1 00:00:02,440 --> 00:00:07,360 Speaker 1: All Zoe Media. Hello and welcome to Better Offline. We 2 00:00:07,400 --> 00:00:09,520 Speaker 1: are live in beautiful New York City. I am your 3 00:00:09,520 --> 00:00:23,400 Speaker 1: host ed Zitron, of course, and I'm joined today by 4 00:00:23,720 --> 00:00:27,000 Speaker 1: Zevity Challenge. She's a professor of law at Fordham Law 5 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:28,840 Speaker 1: School and the author of Break Them Up, Recovering Our 6 00:00:28,880 --> 00:00:32,200 Speaker 1: Freedom from Big Ang, Big Tech, and Big Money. Zephyr, 7 00:00:32,240 --> 00:00:32,880 Speaker 1: thank you so much. 8 00:00:32,800 --> 00:00:34,519 Speaker 2: For being here, Thanks for having me on ed. 9 00:00:34,920 --> 00:00:37,519 Speaker 1: So let's stalk corruption. So you've talked a great deal 10 00:00:37,520 --> 00:00:40,720 Speaker 1: about corruption. But what does it mean in the business 11 00:00:40,720 --> 00:00:41,760 Speaker 1: and economic sense? 12 00:00:42,120 --> 00:00:46,720 Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean corruption is it's this idea that comes 13 00:00:46,720 --> 00:00:51,240 Speaker 2: from the Latin, you know, the rupt rupture break apart, 14 00:00:52,080 --> 00:00:56,520 Speaker 2: and a corruption is breaking apart from within. So it's 15 00:00:56,640 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 2: internal disintegration. 16 00:00:58,080 --> 00:00:58,400 Speaker 1: That's this. 17 00:00:59,200 --> 00:01:03,040 Speaker 2: I mentioned that because and the deep roots of the language, 18 00:01:03,480 --> 00:01:08,960 Speaker 2: because questions of corruption have been central to economic and 19 00:01:08,959 --> 00:01:12,399 Speaker 2: political thinking for thousands of years. So one way to 20 00:01:12,520 --> 00:01:16,679 Speaker 2: start thinking about corruption, if you don't mind, is to 21 00:01:16,760 --> 00:01:19,040 Speaker 2: think about Aristotle. 22 00:01:19,440 --> 00:01:20,800 Speaker 1: Okay, okay, right. 23 00:01:22,240 --> 00:01:26,520 Speaker 2: Because I actually am quite drawn to Aristotle's understanding of corruption, 24 00:01:26,600 --> 00:01:28,280 Speaker 2: and I think it's a kind of man on the 25 00:01:28,319 --> 00:01:30,280 Speaker 2: street understanding of corruption as well. 26 00:01:30,319 --> 00:01:30,760 Speaker 1: What is it? 27 00:01:31,080 --> 00:01:35,920 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's the idea that those with governing power use 28 00:01:36,040 --> 00:01:39,440 Speaker 2: that governing power to serve themselves instead of the public. 29 00:01:40,080 --> 00:01:44,120 Speaker 2: So in Aristotle's classic formulation, he talked about the difference 30 00:01:44,200 --> 00:01:47,840 Speaker 2: between a monarch and a tyrant, you know, is both 31 00:01:47,920 --> 00:01:52,760 Speaker 2: are rule by a single entity. The difference is the 32 00:01:52,800 --> 00:01:57,000 Speaker 2: monarch serves the public and the tyrant serves himself. Aristotle's 33 00:01:57,040 --> 00:02:02,920 Speaker 2: other two formulations were then the rule by an elite few, right, 34 00:02:03,080 --> 00:02:08,440 Speaker 2: So a rule by an elite few is either an aristocracy, right, 35 00:02:08,520 --> 00:02:11,799 Speaker 2: an elite few governing for the public, or an oligarchy 36 00:02:12,400 --> 00:02:19,119 Speaker 2: elite few governing for themselves. And then finally, the mass 37 00:02:19,400 --> 00:02:24,600 Speaker 2: version of this, a little more controversial, especially in modern translation, 38 00:02:25,400 --> 00:02:30,440 Speaker 2: was you know, the idea of a polity or mass rule, 39 00:02:30,560 --> 00:02:32,920 Speaker 2: and often it was described as democracy, in other words, 40 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:36,720 Speaker 2: people using the public power for themselves. But the key 41 00:02:36,800 --> 00:02:42,400 Speaker 2: there is that he saw the corrupted version as being 42 00:02:42,480 --> 00:02:45,040 Speaker 2: about how you use your power, right right, a sort 43 00:02:45,080 --> 00:02:47,800 Speaker 2: of core internal motivation frankly. 44 00:02:47,760 --> 00:02:50,520 Speaker 1: And so I'm going to guess that that's how you're 45 00:02:50,560 --> 00:02:53,680 Speaker 1: looking at tech at the moment, because and to be clear, 46 00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:56,880 Speaker 1: I fully agree it feels like and it's talking Matt 47 00:02:56,919 --> 00:02:59,839 Speaker 1: Stola a few episodes back and he kind of said 48 00:02:59,880 --> 00:03:03,480 Speaker 1: the thing around authoritarianism and new authoritarianism, And you've made 49 00:03:03,520 --> 00:03:05,680 Speaker 1: this point too, so do you. 50 00:03:05,560 --> 00:03:07,600 Speaker 2: Think and I think it just before we get into this, 51 00:03:07,680 --> 00:03:11,320 Speaker 2: it's important to just then, in very you know shakespeare 52 00:03:11,320 --> 00:03:15,200 Speaker 2: thirty seconds way to say, this fight about what is 53 00:03:15,240 --> 00:03:17,600 Speaker 2: corruption and what isn't then has become a two thousand 54 00:03:17,639 --> 00:03:18,040 Speaker 2: year fight. 55 00:03:18,360 --> 00:03:18,640 Speaker 1: Right. 56 00:03:18,800 --> 00:03:22,800 Speaker 2: So Hobbes, for instance, thought that Aristotle was crazy on this. 57 00:03:22,919 --> 00:03:25,440 Speaker 2: He's like, yeah, people are always going to be selfish, right, 58 00:03:25,840 --> 00:03:30,160 Speaker 2: And that a flat version of Hobbes. But there's it's 59 00:03:30,160 --> 00:03:32,400 Speaker 2: actually a fight about human nature and what's possible with 60 00:03:32,480 --> 00:03:35,000 Speaker 2: human nature on the one hand, but it is also 61 00:03:35,040 --> 00:03:39,480 Speaker 2: a fight about where public power is versus your private life. 62 00:03:40,080 --> 00:03:43,600 Speaker 2: Because Aristotle is not saying, in that formulation or understanding 63 00:03:43,600 --> 00:03:45,760 Speaker 2: of corruption that in your private life you can't seek 64 00:03:45,800 --> 00:03:50,040 Speaker 2: out yourself. He's saying there's something uniquely dangerous and destructive 65 00:03:50,520 --> 00:03:55,160 Speaker 2: to a public when the governing power is self serving. 66 00:03:55,680 --> 00:04:02,000 Speaker 2: So when this as applied to the modern the modern 67 00:04:02,160 --> 00:04:07,920 Speaker 2: big tech, big ag questions that the underlying philosophical question 68 00:04:08,040 --> 00:04:11,560 Speaker 2: then is is this a governing power? And if it's governing, 69 00:04:11,840 --> 00:04:14,720 Speaker 2: that's really problematic because it's set up to be selfish, right, 70 00:04:14,840 --> 00:04:18,599 Speaker 2: That's that's you know, that's the nature of modern business. 71 00:04:18,600 --> 00:04:21,120 Speaker 2: So the selfishness isn't the problem. The governingness is. 72 00:04:21,520 --> 00:04:24,760 Speaker 1: So makes sense, yes, because and that's kind of and 73 00:04:24,760 --> 00:04:26,800 Speaker 1: that's kind of the bothersome thing about this because you've 74 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:30,279 Speaker 1: got so many monopolies orligopolies whatever. So one I like 75 00:04:30,320 --> 00:04:32,600 Speaker 1: to choose the most people are not. People are kind 76 00:04:32,600 --> 00:04:35,040 Speaker 1: of dancing around this one is the cloud empires. You've 77 00:04:35,040 --> 00:04:39,839 Speaker 1: got Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Oracle to an extent, though for 78 00:04:39,920 --> 00:04:42,479 Speaker 1: different reasons, and they are the ones that set the 79 00:04:42,560 --> 00:04:45,160 Speaker 1: terms of how the Internet is built out. Ack am 80 00:04:45,200 --> 00:04:48,839 Speaker 1: I in CDNs to an extent, but you can't what 81 00:04:48,920 --> 00:04:51,560 Speaker 1: can you even do about something like that? Is that 82 00:04:51,560 --> 00:04:55,240 Speaker 1: cloud empire bad or good? It's kind of hard to tell. 83 00:04:56,160 --> 00:04:58,440 Speaker 1: But the thing they definitely have is power unchecked. 