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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Welcome back to the show.

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Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is nol Nay call

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Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our super producer,

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Speaker 1: all mission controlled deconds. Most importantly, you are you. You

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Speaker 1: are here, and that makes this stuff they don't want

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Speaker 1: you to know. As I adjust my camera on the zoom.

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Speaker 1: Uh so, long time listeners, you know what day this

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Speaker 1: stuff comes out. This is our weekly listener mail segment

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Speaker 1: where we share some of our favorite and our most

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Speaker 1: important pieces of correspondence from your fellow conspiracy realists. Quick

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Speaker 1: heads up, everybody listening, maybe with younger folks in the

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Speaker 1: crowd with you or in the car wherever you find yourself.

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Speaker 1: Uh there does need to be a disclaimer for today's

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Speaker 1: listener mail segment. We do have a segment that will

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Speaker 1: be covering um covering content of a sexual nature, and

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Speaker 1: we feel this is vital information. We also feel it

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Speaker 1: may not be appropriate for all our fellow listeners. Uh so,

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Speaker 1: do take that into consideration. But We're not starting there.

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Speaker 1: We're gonna We're gonna start with something a little less heavy,

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Speaker 1: but still I would argue scary in its own way.

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Speaker 1: Our first story, I believe it starts with cheese, doesn't

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Speaker 1: It sure does. Cheese and encryption gonna ry people feeling

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Speaker 1: too comfortable on the Internet. That's a thing. And before

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Speaker 1: we get into the story, this came to us by

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Speaker 1: way of clever another good alias UH in a story

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Speaker 1: full of aliases UH, and the subject says it all

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Speaker 1: drug dealer busted by cheese pick. Hello, A longtime listener

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Speaker 1: and enjoyer of your podcast, and I would like to

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Speaker 1: share a bit of strange news. I had seen on

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Speaker 1: the front website page of my local news site that

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Speaker 1: a man from the UK had been jailed due to

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Speaker 1: fingerprint analysis of a picture he took holding a block

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Speaker 1: of cheese. I will link the scene in an article. Uh.

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Speaker 1: They took the story from below my message, but I

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Speaker 1: thought this was wildly fascinating and wanted to share it

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Speaker 1: with you guys. I also thought it would be a

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Speaker 1: great if uh. Most likely Matt spoke about this story

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Speaker 1: and would bring up the craziness but also the crazy

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Speaker 1: tools that law enforcement have to be able to use

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Speaker 1: against people. This is a great and weird story with

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Speaker 1: possibly horrifying consequences for the average citizen due to the

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Speaker 1: nutso bonker's way, government and law enforcement can catch people.

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Speaker 1: I trust you guys will be able to do this

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Speaker 1: story justice. Best and warmest concerns Clever. Hey, thanks for

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Speaker 1: the shout out. By the way, Clever, Sorry it wasn't

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Speaker 1: me this time. Ha ha, But you're here. But but

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Speaker 1: you're here, Matt, You're here. Great name too, Clever. By

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Speaker 1: the way, seriously, I have this image of Clever, you know,

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Speaker 1: like looking around the kitchen and saying which piece of

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Speaker 1: cutlery will I go by? And as the templar said

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Speaker 1: to indeed you have chosen wisely. And also there's only one.

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Speaker 1: It's true, there is one. And it also is the

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Speaker 1: name of the movie inside of the television series The Sopranos,

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Speaker 1: which I will not stop talking about. Um that Christopher

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Speaker 1: makes along with some of his mob financiers. It's like

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Speaker 1: a horror movie about a mob boss who gets hacked

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Speaker 1: into small pieces and re animates and comes back to

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Speaker 1: life as the titular murderous Clever who comes back for

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Speaker 1: revenge against those that wronged him. UM, very very multifascined

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Speaker 1: name there. All right, well clever, take it away. You know,

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Speaker 1: for the longest time anyone let's just okay, no judgment here.

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Speaker 1: But anyone who's perhaps have found themselves procuring illegal substances

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Speaker 1: in some form of fashion probably has been told don't text,

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Speaker 1: you know, don't text things that are incriminating. Um, and

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Speaker 1: probably best just not to text stuff like that at

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Speaker 1: all with your plug. I believe it is the is

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Speaker 1: the term the kids use or make up a silly

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Speaker 1: code word. I think the statutes passed. I'll say that

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Speaker 1: that was one of my favorite things in the younger

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Speaker 1: days was uh. I would know people had these elaborate

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Speaker 1: systems for their text team, for their like uh any

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Speaker 1: any kind of slang you could imagine. It's just somebody

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Speaker 1: was a little bit high and they were like, hey man,

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Speaker 1: you got any more of that peanut butter or something

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Speaker 1: equally sure, Or you could go the kind of you know,

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Speaker 1: measurement route where it's like, yeah, I want to get

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Speaker 1: a mixed CD. Let me get a thirty minute mix

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Speaker 1: CD or a sixty minute mix CD or a hundred

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Speaker 1: and twenty minute mix CD. Right, uh, an you think

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Speaker 1: about this is elaborate. I honestly didn't know what this happened. Well,

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Speaker 1: you're a you're a good lad Matt, and we love

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Speaker 1: you dearly. But it's a thing. Um. But here's the thing.

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Speaker 1: These days, probably for the last you know, ten years maybe, um,

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Speaker 1: the emergence of these encrypted apps for communicating with said

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Speaker 1: plug have become a thing. I actually remember being on

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Speaker 1: a work trip in New York and just kind of

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Speaker 1: like flipping through the you know, the local kind of

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Speaker 1: city pages or whatever. Maybe what would be the equivalent

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Speaker 1: of our creative loafing here or stomp and Stammer or

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Speaker 1: something like that's sort of like an independent rag you

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Speaker 1: know that has like classifies in the back and actually

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Speaker 1: seeing pretty brazen advertisements for drug dealers in the back

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Speaker 1: um that require the use of an app called Telegram.

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Speaker 1: Telegram is sort of the popular one I think these

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Speaker 1: days still because it is encrypted and it's directly to

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Speaker 1: the source, and there's like message boards that you can

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Speaker 1: view where maybe a dealer has their menu or something

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Speaker 1: on there. But certain group of dealers have really taken

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Speaker 1: this to an extreme with an app called ink row

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Speaker 1: Chat E n c R O chat UM and and

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Speaker 1: it actually is even more elaborate than this, because it's

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Speaker 1: not an app you can get in the app store.

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Speaker 1: It's a very kind of exclusive UM app that actually

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Speaker 1: involves a specific I guess jailbroken phone that has like

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Speaker 1: a code you can enter into it to wipe all

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Speaker 1: local data UM and all records of these transactions. Unfortunately,

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Speaker 1: that doesn't work so well when police UM infiltrate said

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Speaker 1: app or said network, when police actually get one of

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Speaker 1: these phones themselves and are acting as either a user

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Speaker 1: or a dealer themselves. But the thing is, this is

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Speaker 1: not just a casual drug forum for you know, buying

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Speaker 1: and selling marijuana for example. This is very elaborate and

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Speaker 1: involves moving lots and lots of weight. This is more

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Speaker 1: of a traffickers type app UM. So some big fish

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Speaker 1: using this service UM. And even in in a press

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Speaker 1: release UM around the story that I'm about to talk about, UH,

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Speaker 1: there is discussion of folks using this to plan hits

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Speaker 1: even against rival dealers. So very very high level crime

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Speaker 1: going on in this app. UH. And obviously this is

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Speaker 1: a in in in England or in the United Kingdom

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Speaker 1: where this story is centered, where in a local man

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Speaker 1: from Liverpool. Um was recently arrested because he you know,

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Speaker 1: was posting on this app using an alias UM and

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Speaker 1: he you know alias meaning like like a screen name,

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Speaker 1: which I believe was something like Toffee Toffee King or

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Speaker 1: Toffee Force t o f f E Force. And if

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Speaker 1: the toffee and then name indicates that this guy was

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Speaker 1: maybe into you know, culinary pursuits, well that's that's that's

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Speaker 1: totally true, um, because he posted in addition to posting

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Speaker 1: pictures of drugs and all of that, um, he posted

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Speaker 1: a picture of a substance that, to your brain may

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Speaker 1: as well be a drug. They say that cheese is

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Speaker 1: to one's brain almost as addictive as like say, crack

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Speaker 1: or cocaine. Um. Cheese sets off some of these uh

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Speaker 1: pleasure centers responses in a very similar way to hard drugs. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And it can become addictive in that way obviously a

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Speaker 1: little more benign long term. You might gain a little

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Speaker 1: weight which probably not gonna overdose, or you know, you know,

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Speaker 1: have some sort of debilitating addiction that you just might

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Speaker 1: just be you know, cheese habitual cheese eater. But um, yeah,

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Speaker 1: this guy Carl Stewart H's thirty nine years old, um.

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Speaker 1: In the In the press release, he's listed as being

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Speaker 1: of Gym Street, Liverpool. He was just recently sentenced to

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Speaker 1: thirteen years and six months in prison by the Liverpool

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Speaker 1: Crown Court. Um. And that is because and in the

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Speaker 1: charge for trafficking, conspiracy to traffic cocaine, conspiracy to supply heroin,

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Speaker 1: conspiracy to supply M D M A and conspiracy to

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Speaker 1: supply ketamine and transferring criminal property. And it all stemmed

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Speaker 1: from a picture where he was holding a piece of

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Speaker 1: stilton blue cheese, specifically mature blue stilton crafted by Long

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Speaker 1: Claws in in Leicestershire, uh, delicately rich and creamy stilton,

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Speaker 1: uh from a company called M N S. I'm literally

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Speaker 1: reading from the label on this picture where you can

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Speaker 1: see his hands. In addition to his hands, you can

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Speaker 1: see the pads of his fingers. And as Cleaver said,

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Speaker 1: this is apparently all it takes for law enforcements to

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Speaker 1: do a fingerprint analysis, which makes sense considering that phone

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Speaker 1: picks these days are of pretty seriously high resolution. You know,

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Speaker 1: they've just gotten you know, every time a new generation

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Speaker 1: comes out, they just add more megapixels, and even you

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Speaker 1: know a few generations old phone would likely be enough

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Speaker 1: to produce a clear enough image that could then be

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Speaker 1: zoomed in and you can actually see those rings on

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Speaker 1: the fingers. And again in this image you can see one, two,

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Speaker 1: three fingers fully unobstructed, um, and they're quite close, close

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Speaker 1: enough where if I zoomed in, I could myself with

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Speaker 1: my naked eye see those rings. So, um, fellas, what

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Speaker 1: what do you think about this technology? Is this something

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Speaker 1: you were aware of? It makes sense to me. It

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Speaker 1: doesn't feel like a stretch, but it also feels a

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Speaker 1: little creepy, right, like for you know, your average Joe

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Speaker 1: that isn't posting on an illegal encrypted drugs app but

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Speaker 1: like say, uh, you know, finding out somebody's identity from

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Speaker 1: Facebook posts or um, using this kind of analysis to

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Speaker 1: find out information that maybe people would rather keep private. Yeah, look, guys,

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Speaker 1: I'm over here taking pictures of my fingers with my

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Speaker 1: what is this an iPhone ten or eleven like whatever one?

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Speaker 1: It only has one camera on it. But I'm having

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Speaker 1: trouble getting high enough resolution photo of my fingerprint. Maybe

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Speaker 1: if I took it into Photoshop, I could like up

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Speaker 1: the contrast or what do they call it? The structure,

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Speaker 1: you know, where you can it makes the lines a

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Speaker 1: little more crisp, or the sharpen you can sharpen the image. Perhaps, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I can see some of it, at least the one

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Speaker 1: that's posted on here on the CNN article doesn't look

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Speaker 1: like you can clearly see the fingerprints. Maybe I'm being generous,

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Speaker 1: and that's certainly possible, Matt, But I also maybe doubt it.

