1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,200 --> 00:00:26,040 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:26,200 --> 00:00:29,160 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is They called me Ben. 6 00:00:29,240 --> 00:00:32,240 Speaker 1: We are joined as always with our super producers Paul, 7 00:00:32,280 --> 00:00:37,960 Speaker 1: Mission Controlled, Decand and Alexis nicknamed tv D Jackson. Most importantly, 8 00:00:38,080 --> 00:00:41,080 Speaker 1: you are you. You are here, and that makes this 9 00:00:41,560 --> 00:00:45,360 Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know. The newest installment 10 00:00:45,440 --> 00:00:49,959 Speaker 1: in our continuing weekly listener mail segment. We are recording 11 00:00:50,000 --> 00:00:55,440 Speaker 1: this on Wednesday, July two. As we always say, since 12 00:00:55,560 --> 00:00:58,800 Speaker 1: day one, you, specifically you are the most important part 13 00:00:58,880 --> 00:01:02,040 Speaker 1: of the show. And this is when we in our 14 00:01:02,120 --> 00:01:06,600 Speaker 1: way past the microphone to you. My compatriots and I 15 00:01:06,720 --> 00:01:11,720 Speaker 1: have each selected some piece of correspondence and we wanted 16 00:01:11,760 --> 00:01:14,959 Speaker 1: to share it with each other and again, more importantly, 17 00:01:15,319 --> 00:01:18,360 Speaker 1: share it with you. So what do you think? Gents? 18 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:21,640 Speaker 1: Who's up first? Oh? I'll take this one. Just another 19 00:01:22,040 --> 00:01:25,240 Speaker 1: shout out to everyone who has been calling. We've been 20 00:01:25,280 --> 00:01:27,680 Speaker 1: hearing your messages. We are a little behind, but we're 21 00:01:27,720 --> 00:01:31,040 Speaker 1: catching up quickly with these episodes. Coming out now, so 22 00:01:31,520 --> 00:01:35,280 Speaker 1: be prepared for us to hear your message and to 23 00:01:35,319 --> 00:01:38,000 Speaker 1: get a call back maybe or to hear yourself on 24 00:01:38,000 --> 00:01:43,600 Speaker 1: one of these episodes, like our first contributor read, Hey guys, Scott, 25 00:01:44,000 --> 00:01:46,520 Speaker 1: I think I's got something for you. Look up the 26 00:01:46,600 --> 00:01:53,680 Speaker 1: name Ronald at the Y. I think you might find 27 00:01:53,800 --> 00:02:01,480 Speaker 1: an interesting got a very good luck. So that was 28 00:02:01,520 --> 00:02:03,760 Speaker 1: a bit hard to hear. What we could make out 29 00:02:04,240 --> 00:02:07,320 Speaker 1: was that this person who left us a messages name 30 00:02:07,680 --> 00:02:11,120 Speaker 1: was read and I couldn't quite make out the name 31 00:02:11,840 --> 00:02:14,840 Speaker 1: of the person that he is telling us to look up. 32 00:02:15,320 --> 00:02:18,120 Speaker 1: But just through a little bit of searching and incorrectly 33 00:02:18,200 --> 00:02:24,560 Speaker 1: spelling this person's name, we stumbled upon Ronald Hadley Stark, 34 00:02:25,320 --> 00:02:29,600 Speaker 1: a very very fascinating individual, if I say so myself. 35 00:02:30,080 --> 00:02:35,600 Speaker 1: This person also is known as John Clarence Dylan, also 36 00:02:35,680 --> 00:02:39,839 Speaker 1: known as Terence William Abbott, and he also went by 37 00:02:40,240 --> 00:02:44,679 Speaker 1: numerous other names of varying origins. At least the names 38 00:02:44,720 --> 00:02:49,400 Speaker 1: were of varying origins throughout his life, and this person appears, 39 00:02:49,480 --> 00:02:54,280 Speaker 1: at least on the surface, to have been functioning as 40 00:02:54,360 --> 00:02:59,640 Speaker 1: some kind of operative for one or more intelligence agencies. Now, 41 00:03:00,040 --> 00:03:03,960 Speaker 1: like anyone who is an agent or someone working for 42 00:03:04,040 --> 00:03:07,040 Speaker 1: an intelligence agency. They're not going to be, you know, 43 00:03:07,240 --> 00:03:10,040 Speaker 1: on the news a whole lot, probably, so you're not 44 00:03:10,080 --> 00:03:12,320 Speaker 1: going to find a whole bunch of links about this 45 00:03:12,400 --> 00:03:18,040 Speaker 1: individual giving interviews talking about what they're doing, their biography, 46 00:03:18,160 --> 00:03:20,919 Speaker 1: their background, or anything like that. But there have been 47 00:03:21,000 --> 00:03:26,600 Speaker 1: numerous publications over the years discussing this person, Ronald Stark, 48 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:29,040 Speaker 1: we'll just call him Stark. I like that a lot, 49 00:03:29,760 --> 00:03:34,280 Speaker 1: agent Stark, whatever. We honestly don't even know the capacity 50 00:03:34,280 --> 00:03:37,480 Speaker 1: at which he was functioning and exactly which agencies he 51 00:03:37,560 --> 00:03:40,120 Speaker 1: was working for, but we do know, just through some 52 00:03:40,240 --> 00:03:44,880 Speaker 1: FBI documentation, that he was working with the CIA at 53 00:03:44,960 --> 00:03:50,160 Speaker 1: some point, and he was functioning both internationally and within 54 00:03:50,360 --> 00:03:53,960 Speaker 1: the United States. It's very very interesting stuff. If you 55 00:03:54,040 --> 00:03:59,839 Speaker 1: go to archive dot org slash details slash Ronald had 56 00:04:00,080 --> 00:04:02,920 Speaker 1: LEAs Stark that's r O n A L D h 57 00:04:03,000 --> 00:04:05,200 Speaker 1: A D L E Y s t A r K, 58 00:04:05,880 --> 00:04:09,840 Speaker 1: you will be able to find several FBI documents of 59 00:04:09,960 --> 00:04:13,320 Speaker 1: background information on this guy. A lot of it has 60 00:04:13,360 --> 00:04:17,400 Speaker 1: to do with the FBI itself looking into Ronald Hadley 61 00:04:17,440 --> 00:04:20,960 Speaker 1: because he's had run ins with another agent generally of 62 00:04:21,000 --> 00:04:25,479 Speaker 1: the FBI, one run in or another, and it is 63 00:04:25,600 --> 00:04:29,240 Speaker 1: really interesting. He was charged with a whole bunch of 64 00:04:29,279 --> 00:04:32,000 Speaker 1: different crimes. According to this A lot of it had 65 00:04:32,040 --> 00:04:36,800 Speaker 1: to do with passport forgery and illegally obtaining passports. But 66 00:04:37,040 --> 00:04:41,680 Speaker 1: his big contribution, let's say, to national discourse and to 67 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:45,719 Speaker 1: some would say the changing of the United States in general, 68 00:04:46,279 --> 00:04:50,279 Speaker 1: was his interaction with a group called the Brotherhood of 69 00:04:50,400 --> 00:04:55,080 Speaker 1: Eternal Love. It's been described in several places, including on 70 00:04:55,320 --> 00:04:59,160 Speaker 1: brain sturbator dot com, which is essentially a blog is 71 00:04:59,200 --> 00:05:03,200 Speaker 1: what it appears to But on this blog and through 72 00:05:03,200 --> 00:05:06,159 Speaker 1: the research that this writer has done, the Brotherhood of 73 00:05:06,160 --> 00:05:10,240 Speaker 1: Eternal Love is described as a quote hippie mafia, druggist syndicate, 74 00:05:12,279 --> 00:05:14,839 Speaker 1: and uh, you