Speaker 1: Technology Stuff from Hey there, and welcome to Tech Stuff.
Speaker 1: I am your host Jonathan Strickland joining me in the
Speaker 1: studio today. He's my friend, he's yours. He's Ben Boland, Ben,
Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. Hey, Jonathan, thank you so
Speaker 1: much for having me on the show. Even though we
Speaker 1: know that we're both going to have to work assiduously
Speaker 1: to keep this a family friendly show. You've invited me
Speaker 1: on to talk about, Yeah, talk about a subject that
Speaker 1: is guaranteed to get us. As my grandfather would say,
Speaker 1: all head up, we get all head up in here. Yeah,
Speaker 1: So we're gonna talk about something that's actually we're gonna
Speaker 1: have to work very hard for multiple reasons, because we're
Speaker 1: talking about Apple versus the FBI, the whole story that's
Speaker 1: unfolding as we record this um and to talk about
Speaker 1: what is behind that case, what are the implications, what
Speaker 1: is the FBI's argument, what is Apple's argument? And in
Speaker 1: addition to that, we have, of course the added responsibility
Speaker 1: of remembering that this is all centered around a truly
Speaker 1: awful crime. Yes, absolutely so. The what we're what we're
Speaker 1: talking about specifically hit mainstream news when Apple did something
Speaker 1: that a lot of tech companies have never done. They
Speaker 1: issued a blanket statement letter and went public with a
Speaker 1: They went public with a response to an FBI request.
Speaker 1: But I guess I'm getting ahead of it. What was
Speaker 1: the crime? Well, let's yeah, let's I'll give you the
Speaker 1: background on what's happened and we'll we'll build from there.
Speaker 1: So first we have to look back on December two,
Speaker 1: two thousand fifteen, uh and San Bernardino, Kelly, Flornia. That's
Speaker 1: in southern California, and that's when to well, an American
Speaker 1: citizen and I legal resident, husband wife team, both of
Speaker 1: Pakistani descent, committed a mass shooting. It was a Sayed
Speaker 1: Rizwan Faruk and tash Feen Malik who committed this act,
Speaker 1: and it happened at the Department of Public Health. They
Speaker 1: were having an event that was starting off as a
Speaker 1: training event and then it was supposed to transition into
Speaker 1: a holiday event. And after the training element. Faruk, who
Speaker 1: was actually at the event, he was in the employee
Speaker 1: of the Department of Public Health, he was a food inspector, left,
Speaker 1: came back with his wife. They were both heavily armed
Speaker 1: and they both started firing into the crowd of people
Speaker 1: at the Department of Public Health. Fourteen people were killed,
Speaker 1: twenty two injured. Very serious crime. Then uh Faruke and
Speaker 1: Malite left. They fled the scene. Turned out they had
Speaker 1: also left behind an explosive device, which thankfully did not detonate.
Speaker 1: Failed to detonate uh and they they fled in a
Speaker 1: vehicle that they had rented a few days before, and
Speaker 1: several hours later law enforcement tracked them down. There was
Speaker 1: a confrontation, there was a shootout UH and then both
Speaker 1: of the shooters died as a result of that shootout.
Speaker 1: The FBI has stated that they believed, based upon the
Speaker 1: evidence they were able to find that the two were
Speaker 1: acting on their own, that they were not part of
Speaker 1: some sort of terrorist cell in the United States. However,
Speaker 1: they can't be absolutely certain of that. That's where the
Speaker 1: crux of this issue with Apple is going to come
Speaker 1: into play. And the big part of it is they
Speaker 1: can't account for it's just less than twenty minutes of
Speaker 1: the activity that happened between the shooting or leading up
Speaker 1: to the shooting, and around the shooting, because they're they're
Speaker 1: thinking that there's a possibility that something that happened within
Speaker 1: that time could give them more information and at least
Speaker 1: allow them to confirm whether or not they truly acted
Speaker 1: on their own or if they were under the direction
Speaker 1: of some other group, which could potentially and this is
Speaker 1: an FBI argument, which could potentially give the government the
Speaker 1: ability to prevent a future attack. And more to that point,
Speaker 1: neither of them had been listed in any database as
Speaker 1: a potential threat. So that puts extra pressure on the government,
Speaker 1: right because citizens say, well, why did this happen? The
Speaker 1: government says, we followed procedure and neither of them registered
Speaker 1: on any of ours and there are no red flags,
Speaker 1: so we had no way of knowing. And uh, that
Speaker 1: means there's actual extra pressure on the FBI to investigate
Speaker 1: this thoroughly, partially to show that in fact, everything that
Speaker 1: could be done had been done short of taking some
Speaker 1: extreme step that none of us want to see. Right,
Speaker 1: the idea of like, okay, everyone of Pakistani descent has
Speaker 1: to leave the country. That's ridiculous. We would that's that's
Speaker 1: returning to an era of the United States history that
Speaker 1: we do not want to revisit, like a World War
Speaker 1: two internment camp situation. Yeah, we don't want that. We
Speaker 1: don't want that because it is never fair to lump
Speaker 1: innocent people in for fear that one of them might
Speaker 1: be guilty. That's not cool, right, this is I'm already
Speaker 1: getting angry and i haven't even gotten to the part
Speaker 1: about the apple stuff yet. I'm going for a slow burning,
Speaker 1: that's fair. So one of the thing that's that all
Speaker 1: of this is about, ostensibly any at any rate, is
Speaker 1: an iPhone. It's specifically an iPhone five C, probably running
Speaker 1: iOS nine. That's based upon the various public filings we've
Speaker 1: seen about this um and it was county owned. It
Speaker 1: was owned by the Department of Public Health and then
Speaker 1: issued to Farouke who worked for the department Department of
Speaker 1: Public Health, so it was county owned. The FBI went
Speaker 1: to the county and said, we want your permission to
Speaker 1: access the contents on this phone. The county said, of course,
Speaker 1: you have our permission. You can access it. Now. If
Speaker 1: that's all there were to it, it would be fine.
Speaker 1: I would just access the phone. They've already received permission
Speaker 1: from the phone's owner, and they could call through it
Speaker 1: to look for any evidence that would lead them to
Speaker 1: more information about this crime. But there is a security
Speaker 1: measure on the phone, and it's a very simple one.
Speaker 1: It's on lots of smartphones. It's it's a little password.
Speaker 1: In this case, it's a a four or six digit
Speaker 1: pin which can be alpha numeric if you activate that
Speaker 1: option on the six digit. So it's one of the two.
Speaker 1: We don't know which, and without that pen, you cannot
Speaker 1: access the the information because the way the pen works.
Speaker 1: This is where we get into the tech stuff. Been
Speaker 1: There are two levels of encryption. You are two keys
Speaker 1: to this encryption. One of the keys is the pen.
Speaker 1: The other key is hard coded onto the device itself.