84 00:04:58,720 --> 00:05:01,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I love your language of term setting. And 85 00:05:01,680 --> 00:05:06,040 Speaker 2: it's not always obvious, right, but that if you think 86 00:05:06,080 --> 00:05:11,120 Speaker 2: of a government, you know what a governing entity does. 87 00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:13,600 Speaker 2: If you think of governing not in a flat formal 88 00:05:13,640 --> 00:05:16,279 Speaker 2: sense like are you elected or not? But who actually 89 00:05:16,320 --> 00:05:19,839 Speaker 2: has the question for whether something is governing? I think 90 00:05:19,880 --> 00:05:21,560 Speaker 2: one way to ask that question is does it have 91 00:05:21,560 --> 00:05:24,360 Speaker 2: the power to set terms right, right, yeah. 92 00:05:24,120 --> 00:05:27,360 Speaker 1: And which is effectively a tech industry now right, every 93 00:05:27,400 --> 00:05:31,520 Speaker 1: big player Airbnb sets the terms for vacations, the cloud 94 00:05:31,560 --> 00:05:34,400 Speaker 1: empire set the terms for how cloud storage is monetized 95 00:05:34,400 --> 00:05:37,680 Speaker 1: and indeed sold, and how indeed our electric grid is 96 00:05:37,720 --> 00:05:40,839 Speaker 1: built out or not as the case maybe, I mean 97 00:05:41,560 --> 00:05:44,960 Speaker 1: even Musk with Tesla, and I have many thoughts about 98 00:05:44,960 --> 00:05:47,560 Speaker 1: that man kind of sets the terms of how charging 99 00:05:47,960 --> 00:05:50,200 Speaker 1: works now, like they have the standard now, even though 100 00:05:50,240 --> 00:05:52,360 Speaker 1: he's a mess, And even then when he fired most 101 00:05:52,400 --> 00:05:54,680 Speaker 1: of the supercharger team, it's like, oh, this isn't just 102 00:05:54,720 --> 00:05:58,240 Speaker 1: about Tesla, this is now the entirety of America is 103 00:05:58,279 --> 00:06:01,120 Speaker 1: being let down, right, But what do you do about that? 104 00:06:01,240 --> 00:06:01,320 Speaker 2: Like? 105 00:06:01,360 --> 00:06:04,080 Speaker 1: How you what can I mean, what you and I 106 00:06:04,120 --> 00:06:06,680 Speaker 1: can do might be someone limited, But what can society 107 00:06:06,760 --> 00:06:07,600 Speaker 1: do with this kind of thing? 108 00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:11,080 Speaker 2: Well, you know, let's start with where we did start 109 00:06:11,080 --> 00:06:14,839 Speaker 2: on corruption. Language of corruption. If we think about term 110 00:06:15,000 --> 00:06:18,640 Speaker 2: setting by selfish actors as a problem in the political 111 00:06:18,680 --> 00:06:21,039 Speaker 2: realm before we then apply it to the realm. We 112 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:23,520 Speaker 2: may not think of as political, but it's clearly political too. 113 00:06:24,520 --> 00:06:32,279 Speaker 2: There's a series of strategies for either removing that term 114 00:06:32,320 --> 00:06:37,760 Speaker 2: setting power, right or having public regulations, so even if 115 00:06:37,800 --> 00:06:42,760 Speaker 2: they're term setting, the terms are fundamentally set by the public. 116 00:06:42,960 --> 00:06:43,200 Speaker 1: Right. 117 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:49,359 Speaker 2: And so the classic American strategy was to have diverse 118 00:06:49,400 --> 00:06:53,560 Speaker 2: sources of competing power in a presidency, right, Senate. 119 00:06:53,640 --> 00:06:55,920 Speaker 1: And ecogress. Right. 120 00:06:56,000 --> 00:06:58,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, so that's a break come up model. And you know, 121 00:06:58,200 --> 00:07:00,919 Speaker 2: if you would, it's not just elections, but it's actually 122 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:05,960 Speaker 2: about providing different sources of competitive power at the local 123 00:07:05,960 --> 00:07:07,920 Speaker 2: and federal level, local, state. 124 00:07:08,000 --> 00:07:11,080 Speaker 1: And when you say maybe I miss when you say 125 00:07:11,120 --> 00:07:15,320 Speaker 1: competitive power, is that so local and federal government stuff? 126 00:07:15,360 --> 00:07:17,760 Speaker 1: Is that just? Is that is elections? Part of this? 127 00:07:17,960 --> 00:07:20,200 Speaker 1: Are these like what are the different mechanisms there that 128 00:07:20,280 --> 00:07:22,560 Speaker 1: help break them up in a governmental sense? 129 00:07:22,640 --> 00:07:25,440 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's all of the above. So right, so if 130 00:07:25,440 --> 00:07:28,360 Speaker 2: you have you know, we can be a little glib 131 00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:34,400 Speaker 2: about just comparing you know, presidential systems to parliamentary that's 132 00:07:34,720 --> 00:07:37,040 Speaker 2: that's one source of difference, but it's not the only 133 00:07:37,080 --> 00:07:40,320 Speaker 2: source of difference. It's cantons versus not cantons. 134 00:07:40,440 --> 00:07:40,640 Speaker 1: Right. 135 00:07:41,120 --> 00:07:43,160 Speaker 2: So, so what it is to say is not that 136 00:07:43,200 --> 00:07:47,240 Speaker 2: there's an ideal vision I don't think there is, but 137 00:07:47,360 --> 00:07:52,480 Speaker 2: that genuinely separating sources of power. So there's some public contestation. 138 00:07:52,840 --> 00:07:55,200 Speaker 2: I think of it both as a federal state and 139 00:07:55,360 --> 00:07:59,440 Speaker 2: across federal and across state branches as being important. That's 140 00:07:59,480 --> 00:08:01,040 Speaker 2: one mechan it's not the only mechanism. 141 00:08:01,320 --> 00:08:03,560 Speaker 1: There are at least options and means in which people 142 00:08:03,560 --> 00:08:05,880 Speaker 1: will be cycled out and ideas will be cycled in. 143 00:08:06,080 --> 00:08:08,800 Speaker 2: Right. And then in the election sphere, we're very worried, 144 00:08:08,880 --> 00:08:14,960 Speaker 2: as we should be about arenas where there's no competitive elections. 145 00:08:14,040 --> 00:08:16,880 Speaker 1: Right, somewhat scary, Yeah, this is very scary. 146 00:08:17,160 --> 00:08:21,760 Speaker 2: And the lockout of the opportunity for new ideas or 147 00:08:21,800 --> 00:08:24,280 Speaker 2: for leverage on a grassroots level, you know. I think 148 00:08:24,280 --> 00:08:26,440 Speaker 2: of it often if if there's nobody you could turn to, 149 00:08:26,880 --> 00:08:31,040 Speaker 2: if the water smells bad in the morning and your 150 00:08:31,200 --> 00:08:33,360 Speaker 2: elected officials aren't doing anything, there's a problem, Like you 151 00:08:33,400 --> 00:08:34,920 Speaker 2: want to you know, it doesn't mean you're gonna win, 152 00:08:34,960 --> 00:08:35,480 Speaker 2: but at least. 153 00:08:35,360 --> 00:08:37,600 Speaker 1: You have some access to dig right, yeah. 154 00:08:37,679 --> 00:08:42,120 Speaker 2: Right, So then when you apply that that breakup or 155 00:08:42,200 --> 00:08:48,320 Speaker 2: divestiture model to companies, you can see similar visions. Right. 156 00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:51,480 Speaker 2: So what I mean to say is that there's plural 157 00:08:51,520 --> 00:08:54,200 Speaker 2: ways to do breakups, right, And that's one of the 158 00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:58,280 Speaker 2: things that the electoral or political world can inform how 159 00:08:58,280 --> 00:09:01,600 Speaker 2: that can inform thinking about breakups, but it's not the 160 00:09:01,600 --> 00:09:02,600 Speaker 2: only way to break up power. 161 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:15,000 Speaker 1: So what are some ones we're not doing yet then, 162 00:09:15,040 --> 00:09:17,480 Speaker 1: because it feels at times like the only thing there 163 00:09:17,559 --> 00:09:20,400 Speaker 1: is is just anti trust. And thanks to Ronald B. Reagan, 164 00:09:20,679 --> 00:09:23,160 Speaker 1: that's not being awake for a while. Yeah, it's kind 165 00:09:23,160 --> 00:09:26,600 Speaker 1: of waking up. Yeah, it's making noises. What are the 166 00:09:26,600 --> 00:09:29,040 Speaker 1: other mechanisms I mean that we could even create? 167 00:09:29,440 --> 00:09:34,200 Speaker 2: Right, Well, so there when I sort of think about 168 00:09:34,240 --> 00:09:36,800 Speaker 2: anti monopoly, and I know you've talked to Matt before, 169 00:09:37,320 --> 00:09:41,600 Speaker 2: but you think of anti monopoly as anti concentrated private 170 00:09:41,640 --> 00:09:44,800 Speaker 2: governing power, you know, the tyranny of private governing power, 171 00:09:45,200 --> 00:09:49,320 Speaker 2: and anti trust is one part of that. In the 172 00:09:49,440 --> 00:09:58,120 Speaker 2: United States, the first real nineteenth century anti monopoly movement 173 00:09:58,440 --> 00:10:06,880 Speaker 2: was actually around on discrimination principles. Okay, so the Interstate 174 00:10:07,080 --> 00:10:12,400 Speaker 2: Commerce Act, which came out of farmers coming together saying 175 00:10:12,440 --> 00:10:16,800 Speaker 2: down with monopolies. The first thing they asked for was 176 00:10:16,920 --> 00:10:20,360 Speaker 2: open access. Basically what we might think of his open access. 