know, this whole thing, by the way, 75 00:05:15,040 --> 00:05:16,400 Speaker 1: is something that we're going to need to do a 76 00:05:16,440 --> 00:05:21,200 Speaker 1: whole episode on. But within this Brainsturvator, which is a 77 00:05:21,240 --> 00:05:25,839 Speaker 1: fun thing to say article, it really chronicles this guy, 78 00:05:26,160 --> 00:05:30,599 Speaker 1: Ronald Hadley Stark, and how he essentially was bringing liquid 79 00:05:30,720 --> 00:05:35,080 Speaker 1: l s D as a supplier into several different major 80 00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:39,799 Speaker 1: cultural groups that were really working in the nineties sixties, 81 00:05:40,160 --> 00:05:42,640 Speaker 1: especially in the West. This guy has been written about 82 00:05:42,640 --> 00:05:45,640 Speaker 1: in numerous books where they talk about how he was, 83 00:05:45,680 --> 00:05:47,760 Speaker 1: oh he always seemed to be there. He seemed to 84 00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:50,960 Speaker 1: be supplying a lot of the l s D, and 85 00:05:51,160 --> 00:05:55,040 Speaker 1: nobody really knew too much about him. But anyway, I 86 00:05:55,120 --> 00:05:57,640 Speaker 1: just want to point this to you guys, Ben and Noll. 87 00:05:58,080 --> 00:06:00,839 Speaker 1: Have you guys ever heard of this person and have 88 00:06:01,000 --> 00:06:07,479 Speaker 1: you read anything about him? Yes? Yes, Actually for intrepid uh. 89 00:06:07,880 --> 00:06:12,679 Speaker 1: Intrepid compatriots would be compatriots of the so called hippie mafia. 90 00:06:13,000 --> 00:06:15,600 Speaker 1: You can go to drug library dot net and read 91 00:06:15,640 --> 00:06:18,960 Speaker 1: the entire book of the Brotherhood of Eternal Love. You 92 00:06:19,000 --> 00:06:21,200 Speaker 1: know what's interesting, Matt, I love that you pointed out 93 00:06:21,640 --> 00:06:25,159 Speaker 1: the arrest here because it's really strange, right, working for 94 00:06:25,560 --> 00:06:30,000 Speaker 1: a gang like the CIA, usually, or theoretically, it comes 95 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:33,200 Speaker 1: aside benefits. One of those side benefits is being at 96 00:06:33,279 --> 00:06:36,400 Speaker 1: least for some time or to some degree above the law. 97 00:06:37,320 --> 00:06:39,880 Speaker 1: But to your point, you know, I think it was 98 00:06:39,920 --> 00:06:44,800 Speaker 1: back in nine when Hadley and a couple of other 99 00:06:44,880 --> 00:06:50,640 Speaker 1: people were either arrested or indicted, including Owlsley, who everybody 100 00:06:50,640 --> 00:06:53,520 Speaker 1: else you know, is like maybe a little more common 101 00:06:53,640 --> 00:06:57,279 Speaker 1: person in the story of LSD and the government and 102 00:06:57,279 --> 00:07:00,800 Speaker 1: the Mary Pranksters. It's interesting to me because this guy 103 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:03,400 Speaker 1: is I agree we should do a full episode on it. 104 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:06,800 Speaker 1: This guy, by which I mean Stark, agent Stark as 105 00:07:06,839 --> 00:07:10,280 Speaker 1: you call him, He is a great example of how 106 00:07:10,480 --> 00:07:16,360 Speaker 1: the intelligence apparatus used an asset, burned the asset, and 107 00:07:16,400 --> 00:07:20,640 Speaker 1: then sort of through them under the counterculture bus, you 108 00:07:20,680 --> 00:07:23,720 Speaker 1: know what I mean? Uh, he was moving weight. King 109 00:07:23,800 --> 00:07:26,960 Speaker 1: of LSD was not by any means, at least from 110 00:07:26,960 --> 00:07:31,760 Speaker 1: what I understand, an ironic nickname like Little John or something. 111 00:07:31,800 --> 00:07:34,640 Speaker 1: He was called the King of LSD because he moved 112 00:07:34,680 --> 00:07:39,040 Speaker 1: the most LSD. Uh. You'll see allegations that he produced 113 00:07:39,200 --> 00:07:45,960 Speaker 1: what kilos of LSD and that in some way the 114 00:07:46,040 --> 00:07:50,400 Speaker 1: stuff that he was making was going international, like not 115 00:07:50,520 --> 00:07:53,200 Speaker 1: just in the US. I don't know what your research 116 00:07:53,240 --> 00:07:57,040 Speaker 1: found there, but um, I agree this would be a 117 00:07:57,120 --> 00:08:01,920 Speaker 1: great uh sequel to our early or episode on how 118 00:08:02,320 --> 00:08:06,680 Speaker 1: US government kind of created counterculture in the US. Oh, yeah, 119 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:10,320 Speaker 1: for sure. UM just talking about the international angle here. 120 00:08:10,960 --> 00:08:15,320 Speaker 1: So in nineteen seventy five, there there was an arrest 121 00:08:16,000 --> 00:08:19,240 Speaker 1: of a man named Terence w Abbott. At least that's 122 00:08:19,240 --> 00:08:22,200 Speaker 1: what his passport said. It was a British passport. It 123 00:08:22,320 --> 00:08:24,880 Speaker 1: was genuine has a number that I'm not going to 124 00:08:25,000 --> 00:08:27,280 Speaker 1: say right here. There was issued two years prior to 125 00:08:27,440 --> 00:08:33,160 Speaker 1: nineteen seventy three, and when this person, Terrence w Abbott, 126 00:08:33,280 --> 00:08:37,439 Speaker 1: was arrested, he was found in possession of four thousand, 127 00:08:37,720 --> 00:08:43,760 Speaker 1: six hundred kilos that's combined of marijuana, morphine, and cocaine 128 00:08:44,720 --> 00:08:48,760 Speaker 1: um a whole lot. And it was later discovered that 129 00:08:48,800 --> 00:08:53,320 Speaker 1: this guy, Mr. Abbott, was in fact Ronald Stark, and 130 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:55,840 Speaker 1: he somehow had access to this British passport with a 131 00:08:55,840 --> 00:09:00,720 Speaker 1: different name that certainly reads as intelligence or were you know, 132 00:09:00,800 --> 00:09:05,640 Speaker 1: somebody taking part in some serious, uh felony passport action there, 133 00:09:06,000 --> 00:09:09,840 Speaker 1: especially since it was a legit number passport number. And 134 00:09:10,360 --> 00:09:13,360 Speaker 1: the really interesting thing here where again this is just 135 00:09:13,440 --> 00:09:16,760 Speaker 1: kind of taking it briefly, dipping your toe into the 136 00:09:16,840 --> 00:09:21,559 Speaker 1: rabbit hole. The British intelligence agencies would not cooperate and 137 00:09:21,760 --> 00:09:24,600 Speaker 1: release the information they had on this guy, or either 138 00:09:24,679 --> 00:09:29,959 Speaker 1: of these guys with their different names. Right. It's fascinating. Oh. 139 00:09:30,000 --> 00:09:33,559 Speaker 1: Also even the FBI, who did have files, some files 140 00:09:33,559 --> 00:09:36,200 Speaker 1: of which you can read, like I just mentioned, you 141 00:09:36,200 --> 00:09:38,760 Speaker 1: can read some of them. Uh, the FBI would not 142 00:09:38,840 --> 00:09:41,400 Speaker 1: share their files with the d e A who are 143 00:09:41,400 --> 00:09:44,960 Speaker 1: doing the investigation into this arrest. With all of these drugs, 144 