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Speaker 1: They don't look like their soft focus. But you're right,

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Speaker 1: it was probably being a little bit generous. Um, I'm

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Speaker 1: zooming in a little bit myself and I can see

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Speaker 1: some of them. But does this feel like new technology

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Speaker 1: to you guys? Or does this feel like something that

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Speaker 1: maybe has been in the works for a long time

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Speaker 1: or in time. It's not new. It isn't new, Um,

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Speaker 1: it's been around. Like reporting of this goes back a

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Speaker 1: few years, which I think should indicate reasonably. This is

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Speaker 1: just me guessing reasonably that it had been around in

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Speaker 1: some form before that. You can find stories from police

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Speaker 1: doing the same thing with what'sapp often with some sort

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Speaker 1: of proprietary matching technology. You can also see this sort

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Speaker 1: of the fancy name is biometric identity verification, dating back

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Speaker 1: even further for a number of years. I think a

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Speaker 1: lot of it is that there are tech aspects that

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Speaker 1: you guys are talking about. But to be clear, this

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Speaker 1: is not as simple as UH someone eyeballying it by

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Speaker 1: no means, And there are there are things that conclusively

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Speaker 1: determine whose fingerprints belong to whom in ways that are

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Speaker 1: not visible to the naked eye, regardless of the resolution.

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Speaker 1: Well you have fingerprints, yes, fingerprints, sure, but this is

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Speaker 1: not a fingerprint. This is this is a picture of

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Speaker 1: a hand right represented by pixels. And like I I

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Speaker 1: did for me, this is brand new. I've never heard

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Speaker 1: of a picture of a physical hand that was taken

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Speaker 1: by a consumer grade phone used to identify for me,

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Speaker 1: that was brand new. It was to me too. But

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Speaker 1: after digging a little bit into Ben's point, there is

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Speaker 1: an article from UH specifically referencing police using a photo

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Speaker 1: taken from WhatsApp, and in this article they are describing

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Speaker 1: it in the release as quote pioneering fingerprint techniques. Here's

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Speaker 1: a here's a little sense we're here's a little snippet

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Speaker 1: from the South Wales Police UM saying more or less

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Speaker 1: how they do it, UH speaking about the pioneering techniques

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Speaker 1: used in this case. Dave Thomas forensic Operations manager at

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Speaker 1: the Scientific Support Unit added specialist staff within the j

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Speaker 1: s i U fully utilized their expert image enhancing skills,

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Speaker 1: which enabled them to provide something that the unit's fingerprint

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Speaker 1: identification experts could work. Despite being provided with only a

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Speaker 1: very small section of the fingerprint. And again, this new

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Speaker 1: one that we're talking about today's story is several full,

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Speaker 1: fully unobstructive fingers small section of the fingerprint which was

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Speaker 1: visible in the photograph, the team were able to successfully

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Speaker 1: identify the individual. So here's the deal. I need to

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Speaker 1: see this tech at work because they do say they

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Speaker 1: enhance it, but I don't. I don't believe it, everybody.

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Speaker 1: I I think they found them out in some other

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Speaker 1: way and they're using this as like this is like

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Speaker 1: the old lie detector test where I'm just joking. No, no,

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Speaker 1: I I thought of that too. I think they're raising

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Speaker 1: a really good consideration. Met Like when I was looking

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Speaker 1: through articles like this from CSO online and other sources, Uh,

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Speaker 1: one thing that I loved was the vague nature of

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Speaker 1: the you know, when you get to the nuts and

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Speaker 1: bolts and technology say it's pioneering, right, which means in

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Speaker 1: my mind that it is publicly admitted to be pioneering

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Speaker 1: now and and they also used phrases that I feel

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Speaker 1: like they come from hastily written cops shows enhance enhanced,

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Speaker 1: can we enhance? You know? And that's right up there

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Speaker 1: with the nineties hacker movies where people quote re reroute

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Speaker 1: the encryptions, right, don't worry rerouted the encryptions. Now we're

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Speaker 1: in and you've got the right noises call throw me

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Speaker 1: some hacker noises. My favorite thing from the movie Hackers

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Speaker 1: or and also just from like nineties internet movies is

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Speaker 1: the visual representation of the Internet where they're like zooming

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Speaker 1: through like and they're representing the Internet using like buildings

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Speaker 1: and portals and stuff. Um. But there's even a newer

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Speaker 1: article that came out just a couple of hours ago

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Speaker 1: from bank info security dot com um that talks about

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Speaker 1: more busts that have been done with this infiltration of

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Speaker 1: this app. And by the way, just a little more

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Speaker 1: detail that wasn't in the cheese article. Um, this incro

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Speaker 1: chat app. Again, it came preloaded on a smartphone that's

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Speaker 1: sold for a thousand dollars and then you'd pay a

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Speaker 1: six month service plan that was sevent hundred additional dollars

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Speaker 1: on top of getting the phone. Um. And because they've

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Speaker 1: infiltrated this, they are absolutely knocking them down, just setting

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Speaker 1: them up and knocking them down. Um. On May six,

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Speaker 1: Dutch police rated several addresses in the Hague and Rotterdam

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Speaker 1: um where they found a quote industrial scale cocaine laboratory

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Speaker 1: that was hidden in a building also housing a garage

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Speaker 1: used by criminals to customize vehicles with secret compartments to

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Speaker 1: transport drugs across Europe. And that is a statement from

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Speaker 1: Europole UM. So I would think these stories coming out

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Speaker 1: would certainly cause people to not use this app anymore.

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Speaker 1: You think they'd made be a little more discreet about it,

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Speaker 1: wouldn't you like in terms of like outing the app.

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Speaker 1: You think they would like do the bus, but not

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Speaker 1: say how they did it? Why, Ben, because they've already

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Speaker 1: done the bus, they've gotten there. Don't squeeze every last

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Speaker 1: uh drop of juice out of this crime tangerine. They're

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Speaker 1: they're going and now they're just sort of let m

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Speaker 1: let us tell you how this was tasty. It So

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Speaker 1: maybe plug will william Carlos Williams. But there's another interesting

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Speaker 1: statistic I found on this as of of people back

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Speaker 1: then had mobile phones and use them to stab photos

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Speaker 1: that cops could quote download And there's that word again, enhance.

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Speaker 1: So this is only accelerated, right, And it's weird because

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Speaker 1: you know, you think about the r the explosive rise

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Speaker 1: and prevalence of facial recognition technology, it logically follows that,

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Speaker 1: at least in my head, it logically follows that other

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Speaker 1: sorts of physical recognition could be used, you know, like

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Speaker 1: like your hands. We've ruined the lives of would be

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Speaker 1: hand models were also criminals and share separate accounts on Instagram.

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Speaker 1: It's too late, ut popped. Yeah, I think this. I

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Speaker 1: think the story is like two fold interesting and obviously

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Speaker 1: because of the the identification technology, but also the level

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Speaker 1: to which these criminals UM went with this incro chats

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Speaker 1: to set up. Like they're all Android phones. They're modified

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Speaker 1: to not contain a SIM card. We always see you

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Speaker 1: know in uh spy movies or whatever. Like when ever

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Speaker 1: someone thinks they're being tracked, they take the SIM card

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Speaker 1: out and break it, you know, and third off a

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Speaker 1: bridge or whatever. These are sim cardless. Uh. They have

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Speaker 1: no camera, no microphone, and no GPS capabilities. UM or

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Speaker 1: a USB port. But despite all of all of these safeguards. Also,

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Speaker 1: by the way, I also have a dual operating system

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Speaker 1: with the encrypted set up being hidden so it can't

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Speaker 1: be even detected. And also this automatic wipe feature that

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Speaker 1: I was talking about, the deletion UM using a specialized code.

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Speaker 1: But even still, good old police work prevails, right because

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Speaker 1: they didn't use technology to infiltrate this system, to my knowledge,

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Speaker 1: they just used good old fashioned like posing as a criminal. Imagine,

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Speaker 1: it seems like they did do a little bit of

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Speaker 1: tech sleuthing here um because according to a release uh

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Speaker 1: here um or actually some reporting from vice UM, they

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Speaker 1: started looking into this service back in UM and by

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Speaker 1: April cops had actually uh successfully pushed malware onto some

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Speaker 1: of these users devices that gave them the ability to

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Speaker 1: let's just say, rewrote the encryptions, ben how about that,

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Speaker 1: But at the very least get through them and be

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Speaker 1: able to see what's going on, see through the encryption,

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Speaker 1: be aware doing some illegal with phones, hanging out on

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Speaker 1: somebody else's phone or computer. Watch out. Yeah. So, guys,

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Speaker 1: while we've been having this discussion, I've been taking the

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Speaker 1: screenshots of my fingers uh through with this camera here,

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Speaker 1: I am unable at this moment at least using this

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Speaker 1: old MacBook Pro camera to enhance by fingers enough to

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Speaker 1: clearly make out my fingerprints. But again, if you're using

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Speaker 1: some kind of algorithm or something, perhaps you're photoshop in photoshop. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: just attempting just to see if I could do it

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Speaker 1: on a low tech way. To make it out to

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Speaker 1: the two most full proof ways to avoid identification in

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Speaker 1: this manner, this lasting I'll say, beause and we're kind

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Speaker 1: of long, but the two most full proof ways are

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Speaker 1: to one not have your hands photographed and give up

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Speaker 1: your dreams of being a hand model, which can hit people,

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Speaker 1: you know, and that can be a tough thing. Or uh,

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Speaker 1: to take physical methods to hide, either hide or remove

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Speaker 1: your fingerprints that are possible. It can, you can do it.

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Speaker 1: It is if you remove them. It is not and

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Speaker 1: not painful procedure, and it is also not a permanent

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Speaker 1: one depending on how you do it. So like if

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Speaker 1: you slice off your fingertips, they'll grow back. Yeah, didn't

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Speaker 1: that character The Killer and seven do that? So acid

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Speaker 1: or some kind of scarifications probably your best move. But

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Speaker 1: I think if you're at the point where you're realistically

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Speaker 1: saying maybe I shouldar raise my fingerprints with acid. You

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Speaker 1: can take a couple of steps back and ask yourself,

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Speaker 1: how did I get here? Yeah, and and I would

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Speaker 1: I would highly recommend Illumination Global's human skin gloves so

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00:21:23,760 --> 00:21:26,520
Speaker 1: that they've been selling, They've just been flying off the shelves.

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Speaker 1: It feels so much like your own skin when you

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Speaker 1: put them on. I would just recommend those totally, and

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Speaker 1: just just to sew this up. UM, a cybersecurity UM

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Speaker 1: expert consultant from the University of Surrey, had this to

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Speaker 1: say about it. His name is Alan Woodward UM, and

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Speaker 1: he just cautioned criminals against you know, believing that any

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Speaker 1: of these methods are full proof. He says, if Anchor

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Speaker 1: Chat showed anything, it was that criminals need to be

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Speaker 1: looking over their shoulder. As a law enforcement agencies will

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Speaker 1: not simply give up. They will look for other ways

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Speaker 1: repeat the success they had with anchor Chat. It may

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Speaker 1: not follow the same pattern, but law enforcement agencies are

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Speaker 1: learning to be innovative just as the criminals are. Add

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Speaker 1: to this the power of working internationally, and I think

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Speaker 1: we'll see some more surprises. So something to keep an

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Speaker 1: eye on. UM. But in the meantime, let's take a

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Speaker 1: quick sponsor break, and then we've back with some more

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Speaker 1: listener mail. Hello, welcome back. Hey, I hope you enjoyed

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Speaker 1: that ad break. We are now in the midst of

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Speaker 1: our second segment, and we are going to someone named

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Speaker 1: Connor who experienced something a little bit strange one night

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Speaker 1: out on the road. Connor, Hello, good evening. My name

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Speaker 1: is Connor. UM. I just want to give you guys

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Speaker 1: a call. U. You know how much I enjoy the show. Uh,

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Speaker 1: And I didn't really know where else to go with

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Speaker 1: this story, but you guys explore a lot of the unknown,

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Speaker 1: Neon explained, so I thought this would be a good

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Speaker 1: place to start. Um. This encounter happened about eight years

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Speaker 1: ago in Savannah, Georgia. It was Friday night during our

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Speaker 1: senior high school in and my best friend Brennan and

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Speaker 1: I were on the way to a party out in Pooler, Georgia,

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Speaker 1: and we were driving uh since we hadn't gotten to

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Speaker 1: the party yet, we were still sober um going maybe

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Speaker 1: about fifty five and we turned down this quieter street

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Speaker 1: near Pooler. I remember it was a super nice night out,

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Speaker 1: so we had all the windows down. The moon roof open,

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Speaker 1: and as the street lights started to disappear, I remember

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Speaker 1: leaning my head back and staring out the moon roof,

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Speaker 1: and all of a sudden, I saw what looked like

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Speaker 1: hundreds of glowing and pulsating orbs that were just flying

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Speaker 1: in a perfect grid pattern across the sky. UM. I

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Speaker 1: just remember saying, Brennan, and we looked at each other uh,

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Speaker 1: and stared up at the sky and off UM. And

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Speaker 1: before we knew it, we looked at on the road

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Speaker 1: and we saw several vehicles pulled over ahead of us.