177 00:10:20,640 --> 00:10:25,040 Speaker 2: You know, on the same terms non discrimination right. You 178 00:10:25,040 --> 00:10:29,880 Speaker 2: have the access to whether it's a grain elevator or 179 00:10:30,120 --> 00:10:34,280 Speaker 2: a train, to not have differential treatment. And so it 180 00:10:34,400 --> 00:10:36,559 Speaker 2: is a key way to break up power. We may 181 00:10:36,559 --> 00:10:40,120 Speaker 2: not think non discrimination equals breaking up power, but. 182 00:10:41,640 --> 00:10:43,520 Speaker 1: That would makes sense. Yeah, because I was just talking 183 00:10:43,520 --> 00:10:46,800 Speaker 1: with Corey doctor Rowe about this, yes, and he had 184 00:10:46,840 --> 00:10:49,120 Speaker 1: suggested that one of the main things is the government 185 00:10:49,240 --> 00:10:53,800 Speaker 1: forcing interoperability between platforms. Everyone has to have the same standard. 186 00:10:54,200 --> 00:10:56,840 Speaker 1: So you can look at posts from Twitter x threats 187 00:10:56,840 --> 00:10:59,160 Speaker 1: and I'm not even talking about the feediverse necessarily just 188 00:10:59,400 --> 00:11:02,800 Speaker 1: open stand Why do you well? I mean, is there 189 00:11:02,800 --> 00:11:05,640 Speaker 1: a reason why these things just don't happen? Is it 190 00:11:05,679 --> 00:11:07,720 Speaker 1: that they're not being pushed through? Is that the lobbying 191 00:11:07,760 --> 00:11:09,640 Speaker 1: is powerful? Like? Is it all of the above? I 192 00:11:09,640 --> 00:11:12,200 Speaker 1: guess right, right? 193 00:11:12,480 --> 00:11:19,320 Speaker 2: Is it? The ability to discriminate between counterparties is extremely. 194 00:11:18,760 --> 00:11:21,400 Speaker 1: Valuable, right as you know, right, yes. 195 00:11:21,400 --> 00:11:24,960 Speaker 2: Right, and especially true if you have anopoly power, right right, right. 196 00:11:25,559 --> 00:11:30,600 Speaker 2: So I'm I'm laughing because I'm just trying to think 197 00:11:30,640 --> 00:11:35,120 Speaker 2: of the right point of intervention. So maybe going to 198 00:11:35,240 --> 00:11:38,679 Speaker 2: history again is useful. So we see the eighteen nineties 199 00:11:38,800 --> 00:11:44,680 Speaker 2: and this first the first effort is and always claiming 200 00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:46,719 Speaker 2: first is difficult. It's all jumbled. 201 00:11:46,360 --> 00:11:48,120 Speaker 1: Together, right, History is a mess. 202 00:11:48,760 --> 00:11:52,719 Speaker 2: History is a mess. There's because there's I'm going to 203 00:11:52,760 --> 00:11:56,000 Speaker 2: do my own little segue. Even within corporate charters, there 204 00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:59,360 Speaker 2: were anti monopoly provisions in the nineteenth century, really, but 205 00:11:59,520 --> 00:12:04,200 Speaker 2: basic rules that said, you can only engage in this 206 00:12:04,320 --> 00:12:07,960 Speaker 2: certain line of business. Right, the government will only grant 207 00:12:08,080 --> 00:12:12,160 Speaker 2: you a corporate charter and all the privileges that accompany 208 00:12:12,240 --> 00:12:15,720 Speaker 2: that in the event in so long as you stay 209 00:12:15,760 --> 00:12:17,880 Speaker 2: within the line of business for which you applied to 210 00:12:17,920 --> 00:12:18,360 Speaker 2: the charter. 211 00:12:18,880 --> 00:12:21,040 Speaker 1: Does that make sense? Why don't they do that anymore? 212 00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:24,840 Speaker 2: Well, in I'm going to get my dates wrong, but 213 00:12:24,880 --> 00:12:30,920 Speaker 2: the gesture right late nineteenth early twentieth century. Actually it 214 00:12:30,960 --> 00:12:35,400 Speaker 2: was a little earlier. There was a real effort to 215 00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:36,680 Speaker 2: engage in. 216 00:12:38,880 --> 00:12:39,839 Speaker 1: Appreciate the question. 217 00:12:39,880 --> 00:12:44,679 Speaker 2: And I'm being the academic worried about sloppiness, so worry people. 218 00:12:44,360 --> 00:12:47,800 Speaker 1: Get things right, so don't worry about Yeah. 219 00:12:47,520 --> 00:12:49,920 Speaker 2: No, I I want to put the asterisks there for 220 00:12:49,960 --> 00:12:55,720 Speaker 2: the corporate law historians who are listening. But there were 221 00:12:56,120 --> 00:12:59,520 Speaker 2: you know, there's really interesting. There was a move towards 222 00:12:59,600 --> 00:13:04,240 Speaker 2: free corporation anybody should be able to incorporate as an 223 00:13:04,280 --> 00:13:05,479 Speaker 2: anti corruption. 224 00:13:05,240 --> 00:13:08,240 Speaker 1: Move, which kind of makes sense a lot. I can 225 00:13:08,400 --> 00:13:10,439 Speaker 1: understand the logic, right. 226 00:13:11,440 --> 00:13:14,080 Speaker 2: And then there's a because the idea is, oh, if 227 00:13:14,120 --> 00:13:16,080 Speaker 2: you can only get a corporate charter if you're friends 228 00:13:16,080 --> 00:13:18,520 Speaker 2: with somebody. That's a pretty corrupt system. 229 00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:21,320 Speaker 1: Right, that makes sense. Well, but now they've moved on 230 00:13:21,360 --> 00:13:23,160 Speaker 1: to other ways of doing exactly. 231 00:13:23,440 --> 00:13:26,680 Speaker 2: And then the other part was an effort to expand 232 00:13:26,800 --> 00:13:30,600 Speaker 2: what all corporate charters have since become, which is you 233 00:13:30,640 --> 00:13:34,160 Speaker 2: get a charter to do whatever is legal in the state. Right, 234 00:13:34,520 --> 00:13:37,320 Speaker 2: that's now what a corporate charter is. This a long 235 00:13:37,480 --> 00:13:42,200 Speaker 2: digression to say that anti monopoly impulses have showed up 236 00:13:42,200 --> 00:13:44,440 Speaker 2: in a lot of different areas of law, right, not 237 00:13:44,600 --> 00:13:47,680 Speaker 2: just in federal anti trust and railroad law. 238 00:13:47,840 --> 00:13:51,439 Speaker 1: So interesting because it it almost feels like, because I 239 00:13:51,679 --> 00:13:54,080 Speaker 1: mean fairly blaming Ronald Reagan, I feel like we can 240 00:13:54,120 --> 00:13:55,960 Speaker 1: all do it every day, but it feels as if 241 00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:00,000 Speaker 1: it's just been a slow bleed for like hundreds of years, 242 00:14:00,080 --> 00:14:02,600 Speaker 1: where we just the ramifications of decisions at the time 243 00:14:02,600 --> 00:14:04,560 Speaker 1: that probably made perfect sense because at the time of 244 00:14:04,600 --> 00:14:07,720 Speaker 1: corporate charters were very limited. There wasn't much commerce. There was, 245 00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:10,480 Speaker 1: or at least more limited commerce. It almost feels like 246 00:14:10,520 --> 00:14:14,040 Speaker 1: we need to bring that back because an episode I 247 00:14:14,240 --> 00:14:18,040 Speaker 1: think I just wrote recently, even I was thinking about Salesforce. 248 00:14:18,120 --> 00:14:21,480 Speaker 1: Salesforce one of my least favorite companies. And if you 249 00:14:21,520 --> 00:14:24,320 Speaker 1: ask what Salesforce does, that is a very long answer 250 00:14:24,560 --> 00:14:28,080 Speaker 1: because they do CRM, they do data lakes, they do AI, 251 00:14:28,160 --> 00:14:30,320 Speaker 1: they do chatbots, they do different kinds of chat. But 252 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:31,800 Speaker 1: they have all of these things and they do it 253 00:14:31,840 --> 00:14:35,320 Speaker 1: by vacuuming up these companies. They eat them alive and 254 00:14:35,400 --> 00:14:38,360 Speaker 1: then and now they do it much like Microsoft, as 255 00:14:38,400 --> 00:14:40,440 Speaker 1: a means of making sure you don't buy another product, 256 00:14:40,440 --> 00:14:44,720 Speaker 1: because we've got everything here like a buffet. Can we 257 00:14:44,840 --> 00:14:47,640 Speaker 1: stop that? How do we stop these acquisites? It almost 258 00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:52,000 Speaker 1: it feels as if acquisitions are the first place to start. Yeah, yeah, 259 00:14:52,040 --> 00:14:53,520 Speaker 1: to make it much harder. 