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Speaker 1: This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio.

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Speaker 1: This week on the podcast, I have a special guest.

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Speaker 1: His name is John Mussou and he is president, CEO

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Speaker 1: and head of fixed income trading at Cumberland Advisors, a

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Speaker 1: firm that runs about three and a half billion dollars

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Speaker 1: in mostly fixed income products. They do equity as well.

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Speaker 1: I know Moose for a long time. He is David

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Speaker 1: Kotok's right hand man, and I have been fishing with

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Speaker 1: Moose up in Maine at the Shadow Federal Reserve event

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Speaker 1: that takes place every summer for gee the better part

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Speaker 1: of a decade. There aren't many people who understands, uh,

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Speaker 1: the internal plumbing and the mechanicals of fixed income the

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Speaker 1: way Moose does. He really is incredibly knowledgeable and insightful.

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Speaker 1: And I think if you are anything interested in fixed

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Speaker 1: income bonds, munis and how they actually are are traded

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Speaker 1: on Wall Street, you're going to find this to be

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Speaker 1: a fascinating conversation. So, with no further ado, my Master's

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Speaker 1: in Business interview with John Mussau. This is Masters in

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Speaker 1: Business with Barry Ridholtz on Boomberg Radio. My special guest

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Speaker 1: this week is John Mussau. He is the CEO and

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Speaker 1: Director of Fixed Income at Cumbling Advisors, a bond shop

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Speaker 1: that manages over three point five billion dollars in assets.

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Speaker 1: He is a chartered financial analyst and has his Masters

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Speaker 1: in Economics from Brown John Mussou, Welcome to a shelter

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Speaker 1: in place version of Masters in Business. I know John

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Speaker 1: for a long time. We fish up in Maine every

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Speaker 1: year in camp Co talk. We'll come back to that

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Speaker 1: a little later. Let's talk a little bit about out

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Speaker 1: your career. Tell us about your first job on Wall Street. Hi, Arry,

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Speaker 1: Thanks Uh. I walked in off the streets in New

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Speaker 1: York in the followed nineteen eighty and answered an ad

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Speaker 1: from the New York Times for the Value Line Investment Survey.

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Speaker 1: They gave me a quiz and hired me as an

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Speaker 1: assistant securities analyst. I remember getting the Value line um

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Speaker 1: papers that you would put into a giant three ring

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Speaker 1: binder on updates on different companies and different sectors. That

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Speaker 1: that was a couple of years ago. You know, it

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Speaker 1: ran that way for a long time before they got

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Speaker 1: to the Internet age. And what you did as a

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Speaker 1: securities analyst there is you really wrote script to fit

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Speaker 1: the model, uh for the stocks. They had a relative

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Speaker 1: value model that ranks stocks. But like I said, it

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Speaker 1: was a great place to learn. Still have a lot

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Speaker 1: of friends from there. Met Jeff Finnick there who was

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Speaker 1: my desk mate early on. And you know, the fact

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Speaker 1: of the product still out there today, says a lot.

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Speaker 1: And and Vinnick ended up at a little shop call

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Speaker 1: Fidelity of Memory. So yes, the little shop call Fidelity.

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Speaker 1: And I can remember him saying to me we were

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Speaker 1: there out over a couple of beers. He goes, moos,

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Speaker 1: if I ever had it really big, I'm going to

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Speaker 1: buy a hockey team. And sure enough you did, and

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Speaker 1: for sure, so so what did you go from value on?

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Speaker 1: What was your next stop? From there? I spent the

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Speaker 1: next twelve years at combined firms of E. F. Hutton

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Speaker 1: and then Shearson after they took over Hutton, and did

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Speaker 1: most of my work there in the beginning years for

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Speaker 1: the government bond Department in the municipal d bond bond Department,

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Speaker 1: and eventually ended up doing portfolio analysis at Hutton and

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Speaker 1: ended up basically running a portfolio analysis group right to

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Speaker 1: where we analyze municipal bond portfolios and suggested changes, and

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Speaker 1: in I went to Lord Abbott and became the director

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Speaker 1: of Municipal bond Management. Was a great spot. Learned a

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Speaker 1: lot from Bob Dow who ran the firm and ran

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Speaker 1: the fixed income area there, and I was there until

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Speaker 1: the year two thousand, and that's the year I joined

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Speaker 1: Cumberland Advisors. So you end up at come when advisors

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Speaker 1: in the year two thousand, why did you gravitate more

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Speaker 1: towards fixed income over equities? I really always enjoyed fixed

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Speaker 1: income because of the way tied together UH math and

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Speaker 1: the idea that all bond prices more or less moved

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Speaker 1: in the same direction, but none of them moved in

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Speaker 1: the same velocity UH and depending on maturities, etcetera. So

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Speaker 1: it always had a lot more appeal to me. And

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Speaker 1: it's it's funny because when I started a value line

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Speaker 1: and you're actually analyzing earnings of companies, UH, I was

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Speaker 1: excellent at predicting earnings and still couldn't figure out why

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Speaker 1: I stopped might hit the earnings, but go down or

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Speaker 1: go up, and bonds always tied together much more rationally

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Speaker 1: for me. So that leads to a question I've heard

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Speaker 1: over the years bonds called the smart money. Why is

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Speaker 1: that is it? Is it that rationality that leads people

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Speaker 1: to thinking bonds are are a little less uh random

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Speaker 1: or emotional than stocks are. I think the idea is,

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Speaker 1: particularly with innoscible bonds. You know, it's not my line,

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Speaker 1: but I thought it was a great line. They don't

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Speaker 1: make you rich, but they keep you rich. And the

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Speaker 1: idea of bond investing over time and the compounding of interest, uh,

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Speaker 1: it's it's terrific. And you know, you go back and

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Speaker 1: look back to the early nineteen eighties when interest rates

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Speaker 1: are high. If you had bought something like zero coupon

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Speaker 1: strips at four percent interests or thirty years, it would

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Speaker 1: have been very hard to replicate that anywhere else. When

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Speaker 1: I think of bonds, I think of three factors that

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Speaker 1: go into the specific value of a bond. It's the

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Speaker 1: credit quality, the coupon or yield, and the duration. Is

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Speaker 1: it that simple or our bonds just a mathematical formula. No,

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Speaker 1: There's a lot more that goes into it. It's not

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Speaker 1: just credit quality. It's relative credit quality. It's not just

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Speaker 1: duration as a relative duration to the market, And it's

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Speaker 1: the structure of bonds to call protection or lack of

