<v Speaker 1>t as well as the Bloomberg head of podcast, Francesco

0:26:02.840 --> 0:26:06.000
<v Speaker 1>Levy at Francesca Today. Thanks for listening.