260 00:14:53,680 --> 00:14:57,000 Speaker 2: Well, so stopping We were talking about different elements of 261 00:14:57,000 --> 00:15:02,640 Speaker 2: anti trust or vanta monopoly. So one element is non 262 00:15:02,640 --> 00:15:05,240 Speaker 2: discrimination rules. And that doesn't mean that every industry should 263 00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:08,800 Speaker 2: be subject to radical non discrimination rules in all cases, 264 00:15:09,240 --> 00:15:14,720 Speaker 2: but that if there are industries that the ability to 265 00:15:14,720 --> 00:15:19,880 Speaker 2: discriminate between counterparties is going to allow for exploitation and 266 00:15:19,920 --> 00:15:23,720 Speaker 2: extraction and shutting down of new entrants, then non discrimination 267 00:15:23,920 --> 00:15:24,680 Speaker 2: is really important. 268 00:15:24,760 --> 00:15:25,200 Speaker 1: Yes, right. 269 00:15:26,120 --> 00:15:29,720 Speaker 2: Anti trust then also very important, And the first step 270 00:15:29,720 --> 00:15:33,920 Speaker 2: in antitrust is not allowing bad as the American system 271 00:15:33,920 --> 00:15:38,720 Speaker 2: has it set up, is not allowing is not allowing mergers. Now, 272 00:15:39,040 --> 00:15:43,520 Speaker 2: I'm not as familiar with the Salesforce corporate structure, but 273 00:15:43,640 --> 00:15:46,280 Speaker 2: I gather that one of the things you're talking about 274 00:15:46,840 --> 00:15:49,720 Speaker 2: is the way in which one we've been quite lax 275 00:15:49,960 --> 00:15:53,960 Speaker 2: until recently on merger policy. Yes, but we also haven't 276 00:15:54,120 --> 00:15:58,520 Speaker 2: until very recently, until Canter and CON's recent merger proposals, 277 00:15:58,760 --> 00:16:04,560 Speaker 2: we've had this highly formal understanding of where threats lie. 278 00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:09,880 Speaker 2: Before we see threats primarily with horizontal acquisitions. I'm a 279 00:16:09,920 --> 00:16:16,320 Speaker 2: shoe company buying another shoe company, right. Secondarily between vertical integration, 280 00:16:16,640 --> 00:16:18,600 Speaker 2: I'm a shoe company buying a shoelace. 281 00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:20,720 Speaker 1: Choice, right. 282 00:16:21,560 --> 00:16:28,280 Speaker 2: But the conglomerate merger, the merger in adjacent agency, adjacent institutions, 283 00:16:28,640 --> 00:16:30,200 Speaker 2: has sort of been assumed to be, well, that's not 284 00:16:30,240 --> 00:16:35,840 Speaker 2: a threat because it's not about dominating that dominating either 285 00:16:35,880 --> 00:16:40,120 Speaker 2: that vertical or that horizontal. And one of the interesting 286 00:16:40,240 --> 00:16:42,720 Speaker 2: buried parts of the merger guidelines, which I think is 287 00:16:42,760 --> 00:16:47,440 Speaker 2: really important, is a recognition that I forget the exact language, 288 00:16:47,920 --> 00:16:51,160 Speaker 2: maybe Canter just said this in a speech, but these 289 00:16:51,440 --> 00:16:55,239 Speaker 2: these don't fit anymore. Yeah, right, Like when when Amazon's 290 00:16:55,280 --> 00:17:00,840 Speaker 2: buying Whole Foods. Well maybe they're using the data of 291 00:17:00,880 --> 00:17:04,639 Speaker 2: the Whole Food's customers to create a moat somewhere else. 292 00:17:05,680 --> 00:17:08,600 Speaker 1: Well, it's just it almost feels like we need to 293 00:17:08,600 --> 00:17:10,760 Speaker 1: start asking them why do you need this so bad? 294 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:14,040 Speaker 1: And make them justify it and not be totally open 295 00:17:14,080 --> 00:17:16,280 Speaker 1: to it because I don't even know why they bought 296 00:17:16,280 --> 00:17:19,119 Speaker 1: it other than the data, for sure, because whatever. But 297 00:17:19,160 --> 00:17:22,040 Speaker 1: also it's another way of conquering another commerce vertical. 298 00:17:22,119 --> 00:17:25,560 Speaker 2: Now, I think there's so much. I mean, I think 299 00:17:25,640 --> 00:17:31,080 Speaker 2: there is so much that we miss psychologically as well 300 00:17:31,080 --> 00:17:35,320 Speaker 2: as economically when we think about mergers as if everybody's 301 00:17:35,359 --> 00:17:37,600 Speaker 2: just rational, like yeah, yeah, there's also a lot of 302 00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:38,520 Speaker 2: boys playing risk. 303 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:41,119 Speaker 1: I'm not I fully agree, because there's a lot of 304 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:44,119 Speaker 1: One of my prevailing theories with tech right now is 305 00:17:44,119 --> 00:17:47,080 Speaker 1: that everyone says, well, open AI, for example, well they're 306 00:17:47,080 --> 00:17:49,560 Speaker 1: going to work it out because he's really smart. It's like, 307 00:17:49,680 --> 00:17:52,720 Speaker 1: what if he isn't what if they don't have any idea? 308 00:17:52,720 --> 00:17:55,679 Speaker 1: What if they're just doing this salesforce great example, they 309 00:17:55,760 --> 00:17:59,560 Speaker 1: just bought a digital storage company and it's not really 310 00:17:59,640 --> 00:18:02,440 Speaker 1: obvious why, but you know they're going to work it out. 311 00:18:02,440 --> 00:18:04,480 Speaker 1: I guess I saw a piece of the information saying, oh, 312 00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:06,920 Speaker 1: Benningoff's got it back. It's like, what is he? God? 313 00:18:07,080 --> 00:18:07,840 Speaker 1: What is going on? 314 00:18:08,119 --> 00:18:10,879 Speaker 2: And it almost with the more capitalists lashing around, actually, 315 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:12,840 Speaker 2: the less likely that we should think that all these 316 00:18:12,840 --> 00:18:14,320 Speaker 2: decisions are rationals. 317 00:18:15,280 --> 00:18:17,480 Speaker 1: And on top of that we've got there's a very 318 00:18:17,520 --> 00:18:20,480 Speaker 1: irrational feeling to the economy. I've said a lot about this. Yeah, 319 00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:22,560 Speaker 1: that's really interesting. Well, because a lot of these companies 320 00:18:22,600 --> 00:18:26,680 Speaker 1: will spend like thirty billion dollars Okay, I'm being a 321 00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:28,920 Speaker 1: little like ten billion dollars to make three hundred million, 322 00:18:29,200 --> 00:18:31,520 Speaker 1: and I guess that you can't really stop Like, maybe 323 00:18:31,520 --> 00:18:33,760 Speaker 1: you don't stop that, but at some point you have 324 00:18:33,800 --> 00:18:37,679 Speaker 1: to wonder if that's a symptom of these big, ungainly 325 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:40,320 Speaker 1: monstrous companies that they just had the companies that do 326 00:18:40,359 --> 00:18:41,520 Speaker 1: everything and thus do nothing. 327 00:18:42,119 --> 00:18:44,240 Speaker 2: Well, there's this interesting reminds me of this research. I 328 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:46,320 Speaker 2: wish I could find it around the urge to merge? 329 00:18:46,359 --> 00:18:47,040 Speaker 2: Have you heard about that? 330 00:18:47,160 --> 00:18:50,240 Speaker 1: No? No, no, I think this is older research. 331 00:18:50,320 --> 00:18:53,400 Speaker 2: But somebody put together a bunch of grad students and 332 00:18:53,440 --> 00:18:57,320 Speaker 2: compared them to CEOs, like would you do this merger? 333 00:18:57,480 --> 00:19:00,880 Speaker 2: And those who already had power to get really. 334 00:19:01,000 --> 00:19:01,960 Speaker 1: They just get grabby. 335 00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:06,239 Speaker 2: They get grabby, right, and and denying that there's a 336 00:19:06,440 --> 00:19:11,639 Speaker 2: power hungriness, yes, is just denying, like do we not 337 00:19:11,760 --> 00:19:15,520 Speaker 2: learn anything from thousands of years of literature and history? 338 00:19:15,960 --> 00:19:18,080 Speaker 1: They want to own more, and I think that like 339 00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:20,280 Speaker 1: Elon Musk, is want to choose as well. Because as 340 00:19:20,280 --> 00:19:23,920 Speaker 1: we speak, we just on the day after the Robotaxi event. 