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Speaker 1: call protection, a convexity comes in. I mean, that's that's

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Speaker 1: really a lot of those judgments are what you would

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Speaker 1: call total return bond management. And that's where David Kotok

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Speaker 1: is still the chairman of Cumberland and I agreed early

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Speaker 1: on it was you know, we we we saw the

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Speaker 1: world the same in the world of bonds. Explain convexity

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Speaker 1: of bonds positions. To me, sure convexity is is really

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Speaker 1: the They call it the second derivative. So if you

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Speaker 1: look at a bond and you can judge it's duration

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Speaker 1: or basically how much the price changes for a given

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Speaker 1: change in yield, the convexity will tell you how fast

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Speaker 1: that duration is changing. It's like the it's like the

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Speaker 1: equivalent of acceleration to speed. Quite interesting and and for

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Speaker 1: most of my career I've heard bonds describe as the

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Speaker 1: adult supervision in the room. Um, the bond vigilantes. We're

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Speaker 1: gonna keep the Congress in check and make sure they

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Speaker 1: didn't deficit spend too much. They were going to keep

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Speaker 1: their eyes on inflation and fight that. Whatever happened to

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Speaker 1: the so called bond vigilantes. Boy, that was a while ago,

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Speaker 1: and and you know, if you go back, one of

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Speaker 1: Bill Clinton's favorite lines was, and I'm taking out the

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Speaker 1: swear words, but you know, do you mean I I

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Speaker 1: really have to bow down to all the bond traders.

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Speaker 1: And the answer back then from Alan Greenspan is yes,

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Speaker 1: you do. And they figured out a way back then

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Speaker 1: to actually lower the government deficit and actually get it

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Speaker 1: to a surplus. And along the way, interest rates came down,

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Speaker 1: which was really not a surprise. Now you've gone the

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Speaker 1: other way and the deferences really haven't mattered, and you're

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Speaker 1: at all time losing yields. So to answer your question,

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Speaker 1: a lot of that has been thrown at the door

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Speaker 1: his his political advisor, James Carville, I believe, is the

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Speaker 1: one who said when he comes back, he wants to

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Speaker 1: be reincarnated as the bond market because everybody is terrified

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Speaker 1: of it. Right, maybe not this bond market, but yes,

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Speaker 1: so Moose, let's talk a little bit about how the

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Speaker 1: bond market has changed over the past thirty years. What

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Speaker 1: are some of the big differences between and I think

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Speaker 1: there's some differences and there's some similarities. Barry. I think

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Speaker 1: the biggest difference, of course, is electronic trading much more

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Speaker 1: prevalent on the taxable side. On the municipal side, you

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Speaker 1: actually still need to talk to dealers and underwriters, and

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Speaker 1: that's because of the diffuse nature of the municipal bond market.

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Speaker 1: The municipal bond market is still much more of a

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Speaker 1: people business. You have to kind of know where the

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Speaker 1: bonds are, where the levels are, who's offering what bonds.

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Speaker 1: On the corporate side, it is much more electronic oriented,

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Speaker 1: block trading oriented, uh and and that's been that's been

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Speaker 1: the biggest change. So a lot less people, clearly, a

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Speaker 1: lot less firms, and bigger volume electronically. So so let's

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Speaker 1: talk about what I think is the most fascinating difference

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Speaker 1: between stocks and bonds. You know the Wilshire five thousand.

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Speaker 1: The joke is it's now about three thousand stocks, and

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Speaker 1: in some of the over the counter and really small

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Speaker 1: caps maybe have four thousand stocks. When we look at

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Speaker 1: the worlds of bonds, there's hundreds of thousands of individual bonds.

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Speaker 1: It's almost as if putting together a bond portfolio is bespoke.

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Speaker 1: How infrequently do these bonds trade and how unique are

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Speaker 1: each of these issues that are out there? Again, it

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Speaker 1: differs when you're in the world of corporates and mortgages

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Speaker 1: and treasuries. It's it's a fairly defined universe of bonds,

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Speaker 1: and putting portfolios together is probably a little easier than

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Speaker 1: on the tax free side, where you have probably have

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Speaker 1: a million different QUE SIPs out there. And that's because

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Speaker 1: of the nature of many bond issues that come to market,

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Speaker 1: where they have serial bonds and term bonds, and so

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Speaker 1: that just the amount of issues is almost overwhelming. So

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Speaker 1: in the tax free side, only a fraction of the

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Speaker 1: available bonds that are out there actually trade every day.

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Speaker 1: And explain what Q SIPs are for the audience who

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Speaker 1: may not be on a bond desk. It's it's a

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Speaker 1: uniform identification system. So each bond has its own unique identifier,

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Speaker 1: which is crucial to identifying the bond itself as well

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Speaker 1: as processing the trade later on. And and let's talk

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Speaker 1: a little bit about processing those trades. You know, early

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Speaker 1: in my career and certainly early in your career, every

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Speaker 1: brokerage firm had its own bond trading desk, every bank,

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Speaker 1: every insured trading was done constantly all over the place. Today,

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Speaker 1: it seems, uh and and I rely on my friend

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Speaker 1: David Nadig, who's been pushing this argument for a long time.

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Speaker 1: Not it says all that has been replaced with black

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Speaker 1: Rock and Vanguard as as the new street bond desks.

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Speaker 1: Is he exaggerating or how true is that? They're They

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Speaker 1: are certainly behemous out there. But look, you know you

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Speaker 1: can you can look at that and say does that

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Speaker 1: with your advantage or not? As as a smaller investment

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Speaker 1: advisor relative to those those guys, Uh, black Rock's not

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Speaker 1: going to care about a twenty five million dollar water

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Speaker 1: bond from Eastern Ohio some school district. We care about

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Speaker 1: million dollar water bond from eastern Ohio because it's meaningful

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Speaker 1: to us. So to the extent that they've gotten too

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Speaker 1: big and a lot of issues aren't relevant to them,

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Speaker 1: we can take advantage of that. So I would disagree

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Speaker 1: with Dave a little bit and combling, are you guys

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Speaker 1: putting together bespoke bond portfolios? Are you buying bond mutual

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Speaker 1: funds or bondingtfs? How do you deliver a fixed income

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Speaker 1: mixed to clients? Um? Now, we we will use individual

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Speaker 1: bonds as we put portfolios together, and our own our

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Speaker 1: thoughts have always been that the final product looks much

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Speaker 1: better when you have individual bond ones as opposed to

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Speaker 1: owning mutual funds, and part of that reason is the

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Speaker 1: ability to input certain yield levels and duration levels into portfolios.

