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Speaker 1: Technology Stuff from Hey there, and welcome to Tech Stuff.

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Speaker 1: I am your host Jonathan Strickland joining me in the

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Speaker 1: studio today. He's my friend, he's yours. He's Ben Boland, Ben,

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Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. Hey, Jonathan, thank you so

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Speaker 1: much for having me on the show. Even though we

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Speaker 1: know that we're both going to have to work assiduously

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Speaker 1: to keep this a family friendly show. You've invited me

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Speaker 1: on to talk about, Yeah, talk about a subject that

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Speaker 1: is guaranteed to get us. As my grandfather would say,

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Speaker 1: all head up, we get all head up in here. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: So we're gonna talk about something that's actually we're gonna

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Speaker 1: have to work very hard for multiple reasons, because we're

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Speaker 1: talking about Apple versus the FBI, the whole story that's

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Speaker 1: unfolding as we record this um and to talk about

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Speaker 1: what is behind that case, what are the implications, what

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Speaker 1: is the FBI's argument, what is Apple's argument? And in

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Speaker 1: addition to that, we have, of course the added responsibility

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Speaker 1: of remembering that this is all centered around a truly

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Speaker 1: awful crime. Yes, absolutely so. The what we're what we're

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Speaker 1: talking about specifically hit mainstream news when Apple did something

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Speaker 1: that a lot of tech companies have never done. They

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Speaker 1: issued a blanket statement letter and went public with a

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Speaker 1: They went public with a response to an FBI request.

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Speaker 1: But I guess I'm getting ahead of it. What was

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Speaker 1: the crime? Well, let's yeah, let's I'll give you the

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Speaker 1: background on what's happened and we'll we'll build from there.

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Speaker 1: So first we have to look back on December two,

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Speaker 1: two thousand fifteen, uh and San Bernardino, Kelly, Flornia. That's

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Speaker 1: in southern California, and that's when to well, an American

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Speaker 1: citizen and I legal resident, husband wife team, both of

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Speaker 1: Pakistani descent, committed a mass shooting. It was a Sayed

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Speaker 1: Rizwan Faruk and tash Feen Malik who committed this act,

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Speaker 1: and it happened at the Department of Public Health. They

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Speaker 1: were having an event that was starting off as a

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Speaker 1: training event and then it was supposed to transition into

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Speaker 1: a holiday event. And after the training element. Faruk, who

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Speaker 1: was actually at the event, he was in the employee

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Speaker 1: of the Department of Public Health, he was a food inspector, left,

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Speaker 1: came back with his wife. They were both heavily armed

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Speaker 1: and they both started firing into the crowd of people

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Speaker 1: at the Department of Public Health. Fourteen people were killed,

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Speaker 1: twenty two injured. Very serious crime. Then uh Faruke and

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Speaker 1: Malite left. They fled the scene. Turned out they had

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Speaker 1: also left behind an explosive device, which thankfully did not detonate.

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Speaker 1: Failed to detonate uh and they they fled in a

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Speaker 1: vehicle that they had rented a few days before, and

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Speaker 1: several hours later law enforcement tracked them down. There was

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Speaker 1: a confrontation, there was a shootout UH and then both

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Speaker 1: of the shooters died as a result of that shootout.

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Speaker 1: The FBI has stated that they believed, based upon the

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Speaker 1: evidence they were able to find that the two were

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Speaker 1: acting on their own, that they were not part of

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Speaker 1: some sort of terrorist cell in the United States. However,

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Speaker 1: they can't be absolutely certain of that. That's where the

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Speaker 1: crux of this issue with Apple is going to come

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Speaker 1: into play. And the big part of it is they

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Speaker 1: can't account for it's just less than twenty minutes of

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Speaker 1: the activity that happened between the shooting or leading up

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Speaker 1: to the shooting, and around the shooting, because they're they're

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Speaker 1: thinking that there's a possibility that something that happened within

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Speaker 1: that time could give them more information and at least

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Speaker 1: allow them to confirm whether or not they truly acted

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Speaker 1: on their own or if they were under the direction

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Speaker 1: of some other group, which could potentially and this is

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Speaker 1: an FBI argument, which could potentially give the government the

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Speaker 1: ability to prevent a future attack. And more to that point,

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Speaker 1: neither of them had been listed in any database as

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Speaker 1: a potential threat. So that puts extra pressure on the government,

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Speaker 1: right because citizens say, well, why did this happen? The

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Speaker 1: government says, we followed procedure and neither of them registered

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Speaker 1: on any of ours and there are no red flags,

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Speaker 1: so we had no way of knowing. And uh, that

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Speaker 1: means there's actual extra pressure on the FBI to investigate

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Speaker 1: this thoroughly, partially to show that in fact, everything that

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Speaker 1: could be done had been done short of taking some

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Speaker 1: extreme step that none of us want to see. Right,

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Speaker 1: the idea of like, okay, everyone of Pakistani descent has

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Speaker 1: to leave the country. That's ridiculous. We would that's that's

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Speaker 1: returning to an era of the United States history that

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Speaker 1: we do not want to revisit, like a World War

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Speaker 1: two internment camp situation. Yeah, we don't want that. We

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Speaker 1: don't want that because it is never fair to lump

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Speaker 1: innocent people in for fear that one of them might

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Speaker 1: be guilty. That's not cool, right, this is I'm already

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Speaker 1: getting angry and i haven't even gotten to the part

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Speaker 1: about the apple stuff yet. I'm going for a slow burning,

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Speaker 1: that's fair. So one of the thing that's that all

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Speaker 1: of this is about, ostensibly any at any rate, is

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Speaker 1: an iPhone. It's specifically an iPhone five C, probably running

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Speaker 1: iOS nine. That's based upon the various public filings we've

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Speaker 1: seen about this um and it was county owned. It

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Speaker 1: was owned by the Department of Public Health and then

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Speaker 1: issued to Farouke who worked for the department Department of

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Speaker 1: Public Health, so it was county owned. The FBI went

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Speaker 1: to the county and said, we want your permission to

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Speaker 1: access the contents on this phone. The county said, of course,

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Speaker 1: you have our permission. You can access it. Now. If

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Speaker 1: that's all there were to it, it would be fine.

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Speaker 1: I would just access the phone. They've already received permission

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Speaker 1: from the phone's owner, and they could call through it

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Speaker 1: to look for any evidence that would lead them to

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Speaker 1: more information about this crime. But there is a security

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Speaker 1: measure on the phone, and it's a very simple one.

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Speaker 1: It's on lots of smartphones. It's it's a little password.

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Speaker 1: In this case, it's a a four or six digit

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Speaker 1: pin which can be alpha numeric if you activate that

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Speaker 1: option on the six digit. So it's one of the two.

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Speaker 1: We don't know which, and without that pen, you cannot

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Speaker 1: access the the information because the way the pen works.

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Speaker 1: This is where we get into the tech stuff. Been

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Speaker 1: There are two levels of encryption. You are two keys

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Speaker 1: to this encryption. One of the keys is the pen.

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Speaker 1: The other key is hard coded onto the device itself.

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Speaker 1: All right, it's only it's if you think about movies

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Speaker 1: like those nineties movies with the nuclear power, where you

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Speaker 1: have to have two generals put their keys into the

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Speaker 1: same sort of thing. So if you don't have the pen,

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Speaker 1: it can't combine with the hardware key, and therefore you

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Speaker 1: cannot unlock the information. The idea here is that Apple

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Speaker 1: doesn't have the pen, right, which is cool because it

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Speaker 1: means that if you or I or you listeners have

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Speaker 1: an iPhone, it means you can trust Apple because they

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Speaker 1: don't know your pin, right, they can't access your phone. Uh,

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Speaker 1: you know that That was the whole point one. Two

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Speaker 1: points one. Apple wanted to make its cure enough so

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Speaker 1: that consumers would say, I feel good about buying an

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Speaker 1: iPhone because I know whatever I store on it, whether

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Speaker 1: it's something that's personal or it's just you know, it's

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Speaker 1: no one else's business, whatever it may be, no one

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Speaker 1: else is going to have access to that unless I

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Speaker 1: give them my pen. It's good for Apple, not just

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Speaker 1: because consumers are happy, but because Apple then hasn't out

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Speaker 1: If the government comes to Apple and says, hey, we

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Speaker 1: want you to break into this phone, they can literally

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Speaker 1: say we cannot do that. It's not that we will not,

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Speaker 1: it's that we literally physically cannot grant your request because

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Speaker 1: it's impossible. And there's also I would just to expound

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Speaker 1: that point a little bit further. This I'm not suggesting

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Speaker 1: as their conscious will or intention, but this also removes

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Speaker 1: possible culpability. Yes, yes, so all of these are very

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Speaker 1: important points. Right, So let's get into a little bit

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Speaker 1: more of why the FBI is coming to Apple. So

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Speaker 1: let's say that it's a four digit pin all right,

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Speaker 1: all numeric, simplest version. That means there are ten thousand

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Speaker 1: combinations that are possible for that pen. That's it. That's

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Speaker 1: you're limited to ten thousand, which is that's a lot,

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Speaker 1: but it's not that much if you're going to do

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Speaker 1: something like a brute force attack. Right. So if you

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Speaker 1: do a brute force attack on a normal system, and

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Speaker 1: there are only ten thousand variations, it's with a fast

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Speaker 1: enough computer, it's just a matter of minutes. But there's

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Speaker 1: some limitations on the iPhone that make this harder. Does

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Speaker 1: it freeze if you enter the incorrect pen? It does

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Speaker 1: more than freeze, right, So, first of all, there is

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Speaker 1: an eighty millisecond delay when you enter a pen and

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Speaker 1: when it gets verified that it is or is not

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Speaker 1: the correct one. Right, So with that eighty millisecond delay,

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Speaker 1: that doesn't sound like much, but it means you can't

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Speaker 1: just blast a whole bunch of numbers through. Also, you

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Speaker 1: have to type it in on a screen. You can't

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Speaker 1: hook it up to a computer and just digitally send

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Speaker 1: the various pen combinations to try and get through. You

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Speaker 1: have to actually tap them on on the screen to

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Speaker 1: do it over and over. So that means you tap

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Speaker 1: in the number eighty milliseconds pass, you get the confirmation

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Speaker 1: or denial, tap in the number next. Uh, if you

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Speaker 1: hit ten consecutive incorrect pen entries the phone interprets that

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Speaker 1: is saying someone else who is not the owner has

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Speaker 1: gotten possession of this phone. So in order to protect

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Speaker 1: the owner's information, we're scrambling everything, and you lose all

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Speaker 1: the metadata. Everything is useless. So even if you got

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Speaker 1: the pen afterward, you would not be able to access

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Speaker 1: the stuff you were looking for in the first place.