00:09:45,800 --> 00:09:50,000 Speaker 1: really really interesting and the last thing here just is 145 00:09:50,080 --> 00:09:53,839 Speaker 1: that the State Department, the U. S State Department, they 146 00:09:54,000 --> 00:09:57,320 Speaker 1: were actually interfering. They were not allowing this guy to 147 00:09:57,400 --> 00:10:01,920 Speaker 1: be extradited at varying points within his career of essentially 148 00:10:01,960 --> 00:10:07,760 Speaker 1: creating and selling and distributing drugs. Really really weird stuff. Man. Yeah, 149 00:10:07,760 --> 00:10:10,520 Speaker 1: there's an interesting quote in this blog post that pulls 150 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:13,160 Speaker 1: from a couple of books, one of which is David 151 00:10:13,160 --> 00:10:17,080 Speaker 1: Black's book Asked a Secret History of LSD UM that says, 152 00:10:17,160 --> 00:10:20,640 Speaker 1: of this gentleman quote, he had a mission, he explained, 153 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:23,559 Speaker 1: to use LSD in order to facilitate the overthrow of 154 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:26,880 Speaker 1: the political systems of both the capitalist West and the 155 00:10:26,920 --> 00:10:31,280 Speaker 1: communist East by inducing altered states of consciousness in millions 156 00:10:31,280 --> 00:10:33,760 Speaker 1: of people. Start did not hide the fact that he 157 00:10:33,840 --> 00:10:37,400 Speaker 1: was well connected in the world of covert politics. Well, 158 00:10:37,640 --> 00:10:41,000 Speaker 1: apparently he had jobs or was doing work at least 159 00:10:41,240 --> 00:10:44,960 Speaker 1: in Europe, in America, in Africa, so in Asia. I 160 00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:48,520 Speaker 1: don't know somebody like this with that much concealment going 161 00:10:48,559 --> 00:10:52,560 Speaker 1: on in assistance from various intelligence agencies. I want to 162 00:10:52,559 --> 00:10:54,880 Speaker 1: know more about this guy, and it appears that we 163 00:10:54,920 --> 00:10:57,520 Speaker 1: can find it if we dig deep enough. But it's 164 00:10:57,559 --> 00:11:01,360 Speaker 1: definitely things where he's been written up about, and some 165 00:11:01,559 --> 00:11:04,199 Speaker 1: of it feels, at least from what I'm reading here, 166 00:11:04,320 --> 00:11:08,000 Speaker 1: some of it does feel I almost want to say 167 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:13,200 Speaker 1: crime folklore maybe, or you know, intelligence folklore. I don't 168 00:11:13,200 --> 00:11:15,400 Speaker 1: know if that's true or not. I think it just 169 00:11:15,559 --> 00:11:18,640 Speaker 1: maybe has that feeling to it because a lot of 170 00:11:18,640 --> 00:11:21,040 Speaker 1: the things that are written about him seems so out 171 00:11:21,080 --> 00:11:24,240 Speaker 1: there to me, like this one person could be involved 172 00:11:24,240 --> 00:11:27,640 Speaker 1: in all of these varying different things and still be 173 00:11:27,720 --> 00:11:30,760 Speaker 1: a ghost to a large extent. I don't know. Yeah, 174 00:11:30,840 --> 00:11:33,559 Speaker 1: it's interesting too, And I was looking for stuff on him, 175 00:11:33,840 --> 00:11:36,240 Speaker 1: like most of the things are on like fish message 176 00:11:36,280 --> 00:11:41,120 Speaker 1: boards or other like counterculture, you know, discussion forums. I 177 00:11:41,160 --> 00:11:43,280 Speaker 1: did find an article from the New York Times that's 178 00:11:43,280 --> 00:11:46,760 Speaker 1: like an archived article from nineteen seventy three. The headline 179 00:11:46,840 --> 00:11:50,160 Speaker 1: is king of LSD and and seven are indicted by 180 00:11:50,320 --> 00:11:53,959 Speaker 1: US and drug ring case. And it's talking about the 181 00:11:53,960 --> 00:11:57,400 Speaker 1: federal grand jury here said yesterday that LSD plants were 182 00:11:57,440 --> 00:12:00,920 Speaker 1: operated here in Windsor, California. St. Louis and Fenton, Missouri, 183 00:12:01,120 --> 00:12:05,400 Speaker 1: and in Belgium. Among those indicted was Augustus Owsley Stanley, 184 00:12:05,520 --> 00:12:08,839 Speaker 1: thirty seven year old of San Raphael California, and that's 185 00:12:08,880 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 1: the king of last we're talking about. And very kind 186 00:12:11,880 --> 00:12:15,160 Speaker 1: of quietly at the bottom at list the co conspirators 187 00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 1: David Lee Mantell's thirty three whereabouts unknown, Lester Freedman forty four, 188 00:12:20,120 --> 00:12:24,120 Speaker 1: Cleveland chemistry professor, Ronald had Lee Stark thirty five of 189 00:12:24,200 --> 00:12:28,440 Speaker 1: New York, Michael B. Randall, address unknown, and Charles Drews 190 00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:32,680 Speaker 1: of London. So um, as far as like journalism, that's 191 00:12:32,679 --> 00:12:34,959 Speaker 1: sort of what I what I found. It's very interesting. 192 00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:39,160 Speaker 1: You're right about the kind of mythic uh reputation of 193 00:12:39,160 --> 00:12:42,000 Speaker 1: this guy. Long story short, It's gonna take a lot 194 00:12:42,040 --> 00:12:44,480 Speaker 1: more time and research to get a full picture here, 195 00:12:44,520 --> 00:12:47,080 Speaker 1: but thank you so much Red for writing in about 196 00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:50,480 Speaker 1: this person. I think we're all down to learn more, 197 00:12:50,920 --> 00:12:54,160 Speaker 1: so maybe we'll be getting back to you soon with 198 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:57,360 Speaker 1: more information totally. And for now, let's take a quick 199 00:12:57,360 --> 00:13:00,000 Speaker 1: word from our sponsor and come back with another message 200 00:13:06,640 --> 00:13:09,880 Speaker 1: and we're back. Okay, boys, who's up next? I could go. 201 00:13:10,400 --> 00:13:13,520 Speaker 1: The message that I pulled comes from Rob and he 202 00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:16,079 Speaker 1: is a long haul truck driver and has some things 203 00:13:16,120 --> 00:13:19,199 Speaker 1: to say about the type of data that his employers 204 00:13:19,200 --> 00:13:23,640 Speaker 1: are able to get from his vehicle. And some questions 205 00:13:23,679 --> 00:13:26,000 Speaker 1: about the future of this kind of tracking. I'll make 206 00:13:26,040 --> 00:13:28,640 Speaker 1: this fast. I'm a truck driver. The ways that my 207 00:13:28,760 --> 00:13:31,920 Speaker 1: company can track what I do and what other companies 208 00:13:31,960 --> 00:13:35,640 Speaker 1: can trackt other trucks is amazing. They can see my speed, 209 00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:40,760 Speaker 1: my breaking, my g how close I get to other vehicles, 210 00:13:40,760 --> 00:13:43,320 Speaker 1: how often I'm in my lane, what's in my trailer, 211 00:13:44,000 --> 00:13:47,520 