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Speaker 1: You know. The other part two is just talking about

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Speaker 1: mutual funds in general. The difference between owning a portfolio

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Speaker 1: of individual bonds and owning a mutual fund of bonds

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Speaker 1: is the fact that if you want a mutual funding,

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Speaker 1: your subservient to one price and one price only, and

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Speaker 1: that's the price of that fund at the end of

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Speaker 1: the day, or if it's an et F, the price

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Speaker 1: of that et F at the end of the day.

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Speaker 1: If you own individual bonds, they can be spread out.

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Speaker 1: You can have some longer term bonds and some shorter

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Speaker 1: term bonds. So if there's a need for cash, uh,

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Speaker 1: and maybe it's not a particularly good bond market, you

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Speaker 1: can find assets in the portfolio that have not been

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Speaker 1: hurt price wise and use them to your advantage. So

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Speaker 1: I think individual bonds offers a much greater degree of flexibility.

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Speaker 1: We've had some clients say to us, I don't want

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Speaker 1: to own a bond mutual funds because I'm concerned if

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Speaker 1: during a bond sell off, I'm subject to the whims

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Speaker 1: of what my fellow mutual fund investors are doing, and

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Speaker 1: that could drive the price below either fair value or

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Speaker 1: net asset value. How realistic of a threat is that

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Speaker 1: to people who are bond mutual fund investors as opposed

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Speaker 1: to buying individual bonds themselves. I think it's a very

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Speaker 1: good point because you don't have control over that. And

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Speaker 1: the route we just went through is a perfect example

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Speaker 1: of that. You walked in the dor March ninth, and

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Speaker 1: treasury prices were skyrocketing because of the Saudis selling of oil. Uh.

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Speaker 1: That meant that a lot of the corporate and municipal

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Speaker 1: bond dealers couldn't hedge anything anymore with the prices and

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Speaker 1: treasures doing what they are doing. So what do they do?

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Speaker 1: They backed off their prices. So then the evaluation services

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Speaker 1: don't have many prices to put on that night, so

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Speaker 1: they take prices down. So the poor guy who's only

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Speaker 1: holdings is x y Z bond fund looks at his

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Speaker 1: NAV the next day is in that ascid value and

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Speaker 1: it's gone down. He says, maybe I should sell some,

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Speaker 1: so he sells something. The next day, the mutual funds

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Speaker 1: have to meet these redemptions by selling bonds into a

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Speaker 1: market that's already of routing. So prices get on further.

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Speaker 1: The next day, the same investor looks at my NAV

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Speaker 1: went down further. I bet ourselves some more. So now

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Speaker 1: you've gotten yourself into a negative feedback loop of selling

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Speaker 1: of mutual funds. And we saw that on an absolutely

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Speaker 1: gargantuant level in the middle of March and HAWD they

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Speaker 1: just wrote it out for a couple of weeks. The

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Speaker 1: worst of it would have passed and we would have

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Speaker 1: seen some sort of recovery in the in the mutual

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Speaker 1: fund and fund market. Is that a fair statement? That

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Speaker 1: is a more than fair statement. And it was not

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Speaker 1: only a rebound, it was a rebound of historic proportions,

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Speaker 1: so the back off was also historic. He went essentially

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Speaker 1: from two percent at to four percent and about seven

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Speaker 1: business days six business days, and then you rebounded three

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Speaker 1: quarters of that in about three business days. I've been

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Speaker 1: managing money for thirty six years. I've never seen anything

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Speaker 1: like it. So we have a mutual friend from Fidelity,

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Speaker 1: Eric Golden, who runs a quantitatively driven fixed income portfolio.

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Speaker 1: He said he saw prices do things that the models

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Speaker 1: say just can't happen. Your your experience sounds like it

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Speaker 1: was very similar, very similar. And and I can tell

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Speaker 1: you just from I mean, having put trades on. We

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Speaker 1: saw bond prices down over twenty points and certainly some

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Speaker 1: discounted bonds from lower coupons. So think about a bond

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Speaker 1: that came in December at a hundred cents on the dollar,

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Speaker 1: that was trading at seventy five cents on the dollar

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Speaker 1: in mid March, and less than a week later was

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Speaker 1: being priced at par. So if you were nimble, there

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Speaker 1: was that capital, there was upside to be had. Oh sure, absolutely,

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Speaker 1: you know. And a total return manager is going to

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Speaker 1: use that type of a distress in the market to

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Speaker 1: go and change the mix of his portfolios. And in

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Speaker 1: our view, that sell off that you saw in March

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Speaker 1: was not credit related. It was all liquidity related. Because

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Speaker 1: of what was going on in the stock market. People

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Speaker 1: wanted cash. It didn't matter whether it was in a bond,

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Speaker 1: mutual fund, or a a reat or or anything else,

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Speaker 1: I mean, or selling gold, and by the end of

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Speaker 1: that week they were also selling treasury bonds. So anything

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Speaker 1: to get cash. The old line is in an emergency.

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Speaker 1: You sell what you can, not what you want. And

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Speaker 1: that's true about the meltdown and mutual funds. You know,

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Speaker 1: a mutual fund manager won't sell what he liked us all,

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Speaker 1: which might be a I'm making it up a hospital

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Speaker 1: bond that he leaned the wrong way on and buying

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Speaker 1: and doesn't have the greatest credit in the world. It's

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Speaker 1: exactly what you said, Barry. You tell what you ken saw,

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Speaker 1: which is usually a high grade bond. So earlier we

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Speaker 1: were discussing the dislocation and corporates and treasuries, let's talk

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Speaker 1: a little bit about the muni market. From everything I

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Speaker 1: heard and saw during the beginning volatility early in March,

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Speaker 1: it looked like the muni bond market had just gone berserk,

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Speaker 1: maybe maybe even the most severe dislocation of any of

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Speaker 1: the fixed income trading we've seen. Tell us what happened?