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Speaker 1: You would maybe be able to turn on the phone,

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Speaker 1: but there wouldn't be anything there to find. Yeah, you

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Speaker 1: would have, just you would have just it would be

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Speaker 1: like you just accidentally set fire to the file room,

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Speaker 1: like you know, like you can't get into the file

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Speaker 1: room door, and whatever you try and do accidentally sets

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Speaker 1: a fire inside the file room. You then get the

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Speaker 1: key to the aisle room, and then you think, well,

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Speaker 1: what's the point you lost everything? And it's it's virtually assured.

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Speaker 1: Yeah that out of those yeah, out of those ten

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Speaker 1: thousand tries, your first ten are going to be wrong. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean, just the odds are pretty much against you,

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Speaker 1: unless you're ridiculously lucky. So there's that, and and of

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Speaker 1: course they don't they also if it were an actual

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Speaker 1: later iPhone, if it weren't the iPhone five C, they

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Speaker 1: would have an added problem, which is that with the

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Speaker 1: later models there's an additional delay after four failed tries.

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Speaker 1: So if you try four times and fail, it will

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Speaker 1: then give you a five second delay before you can

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Speaker 1: try the fifth time. After that, it gives you a

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Speaker 1: fifteen second delay after that, like by the time you

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Speaker 1: get to the ninth try, it's an hour delay. Think

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Speaker 1: about what you're doing, right, So, but the five C

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Speaker 1: doesn't have that, So you may have read about that delay.

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Speaker 1: It does not qualify for this particular case. Through force

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Speaker 1: won't work in the most basic pin situation. But in

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Speaker 1: the six digit alpha numeric I just imagine the same

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Speaker 1: rules apply, but the yeah, yeah, exactly, but the possible

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Speaker 1: answers are much greater because now you've got six digits.

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Speaker 1: You've also got the possibility of alphabet alpha characters in

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Speaker 1: their alphabet characters. I believe so. Um So, anyway, from

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Speaker 1: why here, if you were to try and use brute

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Speaker 1: force on um a six digit alpha numeric one, it

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Speaker 1: would take you with a with a fast computer that

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Speaker 1: had been optimized for this, it would take you about

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Speaker 1: six years to break through it. And that's going through

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Speaker 1: all the different possible combinations. Assuming that there's not another

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Speaker 1: kill switch type deal like there is with the iPhone.

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Speaker 1: By the way, that's software that Apple has built into

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Speaker 1: the iPhone, really firmware that Apple is built into the iPhone.

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Speaker 1: It's not like it's a fundamental you know quality that

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Speaker 1: all smart phones, right, Yeah, yeah, that's that's specific to

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Speaker 1: Apple phones. Right. So you've got this problem, right, you

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Speaker 1: have the FBI. They've gotten permission from the owner of

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Speaker 1: the phone to access the phones uh contents. But the

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Speaker 1: owner of the phone doesn't know the pen because the

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Speaker 1: owner of the phone had had issued it to an employee.

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Speaker 1: The employee had come up with the pen, So they

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Speaker 1: don't know if it's a four digit, they don't know

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Speaker 1: if it's a six digit, they don't know. Um, they

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Speaker 1: don't know if this uh this feature where after ten

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Speaker 1: tries everything gets raised. They don't know if that's necessarily

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Speaker 1: active because you can turn it off, but all indications

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Speaker 1: point to it being on. For one, it was on

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Speaker 1: when the phone was issued to Farouke, right, And people

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Speaker 1: typically don't change their defaults post phone users. So FBI

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Speaker 1: wants Apple to do something particular, and it's something different

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Speaker 1: from what we've talked about in previous episodes about a

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Speaker 1: back door entrance into a system. It's not quite the

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Speaker 1: same thing. So you've got this phone, you can't brute

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Speaker 1: force attack it without risking damaging the contents. Apple cannot

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Speaker 1: access the information on this phone. By design, they did

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Speaker 1: not want that to have that capability. So what the

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Speaker 1: FBI wants Apple to do is build a new version

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Speaker 1: of iOS just for this phone, a specific iOS for

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Speaker 1: this phone that disables the safety features that would one

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Speaker 1: prevent brute force attacks from happening quickly, to allow brute

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Speaker 1: force to attacks to happen by hooking up the phone

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Speaker 1: to a computer so you don't have to tap those

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Speaker 1: numbers in it shore and three disabling that kill switch.

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Speaker 1: So what the FBI wants Apple to do is to

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Speaker 1: build up a brand new iOS again just for this

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Speaker 1: one phone, and then install it on the phone. This

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Speaker 1: to all, you know, hypothetically happen on Apple grounds, like

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Speaker 1: at an Apple location, either at the corporate headquarters or

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Speaker 1: wherever um. And then in theory, you would then destroy

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Speaker 1: the the the custom iOS because you only needed it

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Speaker 1: for that one phone, right, because it was so easy

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Speaker 1: to toss the one ring, bring it back to more door,

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Speaker 1: and destroy it right, Yeah, yeah, you know what, Mount doom.

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Speaker 1: Plenty of backdoors. It's fine, it's integral to the plot.

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Speaker 1: That was that was Souron's problem was that he did

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Speaker 1: not plug the security vulnerabilities doom. I mean, that's that's

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Speaker 1: a classic example, like you know, right up there with

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Speaker 1: the whole land war with Asia thing. So FBI has

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Speaker 1: been very very careful in framing this in a way

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Speaker 1: that presents it as a reasonable request, one time thing.

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Speaker 1: That's a that's a big deal, right, saying this is

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Speaker 1: for one phone and one phone only, you would you know,

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Speaker 1: we're suggesting that Apple creates an iOS that's directly tied

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Speaker 1: to a unique identifier on that phone, meaning even if

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Speaker 1: the iOS were somehow to leak, it would not be

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Speaker 1: applicable to any other device on the market, So it

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Speaker 1: could only work for this one phone. So that that

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Speaker 1: sounds good in its current form. That's that's important. They

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Speaker 1: didn't go so far as to say that that's the

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Speaker 1: important part that's left out, But yeah, so that's that

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Speaker 1: was reasonable. You could argue saying this is for one

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Speaker 1: case only. It's it's an important case. People died as

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Speaker 1: a result, extraordinary and we need to have a clear

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Speaker 1: timeline because we don't know if there's something what is

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Speaker 1: there something planned for December two? Right? Or was there

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Speaker 1: another person involved that we need to to get hold

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Speaker 1: of because otherwise that this could happen again. Um so

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Speaker 1: uh they've said, you know one time only, use gonna

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Speaker 1: stroy it. After that use Hey, an Apple, if you

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Speaker 1: don't want to make this iOS, that's fine, you don't

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Speaker 1: have to do it, will do it. We'll hire some

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Speaker 1: people to reverse engineer it, build out an iOS ourselves.

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Speaker 1: Here's the thing though, Those iPhones will only verify firmware

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Speaker 1: if there's a special Apple digital signature attached to the firmware.

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Speaker 1: So in other words, if the digital signature, which is

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Speaker 1: unique to Apple, if that's not in there, it won't

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Speaker 1: be verified by the device, it won't be loaded on

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Speaker 1: because Apple famously wants to make sure that their hardware

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Speaker 1: and software works together. And that's it. No one else

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Speaker 1: gets to play in that plato. Yeah, it's the same

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Speaker 1: with their Matt computers forever, right, Like you were really

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Speaker 1: meant to run Apple software on Apple hardware and never

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Speaker 1: the Twain shall part. So same thing with this iPhone.

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Speaker 1: So the fbis is so we're not even asking you

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Speaker 1: to give us the digital signature, which would be disastrous

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Speaker 1: if Apple did that. The whole point of the signature

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Speaker 1: is to make sure that only Apple can do this stuff.

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Speaker 1: What they're saying is will make this iOS, will give

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Speaker 1: it to you. Yes, you will sign off and send

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Speaker 1: it right. You give a little stamp of approval with

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Speaker 1: your little digital signature, and then we can load it

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Speaker 1: onto this phone. But that way you don't even have

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Speaker 1: to build the code. See we're being really reasonable. So

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Speaker 1: here's here's the other issue. Apple kind of shot itself

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Speaker 1: in the foot. Uh see, this is kind of a

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Speaker 1: workaround already, this idea of being able to to create

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Speaker 1: a new kind of firmware to work around the the

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Speaker 1: security measures while not affecting any of the underlying data.

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Speaker 1: The reason why that's possible at all is that Apple

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Speaker 1: has allowed for the possibility of issuing a firmware update

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Speaker 1: to a phone without the phones owner having to accept it. Ah. Yes, see,

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Speaker 1: if Apple had designed this so that when it pushed

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Speaker 1: out a firmware update, you as the user, had to

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Speaker 1: log into your phone and accept it, there'd be no

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Speaker 1: way for Apple to do this because you already have

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Speaker 1: to have the pen in order to accept the update.

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Speaker 1: So you can't work your way around the pin, because

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Speaker 1: even the update to try and do the workaround would

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Speaker 1: still need the PEN. But that's not the case. Apple

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Speaker 1: can issue a firmware update without the user's consent. This,

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Speaker 1: by the way, also a security problem. Not just a

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Speaker 1: security problem in this particular case. But what if someone

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Speaker 1: at Apple, you know, decided to code it in so

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Speaker 1: that you could activate the microphone remotely. Yeah, and they

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Speaker 1: and they shoot this firmware update out and you don't

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Speaker 1: have the ability to deny it. You might not even

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Speaker 1: be aware that it happens unless you happen to be

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Speaker 1: using your phone when the from where update gets pushed

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Speaker 1: to your phone. That's an issue. So because Apple can

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Speaker 1: do this, that gives FBI the the the leg up

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Speaker 1: to make this request. So the FBI just is trying

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Speaker 1: to be as reasonable as possible in their request while

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Speaker 1: avoiding the addressing the problems that could arise should Apple

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Speaker 1: agree to it. And yeah, that's that's the thing. Okay,

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Speaker 1: that's that's that's the thing. No matter how single use

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Speaker 1: this might be, no matter how noble or even crucial

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Speaker 1: to cause, right, there's not there is not a practical

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Speaker 1: way that this would work without severe repercussions. Yeah, there's

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Speaker 1: a there's a word I like to use in this case.

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Speaker 1: It's called precedent. So when you set a precedent where

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Speaker 1: Apple agrees, acquiesces, surrenders, is compelled to however you want

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Speaker 1: to put it to agree to FBI's demands, you can't

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Speaker 1: undo that that has happened. And perhaps more importantly, not

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Speaker 1: only hasn't happened in the US government, but now other

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Speaker 1: governments that operate where Apple sells products could come to

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Speaker 1: Apple and say, we know you can do this because

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Speaker 1: you have done it, and we know you will do

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Speaker 1: this because you did do it. So if you want

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Speaker 1: to do business in our country, you know, the one

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Speaker 1: that starts with Chu and ends with Aina, you will

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Speaker 1: do this for us. And when you're talking about a

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Speaker 1: government like China's government, you could see how this could

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Speaker 1: be used to to an abusive extent. Anyone who is

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Speaker 1: identified as a dissident could be targeted. And China's an

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Speaker 1: enormous market. Right, Apple cannot, as a publicly traded company,

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Speaker 1: turn its back on the biggest emerging market in the world.