Speaker 1: and there's so much more. Names. Rob love you guys. 212 00:13:47,800 --> 00:13:50,319 Speaker 1: Guys are awesome. Keep it up. It's true, and I 213 00:13:50,360 --> 00:13:51,920 Speaker 1: think I think this is really interesting. Kind of going 214 00:13:52,000 --> 00:13:53,680 Speaker 1: to use this as a piggyback to talk about something 215 00:13:53,720 --> 00:13:56,600 Speaker 1: a little bit different. But uh, these systems are called 216 00:13:56,760 --> 00:14:02,200 Speaker 1: tele informatic systems that utilize things like GPS navigation, the 217 00:14:02,280 --> 00:14:06,240 Speaker 1: kinds of onboard diagnostic systems that you know, we know 218 00:14:06,320 --> 00:14:09,840 Speaker 1: about that have been kind of replacing more mechanical systems 219 00:14:09,840 --> 00:14:13,000 Speaker 1: and cars for many many years now. Ben, we had 220 00:14:13,040 --> 00:14:15,360 Speaker 1: talked a little bit off air about how kind of 221 00:14:15,400 --> 00:14:18,600 Speaker 1: mind blowing the advancement that the rapid advancement of this 222 00:14:18,640 --> 00:14:22,480 Speaker 1: technology is from you and your car stuff days. Yeah, 223 00:14:22,560 --> 00:14:26,040 Speaker 1: that's correct. It is a technology that is a no 224 00:14:26,240 --> 00:14:31,320 Speaker 1: brainer for large commercial fleets. It will increasingly be found 225 00:14:31,520 --> 00:14:35,440 Speaker 1: in new cars It will probably start off the same 226 00:14:35,440 --> 00:14:38,360 Speaker 1: way Sesame credit started off in China. It will start 227 00:14:38,360 --> 00:14:41,200 Speaker 1: off as an opt in service, but then people will 228 00:14:41,240 --> 00:14:46,960 Speaker 1: be incentivized to accept it, probably by lower insurance premiums 229 00:14:47,040 --> 00:14:51,040 Speaker 1: that's happening now with civilian vehicles. And then ultimately it 230 00:14:51,040 --> 00:14:53,760 Speaker 1: will be some kind of legislation which means it cannot 231 00:14:53,760 --> 00:14:55,840 Speaker 1: be opted out of. That will be with the rise 232 00:14:55,880 --> 00:15:00,520 Speaker 1: of infrastructure for autonomous vehicles. Rob You're absolutely right. One 233 00:15:00,560 --> 00:15:03,600 Speaker 1: thing I think we should emphasize there is the degree 234 00:15:03,680 --> 00:15:08,520 Speaker 1: of sophistication and accuracy in these systems. It makes it 235 00:15:08,600 --> 00:15:12,360 Speaker 1: tougher and tougher to make a living in the trucking industry, 236 00:15:12,440 --> 00:15:18,720 Speaker 1: which is simultaneously incredibly important to the modern world and 237 00:15:18,920 --> 00:15:23,360 Speaker 1: uh incredibly dismissed by people in power for sure. And 238 00:15:23,400 --> 00:15:25,640 Speaker 1: you know, in our episode we did on GPS tracking, 239 00:15:25,680 --> 00:15:28,320 Speaker 1: we talked about this quite a bit, where it doesn't 240 00:15:28,320 --> 00:15:30,760 Speaker 1: have to be you know, the fleet owner, right that's 241 00:15:31,080 --> 00:15:34,080 Speaker 1: tracking your stuff at the vehicle level. That kind of 242 00:15:34,120 --> 00:15:37,440 Speaker 1: tracking can be occurring externally to your vehicle and looking 243 00:15:37,480 --> 00:15:41,200 Speaker 1: at things on the outside of your vehicle, and it 244 00:15:41,240 --> 00:15:44,760 Speaker 1: doesn't have to actually be making any kind of digital 245 00:15:45,120 --> 00:15:48,440 Speaker 1: contact with anything inside your vehicle, that's right, and that 246 00:15:48,520 --> 00:15:51,200 Speaker 1: brings me to UM in thinking about this, how the 247 00:15:51,320 --> 00:15:55,000 Speaker 1: kind of nature of surveillance in vehicles. I found an 248 00:15:55,080 --> 00:15:58,880 Speaker 1: article that came out just today on Slate by Hannah Klein. 249 00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:03,400 Speaker 1: The headline Customs and Border Protection can track cars nationwide 250 00:16:03,920 --> 00:16:07,240 Speaker 1: via commercial database. I had asked a question of you 251 00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:09,760 Speaker 1: guys off air. I've gotten tickets before where it was 252 00:16:09,880 --> 00:16:12,480 Speaker 1: very clear that my license plate was in no way 253 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:15,400 Speaker 1: viewable by the officer that pulled me over. You know, 254 00:16:15,440 --> 00:16:17,200 Speaker 1: for something like can expire tag. You know that that 255 00:16:17,240 --> 00:16:19,760 Speaker 1: I would think would need to be a visually confirmed thing. 256 00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:22,200 Speaker 1: But then you think that tag sticker is so tiny, 257 00:16:22,200 --> 00:16:24,440 Speaker 1: how could they possibly especially if they're on the side 258 00:16:24,440 --> 00:16:26,760 Speaker 1: of the road. And I questioned, like so that some 259 00:16:26,840 --> 00:16:28,680 Speaker 1: kind of like r f I D chips in our 260 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:32,320 Speaker 1: license plates? And Matt mentioned this the idea of license 261 00:16:32,360 --> 00:16:35,760 Speaker 1: plate scanners, and that's exactly what this is. The CPB 262 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:42,200 Speaker 1: actually partnered with a commercial license plate database, UM, so 263 00:16:42,240 --> 00:16:47,600 Speaker 1: they can actually track like historical data about cars across 264 00:16:47,680 --> 00:16:52,119 Speaker 1: the United States without a warrant. The CPB even updated 265 00:16:52,320 --> 00:16:56,480 Speaker 1: it's a privacy impact assessment, which you know makes it 266 00:16:56,520 --> 00:17:00,160 Speaker 1: clear that they are using these commercially owned cameras and 267 00:17:00,240 --> 00:17:04,159 Speaker 1: license plate readers and have been doing so since, but 268 00:17:04,359 --> 00:17:08,919 Speaker 1: with this new information, it really broadens the scope of 269 00:17:08,960 --> 00:17:12,440 Speaker 1: it pretty significantly. And we know about this from the 270 00:17:12,880 --> 00:17:16,520 Speaker 1: article because in twenty nineteen there was a deal between 271 00:17:16,640 --> 00:17:21,439 Speaker 1: the CPB and a company called Vigilant Solutions, which is 272 00:17:21,480 --> 00:17:24,960 Speaker 1: one of these databases that was publicly listed as law 273 00:17:25,040 --> 00:17:29,240 Speaker 1: Enforcement Archival Reporting. Law Enforcement Archival Reporting is actually the 274 00:17:29,320 --> 00:17:34,520 Speaker 1: name of a product that Vigilant makes, so they're talking 275 00:17:34,560 --> 00:17:38,920 Speaker 1: about something upwards of nine billion scans that they own 276 00:17:39,119 --> 00:17:44,760 Speaker 1: and that now the Customs and Border Protection Agency can access. 