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Speaker 1: Um that people are getting out and just staring and

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Speaker 1: pointing up at the sky. So we did the same.

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Speaker 1: We pulled over behind the row of cars and got

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Speaker 1: out and just started staring up at the sky with

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Speaker 1: everybody else. We were just kind of in awe UM

404
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Speaker 1: and stood there for a while when an older gentleman

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Speaker 1: walked over to us and you know, looked up at

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Speaker 1: the guy just said, you'll never see anything like this again, boys.

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Speaker 1: And after a few minutes, the orbs flew past us

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Speaker 1: and out of sight. UM. So we jumped in the

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Speaker 1: car to see if you find him again, but didn't

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Speaker 1: have any luck. And ever since that day, Brandon and

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Speaker 1: I have repeatedly tried to find any news reports or

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Speaker 1: documentation about what we saw that night, but never found anything. Um.

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Speaker 1: It's the only encounter of, you know, something like that

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Speaker 1: that either of us had ever had, And to this day,

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00:24:55,520 --> 00:24:57,600
Speaker 1: whenever we get together, one of us will end up

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Speaker 1: bringing it up and we'll just talk about how we

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00:25:00,240 --> 00:25:03,800
Speaker 1: keep looking for information about it. UM. Outside of that,

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Speaker 1: I just want to let you guys know how much

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Speaker 1: I appreciate everything you do, how much I enjoy the show. UM,

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Speaker 1: and I just wanted to leave you with this weird story.

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Speaker 1: See what you guys think, and maybe someone else out

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Speaker 1: there see something like it. Thanks. Oh man. First off,

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Speaker 1: could I can I just say, Matt Connor, that is

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Speaker 1: the coolest old guy you are going to meet for

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Speaker 1: a long time. Was like, yeah, you never see that again?

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Speaker 1: Watching did you guys? Did you guys hear that detail?

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Speaker 1: Like the guy came up as this was happening. I

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Speaker 1: was like, well, boys were going to see something like

429
00:25:42,240 --> 00:25:45,959
Speaker 1: that again? And I who in my head Connor, you

430
00:25:46,040 --> 00:25:48,919
Speaker 1: and Brennan and this mysterious older guy just sort of

431
00:25:49,240 --> 00:25:53,800
Speaker 1: stood there together in silence. Or alternately, the old guy

432
00:25:53,880 --> 00:25:56,320
Speaker 1: just disappears in a poof of smoke. I'd be down

433
00:25:56,359 --> 00:25:59,920
Speaker 1: with that too. It's a possibility for sure. So yeah,

434
00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:02,399
Speaker 1: just Connor, thank you so much for the kind words

435
00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:06,000
Speaker 1: and for telling us about your experience that. Uh, my goodness,

436
00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:09,399
Speaker 1: I wish I could experience something like you got to

437
00:26:09,440 --> 00:26:14,280
Speaker 1: see on the road there. Um. It makes me specifically

438
00:26:14,320 --> 00:26:18,600
Speaker 1: think about some of these recent U a P. Now

439
00:26:18,640 --> 00:26:23,879
Speaker 1: we call them u AP sightings. Connor, it really is.

440
00:26:24,160 --> 00:26:29,360
Speaker 1: It's sexy, um, but it reminds me of especially the

441
00:26:29,400 --> 00:26:32,840
Speaker 1: thing that Jeremy Corbell person that we've had on the

442
00:26:32,840 --> 00:26:36,000
Speaker 1: show before. He recently posted on Twitter and has been

443
00:26:36,040 --> 00:26:38,639
Speaker 1: talking about it in the media a lot lately. UM,

444
00:26:38,680 --> 00:26:45,320
Speaker 1: some radar imagery of a essentially swarm of unidentified aerial phenomena.

445
00:26:46,359 --> 00:26:50,399
Speaker 1: He's been showing footage radar footage of a UFO or

446
00:26:50,520 --> 00:26:53,199
Speaker 1: u a P swarm essentially. That reminds me a lot

447
00:26:53,240 --> 00:26:56,239
Speaker 1: of this. And you know, it doesn't mean that has

448
00:26:56,280 --> 00:26:58,719
Speaker 1: anything to do with what you saw, but that's certainly

449
00:26:58,720 --> 00:27:01,159
Speaker 1: in the zeitgeist right now, and so interesting to me

450
00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:04,800
Speaker 1: that you saw that way back in two thousand twelve. Um.

451
00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:07,480
Speaker 1: And also, congratulations Connor and making it through the myan

452
00:27:07,520 --> 00:27:11,040
Speaker 1: apocalypse as we I guess all, did I suppose go us?

453
00:27:12,520 --> 00:27:16,280
Speaker 1: Things feel pretty post apocalyptic? I think what happens or

454
00:27:16,280 --> 00:27:20,359
Speaker 1: it's happening, because that's the thing. H apocalypse doesn't just happen, right, No,

455
00:27:20,680 --> 00:27:22,719
Speaker 1: it's like a slow build, you know, it's like a

456
00:27:22,760 --> 00:27:25,800
Speaker 1: death by a thousand cuts apocalypse. There we go. And

457
00:27:25,840 --> 00:27:28,080
Speaker 1: part of that was, you know, a grid pattern U

458
00:27:28,119 --> 00:27:32,200
Speaker 1: a P siding in Pooler, Georgia, just west of Savannah, Georgia.

459
00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:37,479
Speaker 1: I'm just joking, but yeah. I also in my my

460
00:27:37,560 --> 00:27:41,359
Speaker 1: search for any specific information about that night or you

461
00:27:41,400 --> 00:27:43,720
Speaker 1: know that kind of sighting, I was unable to find

462
00:27:43,720 --> 00:27:47,520
Speaker 1: anything either, at least initially. I did not contact your

463
00:27:47,600 --> 00:27:51,560
Speaker 1: local MOUF on Mutual uphone network or anything like that.

464
00:27:51,680 --> 00:27:53,800
Speaker 1: So I haven't I haven't gone all the way down

465
00:27:53,800 --> 00:27:57,240
Speaker 1: the rabbit hole yet with this, but perhaps there's something

466
00:27:57,280 --> 00:27:59,240
Speaker 1: else there, and I would love to know if there's

467
00:27:59,240 --> 00:28:04,840
Speaker 1: anyone else Listen near Savannah, Georgia, Pool or Bloomingdale, Garden City, whatever,

468
00:28:05,400 --> 00:28:09,600
Speaker 1: if you're out there, maybe you two saw something what

469
00:28:09,720 --> 00:28:14,199
Speaker 1: I would point out you guys immediately like between essentially

470
00:28:14,240 --> 00:28:18,000
Speaker 1: between Savannah in Pool or Georgia, there's this place called

471
00:28:18,000 --> 00:28:23,359
Speaker 1: the Savannah Hilton Head International Airport and they are you know,

472
00:28:24,040 --> 00:28:27,480
Speaker 1: they have a lot of things that fly both inwardly

473
00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:31,280
Speaker 1: and outwardly from that airport, So I am I'm wondering

474
00:28:31,320 --> 00:28:34,320
Speaker 1: if there was something there, but I'm assuming being in Pooler,

475
00:28:35,080 --> 00:28:36,879
Speaker 1: you know that stuff is flying in and out of

476
00:28:36,880 --> 00:28:40,440
Speaker 1: that airport all the time, and you wouldn't mistake, you know,

477
00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:45,280
Speaker 1: something at least regular as what you saw. And also

478
00:28:45,400 --> 00:28:49,000
Speaker 1: be interested Connor when you say you guys have looked you,

479
00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:51,960
Speaker 1: you and your pal Bretta, and have looked into possible

480
00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:55,640
Speaker 1: sources or cooperation or even other people who would had

481
00:28:55,680 --> 00:28:59,200
Speaker 1: an eyewitness experience, Like Matt said, how far did you

482
00:28:59,280 --> 00:29:03,560
Speaker 1: take it as far as you know contacting local law enforcement,

483
00:29:03,560 --> 00:29:06,760
Speaker 1: which is always a blast, he said sarcastically, to ask

484
00:29:06,840 --> 00:29:10,480
Speaker 1: them if they had any reports. Um, maybe check with

485
00:29:10,600 --> 00:29:12,920
Speaker 1: f a A. There's someone at the airport you could

486
00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:17,400
Speaker 1: call to ask about this. Moufon has had some pretty

487
00:29:17,400 --> 00:29:21,480
Speaker 1: significant internal problems over the last few years, but the

488
00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:24,960
Speaker 1: a lot of the local organizations, local versions of the

489
00:29:25,040 --> 00:29:28,880
Speaker 1: organization are doing great work. And I think that's an

490
00:29:28,920 --> 00:29:32,400
Speaker 1: excellent suggestion, Matt. The other ways you could go, It

491
00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:36,800
Speaker 1: really depends on how deep into the detective role playing

492
00:29:37,040 --> 00:29:40,960
Speaker 1: you wish to find yourself because you could also contact

493
00:29:41,040 --> 00:29:45,800
Speaker 1: radio stations. You can also contact I would say, look

494
00:29:45,840 --> 00:29:49,360
Speaker 1: into former news reporters or current news reporters who are

495
00:29:49,360 --> 00:29:53,240
Speaker 1: working at that time. It can become a time vampire, dude, honestly,

496
00:29:53,920 --> 00:29:56,360
Speaker 1: it can. But it's the payoff is you have to

497
00:29:56,440 --> 00:29:59,680
Speaker 1: decide going into it in advance. You have to decide

498
00:29:59,720 --> 00:30:02,600
Speaker 1: that you may not find the pay off you're looking for,

499
00:30:02,880 --> 00:30:05,600
Speaker 1: and if you do, it's gonna make all the work

500
00:30:06,080 --> 00:30:08,840
Speaker 1: worth it. Matt, it's super interesting to me man that

501
00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:11,280
Speaker 1: you're a mind reader. I thought of Jeremy as well.

502
00:30:11,720 --> 00:30:14,240
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I had that image in my mind, the

503
00:30:14,280 --> 00:30:18,680
Speaker 1: way the way Connor was describing the grid pattern, and

504
00:30:18,720 --> 00:30:21,480
Speaker 1: honestly what it didn't seem to be that organized in

505
00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:27,360
Speaker 1: Jeremy Corbell's released footage of that the naval radar. But

506
00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:31,760
Speaker 1: you guys have got a wrinkle for you. Just just

507
00:30:32,040 --> 00:30:36,880
Speaker 1: south and U tiny tiny bit west of Savannah, there's

508
00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:40,160
Speaker 1: another airport, but it's not really an airport, it's an

509
00:30:40,200 --> 00:30:45,280
Speaker 1: air field. It's the Hunter Army Airfield. And if you

510
00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:47,960
Speaker 1: go to Apple maps, Google Maps, a lot of places

511
00:30:48,000 --> 00:30:51,080
Speaker 1: you can't actually go in there. It's great out because

512
00:30:51,080 --> 00:30:54,600
Speaker 1: it's a military Uh, it's property of the military, so

513
00:30:54,640 --> 00:30:57,920
Speaker 1: you can't like look at everything there from a satellite

514
00:30:57,920 --> 00:31:00,800
Speaker 1: point of view, but it is is you know, I

515
00:31:00,840 --> 00:31:03,880
Speaker 1: think worth noting. If you happen to be looking in

516
00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:07,080
Speaker 1: that direction from Pooler, which is not that far away,

517
00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:11,720
Speaker 1: I imagine you could see something out in the distance. Um,

518
00:31:11,760 --> 00:31:15,280
Speaker 1: and if something was traveling from that airfield, I don't know,

519
00:31:15,320 --> 00:31:19,640
Speaker 1: I can totally imagine it being over Pooler at some point.