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Speaker 1: Not even emerging, it's emerged. The biggest market in the world. Also,

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Speaker 1: it's a their manufacturing basis for apples in China. That's

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Speaker 1: part of it. That's already been a security concern. Let's

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Speaker 1: also consider I mean, if we're being honest, Okay, how

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Speaker 1: how do I say this correctly? U Jonathan um Oh? Yes, Okay.

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Speaker 1: While there is no universally acknowledged proof that corporate corporate

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Speaker 1: espionage projects or operations coming from China are sponsored by

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Speaker 1: the government, there is widespread certitude that that is the case.

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Speaker 1: Razor right right, Ockom's Razor. You you look at it

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Speaker 1: and you think, okay, it is entirely possible that any

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Speaker 1: hackers operating in China. One, maybe they're not Chinese, unlikely,

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Speaker 1: but possible to Maybe they're operating from a different country

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Speaker 1: and using proxies to go through China. But considering the

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Speaker 1: firewall of China, that seems like that be extra headache

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Speaker 1: for those hackers. Three they could be operating. They could

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Speaker 1: be Chinese and operating in China but not be directed

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Speaker 1: by the Chinese government, in which case they would still

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Speaker 1: have to use proxies in order to access that level

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Speaker 1: of infrastructure. It just gets to a point where you

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Speaker 1: think the simplest explanation is, in fact, there are these

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Speaker 1: state backed hackers that are are doing this on behalf

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Speaker 1: or on the request of Chinese government. If not on

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Speaker 1: the request, at least with the the implicit approval there

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Speaker 1: we go at least someone looking the other way. But

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Speaker 1: even that's not enough. There's assistance involved anyway. I'm I'm

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Speaker 1: derailing us well. The point being that if if Apple

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Speaker 1: were to agree to this FBI request, that is a

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Speaker 1: distinct possibility that it would face not only future requests

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Speaker 1: from UH from other government agencies as well as the FBI,

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Speaker 1: but from other countries as well, and that it would

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Speaker 1: it would be the wedge that drives open the possibility

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Speaker 1: of things like these back doors that Apple and other

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Speaker 1: companies have been resisting for years now. There is one

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Speaker 1: other there. There is a case that I think we

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Speaker 1: should clarify here. Um when we talk about precedent, there

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Speaker 1: have been precedents in the in the legal past wherein

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Speaker 1: Uncle Sam was allowed to compel a company right to

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Speaker 1: do and this is different, but we do need to

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Speaker 1: I think we need to differentiate these because it is

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Speaker 1: legal in the US to compel a third party, whether

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Speaker 1: an individual or a corporation to um help, how do

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Speaker 1: they word it? Like execute a court order or something like. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so you're you're talking about the All Writs Act, right,

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Speaker 1: which is a very old thing, back to seventeen eighty nine. Okay,

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Speaker 1: the US wasn't even the US very much right there,

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Speaker 1: right nine. This is not a smart phone specific law.

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Speaker 1: There were still occasional battles with the British going on, okay,

404
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Speaker 1: seventeen nine, yet many of them were not here yet. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: seventeen eighty nine is when this writ was was first

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Speaker 1: written down as part of the Judiciary Act Um. So specifically,

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Speaker 1: what the all Ritz Act allows the government to do

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Speaker 1: is to compel a third party to accommodate federal orders

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Speaker 1: like a search warrant. So, in other words, the federal

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Speaker 1: government can issue a search warrant to law enforcement. The

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Speaker 1: law enforcement can go to let's say it's an apartment building.

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Speaker 1: They can go to the manager of the apartment building

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Speaker 1: and say, we have the search warrant. The all Ritz

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Speaker 1: Act tells us that you have to allow us to

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Speaker 1: go into this apartment to search it. And then the

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Speaker 1: apartment owners says all right and lets them in. Now,

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Speaker 1: this serves a couple of different purposes. It expedites, uh,

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Speaker 1: the the work of the federal government in in investigations

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Speaker 1: and things of that nature, and it also provides a

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Speaker 1: protection to those third parties because the third party is

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Speaker 1: having to comply with a federal request. And if you

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Speaker 1: are a person like an apartment manager and your other

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Speaker 1: tenants are coming to you and saying, why are you

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Speaker 1: letting them into someone's room without their permission? You can

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Speaker 1: say I have to buy law that protects you as

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Speaker 1: the owner as well, because it means that you're not

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Speaker 1: you're not you're not a rat. You know, you're you're

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Speaker 1: you're following the law, you're obeying the law. Right, so

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00:26:42,280 --> 00:26:46,120
Speaker 1: automatically anything you do in the assistance of the execution

430
00:26:46,160 --> 00:26:51,399
Speaker 1: of that court order is automatically legal. I mean, as

431
00:26:51,480 --> 00:26:54,440
Speaker 1: long as you're as as long as they're not saying, hey,

432
00:26:54,480 --> 00:26:56,640
Speaker 1: we need a search war and you go sure, hey,

433
00:26:56,680 --> 00:26:59,000
Speaker 1: while I'm on the way, do you might ave steal

434
00:26:59,040 --> 00:27:02,080
Speaker 1: a car? Right? Or they'll be or they can't say, hey,

435
00:27:02,080 --> 00:27:03,920
Speaker 1: we're going to get a search warrant. Do you want

436
00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:08,359
Speaker 1: to just listen? Now? That would not be cool. But

437
00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:13,440
Speaker 1: there's a very important idea that's attached to this all

438
00:27:13,520 --> 00:27:16,919
Speaker 1: Ritz Act, which is that and the Supreme Court has

439
00:27:17,000 --> 00:27:21,399
Speaker 1: ruled on this you cannot rely on the all Ritz

440
00:27:21,400 --> 00:27:24,720
Speaker 1: Act to compel a third party to action if it

441
00:27:24,800 --> 00:27:30,960
Speaker 1: creates an unreasonable burden upon that party. So you might say, well,

442
00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:33,680
Speaker 1: what's the unreasonable burden for Apple? I mean, all they're

443
00:27:33,720 --> 00:27:37,560
Speaker 1: asking for is a way around this security system, just

444
00:27:37,600 --> 00:27:40,720
Speaker 1: one time, just a fun time, just the one time.

445
00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:46,160
Speaker 1: So there are actually several counter arguments to this um. First, uh,

446
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:49,880
Speaker 1: you know, Apple is saying their programmers may not even

447
00:27:49,960 --> 00:27:53,359
Speaker 1: know how to make the code that would allow for

448
00:27:53,400 --> 00:27:55,719
Speaker 1: this to happen. They like, listen, we don't even know

449
00:27:55,760 --> 00:27:59,000
Speaker 1: that we can build this yet, So you're asking us

450
00:27:59,040 --> 00:28:01,040
Speaker 1: to do something that we don't know we can build.

451
00:28:01,800 --> 00:28:04,359
Speaker 1: So that's an unreasonable burden because it means we have

452
00:28:04,440 --> 00:28:08,679
Speaker 1: to dedicate our assets to from from projects that they

453
00:28:08,680 --> 00:28:11,359
Speaker 1: should be working on to trying to figure out if

454
00:28:11,400 --> 00:28:13,679
Speaker 1: this thing is possible and if so, how to do

455
00:28:13,760 --> 00:28:17,080
Speaker 1: it now. The FBI's argument was essentially, Hey, you're in

456
00:28:17,119 --> 00:28:21,480
Speaker 1: the business of writing codes. There should be no problem.

457
00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:26,520
Speaker 1: I would desperately need a bleep sound effect right now,

458
00:28:26,560 --> 00:28:29,360
Speaker 1: but I call b S. Let's be nice I'll call

459
00:28:29,440 --> 00:28:32,680
Speaker 1: bs on that argument, because to me, that's the same

460
00:28:32,720 --> 00:28:35,240
Speaker 1: as coming up to Let's say, let's say Ben that

461
00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:39,120
Speaker 1: you are a cook, yes, and you cook in an

462
00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:43,120
Speaker 1: Italian restaurant. You're you're the Italian restaurant's head cook. Three

463
00:28:43,120 --> 00:28:46,280
Speaker 1: initial int. I go up to you and I say, hey, listen,

464
00:28:46,320 --> 00:28:49,720
Speaker 1: I'm from the federal government. I got this, uh this

465
00:28:49,720 --> 00:28:55,440
Speaker 1: this executive order, this federal order for you. You have

466
00:28:55,560 --> 00:28:59,560
Speaker 1: to now go and make a dinner of Peruvian food

467
00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:03,160
Speaker 1: right now for thirty people that are in the restaurant.

468
00:29:03,680 --> 00:29:06,600
Speaker 1: You can do it because you cook right exactly, or

469
00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:10,160
Speaker 1: it's like saying, yeah, um, it would be a disastrous

470
00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:13,400
Speaker 1: proving dinner at very least a loose interpretation. So like

471
00:29:13,600 --> 00:29:17,400
Speaker 1: for another example, let's say to make it even broader,

472
00:29:17,920 --> 00:29:22,000
Speaker 1: because I think this is this is pretty good too. So, uh, Jonathan,

473
00:29:22,200 --> 00:29:27,240
Speaker 1: let's say that you are a doctor. All right, okay,

474
00:29:27,400 --> 00:29:31,360
Speaker 1: you're at your doctor, doctor Strickland, doctor. Hey call me Jonathan,

475
00:29:31,360 --> 00:29:37,680
Speaker 1: doctor Stricklands. My dad. You So you're an easy going doctor, clearly, um,

476
00:29:37,800 --> 00:29:41,680
Speaker 1: and you are, and uh you're an ear nose and

477
00:29:41,720 --> 00:29:46,720
Speaker 1: throat man. And uh so I come up to you

478
00:29:46,760 --> 00:29:50,000
Speaker 1: and I say, I'm from the federal government. I have

479
00:29:50,080 --> 00:29:53,440
Speaker 1: an executive order, but not an appointment. So you're already

480
00:29:53,480 --> 00:29:57,400
Speaker 1: kind of irritated. And I'm like, and I say, I

481
00:29:57,440 --> 00:30:02,480
Speaker 1: need you to make the cure for answer that's a

482
00:30:02,480 --> 00:30:05,000
Speaker 1: bit much. Yeah, I mean you're a doctor, right, you

483
00:30:05,000 --> 00:30:08,960
Speaker 1: know about organs and stuff cancer affects bodies. Or going

484
00:30:09,000 --> 00:30:12,560
Speaker 1: to Harley Davidson Davidson and saying, look, you you make

485
00:30:12,680 --> 00:30:16,160
Speaker 1: stuff where wheels are connected to chassisas and they turn

486
00:30:16,280 --> 00:30:18,440
Speaker 1: and a motor keeps things going. I need you to

487
00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:22,040
Speaker 1: make a bus. I mean, you see where the where

488
00:30:22,040 --> 00:30:26,480
Speaker 1: it's ridiculous. It's it's you can't argue that because this

489
00:30:26,640 --> 00:30:29,120
Speaker 1: company is in the business of doing this one thing,

490
00:30:29,120 --> 00:30:31,560
Speaker 1: which by the way, is just one part of Apple's business,

491
00:30:32,280 --> 00:30:35,080
Speaker 1: that they are capable of making this other thing that

492
00:30:35,160 --> 00:30:37,920
Speaker 1: happens to fall into that same category. That is ludicrous

493
00:30:37,920 --> 00:30:39,600
Speaker 1: on the face of it. So that's argument number one

494
00:30:40,080 --> 00:30:44,040
Speaker 1: about it being a burden. Okay. The second burden is

495
00:30:44,040 --> 00:30:46,440
Speaker 1: the one that we've already touched on. It sets a precedent.