277 00:17:45,400 --> 00:17:48,600 Speaker 1: It was actually successfully used in a drug case not 278 00:17:48,760 --> 00:17:52,720 Speaker 1: long ago, tracking the movement of a heroin dealer to 279 00:17:52,920 --> 00:17:55,399 Speaker 1: and from a pick up and drop off location. So 280 00:17:55,600 --> 00:17:58,200 Speaker 1: it's certainly something we're going to see more of being 281 00:17:58,359 --> 00:18:02,760 Speaker 1: used to kind of sidesteff warrants. And it's really hard 282 00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:06,600 Speaker 1: to opt out of because you would really essentially just 283 00:18:06,720 --> 00:18:09,560 Speaker 1: have to like steer clear of areas where these cameras are. 284 00:18:09,640 --> 00:18:11,880 Speaker 1: We don't know where these cameras are, so there's really 285 00:18:11,880 --> 00:18:13,720 Speaker 1: no way to do that effectively. Right, What do you 286 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:17,320 Speaker 1: guys think about this? Yeah, it's certainly disturbing. I think 287 00:18:17,320 --> 00:18:20,240 Speaker 1: it is all too frequent, and it's just something you know, 288 00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:23,240 Speaker 1: you'd want it to be there if there was a 289 00:18:23,760 --> 00:18:25,800 Speaker 1: you know, a criminal of some sort that had harmed 290 00:18:25,840 --> 00:18:28,920 Speaker 1: you or your family, right, you'd want that to be there. 291 00:18:29,560 --> 00:18:33,159 Speaker 1: At the same time, everywhere you go it is potentially 292 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:38,040 Speaker 1: being tracked in like seven different active ways at all times. 293 00:18:39,040 --> 00:18:41,199 Speaker 1: It's just another one of those things that signals that 294 00:18:41,280 --> 00:18:44,919 Speaker 1: we are done with privacy. We're just over it. Sorry, 295 00:18:45,320 --> 00:18:47,160 Speaker 1: we talked about that on this show all the time. 296 00:18:47,600 --> 00:18:50,680 Speaker 1: Just another signal of it. Just a double back and clarify, 297 00:18:50,880 --> 00:18:53,080 Speaker 1: that case I was talking about was in Massachusetts. In 298 00:18:53,119 --> 00:18:56,960 Speaker 1: April of this year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court actually 299 00:18:57,040 --> 00:18:59,800 Speaker 1: gave the go ahead to use license plate readers to 300 00:19:00,000 --> 00:19:02,439 Speaker 1: track this heroin deal that I was talking about. To 301 00:19:02,480 --> 00:19:05,080 Speaker 1: go back to what you had mentioned earlier, Matt, we 302 00:19:05,160 --> 00:19:09,440 Speaker 1: have a pretty pretty good introductory dive into this on 303 00:19:09,560 --> 00:19:12,960 Speaker 1: Big Brother on the Road car and GPS tracking. But 304 00:19:13,320 --> 00:19:18,119 Speaker 1: your point, Noel Uh, that this is developing technology. It 305 00:19:18,320 --> 00:19:24,159 Speaker 1: is inevitable barring some intense cataclysmic series of events that 306 00:19:24,280 --> 00:19:28,160 Speaker 1: drives technology back to an earlier age. It just makes 307 00:19:28,200 --> 00:19:31,000 Speaker 1: sense to have this tracking capability, and you have to 308 00:19:31,119 --> 00:19:35,960 Speaker 1: argue that it's indeed necessary for autonomous vehicles for anybody 309 00:19:36,000 --> 00:19:39,720 Speaker 1: wants more on that detail. Like you know, Rob, what's 310 00:19:39,760 --> 00:19:42,720 Speaker 1: interesting about your call, and I really appreciate your time here, 311 00:19:43,240 --> 00:19:46,400 Speaker 1: is that in some ways you are a non consensual 312 00:19:46,480 --> 00:19:51,240 Speaker 1: guinea pig for what will become a larger program, again, 313 00:19:51,359 --> 00:19:56,080 Speaker 1: just like so many other social pushes, right, and I 314 00:19:56,080 --> 00:19:59,000 Speaker 1: would be interested in hearing from more of our fellow 315 00:19:59,040 --> 00:20:01,919 Speaker 1: listeners in the trucking industry. Do you think this is 316 00:20:02,000 --> 00:20:05,679 Speaker 1: on balance a good thing? Do you think this is 317 00:20:05,720 --> 00:20:09,200 Speaker 1: on balance a scary thing? Why? Or why not? Because 318 00:20:09,240 --> 00:20:12,760 Speaker 1: the big problem we're looking at some some pretty scary 319 00:20:12,840 --> 00:20:15,440 Speaker 1: Checkers problems, right, and it's pretty scary I would say 320 00:20:15,440 --> 00:20:19,280 Speaker 1: early Chess problems. But one thing looming on the horizon, 321 00:20:19,680 --> 00:20:23,000 Speaker 1: the rough beasts slouching toward Bethlehem to be born. Here 322 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:27,440 Speaker 1: is the idea of those systems being compromised and hacked 323 00:20:27,720 --> 00:20:30,000 Speaker 1: and what you could do with that, especially if it 324 00:20:30,080 --> 00:20:35,119 Speaker 1: becomes a mandate for all civilian vehicles, which could you know, 325 00:20:35,359 --> 00:20:38,160 Speaker 1: not to be dooming gloom, but could probably happen in 326 00:20:38,280 --> 00:20:42,800 Speaker 1: our lifetime. It's take Yeah, nobody, nobody wants to be tracked, 327 00:20:43,200 --> 00:20:48,000 Speaker 1: especially if it's based on you know, your political, religious belief, 328 00:20:48,200 --> 00:20:53,040 Speaker 1: your nationality, whatever it is, whatever the thing that it 329 00:20:53,240 --> 00:20:55,840 Speaker 1: is that you have. Nobody wants to be tracked because 330 00:20:55,880 --> 00:20:58,600 Speaker 1: of that, because someone in power decides that whatever you 331 00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:01,360 Speaker 1: are is bad. Right, That's one of the major things 332 00:21:01,480 --> 00:21:03,920 Speaker 1: we've talked about with a lot of topics on this show. 333 00:21:04,400 --> 00:21:07,359 Speaker 1: And anytime there's a technology like this that is so 334 00:21:07,440 --> 00:21:11,440 Speaker 1: powerful that has the potential to be misused either by 335 00:21:11,480 --> 00:21:14,840 Speaker 1: a controlling party you know that is the ones who 336 00:21:14,880 --> 00:21:18,800 Speaker 1: are actually using the thing, or a third party that is, 337 00:21:18,840 --> 00:21:22,040 Speaker 1: just like Ben said, hacking or making use of it 338 00:21:22,640 --> 00:21:25,480 Speaker 1: through force. It's a it's a scary thought. It freaks 339 00:21:25,480 --> 00:21:27,280 Speaker 1: me out. And the argument, I guess could be made 340 00:21:27,280 --> 00:21:28,920 Speaker 1: that it's, you know, it's all for the greater good. 341 00:21:28,960 --> 00:21:32,560 Speaker 1: It's like for our safety, it's it could technically prevent crimes. 342 00:21:32,640 --> 00:21:35,199 Speaker 1: So it falls into that realm of pre crime, of 343 00:21:35,240 --> 00:21:38,240 Speaker 1: surveilling people in advance of anyone having done anything wrong. 