341 00:19:24,280 --> 00:19:27,159 Speaker 1: What I thought it was illegal to make stuff up 342 00:19:27,160 --> 00:19:29,120 Speaker 1: when you're a public company, but I guess Elon Musk 343 00:19:29,160 --> 00:19:32,159 Speaker 1: has special rules. But that actually kind of brings me 344 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:35,159 Speaker 1: to a point. What do you do with people like 345 00:19:35,320 --> 00:19:39,320 Speaker 1: Musk who they're evil and they're very clearly corrupt in 346 00:19:39,359 --> 00:19:41,199 Speaker 1: some way, but they're not really breaking a law. How 347 00:19:41,240 --> 00:19:43,520 Speaker 1: do you moderate the power of someone like Elon Musk? 348 00:19:43,840 --> 00:19:46,240 Speaker 1: Outside of anti trust? Anti trust has done nothing like 349 00:19:46,359 --> 00:19:48,879 Speaker 1: SEC could barely touch him. What how do we start 350 00:19:49,160 --> 00:19:51,160 Speaker 1: bringing these people back down to earth? 351 00:19:52,880 --> 00:19:56,640 Speaker 2: Wow? Well, anti trust is part of it, campaign finance 352 00:19:56,720 --> 00:20:04,040 Speaker 2: is part of it. U and there are maybe I'm 353 00:20:04,280 --> 00:20:07,879 Speaker 2: answering to glibly, but there there isn't a single answer 354 00:20:08,080 --> 00:20:08,800 Speaker 2: I do There isn't. 355 00:20:08,920 --> 00:20:11,080 Speaker 1: Yeah, I know that there isn't one. If there was, 356 00:20:11,680 --> 00:20:14,159 Speaker 1: I assume someone would have done it. I mean there is, 357 00:20:14,160 --> 00:20:15,000 Speaker 1: but that's not legal. 358 00:20:15,480 --> 00:20:20,280 Speaker 2: And and then there are industry specific abuses and challenges 359 00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:24,080 Speaker 2: that it's not. You know, just just because you and 360 00:20:24,119 --> 00:20:27,520 Speaker 2: I are interested in anti monopoly law or you know 361 00:20:27,560 --> 00:20:30,880 Speaker 2: what the FTC could do tomorrow doesn't mean that there 362 00:20:30,920 --> 00:20:36,240 Speaker 2: aren't real challenges with specific industries that are unique, unique 363 00:20:36,840 --> 00:20:43,840 Speaker 2: foreign policy challenges with starlink right right, unique policy levers 364 00:20:43,920 --> 00:20:47,600 Speaker 2: too that could be used with some areas of maybe you. 365 00:20:47,560 --> 00:20:51,320 Speaker 1: Shouldn't have national security clearance. That's a good start, right, 366 00:20:51,680 --> 00:20:53,760 Speaker 1: But it's I think it comes back to that thing 367 00:20:53,800 --> 00:20:56,560 Speaker 1: he was saying, though. It's the It almost as feels 368 00:20:56,560 --> 00:20:59,720 Speaker 1: as if the media kind of definitely the government doesn't 369 00:20:59,720 --> 00:21:02,720 Speaker 1: look these things and say, oh, they're accumulating power. They're like, oh, 370 00:21:02,760 --> 00:21:06,040 Speaker 1: they're just accumulating markets, and you know that's okay, it's 371 00:21:06,080 --> 00:21:09,000 Speaker 1: still bad, but like they're fine with it. And it 372 00:21:09,000 --> 00:21:12,879 Speaker 1: feels like we actually really have to stop getting like 373 00:21:12,960 --> 00:21:15,840 Speaker 1: there must be new legislation to stop that, or maybe 374 00:21:15,880 --> 00:21:18,440 Speaker 1: just it's as simple as what if we stopped companies 375 00:21:18,480 --> 00:21:21,840 Speaker 1: getting so big? Yeah, what if we just started pinning 376 00:21:21,880 --> 00:21:26,480 Speaker 1: them down a bit and disincentivizing that specifically. 377 00:21:26,440 --> 00:21:31,879 Speaker 2: Well, there there is clearly a problem of gross power, yes, right, 378 00:21:32,640 --> 00:21:35,680 Speaker 2: And there have been various efforts in the past to say, well, 379 00:21:35,680 --> 00:21:39,680 Speaker 2: we should just limit gross power, not simply I think 380 00:21:39,680 --> 00:21:43,600 Speaker 2: this is what you're getting at, abuse of such gross power, right. 381 00:21:43,760 --> 00:21:43,960 Speaker 1: Yeah. 382 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:49,200 Speaker 2: And the senator who has a famous Senate office building 383 00:21:50,920 --> 00:21:54,720 Speaker 2: is a heart named after him, was actually an advocate 384 00:21:54,720 --> 00:21:57,359 Speaker 2: of this in the seventies, you know, really concerned about 385 00:21:58,000 --> 00:22:02,080 Speaker 2: mere accumulation of power. I don't want to poo poo that, 386 00:22:02,160 --> 00:22:04,960 Speaker 2: but I also don't want to suggest that we've reached 387 00:22:04,960 --> 00:22:06,879 Speaker 2: the limit of what we can do with existing tools. 388 00:22:06,960 --> 00:22:10,240 Speaker 2: I mean, we still have an underfunded FTC, that's an 389 00:22:10,359 --> 00:22:14,120 Speaker 2: underfunded DOJ, and we have a whole series of other 390 00:22:14,160 --> 00:22:16,440 Speaker 2: agencies that just start using their power right now. 391 00:22:30,760 --> 00:22:33,399 Speaker 1: Actually that's a good Like the EPA and the FDA. 392 00:22:33,520 --> 00:22:36,159 Speaker 1: I'm not an expert in either, but it feels like 393 00:22:36,240 --> 00:22:39,439 Speaker 1: they are a They are potentially avenues in which we 394 00:22:39,480 --> 00:22:41,880 Speaker 1: could start going off to data. We could start making 395 00:22:41,960 --> 00:22:45,119 Speaker 1: standards of consumer data or I don't know, standards of 396 00:22:45,320 --> 00:22:49,679 Speaker 1: care for the cloud companies. But also I think that 397 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:53,560 Speaker 1: we have when you talk about the governing systems, we 398 00:22:53,640 --> 00:22:55,960 Speaker 1: have a real problem with Silicon Valley, for example, there 399 00:22:56,040 --> 00:22:59,120 Speaker 1: isn't discussed much, and it's the old boys network. It's 400 00:22:59,119 --> 00:23:01,080 Speaker 1: the fact that if you are to grow beyond a 401 00:23:01,119 --> 00:23:05,639 Speaker 1: certain scale, it must come from Sequoia, Coetu, Andreas and 402 00:23:05,800 --> 00:23:08,399 Speaker 1: Tiger and past a certain point right. 403 00:23:08,480 --> 00:23:11,200 Speaker 2: Right, that's the club and we all and everybody knows. 404 00:23:11,119 --> 00:23:14,840 Speaker 1: That is that. And they fund based on accumulation of power. 405 00:23:16,040 --> 00:23:18,639 Speaker 1: Character dot Ai was funded by Andres and Horowitz. That 406 00:23:18,760 --> 00:23:21,760 Speaker 1: company doesn't make much money at all. And on top 407 00:23:21,800 --> 00:23:24,080 Speaker 1: of that, they got reacquired by Google. They were made 408 00:23:24,160 --> 00:23:26,800 Speaker 1: to be acquired. They weren't made to be real companies. 409 00:23:27,440 --> 00:23:29,960 Speaker 1: And it almost feels as if we need to reevaluate 410 00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:33,760 Speaker 1: how finance happens at the private stage as well, because. 411 00:23:34,160 --> 00:23:35,600 Speaker 2: I would love to know more about that, because I 412 00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:38,400 Speaker 2: only have an impressionistic sense of that being true. 413 00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:41,320 Speaker 1: But when you say that, well, what it is is 414 00:23:41,400 --> 00:23:43,719 Speaker 1: so character dot ail chip. So it's founded by guyed 415 00:23:43,880 --> 00:23:45,560 Speaker 1: known Shazi. I'm going to mess up his name someone 416 00:23:45,560 --> 00:23:48,560 Speaker 1: on email me. He was one of the original people 417 00:23:48,560 --> 00:23:51,359 Speaker 1: who wrote the Transformer paper that underpins most generative AI. 418 00:23:51,760 --> 00:23:53,879 Speaker 1: He made this company, which was a chatbot company. You 419 00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:56,800 Speaker 1: could talk to anime characters or I think Hitler. It's 420 00:23:56,880 --> 00:24:00,359 Speaker 1: not a great company at all. It's a pretty bad one. Actually, 421 00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:03,680 Speaker 1: they got absorbed into Google. The company still exists, but 422 00:24:03,760 --> 00:24:05,520 Speaker 1: all of the people work at Google now for two 423 00:24:05,520 --> 00:24:08,080 Speaker 1: and a half billion dollars. And the problem is that 424 00:24:08,880 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 1: I think there are litanyar problems with it. It's that 425 00:24:11,400 --> 00:24:14,920 Speaker 1: the limited partners who fund vcs don't really give a 426 