496
00:30:46,520 --> 00:30:49,040
Speaker 1: If Apple can be forced to attack the security of

497
00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:52,160
Speaker 1: its own system in this case, it can happen again,

498
00:30:52,400 --> 00:30:57,240
Speaker 1: and that would be a disastrous result for consumer Uh,

499
00:30:57,280 --> 00:31:00,680
Speaker 1: you know, confidence in Apple's products that very bad for

500
00:31:00,720 --> 00:31:03,200
Speaker 1: apples bottom line. So if Apple says, look, you will

501
00:31:03,280 --> 00:31:08,200
Speaker 1: make us lose millions, if not billions of dollars in revenue,

502
00:31:08,480 --> 00:31:11,880
Speaker 1: how is that not an unreasonable burden? How can you

503
00:31:12,040 --> 00:31:16,840
Speaker 1: argue that that burden is reasonable? Right? And that's so,

504
00:31:17,040 --> 00:31:18,880
Speaker 1: And not only that, but then you get into the

505
00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:24,400
Speaker 1: the foreign agent approach, the foreign state approach, saying what

506
00:31:24,520 --> 00:31:26,840
Speaker 1: if this means that China comes to us and says,

507
00:31:26,960 --> 00:31:29,680
Speaker 1: because of this other thing that we agreed to do,

508
00:31:29,960 --> 00:31:32,120
Speaker 1: we now have to do it in China all the time,

509
00:31:32,800 --> 00:31:38,640
Speaker 1: and real human beings are being pursued, and uh, their

510
00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:41,720
Speaker 1: lives are are turned upside down and ruined as a

511
00:31:41,720 --> 00:31:44,440
Speaker 1: result of it. And it's all because we have to

512
00:31:44,520 --> 00:31:47,360
Speaker 1: comply because this has already set a precedent. That's an

513
00:31:47,440 --> 00:31:52,520
Speaker 1: that's an unreasonable burden. And finally, they've even said that

514
00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:56,360
Speaker 1: it's a violation of their right to free speech. And

515
00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:59,120
Speaker 1: the reason for that is because code has been ruled

516
00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:01,800
Speaker 1: as a type of free speech in the past. And

517
00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:06,280
Speaker 1: if the government compels Apple to write code that Apple

518
00:32:06,480 --> 00:32:11,400
Speaker 1: doesn't believe in, they're being compelled to speak against their

519
00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:15,800
Speaker 1: own beliefs, thus a violation of free speech. Now that argument,

520
00:32:15,880 --> 00:32:18,080
Speaker 1: most people are saying it's probably the weakest of all

521
00:32:18,120 --> 00:32:20,400
Speaker 1: of their styling on it a little, but I gotta

522
00:32:20,440 --> 00:32:24,120
Speaker 1: admit that's pretty awesome style. Well, yeah, that is. I

523
00:32:24,120 --> 00:32:27,640
Speaker 1: I enjoy it. And there, while it's reaching, it's not invalid.

524
00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:33,320
Speaker 1: And let's consider that Apple legally, in this kind of

525
00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:38,640
Speaker 1: case is playing against Uncle Sam and on its home territory, right.

526
00:32:38,880 --> 00:32:43,160
Speaker 1: And this means that you you might often wonder why

527
00:32:43,280 --> 00:32:46,920
Speaker 1: when the air suits or countersuits are legal problems, why

528
00:32:47,000 --> 00:32:51,400
Speaker 1: so many cases open with just this laundry list of arguments.

529
00:32:51,640 --> 00:32:54,640
Speaker 1: And it's because it's, um, you know, if we could

530
00:32:54,680 --> 00:32:58,920
Speaker 1: go back to my Italian restaurant, Uh, you're just throwing

531
00:32:58,920 --> 00:33:01,360
Speaker 1: the spaghetti at the wall. It's a scattered gun approach,

532
00:33:03,080 --> 00:33:05,800
Speaker 1: or if you prefer, it's casting a very wide net

533
00:33:05,840 --> 00:33:10,000
Speaker 1: because you aren't sure which tactic is necessarily going to

534
00:33:10,040 --> 00:33:12,240
Speaker 1: be your best one from the starting gate, so you

535
00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:14,880
Speaker 1: want to throw out all of them at once. And

536
00:33:14,920 --> 00:33:17,640
Speaker 1: if it's if it's a compelling enough argument, then you

537
00:33:17,680 --> 00:33:21,640
Speaker 1: can get things thrown out before they go any further. Um.

538
00:33:21,760 --> 00:33:24,920
Speaker 1: And in fact, Apple has said that they're willing to

539
00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:26,920
Speaker 1: go all the way to the Supreme Court with this

540
00:33:26,960 --> 00:33:31,400
Speaker 1: particular fight. The CEO said that publicly. Yeah, which interesting

541
00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:35,880
Speaker 1: because I you know, uh, we recently lost a U. S.

542
00:33:35,880 --> 00:33:38,920
Speaker 1: Supreme Court justice here in the United States, and I

543
00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:41,080
Speaker 1: actually think he probably would have sided with Apple on

544
00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:45,760
Speaker 1: this one because of his his very strict view of

545
00:33:45,800 --> 00:33:51,520
Speaker 1: the Constitution, an originalist Anton. Yeah. So, uh, going back

546
00:33:51,680 --> 00:33:53,959
Speaker 1: to this argument of it, I'm going to read a quote,

547
00:33:54,000 --> 00:33:56,960
Speaker 1: and I want to see what your reaction is, because

548
00:33:56,960 --> 00:34:00,360
Speaker 1: I know what mine was. This is from congress spend

549
00:34:00,480 --> 00:34:06,160
Speaker 1: David Jolly of Florida, who said Apple's leadership risks having

550
00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:11,040
Speaker 1: blood on their hands. Ben is shaking his head and

551
00:34:11,120 --> 00:34:14,800
Speaker 1: looking at me in disdain. Not at me, he's looking

552
00:34:14,840 --> 00:34:19,440
Speaker 1: through me. It's absolutely insincere, first off, and it's usually

553
00:34:19,960 --> 00:34:26,880
Speaker 1: whenever you listeners, whenever you hear people make lurid imagery

554
00:34:26,960 --> 00:34:35,280
Speaker 1: based appeals to emotion, right, or these these hyperbolic accusations

555
00:34:35,680 --> 00:34:40,360
Speaker 1: that this is the bread and butter of I'll say it, uh,

556
00:34:40,520 --> 00:34:44,960
Speaker 1: the political class, which political theater exactly. That's a great phrase.

557
00:34:45,040 --> 00:34:48,719
Speaker 1: And so to to say this in such a way.

558
00:34:49,120 --> 00:34:52,360
Speaker 1: What it does is psychologically you get an image of

559
00:34:52,400 --> 00:34:56,759
Speaker 1: somebody with with literal blood on their hands. And then

560
00:34:57,160 --> 00:35:01,319
Speaker 1: you know they're trying to cast aspersion against Apple, not

561
00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:05,600
Speaker 1: by not by making any point about the arguments Apple

562
00:35:05,719 --> 00:35:10,480
Speaker 1: is making, but by going instantly to, uh, these people

563
00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:13,120
Speaker 1: are murderers, right if we don't do why why are

564
00:35:13,120 --> 00:35:18,240
Speaker 1: you defending murderers? That's that's that's essentially you know, uh,

565
00:35:18,360 --> 00:35:21,720
Speaker 1: the argument about you know, it's it's one of those

566
00:35:21,800 --> 00:35:24,160
Speaker 1: those legal arguments you will hear occasionally. This is an

567
00:35:24,160 --> 00:35:26,120
Speaker 1: I legal argument, but it's like the legal arguments you

568
00:35:26,120 --> 00:35:28,960
Speaker 1: will occasionally here where it's clear that the lawyer is

569
00:35:28,960 --> 00:35:32,239
Speaker 1: trying to appeal to the jury's sense of emotion as

570
00:35:32,239 --> 00:35:35,760
Speaker 1: opposed to addressing the facts of the case itself. UM

571
00:35:35,840 --> 00:35:38,680
Speaker 1: So I agree entirely with you. The first reaction I

572
00:35:38,760 --> 00:35:43,600
Speaker 1: had was I'm offended by that statement. I mean, it's condescending,

573
00:35:44,000 --> 00:35:47,480
Speaker 1: and it imagines that it imagines that the person that

574
00:35:47,600 --> 00:35:51,120
Speaker 1: would be swayed by that is not intelligent enough to read,

575
00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:55,279
Speaker 1: and it it deflects the fact that there are two

576
00:35:55,320 --> 00:36:01,200
Speaker 1: people who were responsible for that terrible exam attack, that

577
00:36:01,440 --> 00:36:03,759
Speaker 1: two people, and those two people are the people who

578
00:36:03,800 --> 00:36:05,800
Speaker 1: are holding the guns and pulling the trigger and aiming

579
00:36:05,840 --> 00:36:07,840
Speaker 1: at people. Those those are the ones who have blood

580
00:36:07,840 --> 00:36:10,000
Speaker 1: on their hands, and of course they're they're both dead now.

581
00:36:10,080 --> 00:36:12,600
Speaker 1: They both died in the shootout with the law enforcement.

582
00:36:13,800 --> 00:36:17,480
Speaker 1: But the point being that they're the ones responsible, not Apple.