344 00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:41,080 Speaker 1: And uh, you know, there's sort of like a blue 345 00:21:41,080 --> 00:21:45,640 Speaker 1: sky utopian version that like that sounds nice, but it's 346 00:21:45,680 --> 00:21:48,439 Speaker 1: that slipperty slope argument where then it becomes you know, 347 00:21:48,600 --> 00:21:51,399 Speaker 1: we're basically living in a in a surveillance state, and 348 00:21:51,400 --> 00:21:54,399 Speaker 1: and that doesn't seem so nice. Depending on what kind 349 00:21:54,400 --> 00:21:56,399 Speaker 1: of car you drive or you know, the nature of 350 00:21:56,400 --> 00:21:58,520 Speaker 1: your work, if you work with vehicles. I keep in 351 00:21:58,560 --> 00:22:02,080 Speaker 1: mind that right now it's science fiction. Your carc could 352 00:22:02,080 --> 00:22:05,080 Speaker 1: be remotely shut off. It can happen. We talked about 353 00:22:05,119 --> 00:22:07,720 Speaker 1: it again in that earlier episode. Just the thing to 354 00:22:07,720 --> 00:22:09,679 Speaker 1: point out here that we've mentioned several times Been I 355 00:22:09,720 --> 00:22:13,400 Speaker 1: think you said it and said it best, but the 356 00:22:13,480 --> 00:22:18,119 Speaker 1: concept that any tool that's developed has the potential to 357 00:22:18,200 --> 00:22:21,359 Speaker 1: become a weapon depending on who wields it, something to 358 00:22:21,400 --> 00:22:23,840 Speaker 1: that effect. That feels like a quote from a scholar. 359 00:22:23,840 --> 00:22:26,080 Speaker 1: But I'm pretty sure you said that Been. I'm sure 360 00:22:26,160 --> 00:22:29,960 Speaker 1: somebody else wrote it better and said it earlier. Just 361 00:22:30,040 --> 00:22:32,280 Speaker 1: in the in the nature of things. But yeah, things 362 00:22:32,320 --> 00:22:34,200 Speaker 1: to watch out for. I mean, the US is still 363 00:22:34,280 --> 00:22:37,200 Speaker 1: very much a car culture. Many places in the world are, 364 00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:42,000 Speaker 1: and right now, despite all the various ideas and things 365 00:22:42,080 --> 00:22:45,560 Speaker 1: on the figurative drawing board, the US and a huge 366 00:22:45,720 --> 00:22:50,199 Speaker 1: portion of the world relies on the trucking industry to 367 00:22:50,320 --> 00:22:53,760 Speaker 1: get things from one place or another. So be more 368 00:22:53,800 --> 00:22:55,680 Speaker 1: appreciative to truckers if you see him on the road. 369 00:22:55,680 --> 00:22:57,119 Speaker 1: I don't want to get all car stuff and all. 370 00:22:57,160 --> 00:22:59,159 Speaker 1: I know that's not the point of this one, but 371 00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:03,560 Speaker 1: but don't drive like a jerk around people driving in 372 00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:07,720 Speaker 1: tractor trailers. Imagine what a harrowing experience that is to 373 00:23:07,840 --> 00:23:11,160 Speaker 1: have to be on inner States with a tractor trailer 374 00:23:11,640 --> 00:23:14,080 Speaker 1: and then have people you know, tailgating you or trying 375 00:23:14,080 --> 00:23:15,720 Speaker 1: to get right in front where you can't see them. 376 00:23:16,040 --> 00:23:19,040 Speaker 1: Drive safe. Well, with that, I think we can take 377 00:23:19,080 --> 00:23:22,520 Speaker 1: another quick break and then be back with another listener mail. 378 00:23:29,080 --> 00:23:31,800 Speaker 1: And we're back. We're gonna switch this up a little bit. 379 00:23:32,240 --> 00:23:35,639 Speaker 1: We have an email that comes to us from someone 380 00:23:35,680 --> 00:23:39,440 Speaker 1: who did identify themselves by their real name, but they 381 00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:42,639 Speaker 1: gave us an alias that I believe you all will enjoy, 382 00:23:43,760 --> 00:23:48,119 Speaker 1: Agent Veggie Burger. Agent Veggie Burger, you wrote in to 383 00:23:48,280 --> 00:23:52,080 Speaker 1: say I wanted to shoot you a quick email with 384 00:23:52,119 --> 00:23:54,760 Speaker 1: a few potential topics for future episodes that may be 385 00:23:54,840 --> 00:23:58,119 Speaker 1: worth looking into. I don't mind this being read aloud 386 00:23:58,160 --> 00:24:01,520 Speaker 1: on the air at all. Awesome, Thank you as always 387 00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:04,639 Speaker 1: for verifying that with us. So, Agent Veggie Burger. He 388 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:09,520 Speaker 1: gave us two really strong topics that we hadn't examined before, 389 00:24:09,600 --> 00:24:11,040 Speaker 1: and I want to see if these would be worth 390 00:24:11,080 --> 00:24:14,520 Speaker 1: aful episode in the future. So here we go. The 391 00:24:14,640 --> 00:24:18,440 Speaker 1: first is regarding a question or subject that I wondered 392 00:24:18,440 --> 00:24:23,240 Speaker 1: about when it's come up in different episodes. I'm gonna 393 00:24:23,320 --> 00:24:26,240 Speaker 1: skip part of what you said here, Agent Veggie Burger, 394 00:24:26,600 --> 00:24:29,959 Speaker 1: uh and get right to the big tent item. My 395 00:24:30,000 --> 00:24:33,680 Speaker 1: first question, you say is this, how do people get 396 00:24:34,000 --> 00:24:40,320 Speaker 1: or become made to be disappeared by governments, organized crime, etcetera. Parentheses, 397 00:24:40,359 --> 00:24:42,879 Speaker 1: but the government one is what really interests me and 398 00:24:42,920 --> 00:24:47,520 Speaker 1: what circumstances tend to occur to lead to someone being disappeared. 399 00:24:48,080 --> 00:24:52,000 Speaker 1: If a person is disappeared, is a body or remains 400 00:24:52,359 --> 00:24:58,439 Speaker 1: ever found, Agent Veggie Burger. You suggested to other fantastic subjects, 401 00:24:58,440 --> 00:25:02,040 Speaker 1: but for today's listener, Ale, if that would be interesting 402 00:25:02,080 --> 00:25:08,000 Speaker 1: to focus on this concept of forced disappearances. Agent Veggie 403 00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:10,879 Speaker 1: Burger ends by signing off, thanks and regards or lettuce 404 00:25:10,920 --> 00:25:14,560 Speaker 1: and tomatoes. Agent Veggie Burger. But that's a very serious topic. 405 00:25:14,600 --> 00:25:19,960 Speaker 1: What do you guys think about, uh, forced disappearances in general? 406 00:25:20,480 --> 00:25:23,200 Speaker 1: That's going to be for anybody googling right now, that's 407 00:25:23,240 --> 00:25:26,040 Speaker 1: going to be the topic that will get you the 408 00:25:26,080 --> 00:25:30,640 Speaker 1: most salient results. I would just say The first category 409 00:25:30,800 --> 00:25:33,879 Speaker 1: of this, off the top of my head, is a 410 00:25:33,920 --> 00:25:38,200 Speaker 1: little more lighthearted. Well maybe not for the person involved, 411 00:25:38,240 --> 00:25:43,439 Speaker 1: but things like the witness Protection program are similar programs 412 00:25:43,480 --> 00:25:47,240 Speaker 1: that could be instituted by government agencies and intelligence agencies 413 00:25:47,280 --> 00:25:52,119 Speaker 1: where someone who's perhaps a witness or primary contact or 414 00:25:52,160 --> 00:25:55,720 Speaker 1: source of information, who is spirited away to a safe 415 00:25:55,720 --> 00:25:59,720 Speaker 1: place and none of their contacts ever know where they 416 00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:05,120 Speaker 1: are anymore. That's it. They're they're gone, um, and they're 417 00:26:05,119 --> 00:26:08,520 Speaker 1: still alive somewhere because they're needed and vital, but they 418 00:26:08,520 --> 00:26:12,399 Speaker 1: are no longer accessible by anyone previously in their life. Yeah, 419 00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:15,680 Speaker 1: it's spooky stuff, right, that's it's it's a real thing. 