520
00:31:20,000 --> 00:31:22,120
Speaker 1: That's a really good point because if you look at

521
00:31:22,160 --> 00:31:27,560
Speaker 1: it driving distance, Pooler is pretty much right there. It's

522
00:31:27,640 --> 00:31:31,480
Speaker 1: twenty minutes away, right five. Is the crow flies? That's

523
00:31:31,480 --> 00:31:34,360
Speaker 1: they used to say, But I guess it depends if

524
00:31:34,360 --> 00:31:38,040
Speaker 1: they're if they're on like let's say Pine Barren Road

525
00:31:38,200 --> 00:31:42,160
Speaker 1: out there in Pooler or maybe South Rogers or the

526
00:31:42,160 --> 00:31:45,280
Speaker 1: Pooler Parkway. Yeah, they're like they're right there. Oh, I

527
00:31:45,320 --> 00:31:47,880
Speaker 1: thought you were going to tell me it depends on

528
00:31:47,960 --> 00:31:51,240
Speaker 1: something about the crow with the statement as the fly

529
00:31:51,760 --> 00:31:55,280
Speaker 1: to be like, well, you know, mating season, is that?

530
00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:58,760
Speaker 1: What's the what's the crow rules? Ben the very h

531
00:31:59,120 --> 00:32:02,520
Speaker 1: amorphous on sensical crow rules. We're talking about it yesterday.

532
00:32:02,920 --> 00:32:06,720
Speaker 1: Every time when someone dies and it's bad. A crew

533
00:32:07,440 --> 00:32:11,760
Speaker 1: comes and spirits there soul away, the land of the dead,

534
00:32:12,120 --> 00:32:17,120
Speaker 1: and sometimes sometimes it brings it back. It's like Highlander rules.

535
00:32:17,160 --> 00:32:19,760
Speaker 1: You know, it's very unclear as to exactly how it works.

536
00:32:20,080 --> 00:32:24,560
Speaker 1: Can I get a was that a been impression? That was? Then? No,

537
00:32:24,800 --> 00:32:27,240
Speaker 1: it was like a like a like a creepy voiceover

538
00:32:27,360 --> 00:32:31,680
Speaker 1: movie impression. So I been impression again? Fair enough? Just

539
00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:37,000
Speaker 1: it's just it's a peak behind the scenes. We were

540
00:32:37,040 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 1: at our uh we're at our local bar for a second,

541
00:32:41,200 --> 00:32:44,360
Speaker 1: and longtime listeners will make you'll know the terribly creative

542
00:32:44,440 --> 00:32:48,000
Speaker 1: name of our local bar. Uh. And we're talking about

543
00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:50,680
Speaker 1: you guys. You know, I have a crow, a corvid

544
00:32:50,720 --> 00:32:54,240
Speaker 1: in general fascination. We're talking about a friend of ours

545
00:32:54,280 --> 00:32:57,280
Speaker 1: who had just recently seen the crow for the first

546
00:32:57,320 --> 00:33:01,040
Speaker 1: time as an adult. And I just love how they

547
00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:06,000
Speaker 1: don't spend much time explaining why this crow situation breaks

548
00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:08,719
Speaker 1: down that way, but still the crow. Let us know

549
00:33:08,760 --> 00:33:11,280
Speaker 1: if you've seen it, if it holds up for you. Uh,

550
00:33:11,680 --> 00:33:15,920
Speaker 1: massive amounts of cocaine in that film. I was a kid,

551
00:33:16,080 --> 00:33:18,120
Speaker 1: and it was I saw it before I saw a scarface,

552
00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:22,760
Speaker 1: and I remember thinking simultaneously like did they get in

553
00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:25,160
Speaker 1: trouble for filming this, because I've never had a great

554
00:33:25,160 --> 00:33:27,600
Speaker 1: grasp by the separation of fact and fiction. And then

555
00:33:27,840 --> 00:33:30,520
Speaker 1: also thinking immediately after, am I going to get in

556
00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:33,720
Speaker 1: trouble for watching this? Is there like some threshold of

557
00:33:33,720 --> 00:33:37,880
Speaker 1: amounts of cocaine where seeing them also makes you involved

558
00:33:37,880 --> 00:33:40,040
Speaker 1: in the criminal act? That was the scariest part of

559
00:33:40,040 --> 00:33:42,560
Speaker 1: the crow for me. It's also a good tell as

560
00:33:42,560 --> 00:33:44,840
Speaker 1: to who's the bad guy. It's usually the guy with

561
00:33:44,960 --> 00:33:47,960
Speaker 1: the giant mountain of cocaine and the giant pinky nail

562
00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:53,480
Speaker 1: that he's using to scoop it and you know, snoot it. Yeah,

563
00:33:53,600 --> 00:33:56,480
Speaker 1: except it blow where he's Johnny Depp plays kind of

564
00:33:56,480 --> 00:34:02,560
Speaker 1: an anti hero, tragic figure. But Matt, yes, Swarms, You've

565
00:34:02,600 --> 00:34:04,920
Speaker 1: done some leg work here, man, I admire it. I

566
00:34:05,000 --> 00:34:06,800
Speaker 1: just sent you one extra thing. I sent it in

567
00:34:06,840 --> 00:34:11,879
Speaker 1: our chat right now. This is probably unrelated, but I'm

568
00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:13,799
Speaker 1: sending it to you anyway, so you guys can see

569
00:34:13,840 --> 00:34:18,400
Speaker 1: it in twenty nineteen, I think, let me see. I

570
00:34:18,480 --> 00:34:22,200
Speaker 1: love how how my voice went there. Um, I believe

571
00:34:22,239 --> 00:34:27,399
Speaker 1: it was twenty nineteen. Why can't thank you, good lord

572
00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:32,160
Speaker 1: appreciate it? I was looking in the actual YouTube text. Okay,

573
00:34:32,200 --> 00:34:35,080
Speaker 1: in twenty nineteen, there was a video taken of the

574
00:34:35,239 --> 00:34:40,200
Speaker 1: space X Starlink UH satellites, a swarm of them, if

575
00:34:40,239 --> 00:34:42,440
Speaker 1: you will. It's not really a swarm. It's more like

576
00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:47,920
Speaker 1: a very organized line of Starlink satellites. Um. So this

577
00:34:48,040 --> 00:34:51,520
Speaker 1: is seven years after, or around seven years after Connor

578
00:34:52,080 --> 00:34:56,240
Speaker 1: and his friends had his sighting. But you can watch

579
00:34:56,239 --> 00:34:59,680
Speaker 1: a video of these Starlink satellites and it is in

580
00:35:00,080 --> 00:35:04,720
Speaker 1: edible to see them because it does look like a um,

581
00:35:04,840 --> 00:35:06,880
Speaker 1: I don't know, I don't know how to describe it

582
00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:10,600
Speaker 1: other than a line of lights that seem to be connected,

583
00:35:10,640 --> 00:35:13,440
Speaker 1: almost like the video game Halo in a way, like

584
00:35:13,960 --> 00:35:17,320
Speaker 1: it seems to look like just a string of lights.

585
00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:21,879
Speaker 1: Really that's just somehow huge and flying way above you. Um.

586
00:35:21,920 --> 00:35:23,640
Speaker 1: And I would recommend watching this video just to get

587
00:35:23,680 --> 00:35:25,360
Speaker 1: an idea of how strange that would be if you

588
00:35:25,360 --> 00:35:28,640
Speaker 1: actually viewed it from the ground. Yeah, that's a great

589
00:35:28,640 --> 00:35:32,319
Speaker 1: call to man, because I think unless you unless you

590
00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:36,200
Speaker 1: already know what you're looking at or what to expect,

591
00:35:36,520 --> 00:35:40,840
Speaker 1: this looks extraordinary. It's exceedingly strange, and it's it's important

592
00:35:40,840 --> 00:35:44,080
Speaker 1: at this point, Connor for us to note that, uh,

593
00:35:44,280 --> 00:35:48,120
Speaker 1: none of us, none of us are telling you definitively

594
00:35:48,560 --> 00:35:52,920
Speaker 1: what you guys saw, If anything, I'm curious to hear

595
00:35:53,040 --> 00:35:55,640
Speaker 1: a follow up email or message to tell me more

596
00:35:55,680 --> 00:35:59,080
Speaker 1: about this old man. I love his vibe, I love

597
00:35:59,120 --> 00:36:01,319
Speaker 1: his whole thing. Want to hear more about him, And

598
00:36:01,360 --> 00:36:04,719
Speaker 1: I want to hear if he's whether he said anything,

599
00:36:04,760 --> 00:36:07,960
Speaker 1: because his one line is super interesting right from a

600
00:36:08,000 --> 00:36:12,080
Speaker 1: screenwriting perspective, even it's like somehow he knows he will

601
00:36:12,160 --> 00:36:14,560
Speaker 1: never see this again. I just feel like I feel

602
00:36:14,560 --> 00:36:16,600
Speaker 1: like he should be like Ala Scooby Doo, like I should.

603
00:36:16,760 --> 00:36:19,000
Speaker 1: His name should be like like old Man wins Low.

604
00:36:19,400 --> 00:36:22,040
Speaker 1: You know, maybe he runs a haunted amusement park. He's like,

605
00:36:22,160 --> 00:36:23,759
Speaker 1: I'm not gonna see that another thing like that in

606
00:36:23,800 --> 00:36:30,280
Speaker 1: this lifetime poof first name Carl, Old Carl Winslow. UFO

607
00:36:30,360 --> 00:36:33,480
Speaker 1: guy um No. But it's I I totally I love

608
00:36:33,560 --> 00:36:37,680
Speaker 1: this idea, Ben. But what if the old Man was

609
00:36:37,719 --> 00:36:40,560
Speaker 1: somehow connected to the sighting? What if they were What

610
00:36:40,600 --> 00:36:43,120
Speaker 1: if it was his fleet, you know, and he was

611
00:36:43,200 --> 00:36:47,279
Speaker 1: just observing us, observing it in a way to understand

612
00:36:47,360 --> 00:36:51,600
Speaker 1: the way humans think about advanced technology. What if it

613
00:36:51,680 --> 00:36:53,839
Speaker 1: was a threat. What if that was you'll never see

614
00:36:53,880 --> 00:36:58,040
Speaker 1: something like this again. What if that was more of him, uh,

615
00:36:58,120 --> 00:37:00,799
Speaker 1: not just being a fellow observer, but he's telling these

616
00:37:00,800 --> 00:37:03,680
Speaker 1: guys they slipped up and and uh maybe saw the

617
00:37:03,680 --> 00:37:08,040
Speaker 1: wrong thing. Oh that's a little more foreboding. Uh our

618
00:37:08,120 --> 00:37:11,880
Speaker 1: sinister interpretation of it. Um. It makes me think of

619
00:37:12,920 --> 00:37:14,759
Speaker 1: an excellent movie that I know we've talked about, but

620
00:37:15,080 --> 00:37:17,600
Speaker 1: if anyone missed that, I can't remember when we've discussed it,

621
00:37:17,640 --> 00:37:19,360
Speaker 1: but it's come up a time or two, called The

622
00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:22,799
Speaker 1: Vast of Night. Uh. That came out last year, I

623
00:37:22,840 --> 00:37:24,960
Speaker 1: want to say, and it was a very small, uh

624
00:37:25,040 --> 00:37:28,800
Speaker 1: indie film, absolutely beautifully made, and it's about a rural

625
00:37:29,080 --> 00:37:30,920
Speaker 1: kind of UFO sighting. But I think it takes place

626
00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:34,040
Speaker 1: in like the fifties and revolves around radio transmissions and

627
00:37:34,120 --> 00:37:37,600
Speaker 1: like different tones and things being broadcast. But I highly

628
00:37:37,600 --> 00:37:39,720
Speaker 1: recommend everyone checked that film out if you haven't already

629
00:37:39,719 --> 00:37:44,120
Speaker 1: seen it, that's right. And again, last call to anybody

630
00:37:44,160 --> 00:37:46,799
Speaker 1: else out there near Savannah, did you see anything in

631
00:37:46,840 --> 00:37:50,320
Speaker 1: two thousand twelve? Let us know we look forward to

632
00:37:50,360 --> 00:37:52,600
Speaker 1: hearing from you. We're gonna take a quick break and

633
00:37:52,640 --> 00:37:55,640
Speaker 1: we will be right back. Thanks again, Connor. Here are

634
00:37:55,680 --> 00:38:06,799
Speaker 1: some hats. Wow those ads you know, I gotta tell

635
00:38:06,840 --> 00:38:09,040
Speaker 1: you we took some time behind the scenes. We just

636
00:38:09,120 --> 00:38:13,399
Speaker 1: regroups listen to ads. So well done standing ovation tent, tent,

637
00:38:14,000 --> 00:38:19,240
Speaker 1: no notes, bills to they do they do pay the bills.