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Speaker 1: And so far have the markets uh recovered yet? Sure? Berry,

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Speaker 1: I mean, it was certainly a March was certainly historic

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Speaker 1: volatility and historic loss and almost historic rebounding. You know,

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Speaker 1: I still I hearkened back to March nine, when treasury

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Speaker 1: prices were spiking upward and yields were dropping, and that

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Speaker 1: rendered most firms out there on Wall Street impotent to

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Speaker 1: actually give you a bit on bonds because they couldn't

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Speaker 1: hedge anything. So prices were backed off, and that combined

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Speaker 1: with the stock market that it started to roll over,

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Speaker 1: partly because the price of whale was dropping and there

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Speaker 1: was concerned on the economy and the coronavirus picking up,

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Speaker 1: and you suddenly had a perfect storm of dropping equity prices,

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Speaker 1: people looking for cash wherever it could be, and that

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Speaker 1: involved the selling of bond funds and bond ETFs into

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Speaker 1: a market that was overwhelmed. So when you think about

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Speaker 1: bond yields moving up from two percent to four that

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Speaker 1: is a historic rise in a very short period of

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Speaker 1: time two basis points and essentially a doubling of yields. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And like I said, most of that was almost all

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Speaker 1: liquidity related and not credit related. And and and yet

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Speaker 1: there are concerns out there, but of course about municipalities

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Speaker 1: and how they're going to fare through this. Our viewpoint

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Speaker 1: on that is that most really kind of high quality

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Speaker 1: general obligation and essential service bonds are going to be fine. Uh.

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Speaker 1: You know what you end up doing is you're looking

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Speaker 1: at the essentiality of a service through the prism of

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Speaker 1: the virus, and things look a little different if you're

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Speaker 1: talking about something like a rapid transit bond or an

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Speaker 1: airport bond, etcetera. But that that was not the cause

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Speaker 1: of the sell off in the mutual funds. So so

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Speaker 1: this wasn't a systemic issue. This was just a massive

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Speaker 1: amount of volume that overwhelmed the normal liquidity that exists

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Speaker 1: in the bond market. That's exactly right, And you hadn't

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Speaker 1: seen that before, where the meltdown in the bond market

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Speaker 1: was occurring alongside a meltdown in the stock market. The

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Speaker 1: last time you really saw that was in two thousand

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Speaker 1: and eight, and that was after Lehman failed, And that

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Speaker 1: sell off in municipal bond funds was credit related because

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Speaker 1: nobody knew whether anything was gonna pay. In other words,

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Speaker 1: when when Lehman went under, it was like the thirteen

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Speaker 1: strike of a clock, and people wondered, oh, does that

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Speaker 1: mean my school district is not going to pay off

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Speaker 1: responds or that the water authority won't pay off respons

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Speaker 1: It was really overdone, But but that was the nature

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Speaker 1: of that sell off. So let's look at the current circumstances,

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Speaker 1: which seemed to be not comparable to anything else that's

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Speaker 1: come before, including O eight oh nine. Uncle Sam has

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Speaker 1: shown an ability to keep running deficits for as long

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Speaker 1: and as deeply as needs. But states and cities don't

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Speaker 1: have that luxury. And we know that these states, and

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Speaker 1: we know that these cities, especially areas like New York,

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Speaker 1: New Jersey, Washington State, wherever the virus has has hit

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Speaker 1: pretty hard. We're starting to see signs that's happening in Florida.

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Speaker 1: How are these states going to operate if they can't

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Speaker 1: run a deficit and have hundreds of millions or billions

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Speaker 1: in shortfalls? Are these states potentially at risk for defaulting

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Speaker 1: on whatever general obligation bonds they've issued. It's a good question, Barry,

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Speaker 1: And what you look at is really twofold one. Almost

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Speaker 1: all bond issuers have debt service reserve funds. Sometimes that

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Speaker 1: can be a half year, sometimes a year. It depends

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Speaker 1: on the depends on the issue. Will we see credit downgrades, absolutely,

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Speaker 1: you're seeing it now. Will you see invasion of that

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Speaker 1: service reserves? Sure? And you're gonna see thinner debt service

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Speaker 1: coverage across the board. That's a given. We don't think

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Speaker 1: you're gonna see massive defaults, especially if you come out

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Speaker 1: of this within the next month or two. So what

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Speaker 1: it what it is is, it's just a it's a

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Speaker 1: torpedo out of the side of the ship, but the

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Speaker 1: ship is going to continue to sail and then you

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Speaker 1: start restoring debt service. Um. We think that there is

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Speaker 1: a lot of federal support for certainly some of the

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Speaker 1: bigger agencies out there. Let's take a very high profile one. Uh,

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Speaker 1: look at the MTA in New York City with the subways.

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Speaker 1: You can certainly think of you know, m t A

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Speaker 1: as as a poster child for transportation, and transportation is

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Speaker 1: certainly a poster child for infrastructure, and I think that's

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Speaker 1: one thing that the administration is really keen on. So

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Speaker 1: I I see certainly a lot of support for that.

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Speaker 1: I see a lot of State of New York support

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Speaker 1: for that. So I don't expect to see a default

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Speaker 1: on that. It doesn't stop bonds from trading cheaper. We've

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Speaker 1: seen that for sure, and that's that includes airport bonds

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Speaker 1: as well. You look at the hub airports out there.

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Speaker 1: The federal government is not going to have those airports

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Speaker 1: go into default because they are necessary for the restoration

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Speaker 1: of the economy when we're back working hopefully a month.

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Speaker 1: We normally think of equity investors as the risk takers

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Speaker 1: who were more greatly compensated for assuming that risk than

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Speaker 1: the traditional bond investor. But I have to ask, given

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Speaker 1: what you just said, what sort of compensation are risk

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Speaker 1: takers receiving in the fixed income market these days? Well,

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Speaker 1: you can you can argue that um look at a

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Speaker 1: lot of deals that have come in the last week

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Speaker 1: or so. The long end of the tax rebond market,

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Speaker 1: the high grade end is restored itself to roughly about

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Speaker 1: a three percent yield. That doesn't sound particularly high and

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Speaker 1: like it doesn't sound like a particularly rewarding yield if

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Speaker 1: you think about the potential for downgrades down the road

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Speaker 1: or a thinning of debt service coverage, etcetera. It does

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Speaker 1: look relatively cheap when you compare it to a long

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Speaker 1: treasury bond of one thirty five. But I would contend

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Speaker 1: the treasure are probably a little overbought in here, and

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Speaker 1: municipal was maybe a little cheap, and they're gonna eventually

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Speaker 1: meet in the middle. I think the important part is

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Speaker 1: to keep the long term really economics of municipalities in

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Speaker 1: the forefront when you're investing. If you went back to

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Speaker 1: the worst period in our history, which is the Great Depression,

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00:25:21,440 --> 00:25:24,040
Speaker 1: and we don't think we're going back to that. You

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00:25:24,080 --> 00:25:28,800
Speaker 1: had about municipal entities in this country stopped paying their debt.