420 00:26:16,040 --> 00:26:18,760 Speaker 1: I think they called the witness Security Program now or 421 00:26:18,800 --> 00:26:21,159 Speaker 1: something like that. But everybody who's not a U. S. 422 00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:25,760 Speaker 1: Marshal puls witness protection. Uh, this is a real thing. 423 00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:30,000 Speaker 1: You can under certain circumstances crack of deal that leads 424 00:26:30,000 --> 00:26:34,760 Speaker 1: you to witness protection. Sometimes people who have committed crimes 425 00:26:34,920 --> 00:26:39,159 Speaker 1: are in the witness protection program or security program, but 426 00:26:39,320 --> 00:26:43,600 Speaker 1: they are highly incentivized to at least pretend to be 427 00:26:44,119 --> 00:26:47,000 Speaker 1: playing the straight and narrow and their new identity. There's 428 00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:49,399 Speaker 1: not a three strikes you go to jail kind of 429 00:26:49,480 --> 00:26:53,439 Speaker 1: rule for people in the program. If you commit any crime, 430 00:26:53,600 --> 00:26:57,040 Speaker 1: they can throw you out, and there's nothing stopping them 431 00:26:57,040 --> 00:27:02,880 Speaker 1: from calling Mafio. So's like match both hands or something, Lugiano. 432 00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:05,239 Speaker 1: I'm just making up a name. I'm sorry, Matt, and 433 00:27:05,240 --> 00:27:08,480 Speaker 1: then having you know and then saying, hey, guess what 434 00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:13,679 Speaker 1: you thought Dale da Vinci was dead. No, he was 435 00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:17,879 Speaker 1: living in Utah as of twenty minutes ago, and we 436 00:27:17,920 --> 00:27:20,240 Speaker 1: think he's heading to the airport. So do what you 437 00:27:20,359 --> 00:27:23,720 Speaker 1: do best like that? Can that can absolutely happen. I 438 00:27:23,760 --> 00:27:25,600 Speaker 1: think it's something that gets used a lot in fiction. 439 00:27:25,640 --> 00:27:27,960 Speaker 1: But you're right, man, it's very it's very, very real, 440 00:27:28,119 --> 00:27:32,119 Speaker 1: and it's very valuable. I would also shout out Witless Protection, 441 00:27:33,160 --> 00:27:37,879 Speaker 1: the American cinematic masterpiece starring Larry the Cable Guy. It 442 00:27:38,119 --> 00:27:44,600 Speaker 1: made almost four point two million dollars. Jenny McCarthy's in there, Um, 443 00:27:44,640 --> 00:27:48,840 Speaker 1: I don't think that's a documentary. Forced disappearances, or what's 444 00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:54,680 Speaker 1: sometimes is called enforced disappearances, are sadly much more common 445 00:27:55,359 --> 00:27:57,800 Speaker 1: than maybe we would like to think. Sometimes you think 446 00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:00,800 Speaker 1: of these as something that occurred dur in the Cold War. 447 00:28:01,520 --> 00:28:05,400 Speaker 1: There's something that occurs in authoritarian regimes. But then did 448 00:28:05,400 --> 00:28:09,680 Speaker 1: the Cold War ever end? Authoritarian regimes are certainly around 449 00:28:10,280 --> 00:28:14,679 Speaker 1: we know. Probably it's your question, Agent Veggie Burger. I 450 00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:18,200 Speaker 1: would say the Dirty War in Argentina is a huge 451 00:28:18,200 --> 00:28:25,760 Speaker 1: example of enforced disappearances. Stalin was literally erasing people from photographs. 452 00:28:25,840 --> 00:28:31,720 Speaker 1: That's a very very clear, uh example of forced disappearances. Uh. 453 00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:37,720 Speaker 1: And then the ongoing persecution of the weaker communities in 454 00:28:37,760 --> 00:28:42,320 Speaker 1: Western China, those are definitely forced disappearances. People are finding 455 00:28:42,480 --> 00:28:46,480 Speaker 1: human hair shaved from these people that is sent along, 456 00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:48,920 Speaker 1: you know, as like weave and stuff like that. They're 457 00:28:48,920 --> 00:28:52,160 Speaker 1: being forced to work in factories. Is very much happening. 458 00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:55,800 Speaker 1: As far as the nuts and bolts of how it works, uh, 459 00:28:55,960 --> 00:29:00,400 Speaker 1: Step one start with an authoritarian regime, so thing is 460 00:29:00,440 --> 00:29:03,720 Speaker 1: not accountable to its own rules of law. I would say, 461 00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:07,120 Speaker 1: maybe there's this, Maybe there's like, okay, helpful disappearances like 462 00:29:07,160 --> 00:29:10,360 Speaker 1: what you're talking about met with witness protection whenness security. 463 00:29:10,440 --> 00:29:15,520 Speaker 1: Maybe there's uh forced disappearances by an oppressive regime or government. 464 00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:19,920 Speaker 1: And then there are self motivated disappearances. You could disappear 465 00:29:19,960 --> 00:29:23,120 Speaker 1: yourself and you can get away, especially in places like 466 00:29:23,160 --> 00:29:26,880 Speaker 1: the US, UH, you can commit pseudo side. It's a 467 00:29:26,880 --> 00:29:30,760 Speaker 1: fancy word for faking your death. Uh, and you can, 468 00:29:31,080 --> 00:29:33,240 Speaker 1: you can get away for a long time. One of 469 00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:35,800 Speaker 1: the biggest mistakes people make, though, is when they try 470 00:29:35,840 --> 00:29:38,320 Speaker 1: to get that life insurance money. So if you're hearing this, 471 00:29:38,440 --> 00:29:41,880 Speaker 1: you're living under a fake name. Uh. When you start over, 472 00:29:41,920 --> 00:29:44,400 Speaker 1: you really start over at square one, unless you got 473 00:29:44,440 --> 00:29:46,600 Speaker 1: a bag of loose diamonds or something. I don't want 474 00:29:46,600 --> 00:29:49,520 Speaker 1: to be like two alarmist here, but you guys, I'm 475 00:29:49,560 --> 00:29:52,560 Speaker 1: sure I've been following what's been happening in Portland, UM, 476 00:29:52,560 --> 00:29:56,880 Speaker 1: with a lot of these federal forces being deployed US 477 00:29:56,960 --> 00:30:02,360 Speaker 1: Martial Services and Border Patrol and the like and um 478 00:30:02,360 --> 00:30:05,000 Speaker 1: grabbing folks off the streets and and shoving them into 479 00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:09,959 Speaker 1: unmarked vans. And uh, there's reports that they're being