638
00:38:19,719 --> 00:38:23,560
Speaker 1: So thank you for stinking with us through the break.

639
00:38:23,640 --> 00:38:26,959
Speaker 1: We hope you enjoyed the break as much as we did.

640
00:38:27,320 --> 00:38:33,280
Speaker 1: Our final story for today follows up on a piece

641
00:38:33,480 --> 00:38:38,279
Speaker 1: that I believe was in strange news regarding the ongoing

642
00:38:38,520 --> 00:38:45,239
Speaker 1: crisis with sexual assault kits, which are conventionally known as

643
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:48,160
Speaker 1: rape kits. This is the part of the segment that

644
00:38:48,200 --> 00:38:53,280
Speaker 1: we put a disclaimer slash trigger warning for at the top. However,

645
00:38:54,040 --> 00:38:57,279
Speaker 1: we believe this information is important. It's part of the

646
00:38:57,320 --> 00:39:03,480
Speaker 1: mission of this show too, to examine to understand corruption,

647
00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:08,520
Speaker 1: conspiracy crisises that don't make it to the national news

648
00:39:08,640 --> 00:39:11,040
Speaker 1: near as often as they should. And as you know,

649
00:39:11,160 --> 00:39:15,400
Speaker 1: fellow conspiracy realist, my colleagues and I endeavor to find

650
00:39:15,640 --> 00:39:19,640
Speaker 1: primary sources. We want the firsthand experience. We want to

651
00:39:19,680 --> 00:39:23,200
Speaker 1: hear from what are sometimes colloquially called the boots on

652
00:39:23,239 --> 00:39:29,440
Speaker 1: the ground, and this is where Steve b comes in. Steve,

653
00:39:29,880 --> 00:39:33,400
Speaker 1: a number of weeks ago, you wrote to us in

654
00:39:33,520 --> 00:39:40,120
Speaker 1: response to questions about the ongoing catastrophe with backlogs for

655
00:39:40,239 --> 00:39:42,919
Speaker 1: rape kits. So we're gonna share your letter, and then

656
00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:46,120
Speaker 1: we're going to dive in in a way that hopefully

657
00:39:46,120 --> 00:39:51,600
Speaker 1: gives all of us a better understanding of this credibly disturbing,

658
00:39:51,920 --> 00:39:55,600
Speaker 1: uh and profoundly serious situations. So here we go, Steve,

659
00:39:55,760 --> 00:39:59,279
Speaker 1: you say, hello, I'm a police officer in Minnesota for

660
00:39:59,320 --> 00:40:02,600
Speaker 1: a city with a over three hundred thousand people. We

661
00:40:02,680 --> 00:40:06,279
Speaker 1: take the rape kit serious and sexual assault serious. I

662
00:40:06,320 --> 00:40:09,120
Speaker 1: can tell you every sexual assault that we take, we

663
00:40:09,160 --> 00:40:11,280
Speaker 1: try to get the victim to go to the hospital

664
00:40:11,360 --> 00:40:16,320
Speaker 1: and complete the kit. We handle every kit processed. However,

665
00:40:16,520 --> 00:40:19,759
Speaker 1: Steve continues, I can tell you the main hospital in

666
00:40:19,800 --> 00:40:23,640
Speaker 1: our city has about a thousand kits that are unprocessed.

667
00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:27,960
Speaker 1: They have two refrigerators full of these kits. The kit

668
00:40:28,160 --> 00:40:32,160
Speaker 1: is only a small box, about three inches by two

669
00:40:32,200 --> 00:40:35,600
Speaker 1: inches by one inch. Here's the problem with the number

670
00:40:35,680 --> 00:40:39,319
Speaker 1: of rape kits that have gone unprocessed. A victim can

671
00:40:39,400 --> 00:40:42,680
Speaker 1: walk into a hospital and say they were raped but

672
00:40:42,800 --> 00:40:45,920
Speaker 1: don't want the police called. They still go through the

673
00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:50,480
Speaker 1: process of the kit, which is called a SAME KIT,

674
00:40:50,920 --> 00:40:55,680
Speaker 1: which stands for Sexual Assault Nurse Examination Kit and Steve says,

675
00:40:55,920 --> 00:40:58,640
Speaker 1: the hospital will not call the police for a victim.

676
00:40:58,680 --> 00:41:00,879
Speaker 1: The victim must do it on their our own. So

677
00:41:01,040 --> 00:41:04,480
Speaker 1: if a victim completes the kit, and implying that if

678
00:41:04,480 --> 00:41:06,239
Speaker 1: they do the kit and they don't make the call,

679
00:41:06,560 --> 00:41:09,480
Speaker 1: it sits in the same fridge until the victim wants

680
00:41:09,480 --> 00:41:12,800
Speaker 1: it released to the police. Steve says, I have spoken

681
00:41:12,840 --> 00:41:15,680
Speaker 1: to a sane nurse and she told me the oldest

682
00:41:15,719 --> 00:41:21,359
Speaker 1: one in that fridge was nine years old. Yeah, and

683
00:41:21,800 --> 00:41:24,960
Speaker 1: Steve continues, I cannot speak for other states, but that

684
00:41:25,080 --> 00:41:29,720
Speaker 1: is the issue adding to those unprocessed numbers for Minnesota.

685
00:41:30,040 --> 00:41:32,879
Speaker 1: And this is a question that we had asked your

686
00:41:33,000 --> 00:41:35,960
Speaker 1: call in our earlier times on air with this topic.

687
00:41:36,480 --> 00:41:40,160
Speaker 1: We we had asked first responders and law enforcement and

688
00:41:40,360 --> 00:41:45,400
Speaker 1: people who had experiential knowledge of this matter to help

689
00:41:45,520 --> 00:41:50,319
Speaker 1: us understand what's going on here. And one of the

690
00:41:50,360 --> 00:41:54,000
Speaker 1: points that the three of us brought up rightly so

691
00:41:54,040 --> 00:41:58,719
Speaker 1: I think, is that unfortunately, all too often members of

692
00:41:58,800 --> 00:42:04,719
Speaker 1: law enforcement may disregard or ignore somebody's claim assault for

693
00:42:04,800 --> 00:42:09,320
Speaker 1: any number of reasons. Uh. There's actually a site called

694
00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:13,120
Speaker 1: end the Backlog dot org. YEP. It's an organization called

695
00:42:13,160 --> 00:42:16,160
Speaker 1: The Joyful Heart foundation, and they have some interesting stats.

696
00:42:16,800 --> 00:42:19,560
Speaker 1: There are cases in which um, you know, so these

697
00:42:19,560 --> 00:42:22,600
Speaker 1: are these rape kits are entered into evidence or you know,

698
00:42:22,640 --> 00:42:26,759
Speaker 1: filed into these you know, evidence rooms, storage rooms, but

699
00:42:26,800 --> 00:42:29,920
Speaker 1: it can't but sometimes detectives or prosecutors don't actually request

700
00:42:29,960 --> 00:42:32,400
Speaker 1: the DNA to be analyzed, so they can be taken,

701
00:42:32,400 --> 00:42:34,919
Speaker 1: but they're not required to be analyzed. Um. So that's

702
00:42:35,000 --> 00:42:38,400
Speaker 1: one reason for the backlog UM and that is considered

703
00:42:38,560 --> 00:42:43,959
Speaker 1: untested or unsubmitted rape kits. Uh. There's another factor when

704
00:42:44,239 --> 00:42:47,319
Speaker 1: the backlog literally just comes from lack of personnel to

705
00:42:47,440 --> 00:42:50,719
Speaker 1: process them in a efficient and timely manner, which is

706
00:42:50,760 --> 00:42:54,640
Speaker 1: the second and probably most troubling part of the backlog. UM.

707
00:42:54,640 --> 00:42:58,920
Speaker 1: And this Joyful Heart Foundation um is you know, believes

708
00:42:59,040 --> 00:43:01,920
Speaker 1: that all rape it's should be tested, even if that

709
00:43:02,000 --> 00:43:05,239
Speaker 1: is not requested to be done by the prosecutor or detectives.

710
00:43:05,239 --> 00:43:10,320
Speaker 1: But again, uh, there are no federal laws that require

711
00:43:10,480 --> 00:43:13,600
Speaker 1: tracking and testing of these rape kits, so it's hard

712
00:43:13,640 --> 00:43:16,560
Speaker 1: to you know, know exactly how many are going untested,

713
00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:19,640
Speaker 1: but it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of untested

714
00:43:19,719 --> 00:43:24,440
Speaker 1: kits remain in these uh police storage facilities. Yeah, and

715
00:43:24,480 --> 00:43:26,880
Speaker 1: I'd like to I'd like to step back before we

716
00:43:26,920 --> 00:43:29,920
Speaker 1: continue with that, because one of the things that I

717
00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:33,880
Speaker 1: really want to hit here for to to clarify for

718
00:43:33,880 --> 00:43:36,440
Speaker 1: everybody who is in aware, you'll hear about these kits,

719
00:43:36,680 --> 00:43:40,600
Speaker 1: and you'll you'll hear these phrases thrown around quite a bit.