Speaker 1: All right, it's only it's if you think about movies
Speaker 1: like those nineties movies with the nuclear power, where you
Speaker 1: have to have two generals put their keys into the
Speaker 1: same sort of thing. So if you don't have the pen,
Speaker 1: it can't combine with the hardware key, and therefore you
Speaker 1: cannot unlock the information. The idea here is that Apple
Speaker 1: doesn't have the pen, right, which is cool because it
Speaker 1: means that if you or I or you listeners have
Speaker 1: an iPhone, it means you can trust Apple because they
Speaker 1: don't know your pin, right, they can't access your phone. Uh,
Speaker 1: you know that That was the whole point one. Two
Speaker 1: points one. Apple wanted to make its cure enough so
Speaker 1: that consumers would say, I feel good about buying an
Speaker 1: iPhone because I know whatever I store on it, whether
Speaker 1: it's something that's personal or it's just you know, it's
Speaker 1: no one else's business, whatever it may be, no one
Speaker 1: else is going to have access to that unless I
Speaker 1: give them my pen. It's good for Apple, not just
Speaker 1: because consumers are happy, but because Apple then hasn't out
Speaker 1: If the government comes to Apple and says, hey, we
Speaker 1: want you to break into this phone, they can literally
Speaker 1: say we cannot do that. It's not that we will not,
Speaker 1: it's that we literally physically cannot grant your request because
Speaker 1: it's impossible. And there's also I would just to expound
Speaker 1: that point a little bit further. This I'm not suggesting
Speaker 1: as their conscious will or intention, but this also removes
Speaker 1: possible culpability. Yes, yes, so all of these are very
Speaker 1: important points. Right, So let's get into a little bit
Speaker 1: more of why the FBI is coming to Apple. So
Speaker 1: let's say that it's a four digit pin all right,
Speaker 1: all numeric, simplest version. That means there are ten thousand
Speaker 1: combinations that are possible for that pen. That's it. That's
Speaker 1: you're limited to ten thousand, which is that's a lot,
Speaker 1: but it's not that much if you're going to do
Speaker 1: something like a brute force attack. Right. So if you
Speaker 1: do a brute force attack on a normal system, and
Speaker 1: there are only ten thousand variations, it's with a fast
Speaker 1: enough computer, it's just a matter of minutes. But there's
Speaker 1: some limitations on the iPhone that make this harder. Does
Speaker 1: it freeze if you enter the incorrect pen? It does
Speaker 1: more than freeze, right, So, first of all, there is
Speaker 1: an eighty millisecond delay when you enter a pen and
Speaker 1: when it gets verified that it is or is not
Speaker 1: the correct one. Right, So with that eighty millisecond delay,
Speaker 1: that doesn't sound like much, but it means you can't
Speaker 1: just blast a whole bunch of numbers through. Also, you
Speaker 1: have to type it in on a screen. You can't
Speaker 1: hook it up to a computer and just digitally send
Speaker 1: the various pen combinations to try and get through. You
Speaker 1: have to actually tap them on on the screen to
Speaker 1: do it over and over. So that means you tap
Speaker 1: in the number eighty milliseconds pass, you get the confirmation
Speaker 1: or denial, tap in the number next. Uh, if you
Speaker 1: hit ten consecutive incorrect pen entries the phone interprets that
Speaker 1: is saying someone else who is not the owner has
Speaker 1: gotten possession of this phone. So in order to protect
Speaker 1: the owner's information, we're scrambling everything, and you lose all
Speaker 1: the metadata. Everything is useless. So even if you got
Speaker 1: the pen afterward, you would not be able to access
Speaker 1: the stuff you were looking for in the first place.
Speaker 1: You would maybe be able to turn on the phone,
Speaker 1: but there wouldn't be anything there to find. Yeah, you
Speaker 1: would have, just you would have just it would be
Speaker 1: like you just accidentally set fire to the file room,
Speaker 1: like you know, like you can't get into the file
Speaker 1: room door, and whatever you try and do accidentally sets
Speaker 1: a fire inside the file room. You then get the
Speaker 1: key to the aisle room, and then you think, well,
Speaker 1: what's the point you lost everything? And it's it's virtually assured.
Speaker 1: Yeah that out of those yeah, out of those ten
Speaker 1: thousand tries, your first ten are going to be wrong. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean, just the odds are pretty much against you,
Speaker 1: unless you're ridiculously lucky. So there's that, and and of
Speaker 1: course they don't they also if it were an actual
Speaker 1: later iPhone, if it weren't the iPhone five C, they
Speaker 1: would have an added problem, which is that with the
Speaker 1: later models there's an additional delay after four failed tries.
Speaker 1: So if you try four times and fail, it will
Speaker 1: then give you a five second delay before you can
Speaker 1: try the fifth time. After that, it gives you a
Speaker 1: fifteen second delay after that, like by the time you
Speaker 1: get to the ninth try, it's an hour delay. Think
Speaker 1: about what you're doing, right, So, but the five C
Speaker 1: doesn't have that, So you may have read about that delay.
Speaker 1: It does not qualify for this particular case. Through force
Speaker 1: won't work in the most basic pin situation. But in
Speaker 1: the six digit alpha numeric I just imagine the same
Speaker 1: rules apply, but the yeah, yeah, exactly, but the possible
Speaker 1: answers are much greater because now you've got six digits.
Speaker 1: You've also got the possibility of alphabet alpha characters in
Speaker 1: their alphabet characters. I believe so. Um So, anyway, from
Speaker 1: why here, if you were to try and use brute
Speaker 1: force on um a six digit alpha numeric one, it
Speaker 1: would take you with a with a fast computer that
Speaker 1: had been optimized for this, it would take you about
Speaker 1: six years to break through it. And that's going through
Speaker 1: all the different possible combinations. Assuming that there's not another
Speaker 1: kill switch type deal like there is with the iPhone.
Speaker 1: By the way, that's software that Apple has built into
Speaker 1: the iPhone, really firmware that Apple is built into the iPhone.
Speaker 1: It's not like it's a fundamental you know quality that
Speaker 1: all smart phones, right, Yeah, yeah, that's that's specific to
Speaker 1: Apple phones. Right. So you've got this problem, right, you
Speaker 1: have the FBI. They've gotten permission from the owner of
Speaker 1: the phone to access the phones uh contents. But the
Speaker 1: owner of the phone doesn't know the pen because the
Speaker 1: owner of the phone had had issued it to an employee.
Speaker 1: The employee had come up with the pen, So they
Speaker 1: don't know if it's a four digit, they don't know
Speaker 1: if it's a six digit, they don't know. Um, they
Speaker 1: don't know if this uh this feature where after ten
Speaker 1: tries everything gets raised. They don't know if that's necessarily
Speaker 1: active because you can turn it off, but all indications
Speaker 1: point to it being on. For one, it was on
Speaker 1: when the phone was issued to Farouke, right, And people
Speaker 1: typically don't change their defaults post phone users. So FBI
Speaker 1: wants Apple to do something particular, and it's something different
Speaker 1: from what we've talked about in previous episodes about a
Speaker 1: back door entrance into a system. It's not quite the
Speaker 1: same thing. So you've got this phone, you can't brute
Speaker 1: force attack it without risking damaging the contents. Apple cannot
Speaker 1: access the information on this phone. By design, they did
Speaker 1: not want that to have that capability. So what the
Speaker 1: FBI wants Apple to do is build a new version
Speaker 1: of iOS just for this phone, a specific iOS for
Speaker 1: this phone that disables the safety features that would one
Speaker 1: prevent brute force attacks from happening quickly, to allow brute
Speaker 1: force to attacks to happen by hooking up the phone
Speaker 1: to a computer so you don't have to tap those
Speaker 1: numbers in it shore and three disabling that kill switch.