00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:17,000 Speaker 1: shit if they're good or not. They give a shit 427 00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:20,560 Speaker 1: if there's a return, if they can get that. And 428 00:24:21,440 --> 00:24:24,040 Speaker 1: as a result, the way that venture capital is allocated 429 00:24:24,160 --> 00:24:27,919 Speaker 1: is predominantly not it's the biggest lion Silicon Valley by far. 430 00:24:28,400 --> 00:24:31,920 Speaker 1: Is that startups get the majority of money. No, the 431 00:24:32,040 --> 00:24:37,120 Speaker 1: majority of money in startups goes late stage. The minority 432 00:24:37,280 --> 00:24:40,320 Speaker 1: goes to early stage, which is insane based on what 433 00:24:40,520 --> 00:24:43,560 Speaker 1: most people assume. And it feels that I don't know 434 00:24:43,640 --> 00:24:45,720 Speaker 1: how you start fixing this. But if you think about 435 00:24:46,080 --> 00:24:48,720 Speaker 1: from how you're describing corruption, it really is these governing 436 00:24:48,800 --> 00:24:52,400 Speaker 1: systems that are allowed to exist. And I think it's real. 437 00:24:52,520 --> 00:24:55,000 Speaker 2: It's really interesting. And so when you're talking about the 438 00:24:55,040 --> 00:25:00,280 Speaker 2: motivation of this club, you think it's about power, right, 439 00:25:00,400 --> 00:25:03,359 Speaker 2: and what kind of power? So just give an example 440 00:25:03,400 --> 00:25:05,240 Speaker 2: of a kind of power that you might seek that 441 00:25:05,359 --> 00:25:07,040 Speaker 2: doesn't actually lead to great returns. 442 00:25:08,040 --> 00:25:11,520 Speaker 1: I mean pretty much every investment in open ai. Open 443 00:25:11,560 --> 00:25:14,000 Speaker 1: ai is a company that bleeds more than five billion 444 00:25:14,040 --> 00:25:16,400 Speaker 1: dollars a year, will in twenty twenty four, They'll bleed 445 00:25:16,480 --> 00:25:19,639 Speaker 1: more next year. Investing in them for a theoretical return 446 00:25:20,040 --> 00:25:21,560 Speaker 1: is what I think most of them are doing. But 447 00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:23,639 Speaker 1: I think a lot of them are doing this so 448 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:26,960 Speaker 1: that they have a piece, They have something stuck into 449 00:25:27,040 --> 00:25:29,240 Speaker 1: what they believe a power center is. It's to show 450 00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:31,160 Speaker 1: off to everyone that they've still got it, that they're 451 00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:33,680 Speaker 1: able to get into big deals as a means of 452 00:25:34,119 --> 00:25:36,120 Speaker 1: getting into other big deals. Oh, we were good enough 453 00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:38,080 Speaker 1: to get a quarter billion dollars into open Ai. Now 454 00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:40,040 Speaker 1: we can get into other deals. We're still seen as 455 00:25:40,080 --> 00:25:42,680 Speaker 1: the hot thing. Perhaps that is actually a return of 456 00:25:42,800 --> 00:25:45,440 Speaker 1: sorts in that it's a marketing effort. But I I 457 00:25:45,520 --> 00:25:47,640 Speaker 1: refuse to believe all of that money is just there 458 00:25:47,760 --> 00:25:49,560 Speaker 1: just for returns. I think a lot of it might 459 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:50,679 Speaker 1: be there, And. 460 00:25:50,800 --> 00:25:54,080 Speaker 2: To be fair, I mean power eventually leads to returns. Yes, right, 461 00:25:55,200 --> 00:25:57,160 Speaker 2: it's not necessarily the short term return. 462 00:25:57,440 --> 00:25:59,320 Speaker 1: But it's also gets back to what we're talking about 463 00:25:59,320 --> 00:26:03,479 Speaker 1: about logical thinking. Right, Because these people like the other thing, 464 00:26:03,560 --> 00:26:05,520 Speaker 1: and I get in lots of arguments about this open 465 00:26:05,560 --> 00:26:08,720 Speaker 1: AI episode went out this week and people have really 466 00:26:08,800 --> 00:26:10,960 Speaker 1: pissed at meks they say, well, they'll work it out. 467 00:26:11,720 --> 00:26:12,560 Speaker 1: I want to find all. 468 00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:15,240 Speaker 2: Those great examples of you know, the armies that marched 469 00:26:15,359 --> 00:26:17,760 Speaker 2: in the wrong direction for two weeks sleep. 470 00:26:18,359 --> 00:26:20,040 Speaker 1: I just think of the Schleifen plan. It was the 471 00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:22,119 Speaker 1: smartest thing at the time in World War One, but 472 00:26:22,200 --> 00:26:24,119 Speaker 1: it went the wrong way and it curlled to inward 473 00:26:24,200 --> 00:26:26,760 Speaker 1: and then they lost, probably for the better. I think 474 00:26:26,920 --> 00:26:28,719 Speaker 1: I think we can all agree the causes shouldn't have one, 475 00:26:29,040 --> 00:26:31,200 Speaker 1: but nevertheless, but that those. 476 00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:34,960 Speaker 2: In power actually I mean, there's a very deep point here, 477 00:26:35,680 --> 00:26:38,199 Speaker 2: which is not only that a lot of people are 478 00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:41,520 Speaker 2: just people are will make some good decisions because they're human, 479 00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:45,919 Speaker 2: but that there are particular pathologies that actually come along 480 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:48,800 Speaker 2: with the accumulation of power. And speaking of psych research, 481 00:26:49,720 --> 00:26:55,480 Speaker 2: there's some I think they're Berkeley, California researchers who argue 482 00:26:55,680 --> 00:26:58,879 Speaker 2: that accumulation of power is as bad as getting a 483 00:26:58,960 --> 00:27:01,280 Speaker 2: poll stuck through your head in terms of the impact 484 00:27:01,520 --> 00:27:04,240 Speaker 2: it has on your on your ability to process certain 485 00:27:04,280 --> 00:27:05,000 Speaker 2: kinds of information. 486 00:27:05,240 --> 00:27:09,119 Speaker 1: I like that because it is funny watching people get 487 00:27:09,200 --> 00:27:11,520 Speaker 1: super rich and look at Elon Musk. I'm not saying 488 00:27:11,560 --> 00:27:12,240 Speaker 1: he was a great. 489 00:27:12,040 --> 00:27:15,280 Speaker 2: Guy before, but it's but there's a theory that pathological 490 00:27:15,359 --> 00:27:18,200 Speaker 2: people gain power, and there may be some truth to that, 491 00:27:18,359 --> 00:27:22,359 Speaker 2: but I think it's really important to recognize what accumulation 492 00:27:22,400 --> 00:27:25,160 Speaker 2: of power actually does to somebody. It makes them less 493 00:27:25,280 --> 00:27:28,960 Speaker 2: likely to be able to accurately guess the emotions of 494 00:27:29,000 --> 00:27:32,760 Speaker 2: those who are speaking with them, okay, right right, which 495 00:27:33,080 --> 00:27:37,280 Speaker 2: you can imagine and I'm probably seeing. It makes them 496 00:27:37,359 --> 00:27:41,160 Speaker 2: less likely to observe personal boundaries, more likely to eat 497 00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:44,920 Speaker 2: like cooking monster with the crumbs falling all over their chest. Right, 498 00:27:45,280 --> 00:27:48,440 Speaker 2: So you actually are starting to miss out on a 499 00:27:48,560 --> 00:27:51,440 Speaker 2: lot of subtle cues that are the gather part of 500 00:27:51,480 --> 00:27:55,159 Speaker 2: the gathering of information. And I don't know what impact 501 00:27:55,240 --> 00:27:57,680 Speaker 2: it has on other other cognitive functions. 502 00:27:57,880 --> 00:28:01,120 Speaker 1: I mean, I'm somewhat extract here, but if you look 503 00:28:01,119 --> 00:28:03,320 Speaker 1: at Silicon Valley, which is now dominated by a few 504 00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:06,879 Speaker 1: vcs and Sekoya used to be pretty good. They invested 505 00:28:06,920 --> 00:28:10,600 Speaker 1: in FTX, they invested in open ai. They actually didn't 506 00:28:10,600 --> 00:28:13,639 Speaker 1: go in the latest open ai thing. But Mark Andresen's 507 00:28:13,640 --> 00:28:16,040 Speaker 1: a great example. So from what I've heard Mark andresen 508 00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:19,280 Speaker 1: In like the eighties was a decent enough guy. He 509 00:28:19,400 --> 00:28:22,360 Speaker 1: was like a regular fella. Now as of two years ago, 510 00:28:22,440 --> 00:28:26,399 Speaker 1: he reads comprehensive biographies of Hitler and Funds and claims 511 00:28:26,440 --> 00:28:29,040 Speaker 1: that people like Nick Land are the patron saints of 512 00:28:29,080 --> 00:28:32,560 Speaker 1: techno optimism. It's almost as if the more power he gets, 513 00:28:32,680 --> 00:28:34,240 Speaker 1: the more brain damage he receives. 