1 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:13,480 Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast. 2 00:00:13,560 --> 00:00:17,600 Speaker 1: I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. So, Tracy, I'm 3 00:00:17,600 --> 00:00:19,520 Speaker 1: a little worried that the next few years are going 4 00:00:19,560 --> 00:00:23,920 Speaker 1: to be kind of annoying. Annoying in what sense? Joe, Well, 5 00:00:24,320 --> 00:00:27,760 Speaker 1: you know, it's like we're coming on ten years since 6 00:00:27,800 --> 00:00:31,319 Speaker 1: the financial crisis, and so every day it's gonna be 7 00:00:31,360 --> 00:00:35,000 Speaker 1: another story about ten years since this went under, and 8 00:00:35,080 --> 00:00:38,000 Speaker 1: ten years since this went under, and everyone's gonna be 9 00:00:38,040 --> 00:00:41,400 Speaker 1: retelling war stories about where they were, and journalists are 10 00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:43,600 Speaker 1: gonna be talking about how they're in the office till 11 00:00:43,640 --> 00:00:46,000 Speaker 1: two am. I'm already kind of dreading it all a 12 00:00:46,000 --> 00:00:49,639 Speaker 1: little bit, really, But I mean, aren't those fond memories 13 00:00:49,680 --> 00:00:52,440 Speaker 1: as a financial journalist? You know? Two thousand seven, two 14 00:00:52,440 --> 00:00:55,600 Speaker 1: thousand eight, those were the sort of glory years. People 15 00:00:55,600 --> 00:00:57,640 Speaker 1: couldn't even keep up with the news flow. There was 16 00:00:57,680 --> 00:01:01,080 Speaker 1: so much happening. No, I see, I'm excited about telling 17 00:01:01,120 --> 00:01:03,360 Speaker 1: my stories. I just don't want to hear everyone else's. 18 00:01:03,480 --> 00:01:05,800 Speaker 1: You know, I'm just very selfish. I just I love 19 00:01:05,920 --> 00:01:08,960 Speaker 1: my memories. I just don't want to hear everyone else's stories. Well, 20 00:01:09,000 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: I applaud your honesty, Joe. Yeah, that being said, despite 21 00:01:13,480 --> 00:01:15,119 Speaker 1: the fact that you know, we're going to have all 22 00:01:15,120 --> 00:01:18,840 Speaker 1: of these anniversaries coming up over the next couple of years, 23 00:01:19,200 --> 00:01:22,800 Speaker 1: it has been obviously an extraordinary time, and I think 24 00:01:22,840 --> 00:01:25,840 Speaker 1: all of us have learned a ton about how markets 25 00:01:25,880 --> 00:01:30,400 Speaker 1: and economics work during this period. Yeah, you could definitely 26 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:32,440 Speaker 1: say that. I guess you could also argue it the 27 00:01:32,440 --> 00:01:35,440 Speaker 1: other way and say that the financial crisis and the 28 00:01:35,520 --> 00:01:40,160 Speaker 1: period after it were so um special or so unprecedented 29 00:01:40,200 --> 00:01:43,840 Speaker 1: that we've all learned massively new things, right, like how 30 00:01:43,840 --> 00:01:49,280 Speaker 1: many people were really experts on quee before two thousand nine? 31 00:01:49,320 --> 00:01:51,200 Speaker 1: And I mean, I guess you could argue there aren't 32 00:01:51,320 --> 00:01:53,640 Speaker 1: that many people who truly understand it now, But in 33 00:01:53,680 --> 00:01:56,080 Speaker 1: any case, at least people know what it kind of is. 34 00:01:56,880 --> 00:01:59,920 Speaker 1: Maybe we've just exposed how little we know. A frame 35 00:02:00,040 --> 00:02:02,120 Speaker 1: me this way, because today we're going to be talking 36 00:02:02,480 --> 00:02:07,200 Speaker 1: to a long time industry veteran, someone who worked for 37 00:02:07,240 --> 00:02:10,400 Speaker 1: the I m F, who's involved in mutual funds, who's 38 00:02:10,440 --> 00:02:14,080 Speaker 1: been a global macro trader for several years, uh, and 39 00:02:14,320 --> 00:02:17,880 Speaker 1: someone who has uh you know, sort of catalogued all 40 00:02:17,919 --> 00:02:21,600 Speaker 1: of the things that we should have learned since the crisis, 41 00:02:22,000 --> 00:02:24,760 Speaker 1: and I think that his perspective and sort of what 42 00:02:24,840 --> 00:02:28,440 Speaker 1: he's observed has sort of been an extremely offering some 43 00:02:28,520 --> 00:02:32,359 Speaker 1: extremely important lessons from the last ten years. So, Joe, 44 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:34,560 Speaker 1: I think I know who you're talking about. And if 45 00:02:34,600 --> 00:02:37,320 Speaker 1: it's who I think it is, I'm very excited. He's 46 00:02:37,400 --> 00:02:39,680 Speaker 1: the guy who's very active on Twitter and he has 47 00:02:39,680 --> 00:02:42,840 Speaker 1: a great blog as well, and we all read it. Yeah, 48 00:02:42,880 --> 00:02:46,040 Speaker 1: we're going to be talking to Mark dow He. Anyone 49 00:02:46,120 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 1: who's involved in finance Twitter has certainly seen him. He 50 00:02:49,200 --> 00:02:52,799 Speaker 1: has this awesome blog called Behavioral Macro where he talks 51 00:02:52,840 --> 00:02:56,600 Speaker 1: about big macro topics. He recently wrote a post about 52 00:02:56,680 --> 00:03:01,120 Speaker 1: fifteen things that every investor should have learned from the 53 00:03:01,160 --> 00:03:03,880 Speaker 1: financial crisis and it's aftermath, and we're going to be 54 00:03:03,919 --> 00:03:07,280 Speaker 1: talking through a few of those things. That sounds great, 55 00:03:17,240 --> 00:03:20,080 Speaker 1: Marked Out, thank you very much for joining us. Thanks 56 00:03:20,080 --> 00:03:23,200 Speaker 1: for having me. Guys, before we get started, you know, 57 00:03:24,160 --> 00:03:27,440 Speaker 1: many of us in media and finance Twitter have interacted 58 00:03:27,440 --> 00:03:29,520 Speaker 1: with you for a long time, read your stuff, read 59 00:03:29,520 --> 00:03:33,040 Speaker 1: your tweet, talked to you on TV or whatever. But 60 00:03:33,320 --> 00:03:35,840 Speaker 1: for those of the people who don't know who you 61 00:03:35,840 --> 00:03:38,360 Speaker 1: are yet, why don't you give us the very brief. 62 00:03:38,800 --> 00:03:43,720 Speaker 1: The brief bio. Yeah, the thumbnail sketch is. I started 63 00:03:43,760 --> 00:03:46,200 Speaker 1: my career at the Treasure Department as an international economist, 64 00:03:46,320 --> 00:03:50,440 Speaker 1: working on financial disasters and emerging markets primarily. That's where 65 00:03:50,720 --> 00:03:53,040 Speaker 1: they were then, UH. And then I moved to the 66 00:03:53,040 --> 00:03:55,480 Speaker 1: International Monetary Fund, where I worked on a lot of 67 00:03:55,480 --> 00:03:59,080 Speaker 1: different countries and the same kind of sustainability issues. After that, 68 00:03:59,160 --> 00:04:01,600 Speaker 1: I managed money to mutual fund for a number of 69 00:04:01,680 --> 00:04:05,440 Speaker 1: years fixed income, primarily emerging markets. And then I moved 70 00:04:05,480 --> 00:04:08,160 Speaker 1: to a global macro hedge fund for about seven years 71 00:04:08,760 --> 00:04:11,840 Speaker 1: UH and basically ran part of the book. You know. 72 00:04:11,880 --> 00:04:14,120 Speaker 1: I had my own portfolio where I ran risk and 73 00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:17,960 Speaker 1: all kinds of asset classes, primarily currency in emerging markets, 74 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:21,160 Speaker 1: interest rates, commodities, that that kind of thing. And now 75 00:04:21,240 --> 00:04:26,760 Speaker 1: I run glorified private UH family office from from my 76 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:30,920 Speaker 1: hometown in California. What strikes me is important about your 77 00:04:30,960 --> 00:04:33,840 Speaker 1: background before we get into the various lessons, is that 78 00:04:33,880 --> 00:04:37,040 Speaker 1: you've seen the eco side and the trading side, and 79 00:04:37,120 --> 00:04:40,440 Speaker 1: often the two sides can't really speak to each other 80 00:04:40,800 --> 00:04:42,960 Speaker 1: very well. A lot of traders can be very good, 81 00:04:43,160 --> 00:04:46,880 Speaker 1: but they don't really understand economics. A lot of economists 82 00:04:46,880 --> 00:04:49,200 Speaker 1: have a deep understanding of how things work, but they 83 00:04:49,240 --> 00:04:52,320 Speaker 1: have no idea how markets really work. As you describe 84 00:04:52,360 --> 00:04:56,240 Speaker 1: your career, you've really seen and bridged the two worlds. 85 00:04:56,600 --> 00:05:00,000 Speaker 1: This has been a massive advantage to me over my career. 