Speaker 1: So what the FBI wants Apple to do is to
Speaker 1: build up a brand new iOS again just for this
Speaker 1: one phone, and then install it on the phone. This
Speaker 1: to all, you know, hypothetically happen on Apple grounds, like
Speaker 1: at an Apple location, either at the corporate headquarters or
Speaker 1: wherever um. And then in theory, you would then destroy
Speaker 1: the the the custom iOS because you only needed it
Speaker 1: for that one phone, right, because it was so easy
Speaker 1: to toss the one ring, bring it back to more door,
Speaker 1: and destroy it right, Yeah, yeah, you know what, Mount doom.
Speaker 1: Plenty of backdoors. It's fine, it's integral to the plot.
Speaker 1: That was that was Souron's problem was that he did
Speaker 1: not plug the security vulnerabilities doom. I mean, that's that's
Speaker 1: a classic example, like you know, right up there with
Speaker 1: the whole land war with Asia thing. So FBI has
Speaker 1: been very very careful in framing this in a way
Speaker 1: that presents it as a reasonable request, one time thing.
Speaker 1: That's a that's a big deal, right, saying this is
Speaker 1: for one phone and one phone only, you would you know,
Speaker 1: we're suggesting that Apple creates an iOS that's directly tied
Speaker 1: to a unique identifier on that phone, meaning even if
Speaker 1: the iOS were somehow to leak, it would not be
Speaker 1: applicable to any other device on the market, So it
Speaker 1: could only work for this one phone. So that that
Speaker 1: sounds good in its current form. That's that's important. They
Speaker 1: didn't go so far as to say that that's the
Speaker 1: important part that's left out, But yeah, so that's that
Speaker 1: was reasonable. You could argue saying this is for one
Speaker 1: case only. It's it's an important case. People died as
Speaker 1: a result, extraordinary and we need to have a clear
Speaker 1: timeline because we don't know if there's something what is
Speaker 1: there something planned for December two? Right? Or was there
Speaker 1: another person involved that we need to to get hold
Speaker 1: of because otherwise that this could happen again. Um so
Speaker 1: uh they've said, you know one time only, use gonna
Speaker 1: stroy it. After that use Hey, an Apple, if you
Speaker 1: don't want to make this iOS, that's fine, you don't
Speaker 1: have to do it, will do it. We'll hire some
Speaker 1: people to reverse engineer it, build out an iOS ourselves.
Speaker 1: Here's the thing though, Those iPhones will only verify firmware
Speaker 1: if there's a special Apple digital signature attached to the firmware.
Speaker 1: So in other words, if the digital signature, which is
Speaker 1: unique to Apple, if that's not in there, it won't
Speaker 1: be verified by the device, it won't be loaded on
Speaker 1: because Apple famously wants to make sure that their hardware
Speaker 1: and software works together. And that's it. No one else
Speaker 1: gets to play in that plato. Yeah, it's the same
Speaker 1: with their Matt computers forever, right, Like you were really
Speaker 1: meant to run Apple software on Apple hardware and never
Speaker 1: the Twain shall part. So same thing with this iPhone.
Speaker 1: So the fbis is so we're not even asking you
Speaker 1: to give us the digital signature, which would be disastrous
Speaker 1: if Apple did that. The whole point of the signature
Speaker 1: is to make sure that only Apple can do this stuff.
Speaker 1: What they're saying is will make this iOS, will give
Speaker 1: it to you. Yes, you will sign off and send
Speaker 1: it right. You give a little stamp of approval with
Speaker 1: your little digital signature, and then we can load it
Speaker 1: onto this phone. But that way you don't even have
Speaker 1: to build the code. See we're being really reasonable. So
Speaker 1: here's here's the other issue. Apple kind of shot itself
Speaker 1: in the foot. Uh see, this is kind of a
Speaker 1: workaround already, this idea of being able to to create
Speaker 1: a new kind of firmware to work around the the
Speaker 1: security measures while not affecting any of the underlying data.
Speaker 1: The reason why that's possible at all is that Apple
Speaker 1: has allowed for the possibility of issuing a firmware update
Speaker 1: to a phone without the phones owner having to accept it. Ah. Yes, see,
Speaker 1: if Apple had designed this so that when it pushed
Speaker 1: out a firmware update, you as the user, had to
Speaker 1: log into your phone and accept it, there'd be no
Speaker 1: way for Apple to do this because you already have
Speaker 1: to have the pen in order to accept the update.
Speaker 1: So you can't work your way around the pin, because
Speaker 1: even the update to try and do the workaround would
Speaker 1: still need the PEN. But that's not the case. Apple
Speaker 1: can issue a firmware update without the user's consent. This,
Speaker 1: by the way, also a security problem. Not just a
Speaker 1: security problem in this particular case. But what if someone
Speaker 1: at Apple, you know, decided to code it in so
Speaker 1: that you could activate the microphone remotely. Yeah, and they
Speaker 1: and they shoot this firmware update out and you don't
Speaker 1: have the ability to deny it. You might not even
Speaker 1: be aware that it happens unless you happen to be
Speaker 1: using your phone when the from where update gets pushed
Speaker 1: to your phone. That's an issue. So because Apple can
Speaker 1: do this, that gives FBI the the the leg up
Speaker 1: to make this request. So the FBI just is trying
Speaker 1: to be as reasonable as possible in their request while
Speaker 1: avoiding the addressing the problems that could arise should Apple
Speaker 1: agree to it. And yeah, that's that's the thing. Okay,
Speaker 1: that's that's that's the thing. No matter how single use
Speaker 1: this might be, no matter how noble or even crucial
Speaker 1: to cause, right, there's not there is not a practical
Speaker 1: way that this would work without severe repercussions. Yeah, there's
Speaker 1: a there's a word I like to use in this case.
Speaker 1: It's called precedent. So when you set a precedent where
Speaker 1: Apple agrees, acquiesces, surrenders, is compelled to however you want
Speaker 1: to put it to agree to FBI's demands, you can't
Speaker 1: undo that that has happened. And perhaps more importantly, not
Speaker 1: only hasn't happened in the US government, but now other
Speaker 1: governments that operate where Apple sells products could come to
Speaker 1: Apple and say, we know you can do this because
Speaker 1: you have done it, and we know you will do
Speaker 1: this because you did do it. So if you want
Speaker 1: to do business in our country, you know, the one
Speaker 1: that starts with Chu and ends with Aina, you will
Speaker 1: do this for us. And when you're talking about a
Speaker 1: government like China's government, you could see how this could
Speaker 1: be used to to an abusive extent. Anyone who is
Speaker 1: identified as a dissident could be targeted. And China's an
Speaker 1: enormous market. Right, Apple cannot, as a publicly traded company,
Speaker 1: turn its back on the biggest emerging market in the world.
Speaker 1: Not even emerging, it's emerged. The biggest market in the world. Also,
Speaker 1: it's a their manufacturing basis for apples in China. That's
Speaker 1: part of it. That's already been a security concern. Let's
Speaker 1: also consider I mean, if we're being honest, Okay, how
Speaker 1: how do I say this correctly? U Jonathan um Oh? Yes, Okay.
Speaker 1: While there is no universally acknowledged proof that corporate corporate
Speaker 1: espionage projects or operations coming from China are sponsored by
Speaker 1: the government, there is widespread certitude that that is the case.