583
00:36:17,520 --> 00:36:21,000
Speaker 1: Apple did nothing in relation to this crime. In fact,

584
00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:25,160
Speaker 1: Apple didn't give the freaking phone to Fruit that was

585
00:36:25,480 --> 00:36:28,920
Speaker 1: issued by the county. Apple just made some made a

586
00:36:28,960 --> 00:36:31,960
Speaker 1: device that has this level of security on it that

587
00:36:32,040 --> 00:36:34,799
Speaker 1: people wanted. People wanted that level of security. They want

588
00:36:35,080 --> 00:36:39,879
Speaker 1: the reassurance that Apple itself can't access their phones without

589
00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:45,279
Speaker 1: their permission. It's a very important cornerstone of security. In fact,

590
00:36:45,320 --> 00:36:48,360
Speaker 1: if you look at iOS eight or earlier, Apple could

591
00:36:48,400 --> 00:36:52,239
Speaker 1: bypass security. They could they could access the information on

592
00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:57,440
Speaker 1: a phone without your pen, without you acquiescing and allowing

593
00:36:57,480 --> 00:37:01,839
Speaker 1: that to happen. But they specifically change that with iOS nine.

594
00:37:02,320 --> 00:37:04,640
Speaker 1: They made it so that they could not do that

595
00:37:04,719 --> 00:37:09,600
Speaker 1: because they said, it's important for consumers to trust the company.

596
00:37:10,239 --> 00:37:12,360
Speaker 1: And how can you build trust if you know, in

597
00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:14,359
Speaker 1: the back of your mind this company could at any

598
00:37:14,440 --> 00:37:19,760
Speaker 1: moment access my private information that I have not chosen

599
00:37:19,800 --> 00:37:23,600
Speaker 1: to share with them. Uh, well, you know that trust

600
00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:26,880
Speaker 1: is destroyed in that case. That kind of brings us

601
00:37:26,880 --> 00:37:32,080
Speaker 1: back to that unreasonable burden. So the these arguments are continuing.

602
00:37:32,239 --> 00:37:35,560
Speaker 1: Uh I think the next stage doesn't start unill till

603
00:37:35,600 --> 00:37:40,480
Speaker 1: March ten um, and we're recording this on February. So

604
00:37:42,040 --> 00:37:46,840
Speaker 1: I I am very hopeful that the government sides with

605
00:37:46,880 --> 00:37:49,680
Speaker 1: Apple on this ultimately that when this gets the courts

606
00:37:49,719 --> 00:37:53,200
Speaker 1: at any rate side with Apple on this, because if

607
00:37:53,239 --> 00:37:57,279
Speaker 1: they do not, this is the This could be like

608
00:37:57,440 --> 00:38:01,120
Speaker 1: the snowball effect where we see more or requests of

609
00:38:01,160 --> 00:38:04,640
Speaker 1: this nature come in and then once it once it's

610
00:38:04,680 --> 00:38:07,880
Speaker 1: been established as precedent, it's much easier to happen in

611
00:38:07,880 --> 00:38:12,640
Speaker 1: the future, and it's easier to see larger requests like

612
00:38:12,719 --> 00:38:14,880
Speaker 1: things that are that go beyond all we need you

613
00:38:14,920 --> 00:38:17,920
Speaker 1: to help us circumvent the security and may go into

614
00:38:18,000 --> 00:38:20,000
Speaker 1: we need you. We finally are going to get what

615
00:38:20,040 --> 00:38:22,880
Speaker 1: we wanted all this time. We want a direct path

616
00:38:24,160 --> 00:38:27,520
Speaker 1: that like a doorway that's labeled FBI that lets us

617
00:38:27,560 --> 00:38:31,000
Speaker 1: go straight into the data that your users are storing

618
00:38:31,040 --> 00:38:34,279
Speaker 1: on their devices, which leads to because the FBI, this

619
00:38:34,360 --> 00:38:38,800
Speaker 1: leads to a horrific situation because the FBI is an

620
00:38:38,840 --> 00:38:43,040
Speaker 1: institution sure made up of individuals. Remember when the Snowden

621
00:38:43,120 --> 00:38:46,960
Speaker 1: leaks revealed to us the extent of unethical use of

622
00:38:47,000 --> 00:38:49,319
Speaker 1: surveillance by the n s A. People would look up

623
00:38:49,320 --> 00:38:52,719
Speaker 1: their ex girlfriends or they were stark ex boyfriends. Yeah,

624
00:38:52,760 --> 00:38:55,160
Speaker 1: they were just looking up people that they were interested

625
00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:58,160
Speaker 1: in with absolutely no oversight. As a matter of fact,

626
00:38:58,360 --> 00:39:03,239
Speaker 1: when we talked about the Chinese government looking the other

627
00:39:03,280 --> 00:39:07,520
Speaker 1: way for hackers, that was the same thing that occurred

628
00:39:07,560 --> 00:39:12,600
Speaker 1: with the n s A. To to to assume that,

629
00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:17,120
Speaker 1: for some reason, given the opportunity, individuals in another law

630
00:39:17,239 --> 00:39:21,560
Speaker 1: enforcement branch or another institution would not do the same

631
00:39:21,600 --> 00:39:25,960
Speaker 1: thing is cartoonishly naive, you know. Using the argument of

632
00:39:26,040 --> 00:39:28,120
Speaker 1: this is a one time use, that wouldn't stop the

633
00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:31,359
Speaker 1: FBI from requesting another one time use, or another one

634
00:39:31,360 --> 00:39:34,480
Speaker 1: time use, or even extending that beyond it, saying all

635
00:39:34,560 --> 00:39:37,920
Speaker 1: right now, we want a one size fits all approach

636
00:39:38,000 --> 00:39:40,080
Speaker 1: to doing the same thing because it's too much time

637
00:39:40,120 --> 00:39:42,799
Speaker 1: for us. And don't worry, we'll get a court order

638
00:39:42,880 --> 00:39:46,160
Speaker 1: before we do it. We'll make sure that nobody else

639
00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:48,880
Speaker 1: gets access to this ability, and you'll know that the

640
00:39:48,920 --> 00:39:53,239
Speaker 1: court order is good because they'll be classified. So we'll

641
00:39:53,239 --> 00:39:55,640
Speaker 1: just inform you when the orders are approved. I have

642
00:39:55,680 --> 00:39:58,480
Speaker 1: said it many times that there is no way to

643
00:39:58,600 --> 00:40:03,560
Speaker 1: ensure security by enforcing a vulnerability. Yeah, and I think

644
00:40:03,600 --> 00:40:06,600
Speaker 1: that's a student way to encapsulate it. But there is

645
00:40:06,640 --> 00:40:09,120
Speaker 1: a question that I have that I'm sure a lot

646
00:40:09,160 --> 00:40:11,719
Speaker 1: of you have as well, ladies and gentlemen, which is,

647
00:40:12,560 --> 00:40:17,880
Speaker 1: let's say the worst happens. Worst happens, court rules in

648
00:40:18,080 --> 00:40:22,920
Speaker 1: favor of the FBI, and Apple says, no, we're not

649
00:40:22,960 --> 00:40:27,360
Speaker 1: going to do it. Well, I mean if if the court,

650
00:40:27,880 --> 00:40:29,800
Speaker 1: assuming he goes all the way up to the Supreme Court,

651
00:40:30,440 --> 00:40:33,080
Speaker 1: this could end up becoming a matter of law where

652
00:40:33,680 --> 00:40:37,960
Speaker 1: it's codified that companies have to obey that within the

653
00:40:38,040 --> 00:40:42,040
Speaker 1: United States, which would mean far reaching implications, not just

654
00:40:42,080 --> 00:40:46,440
Speaker 1: for Apple, but for all companies everyone, any any tech company,

655
00:40:46,480 --> 00:40:49,839
Speaker 1: any company, really, any company doing business in the US,

656
00:40:49,960 --> 00:40:54,000
Speaker 1: not even based here, because doing business so that's a

657
00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:59,680
Speaker 1: big deal. It's it's potentially disastrous for privacy. Uh, there's

658
00:41:00,040 --> 00:41:03,839
Speaker 1: ampen possibilities of misuse. We've talked about the possibility that

659
00:41:03,920 --> 00:41:08,920
Speaker 1: if you do create a vulnerability, someone somewhere is going

660
00:41:08,960 --> 00:41:11,520
Speaker 1: to try and figure out a way to also gain

661
00:41:11,560 --> 00:41:15,080
Speaker 1: access to that vulnerability. And these are not necessarily other

662
00:41:15,840 --> 00:41:20,520
Speaker 1: law agencies or intelligence agencies, or maybe they are intelligence agencies.

663
00:41:20,640 --> 00:41:22,759
Speaker 1: They just have to be intelligence agencies working for a

664
00:41:22,760 --> 00:41:25,759
Speaker 1: different country. And yeah, and here's the problem, because we've

665
00:41:25,800 --> 00:41:30,000
Speaker 1: talked about this before, man, I legislation, I think we

666
00:41:30,040 --> 00:41:33,960
Speaker 1: talked about this with autonomous vehicles before. Legislation is almost

667
00:41:34,000 --> 00:41:38,920
Speaker 1: always outpaced by technological innovation. Yes, yeah, but you will

668
00:41:38,920 --> 00:41:42,160
Speaker 1: almost always see a case where someone has figured out

669
00:41:42,200 --> 00:41:45,000
Speaker 1: something really interesting to do with technology, or perhaps even

670
00:41:45,080 --> 00:41:48,200
Speaker 1: really scary things they could do with technology, and there

671
00:41:48,200 --> 00:41:51,000
Speaker 1: are no laws to cover it because before that person

672
00:41:51,040 --> 00:41:53,600
Speaker 1: figured it out, it didn't exist. So you don't write

673
00:41:53,640 --> 00:41:55,759
Speaker 1: laws for stuff that doesn't exist. We don't have a

674
00:41:55,840 --> 00:42:00,000
Speaker 1: law saying listen, guys, I just I just it's keep

675
00:42:00,120 --> 00:42:01,759
Speaker 1: me up at night. We have got to write a

676
00:42:01,840 --> 00:42:05,600
Speaker 1: law about what happens in the case that the Lockness

677
00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:08,560
Speaker 1: Monster is real, gets out of Scotland, comes over to

678
00:42:08,600 --> 00:42:10,680
Speaker 1: New Jersey and starts to eat people. We need a

679
00:42:10,760 --> 00:42:17,239
Speaker 1: law to protect us from this potential catastrophe. Iculous. Yeah,

680
00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:20,120
Speaker 1: Like if we're senators, everyone in the audience and you,

681
00:42:20,239 --> 00:42:24,200
Speaker 1: Jonathan myself, and then one of us walks in and says, guys,

682
00:42:24,239 --> 00:42:26,960
Speaker 1: I know that, uh, I know that we have some

683
00:42:27,000 --> 00:42:29,719
Speaker 1: other issues coming up, and we have to nominate this

684
00:42:29,920 --> 00:42:33,759
Speaker 1: Court justice, and there's an election coming up. But I

685
00:42:33,800 --> 00:42:36,279
Speaker 1: think we need to look into the future and look

686
00:42:36,280 --> 00:42:39,520
Speaker 1: at the big picture, which is moon boot theft right,

687
00:42:40,280 --> 00:42:43,439
Speaker 1: because I don't want people shoelace on the moon when

688
00:42:43,480 --> 00:42:46,600
Speaker 1: and if we build a colony there. I think arguing example,

689
00:42:47,440 --> 00:42:49,840
Speaker 1: for example, for robot rights right now might be a

690
00:42:49,840 --> 00:42:53,040
Speaker 1: little premature that kind of thing. Maybe not forever, but

691
00:42:53,160 --> 00:42:55,480
Speaker 1: for now, it's definitely it's good to think about. But

692
00:42:55,760 --> 00:42:59,000
Speaker 1: you know, you make a very astute point when you say,

693
00:43:00,040 --> 00:43:02,960
Speaker 1: if we're talking about codifying something, we codifying a law,

694
00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:07,680
Speaker 1: then what what happens is once the Supreme Court rules

695
00:43:07,719 --> 00:43:11,880
Speaker 1: on something like this and it becomes a matter of law,

696
00:43:12,200 --> 00:43:15,080
Speaker 1: it is much It is very, very difficult to get

697
00:43:15,120 --> 00:43:19,000
Speaker 1: that kind of ruling. The Supremes are pretty busy people.