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Speaker 1: Didn't mean they went bankrupt in a legal sense, but

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Speaker 1: they just stopped paying. And in the end, as the

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Speaker 1: economy turned around, they all, except for a few dust

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Speaker 1: bowl towns in Oklahoma, almost all paid off their debt

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Speaker 1: inter ears and got current on their debt and continue

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Speaker 1: to pay. And that's because of the monopolistic powers that

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Speaker 1: municipalities have. If a meteor came tomorrow and hit the St.

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Speaker 1: Louis Water Authority, would they stop paying their debt? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: most likely when they rebuilt things and started to get

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Speaker 1: debt service again, where they repay it. Absolutely So, John,

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Speaker 1: and all of this, we haven't talked about the mac

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Speaker 1: daddy in the room, the Federal Reserve. What is the

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Speaker 1: role today of the FED in the fixed income market?

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Speaker 1: Barry role is probably more important than ever and you

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Speaker 1: only have to look back at the last few weeks

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Speaker 1: to figure it out. Uh, you look at the FED

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Speaker 1: and how did they step in on this crisis. Well,

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Speaker 1: the first thing is that they fixed the short term

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Speaker 1: bond market. You think about things like revenue anticipation notes,

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Speaker 1: bond anticipation notes. These are the things that money market

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Speaker 1: funds invest in. Some of them are non rated, their

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Speaker 1: their promises to pay. The bid dropped out of the

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Speaker 1: market in the middle of this crisis in mid March.

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Speaker 1: What the FED did is they established credit facilities that

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Speaker 1: would buy these bonds from the money market funds, these

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00:26:54,359 --> 00:26:57,119
Speaker 1: rands and tans at their cost basis, not at the market,

432
00:26:57,440 --> 00:27:00,919
Speaker 1: and give them cash. So that up the money market

433
00:27:00,960 --> 00:27:04,919
Speaker 1: funds in business. And you can't really get uh an

434
00:27:04,920 --> 00:27:07,480
Speaker 1: improvement in equities until you improve the bond market. So

435
00:27:07,520 --> 00:27:10,359
Speaker 1: their first stop was to fix the short term bond market.

436
00:27:10,920 --> 00:27:15,040
Speaker 1: Then you saw the legislation come in where the Treasury,

437
00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:18,080
Speaker 1: through the FED as their agent, was going to start

438
00:27:18,080 --> 00:27:22,359
Speaker 1: to buy municipal bonds one out of five years that

439
00:27:22,400 --> 00:27:25,760
Speaker 1: have to be investment, greater, better, not how yield. They

440
00:27:25,760 --> 00:27:28,840
Speaker 1: haven't done it yet, just the fact that they established

441
00:27:28,840 --> 00:27:31,800
Speaker 1: it was enough to really improve the bond market. A

442
00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:33,919
Speaker 1: couple of weeks ago. Is that package is putting together.

443
00:27:34,440 --> 00:27:38,240
Speaker 1: So the Fed, through either their ability to do credit

444
00:27:38,280 --> 00:27:42,320
Speaker 1: facilities or their special ability to buy bonds out through

445
00:27:42,359 --> 00:27:45,159
Speaker 1: six months, which they have and have not exercised, and

446
00:27:45,240 --> 00:27:48,160
Speaker 1: now the ability of the Treasury to go through the

447
00:27:48,160 --> 00:27:51,600
Speaker 1: FED and try to buy bonds out through five years.

448
00:27:51,760 --> 00:27:53,600
Speaker 1: All of that has helped shore up the market, and

449
00:27:53,640 --> 00:27:58,920
Speaker 1: it's been very important. So the mirror announcement that hey,

450
00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:01,040
Speaker 1: we have the ability to buy munis if you want to,

451
00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:07,159
Speaker 1: is sufficient to stabilize the bond market absolutely, and and

452
00:28:07,240 --> 00:28:09,760
Speaker 1: not only is stabilized the short term market, which is

453
00:28:09,800 --> 00:28:12,240
Speaker 1: also in this array, but it helped to stabilize a

454
00:28:12,320 --> 00:28:16,760
Speaker 1: long term market because within that confined there is the

455
00:28:16,800 --> 00:28:20,359
Speaker 1: ability to take that beyond five years. I mean, Steve

456
00:28:20,400 --> 00:28:22,440
Speaker 1: Manuchan can call up J. Powe and say we want

457
00:28:22,440 --> 00:28:25,399
Speaker 1: this extended to fifteen or twenty or thirty years, and

458
00:28:25,440 --> 00:28:29,160
Speaker 1: they could do that. Huh. I recalled during the eight

459
00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:34,080
Speaker 1: o nine crisis, the big complaint I heard from the

460
00:28:34,080 --> 00:28:36,840
Speaker 1: FED haters and the people wringing their hands over the

461
00:28:36,920 --> 00:28:40,800
Speaker 1: various rescue packages was that the FED is adding three

462
00:28:40,840 --> 00:28:43,120
Speaker 1: trillion dollars to their balance sheet. This is going to

463
00:28:43,240 --> 00:28:46,880
Speaker 1: cause all sorts of trouble. Well, here we are a

464
00:28:46,960 --> 00:28:49,440
Speaker 1: decade later, what is there five trillion on the way

465
00:28:49,480 --> 00:28:53,960
Speaker 1: to six trillion. What does that mean for fill in

466
00:28:54,000 --> 00:28:58,360
Speaker 1: the blank, the economy, fixed income inflation, For the FED

467
00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:03,080
Speaker 1: to potentially have trillions and trillions on their balance sheet, Well,

468
00:29:03,520 --> 00:29:06,880
Speaker 1: what did we learn from the oh eight o nine area,

469
00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:11,480
Speaker 1: and actually was essentially three rounds of quantitative easy? It

470
00:29:11,600 --> 00:29:15,000
Speaker 1: never created inflation. Even though you saw the FED take

471
00:29:15,040 --> 00:29:17,320
Speaker 1: their balance sheet up to what was then record levels

472
00:29:17,520 --> 00:29:21,280
Speaker 1: and they were buying treasuries, agencies, and mortgages. The key

473
00:29:21,320 --> 00:29:23,720
Speaker 1: to that was the fact a they were trying to

474
00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:27,400
Speaker 1: keep rates lower, but it didn't create inflation. Because if

475
00:29:27,400 --> 00:29:30,240
Speaker 1: they bought a hundred million dollars worth the treasuries, and