Speaker 1: Razor right right, Ockom's Razor. You you look at it
Speaker 1: and you think, okay, it is entirely possible that any
Speaker 1: hackers operating in China. One, maybe they're not Chinese, unlikely,
Speaker 1: but possible to Maybe they're operating from a different country
Speaker 1: and using proxies to go through China. But considering the
Speaker 1: firewall of China, that seems like that be extra headache
Speaker 1: for those hackers. Three they could be operating. They could
Speaker 1: be Chinese and operating in China but not be directed
Speaker 1: by the Chinese government, in which case they would still
Speaker 1: have to use proxies in order to access that level
Speaker 1: of infrastructure. It just gets to a point where you
Speaker 1: think the simplest explanation is, in fact, there are these
Speaker 1: state backed hackers that are are doing this on behalf
Speaker 1: or on the request of Chinese government. If not on
Speaker 1: the request, at least with the the implicit approval there
Speaker 1: we go at least someone looking the other way. But
Speaker 1: even that's not enough. There's assistance involved anyway. I'm I'm
Speaker 1: derailing us well. The point being that if if Apple
Speaker 1: were to agree to this FBI request, that is a
Speaker 1: distinct possibility that it would face not only future requests
Speaker 1: from UH from other government agencies as well as the FBI,
Speaker 1: but from other countries as well, and that it would
Speaker 1: it would be the wedge that drives open the possibility
Speaker 1: of things like these back doors that Apple and other
Speaker 1: companies have been resisting for years now. There is one
Speaker 1: other there. There is a case that I think we
Speaker 1: should clarify here. Um when we talk about precedent, there
Speaker 1: have been precedents in the in the legal past wherein
Speaker 1: Uncle Sam was allowed to compel a company right to
Speaker 1: do and this is different, but we do need to
Speaker 1: I think we need to differentiate these because it is
Speaker 1: legal in the US to compel a third party, whether
Speaker 1: an individual or a corporation to um help, how do
Speaker 1: they word it? Like execute a court order or something like. Yeah,
Speaker 1: so you're you're talking about the All Writs Act, right,
Speaker 1: which is a very old thing, back to seventeen eighty nine. Okay,
Speaker 1: the US wasn't even the US very much right there,
Speaker 1: right nine. This is not a smart phone specific law.
Speaker 1: There were still occasional battles with the British going on, okay,
Speaker 1: seventeen nine, yet many of them were not here yet. Yeah,
Speaker 1: seventeen eighty nine is when this writ was was first
Speaker 1: written down as part of the Judiciary Act Um. So specifically,
Speaker 1: what the all Ritz Act allows the government to do
Speaker 1: is to compel a third party to accommodate federal orders
Speaker 1: like a search warrant. So, in other words, the federal
Speaker 1: government can issue a search warrant to law enforcement. The
Speaker 1: law enforcement can go to let's say it's an apartment building.
Speaker 1: They can go to the manager of the apartment building
Speaker 1: and say, we have the search warrant. The all Ritz
Speaker 1: Act tells us that you have to allow us to
Speaker 1: go into this apartment to search it. And then the
Speaker 1: apartment owners says all right and lets them in. Now,
Speaker 1: this serves a couple of different purposes. It expedites, uh,
Speaker 1: the the work of the federal government in in investigations
Speaker 1: and things of that nature, and it also provides a
Speaker 1: protection to those third parties because the third party is
Speaker 1: having to comply with a federal request. And if you
Speaker 1: are a person like an apartment manager and your other
Speaker 1: tenants are coming to you and saying, why are you
Speaker 1: letting them into someone's room without their permission? You can
Speaker 1: say I have to buy law that protects you as
Speaker 1: the owner as well, because it means that you're not
Speaker 1: you're not you're not a rat. You know, you're you're
Speaker 1: you're following the law, you're obeying the law. Right, so
Speaker 1: automatically anything you do in the assistance of the execution
Speaker 1: of that court order is automatically legal. I mean, as
Speaker 1: long as you're as as long as they're not saying, hey,
Speaker 1: we need a search war and you go sure, hey,
Speaker 1: while I'm on the way, do you might ave steal
Speaker 1: a car? Right? Or they'll be or they can't say, hey,
Speaker 1: we're going to get a search warrant. Do you want
Speaker 1: to just listen? Now? That would not be cool. But
Speaker 1: there's a very important idea that's attached to this all
Speaker 1: Ritz Act, which is that and the Supreme Court has
Speaker 1: ruled on this you cannot rely on the all Ritz
Speaker 1: Act to compel a third party to action if it
Speaker 1: creates an unreasonable burden upon that party. So you might say, well,
Speaker 1: what's the unreasonable burden for Apple? I mean, all they're
Speaker 1: asking for is a way around this security system, just
Speaker 1: one time, just a fun time, just the one time.
Speaker 1: So there are actually several counter arguments to this um. First, uh,
Speaker 1: you know, Apple is saying their programmers may not even
Speaker 1: know how to make the code that would allow for
Speaker 1: this to happen. They like, listen, we don't even know
Speaker 1: that we can build this yet, So you're asking us
Speaker 1: to do something that we don't know we can build.
Speaker 1: So that's an unreasonable burden because it means we have
Speaker 1: to dedicate our assets to from from projects that they
Speaker 1: should be working on to trying to figure out if
Speaker 1: this thing is possible and if so, how to do
Speaker 1: it now. The FBI's argument was essentially, Hey, you're in
Speaker 1: the business of writing codes. There should be no problem.
Speaker 1: I would desperately need a bleep sound effect right now,
Speaker 1: but I call b S. Let's be nice I'll call
Speaker 1: bs on that argument, because to me, that's the same
Speaker 1: as coming up to Let's say, let's say Ben that
Speaker 1: you are a cook, yes, and you cook in an
Speaker 1: Italian restaurant. You're you're the Italian restaurant's head cook. Three
Speaker 1: initial int. I go up to you and I say, hey, listen,
Speaker 1: I'm from the federal government. I got this, uh this
Speaker 1: this executive order, this federal order for you. You have
Speaker 1: to now go and make a dinner of Peruvian food
Speaker 1: right now for thirty people that are in the restaurant.
Speaker 1: You can do it because you cook right exactly, or
Speaker 1: it's like saying, yeah, um, it would be a disastrous
Speaker 1: proving dinner at very least a loose interpretation. So like
Speaker 1: for another example, let's say to make it even broader,
Speaker 1: because I think this is this is pretty good too. So, uh, Jonathan,
Speaker 1: let's say that you are a doctor. All right, okay,
Speaker 1: you're at your doctor, doctor Strickland, doctor. Hey call me Jonathan,
Speaker 1: doctor Stricklands. My dad. You So you're an easy going doctor, clearly, um,
Speaker 1: and you are, and uh you're an ear nose and
Speaker 1: throat man. And uh so I come up to you
Speaker 1: and I say, I'm from the federal government. I have
Speaker 1: an executive order, but not an appointment. So you're already
Speaker 1: kind of irritated. And I'm like, and I say, I
Speaker 1: need you to make the cure for answer that's a
Speaker 1: bit much. Yeah, I mean you're a doctor, right, you
Speaker 1: know about organs and stuff cancer affects bodies. Or going
Speaker 1: to Harley Davidson Davidson and saying, look, you you make
Speaker 1: stuff where wheels are connected to chassisas and they turn
Speaker 1: and a motor keeps things going. I need you to
Speaker 1: make a bus. I mean, you see where the where
Speaker 1: it's ridiculous. It's it's you can't argue that because this
Speaker 1: company is in the business of doing this one thing,
Speaker 1: which by the way, is just one part of Apple's business,
Speaker 1: that they are capable of making this other thing that
Speaker 1: happens to fall into that same category. That is ludicrous
Speaker 1: on the face of it. So that's argument number one
Speaker 1: about it being a burden. Okay. The second burden is
Speaker 1: the one that we've already touched on. It sets a precedent.
