WEBVTT - Apple vs the FBI 0:00:04.519 --> 0:00:13.920 Technology Stuff from Hey there, and welcome to Tech Stuff. 0:00:13.960 --> 0:00:17.040 I am your host Jonathan Strickland joining me in the 0:00:17.079 --> 0:00:21.320 studio today. He's my friend, he's yours. He's Ben Boland, Ben, 0:00:21.360 --> 0:00:23.920 welcome back to the show. Hey, Jonathan, thank you so 0:00:24.000 --> 0:00:27.360 much for having me on the show. Even though we 0:00:27.600 --> 0:00:32.280 know that we're both going to have to work assiduously 0:00:33.360 --> 0:00:36.040 to keep this a family friendly show. You've invited me 0:00:36.200 --> 0:00:39.720 on to talk about, Yeah, talk about a subject that 0:00:40.440 --> 0:00:44.360 is guaranteed to get us. As my grandfather would say, 0:00:44.479 --> 0:00:49.200 all head up, we get all head up in here. Yeah, 0:00:49.240 --> 0:00:52.520 So we're gonna talk about something that's actually we're gonna 0:00:52.520 --> 0:00:54.480 have to work very hard for multiple reasons, because we're 0:00:54.480 --> 0:00:58.880 talking about Apple versus the FBI, the whole story that's 0:00:59.000 --> 0:01:03.480 unfolding as we record this um and to talk about 0:01:03.520 --> 0:01:07.480 what is behind that case, what are the implications, what 0:01:07.640 --> 0:01:11.200 is the FBI's argument, what is Apple's argument? And in 0:01:11.560 --> 0:01:16.040 addition to that, we have, of course the added responsibility 0:01:16.080 --> 0:01:21.080 of remembering that this is all centered around a truly 0:01:21.400 --> 0:01:26.360 awful crime. Yes, absolutely so. The what we're what we're 0:01:26.400 --> 0:01:31.920 talking about specifically hit mainstream news when Apple did something 0:01:31.959 --> 0:01:35.720 that a lot of tech companies have never done. They 0:01:35.840 --> 0:01:41.720 issued a blanket statement letter and went public with a 0:01:42.720 --> 0:01:45.759 They went public with a response to an FBI request. 0:01:45.800 --> 0:01:47.360 But I guess I'm getting ahead of it. What was 0:01:47.400 --> 0:01:49.520 the crime? Well, let's yeah, let's I'll give you the 0:01:49.560 --> 0:01:53.320 background on what's happened and we'll we'll build from there. 0:01:53.440 --> 0:01:56.240 So first we have to look back on December two, 0:01:56.600 --> 0:02:00.520 two thousand fifteen, uh and San Bernardino, Kelly, Flornia. That's 0:02:00.520 --> 0:02:05.280 in southern California, and that's when to well, an American 0:02:05.360 --> 0:02:10.320 citizen and I legal resident, husband wife team, both of 0:02:10.440 --> 0:02:17.280 Pakistani descent, committed a mass shooting. It was a Sayed 0:02:17.400 --> 0:02:22.640 Rizwan Faruk and tash Feen Malik who committed this act, 0:02:22.800 --> 0:02:25.200 and it happened at the Department of Public Health. They 0:02:25.240 --> 0:02:28.200 were having an event that was starting off as a 0:02:28.240 --> 0:02:32.079 training event and then it was supposed to transition into 0:02:32.160 --> 0:02:37.359 a holiday event. And after the training element. Faruk, who 0:02:37.360 --> 0:02:39.680 was actually at the event, he was in the employee 0:02:39.680 --> 0:02:43.400 of the Department of Public Health, he was a food inspector, left, 0:02:43.919 --> 0:02:46.680 came back with his wife. They were both heavily armed 0:02:47.160 --> 0:02:50.600 and they both started firing into the crowd of people 0:02:50.639 --> 0:02:53.280 at the Department of Public Health. Fourteen people were killed, 0:02:53.400 --> 0:02:59.760 twenty two injured. Very serious crime. Then uh Faruke and 0:03:00.040 --> 0:03:04.960 Malite left. They fled the scene. Turned out they had 0:03:04.960 --> 0:03:09.200 also left behind an explosive device, which thankfully did not detonate. 0:03:10.280 --> 0:03:13.679 Failed to detonate uh and they they fled in a 0:03:14.680 --> 0:03:18.520 vehicle that they had rented a few days before, and 0:03:18.600 --> 0:03:21.680 several hours later law enforcement tracked them down. There was 0:03:21.720 --> 0:03:25.720 a confrontation, there was a shootout UH and then both 0:03:26.000 --> 0:03:29.440 of the shooters died as a result of that shootout. 