720
00:43:40,719 --> 00:43:43,920
Speaker 1: I like saying kits because hearing the hearing the R

721
00:43:44,000 --> 00:43:48,240
Speaker 1: word can be quite triggering for survivors of these sorts

722
00:43:48,239 --> 00:43:52,360
Speaker 1: of attacks. But when you hear that word thrown around,

723
00:43:53,360 --> 00:43:55,920
Speaker 1: what what does it mean? What does it describe? What

724
00:43:56,000 --> 00:44:00,239
Speaker 1: exactly is this kit? It's pretty basic stuff. And I

725
00:44:00,600 --> 00:44:04,080
Speaker 1: don't mean that as a criticism of any sort. In

726
00:44:04,120 --> 00:44:07,640
Speaker 1: these situations, it's better to have the most basic, most

727
00:44:07,719 --> 00:44:12,320
Speaker 1: reliable components. I think we can all agree. You get instructions,

728
00:44:12,560 --> 00:44:17,400
Speaker 1: bags and sheets for evidence collection, swabs for collecting fluids

729
00:44:17,480 --> 00:44:22,440
Speaker 1: from different parts of the body, uh, sterile urine collection containers,

730
00:44:23,000 --> 00:44:27,360
Speaker 1: sample containers, blood collecting devices, a comb to be used

731
00:44:27,680 --> 00:44:31,680
Speaker 1: for collecting evidence from a victim's hair, glass slides, self

732
00:44:31,719 --> 00:44:37,120
Speaker 1: sealing envelopes, nail picks, and then generic like white sheets

733
00:44:37,160 --> 00:44:39,520
Speaker 1: to catch I mean physical evidence that might have been

734
00:44:39,560 --> 00:44:42,920
Speaker 1: stripped from the body. Because unfortunately, these are not always

735
00:44:43,840 --> 00:44:47,000
Speaker 1: the victims aren't always alive, and these things are used

736
00:44:47,280 --> 00:44:51,359
Speaker 1: and the and then to go forward with that one

737
00:44:51,360 --> 00:44:56,359
Speaker 1: thing I love about and the backlog is yet as

738
00:44:56,480 --> 00:44:59,520
Speaker 1: as you said, that's one of the first things they

739
00:44:59,560 --> 00:45:04,160
Speaker 1: talk out is where this backlog comes from. There is

740
00:45:04,200 --> 00:45:08,960
Speaker 1: a third factor that end the backlog doesn't address right

741
00:45:09,000 --> 00:45:11,520
Speaker 1: on that main page that we're talking about, and it

742
00:45:11,840 --> 00:45:17,400
Speaker 1: is the cost of these kits, right the adjust for

743
00:45:17,480 --> 00:45:21,680
Speaker 1: the ingredients. The ingredients are relatively inexpensive, even in a

744
00:45:21,719 --> 00:45:25,040
Speaker 1: place like the US that absolutely gouges people on medical

745
00:45:25,280 --> 00:45:31,160
Speaker 1: devices and equipment. But this, uh, this process, we think

746
00:45:31,200 --> 00:45:34,719
Speaker 1: of each kit in terms of not just the physical materials,

747
00:45:34,880 --> 00:45:39,080
Speaker 1: but also the processing. Then I went to the g

748
00:45:39,239 --> 00:45:43,560
Speaker 1: b I, which is the state level Georgian version of

749
00:45:43,600 --> 00:45:46,920
Speaker 1: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and according to them, it

750
00:45:47,000 --> 00:45:50,960
Speaker 1: cost about nine dollars per kit to Yeah, which is

751
00:45:51,000 --> 00:45:54,320
Speaker 1: more expensive than I thought it would be, you know. Um,

752
00:45:54,360 --> 00:45:57,840
Speaker 1: but again you know, having no reference for this, they

753
00:45:57,960 --> 00:46:02,239
Speaker 1: say that they have twenty one trained DNA analysts dedicated

754
00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:05,319
Speaker 1: to testing these kits. Uh. They have the problem like

755
00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:08,239
Speaker 1: if they are if all pistons are firing and the

756
00:46:08,280 --> 00:46:11,239
Speaker 1: wind is at their back, then they can process up

757
00:46:11,239 --> 00:46:15,040
Speaker 1: to two hundred and ninety four assault kits per month,

758
00:46:15,440 --> 00:46:19,440
Speaker 1: but typically they do between two hundred and two twenty

759
00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:22,760
Speaker 1: because things keep moving to the front of the line

760
00:46:22,880 --> 00:46:25,600
Speaker 1: for one reason or another, and this may this may

761
00:46:25,680 --> 00:46:28,279
Speaker 1: startle and disturb some of us to learn there are

762
00:46:28,280 --> 00:46:32,120
Speaker 1: things known as priority request. I am sure there are

763
00:46:32,480 --> 00:46:35,960
Speaker 1: valid and compelling reasons for that. But upon first hearing that,

764
00:46:35,960 --> 00:46:38,719
Speaker 1: that sounds a little well messed up, doesn't it? Like

765
00:46:38,760 --> 00:46:42,120
Speaker 1: it does? It does? I understand the cost though, I

766
00:46:42,160 --> 00:46:44,600
Speaker 1: mean because you know of the analysis, because they're not

767
00:46:44,719 --> 00:46:49,239
Speaker 1: they're analyzing multiple different UH sources. I mean, like you're

768
00:46:49,239 --> 00:46:53,160
Speaker 1: talking about nail picks that could be for um, scraping

769
00:46:53,640 --> 00:46:57,400
Speaker 1: DNA from underneath thing, announce from perhaps fighting back against

770
00:46:57,400 --> 00:46:59,520
Speaker 1: an assailant, and then you might end up with blood

771
00:46:59,600 --> 00:47:01,799
Speaker 1: or to SHO underneath the finger. Now, so that's one.

772
00:47:01,960 --> 00:47:05,440
Speaker 1: Then you obviously have the potential for semen UH and

773
00:47:05,480 --> 00:47:08,800
Speaker 1: also the potential for other fluids elsewhere on the body,

774
00:47:08,920 --> 00:47:10,720
Speaker 1: you know, And like you said, all of these different

775
00:47:10,719 --> 00:47:12,880
Speaker 1: things are each their own test, I imagine, so I

776
00:47:12,880 --> 00:47:16,320
Speaker 1: can kind of understand why it would be so costly,

777
00:47:16,400 --> 00:47:20,319
Speaker 1: but obviously absolutely necessary. So there must be some way

778
00:47:20,360 --> 00:47:23,560
Speaker 1: to subsidize it or you know how what's the solution.

779
00:47:23,600 --> 00:47:26,600
Speaker 1: I wonder what is really interesting because according to that

780
00:47:26,640 --> 00:47:29,880
Speaker 1: Fox article you're you're talking about it, it does seem

781
00:47:29,960 --> 00:47:32,680
Speaker 1: like at least of the governor, the current government of

782
00:47:32,760 --> 00:47:35,880
Speaker 1: Georgia is attempting to cut back so right there, they're

783
00:47:35,880 --> 00:47:39,640
Speaker 1: having to scale back quite a bit in the the lab,

784
00:47:39,760 --> 00:47:43,160
Speaker 1: the GBI labs. But it does feel like with Emery,

785
00:47:43,480 --> 00:47:47,840
Speaker 1: with Georgia Tech, with all of these you know, institutions, U,

786
00:47:47,920 --> 00:47:50,120
Speaker 1: g A, we could find a way in Georgia to

787
00:47:51,120 --> 00:47:54,640
Speaker 1: make this kind of testing streamlined and maybe done you know,

788
00:47:54,760 --> 00:47:58,239
Speaker 1: through a university system where they're younger people who want

789
00:47:58,280 --> 00:48:02,840
Speaker 1: to train to do this kind of testing. It's yeah,

790
00:48:02,880 --> 00:48:06,799
Speaker 1: and that's something Steve that you said that I really appreciate.

791
00:48:06,920 --> 00:48:11,960
Speaker 1: Like you, you have laid out, uh very solid argument

792
00:48:12,920 --> 00:48:17,240
Speaker 1: that at times law enforcements hands are tied, right because

793
00:48:17,280 --> 00:48:21,040
Speaker 1: there are there are any number of rules or policies

794
00:48:21,120 --> 00:48:26,040
Speaker 1: that are designed to protect victims of these attacks. Right,

795
00:48:26,239 --> 00:48:29,360
Speaker 1: if you do not want the police involved, if you

796
00:48:29,440 --> 00:48:33,800
Speaker 1: do not want um, you know, to risk your private

797
00:48:33,840 --> 00:48:37,760
Speaker 1: information or your identity being leaked to an often vicious

798
00:48:37,800 --> 00:48:43,239
Speaker 1: and exploitative press, then obviously that should that should be

799
00:48:43,320 --> 00:48:48,640
Speaker 1: the primary concern um into It sounds weird saying, but

800
00:48:48,680 --> 00:48:52,240
Speaker 1: maybe in defense of like the the prioritization of kits,

801
00:48:52,320 --> 00:48:56,040
Speaker 1: maybe they're trying to find a serial assaulter or they

802
00:48:56,040 --> 00:48:58,840
Speaker 1: have a lead or something, and that that puts it

803
00:48:58,880 --> 00:49:00,520
Speaker 1: to the front of line because they're try and enclose

804
00:49:00,600 --> 00:49:03,360
Speaker 1: the case. But still, this is the thing that stays

805
00:49:03,400 --> 00:49:08,000
Speaker 1: with me about this. Uh, everyone listening, The statistics are

806
00:49:08,120 --> 00:49:13,399
Speaker 1: pretty clear. Testing these kids getting through this backlog, maybe

807
00:49:13,440 --> 00:49:16,719
Speaker 1: not in every state, but somewhere in the US, would

808
00:49:16,719 --> 00:49:21,319
Speaker 1: expose and quite likely lead to the arrest of a

809
00:49:21,520 --> 00:49:26,880
Speaker 1: serial sexual assaulter or confirmed crimes that they were able

810
00:49:26,920 --> 00:49:29,520
Speaker 1: to escape justice for, you know what I mean, because

811
00:49:29,560 --> 00:49:31,600
Speaker 1: a lot of those a lot of those folks are

812
00:49:31,640 --> 00:49:34,840
Speaker 1: already imprisoned for something else. I would imagine that's serfs

813
00:49:35,040 --> 00:49:37,400
Speaker 1: they caught. So they would find repeat offenders and they

814
00:49:37,440 --> 00:49:39,920
Speaker 1: would match it to a single source that is already

815
00:49:39,920 --> 00:49:42,160
Speaker 1: on record. That's fascinating, man, I never thought about that,

816
00:49:42,200 --> 00:49:44,040
Speaker 1: But it's a It is a good point, and I

817
00:49:44,120 --> 00:49:48,000
Speaker 1: think a good argument for why even But it's all

818
00:49:48,000 --> 00:49:51,719
Speaker 1: about resources, right, Like I mean, police forces and and

819
00:49:51,719 --> 00:49:55,480
Speaker 1: and all these local you know, bureaus of investigation are

820
00:49:55,960 --> 00:49:58,440
Speaker 1: short staffed, and there's a lot more crimes often than

821
00:49:58,480 --> 00:50:01,560
Speaker 1: there are personnel. So it's a delicate balancing act. But

822
00:50:01,640 --> 00:50:03,680
Speaker 1: it seems very important because this is one of the

823
00:50:03,719 --> 00:50:08,879
Speaker 1: most egregious crimes you know out there, literally taking from

824
00:50:08,920 --> 00:50:13,480
Speaker 1: someone the most sacred and personal kind of experience. Right.

825
00:50:14,640 --> 00:50:17,600
Speaker 1: But at the same just as a counterpoint, there are

826
00:50:17,680 --> 00:50:21,320
Speaker 1: so many homicides every day. I mean, you cannot compare

827
00:50:21,360 --> 00:50:24,360
Speaker 1: one crime with another, necessarily, but the complete loss of

828
00:50:24,440 --> 00:50:26,920
Speaker 1: human life, it's a tough thing to argue with it.

829
00:50:26,920 --> 00:50:30,839
Speaker 1: It's me right, I don't know, it's a tough thing

830
00:50:30,840 --> 00:50:33,120
Speaker 1: to argue, but I would just say, in these crime labs,

831
00:50:33,280 --> 00:50:35,480
Speaker 1: when there is a homicide and DNA maybe needs to

832
00:50:35,480 --> 00:50:38,160
Speaker 1: be tested for that, I can imagine that taking priority.

833
00:50:40,000 --> 00:50:45,160
Speaker 1: And that's again that's an issue of limited resources there,

834
00:50:45,239 --> 00:50:47,799
Speaker 1: as you guys pointed out. And I also think it

835
00:50:47,960 --> 00:50:52,680
Speaker 1: is crucial that we define what backlog means. Those were

836
00:50:52,760 --> 00:50:55,360
Speaker 1: two What is a rape kit? What is a backlog?

837
00:50:55,440 --> 00:50:57,759
Speaker 1: Those are two of the things I absolutely wanted to

838
00:50:57,840 --> 00:51:02,200
Speaker 1: hit somewhere in this segment. The backlog is tough, Oh

839
00:51:02,320 --> 00:51:04,480
Speaker 1: show you this. There's a little bit of math involved.