Speaker 1: If Apple can be forced to attack the security of
Speaker 1: its own system in this case, it can happen again,
Speaker 1: and that would be a disastrous result for consumer Uh,
Speaker 1: you know, confidence in Apple's products that very bad for
Speaker 1: apples bottom line. So if Apple says, look, you will
Speaker 1: make us lose millions, if not billions of dollars in revenue,
Speaker 1: how is that not an unreasonable burden? How can you
Speaker 1: argue that that burden is reasonable? Right? And that's so,
Speaker 1: And not only that, but then you get into the
Speaker 1: the foreign agent approach, the foreign state approach, saying what
Speaker 1: if this means that China comes to us and says,
Speaker 1: because of this other thing that we agreed to do,
Speaker 1: we now have to do it in China all the time,
Speaker 1: and real human beings are being pursued, and uh, their
Speaker 1: lives are are turned upside down and ruined as a
Speaker 1: result of it. And it's all because we have to
Speaker 1: comply because this has already set a precedent. That's an
Speaker 1: that's an unreasonable burden. And finally, they've even said that
Speaker 1: it's a violation of their right to free speech. And
Speaker 1: the reason for that is because code has been ruled
Speaker 1: as a type of free speech in the past. And
Speaker 1: if the government compels Apple to write code that Apple
Speaker 1: doesn't believe in, they're being compelled to speak against their
Speaker 1: own beliefs, thus a violation of free speech. Now that argument,
Speaker 1: most people are saying it's probably the weakest of all
Speaker 1: of their styling on it a little, but I gotta
Speaker 1: admit that's pretty awesome style. Well, yeah, that is. I
Speaker 1: I enjoy it. And there, while it's reaching, it's not invalid.
Speaker 1: And let's consider that Apple legally, in this kind of
Speaker 1: case is playing against Uncle Sam and on its home territory, right.
Speaker 1: And this means that you you might often wonder why
Speaker 1: when the air suits or countersuits are legal problems, why
Speaker 1: so many cases open with just this laundry list of arguments.
Speaker 1: And it's because it's, um, you know, if we could
Speaker 1: go back to my Italian restaurant, Uh, you're just throwing
Speaker 1: the spaghetti at the wall. It's a scattered gun approach,
Speaker 1: or if you prefer, it's casting a very wide net
Speaker 1: because you aren't sure which tactic is necessarily going to
Speaker 1: be your best one from the starting gate, so you
Speaker 1: want to throw out all of them at once. And
Speaker 1: if it's if it's a compelling enough argument, then you
Speaker 1: can get things thrown out before they go any further. Um.
Speaker 1: And in fact, Apple has said that they're willing to
Speaker 1: go all the way to the Supreme Court with this
Speaker 1: particular fight. The CEO said that publicly. Yeah, which interesting
Speaker 1: because I you know, uh, we recently lost a U. S.
Speaker 1: Supreme Court justice here in the United States, and I
Speaker 1: actually think he probably would have sided with Apple on
Speaker 1: this one because of his his very strict view of
Speaker 1: the Constitution, an originalist Anton. Yeah. So, uh, going back
Speaker 1: to this argument of it, I'm going to read a quote,
Speaker 1: and I want to see what your reaction is, because
Speaker 1: I know what mine was. This is from congress spend
Speaker 1: David Jolly of Florida, who said Apple's leadership risks having
Speaker 1: blood on their hands. Ben is shaking his head and
Speaker 1: looking at me in disdain. Not at me, he's looking
Speaker 1: through me. It's absolutely insincere, first off, and it's usually
Speaker 1: whenever you listeners, whenever you hear people make lurid imagery
Speaker 1: based appeals to emotion, right, or these these hyperbolic accusations
Speaker 1: that this is the bread and butter of I'll say it, uh,
Speaker 1: the political class, which political theater exactly. That's a great phrase.
Speaker 1: And so to to say this in such a way.
Speaker 1: What it does is psychologically you get an image of
Speaker 1: somebody with with literal blood on their hands. And then
Speaker 1: you know they're trying to cast aspersion against Apple, not
Speaker 1: by not by making any point about the arguments Apple
Speaker 1: is making, but by going instantly to, uh, these people
Speaker 1: are murderers, right if we don't do why why are
Speaker 1: you defending murderers? That's that's that's essentially you know, uh,
Speaker 1: the argument about you know, it's it's one of those
Speaker 1: those legal arguments you will hear occasionally. This is an
Speaker 1: I legal argument, but it's like the legal arguments you
Speaker 1: will occasionally here where it's clear that the lawyer is
Speaker 1: trying to appeal to the jury's sense of emotion as
Speaker 1: opposed to addressing the facts of the case itself. UM
Speaker 1: So I agree entirely with you. The first reaction I
Speaker 1: had was I'm offended by that statement. I mean, it's condescending,
Speaker 1: and it imagines that it imagines that the person that
Speaker 1: would be swayed by that is not intelligent enough to read,
Speaker 1: and it it deflects the fact that there are two
Speaker 1: people who were responsible for that terrible exam attack, that
Speaker 1: two people, and those two people are the people who
Speaker 1: are holding the guns and pulling the trigger and aiming
Speaker 1: at people. Those those are the ones who have blood
Speaker 1: on their hands, and of course they're they're both dead now.
Speaker 1: They both died in the shootout with the law enforcement.
Speaker 1: But the point being that they're the ones responsible, not Apple.
Speaker 1: Apple did nothing in relation to this crime. In fact,
Speaker 1: Apple didn't give the freaking phone to Fruit that was
Speaker 1: issued by the county. Apple just made some made a
Speaker 1: device that has this level of security on it that
Speaker 1: people wanted. People wanted that level of security. They want
Speaker 1: the reassurance that Apple itself can't access their phones without
Speaker 1: their permission. It's a very important cornerstone of security. In fact,
Speaker 1: if you look at iOS eight or earlier, Apple could
Speaker 1: bypass security. They could they could access the information on
Speaker 1: a phone without your pen, without you acquiescing and allowing
Speaker 1: that to happen. But they specifically change that with iOS nine.
Speaker 1: They made it so that they could not do that
Speaker 1: because they said, it's important for consumers to trust the company.
Speaker 1: And how can you build trust if you know, in
Speaker 1: the back of your mind this company could at any
Speaker 1: moment access my private information that I have not chosen
Speaker 1: to share with them. Uh, well, you know that trust
Speaker 1: is destroyed in that case. That kind of brings us
Speaker 1: back to that unreasonable burden. So the these arguments are continuing.