476
00:29:30,280 --> 00:29:32,600
Speaker 1: they bought it from the Bank of Barry Rithholtz and

477
00:29:32,680 --> 00:29:35,880
Speaker 1: deposited a hundred million dollars at two o'clock in the afternoon,

478
00:29:35,960 --> 00:29:38,320
Speaker 1: the Bank of Barry Ridholts put that money back on

479
00:29:38,400 --> 00:29:41,160
Speaker 1: deposit at the FED learning a quarter of percent. What

480
00:29:41,320 --> 00:29:44,480
Speaker 1: it was not doing was lending the money out, So

481
00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:48,120
Speaker 1: the velocity of money and the expansion of money that

482
00:29:48,200 --> 00:29:52,200
Speaker 1: way was not happening. The quantitative easy was effectively keeping

483
00:29:52,320 --> 00:29:57,680
Speaker 1: rates in a certain range. What could cause inflation is

484
00:29:57,720 --> 00:30:01,959
Speaker 1: the two trillion plus early more money coming on the

485
00:30:02,000 --> 00:30:04,560
Speaker 1: government spending side, and that's what you didn't have. I mean,

486
00:30:04,600 --> 00:30:09,800
Speaker 1: you had eight hundred billion in programs back in the

487
00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:12,959
Speaker 1: O eight o nine crisis that is going to be

488
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:18,320
Speaker 1: tripled or quadrupled. Here, I would remember that, remember that

489
00:30:18,360 --> 00:30:22,880
Speaker 1: eight hundred billion was three billion was a temporary tax cut,

490
00:30:22,960 --> 00:30:27,280
Speaker 1: three hundred billion was a temporary extension of unemployment benefits.

491
00:30:27,840 --> 00:30:32,280
Speaker 1: The pure stimulative fiscal part of it was barely two

492
00:30:32,400 --> 00:30:36,480
Speaker 1: hundred billion dollars, right, And you saw some other things

493
00:30:36,480 --> 00:30:38,880
Speaker 1: like the BABS programs, et cetera. You might see a

494
00:30:38,880 --> 00:30:42,760
Speaker 1: resurrection or something like that that's being built American Build

495
00:30:42,800 --> 00:30:46,360
Speaker 1: America bonds, Build America bonds, which was really to try

496
00:30:46,400 --> 00:30:50,880
Speaker 1: to get municipalities to borrow in the taxable market because

497
00:30:50,880 --> 00:30:53,960
Speaker 1: the at that point treasuries were at three and long

498
00:30:54,000 --> 00:30:56,480
Speaker 1: tax remonds were at six, so that it was really

499
00:30:56,520 --> 00:30:59,800
Speaker 1: ineffective borrowing. So this allowed them to get a thirty

500
00:30:59,800 --> 00:31:03,200
Speaker 1: five percent subsidy from the federal government, really lowered their

501
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:06,360
Speaker 1: borrowing costs to something under four percent. And they were

502
00:31:07,160 --> 00:31:11,200
Speaker 1: essentially building new things. So I think about an airport

503
00:31:11,280 --> 00:31:14,160
Speaker 1: building a new runway, or a state university building a

504
00:31:14,160 --> 00:31:17,880
Speaker 1: new dorm where they're pointing concrete, hiring people building stuff.

505
00:31:18,200 --> 00:31:21,360
Speaker 1: That was the stimulative nature of it. Whether we see

506
00:31:21,360 --> 00:31:25,600
Speaker 1: something like that here. We don't know that the administration

507
00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:29,080
Speaker 1: has announced a two trillion dollar infrastructure policy, but we

508
00:31:29,120 --> 00:31:31,720
Speaker 1: haven't seen any particulars on it yet. I would I

509
00:31:31,720 --> 00:31:34,680
Speaker 1: would think though, that if you don't get inflation down

510
00:31:34,760 --> 00:31:37,800
Speaker 1: the road from this amount of government spending, then we

511
00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:42,520
Speaker 1: might never see inflation. Huh. That's that's quite that's quite fascinating.

512
00:31:42,960 --> 00:31:47,040
Speaker 1: So let's let's talk about the opposite of inflation. Let's

513
00:31:47,040 --> 00:31:51,960
Speaker 1: talk about deflation and negative rates. When when you started

514
00:31:52,080 --> 00:31:55,920
Speaker 1: your career, did you ever imagine a set of circumstances

515
00:31:56,440 --> 00:32:00,800
Speaker 1: where rates could go negative? Uh? Oh, And I guess

516
00:32:00,800 --> 00:32:02,600
Speaker 1: one of the nice things of having a long career

517
00:32:02,640 --> 00:32:04,560
Speaker 1: is I've seen the peak and interest rates, and I've

518
00:32:04,600 --> 00:32:09,320
Speaker 1: seen the loan interest rates. Uh like forever you know,

519
00:32:09,400 --> 00:32:13,000
Speaker 1: you you don't think about negative interest rates when you

520
00:32:13,040 --> 00:32:17,120
Speaker 1: think about textbooks back in the nineteen eighties or seventies

521
00:32:17,160 --> 00:32:21,600
Speaker 1: or even even nineties. But you saw negative interest rates,

522
00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:23,520
Speaker 1: and you saw them in Europe over the last year.

523
00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:26,960
Speaker 1: So you get back from this particular crisis and go

524
00:32:27,040 --> 00:32:30,760
Speaker 1: through last year, you saw negative rates not here. And

525
00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:34,200
Speaker 1: our interest rates dropped in the US last summer, really

526
00:32:34,240 --> 00:32:37,480
Speaker 1: not because the economy here is foundering, but because our

527
00:32:37,600 --> 00:32:39,560
Speaker 1: rates are too high relative to what was going on

528
00:32:39,600 --> 00:32:43,440
Speaker 1: around the world. UH. And all negative rate means is

529
00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:45,720
Speaker 1: that you're expecting rates to go more negative, so you

530
00:32:45,760 --> 00:32:49,200
Speaker 1: want to lock in something. Losing half a percent is

531
00:32:49,240 --> 00:32:51,560
Speaker 1: better than losing one percent, so you want to lock

532
00:32:51,680 --> 00:32:56,400
Speaker 1: that in. I think Europe was coming to the agreement

533
00:32:56,440 --> 00:33:00,560
Speaker 1: that this was not good for banks. UH. And you

534
00:33:00,600 --> 00:33:03,000
Speaker 1: saw a lot of noise and some movement, and before

535
00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:06,200
Speaker 1: all this you would start to see rates rise. So

536
00:33:06,680 --> 00:33:10,160
Speaker 1: Germany had gone from negative tenure bond rates to actually

537
00:33:10,160 --> 00:33:13,600
Speaker 1: positive rates UH. In the last in the last few

538
00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:17,240
Speaker 1: weeks they have gone from negative like minus point nine

539
00:33:17,280 --> 00:33:19,200
Speaker 1: to up to minus point three. So I think we're

540
00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:23,040
Speaker 1: gonna move out of the negative interest rate range over time.