514 00:28:34,359 --> 00:28:34,439 Speaker 2: Ye. 515 00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:37,119 Speaker 1: And it's but when you think of this in the 516 00:28:37,320 --> 00:28:39,520 Speaker 1: realms of Silicon Valley and how harmful this is. If 517 00:28:39,600 --> 00:28:42,240 Speaker 1: most of the big checks come from a certain few 518 00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:44,920 Speaker 1: who have accumulated so much power, and most of those 519 00:28:44,960 --> 00:28:47,800 Speaker 1: big checks are going to late stage companies, it's going 520 00:28:47,840 --> 00:28:50,680 Speaker 1: to reinforce the same thing. We are not going to 521 00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:53,960 Speaker 1: innovate much further because the money is going to the 522 00:28:54,040 --> 00:28:56,000 Speaker 1: same guys, from the same guys in the same way 523 00:28:56,040 --> 00:28:58,280 Speaker 1: and the same Sam Altman is a great example. This 524 00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:01,800 Speaker 1: man has been fired for three companies, including Open Ai. 525 00:29:02,280 --> 00:29:04,560 Speaker 1: He has done like some of the stuff about his 526 00:29:04,600 --> 00:29:07,040 Speaker 1: sister is truly grizzly as well. But on top of that, 527 00:29:07,400 --> 00:29:10,120 Speaker 1: he's a liar. He lies regularly, and he's also not technical. 528 00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:12,400 Speaker 1: He doesn't know what he's talking about. But I think 529 00:29:12,520 --> 00:29:14,240 Speaker 1: as he And this is actually kind of funny to 530 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:16,240 Speaker 1: think about. As you watch Samon went over the years, 531 00:29:16,320 --> 00:29:18,920 Speaker 1: he gets even dumber. The thing I hate using that 532 00:29:18,960 --> 00:29:21,120 Speaker 1: phrase in general, but it's Samon. I don't care. He's 533 00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:24,240 Speaker 1: worth billions, but with him, he sounds sillier. The more 534 00:29:24,320 --> 00:29:27,960 Speaker 1: stuff he says, the more out of whack it gets reality, 535 00:29:28,320 --> 00:29:29,680 Speaker 1: and the more just ridicaent. 536 00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:33,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, right, and so the you know, there's people are 537 00:29:33,360 --> 00:29:35,560 Speaker 2: going to be ridiculous in the world, and our job 538 00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:37,960 Speaker 2: as a society is to make sure that they don't 539 00:29:38,080 --> 00:29:41,640 Speaker 2: accumulate governing power. Right, that's our job, yes, right, because 540 00:29:41,680 --> 00:29:43,560 Speaker 2: the people who are going to be genuinely and who 541 00:29:43,640 --> 00:29:49,239 Speaker 2: are being genuinely hurt are those who I just use 542 00:29:49,280 --> 00:29:52,440 Speaker 2: the example from this week in New York, a great 543 00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:59,600 Speaker 2: Bloomberg story investigating how Uber and left drivers are now 544 00:30:00,480 --> 00:30:03,760 Speaker 2: locked out. Yes, of Uber and Lyft just locked out. 545 00:30:03,760 --> 00:30:05,680 Speaker 2: You're going to work, You're an hour into your shift, 546 00:30:05,720 --> 00:30:07,000 Speaker 2: you go to the bathroom. 547 00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:08,760 Speaker 1: Locked Yeah, you looked out. So you don't become a 548 00:30:08,840 --> 00:30:11,720 Speaker 1: full time is it the classification full time employment? 549 00:30:12,280 --> 00:30:14,000 Speaker 2: No, they just can't access the app. 550 00:30:14,320 --> 00:30:15,800 Speaker 1: Why is Uber looking amount then. 551 00:30:16,360 --> 00:30:19,000 Speaker 2: Because they're trying to do a run around around a 552 00:30:19,480 --> 00:30:24,160 Speaker 2: New York City law that says if cabs are empty 553 00:30:24,320 --> 00:30:26,800 Speaker 2: over a certain number of hours, then they have to 554 00:30:26,920 --> 00:30:27,640 Speaker 2: increase their. 555 00:30:27,520 --> 00:30:30,440 Speaker 1: Per mile rate. Huh does that make sense? 556 00:30:30,640 --> 00:30:33,520 Speaker 2: Yes? And so they're saying, well, when they're locked out, 557 00:30:33,600 --> 00:30:34,760 Speaker 2: they're not an empty cab. 558 00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:37,320 Speaker 1: They're not a cab at all, right, they're no longer. 559 00:30:37,640 --> 00:30:38,320 Speaker 1: They're no longer? 560 00:30:38,720 --> 00:30:38,880 Speaker 2: Is it? 561 00:30:39,480 --> 00:30:42,080 Speaker 1: This is a dumb question, and we can wrap off 562 00:30:42,160 --> 00:30:45,960 Speaker 1: after this one. But why does no one ever think 563 00:30:46,040 --> 00:30:49,080 Speaker 1: of these It feels like they make these very interesting 564 00:30:49,120 --> 00:30:52,480 Speaker 1: and useful laws and then they're like, ah, they won't 565 00:30:52,520 --> 00:30:55,640 Speaker 1: work it out, but they always do. What is it 566 00:30:55,880 --> 00:30:58,720 Speaker 1: just a limit of what Look, maybe you can speak 567 00:30:58,760 --> 00:31:00,640 Speaker 1: to this. Is it just the limit of what you 568 00:31:00,720 --> 00:31:03,600 Speaker 1: can get past? Or is it just you can't think 569 00:31:03,600 --> 00:31:05,680 Speaker 1: of everything? Or is it just hard to get that 570 00:31:06,120 --> 00:31:10,840 Speaker 1: down in paper when you're facing off against multimillion dollar lord. 571 00:31:11,160 --> 00:31:15,120 Speaker 2: Look, I think they're breaking the law, but that doesn't 572 00:31:15,120 --> 00:31:18,840 Speaker 2: mean it's a perfectly air tight law. And this is 573 00:31:18,960 --> 00:31:20,840 Speaker 2: a no. I actually think it's a big deal, So 574 00:31:20,920 --> 00:31:23,800 Speaker 2: I'll say it. I think that there is a societal 575 00:31:24,720 --> 00:31:28,800 Speaker 2: failure to date to recognize the risk to workers of 576 00:31:28,920 --> 00:31:33,479 Speaker 2: how big data can be used to individually exploit them. 577 00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:35,720 Speaker 1: Yes, absolutely, and that this is. 578 00:31:35,760 --> 00:31:39,680 Speaker 2: A major deal for labor, not just for gigwork, although 579 00:31:39,680 --> 00:31:42,440 Speaker 2: it's the clearest in gigwork, and that we should more 580 00:31:42,520 --> 00:31:45,360 Speaker 2: comprehensively think about this and get out ahead of it. Basically, 581 00:31:45,920 --> 00:31:47,960 Speaker 2: you know, if you can banfracking before it comes to 582 00:31:48,040 --> 00:31:50,480 Speaker 2: New York, it's a lot easier than after it's already there. 583 00:31:50,560 --> 00:31:53,120 Speaker 1: Yes so, and it almost will. We need to just 584 00:31:53,160 --> 00:31:56,040 Speaker 1: start by classifying this stuff. We don't know what these 585 00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:58,240 Speaker 1: companies have, we don't know how the algorithms will, we 586 00:31:58,320 --> 00:31:59,360 Speaker 1: don't know what they're doing too well. 587 00:32:00,120 --> 00:32:02,800 Speaker 2: But this is a really important point because when we 588 00:32:02,880 --> 00:32:06,120 Speaker 2: talk about power and we talk about governing power, we 589 00:32:06,240 --> 00:32:08,440 Speaker 2: are in a new era of a kind of new 590 00:32:08,520 --> 00:32:12,600 Speaker 2: governing power, right, Like the mere friction that I just 591 00:32:12,800 --> 00:32:16,080 Speaker 2: couldn't collect data on what baseball team you like, and 592 00:32:16,200 --> 00:32:19,240 Speaker 2: you know how long you sit on a that Now 593 00:32:19,320 --> 00:32:21,920 Speaker 2: that looks like some limit in what I used to 594 00:32:21,960 --> 00:32:23,320 Speaker 2: be able to know about you. But there was just 595 00:32:23,480 --> 00:32:29,800 Speaker 2: lots of informational great freeing informational gaps, right, And that 596 00:32:30,040 --> 00:32:33,880 Speaker 2: meant that even if I had certain amount of market power, 597 00:32:34,400 --> 00:32:40,280 Speaker 2: maybe non monopolistic market power, there was only there were 598 00:32:40,360 --> 00:32:44,000 Speaker 2: limits and how much I could as an employer or 599 00:32:44,160 --> 00:32:48,800 Speaker 2: somebody interacting with you exploit you. There still are limits, 600 00:32:49,280 --> 00:32:52,520 Speaker 2: but the need for anti trust, the need for non 601 00:32:52,600 --> 00:32:57,120 Speaker 2: discrimination laws, the need for stopping mergers. Yes, you know, 602 00:32:58,320 --> 00:33:01,040 Speaker 2: so much greater now than it was thirty years ago 603 00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:04,800 Speaker 2: because of big data. It's a game changer in terms 604 00:33:04,840 --> 00:33:08,880 Speaker 2: of how power can be used to exploit and then 605 00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:10,160 Speaker 2: to build more power. 