Speaker 1: Uh I think the next stage doesn't start unill till
Speaker 1: March ten um, and we're recording this on February. So
Speaker 1: I I am very hopeful that the government sides with
Speaker 1: Apple on this ultimately that when this gets the courts
Speaker 1: at any rate side with Apple on this, because if
Speaker 1: they do not, this is the This could be like
Speaker 1: the snowball effect where we see more or requests of
Speaker 1: this nature come in and then once it once it's
Speaker 1: been established as precedent, it's much easier to happen in
Speaker 1: the future, and it's easier to see larger requests like
Speaker 1: things that are that go beyond all we need you
Speaker 1: to help us circumvent the security and may go into
Speaker 1: we need you. We finally are going to get what
Speaker 1: we wanted all this time. We want a direct path
Speaker 1: that like a doorway that's labeled FBI that lets us
Speaker 1: go straight into the data that your users are storing
Speaker 1: on their devices, which leads to because the FBI, this
Speaker 1: leads to a horrific situation because the FBI is an
Speaker 1: institution sure made up of individuals. Remember when the Snowden
Speaker 1: leaks revealed to us the extent of unethical use of
Speaker 1: surveillance by the n s A. People would look up
Speaker 1: their ex girlfriends or they were stark ex boyfriends. Yeah,
Speaker 1: they were just looking up people that they were interested
Speaker 1: in with absolutely no oversight. As a matter of fact,
Speaker 1: when we talked about the Chinese government looking the other
Speaker 1: way for hackers, that was the same thing that occurred
Speaker 1: with the n s A. To to to assume that,
Speaker 1: for some reason, given the opportunity, individuals in another law
Speaker 1: enforcement branch or another institution would not do the same
Speaker 1: thing is cartoonishly naive, you know. Using the argument of
Speaker 1: this is a one time use, that wouldn't stop the
Speaker 1: FBI from requesting another one time use, or another one
Speaker 1: time use, or even extending that beyond it, saying all
Speaker 1: right now, we want a one size fits all approach
Speaker 1: to doing the same thing because it's too much time
Speaker 1: for us. And don't worry, we'll get a court order
Speaker 1: before we do it. We'll make sure that nobody else
Speaker 1: gets access to this ability, and you'll know that the
Speaker 1: court order is good because they'll be classified. So we'll
Speaker 1: just inform you when the orders are approved. I have
Speaker 1: said it many times that there is no way to
Speaker 1: ensure security by enforcing a vulnerability. Yeah, and I think
Speaker 1: that's a student way to encapsulate it. But there is
Speaker 1: a question that I have that I'm sure a lot
Speaker 1: of you have as well, ladies and gentlemen, which is,
Speaker 1: let's say the worst happens. Worst happens, court rules in
Speaker 1: favor of the FBI, and Apple says, no, we're not
Speaker 1: going to do it. Well, I mean if if the court,
Speaker 1: assuming he goes all the way up to the Supreme Court,
Speaker 1: this could end up becoming a matter of law where
Speaker 1: it's codified that companies have to obey that within the
Speaker 1: United States, which would mean far reaching implications, not just
Speaker 1: for Apple, but for all companies everyone, any any tech company,
Speaker 1: any company, really, any company doing business in the US,
Speaker 1: not even based here, because doing business so that's a
Speaker 1: big deal. It's it's potentially disastrous for privacy. Uh, there's
Speaker 1: ampen possibilities of misuse. We've talked about the possibility that
Speaker 1: if you do create a vulnerability, someone somewhere is going
Speaker 1: to try and figure out a way to also gain
Speaker 1: access to that vulnerability. And these are not necessarily other
Speaker 1: law agencies or intelligence agencies, or maybe they are intelligence agencies.
Speaker 1: They just have to be intelligence agencies working for a
Speaker 1: different country. And yeah, and here's the problem, because we've
Speaker 1: talked about this before, man, I legislation, I think we
Speaker 1: talked about this with autonomous vehicles before. Legislation is almost
Speaker 1: always outpaced by technological innovation. Yes, yeah, but you will
Speaker 1: almost always see a case where someone has figured out
Speaker 1: something really interesting to do with technology, or perhaps even
Speaker 1: really scary things they could do with technology, and there
Speaker 1: are no laws to cover it because before that person
Speaker 1: figured it out, it didn't exist. So you don't write
Speaker 1: laws for stuff that doesn't exist. We don't have a
Speaker 1: law saying listen, guys, I just I just it's keep
Speaker 1: me up at night. We have got to write a
Speaker 1: law about what happens in the case that the Lockness
Speaker 1: Monster is real, gets out of Scotland, comes over to
Speaker 1: New Jersey and starts to eat people. We need a
Speaker 1: law to protect us from this potential catastrophe. Iculous. Yeah,
Speaker 1: Like if we're senators, everyone in the audience and you,
Speaker 1: Jonathan myself, and then one of us walks in and says, guys,
Speaker 1: I know that, uh, I know that we have some
Speaker 1: other issues coming up, and we have to nominate this
Speaker 1: Court justice, and there's an election coming up. But I
Speaker 1: think we need to look into the future and look
Speaker 1: at the big picture, which is moon boot theft right,
Speaker 1: because I don't want people shoelace on the moon when
Speaker 1: and if we build a colony there. I think arguing example,
Speaker 1: for example, for robot rights right now might be a
Speaker 1: little premature that kind of thing. Maybe not forever, but
Speaker 1: for now, it's definitely it's good to think about. But
Speaker 1: you know, you make a very astute point when you say,
Speaker 1: if we're talking about codifying something, we codifying a law,
Speaker 1: then what what happens is once the Supreme Court rules
Speaker 1: on something like this and it becomes a matter of law,
Speaker 1: it is much It is very, very difficult to get
Speaker 1: that kind of ruling. The Supremes are pretty busy people.
Speaker 1: They don't hear every case that's brought before. They absolutely don't.
Speaker 1: And then but the thing is, you think it's hard
Speaker 1: to get one of the to get those justices to
Speaker 1: change the substance of American jurisprudence. Imagine trying to get
Speaker 1: him to change it back. This is like a Pandora's
Speaker 1: box Pandora's jar situation. Yeah, now this is not not good.
Speaker 1: You don't want this to happen for multiple reasons. Now,
Speaker 1: all that being said, our our sympathies with the families
Speaker 1: of those who are wounded and killed as a result
Speaker 1: of this mass shooting. Absolutely I feel awful for them.
Speaker 1: And if there were any other way to get to
Speaker 1: that information that did not require Apple to be complicit
Speaker 1: in destroying its own security, I would be in favor
Speaker 1: of it. And in fact, the FBI has taken such
Speaker 1: pains they got access to the iCloud backups that this
Speaker 1: phone creates. The problem being that the phone didn't have
Speaker 1: an eye cloud backup for the month leading up to
Speaker 1: the actual attacks, so there could be information on the
Speaker 1: phone that's not on the cloud, and that's why the
Speaker 1: FBI wants to get access to that. I totally understand
Speaker 1: the reasoning behind it. But but two things, of course
Speaker 1: keep me from being completely sympathetic. One is that the
Speaker 1: FBI has for years been trying to get backdoor access
Speaker 1: to multiple systems. Yeah, so that so you could argue
Speaker 1: that perhaps this mass shooting is being leveraged cynically by
Speaker 1: the FBI in order to further their goals, because it's
Speaker 1: hard to say no to such an emotionally devastating event.
Speaker 1: I would say, I do, I do know, I believe it.
Speaker 1: And this is just my personal opinion based on again precedent.
Speaker 1: It is completely within the realm of not only possibility
Speaker 1: but plausibility that an institution would wait for an opportune
Speaker 1: time to make this this kind of legislation, like the
Speaker 1: argument for internet surveillance based on saying, hey, we need
Speaker 1: to protect people, we need to protect you from um
Speaker 1: inappropriate content and your children, think of the kids. Really,
Speaker 1: this is this is a lot of the same stuff
Speaker 1: we heard in the wake of the Patriot Act, where
Speaker 1: a lot of people felt the Patriot Act was a
Speaker 1: reactionary uh, piece of legislation that was drafted far too
Speaker 1: quickly and what had had reached far, far too wide
Speaker 1: for what it was proposing. What what what? What everyone
Speaker 1: claimed it was all about, and Uh, that was a
Speaker 1: big mess. This is also potentially a really big mess.