541
00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:25,960
Speaker 1: And I think the idea is if you can get

542
00:33:26,000 --> 00:33:29,160
Speaker 1: back to a world where you have a steeper yield

543
00:33:29,200 --> 00:33:31,440
Speaker 1: curve than the banks are in the shape to make money,

544
00:33:31,880 --> 00:33:34,120
Speaker 1: and you need a decent banking system and a banking

545
00:33:34,120 --> 00:33:36,640
Speaker 1: system that's in financial health and can make money to

546
00:33:36,720 --> 00:33:40,240
Speaker 1: get the economy movement they used to call it the

547
00:33:40,360 --> 00:33:43,200
Speaker 1: zero bound for a reason. I guess we can't use

548
00:33:43,200 --> 00:33:47,480
Speaker 1: that phrase anymore. Um So, so it sounds like you're

549
00:33:47,520 --> 00:33:51,600
Speaker 1: not looking at rates going negative from here, even if

550
00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:57,080
Speaker 1: we have a pretty substantial rescue package. No. I think

551
00:33:57,120 --> 00:34:01,080
Speaker 1: what you'll see is you will actually see rates turn positive.

552
00:34:01,120 --> 00:34:05,240
Speaker 1: I think you'll see a more positive looking yield curve.

553
00:34:05,880 --> 00:34:09,440
Speaker 1: And I think if all the kind of government stimulus

554
00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:12,120
Speaker 1: that you see, that should produce a positive yield curve

555
00:34:12,160 --> 00:34:14,800
Speaker 1: because you think you would start to build out inflation

556
00:34:14,800 --> 00:34:18,000
Speaker 1: are expectations as you go further out, and that's reflected

557
00:34:18,040 --> 00:34:20,399
Speaker 1: in the shape of the yield curve as well. So

558
00:34:20,760 --> 00:34:24,759
Speaker 1: that leads to the obvious question, are we ever going

559
00:34:24,800 --> 00:34:30,560
Speaker 1: to see inflation in our lifetime? I think so. And

560
00:34:30,840 --> 00:34:32,799
Speaker 1: you know, if you look, if you look last year

561
00:34:32,960 --> 00:34:36,479
Speaker 1: at the kind of the middle part of the year,

562
00:34:37,040 --> 00:34:39,120
Speaker 1: you had a cover of Business Week and it had

563
00:34:39,160 --> 00:34:41,959
Speaker 1: a picture of some kind of animal and it said

564
00:34:42,360 --> 00:34:44,880
Speaker 1: says the death of inflation. That was good enough for

565
00:34:44,880 --> 00:34:47,920
Speaker 1: me to realize that inflation is probably coming back. It

566
00:34:49,040 --> 00:34:51,480
Speaker 1: takes a while, and it will take a while to

567
00:34:51,560 --> 00:34:55,719
Speaker 1: build up, and I think you wonder about where where

568
00:34:55,760 --> 00:34:57,840
Speaker 1: will it end up, what asset class will it end

569
00:34:57,960 --> 00:35:00,520
Speaker 1: up and we've seen some of the FEDS actions in

570
00:35:00,520 --> 00:35:03,120
Speaker 1: the past. It ends up and maybe small cat stocks,

571
00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:05,319
Speaker 1: or it ends up in the housing market. Does this

572
00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:08,360
Speaker 1: time does it end up in commodities which are are

573
00:35:08,880 --> 00:35:12,319
Speaker 1: you know, it's been severely depressed. You would think that

574
00:35:12,360 --> 00:35:15,239
Speaker 1: if you come out of this mess, those kind of

575
00:35:15,280 --> 00:35:19,080
Speaker 1: traditional things like copper and timber and things of that

576
00:35:19,160 --> 00:35:21,359
Speaker 1: nature would start to do well, and so I would

577
00:35:21,560 --> 00:35:25,720
Speaker 1: start to think you'd see some inflation. And yet throughout

578
00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:29,880
Speaker 1: this whole post credit crisis recovery period, we've seen a

579
00:35:30,000 --> 00:35:34,719
Speaker 1: huge uptick in multi family housing construction. We've seen a

580
00:35:34,800 --> 00:35:38,440
Speaker 1: lot of sectors of the economy over the past twelve

581
00:35:38,520 --> 00:35:44,839
Speaker 1: years slowly come back online, and still no inflation. So

582
00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:49,000
Speaker 1: what's gonna be the the spark that lights that fire?

583
00:35:50,560 --> 00:35:55,560
Speaker 1: You know, it's hard to say very because I think

584
00:35:55,600 --> 00:35:58,560
Speaker 1: what's gonna be going on here is a lot of

585
00:35:58,600 --> 00:36:03,759
Speaker 1: it based on demographic and what you're gonna see is

586
00:36:04,000 --> 00:36:07,400
Speaker 1: the millennials, who if you draw a bell cover the millennials,

587
00:36:08,760 --> 00:36:10,759
Speaker 1: the biggest part of that curve is just starting to

588
00:36:10,840 --> 00:36:13,600
Speaker 1: turn thirty and they're just starting to get into the

589
00:36:13,680 --> 00:36:16,799
Speaker 1: years where uh they will start to spend money on

590
00:36:17,080 --> 00:36:20,960
Speaker 1: family formation and all the things the baby Boomers did,

591
00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:24,480
Speaker 1: except maybe a little more delayed and and a little

592
00:36:24,480 --> 00:36:27,600
Speaker 1: more delayed, partly because of the financial crisis of two

593
00:36:27,600 --> 00:36:30,040
Speaker 1: thousand eight oh nine. So kids will got out of

594
00:36:30,080 --> 00:36:34,000
Speaker 1: college between say two thousand and eight and two thousand eleven.

595
00:36:34,080 --> 00:36:36,719
Speaker 1: We're really behind the eight ball a little bit in

596
00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:39,120
Speaker 1: terms of getting jobs, are getting the quality of jobs

597
00:36:39,280 --> 00:36:42,040
Speaker 1: that people just a couple of years younger gut later on.