840
00:51:04,840 --> 00:51:06,520
Speaker 1: But you can just do it in your head and

841
00:51:06,640 --> 00:51:09,440
Speaker 1: quickly see the problem without walking through all the sums

842
00:51:09,880 --> 00:51:12,120
Speaker 1: according in place I was coining earlier in the backlog,

843
00:51:12,719 --> 00:51:17,520
Speaker 1: every seventy three seconds someone is sexually assaulted in the

844
00:51:17,640 --> 00:51:23,000
Speaker 1: United States. That's a pretty solid statistic. A sexual assault

845
00:51:23,120 --> 00:51:26,520
Speaker 1: kit is officially considered backlogged if it has not been

846
00:51:26,560 --> 00:51:31,279
Speaker 1: submitted for DNA analysis, which usually detectives or prosecutors have

847
00:51:31,400 --> 00:51:34,640
Speaker 1: to specifically request. It's knoped in, not an opt out.

848
00:51:35,400 --> 00:51:39,120
Speaker 1: If that kit has been sitting around and hasn't gone

849
00:51:39,120 --> 00:51:43,400
Speaker 1: for analysis within ten days of the evidence being submitted,

850
00:51:44,040 --> 00:51:48,040
Speaker 1: it's considered backlogged. So these things aren't waiting around all

851
00:51:48,080 --> 00:51:50,680
Speaker 1: the time for nine years. But there is a lot

852
00:51:50,680 --> 00:51:53,839
Speaker 1: of stuff getting lost in the system. And unfortunately in

853
00:51:53,920 --> 00:51:58,160
Speaker 1: this society, uh, there there's a crime of this sort

854
00:51:58,200 --> 00:52:02,960
Speaker 1: every seventy three seconds. So the backlog builds very quickly,

855
00:52:03,320 --> 00:52:09,200
Speaker 1: and without more funding, more visibility, uh, probably some different policies,

856
00:52:09,320 --> 00:52:12,520
Speaker 1: it's going to be very difficult to address this problem.

857
00:52:12,640 --> 00:52:14,840
Speaker 1: And and of course you know there are members of

858
00:52:14,920 --> 00:52:18,080
Speaker 1: law enforcement, members of in geos, like in the backlog,

859
00:52:18,320 --> 00:52:20,839
Speaker 1: who are working around the clock to make this better,

860
00:52:20,920 --> 00:52:24,960
Speaker 1: to bring justice to these people. But those those numbers,

861
00:52:25,320 --> 00:52:29,400
Speaker 1: I think give us a very real sense of the problem.

862
00:52:30,040 --> 00:52:32,000
Speaker 1: If you are wondering, if you're in the US and

863
00:52:32,000 --> 00:52:34,879
Speaker 1: you're wondering what's happening in your state, Uh, then one

864
00:52:34,920 --> 00:52:37,280
Speaker 1: of the best things to do would be to check

865
00:52:37,360 --> 00:52:41,759
Speaker 1: out the interactive map that is on in the backlog,

866
00:52:42,440 --> 00:52:44,719
Speaker 1: where you can go state by state and see their

867
00:52:45,040 --> 00:52:49,080
Speaker 1: status of their policies, whether they've reformed things where your

868
00:52:49,200 --> 00:52:53,279
Speaker 1: home state is essentially in terms of resolving this. And

869
00:52:53,480 --> 00:52:56,239
Speaker 1: as I had said at that previous uh in our

870
00:52:56,280 --> 00:53:01,400
Speaker 1: previous Strange News, we know that these reforms can have measurable,

871
00:53:01,560 --> 00:53:06,239
Speaker 1: significant positive results. So it's very well worth it. Even

872
00:53:06,239 --> 00:53:10,239
Speaker 1: though it's an issue you know that many politicians would

873
00:53:10,320 --> 00:53:13,000
Speaker 1: later would would probably prefer not to talk about when

874
00:53:13,000 --> 00:53:18,280
Speaker 1: they're campaigning, right, because it makes people think of horrific things.

875
00:53:18,280 --> 00:53:22,120
Speaker 1: But Matt, you clocked something that I'm glad you mentioned

876
00:53:22,160 --> 00:53:26,520
Speaker 1: it because we had to mention it's some some level. Uh. Yes,

877
00:53:26,760 --> 00:53:31,280
Speaker 1: the current governor of our state of Georgia, when Brian

878
00:53:31,640 --> 00:53:37,120
Speaker 1: Kemp is asking for is asking for significant budget cuts,

879
00:53:37,880 --> 00:53:41,319
Speaker 1: especially the g b I and especially there's state Crime Lab.

880
00:53:41,760 --> 00:53:43,879
Speaker 1: Feels like there are other things you could cut from

881
00:53:43,920 --> 00:53:48,799
Speaker 1: a budget, you know what I mean, like governor salary. Yep.

882
00:53:50,640 --> 00:53:53,680
Speaker 1: I know, I know, not everybody, not everybody can do that,

883
00:53:53,719 --> 00:53:55,880
Speaker 1: but we've all heard the stories of like CEO is

884
00:53:55,960 --> 00:53:59,960
Speaker 1: refusing to accept event for something. But and look, I'm

885
00:54:00,040 --> 00:54:04,319
Speaker 1: not a fan of Brian kemp um um he, in

886
00:54:04,360 --> 00:54:07,920
Speaker 1: my opinion, is not the best dude. Uh, and recently

887
00:54:08,000 --> 00:54:12,440
Speaker 1: signed this heartbeat bill into law that fundamentally deprives women

888
00:54:12,840 --> 00:54:16,520
Speaker 1: of the ability to get an abortion beyond a very

889
00:54:16,800 --> 00:54:18,880
Speaker 1: very limited window of time. And it's all kind of

890
00:54:18,880 --> 00:54:22,279
Speaker 1: based around these evangelical ideals about like a heartbeat and

891
00:54:22,320 --> 00:54:24,400
Speaker 1: the soul. And I know these are all very loaded issues,

892
00:54:24,440 --> 00:54:28,640
Speaker 1: but to me, this this, this, this feels like something

893
00:54:28,719 --> 00:54:31,640
Speaker 1: someone like that would also be like who cares? You know,

894
00:54:31,800 --> 00:54:34,920
Speaker 1: like we're not letting women take control over their bodies

895
00:54:35,200 --> 00:54:37,920
Speaker 1: and we're also not helping them out when they've been

896
00:54:37,960 --> 00:54:43,719
Speaker 1: sexually assaulted. So yeah, and there could be there could

897
00:54:43,719 --> 00:54:49,279
Speaker 1: be an aspect there where the reporters are spinning a

898
00:54:49,400 --> 00:54:54,240
Speaker 1: perspective of their own. You know. Uh, there's no there's

899
00:54:54,280 --> 00:54:58,640
Speaker 1: no proof that the governor of Georgia or really any

900
00:54:58,880 --> 00:55:02,560
Speaker 1: state level federal level official is sitting around like steepling

901
00:55:02,600 --> 00:55:07,000
Speaker 1: their fingers Monty Burns style and saying is let's cut

902
00:55:07,040 --> 00:55:09,800
Speaker 1: the budget in the way it huch people the most

903
00:55:10,120 --> 00:55:13,560
Speaker 1: like that doesn't happen. They're thinking of spreadsheets and numbers,

904
00:55:13,640 --> 00:55:20,120
Speaker 1: and it's incredibly dehumanized, right because the US really only

905
00:55:20,200 --> 00:55:25,400
Speaker 1: tends to do something about important issues if there is

906
00:55:25,440 --> 00:55:28,279
Speaker 1: a face that can be put on it for the

907
00:55:28,360 --> 00:55:34,280
Speaker 1: evening news. When you hear statistics like this evil, evil

908
00:55:34,400 --> 00:55:38,680
Speaker 1: thing happens to people every seventy three seconds. What you're

909
00:55:38,719 --> 00:55:41,720
Speaker 1: hearing is the idea of a crime and every seventy

910
00:55:41,760 --> 00:55:46,160
Speaker 1: three seconds. But if every seventy three seconds you gotta

911
00:55:46,320 --> 00:55:50,160
Speaker 1: text with the name of the person this was happening to,

912
00:55:50,719 --> 00:55:54,640
Speaker 1: I guarantee you the enormity of this miscarriage of justice

913
00:55:54,880 --> 00:55:58,040
Speaker 1: would hit completely differently. I mean, when you agree like,

914
00:55:58,320 --> 00:56:00,960
Speaker 1: I don't know, maybe I'm being too optimistic because I'm

915
00:56:01,000 --> 00:56:05,719
Speaker 1: thinking of amber alerts. I certainly that's tough. Man. That's

916
00:56:05,719 --> 00:56:10,680
Speaker 1: a really interesting counterpoint. I do feel like associated. I mean,

917
00:56:11,000 --> 00:56:13,400
Speaker 1: I would take it a step further and say, you know,

918
00:56:13,480 --> 00:56:15,719
Speaker 1: you often see with people in power that they don't

919
00:56:15,719 --> 00:56:17,640
Speaker 1: really care about an issue until it happens to someone

920
00:56:17,680 --> 00:56:20,080
Speaker 1: they love. And then they make it a pet, pet

921
00:56:20,160 --> 00:56:23,560
Speaker 1: cause or a pet project of their's, but otherwise tend

922
00:56:23,600 --> 00:56:28,040
Speaker 1: to not be particularly uh empathetic to others because of

923
00:56:28,080 --> 00:56:31,560
Speaker 1: that faceless spreadsheety kind of quality of the whole thing

924
00:56:32,640 --> 00:56:36,160
Speaker 1: for for my money, on the end the backlog dot

925
00:56:36,320 --> 00:56:39,560
Speaker 1: org site, it's kind of hard to it might be

926
00:56:39,560 --> 00:56:44,000
Speaker 1: difficult to get to, but they've got an article or

927
00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:47,719
Speaker 1: a page here that says test kits stop serial rapists.

928
00:56:48,040 --> 00:56:50,520
Speaker 1: And if you go down here you can see three

929
00:56:50,560 --> 00:56:54,960
Speaker 1: individual people. They're just examples of people who have been

930
00:56:55,000 --> 00:56:58,920
Speaker 1: linked to violent crimes and sexual assaults through these kits,

931
00:56:59,520 --> 00:57:04,040
Speaker 1: and it just shows you, like, what could happen if you,

932
00:57:04,040 --> 00:57:06,600
Speaker 1: you know, if we were able to get rid of

933
00:57:06,680 --> 00:57:10,279
Speaker 1: this this issue that we're discussing here, how many people

934
00:57:10,320 --> 00:57:13,000
Speaker 1: we could get off the street, at least hopefully in

935
00:57:13,000 --> 00:57:16,760
Speaker 1: the best in the worst case scenario, you could nab

936
00:57:17,280 --> 00:57:20,960
Speaker 1: a bunch of people who are doing terrible things. Yeah,

937
00:57:21,120 --> 00:57:27,160
Speaker 1: and again, to further emphasize and highlight this point, there

938
00:57:27,160 --> 00:57:30,080
Speaker 1: are people getting away. There are people have done this.