606 00:33:10,920 --> 00:33:13,680 Speaker 1: So to wrap us up, I know that we have 607 00:33:13,800 --> 00:33:16,080 Speaker 1: been quite negative and this show kind of times me 608 00:33:16,160 --> 00:33:21,040 Speaker 1: like a little bit of a downer. Perhaps, can what 609 00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:22,560 Speaker 1: should give people hope right now? 610 00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:23,040 Speaker 2: Should? 611 00:33:23,480 --> 00:33:24,440 Speaker 1: Yeah? I think there's a lot. 612 00:33:25,080 --> 00:33:29,120 Speaker 2: Basically, I think that we, you know, split the hemispheres 613 00:33:29,160 --> 00:33:31,960 Speaker 2: of our brain apart in nineteen in the nineteen seventies 614 00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:37,120 Speaker 2: and decided that politics was in one arena and economics 615 00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:41,800 Speaker 2: was in another, again defying all of human history, right, 616 00:33:42,880 --> 00:33:45,240 Speaker 2: and we may not have all the solutions right now, 617 00:33:45,320 --> 00:33:47,760 Speaker 2: but the spheres of the brain have rejoined. 618 00:33:48,280 --> 00:33:50,160 Speaker 1: So you think that is like a I do think 619 00:33:50,200 --> 00:33:51,160 Speaker 1: people are an awakening. 620 00:33:51,560 --> 00:33:54,720 Speaker 2: I think there's a deep awakening and a deep I 621 00:33:54,760 --> 00:33:56,800 Speaker 2: don't know that you need an awakening on the ground, 622 00:33:57,280 --> 00:34:02,680 Speaker 2: but an elite there's been a transformation in talking about 623 00:34:02,720 --> 00:34:04,120 Speaker 2: how antitrust relates. 624 00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:08,440 Speaker 1: To politics and this consciousness of the of the problem 625 00:34:08,560 --> 00:34:09,520 Speaker 1: with this kind of power. 626 00:34:09,880 --> 00:34:13,080 Speaker 2: Yeah, so instead of just just sort of imagining it's 627 00:34:13,200 --> 00:34:16,440 Speaker 2: possible to cabin economic power and not have it bleed 628 00:34:16,560 --> 00:34:21,359 Speaker 2: into political power or vice versa, I don't think that's 629 00:34:21,440 --> 00:34:25,879 Speaker 2: credible anymore, right, And I think that the the sort 630 00:34:25,920 --> 00:34:29,880 Speaker 2: of the final blow to that way of thinking. It'll 631 00:34:29,920 --> 00:34:33,759 Speaker 2: still exist, they're still trying to come back. But was 632 00:34:34,400 --> 00:34:42,400 Speaker 2: the was COVID the supply chain disruptions and price hikes right, 633 00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:47,399 Speaker 2: because basically the promise from the seventies on was let's 634 00:34:47,480 --> 00:34:52,279 Speaker 2: just separate all economic and power thinking, right, and we promise. 635 00:34:52,000 --> 00:34:56,319 Speaker 1: You low prices we have and we have not had those. 636 00:34:56,520 --> 00:34:59,680 Speaker 2: So the the you know that the internet meme, you 637 00:34:59,800 --> 00:35:04,239 Speaker 2: had one job, they had one job, and they had 638 00:35:04,280 --> 00:35:06,319 Speaker 2: already failed in the crash of two thousand and eight, 639 00:35:06,600 --> 00:35:11,400 Speaker 2: but after COVID, that failure is complete. So I just 640 00:35:11,480 --> 00:35:14,360 Speaker 2: think there's a totally different way of thinking about power 641 00:35:14,440 --> 00:35:18,560 Speaker 2: and economics. And that's exciting what chair Con and the 642 00:35:18,760 --> 00:35:22,120 Speaker 2: FTC has been doing. I mean they don't stop every day. 643 00:35:22,440 --> 00:35:24,839 Speaker 1: Yeah, its it's real. 644 00:35:25,040 --> 00:35:29,280 Speaker 2: It's understanding that governing power held in a public entity 645 00:35:30,080 --> 00:35:33,440 Speaker 2: can be innovative and exciting and engaged and enforce the 646 00:35:33,560 --> 00:35:36,919 Speaker 2: law and curious. So that's also changing a really deep 647 00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:40,400 Speaker 2: paradigm we've had for thirty years, which is all innovation 648 00:35:40,680 --> 00:35:43,799 Speaker 2: comes from, you know, the people that Mark had recent funds, right, right? 649 00:35:44,960 --> 00:35:48,560 Speaker 2: And Look, I really want a lot more innovation in 650 00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:49,760 Speaker 2: the private sector. 651 00:35:49,920 --> 00:35:52,839 Speaker 1: Well why, I would love there to be more cool 652 00:35:52,880 --> 00:35:55,200 Speaker 1: stuff and bets the things. I would love for AI 653 00:35:55,360 --> 00:35:58,080 Speaker 1: not to be destructive and actually help people. Yeah, and 654 00:35:58,560 --> 00:36:02,040 Speaker 1: I guess like maybe some things could change to actually 655 00:36:02,120 --> 00:36:02,960 Speaker 1: make that possible. 656 00:36:03,200 --> 00:36:06,520 Speaker 2: Well we but for AI in particular, I mean a 657 00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:12,640 Speaker 2: lot of these these worldviews are sort of this epical 658 00:36:12,800 --> 00:36:18,239 Speaker 2: struggle inside the AI fight, right, It's uh, we need 659 00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:21,200 Speaker 2: to understand AI as a power problem, sure. 660 00:36:21,400 --> 00:36:25,880 Speaker 1: Right, and not just as not just as a business one. Zephyr, 661 00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:28,120 Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining me. It's such a 662 00:36:28,160 --> 00:36:28,960 Speaker 1: pleasure to have you on. 663 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:30,360 Speaker 2: Likewise, thanks for having me on. 664 00:36:30,640 --> 00:36:32,680 Speaker 1: You've been listening to Better Offline. You can find me 665 00:36:32,920 --> 00:36:35,359 Speaker 1: on the message that will play immediately after this. Thank 666 00:36:35,400 --> 00:36:45,000 Speaker 1: you so much for listening. Thank you for listening to 667 00:36:45,040 --> 00:36:48,000 Speaker 1: Better Offline. The editor and composer of the Better Offline 668 00:36:48,040 --> 00:36:50,680 Speaker 1: theme song is Matasowski. You can check out more of 669 00:36:50,760 --> 00:36:54,320 Speaker 1: his music and audio projects at Matasowski dot com, M 670 00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:58,480 Speaker 1: A T T O S O W s Ki dot com. 671 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:01,719 Speaker 1: You can email me easy at better offline dot com 672 00:37:01,960 --> 00:37:04,240 Speaker 1: or visit better Offline dot com to find more podcast 673 00:37:04,320 --> 00:37:07,640 Speaker 1: links and of course, my newsletter. I also really recommend 674 00:37:07,640 --> 00:37:09,600 Speaker 1: you go to chat dot Where's Youread dot am to 675 00:37:09,680 --> 00:37:12,480 Speaker 1: visit the discord, and go to our slash Better Offline 676 00:37:12,520 --> 00:37:15,680 Speaker 1: to check out I'll Reddit. Thank you so much for listening. 677 00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:19,239 Speaker 1: Better Offline is a production of cool Zone Media. For 678 00:37:19,360 --> 00:37:22,560 Speaker 1: more from cool Zone Media, visit our website cool Zonemedia 679 00:37:22,600 --> 00:37:25,399 Speaker 1: dot com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, 680 00:37:25,480 --> 00:37:27,880 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.