86 00:05:00,080 --> 00:05:03,160 Speaker 1: You see a lot of shops, particularly big ones, where 87 00:05:03,160 --> 00:05:07,719 Speaker 1: there's a stark divide between thought leaders and risk takers, 88 00:05:08,400 --> 00:05:11,120 Speaker 1: and not that many people speak both languages. So the 89 00:05:11,120 --> 00:05:14,360 Speaker 1: thought leaders are great for framing things and providing frameworks 90 00:05:14,360 --> 00:05:19,240 Speaker 1: and backdrop ways to analyze issues and to communicate with 91 00:05:19,320 --> 00:05:22,120 Speaker 1: clients who want who want to understand the world better, 92 00:05:22,320 --> 00:05:25,719 Speaker 1: but they often don't have that market savvy, that psychological 93 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:30,360 Speaker 1: dimension that makes a good risk taker. Uh, that defines 94 00:05:30,400 --> 00:05:34,240 Speaker 1: a good risk taker. Speaking of framing ideas, you did 95 00:05:34,400 --> 00:05:37,480 Speaker 1: pen this blog post about the fifteen things that investors 96 00:05:37,520 --> 00:05:41,440 Speaker 1: should have learned after the Financial Crisis, and one of 97 00:05:41,480 --> 00:05:44,720 Speaker 1: the ones that really struck me. Um, and these are 98 00:05:44,760 --> 00:05:47,000 Speaker 1: all you know their number, they're in bullet points, they're 99 00:05:47,040 --> 00:05:49,120 Speaker 1: relatively short, so we really want you to dig into 100 00:05:49,160 --> 00:05:51,520 Speaker 1: them a bit more. But one of the ones was 101 00:05:51,560 --> 00:05:55,800 Speaker 1: this idea that the interest rate sensitivity of economic activity 102 00:05:56,240 --> 00:06:00,760 Speaker 1: is less than what was previously believed to be the case. 103 00:06:00,880 --> 00:06:03,320 Speaker 1: And I want to tie that in with another one, 104 00:06:03,440 --> 00:06:07,080 Speaker 1: which is the idea that, uh, the economic channel of 105 00:06:07,160 --> 00:06:11,360 Speaker 1: monetary policy and the financial channel of monetary policy, uh 106 00:06:11,760 --> 00:06:15,960 Speaker 1: kind of might be operating and existing separately. Can you 107 00:06:16,000 --> 00:06:18,159 Speaker 1: walk us through those points for me? That might be 108 00:06:18,200 --> 00:06:21,599 Speaker 1: the most important portion of the post really from a 109 00:06:21,640 --> 00:06:23,840 Speaker 1: policy a policy standpoint. I wrote this because I was 110 00:06:23,839 --> 00:06:27,120 Speaker 1: a little frustrated I had from given my background, I'd 111 00:06:27,160 --> 00:06:29,280 Speaker 1: climbed into so many central banks all over the world, 112 00:06:29,320 --> 00:06:31,359 Speaker 1: I had seen so many things, like you know, a 113 00:06:31,440 --> 00:06:33,200 Speaker 1: doctor in the e R with a lot of experience 114 00:06:33,760 --> 00:06:35,960 Speaker 1: that I was kind of a hit of the curve 115 00:06:36,000 --> 00:06:38,400 Speaker 1: on a lot of a lot of these issues, just 116 00:06:38,440 --> 00:06:41,240 Speaker 1: because you've seen financial crisis and money printing and all 117 00:06:41,279 --> 00:06:44,080 Speaker 1: these things before. But when it came to the when 118 00:06:44,080 --> 00:06:46,000 Speaker 1: it came to the US, a lot of people who 119 00:06:46,000 --> 00:06:52,200 Speaker 1: were really deeply steeped in nineties economics had a very 120 00:06:52,240 --> 00:06:56,480 Speaker 1: fixed view of of of money supply and interest rates 121 00:06:56,600 --> 00:07:01,120 Speaker 1: and economic activity. And what we know really is what 122 00:07:01,760 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 1: the element that was lacking was behavior. The models that 123 00:07:04,839 --> 00:07:07,320 Speaker 1: were taught in the eighties and were perpetuated throughout really 124 00:07:07,400 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 1: until the Great Financial Crisis was a very rational way 125 00:07:11,720 --> 00:07:14,200 Speaker 1: of looking at it. A lower price for money means 126 00:07:14,240 --> 00:07:16,600 Speaker 1: more borrowing, both in the fin in the in the 127 00:07:16,600 --> 00:07:19,880 Speaker 1: financial sector and in the real economy, and higher rates 128 00:07:19,920 --> 00:07:22,520 Speaker 1: means less. And if you just look at what happened 129 00:07:23,520 --> 00:07:25,560 Speaker 1: before and after the crisis, you'll see that this doesn't 130 00:07:25,560 --> 00:07:27,320 Speaker 1: really hold that. The other factors that are that are 131 00:07:27,360 --> 00:07:30,080 Speaker 1: more important. You know, from two thousand and four to 132 00:07:30,160 --> 00:07:33,960 Speaker 1: two thousand and seven or so, people were borrowing like crazy, 133 00:07:34,120 --> 00:07:37,320 Speaker 1: and the said funds rate was around five. Everyone wanted 134 00:07:37,360 --> 00:07:40,240 Speaker 1: to borrow, everyone wanted to lend, everybody was on the money. 135 00:07:40,280 --> 00:07:43,880 Speaker 1: Supply was scoring rapidly because thanks were lending and people 136 00:07:43,880 --> 00:07:47,200 Speaker 1: were borrowing. After the crisis, for a long period of time, 137 00:07:47,280 --> 00:07:51,440 Speaker 1: rates were zero and nobody was lending. Nobody was borrowing. Uh. 138 00:07:51,440 --> 00:07:53,280 Speaker 1: And this isn't just a US phenomenon. You see it 139 00:07:53,280 --> 00:07:56,080 Speaker 1: around the world. So you have to ask yourself, you know, 140 00:07:56,120 --> 00:07:59,920 Speaker 1: why is that and why aren't we more sensitive to interest? 141 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:03,800 Speaker 1: It's and the simple answers risk appetite. Uh, people were 142 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:09,040 Speaker 1: We're much more sensitive to our risk appetite whether we 143 00:08:09,240 --> 00:08:12,080 Speaker 1: feel secure in our jobs than we are to the 144 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:13,880 Speaker 1: interest rate. If you're securing your job and you know 145 00:08:13,920 --> 00:08:15,840 Speaker 1: you've got a good income for the next ten years, 146 00:08:16,200 --> 00:08:17,760 Speaker 1: you're more likely to go out and buy that house 147 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:20,960 Speaker 1: even if the interest rate is five instead of three. Uh. 148 00:08:21,400 --> 00:08:23,360 Speaker 1: That's just the way human nature works. So I think 149 00:08:23,880 --> 00:08:29,080 Speaker 1: that's why people overstated the sensitivity of economic activity uh 150 00:08:29,240 --> 00:08:32,080 Speaker 1: to to interest rates. UH. And if you factor that in, 151 00:08:32,120 --> 00:08:34,680 Speaker 1: if you look more at people's risk appetite, then you'll 152 00:08:35,120 --> 00:08:38,439 Speaker 1: you'll get a better picture of of what's going to happen, 153 00:08:38,679 --> 00:08:40,959 Speaker 1: you know, to the transmission of monetary policy into the 154 00:08:41,040 --> 00:08:45,120 Speaker 1: economy or into finance. Now, with respect to the two 155 00:08:45,120 --> 00:08:48,240 Speaker 1: different channels, if you just think about it, uh, the 156 00:08:48,280 --> 00:08:51,520 Speaker 1: financial channel happens fast. These are liquid positions that you 157 00:08:51,559 --> 00:08:55,160 Speaker 1: can get out of, very sensitive often to the funding rate. Right, 158 00:08:55,240 --> 00:08:57,880 Speaker 1: you can leverage something that yields three if you're if 159 00:08:57,880 --> 00:09:01,480 Speaker 1: you're funding rate is one. Uh. So the financial channel 160 00:09:01,720 --> 00:09:06,200 Speaker 1: tends to uh react quickly. Interest rates are quicker. On 161 00:09:06,240 --> 00:09:09,600 Speaker 1: the economic side, you need a much higher higher level 162 00:09:09,640 --> 00:09:13,480 Speaker 1: of risk appetite to build that factory or to set 163 00:09:13,559 --> 00:09:16,400 Speaker 1: up a new shop or new branches because you're gonna 164 00:09:16,400 --> 00:09:18,200 Speaker 1: be stuck with that investment for quite some time. It 165 00:09:18,240 --> 00:09:20,840 Speaker 1: just requires a lot more confidence. So that can be 166 00:09:20,920 --> 00:09:24,760 Speaker 1: even stickier. UM in response, so it's it's just it 167 00:09:24,840 --> 00:09:28,960 Speaker 1: really maps back to a behavioral uh just uh, a 168 00:09:28,960 --> 00:09:32,240 Speaker 1: behavioral phenomenon uh. And for a policymaker, it's super important 169 00:09:32,280 --> 00:09:34,600 Speaker 1: because you can have points in time when the financial 170 00:09:34,640 --> 00:09:39,559 Speaker 1: channel has responded sufficiently and even excessively, but the economic 171 00:09:39,640 --> 00:09:43,080 Speaker 1: channel is still inching its way up the curve. And 172 00:09:43,080 --> 00:09:44,800 Speaker 1: in fact, I would argue, now we're in that kind 173 00:09:44,800 --> 00:09:47,800 Speaker 1: of situation where the financial channel has responded quite well, 174 00:09:48,160 --> 00:09:50,960 Speaker 1: pretty fully. I wouldn't say it's gone crazy, but it's 175 00:09:51,000 --> 00:09:54,120 Speaker 1: it's respond responded well, and the economic side is just 176 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:56,120 Speaker 1: you know, we're still not seeing robust investment, and we're 177 00:09:56,120 --> 00:09:58,360 Speaker 1: still not seeing wages, and we're still not seeing people 178 00:09:58,400 --> 