939
00:57:30,320 --> 00:57:35,640
Speaker 1: They are walking free. Statistically speaking, I should say, statistically speaking,

940
00:57:35,760 --> 00:57:39,360
Speaker 1: is very likely that is the case, and it is

941
00:57:39,400 --> 00:57:45,000
Speaker 1: a problem that is going to require multiple institutions and

942
00:57:45,120 --> 00:57:48,720
Speaker 1: authorities and agencies working together. And I think it's a

943
00:57:48,720 --> 00:57:53,959
Speaker 1: problem that is both solvable and worth solving. UH, it's

944
00:57:54,040 --> 00:57:58,400
Speaker 1: also one that is UH not going to improve anytime

945
00:57:58,480 --> 00:58:03,040
Speaker 1: soon and us unless they're serious action taken. So thank

946
00:58:03,080 --> 00:58:06,040
Speaker 1: you to end the backlog. Thank you to everybody who

947
00:58:06,120 --> 00:58:10,120
Speaker 1: works in the fields of medical, physical, and mental health UH,

948
00:58:10,240 --> 00:58:13,720
Speaker 1: and thank you especially to Steve, because I think a

949
00:58:13,760 --> 00:58:17,320
Speaker 1: lot of people, perhaps us included on the show today UH,

950
00:58:17,600 --> 00:58:22,040
Speaker 1: did not realize that there were there were hard ways

951
00:58:22,360 --> 00:58:27,040
Speaker 1: for any number of stakeholders to prevent UH an investigation

952
00:58:27,160 --> 00:58:31,840
Speaker 1: or prevent the processing of these And with that in mind,

953
00:58:32,440 --> 00:58:35,880
Speaker 1: we would like to hear your experiences with this process,

954
00:58:35,960 --> 00:58:39,720
Speaker 1: your ideas of these attempted solutions, and we'd also like

955
00:58:39,800 --> 00:58:42,920
Speaker 1: to hear about the things you've seen in the sky.

956
00:58:43,040 --> 00:58:45,560
Speaker 1: As Matt said, if you are from the Pool or

957
00:58:45,680 --> 00:58:49,800
Speaker 1: Savannah metro area, we'd also like to say it because

958
00:58:49,800 --> 00:58:53,200
Speaker 1: I don't want this to be a total downer ending. UM,

959
00:58:53,320 --> 00:58:56,600
Speaker 1: what's the weirdest cheese you ever tried? There's Kazu mirzu,

960
00:58:56,760 --> 00:58:59,200
Speaker 1: which I haven't tried yet because it's only made in

961
00:58:59,240 --> 00:59:03,720
Speaker 1: Sardinia and it's illegal like seriously illegal to have some

962
00:59:03,800 --> 00:59:07,760
Speaker 1: of it, which don't understand, But mafioso, if you're out there,

963
00:59:08,600 --> 00:59:11,600
Speaker 1: hit me up. There's also some cheeses I believe that

964
00:59:11,720 --> 00:59:17,600
Speaker 1: like contain live maggots. That's the one boom. Why is it?

965
00:59:17,600 --> 00:59:21,080
Speaker 1: Why is it illegal? Does it make you like trip balls? No?

966
00:59:21,320 --> 00:59:27,320
Speaker 1: I think it's just violating several very well established healthcoat standards.

967
00:59:27,800 --> 00:59:30,360
Speaker 1: Have you guys heard of the concept of high meat?

968
00:59:31,240 --> 00:59:35,680
Speaker 1: High meat? Is this like trend where people literally leave

969
00:59:35,880 --> 00:59:40,160
Speaker 1: meat out to rot, uh and become infested with maggots

970
00:59:40,160 --> 00:59:44,080
Speaker 1: and turn green and like you know, moldy and fungacy,

971
00:59:44,080 --> 00:59:45,680
Speaker 1: and they eat it and it claims to get them

972
00:59:45,760 --> 00:59:51,480
Speaker 1: high high meat. It's a long road to go down.

973
00:59:51,600 --> 00:59:55,640
Speaker 1: It really is to each their own. But good lord,

974
00:59:55,720 --> 00:59:58,280
Speaker 1: what have we become? I just didn't read it in

975
00:59:58,320 --> 01:00:01,720
Speaker 1: the Anarchists cookbook, so I'm gonna be honest. I probably

976
01:00:01,760 --> 01:00:03,600
Speaker 1: would have tried it if I if I had read

977
01:00:03,600 --> 01:00:06,480
Speaker 1: about it, I may have accidentally tried it. But if

978
01:00:06,560 --> 01:00:09,600
Speaker 1: that was the situation, I wasn't looking to get high,

979
01:00:09,600 --> 01:00:13,200
Speaker 1: and it wasn't like monitoring whether I felt good about

980
01:00:13,200 --> 01:00:16,880
Speaker 1: whatever horrible misadventure I was in. Speaking of that by

981
01:00:16,880 --> 01:00:19,120
Speaker 1: the way, guys, I went through my I was in

982
01:00:19,120 --> 01:00:22,640
Speaker 1: the office again. I went through my office desk, and

983
01:00:22,840 --> 01:00:24,800
Speaker 1: right on the top of it, on in one of

984
01:00:24,800 --> 01:00:27,880
Speaker 1: these locked or drawers, there was a how to Diffuse

985
01:00:27,920 --> 01:00:32,280
Speaker 1: a bomb how to Diffuse a bomb like manual. I

986
01:00:32,280 --> 01:00:34,920
Speaker 1: don't know why I have it. I don't know what

987
01:00:35,040 --> 01:00:37,040
Speaker 1: it's doing in my desk, but it's there. I mean,

988
01:00:37,040 --> 01:00:39,280
Speaker 1: it's better to have it and not need it than

989
01:00:39,360 --> 01:00:41,560
Speaker 1: to need it and not have it. You know, if

990
01:00:41,600 --> 01:00:43,520
Speaker 1: it's got to be at the office or a place

991
01:00:43,520 --> 01:00:46,000
Speaker 1: where other people might be going through your stuff, it's

992
01:00:46,040 --> 01:00:50,480
Speaker 1: better to have the book about diffusing bombs. Yes, you're right.

993
01:00:51,240 --> 01:00:55,600
Speaker 1: Oh well, don't go through my stuff. I already found it.

994
01:00:57,400 --> 01:01:00,720
Speaker 1: So so that's our show for to a thank you,

995
01:01:00,800 --> 01:01:03,600
Speaker 1: as always to everyone who took the time to write

996
01:01:03,640 --> 01:01:06,560
Speaker 1: to us, to email us, to call us. If you

997
01:01:06,640 --> 01:01:10,160
Speaker 1: want to take a page from your fellow conspiracy realist book,

998
01:01:10,560 --> 01:01:13,840
Speaker 1: we would love to hear from you your personal experience

999
01:01:13,880 --> 01:01:17,400
Speaker 1: with the stories we explore today. We'd also love to

1000
01:01:17,400 --> 01:01:21,880
Speaker 1: hear suggestions for upcoming topics you think your fellow listeners

1001
01:01:21,960 --> 01:01:25,840
Speaker 1: would enjoy. And we try to be easy to find online.

1002
01:01:25,920 --> 01:01:29,400
Speaker 1: Hopefully you can't find our fingerprints. No one now, please don't.

1003
01:01:29,600 --> 01:01:32,360
Speaker 1: But we are available in multiple places. We are conspiracy

1004
01:01:32,440 --> 01:01:36,080
Speaker 1: stuff on Twitter and Facebook, and we are conspiracy stuff

1005
01:01:36,120 --> 01:01:38,959
Speaker 1: show on Instagram. Um, you can find our favorite place

1006
01:01:38,960 --> 01:01:41,320
Speaker 1: on the internet that here's where it gets crazy Facebook group.

1007
01:01:41,360 --> 01:01:43,400
Speaker 1: All you gotta do is a name one or all

1008
01:01:43,480 --> 01:01:45,560
Speaker 1: three of us, or just say something that lets us

1009
01:01:45,560 --> 01:01:47,520
Speaker 1: know that you're a human person who is aware of

1010
01:01:47,520 --> 01:01:49,800
Speaker 1: what the show is. Make Ben laugh, any of those,

1011
01:01:49,880 --> 01:01:52,360
Speaker 1: any combination of those things in your end. Uh. You

1012
01:01:52,400 --> 01:01:54,440
Speaker 1: can also give us a telephone call. Yes, you can.

1013
01:01:54,520 --> 01:01:57,920
Speaker 1: Our number three s T D W y t K.

1014
01:01:58,600 --> 01:02:00,640
Speaker 1: Please when you call, give us the name you'd like

1015
01:02:00,760 --> 01:02:02,640
Speaker 1: to be referred to as. Not It doesn't have to

1016
01:02:02,640 --> 01:02:04,840
Speaker 1: be a real name, it can be but whatever you

1017
01:02:04,880 --> 01:02:07,960
Speaker 1: want us to call you and let us know if

1018
01:02:08,080 --> 01:02:10,800
Speaker 1: we can or cannot use your name on the air.

1019
01:02:10,840 --> 01:02:14,439
Speaker 1: Been I'm legally deciding that we have to do. Yes,

1020
01:02:14,520 --> 01:02:17,080
Speaker 1: give give us permission or do not give us permission,

1021
01:02:17,240 --> 01:02:21,480
Speaker 1: because I think our attorney would rather you say you

1022
01:02:21,520 --> 01:02:26,200
Speaker 1: can use this right. Yeah, we were. It's the it's

1023
01:02:26,240 --> 01:02:30,200
Speaker 1: the old opt in, opt out game or game of framing,

1024
01:02:30,360 --> 01:02:32,920
Speaker 1: and we I think we talked about this in previous episode.

1025
01:02:33,000 --> 01:02:37,120
Speaker 1: But my favorite example is when a couple of different

1026
01:02:37,160 --> 01:02:43,000
Speaker 1: countries or communities changed their organ donation option on a

1027
01:02:43,240 --> 01:02:48,040
Speaker 1: license from opt in to opt out, and so many

1028
01:02:48,080 --> 01:02:50,040
Speaker 1: people just don't bother to opt out, so they were

1029
01:02:50,040 --> 01:02:53,080
Speaker 1: able to get a lot more organ donors. Uh. Look,

1030
01:02:53,280 --> 01:02:56,880
Speaker 1: you know, stuff they don't want you to know. Guaranteed

1031
01:02:57,000 --> 01:03:00,000
Speaker 1: to be the podcast out of all the other podcasts

1032
01:03:00,000 --> 01:03:02,320
Speaker 1: that will not try to harvest your organs. Take that

1033
01:03:02,360 --> 01:03:05,959
Speaker 1: to the bank, right, we can say that, we can't

1034
01:03:06,200 --> 01:03:09,160
Speaker 1: you know, we we can't say that about other shows.

1035
01:03:09,400 --> 01:03:14,760
Speaker 1: You know. He's right, Uh, as I sit here and

1036
01:03:14,760 --> 01:03:18,760
Speaker 1: the stuff you should know. Alright, they have never publicly

1037
01:03:18,760 --> 01:03:23,320
Speaker 1: said there against organ harvesting. Fun framing is. But but

1038
01:03:23,480 --> 01:03:27,680
Speaker 1: that yes do most importantly we do uh, we do

1039
01:03:27,720 --> 01:03:31,120
Speaker 1: want to make sure that we don't violate anybody's rights

1040
01:03:31,240 --> 01:03:34,800
Speaker 1: or privacy. So if you do wish us to use

1041
01:03:34,920 --> 01:03:37,880
Speaker 1: your name and or story on air, please do explicitly

1042
01:03:37,920 --> 01:03:40,560
Speaker 1: tell us it's okay, thank you for that. Yes, so

1043
01:03:40,640 --> 01:03:43,480
Speaker 1: that's the message. That's three minutes that you've got to

1044
01:03:43,560 --> 01:03:47,280
Speaker 1: leave it. Um, Please do not leave multiple messages in

1045
01:03:47,280 --> 01:03:49,680
Speaker 1: a row. That just helps us out in listening back

1046
01:03:49,680 --> 01:03:52,480
Speaker 1: to all of them. If you've got a lot to say,

1047
01:03:52,640 --> 01:03:56,080
Speaker 1: then use our email address. It's much easier that way.

1048
01:03:56,360 --> 01:04:19,000
Speaker 1: Our email addresses conspiracy at iHeart radio dot off. Stuff

1049
01:04:19,000 --> 01:04:20,920
Speaker 1: they don't want you to know is a production of

1050
01:04:20,960 --> 01:04:23,920
Speaker 1: I heart Radio. For more podcasts from my heart Radio,

1051
01:04:24,080 --> 01:04:26,920
Speaker 1: visit the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever

1052
01:04:27,000 --> 01:04:28,280
Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.