698
00:43:19,800 --> 00:43:22,560
Speaker 1: They don't hear every case that's brought before. They absolutely don't.

699
00:43:22,600 --> 00:43:25,640
Speaker 1: And then but the thing is, you think it's hard

700
00:43:25,680 --> 00:43:29,120
Speaker 1: to get one of the to get those justices to

701
00:43:29,600 --> 00:43:34,480
Speaker 1: change the substance of American jurisprudence. Imagine trying to get

702
00:43:34,520 --> 00:43:37,040
Speaker 1: him to change it back. This is like a Pandora's

703
00:43:37,120 --> 00:43:41,040
Speaker 1: box Pandora's jar situation. Yeah, now this is not not good.

704
00:43:41,360 --> 00:43:44,399
Speaker 1: You don't want this to happen for multiple reasons. Now,

705
00:43:44,840 --> 00:43:49,200
Speaker 1: all that being said, our our sympathies with the families

706
00:43:49,239 --> 00:43:51,840
Speaker 1: of those who are wounded and killed as a result

707
00:43:51,920 --> 00:43:56,080
Speaker 1: of this mass shooting. Absolutely I feel awful for them.

708
00:43:56,120 --> 00:43:59,080
Speaker 1: And if there were any other way to get to

709
00:43:59,120 --> 00:44:02,719
Speaker 1: that information that did not require Apple to be complicit

710
00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:07,240
Speaker 1: in destroying its own security, I would be in favor

711
00:44:07,280 --> 00:44:09,239
Speaker 1: of it. And in fact, the FBI has taken such

712
00:44:09,239 --> 00:44:13,200
Speaker 1: pains they got access to the iCloud backups that this

713
00:44:13,320 --> 00:44:15,799
Speaker 1: phone creates. The problem being that the phone didn't have

714
00:44:15,840 --> 00:44:17,960
Speaker 1: an eye cloud backup for the month leading up to

715
00:44:18,200 --> 00:44:21,680
Speaker 1: the actual attacks, so there could be information on the

716
00:44:21,719 --> 00:44:24,160
Speaker 1: phone that's not on the cloud, and that's why the

717
00:44:24,200 --> 00:44:27,200
Speaker 1: FBI wants to get access to that. I totally understand

718
00:44:27,239 --> 00:44:31,200
Speaker 1: the reasoning behind it. But but two things, of course

719
00:44:31,480 --> 00:44:34,880
Speaker 1: keep me from being completely sympathetic. One is that the

720
00:44:34,920 --> 00:44:38,480
Speaker 1: FBI has for years been trying to get backdoor access

721
00:44:38,520 --> 00:44:42,800
Speaker 1: to multiple systems. Yeah, so that so you could argue

722
00:44:42,840 --> 00:44:48,160
Speaker 1: that perhaps this mass shooting is being leveraged cynically by

723
00:44:48,200 --> 00:44:53,239
Speaker 1: the FBI in order to further their goals, because it's

724
00:44:53,280 --> 00:44:57,520
Speaker 1: hard to say no to such an emotionally devastating event.

725
00:44:59,280 --> 00:45:03,399
Speaker 1: I would say, I do, I do know, I believe it.

726
00:45:03,920 --> 00:45:09,080
Speaker 1: And this is just my personal opinion based on again precedent.

727
00:45:09,719 --> 00:45:14,160
Speaker 1: It is completely within the realm of not only possibility

728
00:45:14,480 --> 00:45:20,360
Speaker 1: but plausibility that an institution would wait for an opportune

729
00:45:20,440 --> 00:45:25,000
Speaker 1: time to make this this kind of legislation, like the

730
00:45:25,120 --> 00:45:29,319
Speaker 1: argument for internet surveillance based on saying, hey, we need

731
00:45:29,320 --> 00:45:32,799
Speaker 1: to protect people, we need to protect you from um

732
00:45:33,360 --> 00:45:38,560
Speaker 1: inappropriate content and your children, think of the kids. Really,

733
00:45:38,600 --> 00:45:41,000
Speaker 1: this is this is a lot of the same stuff

734
00:45:41,040 --> 00:45:44,880
Speaker 1: we heard in the wake of the Patriot Act, where

735
00:45:45,160 --> 00:45:48,000
Speaker 1: a lot of people felt the Patriot Act was a

736
00:45:48,040 --> 00:45:52,759
Speaker 1: reactionary uh, piece of legislation that was drafted far too

737
00:45:52,800 --> 00:45:56,280
Speaker 1: quickly and what had had reached far, far too wide

738
00:45:57,080 --> 00:46:01,240
Speaker 1: for what it was proposing. What what what? What everyone

739
00:46:01,280 --> 00:46:06,239
Speaker 1: claimed it was all about, and Uh, that was a

740
00:46:06,280 --> 00:46:10,120
Speaker 1: big mess. This is also potentially a really big mess.

741
00:46:10,200 --> 00:46:12,600
Speaker 1: And the Patriot Act, the substance of it was pretty

742
00:46:12,680 --> 00:46:16,080
Speaker 1: much had been written in advance. Yeah yeah, which is

743
00:46:16,120 --> 00:46:19,640
Speaker 1: pretty like now that used to be a controversial statement,

744
00:46:19,680 --> 00:46:23,080
Speaker 1: but now it's acknowledged. Yeah, So this is this is uh,

745
00:46:23,160 --> 00:46:25,359
Speaker 1: I mean the fact that FBI has had this plan

746
00:46:25,440 --> 00:46:30,080
Speaker 1: for a while, not the specific implementation, but this desire

747
00:46:30,120 --> 00:46:33,680
Speaker 1: to get this workaround access to things. And I mean,

748
00:46:33,719 --> 00:46:36,960
Speaker 1: I totally understand their point of view. Two, they're trying

749
00:46:36,960 --> 00:46:40,560
Speaker 1: to investigate things. It's not like the FBI is necessarily

750
00:46:40,640 --> 00:46:43,759
Speaker 1: made up of the cigarette smoking man and all of

751
00:46:43,760 --> 00:46:46,320
Speaker 1: his cronies. You know, I'm not I'm not going I don't.

752
00:46:46,400 --> 00:46:50,160
Speaker 1: I don't mean to to uh disparage them. I don't

753
00:46:50,160 --> 00:46:52,640
Speaker 1: want to demonize them, Right, That's not That's not what

754
00:46:52,680 --> 00:46:55,960
Speaker 1: I'm trying to get at. Either. The FBI's intentions may

755
00:46:56,000 --> 00:46:59,000
Speaker 1: in fact be nothing but noble that they want this

756
00:46:59,200 --> 00:47:05,040
Speaker 1: in the effort to investigate, solve crime, prevent crime from happening,

757
00:47:05,520 --> 00:47:09,600
Speaker 1: and not in any way that is uh malevolent. However,

758
00:47:10,760 --> 00:47:13,600
Speaker 1: the fact remains, whether their intentions are noble or not,

759
00:47:13,680 --> 00:47:17,520
Speaker 1: it opens up this opportunity for people whose intentions are

760
00:47:17,560 --> 00:47:23,160
Speaker 1: demonstrably not noble to take advantage of those same opportunities. Yeah,

761
00:47:23,239 --> 00:47:25,120
Speaker 1: and you know, I'm glad you said that because I

762
00:47:25,160 --> 00:47:27,319
Speaker 1: want to see something that I want to add to this,

763
00:47:27,719 --> 00:47:30,960
Speaker 1: something that has rarely said when we talk about um

764
00:47:31,200 --> 00:47:35,360
Speaker 1: government surveillance or concerns about privacy right. One thing that

765
00:47:35,480 --> 00:47:41,280
Speaker 1: is rarely said is that law enforcement agencies, law enforcement institutions,

766
00:47:41,320 --> 00:47:47,279
Speaker 1: and individuals in the US actually do quite, um, quite

767
00:47:47,280 --> 00:47:50,279
Speaker 1: an extraordinary job compared to a lot of places. If

768
00:47:50,320 --> 00:47:52,920
Speaker 1: you're fortunate enough to grow up in a place that

769
00:47:53,040 --> 00:47:56,200
Speaker 1: has rule of law, where you can walk down the

770
00:47:56,239 --> 00:47:59,440
Speaker 1: street in the dark, or you can say, you can say, uh,

771
00:47:59,480 --> 00:48:02,799
Speaker 1: you know, whomever your senator president is, you can go

772
00:48:02,880 --> 00:48:06,560
Speaker 1: on the internet and say, I think they stink. I

773
00:48:06,560 --> 00:48:10,000
Speaker 1: think you're in jerk. Yeah, I think you're the piece

774
00:48:10,040 --> 00:48:13,560
Speaker 1: of bologna with shoes. And then but in other countries,

775
00:48:13,640 --> 00:48:17,319
Speaker 1: we you know, people get arrested for that, people get imprisoned.

776
00:48:17,600 --> 00:48:22,839
Speaker 1: So we're not gonna raced, Yes, not just arrested or imprisoned,

777
00:48:22,840 --> 00:48:26,600
Speaker 1: but the government in some countries will take steps to

778
00:48:27,280 --> 00:48:29,960
Speaker 1: make it seem like that person was never a person exactly.

779
00:48:30,040 --> 00:48:32,080
Speaker 1: They'll keep the photos, but you won't be in them.

780
00:48:32,480 --> 00:48:34,920
Speaker 1: And and I say that because it's a sense of

781
00:48:35,000 --> 00:48:41,560
Speaker 1: much needed perspective. However, you know, I'm not demonizing the

782
00:48:41,600 --> 00:48:48,240
Speaker 1: people who work at the FBI. Institutions, whether private or public,

783
00:48:48,680 --> 00:48:55,520
Speaker 1: seek power. They seek uh further further, influence. And that's

784
00:48:55,520 --> 00:48:59,759
Speaker 1: not that's not because it's some sort of James Bond supervillain.