0:03:29.880 --> 0:03:33.360 The FBI has stated that they believed, based upon the 0:03:33.400 --> 0:03:35.720 evidence they were able to find that the two were 0:03:35.760 --> 0:03:38.040 acting on their own, that they were not part of 0:03:38.080 --> 0:03:41.640 some sort of terrorist cell in the United States. However, 0:03:41.680 --> 0:03:44.480 they can't be absolutely certain of that. That's where the 0:03:44.920 --> 0:03:48.000 crux of this issue with Apple is going to come 0:03:48.000 --> 0:03:51.840 into play. And the big part of it is they 0:03:51.880 --> 0:03:57.200 can't account for it's just less than twenty minutes of 0:03:57.200 --> 0:04:02.240 the activity that happened between the shooting or leading up 0:04:02.240 --> 0:04:04.800 to the shooting, and around the shooting, because they're they're 0:04:04.800 --> 0:04:08.520 thinking that there's a possibility that something that happened within 0:04:08.560 --> 0:04:11.200 that time could give them more information and at least 0:04:11.200 --> 0:04:15.280 allow them to confirm whether or not they truly acted 0:04:15.320 --> 0:04:17.640 on their own or if they were under the direction 0:04:17.800 --> 0:04:21.599 of some other group, which could potentially and this is 0:04:21.640 --> 0:04:25.680 an FBI argument, which could potentially give the government the 0:04:25.760 --> 0:04:29.599 ability to prevent a future attack. And more to that point, 0:04:29.920 --> 0:04:33.560 neither of them had been listed in any database as 0:04:33.560 --> 0:04:38.160 a potential threat. So that puts extra pressure on the government, 0:04:38.279 --> 0:04:43.599 right because citizens say, well, why did this happen? The 0:04:43.640 --> 0:04:49.000 government says, we followed procedure and neither of them registered 0:04:49.040 --> 0:04:51.839 on any of ours and there are no red flags, 0:04:51.920 --> 0:04:55.000 so we had no way of knowing. And uh, that 0:04:55.040 --> 0:04:58.480 means there's actual extra pressure on the FBI to investigate 0:04:58.480 --> 0:05:02.680 this thoroughly, partially to show that in fact, everything that 0:05:02.720 --> 0:05:06.440 could be done had been done short of taking some 0:05:06.560 --> 0:05:09.640 extreme step that none of us want to see. Right, 0:05:09.680 --> 0:05:12.760 the idea of like, okay, everyone of Pakistani descent has 0:05:12.800 --> 0:05:16.120 to leave the country. That's ridiculous. We would that's that's 0:05:16.200 --> 0:05:18.479 returning to an era of the United States history that 0:05:18.520 --> 0:05:20.360 we do not want to revisit, like a World War 0:05:20.400 --> 0:05:23.919 two internment camp situation. Yeah, we don't want that. We 0:05:23.960 --> 0:05:27.120 don't want that because it is never fair to lump 0:05:27.200 --> 0:05:29.880 innocent people in for fear that one of them might 0:05:29.880 --> 0:05:33.359 be guilty. That's not cool, right, this is I'm already 0:05:33.360 --> 0:05:34.880 getting angry and i haven't even gotten to the part 0:05:34.920 --> 0:05:37.480 about the apple stuff yet. I'm going for a slow burning, 0:05:38.080 --> 0:05:42.000 that's fair. So one of the thing that's that all 0:05:42.000 --> 0:05:45.360 of this is about, ostensibly any at any rate, is 0:05:45.839 --> 0:05:50.760 an iPhone. It's specifically an iPhone five C, probably running 0:05:50.760 --> 0:05:57.080 iOS nine. That's based upon the various public filings we've 0:05:57.120 --> 0:06:00.919 seen about this um and it was county owned. It 0:06:01.000 --> 0:06:03.719 was owned by the Department of Public Health and then 0:06:03.760 --> 0:06:06.960 issued to Farouke who worked for the department Department of 0:06:06.960 --> 0:06:10.200 Public Health, so it was county owned. The FBI went 0:06:10.240 --> 0:06:12.599 to the county and said, we want your permission to 0:06:12.760 --> 0:06:15.839 access the contents on this phone. The county said, of course, 0:06:15.880 --> 0:06:18.800 you have our permission. You can access it. Now. If 0:06:18.800 --> 0:06:21.359 that's all there were to it, it would be fine. 0:06:21.400 --> 0:06:24.080 I would just access the phone. They've already received permission 0:06:24.120 --> 0:06:27.400 from the phone's owner, and they could call through it 0:06:27.440 --> 0:06:29.839 to look for any evidence that would lead them to 0:06:29.880 --> 0:06:35.960 more information about this crime. But there is a security 0:06:36.040 --> 0:06:38.640 measure on the phone, and it's a very simple one. 0:06:38.680 --> 0:06:42.400 It's on lots of smartphones. It's it's a little password. 0:06:42.480 --> 0:06:46.359 In this case, it's a a four or six digit 0:06:46.640 --> 0:06:50.840 pin which can be alpha numeric if you activate that 0:06:51.279 --> 0:06:53.920 option on the six digit. So it's one of the two. 0:06:54.000 --> 0:06:59.320 We don't know which, and without that pen, you cannot 0:06:59.360 --> 0:07:03.880 access the the information because the way the pen works. 0:07:03.920 --> 0:07:05.280 This is where we get into the tech stuff. Been 0:07:06.440 --> 0:07:09.160 There are two levels of encryption. You are two keys 0:07:09.240 --> 0:07:11.880 to this encryption. One of the keys is the pen. 0:07:12.560 --> 0:07:16.400 The other key is hard coded onto the device itself. 0:07:17.160 --> 0:07:19.880 All right, it's only it's if you think about movies 0:07:19.920 --> 0:07:22.760 like those nineties movies with the nuclear power, where you 0:07:22.840 --> 0:07:26.280 have to have two generals put their keys into the 0:07:26.320 --> 0:07:28.600 same sort of thing. So if you don't have the pen, 0:07:29.240 --> 0:07:32.280 it can't combine with the hardware key, and therefore you 0:07:32.320 --> 0:07:37.040 cannot unlock the information. The idea here is that Apple 0:07:37.560 --> 0:07:42.520 doesn't have the pen, right, which is cool because it 0:07:42.560 --> 0:07:46.280 means that if you or I or you listeners have 0:07:46.760 --> 0:07:50.720 an iPhone, it means you can trust Apple because they 0:07:50.800 --> 0:07:55.200 don't know your pin, right, they can't access your phone. Uh, 0:07:55.480 --> 0:07:57.800 you know that That was the whole point one. Two 0:07:57.840 --> 0:08:00.760 points one. Apple wanted to make its cure enough so 0:08:00.840 --> 0:08:03.880 that consumers would say, I feel good about buying an 0:08:03.880 --> 0:08:07.280 iPhone because I know whatever I store on it, whether 0:08:07.800 --> 0:08:10.520 it's something that's personal or it's just you know, it's 0:08:10.520 --> 0:08:13.480 no one else's business, whatever it may be, no one 0:08:13.520 --> 0:08:15.200 else is going to have access to that unless I 0:08:15.240 --> 0:08:19.640 give them my pen. It's good for Apple, not just 0:08:19.680 --> 0:08:23.040 because consumers are happy, but because Apple then hasn't out 0:08:23.320 --> 0:08:25.040 If the government comes to Apple and says, hey, we 0:08:25.040 --> 0:08:27.200 want you to break into this phone, they can literally 0:08:27.240 --> 0:08:30.000 say we cannot do that. It's not that we will not, 0:08:30.200 --> 0:08:34.000 it's that we literally physically cannot grant your request because 0:08:34.040 --> 0:08:38.199 it's impossible. And there's also I would just to expound 0:08:38.240 --> 0:08:42.120 that point a little bit further. This I'm not suggesting 0:08:42.120 --> 0:08:46.360 as their conscious will or intention, but this also removes 0:08:46.440 --> 0:08:51.680 possible culpability. Yes, yes, so all of these are very 0:08:51.720 --> 0:08:54.679 important points. Right, So let's get into a little bit 0:08:54.720 --> 0:08:57.400 more of why the FBI is coming to Apple. So 0:08:58.480 --> 0:09:01.280 let's say that it's a four digit pin all right, 0:09:01.480 --> 0:09:07.040 all numeric, simplest version. That means there are ten thousand 0:09:07.080 --> 0:09:11.040 combinations that are possible for that pen. That's it. That's 0:09:11.200 --> 0:09:14.080 you're limited to ten thousand, which is that's a lot, 0:09:14.640 --> 0:09:16.400 but it's not that much if you're going to do 0:09:16.640 --> 0:09:19.199 something like a brute force attack. Right. So if you 0:09:19.240 --> 0:09:22.120 do a brute force attack on a normal system, and 0:09:22.160 --> 0:09:24.840 there are only ten thousand variations, it's with a fast 0:09:24.920 --> 0:09:27.640 enough computer, it's just a matter of minutes. But there's 0:09:27.679 --> 0:09:32.439 some limitations on the iPhone that make this harder. Does 0:09:32.480 --> 0:09:36.120 it freeze if you enter the incorrect pen? It does 0:09:36.160 --> 0:09:38.880 more than freeze, right, So, first of all, there is 0:09:38.880 --> 0:09:42.400 an eighty millisecond delay when you enter a pen and 0:09:42.440 --> 0:09:44.720 when it gets verified that it is or is not 0:09:45.000 --> 0:09:48.800 the correct one. Right, So with that eighty millisecond delay, 0:09:48.960 --> 0:09:51.280 that doesn't sound like much, but it means you can't 0:09:51.360 --> 0:09:54.520 just blast a whole bunch of numbers through. Also, you 0:09:54.559 --> 0:09:56.559 have to type it in on a screen. You can't 0:09:56.960 --> 0:09:59.400 hook it up to a computer and just digitally send 0:10:00.040 --> 0:10:03.000 the various pen combinations to try and get through. You 0:10:03.040 --> 0:10:05.280 have to actually tap them on on the screen to 0:10:05.760 --> 0:10:07.680 do it over and over. So that means you tap 0:10:07.720 --> 0:10:11.000 in the number eighty milliseconds pass, you get the confirmation 0:10:11.080 --> 0:10:17.240 or denial, tap in the number next. Uh, if you 0:10:17.440 --> 0:10:23.560 hit ten consecutive incorrect pen entries the phone interprets that 0:10:23.679 --> 0:10:26.160 is saying someone else who is not the owner has 0:10:26.200 --> 0:10:28.840 gotten possession of this phone. So in order to protect 0:10:28.840 --> 0:10:33.319 the owner's information, we're scrambling everything, and you lose all 0:10:33.360 --> 0:10:37.400 the metadata. Everything is useless. So even if you got 0:10:37.400 --> 0:10:39.720 the pen afterward, you would not be able to access 0:10:39.720 --> 0:10:41.319 the stuff you were looking for in the first place. 0:10:41.360 --> 0:10:43.840 You would maybe be able to turn on the phone, 0:10:43.880 --> 0:10:45.719 but there wouldn't be anything there to find. Yeah, you 0:10:46.000 --> 0:10:48.840 would have, just you would have just it would be 0:10:48.880 --> 0:10:52.000 like you just accidentally set fire to the file room, 0:10:52.360 --> 0:10:54.199 like you know, like you can't get into the file 0:10:54.280 --> 0:10:57.319 room door, and whatever you try and do accidentally sets 0:10:57.320 --> 0:10:59.439 a fire inside the file room. You then get the 0:10:59.480 --> 0:11:01.280 key to the aisle room, and then you think, well, 0:11:01.600 --> 0:11:06.119 what's the point you lost everything? And it's it's virtually assured. 0:11:06.640 --> 0:11:11.120 Yeah that out of those yeah, out of those ten 0:11:11.160 --> 0:11:14.880 thousand tries, your first ten are going to be wrong. Yeah, 0:11:14.960 --> 0:11:17.320 I mean, just the odds are pretty much against you, 0:11:17.440 --> 0:11:23.280 unless you're ridiculously lucky. So there's that, and and of 0:11:23.320 --> 0:11:26.080 course they don't they also if it were an actual 0:11:26.200 --> 0:11:30.000 later iPhone, if it weren't the iPhone five C, they 0:11:30.000 --> 0:11:33.640 would have an added problem, which is that with the 0:11:33.760 --> 0:11:38.360 later models there's an additional delay after four failed tries. 0:11:39.240 --> 0:11:41.920 So if you try four times and fail, it will 0:11:41.960 --> 0:11:44.000 then give you a five second delay before you can 0:11:44.000 --> 0:11:45.920 try the fifth time. After that, it gives you a 0:11:45.960 --> 0:11:49.120 fifteen second delay after that, like by the time you 0:11:49.120 --> 0:11:52.600 get to the ninth try, it's an hour delay. Think 0:11:52.640 --> 0:11:55.800 about what you're doing, right, So, but the five C 0:11:56.000 --> 0:11:58.679 doesn't have that, So you may have read about that delay. 0:11:58.720 --> 0:12:02.600 It does not qualify for this particular case. Through force 0:12:02.679 --> 0:12:06.240 won't work in the most basic pin situation. But in 0:12:06.280 --> 0:12:09.440 the six digit alpha numeric I just imagine the same 0:12:09.520 --> 0:12:14.240 rules apply, but the yeah, yeah, exactly, but the possible 0:12:14.480 --> 0:12:18.439 answers are much greater because now you've got six digits. 0:12:18.480 --> 0:12:22.280 You've also got the possibility of alphabet alpha characters in 0:12:22.280 --> 0:12:28.160 their alphabet characters. I believe so. Um So, anyway, from 0:12:28.160 --> 0:12:30.160 why here, if you were to try and use brute 0:12:30.200 --> 0:12:33.520 force on um a six digit alpha numeric one, it 0:12:33.520 --> 0:12:35.840 would take you with a with a fast computer that 0:12:35.920 --> 0:12:38.439 had been optimized for this, it would take you about 0:12:38.480 --> 0:12:41.679 six years to break through it. And that's going through 0:12:41.720 --> 0:12:45.280 all the different possible combinations. Assuming that there's not another 0:12:45.400 --> 0:12:48.120 kill switch type deal like there is with the iPhone. 0:12:48.200 --> 0:12:51.000 By the way, that's software that Apple has built into 0:12:51.160 --> 0:12:54.880 the iPhone, really firmware that Apple is built into the iPhone. 0:12:55.240 --> 0:12:59.440 It's not like it's a fundamental you know quality that 0:12:59.520 --> 0:13:03.160 all smart phones, right, Yeah, yeah, that's that's specific to 0:13:03.240 --> 0:13:07.520 Apple phones. Right. So you've got this problem, right, you 0:13:07.559 --> 0:13:10.400 have the FBI. They've gotten permission from the owner of 0:13:10.440 --> 0:13:14.320 the phone to access the phones uh contents. But the 0:13:14.320 --> 0:13:16.960 owner of the phone doesn't know the pen because the 0:13:16.960 --> 0:13:20.520 owner of the phone had had issued it to an employee. 0:13:20.559 --> 0:13:23.240 The employee had come up with the pen, So they 0:13:23.240 --> 0:13:24.719 don't know if it's a four digit, they don't know 0:13:24.720 --> 0:13:27.760 if it's a six digit, they don't know. Um, they 0:13:27.800 --> 0:13:30.720 don't know if this uh this feature where after ten 0:13:30.800 --> 0:13:33.560 tries everything gets raised. They don't know if that's necessarily 0:13:33.600 --> 0:13:37.559 active because you can turn it off, but all indications 0:13:37.640 --> 0:13:40.640 point to it being on. For one, it was on 0:13:40.840 --> 0:13:44.800 when the phone was issued to Farouke, right, And people 0:13:44.840 --> 0:13:49.960 typically don't change their defaults post phone users. So FBI 0:13:50.080 --> 0:13:55.520 wants Apple to do something particular, and it's something different 0:13:55.559 --> 0:13:59.240 from what we've talked about in previous episodes about a 0:13:59.320 --> 0:14:03.040 back door entrance into a system. It's not quite the 0:14:03.080 --> 0:14:07.000 same thing. So you've got this phone, you can't brute 0:14:07.040 --> 0:14:12.560 force attack it without risking damaging the contents. Apple cannot 0:14:12.640 --> 0:14:15.960 access the information on this phone. By design, they did 0:14:16.000 --> 0:14:20.040 not want that to have that capability. So what the 0:14:20.080 --> 0:14:23.240 FBI wants Apple to do is build a new version 0:14:23.640 --> 0:14:28.600 of iOS just for this phone, a specific iOS for 0:14:28.680 --> 0:14:34.000 this phone that disables the safety features that would one 0:14:34.120 --> 0:14:38.920 prevent brute force attacks from happening quickly, to allow brute 0:14:38.960 --> 0:14:41.880 force to attacks to happen by hooking up the phone 0:14:41.880 --> 0:14:43.560 to a computer so you don't have to tap those 0:14:43.640 --> 0:14:47.960 numbers in it shore and three disabling that kill switch. 0:14:48.840 --> 0:14:51.720 So what the FBI wants Apple to do is to 0:14:51.840 --> 0:14:55.800 build up a brand new iOS again just for this 0:14:55.880 --> 0:14:59.720 one phone, and then install it on the phone. This 0:15:00.000 --> 0:15:04.920 to all, you know, hypothetically happen on Apple grounds, like 0:15:05.080 --> 0:15:08.880 at an Apple location, either at the corporate headquarters or 0:15:08.920 --> 0:15:14.560 wherever um. And then in theory, you would then destroy 0:15:14.680 --> 0:15:20.320 the the the custom iOS because you only needed it 0:15:20.360 --> 0:15:23.440 for that one phone, right, because it was so easy 0:15:23.520 --> 0:15:26.600 to toss the one ring, bring it back to more door, 0:15:26.640 --> 0:15:30.320 and destroy it right, Yeah, yeah, you know what, Mount doom. 0:15:30.800 --> 0:15:34.880 Plenty of backdoors. It's fine, it's integral to the plot. 0:15:34.920 --> 0:15:37.880 That was that was Souron's problem was that he did 0:15:37.920 --> 0:15:43.560 not plug the security vulnerabilities doom. I mean, that's that's 0:15:43.600 --> 0:15:46.520 a classic example, like you know, right up there with 0:15:46.560 --> 0:15:50.200 the whole land war with Asia thing. So FBI has 0:15:50.240 --> 0:15:53.240 been very very careful in framing this in a way 0:15:53.360 --> 0:15:58.920 that presents it as a reasonable request, one time thing. 0:15:58.960 --> 0:16:01.280 That's a that's a big deal, right, saying this is 0:16:01.320 --> 0:16:04.320 for one phone and one phone only, you would you know, 0:16:04.400 --> 0:16:07.680 we're suggesting that Apple creates an iOS that's directly tied 0:16:08.080 --> 0:16:12.800 to a unique identifier on that phone, meaning even if 0:16:12.920 --> 0:16:16.240 the iOS were somehow to leak, it would not be 0:16:16.280 --> 0:16:19.200 applicable to any other device on the market, So it 0:16:19.200 --> 0:16:21.280 could only work for this one phone. So that that 0:16:21.360 --> 0:16:25.760 sounds good in its current form. That's that's important. They 0:16:25.760 --> 0:16:27.760 didn't go so far as to say that that's the 0:16:27.800 --> 0:16:31.720 important part that's left out, But yeah, so that's that 0:16:31.840 --> 0:16:34.840 was reasonable. You could argue saying this is for one 0:16:34.880 --> 0:16:37.960 case only. It's it's an important case. People died as 0:16:37.960 --> 0:16:41.680 a result, extraordinary and we need to have a clear 0:16:41.800 --> 0:16:44.560 timeline because we don't know if there's something what is 0:16:44.560 --> 0:16:48.920 there something planned for December two? Right? Or was there 0:16:48.960 --> 0:16:51.840 another person involved that we need to to get hold 0:16:51.840 --> 0:16:55.440 of because otherwise that this could happen again. Um so 0:16:56.480 --> 0:16:59.880 uh they've said, you know one time only, use gonna 0:17:00.040 --> 0:17:03.440 stroy it. After that use Hey, an Apple, if you 0:17:03.480 --> 0:17:06.520 don't want to make this iOS, that's fine, you don't 0:17:06.560 --> 0:17:09.080 have to do it, will do it. We'll hire some 0:17:09.160 --> 0:17:12.440 people to reverse engineer it, build out an iOS ourselves. 0:17:13.680 --> 0:17:19.040 Here's the thing though, Those iPhones will only verify firmware 0:17:19.480 --> 0:17:23.960 if there's a special Apple digital signature attached to the firmware. 0:17:24.920 --> 0:17:28.199 So in other words, if the digital signature, which is 0:17:28.320 --> 0:17:31.399 unique to Apple, if that's not in there, it won't 0:17:31.400 --> 0:17:34.080 be verified by the device, it won't be loaded on 0:17:34.400 --> 0:17:39.880 because Apple famously wants to make sure that their hardware 0:17:39.880 --> 0:17:43.240 and software works together. And that's it. No one else 0:17:43.280 --> 0:17:46.400 gets to play in that plato. Yeah, it's the same 0:17:46.400 --> 0:17:50.480 with their Matt computers forever, right, Like you were really 0:17:50.520 --> 0:17:54.200 meant to run Apple software on Apple hardware and never 0:17:54.280 --> 0:17:58.880 the Twain shall part. So same thing with this iPhone. 0:17:58.960 --> 0:18:02.120 So the fbis is so we're not even asking you 0:18:02.200 --> 0:18:05.240 to give us the digital signature, which would be disastrous 0:18:05.280 --> 0:18:07.800 if Apple did that. The whole point of the signature 0:18:07.880 --> 0:18:10.919 is to make sure that only Apple can do this stuff. 0:18:11.040 --> 0:18:14.280 What they're saying is will make this iOS, will give 0:18:14.320 --> 0:18:17.720 it to you. Yes, you will sign off and send 0:18:17.760 --> 0:18:20.000 it right. You give a little stamp of approval with 0:18:20.040 --> 0:18:22.480 your little digital signature, and then we can load it 0:18:22.480 --> 0:18:24.560 onto this phone. But that way you don't even have 0:18:24.640 --> 0:18:28.840 to build the code. See we're being really reasonable. So 0:18:30.240 --> 0:18:35.920 here's here's the other issue. Apple kind of shot itself 0:18:35.960 --> 0:18:38.600 in the foot. Uh see, this is kind of a 0:18:38.680 --> 0:18:42.760 workaround already, this idea of being able to to create 0:18:42.800 --> 0:18:46.119 a new kind of firmware to work around the the 0:18:46.160 --> 0:18:50.200 security measures while not affecting any of the underlying data. 0:18:50.400 --> 0:18:52.920 The reason why that's possible at all is that Apple 0:18:53.359 --> 0:18:57.800 has allowed for the possibility of issuing a firmware update 0:18:57.840 --> 0:19:04.800 to a phone without the phones owner having to accept it. Ah. Yes, see, 0:19:04.960 --> 0:19:09.080 if Apple had designed this so that when it pushed 0:19:09.080 --> 0:19:12.439 out a firmware update, you as the user, had to 0:19:12.520 --> 0:19:15.760 log into your phone and accept it, there'd be no 0:19:15.840 --> 0:19:18.199 way for Apple to do this because you already have 0:19:18.280 --> 0:19:21.560 to have the pen in order to accept the update. 0:19:21.960 --> 0:19:24.560 So you can't work your way around the pin, because 0:19:24.600 --> 0:19:26.680 even the update to try and do the workaround would 0:19:26.680 --> 0:19:28.960 still need the PEN. But that's not the case. Apple 0:19:29.119 --> 0:19:34.919 can issue a firmware update without the user's consent. This, 0:19:35.080 --> 0:19:38.639 by the way, also a security problem. Not just a 0:19:38.640 --> 0:19:41.840 security problem in this particular case. But what if someone 0:19:41.880 --> 0:19:44.680 at Apple, you know, decided to code it in so 0:19:44.760 --> 0:19:50.200 that you could activate the microphone remotely. Yeah, and they 0:19:50.240 --> 0:19:53.120 and they shoot this firmware update out and you don't 0:19:53.200 --> 0:19:56.720 have the ability to deny it. You might not even 0:19:56.720 --> 0:19:58.879 be aware that it happens unless you happen to be 0:19:59.000 --> 0:20:01.480 using your phone when the from where update gets pushed 0:20:01.520 --> 0:20:06.600 to your phone. That's an issue. So because Apple can 0:20:06.680 --> 0:20:10.760 do this, that gives FBI the the the leg up 0:20:10.960 --> 0:20:17.520 to make this request. So the FBI just is trying 0:20:17.520 --> 0:20:19.960 to be as reasonable as possible in their request while 0:20:20.200 --> 0:20:25.600 avoiding the addressing the problems that could arise should Apple 0:20:26.680 --> 0:20:33.000 agree to it. And yeah, that's that's the thing. Okay, 0:20:33.040 --> 0:20:39.240 that's that's that's the thing. No matter how single use 0:20:39.480 --> 0:20:45.800 this might be, no matter how noble or even crucial 0:20:45.880 --> 0:20:51.040 to cause, right, there's not there is not a practical 0:20:51.080 --> 0:20:55.480 way that this would work without severe repercussions. Yeah, there's 0:20:55.520 --> 0:20:57.960 a there's a word I like to use in this case. 0:20:57.960 --> 0:21:02.879 It's called precedent. So when you set a precedent where 0:21:02.960 --> 0:21:09.760 Apple agrees, acquiesces, surrenders, is compelled to however you want 0:21:09.800 --> 0:21:16.040 to put it to agree to FBI's demands, you can't 0:21:16.240 --> 0:21:21.840 undo that that has happened. And perhaps more importantly, not 0:21:21.880 --> 0:21:24.840 only hasn't happened in the US government, but now other 0:21:24.960 --> 0:21:29.280 governments that operate where Apple sells products could come to 0:21:29.320 --> 0:21:32.639 Apple and say, we know you can do this because 0:21:32.640 --> 0:21:34.919 you have done it, and we know you will do 0:21:34.960 --> 0:21:37.160 this because you did do it. So if you want 0:21:37.200 --> 0:21:40.160 to do business in our country, you know, the one 0:21:40.240 --> 0:21:44.160 that starts with Chu and ends with Aina, you will 0:21:44.240 --> 0:21:46.240 do this for us. And when you're talking about a 0:21:46.280 --> 0:21:50.080 government like China's government, you could see how this could 0:21:50.200 --> 0:21:55.439 be used to to an abusive extent. Anyone who is 0:21:55.480 --> 0:22:00.080 identified as a dissident could be targeted. And China's an 0:22:00.240 --> 0:22:05.160 enormous market. Right, Apple cannot, as a publicly traded company, 0:22:05.400 --> 0:22:09.560 turn its back on the biggest emerging market in the world. 0:22:09.800 --> 0:22:13.760 Not even emerging, it's emerged. The biggest market in the world. Also, 0:22:13.840 --> 0:22:18.120 it's a their manufacturing basis for apples in China. That's 0:22:18.160 --> 0:22:20.480 part of it. That's already been a security concern. Let's 0:22:20.480 --> 0:22:25.640 also consider I mean, if we're being honest, Okay, how 0:22:25.720 --> 0:22:30.119 how do I say this correctly? U Jonathan um Oh? Yes, Okay. 0:22:30.840 --> 0:22:36.680 While there is no universally acknowledged proof that corporate corporate 0:22:36.840 --> 0:22:42.040 espionage projects or operations coming from China are sponsored by 0:22:42.080 --> 0:22:50.040 the government, there is widespread certitude that that is the case. 0:22:50.720 --> 0:22:54.439 Razor right right, Ockom's Razor. You you look at it 0:22:54.480 --> 0:22:58.240 and you think, okay, it is entirely possible that any 0:22:58.280 --> 0:23:03.400 hackers operating in China. One, maybe they're not Chinese, unlikely, 0:23:03.480 --> 0:23:07.440 but possible to Maybe they're operating from a different country 0:23:07.560 --> 0:23:11.000 and using proxies to go through China. But considering the 0:23:11.080 --> 0:23:15.640 firewall of China, that seems like that be extra headache 0:23:15.960 --> 0:23:19.880 for those hackers. Three they could be operating. They could 0:23:19.920 --> 0:23:23.040 be Chinese and operating in China but not be directed 0:23:23.040 --> 0:23:26.160 by the Chinese government, in which case they would still 0:23:26.200 --> 0:23:30.760 have to use proxies in order to access that level 0:23:30.800 --> 0:23:32.760 of infrastructure. It just gets to a point where you 0:23:32.800 --> 0:23:35.880 think the simplest explanation is, in fact, there are these 0:23:35.920 --> 0:23:39.360 state backed hackers that are are doing this on behalf 0:23:39.640 --> 0:23:42.119 or on the request of Chinese government. If not on 0:23:42.160 --> 0:23:46.640 the request, at least with the the implicit approval there 0:23:46.640 --> 0:23:48.480 we go at least someone looking the other way. But 0:23:48.520 --> 0:23:51.520 even that's not enough. There's assistance involved anyway. I'm I'm 0:23:51.600 --> 0:23:54.840 derailing us well. The point being that if if Apple 0:23:54.880 --> 0:23:58.240 were to agree to this FBI request, that is a 0:23:58.280 --> 0:24:01.480 distinct possibility that it would face not only future requests 0:24:01.560 --> 0:24:05.800 from UH from other government agencies as well as the FBI, 0:24:06.160 --> 0:24:09.000 but from other countries as well, and that it would 0:24:09.200 --> 0:24:12.959 it would be the wedge that drives open the possibility 0:24:12.960 --> 0:24:15.640 of things like these back doors that Apple and other 0:24:15.640 --> 0:24:19.600 companies have been resisting for years now. There is one 0:24:19.600 --> 0:24:21.399 other there. There is a case that I think we 0:24:21.400 --> 0:24:25.240 should clarify here. Um when we talk about precedent, there 0:24:25.320 --> 0:24:29.000 have been precedents in the in the legal past wherein 0:24:29.680 --> 0:24:35.119 Uncle Sam was allowed to compel a company right to 0:24:35.320 --> 0:24:37.359 do and this is different, but we do need to 0:24:37.520 --> 0:24:40.919 I think we need to differentiate these because it is 0:24:41.080 --> 0:24:45.920 legal in the US to compel a third party, whether 0:24:45.960 --> 0:24:50.800 an individual or a corporation to um help, how do 0:24:50.880 --> 0:24:54.240 they word it? Like execute a court order or something like. Yeah, 0:24:54.280 --> 0:24:57.520 so you're you're talking about the All Writs Act, right, 0:24:57.680 --> 0:25:03.400 which is a very old thing, back to seventeen eighty nine. Okay, 0:25:03.560 --> 0:25:06.080