00:10:01,800 Speaker 1: are still getting to that mind that where they want 179 00:10:01,840 --> 00:10:04,439 Speaker 1: to take risk and propulse maker, what do you do 180 00:10:04,600 --> 00:10:08,600 Speaker 1: when the financial channel is too far ahead of the 181 00:10:08,640 --> 00:10:14,040 Speaker 1: economic channel. Now, it's my belief that the way recessions 182 00:10:14,080 --> 00:10:18,520 Speaker 1: happen in the modern world is we get too optimistic 183 00:10:18,559 --> 00:10:21,480 Speaker 1: in the financial channel, and we also get too optimistic 184 00:10:21,520 --> 00:10:23,400 Speaker 1: in the economic channel, and at some point we have 185 00:10:23,440 --> 00:10:26,360 Speaker 1: a financial disruption from kind of shock. It can be 186 00:10:26,400 --> 00:10:29,240 Speaker 1: a small one, but it triggers a sell off in 187 00:10:29,320 --> 00:10:33,360 Speaker 1: the financial markets, and that forces a retrenchment or a 188 00:10:33,400 --> 00:10:36,920 Speaker 1: rethink of people in the real economy about how extended 189 00:10:36,960 --> 00:10:40,160 Speaker 1: they are with respect to risk, and they start laying 190 00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:43,440 Speaker 1: people off and cutting back on investment, which has a 191 00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:46,439 Speaker 1: multiplier effect throughout the economy, leading to more layoffs and 192 00:10:46,520 --> 00:10:49,280 Speaker 1: more cutbacks and investment, and you get a real recession. 193 00:10:49,880 --> 00:10:53,720 Speaker 1: But you really, if you don't have the real economy extended, 194 00:10:53,760 --> 00:10:57,520 Speaker 1: the real that that channel very optimistic if you need 195 00:10:57,559 --> 00:11:02,880 Speaker 1: a much bigger financial impulse to push the economy into recession. 196 00:11:02,880 --> 00:11:04,280 Speaker 1: And I think that's where we are right now. And 197 00:11:04,280 --> 00:11:07,440 Speaker 1: this is why my view all along has been as 198 00:11:07,480 --> 00:11:10,480 Speaker 1: long as I've been on Twitter long the We're gonna 199 00:11:10,480 --> 00:11:14,040 Speaker 1: have the longest and slowest expansion you know, uh shallow 200 00:11:14,080 --> 00:11:17,200 Speaker 1: and slow Uh that that that we've ever seen. Because 201 00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:19,280 Speaker 1: people are still looking in the mirror, even on the 202 00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:22,520 Speaker 1: financial channel. I would argue, when we get excited, uh, 203 00:11:22,800 --> 00:11:25,199 Speaker 1: we we kind of check ourselves and say, no, no, no, 204 00:11:25,280 --> 00:11:26,880 Speaker 1: this is a bubble. I mean, we hear people talking 205 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:29,240 Speaker 1: about bubbles all the time. We're afraid of getting caught out. 206 00:11:29,600 --> 00:11:31,760 Speaker 1: When I talk to guys right now, big investors, the 207 00:11:31,800 --> 00:11:35,440 Speaker 1: word you hear is caution, Something's gonna happen. We don't 208 00:11:35,440 --> 00:11:37,439 Speaker 1: know what this is long in the two those kinds 209 00:11:37,440 --> 00:11:39,000 Speaker 1: of things, and it's funny after and that's through the 210 00:11:39,000 --> 00:11:41,680 Speaker 1: financial channel, which is the one that's more sensitive uh 211 00:11:41,720 --> 00:11:44,840 Speaker 1: to uh to the stimulative policies that we've had for 212 00:11:44,840 --> 00:11:46,720 Speaker 1: for for so long. So that tells me that the 213 00:11:46,760 --> 00:11:49,480 Speaker 1: economic channel is just not there and it's gonna it 214 00:11:49,559 --> 00:11:53,880 Speaker 1: would take a much bigger financial shock other things equal 215 00:11:54,000 --> 00:11:56,000 Speaker 1: to push us into recessions. So the odds of recession 216 00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:59,440 Speaker 1: are still uh in my mind's I'm very very low, 217 00:11:59,480 --> 00:12:02,960 Speaker 1: even though don't expect robust girls. So for a policymaker, 218 00:12:02,960 --> 00:12:06,200 Speaker 1: it's these two different channels. Is something people haven't dealt 219 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:09,000 Speaker 1: with because the FED in particular and most and most 220 00:12:09,040 --> 00:12:13,120 Speaker 1: central banks more broadly, their mandate is key to the 221 00:12:13,160 --> 00:12:16,840 Speaker 1: economic channel, and the FED only only over the past 222 00:12:16,840 --> 00:12:18,760 Speaker 1: ten years have started to really think about how the 223 00:12:18,760 --> 00:12:21,720 Speaker 1: financial channel feeds back into monetary policy and in their 224 00:12:21,720 --> 00:12:25,080 Speaker 1: formal modeling, Mark, I feel like that answer explained so 225 00:12:25,160 --> 00:12:28,400 Speaker 1: much about what we've seen in the you know, obviously 226 00:12:28,400 --> 00:12:30,319 Speaker 1: that's the whole point of this in terms of lessons, 227 00:12:30,360 --> 00:12:32,319 Speaker 1: but you know, you said, this is a really big one, 228 00:12:32,720 --> 00:12:35,600 Speaker 1: and you know, just all this stuff about oh, we're 229 00:12:35,640 --> 00:12:38,800 Speaker 1: in a bubble, or all these macro hedge fund managers 230 00:12:38,880 --> 00:12:42,679 Speaker 1: who think that the FED has behaved irresponsibly by keeping 231 00:12:42,720 --> 00:12:45,440 Speaker 1: interest rates low and are you know, causing all kinds 232 00:12:45,440 --> 00:12:47,920 Speaker 1: of distortions. I feel like if they had all listened 233 00:12:48,000 --> 00:12:51,959 Speaker 1: to that answer, you know, several years ago. Unfortunately it's 234 00:12:52,080 --> 00:12:55,200 Speaker 1: too late for them now in seventeen, a lot of 235 00:12:55,280 --> 00:13:00,280 Speaker 1: mistakes would have been avoided on this theme of the 236 00:13:00,280 --> 00:13:03,920 Speaker 1: gap between the financial channel and the real channel. Another 237 00:13:04,000 --> 00:13:07,760 Speaker 1: one of your lessons is commodity markets, and you point 238 00:13:07,760 --> 00:13:11,240 Speaker 1: out that they're driven first by speculation and that that 239 00:13:11,320 --> 00:13:15,800 Speaker 1: overwhelms fundamentals. What's the lesson there? Two different things. One 240 00:13:16,160 --> 00:13:18,600 Speaker 1: is just the market market structure, So the story of 241 00:13:18,640 --> 00:13:23,560 Speaker 1: commodities was in right around them. They would electronic so 242 00:13:23,760 --> 00:13:25,600 Speaker 1: you didn't have to be in the pits and know 243 00:13:25,720 --> 00:13:28,360 Speaker 1: all the secret handshakes uh to trade them. You could 244 00:13:28,360 --> 00:13:31,800 Speaker 1: trade them electronically from your office UH and then now 245 00:13:31,880 --> 00:13:36,520 Speaker 1: from from from home UH. And that allowed people to 246 00:13:36,520 --> 00:13:39,320 Speaker 1: to get involved in a way they hadn't been easily 247 00:13:39,360 --> 00:13:42,199 Speaker 1: able to before. UM. And then around two three, two 248 00:13:42,520 --> 00:13:43,960 Speaker 1: and four there were there were a lot of there 249 00:13:44,000 --> 00:13:46,959 Speaker 1: were academics talking about diversified the divers supplying properties of 250 00:13:47,160 --> 00:13:50,000 Speaker 1: owning commodities as an asset class, and that gained a 251 00:13:50,040 --> 00:13:52,719 Speaker 1: lot of traction. At the same time, you had the 252 00:13:52,800 --> 00:13:55,640 Speaker 1: emerging markets plugging into the grid. China joined the w 253 00:13:55,800 --> 00:13:59,319 Speaker 1: t O and that whole emerging markets theme, you know, 254 00:13:59,360 --> 00:14:02,000 Speaker 1: the paradigm is changed, were starting to take off, and 255 00:14:02,320 --> 00:14:05,559 Speaker 1: people associated that with commodities. So we we moved into 256 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:07,320 Speaker 1: a world where you know, China was going to take 257 00:14:07,360 --> 00:14:10,199 Speaker 1: over that We're gonna eat all our commodities, uh and 258 00:14:10,679 --> 00:14:13,880 Speaker 1: mL dousing way and uh, therefore you had to own it. 259 00:14:13,920 --> 00:14:17,480 Speaker 1: So as consultants were peddling the story about diversifying through 260 00:14:17,559 --> 00:14:21,280 Speaker 1: commodities as an asset class, commodities were going up. And 261 00:14:21,320 --> 00:14:25,600 Speaker 1: when guys are pitched a story about an asset class 262 00:14:25,640 --> 00:14:28,240 Speaker 1: that's going up rapidly, it makes them want to get 263 00:14:28,240 --> 00:14:31,000 Speaker 1: more involved faster. So we we kind of had this 264 00:14:31,480 --> 00:14:35,320 Speaker 1: boom in investment speculation whatever you want to call it, 265 00:14:35,760 --> 00:14:38,520 Speaker 1: in in commodities from two thousand and three until really 266 00:14:38,600 --> 00:14:41,000 Speaker 1: until two thousand and you could argue two thousand and eleven, 267 00:14:41,520 --> 00:14:45,000 Speaker 1: um and Mark, I want to interrupt you real quickly. 