598
00:36:42,480 --> 00:36:46,080
Speaker 1: So even they are now approaching that point of liftoff

599
00:36:46,120 --> 00:36:48,759
Speaker 1: from a spending standpoint. And if you look at the

600
00:36:48,800 --> 00:36:52,320
Speaker 1: millennials as a group, they are bigger than the Baby boomers.

601
00:36:52,360 --> 00:36:54,239
Speaker 1: So I think that's where it's going to come from.

602
00:36:54,800 --> 00:36:58,920
Speaker 1: Quite interesting. So normally, if we were in the Bloomberg office,

603
00:36:58,960 --> 00:37:02,440
Speaker 1: I would be asking my ten favorite questions, but we

604
00:37:02,560 --> 00:37:04,920
Speaker 1: don't have the full ninety minutes to do that. So

605
00:37:04,960 --> 00:37:08,400
Speaker 1: I'm just gonna give you a speed rounds. Five questions,

606
00:37:08,719 --> 00:37:12,480
Speaker 1: quick answers. Let's plow right through this. What are you

607
00:37:12,520 --> 00:37:17,120
Speaker 1: streaming these days? Give us your favorite Netflix, Amazon Prime, Uh,

608
00:37:17,239 --> 00:37:21,160
Speaker 1: Disney Plus shows. I am back watching all the Ken

609
00:37:21,160 --> 00:37:27,600
Speaker 1: Burns specials on baseball, World War, Prohibition, etcetera. So you know,

610
00:37:28,000 --> 00:37:29,839
Speaker 1: you're never too old to learn, and you're never too

611
00:37:29,840 --> 00:37:34,200
Speaker 1: old to relearn. Huh. Quite interesting. Who were your early

612
00:37:34,280 --> 00:37:39,120
Speaker 1: mentors who influenced your career? Um? Really, when I look

613
00:37:39,200 --> 00:37:41,759
Speaker 1: back at a man named Billy gow At E. F.

614
00:37:41,840 --> 00:37:45,200
Speaker 1: Hutton who was a public finance banker, and he really

615
00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:47,520
Speaker 1: kind of took a liking to me and got me

616
00:37:47,560 --> 00:37:50,080
Speaker 1: into the municipal bond area, and then later on Bob

617
00:37:50,120 --> 00:37:53,600
Speaker 1: gao at Lord Abbott. Tell us about your favorite books?

618
00:37:53,640 --> 00:37:55,120
Speaker 1: What are you reading? What do you like to give

619
00:37:55,120 --> 00:37:59,920
Speaker 1: his gifts? I'm big into history. Um, you know, one

620
00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:02,279
Speaker 1: of my favorite books was Rise and Fall of the

621
00:38:02,320 --> 00:38:06,360
Speaker 1: Third Reich, which was a tumb by William Shier. I

622
00:38:06,440 --> 00:38:08,160
Speaker 1: go back and read for You to Choose by Milton

623
00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:10,200
Speaker 1: Freedman every once in a while to make sure I'm

624
00:38:10,440 --> 00:38:12,680
Speaker 1: or he handed the right way, and I'm I'm trying

625
00:38:12,680 --> 00:38:16,240
Speaker 1: to read the Ulysses Grant biography right now by Ron Turner.

626
00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:21,480
Speaker 1: Quite quite interesting. A recent college graduate considering a career

627
00:38:21,960 --> 00:38:24,640
Speaker 1: and fixed income comes to you and ask for some advice.

628
00:38:25,160 --> 00:38:30,080
Speaker 1: What would you tell them? I would say, find a

629
00:38:30,120 --> 00:38:33,399
Speaker 1: spot on any firm and do everything they asked, from

630
00:38:33,440 --> 00:38:37,480
Speaker 1: sweeping the floors to uh, you know, make sure you

631
00:38:37,520 --> 00:38:39,600
Speaker 1: show up the first one there every day and find

632
00:38:39,640 --> 00:38:42,040
Speaker 1: a mentor. But I would give that advice to anybody

633
00:38:42,080 --> 00:38:45,720
Speaker 1: that's starting out, if you can find a mentor. Uh

634
00:38:45,800 --> 00:38:47,520
Speaker 1: and and even if it takes you a few years,

635
00:38:48,120 --> 00:38:50,239
Speaker 1: it is well worth it because you have somebody to

636
00:38:50,320 --> 00:38:53,799
Speaker 1: bounce ideas off of. And our final question, what do

637
00:38:53,840 --> 00:38:56,440
Speaker 1: you know about the world of fixed income today? You

638
00:38:56,560 --> 00:38:59,399
Speaker 1: wish you knew forty years ago when you were first

639
00:38:59,440 --> 00:39:04,719
Speaker 1: starting out. I wish I had known the importance of

640
00:39:04,880 --> 00:39:08,920
Speaker 1: international flows and currencies. Um. You know, as a as

641
00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:13,480
Speaker 1: a municipal bond expert. Back forty years ago, you didn't

642
00:39:13,520 --> 00:39:17,959
Speaker 1: realize the importance of international flows and how they would

643
00:39:17,960 --> 00:39:21,400
Speaker 1: affect me. So the fact is that the change in

644
00:39:21,440 --> 00:39:24,279
Speaker 1: the Chinese currency would affect municipal bond invest he would

645
00:39:24,280 --> 00:39:27,000
Speaker 1: never occur to you. It definitely affects it today. So

646
00:39:27,800 --> 00:39:30,280
Speaker 1: I think that's the one thing that I've learned quite

647
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Speaker 1: quite interesting. We have been speaking with John Mussau. He

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Speaker 1: is president, CEO and director of fixed income Trading at

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Speaker 1: Cumberland Advisers. If you enjoy this conversation, well be sure

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Speaker 1: and come back for the podcast extras when we keep

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Speaker 1: the tape rolling and continue discussing all things fixed income.

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Speaker 1: We love your comments, feedback and suggestions right to us

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Speaker 1: at m IB podcast at Bloomberg dot net. Give us

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Speaker 1: a review on Masters and Business at Apple iTunes. I

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Speaker 1: would be remiss if I did not thank our crack

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Speaker 1: staff that helps put these conversations together each week under

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Speaker 1: trying conditions from various remote locations. Michael Boyle is my producer.

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Speaker 1: Jolie Volmer is my audio engineer. Michael Batnick is my

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Speaker 1: head of research. I'm Barry Hults. You've been listening to

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Speaker 1: Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio