WEBVTT - Bonus Episode: Here's Why the Iran War Could Hinge on Missile Math 0:00:00.120 --> 0:00:02.559 Hello, it's even from daybreak Europe. I wanted to share 0:00:02.560 --> 0:00:05.080 the latest episode of the other podcast that I host. 0:00:05.200 --> 0:00:07.640 Here's Why. We look at a single story every week 0:00:07.680 --> 0:00:10.360 and give you the context and analysis from our global 0:00:10.400 --> 0:00:13.720 network of reporters and analysts. This week, we've been examining 0:00:13.800 --> 0:00:16.600 the supply of weapons in the Iran war and how 0:00:16.640 --> 0:00:19.680 that might affect what happens next. If you like the episode, 0:00:19.720 --> 0:00:22.080 you can subscribe to us wherever you get your podcasts. 0:00:22.239 --> 0:00:23.599 Here is Here's Why. 0:00:25.880 --> 0:00:37.920 Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. 0:00:40.320 --> 0:00:42.560 Since the start of the war, the US and Israel 0:00:42.600 --> 0:00:45.960 have been attacking sites across Iran. In response to Ihran 0:00:46.000 --> 0:00:49.000 has fired hundreds of missiles and drones at targets around 0:00:49.040 --> 0:00:51.600 the Middle East, from its neighbors in the Gulf, but 0:00:51.720 --> 0:00:55.160 also reaching as far as Cyprus and Turkey. As the 0:00:55.200 --> 0:00:57.560 shock of the opening days of the conflict gives way 0:00:57.600 --> 0:01:01.280 to a more sustained campaign, some key questions are emerging, 0:01:01.760 --> 0:01:04.760 like who could run out of weapons first, and when. 0:01:05.480 --> 0:01:07.800 There's really a race on to figure out who expends 0:01:07.840 --> 0:01:10.600 their ammunitions first and fastest. I don't believe that the 0:01:10.680 --> 0:01:13.200 US entered this fight going okay, we only have enough 0:01:13.240 --> 0:01:15.679 missiles for one week, two weeks, three weeks, or even 0:01:15.720 --> 0:01:16.200 four weeks. 0:01:16.240 --> 0:01:19.520 I think it's really about the tempo of taking out 0:01:19.600 --> 0:01:23.280 the Iranian capacities for dromes and ballistic missiles. 0:01:23.360 --> 0:01:25.720 But if you look at the basic math before the war, 0:01:25.959 --> 0:01:29.240 I certainly favored Iran and just share numbers. The question 0:01:29.319 --> 0:01:32.800 becomes how effective is it being at degrading those capabilities. 0:01:33.520 --> 0:01:37.280 Here's why the around war could hinge on missile math. 0:01:40.160 --> 0:01:43.039 Becha Wasser leads our defense research at Bloomberg Economics and 0:01:43.080 --> 0:01:46.039 she joins US now for more. Becca, First of all, 0:01:46.080 --> 0:01:49.240 what do we know about Iran's stockpile of missiles and 0:01:49.280 --> 0:01:50.800 how many they may have left? 0:01:51.080 --> 0:01:54.200 So nobody knows exactly how many they have left right now. 0:01:54.240 --> 0:01:56.440 But I think the most important thing is it's not 0:01:56.560 --> 0:01:59.720 just about the missile numbers. It's about whether they can 0:01:59.760 --> 0:02:04.040 add actually use those missiles. And the United States has 0:02:04.360 --> 0:02:08.480 really focused on degrading Iran's missile program, going after the 0:02:08.520 --> 0:02:12.440 missile launchers and making it so those missiles that Iran 0:02:12.560 --> 0:02:16.160 does still have they can't fire them. But that being said, 0:02:16.520 --> 0:02:21.160 prior to the Twelve Day War, Iran had approximately two 0:02:21.240 --> 0:02:24.880 thousand to three thousand ballistic missiles and it fired at 0:02:24.960 --> 0:02:29.400 least five hundred of those. It spent some time reconstituting 0:02:29.840 --> 0:02:33.080 prior to this current conflict, so they probably have a 0:02:33.080 --> 0:02:36.200 sizeable amount. And it's worth noting that they've got missiles 0:02:36.320 --> 0:02:39.440 of different ranges, short range missiles that they've used to 0:02:39.680 --> 0:02:43.560 strike the Gulf States, medium range missiles that they've used 0:02:43.760 --> 0:02:47.400 in places like Jordan and Israel, as well as some 0:02:47.480 --> 0:02:50.320 long range missiles that we haven't really seen play such 0:02:50.360 --> 0:02:52.919 a large role in this fight. They also have a 0:02:53.000 --> 0:02:56.679 number of drones and cruise missiles, and those also come 0:02:56.720 --> 0:02:57.240 into play. 0:02:57.800 --> 0:02:59.919 Well, let's talk a little bit more about the drone 0:03:00.120 --> 0:03:02.840 which are of course cheaper and faster to produce. What 0:03:02.880 --> 0:03:04.920 do we know about the capacity that Iran has in 0:03:05.000 --> 0:03:05.560 that area. 0:03:06.320 --> 0:03:10.840 So Iran as by my account, fired over three thousand 0:03:11.000 --> 0:03:14.120 drones at the Gulf States alone at this juncture in 0:03:14.200 --> 0:03:17.000 time in the conflict. As you said, they're cheap, they're 0:03:17.120 --> 0:03:21.600 roughly you know, twenty to fifty thousand dollars. They've used 0:03:21.600 --> 0:03:25.560 them to great effect to create a number of economic 0:03:25.600 --> 0:03:28.600 costs as well as psychological costs on the Golf States 0:03:28.600 --> 0:03:32.399 and the global economy. They've managed to fire these at 0:03:32.440 --> 0:03:35.120 a pretty consistent rate, and part of that is because 0:03:35.160 --> 0:03:38.160 they can't rely on their missiles as much, so they've 0:03:38.160 --> 0:03:41.520 tried to make up for that with their use of drones. 0:03:42.160 --> 0:03:46.560 We imagine that right now there is still some drone capacity, 0:03:46.680 --> 0:03:51.240 drone production capacity that Iran still has, but a lot 0:03:51.280 --> 0:03:53.720 of the US and Israeli strikes have also tried to 0:03:53.760 --> 0:03:58.760 go after some of the drone storage locations and production facilities, 0:03:58.800 --> 0:04:01.920 really going after the heart of their drone and missile 0:04:01.960 --> 0:04:05.000 programs and making it so that they can't replenish and 0:04:05.040 --> 0:04:08.920 they can't reconstitute either during the conflict or into the future. 0:04:09.240 --> 0:04:11.320 So that speaks to I suppose the possibility of them 0:04:11.360 --> 0:04:15.240 being able to replenish those stocks too. What about the 0:04:15.280 --> 0:04:17.800 pace of attacks that we've seen, though there's been some 0:04:17.960 --> 0:04:21.239 change in cadence as we've moved into the second week 0:04:21.800 --> 0:04:24.479 of this war, what does that tell us about the 0:04:24.520 --> 0:04:26.560 strategy that Iran appears to be adopting. 0:04:27.279 --> 0:04:31.920 So, by my calculations, Iran's missile and drone attacks are 0:04:32.040 --> 0:04:37.000 down approximately eighty three percent from the start of the conflict, 0:04:37.120 --> 0:04:39.480 and there's a few different reasons for this. The first 0:04:39.600 --> 0:04:43.520 is those initial salvos were quite large. They were intended 0:04:43.560 --> 0:04:47.240 to overwhelm. They were intended to overwhelm air defenses, to 0:04:47.400 --> 0:04:49.760 extract costs, and to try and make it so that 0:04:49.800 --> 0:04:53.840 the Gulf States in particular didn't become partied to the fight. 0:04:54.560 --> 0:04:58.919 Since then, we've seen continued use of those drone attacks, 0:04:59.279 --> 0:05:03.320 and part of them is because of the attrition that 0:05:03.400 --> 0:05:06.480 Iran has taken to some of its missile launchers and 0:05:06.560 --> 0:05:09.760 trying to continue to use what it can. But even 0:05:09.800 --> 0:05:13.159 though drones don't require dedicated launchers, you still have to 0:05:13.200 --> 0:05:15.760 move them out into the open. You need to position 0:05:15.880 --> 0:05:18.640 them and be able to get them off the ground, 0:05:18.800 --> 0:05:21.920 and that means that they are viable targets for both 0:05:22.160 --> 0:05:26.159 US and Israel to strike. So that has also degraded 0:05:26.240 --> 0:05:30.400 some of the tempo that we've seen in those attacks. Really, 0:05:30.400 --> 0:05:32.400 what I think we're seeing right now is a shift 0:05:32.440 --> 0:05:35.719 to what I would term an attritional approach from Iran, 0:05:36.120 --> 0:05:38.680 where they're in it for the long haul and they're 0:05:38.680 --> 0:05:43.280 trying to impose costs slowly over time, and all they 0:05:43.320 --> 0:05:45.200 need to do is just keep up the pace of 0:05:45.279 --> 0:05:48.440 attacks and make it so that there are attacks every 0:05:48.520 --> 0:05:53.920 single day rather than have intense attacks every single day. 0:05:54.279 --> 0:05:56.560 We've also seen them have a shift in targeting, where 0:05:56.560 --> 0:06:00.480 they're targeting has seemingly gotten better Rather than these large 0:06:00.560 --> 0:06:04.640 salvos of both drones and missiles, we see drones being 0:06:04.680 --> 0:06:09.520 able to cause some damage to critical infrastructure, including oil infrastructure, 0:06:09.600 --> 0:06:14.279 AI data centers, population centers, as well as really critical 0:06:14.360 --> 0:06:18.640 military hardware like radars needed for air defense. So we're 0:06:18.640 --> 0:06:21.880 seeing the start of a cost and position strategy. That 0:06:22.040 --> 0:06:26.120 means that Iran's probably also trying to preserve some capabilities 0:06:26.200 --> 0:06:27.320 in case of a long war. 0:06:28.120 --> 0:06:30.560 What about the weapons that the US and it's partners 0:06:30.600 --> 0:06:33.279 are using to defend against Iran's attacks, and of course 0:06:33.320 --> 0:06:36.200 the continuing strikes on the US and Israeli sides as well, 0:06:36.560 --> 0:06:41.200 stretched to those stockpiles and how quickly could they be replaced? 