Speaker 1: And the Patriot Act, the substance of it was pretty
Speaker 1: much had been written in advance. Yeah yeah, which is
Speaker 1: pretty like now that used to be a controversial statement,
Speaker 1: but now it's acknowledged. Yeah, So this is this is uh,
Speaker 1: I mean the fact that FBI has had this plan
Speaker 1: for a while, not the specific implementation, but this desire
Speaker 1: to get this workaround access to things. And I mean,
Speaker 1: I totally understand their point of view. Two, they're trying
Speaker 1: to investigate things. It's not like the FBI is necessarily
Speaker 1: made up of the cigarette smoking man and all of
Speaker 1: his cronies. You know, I'm not I'm not going I don't.
Speaker 1: I don't mean to to uh disparage them. I don't
Speaker 1: want to demonize them, Right, That's not That's not what
Speaker 1: I'm trying to get at. Either. The FBI's intentions may
Speaker 1: in fact be nothing but noble that they want this
Speaker 1: in the effort to investigate, solve crime, prevent crime from happening,
Speaker 1: and not in any way that is uh malevolent. However,
Speaker 1: the fact remains, whether their intentions are noble or not,
Speaker 1: it opens up this opportunity for people whose intentions are
Speaker 1: demonstrably not noble to take advantage of those same opportunities. Yeah,
Speaker 1: and you know, I'm glad you said that because I
Speaker 1: want to see something that I want to add to this,
Speaker 1: something that has rarely said when we talk about um
Speaker 1: government surveillance or concerns about privacy right. One thing that
Speaker 1: is rarely said is that law enforcement agencies, law enforcement institutions,
Speaker 1: and individuals in the US actually do quite, um, quite
Speaker 1: an extraordinary job compared to a lot of places. If
Speaker 1: you're fortunate enough to grow up in a place that
Speaker 1: has rule of law, where you can walk down the
Speaker 1: street in the dark, or you can say, you can say, uh,
Speaker 1: you know, whomever your senator president is, you can go
Speaker 1: on the internet and say, I think they stink. I
Speaker 1: think you're in jerk. Yeah, I think you're the piece
Speaker 1: of bologna with shoes. And then but in other countries,
Speaker 1: we you know, people get arrested for that, people get imprisoned.
Speaker 1: So we're not gonna raced, Yes, not just arrested or imprisoned,
Speaker 1: but the government in some countries will take steps to
Speaker 1: make it seem like that person was never a person exactly.
Speaker 1: They'll keep the photos, but you won't be in them.
Speaker 1: And and I say that because it's a sense of
Speaker 1: much needed perspective. However, you know, I'm not demonizing the
Speaker 1: people who work at the FBI. Institutions, whether private or public,
Speaker 1: seek power. They seek uh further further, influence. And that's
Speaker 1: not that's not because it's some sort of James Bond supervillain.
Speaker 1: It's not specter. It's not specter. And it's because it
Speaker 1: allows for it allows for an easier, more efficient pursuit
Speaker 1: of whatever the original mission would be right, and sometimes
Speaker 1: that ends up stepping over a line that should not
Speaker 1: be crossed. So so yeah, like like Ben and I
Speaker 1: we both talk about things that here at work where
Speaker 1: we say, gosh, I wish we had X because it
Speaker 1: would make our lives so much easier. Well, even if
Speaker 1: we got X, we would come up with why. That
Speaker 1: would be the next one we get X. X is awesome,
Speaker 1: X is helping us out. We're like, oh man, it's
Speaker 1: so good to have X here. Yeah, it would be
Speaker 1: great if we had why because if we had why,
Speaker 1: we could really do our jobs. Well we get why,
Speaker 1: and then you know, man, X and Why are working
Speaker 1: out like a dream. But boy, if we had Z,
Speaker 1: can you imagine the level we get to Now what
Speaker 1: we do Ben, we make fun audio podcasts, videos and
Speaker 1: articles that go on the Internet, and that's awesome and
Speaker 1: so really our capacity to do horrible, horrible harm is
Speaker 1: fairly limited. I mean in respect to how our jobs comparatively. Yeah. Granted,
Speaker 1: if either of us wanted to go outside and just
Speaker 1: start throwing kingop hops popsicles at people, we could go
Speaker 1: on a popsicle rampage. But that's that's not that's not
Speaker 1: job related. The FBI, the c, I, A, N, S A,
Speaker 1: a lot of those three letter organizations, in pursuit of
Speaker 1: what they need to do in order to to fulfill
Speaker 1: their their organization's mission, in some cases will step over
Speaker 1: lines that we cannot allow people to cross because it
Speaker 1: creates a system that is at least as dangerous as
Speaker 1: whatever problem they're trying to solve. Another example of this
Speaker 1: is the the idea that the idea of absolute prevention.
Speaker 1: Like you know, there was the old conversation about tortures
Speaker 1: several years ago when it was the ticking time bomb argument,
Speaker 1: which was, should torture be legal if there is a
Speaker 1: criminal in custody who has suspected of having knowledge of
Speaker 1: another nine eleven here? Yeah, yeah, Jack Bauer from twenty
Speaker 1: four kind of argument. Should torture, while reprehensible, be allowed
Speaker 1: when it gets results? And this, this kind of reasoning
Speaker 1: is dangerous. Not I'm not saying that because of any
Speaker 1: desire to see human tragedy if I'm saying it's dangerous
Speaker 1: because of the assumptions it makes that a special case
Speaker 1: will remain a special case, right, and that perhaps the
Speaker 1: next case, which maybe is that quite so special, Like, well,
Speaker 1: you know we've done it before, So what's the deal here? Yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean what happened? Yeah, So this is this is
Speaker 1: exactly why neither I think I feel pretty strongly about this.
Speaker 1: I think I'm on the right track that neither you
Speaker 1: nor I feel that the FBI should win out in
Speaker 1: this particular case. I think this is something where we
Speaker 1: really need to see Apple come out on top. I
Speaker 1: am not a huge fan of Apple. I don't own
Speaker 1: a lot of Apple products I have. Apple does not
Speaker 1: sponsor this show. I'm not getting any money from Apple.
Speaker 1: If anything, I'm losing money to Apple because my wife
Speaker 1: is a fan, so she wants to get an Apple Watch,
Speaker 1: but I am not. I'm not getting anything from Apple. Uh.