785
00:49:00,280 --> 00:49:04,200
Speaker 1: It's not specter. It's not specter. And it's because it

786
00:49:04,400 --> 00:49:10,640
Speaker 1: allows for it allows for an easier, more efficient pursuit

787
00:49:10,719 --> 00:49:14,000
Speaker 1: of whatever the original mission would be right, and sometimes

788
00:49:14,040 --> 00:49:17,200
Speaker 1: that ends up stepping over a line that should not

789
00:49:17,280 --> 00:49:21,440
Speaker 1: be crossed. So so yeah, like like Ben and I

790
00:49:21,520 --> 00:49:23,759
Speaker 1: we both talk about things that here at work where

791
00:49:23,760 --> 00:49:26,759
Speaker 1: we say, gosh, I wish we had X because it

792
00:49:26,760 --> 00:49:30,000
Speaker 1: would make our lives so much easier. Well, even if

793
00:49:30,040 --> 00:49:32,800
Speaker 1: we got X, we would come up with why. That

794
00:49:32,800 --> 00:49:35,680
Speaker 1: would be the next one we get X. X is awesome,

795
00:49:35,840 --> 00:49:37,520
Speaker 1: X is helping us out. We're like, oh man, it's

796
00:49:37,520 --> 00:49:40,480
Speaker 1: so good to have X here. Yeah, it would be

797
00:49:40,480 --> 00:49:42,399
Speaker 1: great if we had why because if we had why,

798
00:49:42,480 --> 00:49:45,080
Speaker 1: we could really do our jobs. Well we get why,

799
00:49:45,120 --> 00:49:48,240
Speaker 1: and then you know, man, X and Why are working

800
00:49:48,239 --> 00:49:50,600
Speaker 1: out like a dream. But boy, if we had Z,

801
00:49:51,000 --> 00:49:53,799
Speaker 1: can you imagine the level we get to Now what

802
00:49:53,880 --> 00:49:58,880
Speaker 1: we do Ben, we make fun audio podcasts, videos and

803
00:49:59,040 --> 00:50:02,680
Speaker 1: articles that go on the Internet, and that's awesome and

804
00:50:02,760 --> 00:50:08,719
Speaker 1: so really our capacity to do horrible, horrible harm is

805
00:50:08,920 --> 00:50:14,240
Speaker 1: fairly limited. I mean in respect to how our jobs comparatively. Yeah. Granted,

806
00:50:14,239 --> 00:50:16,200
Speaker 1: if either of us wanted to go outside and just

807
00:50:16,239 --> 00:50:19,160
Speaker 1: start throwing kingop hops popsicles at people, we could go

808
00:50:19,239 --> 00:50:22,319
Speaker 1: on a popsicle rampage. But that's that's not that's not

809
00:50:22,440 --> 00:50:28,360
Speaker 1: job related. The FBI, the c, I, A, N, S A,

810
00:50:28,360 --> 00:50:33,799
Speaker 1: a lot of those three letter organizations, in pursuit of

811
00:50:33,840 --> 00:50:36,280
Speaker 1: what they need to do in order to to fulfill

812
00:50:36,320 --> 00:50:41,759
Speaker 1: their their organization's mission, in some cases will step over

813
00:50:41,880 --> 00:50:45,560
Speaker 1: lines that we cannot allow people to cross because it

814
00:50:45,760 --> 00:50:49,839
Speaker 1: creates a system that is at least as dangerous as

815
00:50:49,880 --> 00:50:55,360
Speaker 1: whatever problem they're trying to solve. Another example of this

816
00:50:55,480 --> 00:51:03,440
Speaker 1: is the the idea that the idea of absolute prevention.

817
00:51:03,560 --> 00:51:07,280
Speaker 1: Like you know, there was the old conversation about tortures

818
00:51:07,320 --> 00:51:11,960
Speaker 1: several years ago when it was the ticking time bomb argument,

819
00:51:12,239 --> 00:51:16,319
Speaker 1: which was, should torture be legal if there is a

820
00:51:16,360 --> 00:51:21,560
Speaker 1: criminal in custody who has suspected of having knowledge of

821
00:51:22,160 --> 00:51:27,520
Speaker 1: another nine eleven here? Yeah, yeah, Jack Bauer from twenty

822
00:51:27,520 --> 00:51:32,960
Speaker 1: four kind of argument. Should torture, while reprehensible, be allowed

823
00:51:33,400 --> 00:51:38,400
Speaker 1: when it gets results? And this, this kind of reasoning

824
00:51:39,840 --> 00:51:43,879
Speaker 1: is dangerous. Not I'm not saying that because of any

825
00:51:43,960 --> 00:51:47,400
Speaker 1: desire to see human tragedy if I'm saying it's dangerous

826
00:51:47,480 --> 00:51:51,359
Speaker 1: because of the assumptions it makes that a special case

827
00:51:51,400 --> 00:51:54,920
Speaker 1: will remain a special case, right, and that perhaps the

828
00:51:54,960 --> 00:51:58,600
Speaker 1: next case, which maybe is that quite so special, Like, well,

829
00:51:59,680 --> 00:52:04,759
Speaker 1: you know we've done it before, So what's the deal here? Yeah,

830
00:52:04,800 --> 00:52:08,440
Speaker 1: I mean what happened? Yeah, So this is this is

831
00:52:08,800 --> 00:52:13,440
Speaker 1: exactly why neither I think I feel pretty strongly about this.

832
00:52:13,520 --> 00:52:15,040
Speaker 1: I think I'm on the right track that neither you

833
00:52:15,160 --> 00:52:19,200
Speaker 1: nor I feel that the FBI should win out in

834
00:52:19,239 --> 00:52:23,359
Speaker 1: this particular case. I think this is something where we

835
00:52:23,400 --> 00:52:25,719
Speaker 1: really need to see Apple come out on top. I

836
00:52:25,800 --> 00:52:29,160
Speaker 1: am not a huge fan of Apple. I don't own

837
00:52:29,200 --> 00:52:31,960
Speaker 1: a lot of Apple products I have. Apple does not

838
00:52:32,040 --> 00:52:35,760
Speaker 1: sponsor this show. I'm not getting any money from Apple.

839
00:52:36,800 --> 00:52:39,200
Speaker 1: If anything, I'm losing money to Apple because my wife

840
00:52:39,280 --> 00:52:41,680
Speaker 1: is a fan, so she wants to get an Apple Watch,

841
00:52:42,239 --> 00:52:46,240
Speaker 1: but I am not. I'm not getting anything from Apple. Uh.

842
00:52:46,320 --> 00:52:48,960
Speaker 1: I do think they're in the right because I don't

843
00:52:49,000 --> 00:52:53,280
Speaker 1: want to see a precedent where a company that creates

844
00:52:53,280 --> 00:52:58,080
Speaker 1: a secure system has to be or can be compelled

845
00:52:58,239 --> 00:53:03,320
Speaker 1: to compromise that security. It defeats the purpose of the security,

846
00:53:04,160 --> 00:53:08,239
Speaker 1: and whether it's this case, which is extraordinary and very emotional,

847
00:53:09,080 --> 00:53:14,040
Speaker 1: or something much less impactful for the general public. Maybe

848
00:53:14,080 --> 00:53:18,960
Speaker 1: it's something, you know, uh, simpler and less dramatic. It

849
00:53:19,000 --> 00:53:23,919
Speaker 1: doesn't matter. You cannot you cannot go down that pathway,

850
00:53:24,040 --> 00:53:26,640
Speaker 1: uh and expect things to turn out all right. You've

851
00:53:26,680 --> 00:53:29,240
Speaker 1: got to figure out other ways to do that kind

852
00:53:29,320 --> 00:53:35,000
Speaker 1: of investigation. Either Apple needs to go in a direction

853
00:53:35,080 --> 00:53:41,320
Speaker 1: where they can, uh, they can access user data without

854
00:53:41,360 --> 00:53:44,919
Speaker 1: having to circumvent a security system like this, which means

855
00:53:44,920 --> 00:53:46,759
Speaker 1: they have to go backwards, which can really is not

856
00:53:46,800 --> 00:53:52,040
Speaker 1: a possibility. Or Apple and other companies have to create

857
00:53:52,680 --> 00:53:57,680
Speaker 1: systems where it really is impossible for them to access

858
00:53:57,719 --> 00:54:02,560
Speaker 1: without the consent or the actions of the owner of

859
00:54:02,600 --> 00:54:06,640
Speaker 1: the device. I suspect that every company is rushing to

860
00:54:06,719 --> 00:54:09,600
Speaker 1: develop that kind of approach right now, because none of

861
00:54:09,600 --> 00:54:14,240
Speaker 1: them want to be in this position. Facebook, Google, Microsoft

862
00:54:14,440 --> 00:54:18,560
Speaker 1: all publicly showed support for Apple. Apple right now is

863
00:54:18,800 --> 00:54:23,799
Speaker 1: um you know, part of Apple hired a dev that

864
00:54:23,880 --> 00:54:28,480
Speaker 1: worked on Edward Snowden's favorite messaging app obasually Yeah, and uh,

865
00:54:28,560 --> 00:54:31,520
Speaker 1: and I don't know how much of that is meant

866
00:54:31,520 --> 00:54:34,480
Speaker 1: to be like a pr move, but also they have

867
00:54:34,760 --> 00:54:39,640
Speaker 1: um you know, the leaked Snowden papers are out there,

868
00:54:39,640 --> 00:54:42,080
Speaker 1: and I know I'm harping on them. They revealed an

869
00:54:42,160 --> 00:54:47,000
Speaker 1: ugly behind the scenes look at corporate involvement with government

870
00:54:47,000 --> 00:54:54,080
Speaker 1: requests for surveillance. You know, so the average consumer you me, uh,

871
00:54:54,280 --> 00:55:01,200
Speaker 1: Gary Busey, whomever, we have much less trust in general

872
00:55:01,320 --> 00:55:05,600
Speaker 1: in these companies because we have a reason not to

873
00:55:05,680 --> 00:55:11,080
Speaker 1: trust them. Well, we we have handed over so much

874
00:55:11,239 --> 00:55:16,040
Speaker 1: of our own personal data. We trust that the devices

875
00:55:16,120 --> 00:55:20,399
Speaker 1: that hold that personal data aren't going to just give

876
00:55:20,480 --> 00:55:26,279
Speaker 1: that away to whatever entity, uh, without our consent. We

877
00:55:26,280 --> 00:55:29,800
Speaker 1: we trust that that's not going to happen. When things

878
00:55:29,800 --> 00:55:32,560
Speaker 1: like this pop up where we start to question that trust,

879
00:55:33,360 --> 00:55:37,280
Speaker 1: that's problematic. There's someone else that Apple has recently hired,

880
00:55:38,440 --> 00:55:41,440
Speaker 1: Ted Olsen. Does that name sound familiar to you? Ted?