0:06:41.400 --> 0:06:45.719 So I think it's worth making a difference between air 0:06:45.760 --> 0:06:49.479 defense interceptors and some of the offensive missiles that the 0:06:49.640 --> 0:06:53.520 US and Israel are using. The offensive missiles, while yes, 0:06:53.520 --> 0:06:56.400 there are limited stockpiles for some of those higher end 0:06:56.680 --> 0:07:00.800 long range capabilities, they do exist in greater members and 0:07:01.480 --> 0:07:04.200 I think that it's very likely that the United States 0:07:04.240 --> 0:07:08.480 and Israel could sustain the conflict over time without having 0:07:08.560 --> 0:07:13.240 to dip too far into their stockpiles. Although there may 0:07:13.280 --> 0:07:17.440 be some pulling of missiles and munitions from one theater, 0:07:17.600 --> 0:07:20.600 say Europe or the Indo Pacific, to the Middle East. 0:07:21.120 --> 0:07:23.960 Air defense interceptors are a little bit harder because they're 0:07:24.040 --> 0:07:27.560 so in demand. There's never enough air defense to go around, 0:07:27.960 --> 0:07:31.000 and there's air defense for the US, and then there's 0:07:31.040 --> 0:07:33.800 also the air defense interceptors that it sells to the 0:07:33.800 --> 0:07:38.120 Gulf States and other regional allies. So when you have that, 0:07:38.200 --> 0:07:41.160 there is this stress and strain on the US defense 0:07:41.160 --> 0:07:44.200 industrial base to produce more, and they're trying to quickly 0:07:44.280 --> 0:07:48.320 ramp up production. There's a new push to quadruple production 0:07:48.600 --> 0:07:52.240 of really critical interceptors, but that's not going to happen 0:07:52.360 --> 0:07:56.440 until twenty thirty and you're moving from producing say ninety 0:07:56.480 --> 0:08:00.280 six bad interceptors per year to close to four hundhre 0:08:00.640 --> 0:08:04.120 in the twenty thirties, so replenishment is not going to 0:08:04.160 --> 0:08:04.559 be quick. 0:08:05.280 --> 0:08:08.200 All of that being said, if the fighting then continues 0:08:08.240 --> 0:08:11.440 at this intensity, what is likely to become the most 0:08:11.480 --> 0:08:12.360 limiting factor? 0:08:12.480 --> 0:08:17.000 First, I think the most limiting factor is not the 0:08:17.000 --> 0:08:21.040 one that you can count. It's not missiles and munitions 0:08:21.200 --> 0:08:24.720 it's not going to be things like force readiness. It's 0:08:24.760 --> 0:08:28.640 going to actually be political will. The ability to wage war, 0:08:28.840 --> 0:08:32.240 and frankly, the ability to terminate war is so based 0:08:32.320 --> 0:08:35.760 on political will, and it's going to require leaders who 0:08:35.800 --> 0:08:38.520 are able to do that, and that is something that 0:08:38.559 --> 0:08:41.360 we can't quite quantify, and I think we're already starting 0:08:41.360 --> 0:08:44.720 to see shifts in that direction. We're starting to see 0:08:44.720 --> 0:08:47.560 President Donald Trump say that the war is going to 0:08:47.679 --> 0:08:50.040 end soon and he can end it whenever he wants. 0:08:50.360 --> 0:08:52.520 At the same time that he's saying the US can 0:08:52.559 --> 0:08:55.679 sustain this conflict for as long as it takes. So, 0:08:56.120 --> 0:08:58.000 when it comes down to it, what we should be 0:08:58.040 --> 0:09:00.640 looking at, it's not just the math, it's also the 0:09:00.640 --> 0:09:01.520 political part. 0:09:02.000 --> 0:09:05.439 Okay, Becca Wasser, leading our defense research at Bloomberg Economics. 0:09:05.440 --> 0:09:08.800 Thank you For more explanations like this from our team 0:09:08.840 --> 0:09:11.680 of three thousand journalists and analysts around the world, go 0:09:11.720 --> 0:09:16.480 to Bloomberg dot com slash explainers. I'm Stephen Carroll. This 0:09:16.600 --> 0:09:18.920 is here's why. I'll be back next week with more. 0:09:19.240 --> 0:09:20.000 Thanks for listening.