268 00:14:45,160 --> 00:14:47,560 Speaker 1: We're gonna do something. I want to do something really special. 269 00:14:47,680 --> 00:14:52,320 Speaker 1: So for listeners, we are recording this episode on August 270 00:14:52,480 --> 00:14:58,240 Speaker 1: four in the morning. It's am on a Friday. That 271 00:14:58,280 --> 00:15:03,240 Speaker 1: means we're about, let's just under four minutes away from 272 00:15:03,440 --> 00:15:06,200 Speaker 1: the monthly non farm payrolls report, which is of course 273 00:15:06,560 --> 00:15:09,800 Speaker 1: the most important economic data point of the month. So 274 00:15:09,800 --> 00:15:12,200 Speaker 1: we're gonna do something a little different. We're gonna take 275 00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:15,440 Speaker 1: a little interlude from the podcast. Will return to the 276 00:15:15,520 --> 00:15:19,120 Speaker 1: lessons in a moment, but we are going to talk 277 00:15:19,480 --> 00:15:22,280 Speaker 1: through the jobs report as it comes out, because I 278 00:15:22,280 --> 00:15:25,160 Speaker 1: think this is very exciting, the chance to be talking 279 00:15:25,200 --> 00:15:30,120 Speaker 1: to a sort of experienced macro trader about a report 280 00:15:30,360 --> 00:15:33,400 Speaker 1: as it's coming out. It's coming out in um just 281 00:15:33,560 --> 00:15:36,840 Speaker 1: over three minutes now, and so we'll look at the data, 282 00:15:36,960 --> 00:15:39,120 Speaker 1: we'll talk about it, we'll talk about the market reaction. 283 00:15:39,240 --> 00:15:42,400 Speaker 1: People will get this snapshot of how you see things, 284 00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:44,720 Speaker 1: how you interpret the data, and then of course we 285 00:15:44,840 --> 00:15:48,040 Speaker 1: can come back to it. But ahead of the data, 286 00:15:48,080 --> 00:15:50,120 Speaker 1: we just about a little less than three minutes. You 287 00:15:50,160 --> 00:15:52,760 Speaker 1: have any sort of early thoughts about the data, I 288 00:15:52,800 --> 00:15:57,280 Speaker 1: should just note the economists are looking for k jobs 289 00:15:57,360 --> 00:16:00,360 Speaker 1: for July, the unemployment rates to fall to four point 290 00:16:00,360 --> 00:16:04,080 Speaker 1: three percent, and two point four percent wage growth. What 291 00:16:04,120 --> 00:16:06,760 Speaker 1: are you looking at in the minutes ahead of the release. Well, 292 00:16:07,200 --> 00:16:08,840 Speaker 1: the way I tend to approach these things is I 293 00:16:08,880 --> 00:16:10,880 Speaker 1: look at where the areas in which the market is 294 00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:14,280 Speaker 1: heavily positioned, what are the trends that have been working uh, 295 00:16:14,280 --> 00:16:17,480 Speaker 1: and what kind of data would would be required to 296 00:16:17,960 --> 00:16:21,600 Speaker 1: trigger either a shakeout or reversal of these Of the 297 00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:24,040 Speaker 1: of the recent trends, and the biggest recent trend has 298 00:16:24,160 --> 00:16:28,000 Speaker 1: has been short dollar, both against the funding currencies like 299 00:16:28,040 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 1: the euro and the pound UH and swissy UH, and 300 00:16:31,960 --> 00:16:35,520 Speaker 1: against the risk currencies for emerging markets have done quite well. 301 00:16:35,800 --> 00:16:38,960 Speaker 1: The answer antipodeans in New Zealand and the Key. We 302 00:16:39,000 --> 00:16:41,400 Speaker 1: are always somewhere in the middle between those two the 303 00:16:41,480 --> 00:16:44,960 Speaker 1: two camps. But because dollar has been on a on 304 00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:46,520 Speaker 1: a run in in a negative way, I'm going to 305 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:49,240 Speaker 1: call it that. It wouldn't take much one data, one 306 00:16:49,280 --> 00:16:53,520 Speaker 1: strong number could could trigger a shakeout that could last 307 00:16:53,560 --> 00:16:55,480 Speaker 1: a day or two or three or a week or whatever. 308 00:16:55,520 --> 00:16:57,280 Speaker 1: I still think the longer term trends for the dollar 309 00:16:57,720 --> 00:17:00,600 Speaker 1: is down because we're in that phase of the cycle. 310 00:17:01,000 --> 00:17:04,879 Speaker 1: You know, the US has recovered, valuations are fairly full. 311 00:17:05,200 --> 00:17:07,480 Speaker 1: Let's move further out the risk of the spectrum to 312 00:17:07,520 --> 00:17:10,400 Speaker 1: places that haven't been fully fished out, and that's where 313 00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:13,800 Speaker 1: people that's why people have gravitated to emerging markets in Europe. Tracy, 314 00:17:13,880 --> 00:17:15,840 Speaker 1: are you excited about the number we're about to get 315 00:17:15,840 --> 00:17:18,720 Speaker 1: in less than sixty seconds? I'm very curious to hear 316 00:17:19,280 --> 00:17:22,520 Speaker 1: Mark's sort of play by play, a minute by minute analysis. 317 00:17:22,600 --> 00:17:25,360 Speaker 1: Mark really really quickly, because it's less than a minute. Now, 318 00:17:25,600 --> 00:17:29,119 Speaker 1: would you try to trade around the immediate jobs report 319 00:17:29,240 --> 00:17:31,399 Speaker 1: or do you just try to, you know, think about 320 00:17:31,440 --> 00:17:34,359 Speaker 1: the implications for your portfolio. It depends on what I'm 321 00:17:34,400 --> 00:17:36,359 Speaker 1: what I'm thinking. If there's a situation where the position 322 00:17:36,480 --> 00:17:38,960 Speaker 1: is really offside and I don't think it would take 323 00:17:39,040 --> 00:17:42,320 Speaker 1: much to trigger a reversal, I might drive something. Often. 324 00:17:42,359 --> 00:17:45,440 Speaker 1: I like to see the market react before jumping in 325 00:17:45,640 --> 00:17:47,800 Speaker 1: if it's a trade. I also do investments, which is 326 00:17:47,800 --> 00:17:50,680 Speaker 1: a different different story, but from the trading side, I can. 327 00:17:50,840 --> 00:17:53,040 Speaker 1: I can be active right now. I have some short 328 00:17:53,040 --> 00:17:55,440 Speaker 1: dollar positions. I've paired back a little bit to get 329 00:17:55,440 --> 00:17:56,960 Speaker 1: my size and right make sure I don't get hurt. 330 00:17:56,960 --> 00:17:59,400 Speaker 1: I've had a nice run. Here we go, numbers out, 331 00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:03,879 Speaker 1: O Wow, two hundred nine K jobs so that's a 332 00:18:03,920 --> 00:18:07,840 Speaker 1: beat versus eighty k last month. Last month revised up 333 00:18:07,840 --> 00:18:10,119 Speaker 1: from two twenty two to to thirty one case of 334 00:18:10,240 --> 00:18:13,879 Speaker 1: very nice. Unemployment rate falls to four point three percent 335 00:18:14,040 --> 00:18:17,520 Speaker 1: from four point four percent. That's in line with expectations. 336 00:18:17,600 --> 00:18:22,400 Speaker 1: And UH average really earnings growth at two point five percent, 337 00:18:22,880 --> 00:18:25,159 Speaker 1: that's a little bit ahead of the expectations of two 338 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:28,640 Speaker 1: point four percent. And the labor force participation rate, which 339 00:18:28,680 --> 00:18:30,359 Speaker 1: is many people would argue has been one of the 340 00:18:30,720 --> 00:18:34,320 Speaker 1: weak spots of concerning long term trend up to sixty 341 00:18:34,320 --> 00:18:36,959 Speaker 1: two point nine percent. We are seeing rates pick up, 342 00:18:37,000 --> 00:18:40,120 Speaker 1: tenure yield a little bit higher, not dramatically, from two 343 00:18:40,119 --> 00:18:42,760 Speaker 1: point to three to two point to five percent. Mark 344 00:18:42,800 --> 00:18:44,720 Speaker 1: give us your take. So I take is this is 345 00:18:44,720 --> 00:18:47,520 Speaker 1: that kind of shakeout the bondswork position and short dollars 346 00:18:47,520 --> 00:18:49,480 Speaker 1: were position, so now we get we get a test 347 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:51,840 Speaker 1: of that shakeout. These aren't massively strong numbers, but they're 348 00:18:51,880 --> 00:18:54,440 Speaker 1: definitely stronger than what people were looking for. I think 349 00:18:54,440 --> 00:18:57,600 Speaker 1: what will stand out at average hourly earnings that that's up. 350 00:18:57,640 --> 00:19:01,800 Speaker 1: People have been very sensitive to labor labor inflation here, um, 351 00:19:02,000 --> 00:19:06,120 Speaker 1: so all the all everything is skewed towards stronger than expected, 352 00:19:06,160 --> 00:19:08,840 Speaker 1: but not massively. So so this is a decent test 353 00:19:09,440 --> 00:19:12,680 Speaker 1: for the short dollar thesis and for the long bond thesis. 354 00:19:13,800 --> 00:19:15,000 Speaker 1: What I would do in a case and what I 355 00:19:15,000 --> 00:19:16,359 Speaker 1: will do in a case like this, I just stand 356 00:19:16,359 --> 00:19:18,560 Speaker 1: back and let it play out. And if I want 357 00:19:18,600 --> 00:19:20,920 Speaker 1: to add to my positions, I wait until I think 358 00:19:21,080 --> 00:19:24,600 Speaker 1: that this shakeout is over. But it's really the thing 359 00:19:24,640 --> 00:19:26,680 Speaker 1: you have to feel your way through. You never know. 360 00:19:26,960 --> 00:19:29,960 Speaker 1: I mean, this is a behavioral animal, this market, and 361 00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:32,480 Speaker 1: you have to stand back and and and watch it 362 00:19:32,520 --> 00:19:34,639 Speaker 1: and see how it plays out, and look for correlations 363 00:19:34,680 --> 00:19:38,800 Speaker 1: breaking down, and look for weakness and in volume and 364 00:19:38,920 --> 00:19:41,760 Speaker 1: other signs that the story is getting tired before trying 365 00:19:41,760 --> 00:19:43,960 Speaker 1: to take it on. So, Mark, I think you mentioned 366 00:19:43,960 --> 00:19:46,560 Speaker 1: that you had some short dollar positions. Would this be 367 00:19:46,680 --> 00:19:50,080 Speaker 1: enough for you to reconsider those No, particularly in the 368 00:19:50,080 --> 00:19:53,080 Speaker 1: emerging markets, where my positions are more important. Because even 369 00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:56,240 Speaker 1: though this is so, I mentioned earlier the distinction between 370 00:19:56,320 --> 00:19:59,720 Speaker 1: risk currencies and and and funding currencies. This is bad 371 00:19:59,760 --> 00:20:02,560 Speaker 1: for the funding currencies, but not necessarily bad for the 372 00:20:02,600 --> 00:20:06,960 Speaker 1: emerging markets because strong U S data, uh, it's good 373 00:20:06,960 --> 00:20:09,400 Speaker 1: for risk in a certain sence. You see, equity markets 374 00:20:09,440 --> 00:20:13,080 Speaker 1: aren't down right so the risky currencies trade off of 375 00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:15,439 Speaker 1: risk and the trade off of bonds, whereas the funding 376 00:20:15,440 --> 00:20:18,840 Speaker 1: currencies trade mostly off of bonds. And to your point 377 00:20:19,000 --> 00:20:23,119 Speaker 1: about you know, sort of US equities, we mentioned that 378 00:20:23,160 --> 00:20:25,639 Speaker 1: all the dollar is up, rates were up, but we 379 00:20:25,680 --> 00:20:29,919 Speaker 1: haven't seen a sell off in US futures at this moment. 380 00:20:29,960 --> 00:20:34,720 Speaker 1: We still see risk assets rising up, not not much out. 381 00:20:34,840 --> 00:20:36,959 Speaker 1: So you know the which if you were to take 382 00:20:36,960 --> 00:20:38,760 Speaker 1: a maquar ree from all of this, you would say, Okay, 383 00:20:38,840 --> 00:20:40,480 Speaker 1: people say the numbers a little bit stronger, but it's 384 00:20:40,480 --> 00:20:42,320 Speaker 1: not going to change the FEDS terminal rate which has 385 00:20:42,320 --> 00:20:44,720 Speaker 1: been coming down. Right, It's not going to make rate 386 00:20:44,760 --> 00:20:47,919 Speaker 1: hikes come that much sooner necessarily, but it might not 387 00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:50,840 Speaker 1: be dubbish forever the way people have been had been 388 00:20:50,840 --> 00:20:54,360 Speaker 1: pricing in. So it's a modestly strong number that we'll 389 00:20:54,359 --> 00:20:56,720 Speaker 1: shake some people out of their funding currency shorts. I 390 00:20:56,720 --> 00:21:00,400 Speaker 1: would suspect the Japanese en um is a on one. 391 00:21:00,800 --> 00:21:03,800 Speaker 1: Euro is another that's had a nice run, But I 392 00:21:03,840 --> 00:21:06,320 Speaker 1: don't think it's going to hit the emerging markets that hard. 393 00:21:07,000 --> 00:21:09,760 Speaker 1: One of the fears in emergency markets emerging markets has 394 00:21:09,840 --> 00:21:12,680 Speaker 1: been that, you know, the FED will have to raise rates, 395 00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:14,680 Speaker 1: and we know when raising when they when they raise rates, 396 00:21:14,680 --> 00:21:17,120 Speaker 1: it hurts emerging markets. I think that's a backwards looking view. 397 00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:19,600 Speaker 1: In fact, one of the points and in the blog 398 00:21:19,720 --> 00:21:23,200 Speaker 1: was emerging markets are structurally UH different. Now. I don't 399 00:21:23,240 --> 00:21:25,200 Speaker 1: think that the Fed's gonna raise rates all that much, 400 00:21:25,200 --> 00:21:27,320 Speaker 1: first of all, but more importantly, even if they did, 401 00:21:27,640 --> 00:21:30,040 Speaker 1: the emerging markets are in a much better position to 402 00:21:30,119 --> 00:21:33,440 Speaker 1: weather it because they have a lot less dollar denominated 403 00:21:33,520 --> 00:21:36,679 Speaker 1: debt hanging over hanging over their heads, particularly the sovereigns 404 00:21:37,040 --> 00:21:39,080 Speaker 1: UH then then used to be then used to be 405 00:21:39,119 --> 00:21:41,000 Speaker 1: the case, so it shouldn't be too bad for her. 406 00:21:41,080 --> 00:21:42,400 Speaker 1: And if you look at the Mexican page, so it's 407 00:21:42,400 --> 00:21:45,800 Speaker 1: still up on the day, the Brazilian realities flat for 408 00:21:45,800 --> 00:21:49,760 Speaker 1: for for so far in the futures UH. The ones 409 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:53,360 Speaker 1: getting hit and not even massively is the euro UH 410 00:21:53,359 --> 00:21:56,760 Speaker 1: and UH and the pound and the end right the 411 00:21:57,240 --> 00:22:00,439 Speaker 1: funding currency. So this is a pretty good number. We 412 00:22:00,480 --> 00:22:02,920 Speaker 1: want to see the economy continued. We've had some week 413 00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:06,080 Speaker 1: data here and there. UM. It's also worth noting that 414 00:22:06,119 --> 00:22:09,359 Speaker 1: the last last month stuff got got revised, revised stuff 415 00:22:09,359 --> 00:22:11,800 Speaker 1: a little bit, so that's not bad. So you know, 416 00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:14,159 Speaker 1: we've had some soft stuff with the autos and other areas. 417 00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:17,159 Speaker 1: And uh, it's it's nice to see a little a 418 00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:19,320 Speaker 1: little counterweights to that. But this doesn't nothing, and this 419 00:22:19,359 --> 00:22:23,120 Speaker 1: doesn't anything earth shaking. Uh, this isn't something's gonna it's 420 00:22:23,119 --> 00:22:27,639 Speaker 1: gonna rock our worlds. Let's return to the lessons we 421 00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:29,920 Speaker 1: all should have learned, Tracy, do you want to pick 422 00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:34,239 Speaker 1: another lesson from Mark's list for us to go? I 423 00:22:34,280 --> 00:22:36,920 Speaker 1: was going to ask the oil question. Yeah, we'll get okay, 424 00:22:37,000 --> 00:22:38,919 Speaker 1: let me I'll finis to the commodities and then come 425 00:22:38,920 --> 00:22:42,800 Speaker 1: onto oil. So the trading was enabled to trying to 426 00:22:42,840 --> 00:22:45,119 Speaker 1: trading was enabled. The asset class was being pitched as 427 00:22:45,119 --> 00:22:48,239 Speaker 1: a diversifier. At the same time, emerging markets were kind 428 00:22:48,240 --> 00:22:50,840 Speaker 1: of plugging into the grid, and this led to a 429 00:22:50,920 --> 00:22:53,879 Speaker 1: lot of enthusiasm and commodities at the beginning. You know, 430 00:22:53,880 --> 00:22:57,320 Speaker 1: if you go back and that point in time, the 431 00:22:58,280 --> 00:23:02,879 Speaker 1: breakdown and people trading oil, for example, was uh, you know, 432 00:23:04,160 --> 00:23:08,080 Speaker 1: the people were financial, uh, and seventy of the people 433 00:23:08,119 --> 00:23:10,800 Speaker 1: were commercial. That is to say, they were hedging either 434 00:23:11,040 --> 00:23:16,000 Speaker 1: their needs for for oil or their production of oil. 435 00:23:16,359 --> 00:23:19,840 Speaker 1: Now that numbers roughly reversed. It's like the people involved 436 00:23:19,840 --> 00:23:23,520 Speaker 1: in oil are trading it and are the commercial guys 437 00:23:23,600 --> 00:23:26,600 Speaker 1: just because there's so many more people have gotten involved 438 00:23:26,680 --> 00:23:30,439 Speaker 1: over over the years, and that means that the asset 439 00:23:30,520 --> 00:23:32,720 Speaker 1: is gonna be wilder, it's gonna do crazier things, it's 440 00:23:32,720 --> 00:23:36,320 Speaker 1: gonna be left linked to fundamentals for longer periods of time. Uh. 441 00:23:36,320 --> 00:23:38,159 Speaker 1: And I think we've we've we've seen a lot of that. 442 00:23:38,480 --> 00:23:41,000 Speaker 1: And the extremes have feedback effects, you know, the the 443 00:23:41,080 --> 00:23:44,359 Speaker 1: extreme buying of oil, a lot of which interestingly was 444 00:23:44,359 --> 00:23:46,520 Speaker 1: blamed on low FED rates. Even though we we got 445 00:23:46,560 --> 00:23:49,000 Speaker 1: two hundred fifty dollars in barrel with FED funds five 446 00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:51,639 Speaker 1: percent back in two thousand and whatever thou eight or 447 00:23:51,680 --> 00:23:57,840 Speaker 1: so um. Uh, it's lead to are incentivized. A lot 448 00:23:57,880 --> 00:24:00,719 Speaker 1: of the shale production was coming on online because they 449 00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:03,200 Speaker 1: didn't care about interest rates, these guys because they were 450 00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:05,679 Speaker 1: looking to make fortyfold on their investment. And if you 451 00:24:05,680 --> 00:24:07,520 Speaker 1: want to make forty fold in your investment, if you 452 00:24:07,520 --> 00:24:10,280 Speaker 1: don't care if you're funding rates, three and seven is 453 00:24:10,320 --> 00:24:13,399 Speaker 1: the same number, right. Uh. They were borrowing because the 454 00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:15,639 Speaker 1: price of oil was high, and it went to a 455 00:24:15,720 --> 00:24:18,240 Speaker 1: much higher rate than ever otherwise would have been the case. 456 00:24:18,800 --> 00:24:23,000 Speaker 1: Because of the amount of speculation UH and investment in 457 00:24:23,040 --> 00:24:25,560 Speaker 1: commodities as as a theme. So I think that's a 458 00:24:25,600 --> 00:24:27,680 Speaker 1: super important point. The second important point to make about 459 00:24:27,680 --> 00:24:32,520 Speaker 1: commodities is that over time we find ways, technology finds ways. 460 00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:36,400 Speaker 1: The substitute for commodity consumption. Our oil consumption, and this 461 00:24:36,840 --> 00:24:41,120 Speaker 1: relates to the oil point is one in the home 462 00:24:41,520 --> 00:24:45,800 Speaker 1: home homeowner basket is one less than a half of 463 00:24:45,800 --> 00:24:49,080 Speaker 1: what it was in the in the eighties. Our consumption 464 00:24:49,119 --> 00:24:52,080 Speaker 1: of oil UH is less than half of what it 465 00:24:52,160 --> 00:24:55,120 Speaker 1: used to be UH in the household level. And that's 466 00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:57,240 Speaker 1: true of all commodities to some degree. People don't have 467 00:24:57,280 --> 00:24:59,840 Speaker 1: gold teeth, people don't use copper as much as that 468 00:25:00,080 --> 00:25:03,640 Speaker 1: is to over time we find substitution UM the things 469 00:25:03,680 --> 00:25:07,119 Speaker 1: to substitute for our commodity consumption because it's cleaner, because 470 00:25:07,119 --> 00:25:11,040 Speaker 1: it's cheaper, because it's better UH, and commodities should go 471 00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:14,840 Speaker 1: down in real terms over time. Right, So you have, 472 00:25:14,880 --> 00:25:17,880 Speaker 1: on the one hand, speculation that leads to larger swings 473 00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:20,560 Speaker 1: that have predominantly been to the upside over the past 474 00:25:20,880 --> 00:25:25,360 Speaker 1: fifteen years, and you have less of a fundamental UH driver. Yes, 475 00:25:25,359 --> 00:25:27,080 Speaker 1: you have the emerging markets plugging into the grid, and 476 00:25:27,119 --> 00:25:29,600 Speaker 1: they're less less commodity efficient. But I met you the 477 00:25:29,600 --> 00:25:32,119 Speaker 1: new houses in China are using PVC and not copper 478 00:25:32,440 --> 00:25:35,200 Speaker 1: for the most part when when they're being built out. Yeah, 479 00:25:35,240 --> 00:25:38,960 Speaker 1: to some extent, human progress is the story of making 480 00:25:39,040 --> 00:25:42,120 Speaker 1: fewer commodities to maintain the standard. In a very real way. 481 00:25:42,200 --> 00:25:44,600 Speaker 1: It's kind of the inverse of commodities, kind of the 482 00:25:44,600 --> 00:25:49,400 Speaker 1: inverse of technology, right, shorten commodities are it's a uh 483 00:25:49,520 --> 00:25:53,000 Speaker 1: pro technology that. Now you know the case with oil 484 00:25:53,280 --> 00:25:57,119 Speaker 1: if you remember, you know people were saying when oil 485 00:25:57,160 --> 00:25:59,880 Speaker 1: fell dramatically from over two thousand and fourteen and two 486 00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:04,320 Speaker 1: US and fifteen. Uh, they said, oh, this is really bad. 487 00:26:04,359 --> 00:26:07,080 Speaker 1: This is first of all, it was misdiagnosed as demand. People. 488 00:26:07,280 --> 00:26:09,040 Speaker 1: One of the mistakes that we make in markets is 489 00:26:09,080 --> 00:26:12,920 Speaker 1: we read way too much fundamental information uh to two 490 00:26:12,920 --> 00:26:16,199 Speaker 1: moves to price moves. So people were saying, oh, no, 491 00:26:16,280 --> 00:26:18,000 Speaker 1: this isn't demand story. The US is going to have 492 00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:21,119 Speaker 1: a recession, etcetera, etcetera. But it was a lot of 493 00:26:21,160 --> 00:26:23,359 Speaker 1: guys that got the shale producers and other guys that 494 00:26:23,440 --> 00:26:25,840 Speaker 1: got excited about a high price of oil, and they 495 00:26:25,840 --> 00:26:30,280 Speaker 1: got caught. They got caught out speculating. Now, the people 496 00:26:30,320 --> 00:26:34,720 Speaker 1: who were bullish, uh, of the US economy in general. 497 00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:37,720 Speaker 1: We're saying, gospel oil falling is gonna be really good 498 00:26:37,720 --> 00:26:41,480 Speaker 1: for the consumer, and I was making the point, uh, 499 00:26:41,640 --> 00:26:44,160 Speaker 1: quite strongly, that it won't help very much because it's 500 00:26:44,160 --> 00:26:47,159 Speaker 1: become such a small share of our overall basket. The 501 00:26:47,320 --> 00:26:52,320 Speaker 1: oil intensity of our GDP has declined significantly over the 502 00:26:52,320 --> 00:26:55,520 Speaker 1: past twenty or thirty years. So it just doesn't matter. Uh, 503 00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:57,320 Speaker 1: it just doesn't matter so much. It's not going to 504 00:26:57,440 --> 00:26:58,800 Speaker 1: turn that. It's not going to turn the dial. And 505 00:26:58,800 --> 00:27:02,359 Speaker 1: in fact it didn't in the same way, it didn't 506 00:27:02,440 --> 00:27:05,560 Speaker 1: hurt consumption very much when it with you know, up 507 00:27:05,560 --> 00:27:09,119 Speaker 1: to a hundred hundred and fifty. So as oil becomes 508 00:27:09,119 --> 00:27:12,879 Speaker 1: a smaller share of of our consumption, it's oscillations are 509 00:27:12,920 --> 00:27:15,359 Speaker 1: are are going to help us less? Help us and 510 00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:18,200 Speaker 1: hurt us less and less. The real problem is people, 511 00:27:18,520 --> 00:27:20,600 Speaker 1: you know, in markets, we say we look at something 512 00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:22,760 Speaker 1: new and have to process it, and we look backwards 513 00:27:22,760 --> 00:27:25,800 Speaker 1: first and say, what looks vaguely similar to this in history? 514 00:27:26,200 --> 00:27:27,879 Speaker 1: And the first thing that they they'll find when they 515 00:27:27,880 --> 00:27:32,000 Speaker 1: look back in oil and consumption is the early eighties 516 00:27:32,000 --> 00:27:34,719 Speaker 1: and the late seventies, and those data and they end 517 00:27:34,760 --> 00:27:38,800 Speaker 1: up anchoring on that reality and those coefficients no longer 518 00:27:38,840 --> 00:27:42,800 Speaker 1: obtained for the reasons uh we just discussed. So Mark 519 00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:46,520 Speaker 1: is very energetically and very eloquently connecting all the dots 520 00:27:46,640 --> 00:27:50,560 Speaker 1: in all his lessons for post crisis investors. So let 521 00:27:50,560 --> 00:27:52,400 Speaker 1: me see if I can get in there with one 522 00:27:52,440 --> 00:27:54,840 Speaker 1: more that I think is connected to all of this. 523 00:27:55,040 --> 00:27:58,520 Speaker 1: And that's your very first lesson about potential growth and 524 00:27:58,520 --> 00:28:04,240 Speaker 1: developed economies being lower than it was before the crisis. Well, 525 00:28:04,359 --> 00:28:07,479 Speaker 1: go back to the ear the early eighties, and we 526 00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:11,000 Speaker 1: had a situation where we have four factors really that 527 00:28:11,040 --> 00:28:15,080 Speaker 1: we're driving growth in a really positive way, creating significant 528 00:28:15,080 --> 00:28:19,040 Speaker 1: pail winds. One with demography, baby boomers were plugging into 529 00:28:19,080 --> 00:28:23,040 Speaker 1: the grid. Uh. And the labor force was growing at 530 00:28:23,040 --> 00:28:26,600 Speaker 1: a rapid rate. And as we know, your potential potential 531 00:28:26,640 --> 00:28:28,800 Speaker 1: growth is a function of the growth in your labor 532 00:28:28,840 --> 00:28:31,840 Speaker 1: force and a productivity number. You know, how productive that 533 00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:34,199 Speaker 1: labor in the capital that you bring in with it is. 534 00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:36,840 Speaker 1: So that was going for us. On top of that, 535 00:28:37,200 --> 00:28:40,520 Speaker 1: we had a secular factor of women joining the working 536 00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:43,840 Speaker 1: the workforce. That's kind of a one off. Now women 537 00:28:43,920 --> 00:28:45,560 Speaker 1: can join it, come, you know, they can join and 538 00:28:45,600 --> 00:28:49,040 Speaker 1: they can uh and leave just like a men used to. 539 00:28:49,160 --> 00:28:52,160 Speaker 1: But at that time female participation in labor force was 540 00:28:52,160 --> 00:28:54,640 Speaker 1: was very low, and they spent the eighties and nineties 541 00:28:54,680 --> 00:28:58,080 Speaker 1: coming on online. I think it peaked in probably or 542 00:28:58,160 --> 00:29:00,880 Speaker 1: ninety seven or ninety nine according to the artistics. So 543 00:29:00,960 --> 00:29:03,960 Speaker 1: it became normalized then. So it is what it is. 544 00:29:04,000 --> 00:29:07,000 Speaker 1: It oscillates with with everything else. But over that period 545 00:29:07,040 --> 00:29:09,720 Speaker 1: when they were coming in, it created effectively a growth 546 00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:14,200 Speaker 1: uh in the labor force much faster than what the 547 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:17,600 Speaker 1: actual labor force growth suggested. So that was another tale wind. 548 00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:20,360 Speaker 1: On top of that, very powerfully, we had a decline 549 00:29:20,360 --> 00:29:23,320 Speaker 1: in interest rates and a decline in inflation. Remember the 550 00:29:23,360 --> 00:29:27,200 Speaker 1: eighties had a very high inflation, uh. And that means 551 00:29:27,240 --> 00:29:29,800 Speaker 1: that people had clean balance sheets. No one had borrowed 552 00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:34,000 Speaker 1: anything because the rates were just too high and we 553 00:29:34,040 --> 00:29:37,040 Speaker 1: could borrow, so people borrow more. When rates come down, 554 00:29:37,080 --> 00:29:40,800 Speaker 1: people borrow more. When inflation is more is more stable, 555 00:29:41,080 --> 00:29:43,120 Speaker 1: and when people don't have any debt on the balance sheets. 556 00:29:43,160 --> 00:29:45,760 Speaker 1: And then the fourth point is we adopted with Reagan 557 00:29:46,120 --> 00:29:49,720 Speaker 1: deregulatory mindset. And you know, people complain a lot about regulation. 558 00:29:49,760 --> 00:29:52,480 Speaker 1: I mean people always do, but uh, you know lately, 559 00:29:52,480 --> 00:29:54,600 Speaker 1: it's been a boogeyman for a lot of things, but 560 00:29:55,480 --> 00:29:58,520 Speaker 1: people forget that back in the seventies, we had real obstacles. 561 00:29:58,920 --> 00:30:03,000 Speaker 1: We uh, really regulatory obstacles. There were price controls, there 562 00:30:03,000 --> 00:30:05,640 Speaker 1: were wage controls. We were rationing gasoline. We had to 563 00:30:05,640 --> 00:30:08,080 Speaker 1: buy every other day depending on your license plate. I mean, 564 00:30:08,080 --> 00:30:09,720 Speaker 1: you guys are probably too young to remember this, but 565 00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:12,120 Speaker 1: I was a little boy. I remember waiting with my dad, uh, 566 00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:15,400 Speaker 1: you know, in line for to buy to buy guests. 567 00:30:15,520 --> 00:30:18,720 Speaker 1: So we had a lot of the relationship between labor 568 00:30:18,720 --> 00:30:21,320 Speaker 1: and capital was very different, so they need to regulatory 569 00:30:21,360 --> 00:30:24,360 Speaker 1: mindset led to a lot of financial innovation. Consumers and 570 00:30:24,400 --> 00:30:26,920 Speaker 1: businesses had clean balance sheets so we can borrow. So 571 00:30:26,960 --> 00:30:31,360 Speaker 1: you had rapid credit deepening along with these labor force phenomena. 572 00:30:31,800 --> 00:30:34,320 Speaker 1: Let the really rapid growth that kind of ended, or 573 00:30:34,320 --> 00:30:37,400 Speaker 1: at least the demographic portions slowed down by the end 574 00:30:37,440 --> 00:30:40,600 Speaker 1: of the of the nineties and stopped being a tail wind. 575 00:30:41,280 --> 00:30:44,640 Speaker 1: The credit, though, continue to deepen, and so we didn't 576 00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:49,320 Speaker 1: see the underlying weakness in demography because we had this 577 00:30:49,400 --> 00:30:51,400 Speaker 1: credit deepening for a long time, giving us this and 578 00:30:51,520 --> 00:30:53,600 Speaker 1: you know, we had stagnating income. But it didn't feel 579 00:30:53,600 --> 00:30:55,520 Speaker 1: like that because everybody could borrow. We were getting more 580 00:30:55,560 --> 00:30:59,000 Speaker 1: credit cards and we were buying uh cars and houses 581 00:30:59,040 --> 00:31:03,040 Speaker 1: and and everything on credit. So that papered over. Um. 582 00:31:03,040 --> 00:31:06,960 Speaker 1: Really the change in the in the demographic headwinds that 583 00:31:07,080 --> 00:31:09,520 Speaker 1: all got exposed when the when the when the GFC 584 00:31:10,400 --> 00:31:13,840 Speaker 1: hit us. Uh, that crisis meant, okay, the credit machine, 585 00:31:13,880 --> 00:31:16,200 Speaker 1: the credit tail wind is done. It's over. Now it's 586 00:31:16,200 --> 00:31:20,520 Speaker 1: a headwind. So now we've uncovered the demographic weakness and 587 00:31:20,640 --> 00:31:24,280 Speaker 1: we have a credit headwind. Uh. This is labor force 588 00:31:24,360 --> 00:31:26,080 Speaker 1: is growing at a slower rate. We don't have the 589 00:31:26,080 --> 00:31:29,360 Speaker 1: benefit of women structurally coming into the labor force. Uh 590 00:31:29,400 --> 00:31:32,640 Speaker 1: and uh, we no longer have the credit machine on. 591 00:31:33,040 --> 00:31:35,120 Speaker 1: That's why we have to grow lower. So at first 592 00:31:35,360 --> 00:31:38,120 Speaker 1: after the crisis, it was cyclical. We had to work 593 00:31:38,120 --> 00:31:40,240 Speaker 1: our way out from the credit boom and the typical 594 00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:43,080 Speaker 1: cyclical problems. But on top of that, we structurally have 595 00:31:43,120 --> 00:31:45,000 Speaker 1: a slower growth rate. And this is what you know 596 00:31:45,040 --> 00:31:47,920 Speaker 1: Mohammed Hilarion calls the new normal and what at the 597 00:31:47,920 --> 00:31:50,600 Speaker 1: same actually around the same time, I was referring to 598 00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:54,080 Speaker 1: it as reversion to a different meed back at my firm. 599 00:31:54,080 --> 00:31:58,080 Speaker 1: But it's the same phenomenon, UH, and recognizing this has 600 00:31:58,120 --> 00:32:02,080 Speaker 1: been super important. UH. Policymakers always want to believe they 601 00:32:02,080 --> 00:32:04,760 Speaker 1: can do more uh to change the growth break than 602 00:32:04,760 --> 00:32:06,640 Speaker 1: they can because that's what they have to sell. Right. 603 00:32:07,040 --> 00:32:10,600 Speaker 1: Both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump were promising four percent growth, 604 00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:13,280 Speaker 1: different ways to get there, but that's what they were promising. 605 00:32:13,480 --> 00:32:16,280 Speaker 1: But recognizing that policy can't do that much about it, 606 00:32:16,760 --> 00:32:19,360 Speaker 1: and that all developed economies are probably going to have 607 00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:23,840 Speaker 1: the same demographic phenomenon and similar structural credit headwinds or 608 00:32:23,840 --> 00:32:26,120 Speaker 1: at least no longer the tail winds is a is 609 00:32:26,120 --> 00:32:28,720 Speaker 1: a very important observation when you're thinking globally about where 610 00:32:28,720 --> 00:32:32,240 Speaker 1: to allocate uh your risk. All Right, Mark, I'm gonna 611 00:32:32,240 --> 00:32:34,240 Speaker 1: ask you one more question, and it's going to be 612 00:32:34,280 --> 00:32:36,240 Speaker 1: really unfair because I'm going to ask you the most 613 00:32:36,280 --> 00:32:39,120 Speaker 1: controversial question. But we all we have to do like 614 00:32:39,160 --> 00:32:41,680 Speaker 1: a speed round. Okay, So I'm gonna make you we 615 00:32:41,920 --> 00:32:43,840 Speaker 1: This is a question we probably could have done a 616 00:32:43,880 --> 00:32:47,240 Speaker 1: whole episode on, but we're gonna have it's gonna have 617 00:32:47,320 --> 00:32:51,280 Speaker 1: to be very short. Number thirteen. I'm fascinated by you say. 618 00:32:51,440 --> 00:32:56,600 Speaker 1: Very few investors can disentangle their political preferences from economic analysis. 619 00:32:56,920 --> 00:33:02,000 Speaker 1: What's the story there. It's just people re Daniel cannonman. 620 00:33:02,160 --> 00:33:04,600 Speaker 1: I mean, we we get so deep into our own narratives, 621 00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:06,760 Speaker 1: and the confirmation bias is so strong. I mean, look 622 00:33:06,760 --> 00:33:10,160 Speaker 1: at how many guys became bullish when Donald Trump became president, 623 00:33:10,520 --> 00:33:12,880 Speaker 1: and how many people turned barrassed when he became president, 624 00:33:13,320 --> 00:33:16,120 Speaker 1: and how many people have objected or were fighting the 625 00:33:16,120 --> 00:33:18,360 Speaker 1: stock markets for the whole period under Obama because they 626 00:33:18,360 --> 00:33:22,200 Speaker 1: didn't like his policies. Uh, and how many people like 627 00:33:22,320 --> 00:33:25,680 Speaker 1: the policies. Right, So this is what you see, and 628 00:33:25,720 --> 00:33:27,480 Speaker 1: you see it time and time again, and the season 629 00:33:27,560 --> 00:33:29,959 Speaker 1: investor just kind of gets past that. I didn't think 630 00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:32,480 Speaker 1: Trump was gonna get elected and definitely someone I don't 631 00:33:32,560 --> 00:33:35,400 Speaker 1: I don't think is suited for the for the job. 632 00:33:35,640 --> 00:33:38,400 Speaker 1: That's my personal, my personal view. But I didn't think 633 00:33:38,400 --> 00:33:40,120 Speaker 1: he was going to cause a recession. But a lot 634 00:33:40,120 --> 00:33:41,480 Speaker 1: of guys. I saw a lot of guys fall into 635 00:33:41,480 --> 00:33:43,240 Speaker 1: that trap, and a lot of people have been embarrassed 636 00:33:43,280 --> 00:33:45,320 Speaker 1: for eight years. He saw them flip the switch and say, oh, 637 00:33:45,320 --> 00:33:47,880 Speaker 1: I'm bullish now, and they mumbled something about tax cuts 638 00:33:47,920 --> 00:33:50,440 Speaker 1: that have materialized. But we can see now in the 639 00:33:50,520 --> 00:33:52,479 Speaker 1: data that you know what really happened is we went 640 00:33:52,520 --> 00:33:56,640 Speaker 1: into the election coiled right. Everyone was ready to take risk, 641 00:33:57,160 --> 00:34:01,000 Speaker 1: and uh, it played out a little bit differently than 642 00:34:01,080 --> 00:34:04,560 Speaker 1: most people thought. But you know, the economy underlying economy 643 00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:07,320 Speaker 1: is doing okay, and the fact that Trump's policies didn't 644 00:34:07,320 --> 00:34:10,759 Speaker 1: materialize and we're still holding up is a sign that 645 00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:14,759 Speaker 1: that that things are okay. All right, Mark, phenomenal conversation. 646 00:34:14,960 --> 00:34:18,440 Speaker 1: Gotta leave it there. Uh, great talking to you. I 647 00:34:18,480 --> 00:34:21,160 Speaker 1: loved how we did that jobs report thing. That was 648 00:34:21,239 --> 00:34:23,680 Speaker 1: really cool. I feel like I learned a lot there. 649 00:34:23,920 --> 00:34:26,560 Speaker 1: Really appreciate you coming on my pleasure. It was great 650 00:34:26,560 --> 00:34:39,920 Speaker 1: talking to you guys, Tracy. I thought that was really fun. 651 00:34:40,120 --> 00:34:44,839 Speaker 1: Mark obviously knows way more about so many things than 652 00:34:45,080 --> 00:34:47,680 Speaker 1: you know, sort of we do, or even a lot 653 00:34:47,719 --> 00:34:51,560 Speaker 1: of uh, you know, typical people in finance do. I 654 00:34:51,560 --> 00:34:54,319 Speaker 1: thought that was a pretty cool conversation. Yeah, And I 655 00:34:54,360 --> 00:34:57,680 Speaker 1: thought the way he put this idea of um sort 656 00:34:57,719 --> 00:35:00,799 Speaker 1: of the financial world and the real economy running at 657 00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:03,680 Speaker 1: two different speeds. The way he framed that is really 658 00:35:03,680 --> 00:35:06,919 Speaker 1: really useful. And it kind of amazes me now that 659 00:35:07,200 --> 00:35:10,360 Speaker 1: it feels like others, and in particular the Federal Reserve, 660 00:35:10,440 --> 00:35:13,520 Speaker 1: are only just beginning to think of it in that way, 661 00:35:13,560 --> 00:35:17,200 Speaker 1: but uh, it seems like a pretty big deal. Yeah, 662 00:35:17,239 --> 00:35:20,400 Speaker 1: And I think that that's sort of like the underlying 663 00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:24,320 Speaker 1: theme of all of this, which is that human behavior. 664 00:35:24,360 --> 00:35:27,319 Speaker 1: I mean, his blog is called Behavioral Macro, and so 665 00:35:27,520 --> 00:35:31,440 Speaker 1: the sort of traditional macro ignores what he you know, 666 00:35:31,480 --> 00:35:34,200 Speaker 1: these sort of behavioral things that humans do things because 667 00:35:34,400 --> 00:35:37,319 Speaker 1: we're animals and we run in herds and we have 668 00:35:37,440 --> 00:35:41,560 Speaker 1: fear and greed that don't necessarily correspond with supply and demand. 669 00:35:41,840 --> 00:35:44,440 Speaker 1: But that trying to really like suss out which of 670 00:35:44,440 --> 00:35:47,160 Speaker 1: those uh, you know, factors are driving what has sort 671 00:35:47,200 --> 00:35:51,680 Speaker 1: of been a key aspect of understanding the post crisis period. Yeah. 672 00:35:51,719 --> 00:35:54,680 Speaker 1: And also the idea that human beings have a tendency 673 00:35:54,800 --> 00:35:59,319 Speaker 1: to cling on to um their previously understood notions of 674 00:35:59,360 --> 00:36:02,480 Speaker 1: how they were old works is really important. So, I know, 675 00:36:02,560 --> 00:36:06,879 Speaker 1: we were talking about the financial crisis anniversary coming up. 676 00:36:07,280 --> 00:36:11,280 Speaker 1: I remember when I first started writing about quantitative easing 677 00:36:11,360 --> 00:36:15,439 Speaker 1: in two thousand nine, you know, writing analysis about how 678 00:36:15,480 --> 00:36:18,839 Speaker 1: this was going to push up financial asset prices through 679 00:36:18,840 --> 00:36:22,560 Speaker 1: a substitution effect. And I remember people getting really really 680 00:36:22,640 --> 00:36:27,759 Speaker 1: outraged about that idea, And now it's just common knowledge, right. Well, 681 00:36:27,760 --> 00:36:29,960 Speaker 1: and also it's like everyone just assumed that it was 682 00:36:30,040 --> 00:36:33,440 Speaker 1: hyper inflationary, like all these sort of deep seat oh 683 00:36:33,480 --> 00:36:36,439 Speaker 1: printing money, that's gonna cause Weimar, just like all these 684 00:36:36,480 --> 00:36:38,520 Speaker 1: things that we you know, Mark refer to as like 685 00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:40,759 Speaker 1: we anchor on certain periods. So when it comes to 686 00:36:41,160 --> 00:36:44,480 Speaker 1: money creation, we might anchor on some hyper inflationary period. 687 00:36:44,520 --> 00:36:47,960 Speaker 1: When it's oil, we might think about the late seventies 688 00:36:48,280 --> 00:36:50,759 Speaker 1: and just without very little thoughts, sort of draw that 689 00:36:51,000 --> 00:36:54,840 Speaker 1: one thing we know to the current thing. And of course, uh, 690 00:36:54,920 --> 00:36:56,920 Speaker 1: you know, history is never quite the same as the 691 00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:01,319 Speaker 1: first time rove. Yeah, human beings are we weak entities 692 00:37:02,080 --> 00:37:07,080 Speaker 1: flawed And on that note, that's the perfect way to 693 00:37:07,239 --> 00:37:09,560 Speaker 1: uh you know, sort of set the stage for the 694 00:37:09,560 --> 00:37:12,600 Speaker 1: next few years. Just a reminder that we're week week 695 00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:18,160 Speaker 1: flawed entities. All right. Uh well, this has been another 696 00:37:18,200 --> 00:37:21,040 Speaker 1: episode of the All Thoughts podcast. You can follow me 697 00:37:21,200 --> 00:37:24,480 Speaker 1: on Twitter at Tracy Alloway and you can follow me 698 00:37:24,719 --> 00:37:28,040 Speaker 1: on Twitter at the Stalwart, and you can follow Mark 699 00:37:28,160 --> 00:37:31,440 Speaker 1: Dow on Twitter at Mark Dow. You should also check 700 00:37:31,440 --> 00:37:34,839 Speaker 1: out his blog marked out dot tumbler dot com and 701 00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:39,280 Speaker 1: follow our producer Sarah Patterson Sarah Pett with two teas,