Speaker 1: I do think they're in the right because I don't
Speaker 1: want to see a precedent where a company that creates
Speaker 1: a secure system has to be or can be compelled
Speaker 1: to compromise that security. It defeats the purpose of the security,
Speaker 1: and whether it's this case, which is extraordinary and very emotional,
Speaker 1: or something much less impactful for the general public. Maybe
Speaker 1: it's something, you know, uh, simpler and less dramatic. It
Speaker 1: doesn't matter. You cannot you cannot go down that pathway,
Speaker 1: uh and expect things to turn out all right. You've
Speaker 1: got to figure out other ways to do that kind
Speaker 1: of investigation. Either Apple needs to go in a direction
Speaker 1: where they can, uh, they can access user data without
Speaker 1: having to circumvent a security system like this, which means
Speaker 1: they have to go backwards, which can really is not
Speaker 1: a possibility. Or Apple and other companies have to create
Speaker 1: systems where it really is impossible for them to access
Speaker 1: without the consent or the actions of the owner of
Speaker 1: the device. I suspect that every company is rushing to
Speaker 1: develop that kind of approach right now, because none of
Speaker 1: them want to be in this position. Facebook, Google, Microsoft
Speaker 1: all publicly showed support for Apple. Apple right now is
Speaker 1: um you know, part of Apple hired a dev that
Speaker 1: worked on Edward Snowden's favorite messaging app obasually Yeah, and uh,
Speaker 1: and I don't know how much of that is meant
Speaker 1: to be like a pr move, but also they have
Speaker 1: um you know, the leaked Snowden papers are out there,
Speaker 1: and I know I'm harping on them. They revealed an
Speaker 1: ugly behind the scenes look at corporate involvement with government
Speaker 1: requests for surveillance. You know, so the average consumer you me, uh,
Speaker 1: Gary Busey, whomever, we have much less trust in general
Speaker 1: in these companies because we have a reason not to
Speaker 1: trust them. Well, we we have handed over so much
Speaker 1: of our own personal data. We trust that the devices
Speaker 1: that hold that personal data aren't going to just give
Speaker 1: that away to whatever entity, uh, without our consent. We
Speaker 1: we trust that that's not going to happen. When things
Speaker 1: like this pop up where we start to question that trust,
Speaker 1: that's problematic. There's someone else that Apple has recently hired,
Speaker 1: Ted Olsen. Does that name sound familiar to you? Ted?
Speaker 1: Ted Olson's a lawyer. Uh so, Ted Olson is going
Speaker 1: to be representing Apple. Ted Olson's probably best known for
Speaker 1: representing George W. Bush in the Bush versus Gore election fallout.
Speaker 1: You know, for those of you in the United States
Speaker 1: when when Bush was running against Gore, there was this
Speaker 1: whole battle about you know, voting recounts, voting recounts, and
Speaker 1: Olsen represented uh, W. George W. Bush on that and
Speaker 1: Bush ended up winning that. So now he's representing Apple
Speaker 1: in this particular battle with the FBI. So interesting to
Speaker 1: see these kinds of personalities involved in this. And I
Speaker 1: know that with the public perception it's been a little
Speaker 1: sea saw ish, But general public, I would argue, the
Speaker 1: people who are not necessarily paying attention to the text sphere,
Speaker 1: I think a lot of them are siting with the
Speaker 1: FBI because it's a terrorist story. It's a story about
Speaker 1: trying to establish the most information about these these shooters
Speaker 1: as possible. Do you think I do? I think that.
Speaker 1: I think at least a lot of polls that I've
Speaker 1: seen leading up to today, the general public tends to
Speaker 1: side with the I because the FBI has a very
Speaker 1: emotional story. Apples story is much more rationally based, intellectually based, um,
Speaker 1: and the FBI story is is penned on this event,
Speaker 1: this very emotionally charged event. UM. I don't know that
Speaker 1: that's going to continue. I think. I think people who
Speaker 1: are savvy in the text sphere, I think the majority
Speaker 1: of them side with Apple. But it's still because it's
Speaker 1: still it goes back to the taking time bomb argument.
Speaker 1: You know, yeah. Yeah, So this is one of the
Speaker 1: stories that we definitely had to cover. I mean, obviously
Speaker 1: it's it's such a huge it's probably the biggest story
Speaker 1: in tech right now as we record this, um, and
Speaker 1: I'm glad that you could join Mayben to to chat
Speaker 1: about this, to kind of give your your insight as well,
Speaker 1: and to talk about why this is so important, not
Speaker 1: just from a technology standpoint, but just a philosophical standpoint
Speaker 1: in a matter of law as well. So then where
Speaker 1: can people find other stuff what you do? Ah? Yes, uh, well,
Speaker 1: if for any audience members who are interested in stories
Speaker 1: about Big Brother and overarching government surveillance, you can join
Speaker 1: me along with my producers Noel Brown and Matt Frederick
Speaker 1: at our show Stuff they don't want you to know,
Speaker 1: on which you have made several appearances, Jonathan. I enjoyed
Speaker 1: all of them. Oh, thank you. I like it when
Speaker 1: we go on the pun tangents, which sadly doesn't happen
Speaker 1: too much off air. But oh and side note, folks, Yeah,
Speaker 1: I know we didn't make very many jokes today, but
Speaker 1: that's because I think I can I can say you know,
Speaker 1: you and I are on the same page with this.
Speaker 1: This is a very important issue, more more important than
Speaker 1: it may appear at the time. Yeah, we we made
Speaker 1: light of a few of the arguments simply because we
Speaker 1: scot off at the uh the stated intent as opposed
Speaker 1: to what we believe is the true intent of them. Yeah,
Speaker 1: we've done that a couple of times. But and also,
Speaker 1: you know, we do acknowledge that this ultimately is being
Speaker 1: tied back to a really awful event. I mean, we
Speaker 1: can't you know, we can't get around that, and you
Speaker 1: have to acknowledge it and be respectful, I think, right.
Speaker 1: And plus uh, Plus we think we're funny, so that too,
Speaker 1: and we want you to remember that we think we're funny, right,
Speaker 1: that's our opinion. We don't we don't expect you to
Speaker 1: find us funny. That would be presumptuous, but we are.
Speaker 1: We think we're pretty hilarious. You can also find me
Speaker 1: with my co host Scott Benjamin, who has appeared on
Speaker 1: Tech Stuff as well. On our show Car Stuff is
Speaker 1: show about everything that floats, flies, swims, or drives Jonathan.
Speaker 1: Folks can see us uh together even at times on
Speaker 1: our shows What the Stuff and Brain Stuff, which answers
Speaker 1: every day science. Why does popcorn pop what is it
Speaker 1: GPS and uh I know that this is something I
Speaker 1: recommend every time if there's someone who hasn't checked it
Speaker 1: out yet. You have another show called Forward Thinking, which
Speaker 1: is a bright, cheery show about the future, and it
Speaker 1: really is. It's a very it's it's an optimistic view
Speaker 1: of what our future can be based upon the very
Speaker 1: long history of humankind coming up with ingenious solutions to
Speaker 1: big problems. Well, yeah, and you have, um, you have
Speaker 1: some great questions on there. The research is top notch.
Speaker 1: This is a video and an audio series, so I
Speaker 1: highly recommend it. Well, thank you so much, Ben, and
Speaker 1: I really do hope that you and I get the
Speaker 1: opportunity to do some more of those videos together. It's
Speaker 1: been a long time since we've done a two person episode.
Speaker 1: I wish you know what I wish I could tell
Speaker 1: everyone is to go to Brooklyn and catch the two
Speaker 1: of us competing and what was it Thendunderdome. Yeah, there's
Speaker 1: gonna be no no puns barred and we go there. Alright. So,
Speaker 1: guy is, if you have any suggestions for future episodes
Speaker 1: of Text Stuff, let me know. Send me an email.
Speaker 1: The addresses tech Stuff at how stuff Works dot com,
Speaker 1: or you can drop me a line on Facebook or Twitter.
Speaker 1: The handle of both of those is text stuff H
Speaker 1: s W and I will talk to you guys again
Speaker 1: really soon. For more on this and thousands of other topics,
Speaker 1: is it how stuff works dot com