881
00:55:42,280 --> 00:55:45,759
Speaker 1: Ted Olson's a lawyer. Uh so, Ted Olson is going

882
00:55:45,800 --> 00:55:48,840
Speaker 1: to be representing Apple. Ted Olson's probably best known for

883
00:55:50,000 --> 00:55:56,320
Speaker 1: representing George W. Bush in the Bush versus Gore election fallout.

884
00:55:56,520 --> 00:55:59,160
Speaker 1: You know, for those of you in the United States

885
00:55:59,480 --> 00:56:02,640
Speaker 1: when when Bush was running against Gore, there was this

886
00:56:02,719 --> 00:56:08,080
Speaker 1: whole battle about you know, voting recounts, voting recounts, and

887
00:56:08,120 --> 00:56:12,440
Speaker 1: Olsen represented uh, W. George W. Bush on that and

888
00:56:12,560 --> 00:56:15,720
Speaker 1: Bush ended up winning that. So now he's representing Apple

889
00:56:15,760 --> 00:56:20,960
Speaker 1: in this particular battle with the FBI. So interesting to

890
00:56:21,040 --> 00:56:26,120
Speaker 1: see these kinds of personalities involved in this. And I

891
00:56:26,200 --> 00:56:31,200
Speaker 1: know that with the public perception it's been a little

892
00:56:31,360 --> 00:56:34,279
Speaker 1: sea saw ish, But general public, I would argue, the

893
00:56:34,280 --> 00:56:37,280
Speaker 1: people who are not necessarily paying attention to the text sphere,

894
00:56:38,160 --> 00:56:39,719
Speaker 1: I think a lot of them are siting with the

895
00:56:39,760 --> 00:56:44,480
Speaker 1: FBI because it's a terrorist story. It's a story about

896
00:56:45,000 --> 00:56:49,600
Speaker 1: trying to establish the most information about these these shooters

897
00:56:49,640 --> 00:56:53,000
Speaker 1: as possible. Do you think I do? I think that.

898
00:56:53,040 --> 00:56:55,759
Speaker 1: I think at least a lot of polls that I've

899
00:56:55,760 --> 00:56:59,200
Speaker 1: seen leading up to today, the general public tends to

900
00:56:59,239 --> 00:57:01,719
Speaker 1: side with the I because the FBI has a very

901
00:57:01,719 --> 00:57:09,120
Speaker 1: emotional story. Apples story is much more rationally based, intellectually based, um,

902
00:57:09,200 --> 00:57:14,760
Speaker 1: and the FBI story is is penned on this event,

903
00:57:14,880 --> 00:57:19,480
Speaker 1: this very emotionally charged event. UM. I don't know that

904
00:57:19,480 --> 00:57:21,240
Speaker 1: that's going to continue. I think. I think people who

905
00:57:21,240 --> 00:57:24,600
Speaker 1: are savvy in the text sphere, I think the majority

906
00:57:24,640 --> 00:57:27,120
Speaker 1: of them side with Apple. But it's still because it's

907
00:57:27,160 --> 00:57:30,080
Speaker 1: still it goes back to the taking time bomb argument.

908
00:57:30,200 --> 00:57:34,760
Speaker 1: You know, yeah. Yeah, So this is one of the

909
00:57:34,800 --> 00:57:37,240
Speaker 1: stories that we definitely had to cover. I mean, obviously

910
00:57:37,280 --> 00:57:39,600
Speaker 1: it's it's such a huge it's probably the biggest story

911
00:57:39,600 --> 00:57:42,680
Speaker 1: in tech right now as we record this, um, and

912
00:57:42,760 --> 00:57:45,880
Speaker 1: I'm glad that you could join Mayben to to chat

913
00:57:45,920 --> 00:57:48,520
Speaker 1: about this, to kind of give your your insight as well,

914
00:57:49,040 --> 00:57:52,800
Speaker 1: and to talk about why this is so important, not

915
00:57:52,920 --> 00:57:56,760
Speaker 1: just from a technology standpoint, but just a philosophical standpoint

916
00:57:57,280 --> 00:58:01,439
Speaker 1: in a matter of law as well. So then where

917
00:58:01,480 --> 00:58:06,760
Speaker 1: can people find other stuff what you do? Ah? Yes, uh, well,

918
00:58:06,880 --> 00:58:12,320
Speaker 1: if for any audience members who are interested in stories

919
00:58:12,400 --> 00:58:17,040
Speaker 1: about Big Brother and overarching government surveillance, you can join

920
00:58:17,200 --> 00:58:21,640
Speaker 1: me along with my producers Noel Brown and Matt Frederick

921
00:58:21,760 --> 00:58:25,000
Speaker 1: at our show Stuff they don't want you to know,

922
00:58:25,280 --> 00:58:29,480
Speaker 1: on which you have made several appearances, Jonathan. I enjoyed

923
00:58:29,480 --> 00:58:32,320
Speaker 1: all of them. Oh, thank you. I like it when

924
00:58:32,400 --> 00:58:36,320
Speaker 1: we go on the pun tangents, which sadly doesn't happen

925
00:58:37,040 --> 00:58:40,720
Speaker 1: too much off air. But oh and side note, folks, Yeah,

926
00:58:40,760 --> 00:58:43,520
Speaker 1: I know we didn't make very many jokes today, but

927
00:58:44,200 --> 00:58:47,360
Speaker 1: that's because I think I can I can say you know,

928
00:58:47,440 --> 00:58:49,080
Speaker 1: you and I are on the same page with this.

929
00:58:49,080 --> 00:58:52,360
Speaker 1: This is a very important issue, more more important than

930
00:58:52,520 --> 00:58:55,360
Speaker 1: it may appear at the time. Yeah, we we made

931
00:58:55,440 --> 00:58:59,560
Speaker 1: light of a few of the arguments simply because we

932
00:58:59,680 --> 00:59:05,200
Speaker 1: scot off at the uh the stated intent as opposed

933
00:59:05,200 --> 00:59:08,040
Speaker 1: to what we believe is the true intent of them. Yeah,

934
00:59:08,320 --> 00:59:10,600
Speaker 1: we've done that a couple of times. But and also,

935
00:59:10,880 --> 00:59:15,479
Speaker 1: you know, we do acknowledge that this ultimately is being

936
00:59:15,520 --> 00:59:18,400
Speaker 1: tied back to a really awful event. I mean, we

937
00:59:18,440 --> 00:59:22,400
Speaker 1: can't you know, we can't get around that, and you

938
00:59:22,520 --> 00:59:25,360
Speaker 1: have to acknowledge it and be respectful, I think, right.

939
00:59:25,560 --> 00:59:29,720
Speaker 1: And plus uh, Plus we think we're funny, so that too,

940
00:59:29,720 --> 00:59:33,040
Speaker 1: and we want you to remember that we think we're funny, right,

941
00:59:33,080 --> 00:59:35,680
Speaker 1: that's our opinion. We don't we don't expect you to

942
00:59:35,720 --> 00:59:38,400
Speaker 1: find us funny. That would be presumptuous, but we are.

943
00:59:39,280 --> 00:59:41,800
Speaker 1: We think we're pretty hilarious. You can also find me

944
00:59:41,920 --> 00:59:45,240
Speaker 1: with my co host Scott Benjamin, who has appeared on

945
00:59:45,280 --> 00:59:47,640
Speaker 1: Tech Stuff as well. On our show Car Stuff is

946
00:59:47,680 --> 00:59:51,920
Speaker 1: show about everything that floats, flies, swims, or drives Jonathan.

947
00:59:52,040 --> 00:59:56,280
Speaker 1: Folks can see us uh together even at times on

948
00:59:56,440 --> 00:59:59,600
Speaker 1: our shows What the Stuff and Brain Stuff, which answers

949
00:59:59,600 --> 01:00:02,000
Speaker 1: every day science. Why does popcorn pop what is it

950
01:00:02,080 --> 01:00:06,720
Speaker 1: GPS and uh I know that this is something I

951
01:00:07,080 --> 01:00:09,320
Speaker 1: recommend every time if there's someone who hasn't checked it

952
01:00:09,320 --> 01:00:12,400
Speaker 1: out yet. You have another show called Forward Thinking, which

953
01:00:12,480 --> 01:00:15,000
Speaker 1: is a bright, cheery show about the future, and it

954
01:00:15,040 --> 01:00:17,880
Speaker 1: really is. It's a very it's it's an optimistic view

955
01:00:18,440 --> 01:00:22,200
Speaker 1: of what our future can be based upon the very

956
01:00:22,280 --> 01:00:26,160
Speaker 1: long history of humankind coming up with ingenious solutions to

957
01:00:26,200 --> 01:00:29,040
Speaker 1: big problems. Well, yeah, and you have, um, you have

958
01:00:29,160 --> 01:00:32,160
Speaker 1: some great questions on there. The research is top notch.

959
01:00:32,280 --> 01:00:34,800
Speaker 1: This is a video and an audio series, so I

960
01:00:34,880 --> 01:00:37,240
Speaker 1: highly recommend it. Well, thank you so much, Ben, and

961
01:00:37,280 --> 01:00:38,880
Speaker 1: I really do hope that you and I get the

962
01:00:38,880 --> 01:00:41,240
Speaker 1: opportunity to do some more of those videos together. It's

963
01:00:41,240 --> 01:00:43,840
Speaker 1: been a long time since we've done a two person episode.

964
01:00:44,080 --> 01:00:46,000
Speaker 1: I wish you know what I wish I could tell

965
01:00:46,200 --> 01:00:50,160
Speaker 1: everyone is to go to Brooklyn and catch the two

966
01:00:50,160 --> 01:00:55,880
Speaker 1: of us competing and what was it Thendunderdome. Yeah, there's

967
01:00:55,880 --> 01:00:59,560
Speaker 1: gonna be no no puns barred and we go there. Alright. So,

968
01:00:59,640 --> 01:01:02,280
Speaker 1: guy is, if you have any suggestions for future episodes

969
01:01:02,320 --> 01:01:04,760
Speaker 1: of Text Stuff, let me know. Send me an email.

970
01:01:05,120 --> 01:01:07,680
Speaker 1: The addresses tech Stuff at how stuff Works dot com,

971
01:01:07,800 --> 01:01:10,000
Speaker 1: or you can drop me a line on Facebook or Twitter.

972
01:01:10,400 --> 01:01:12,919
Speaker 1: The handle of both of those is text stuff H

973
01:01:13,120 --> 01:01:15,400
Speaker 1: s W and I will talk to you guys again

974
01:01:16,200 --> 01:01:25,360
Speaker 1: really soon. For more on this and thousands of other topics,

975
01:01:25,600 --> 01:01:37,120
Speaker 1: is it how stuff works dot com