detained 480 00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:12,719 Speaker 1: and dragged into a courthouse without being told why they 481 00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:16,120 Speaker 1: were being arrested or you know, who the arresting authority was, 482 00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:20,440 Speaker 1: and then you know, being released without official record of 483 00:30:20,440 --> 00:30:23,600 Speaker 1: of of any kind of detainment or whatever. And you know, 484 00:30:23,640 --> 00:30:25,560 Speaker 1: it's stuff like this that just kind of has that 485 00:30:25,640 --> 00:30:28,440 Speaker 1: sort of police state kind of vibe. There's a there's 486 00:30:28,440 --> 00:30:30,280 Speaker 1: an interesting article in the Guardian about it And I 487 00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:32,040 Speaker 1: don't know now that we have any reports of people 488 00:30:32,080 --> 00:30:35,320 Speaker 1: being quote unquote disappeared, But isn't in a slipperty slope 489 00:30:35,320 --> 00:30:38,640 Speaker 1: like between that and just you know you're never hearing 490 00:30:38,680 --> 00:30:41,240 Speaker 1: from someone again and it's happened, and you know one 491 00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:44,560 Speaker 1: of the camera what show this was on. But one 492 00:30:44,600 --> 00:30:48,320 Speaker 1: of the big misconceptions that's happening right now with the 493 00:30:48,360 --> 00:30:52,160 Speaker 1: best of intentions regarding the situation in Portland, is the 494 00:30:52,240 --> 00:30:58,160 Speaker 1: idea that unidentified federal agencies or law enforcement groups putting 495 00:30:58,160 --> 00:31:02,280 Speaker 1: people into unmarked they and said abducting them is new 496 00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:05,400 Speaker 1: or unique to Portlands. That happened earlier in San Diego 497 00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:08,720 Speaker 1: with the San Diego p D, that's happened during the 498 00:31:08,800 --> 00:31:12,280 Speaker 1: times of civil rights. And those people were forcibly they 499 00:31:12,280 --> 00:31:15,640 Speaker 1: weren't just forcibly disappeared. They were you know, they were killed, 500 00:31:16,160 --> 00:31:20,080 Speaker 1: sometimes tortured, right or offered the chance to turn and 501 00:31:20,120 --> 00:31:23,640 Speaker 1: then uh come back as a mole. But you're right. 502 00:31:23,960 --> 00:31:27,800 Speaker 1: In fact, as we record this and by the time 503 00:31:27,920 --> 00:31:31,160 Speaker 1: this publishes, will have some more clarity on this. Uh, 504 00:31:31,200 --> 00:31:36,600 Speaker 1: the current administration's plan is to franchise this practice of 505 00:31:36,680 --> 00:31:41,040 Speaker 1: detaining people and unmarked fans. Often these people have been detained, 506 00:31:41,400 --> 00:31:43,960 Speaker 1: at least in the Portland case, are saying that they 507 00:31:43,960 --> 00:31:46,920 Speaker 1: were the people come back or saying they were detained. 508 00:31:47,000 --> 00:31:50,640 Speaker 1: They were, maybe they were read the rights, but they 509 00:31:50,640 --> 00:31:53,360 Speaker 1: were there. It was basically an intimidation show of power. 510 00:31:53,480 --> 00:31:56,920 Speaker 1: And then they were released. But they were released without paperwork. 511 00:31:57,560 --> 00:31:59,560 Speaker 1: And when you talk about the government, if it didn't 512 00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:03,800 Speaker 1: happen on paper, it just didn't happen. Shout out to uh, 513 00:32:03,920 --> 00:32:07,800 Speaker 1: Ronald Hadley Stark, right. What's troubling about this is the 514 00:32:07,840 --> 00:32:11,360 Speaker 1: idea of franchising this operation means that it could come 515 00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:15,560 Speaker 1: to a town near you. Democratic opponents of the current 516 00:32:15,880 --> 00:32:20,240 Speaker 1: administration are saying that this thing, UH that the administration 517 00:32:20,320 --> 00:32:24,880 Speaker 1: is calling Operation Legend, is going to be focused on 518 00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:30,560 Speaker 1: left leaning city, so think of like your Chicago's for instance. UH. 519 00:32:30,600 --> 00:32:34,200 Speaker 1: And that what's interesting about that is if that is true, 520 00:32:34,600 --> 00:32:37,800 Speaker 1: then that means that there is a move to use 521 00:32:37,960 --> 00:32:42,160 Speaker 1: this power, whether or not it's legal. There's a move 522 00:32:42,240 --> 00:32:47,640 Speaker 1: to use this power to enforce a political aim rather 523 00:32:47,720 --> 00:32:50,880 Speaker 1: than status quo. And that's that's where you get into 524 00:32:50,960 --> 00:32:54,480 Speaker 1: the dangerous slippery slope you describe. I think shout out 525 00:32:54,560 --> 00:32:58,920 Speaker 1: to our attempt at defining fascism, and I think this 526 00:32:58,960 --> 00:33:01,720 Speaker 1: is something that folks on both sides of any political 527 00:33:01,760 --> 00:33:04,560 Speaker 1: divide in this country or otherwise could probably get behind. 528 00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:08,840 Speaker 1: I don't think anybody particularly wants an authoritarian state or wants, 529 00:33:09,000 --> 00:33:13,400 Speaker 1: you know, removal of civil liberties. I think focus on 530 00:33:13,440 --> 00:33:17,360 Speaker 1: the right are fans of smaller government and less government 531 00:33:17,400 --> 00:33:19,640 Speaker 1: control over our day to day lives, and this would 532 00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:23,320 Speaker 1: very much represent a significant escalation of that kind of control. 533 00:33:23,800 --> 00:33:27,440 Speaker 1: Agreed and to walk a little bit further down the 534 00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:30,440 Speaker 1: path here, which maybe could be its own full episode 535 00:33:30,440 --> 00:33:33,840 Speaker 1: in the future. There are real life cases of how 536 00:33:33,880 --> 00:33:39,040 Speaker 1: far this can go practice of government supported forced disappearances 537 00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:45,280 Speaker 1: and they have long lasting, multigenerational consequences. Earlier I mentioned 538 00:33:45,280 --> 00:33:49,920 Speaker 1: the Dirty War in Argentina, the military junta that was 539 00:33:50,040 --> 00:33:57,000 Speaker 1: ruling Argentina from nineteen seventy six without three uh. They 540 00:33:57,160 --> 00:34:01,800 Speaker 1: disappeared tons and tons of people bowl maybe as many 541 00:34:01,880 --> 00:34:07,160 Speaker 1: as thirty thousand people for one reason or another. And 542 00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:10,200 Speaker 1: many of these people ended up going, you know, getting 543 00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:14,840 Speaker 1: abducted by death squads, tortured and then murdered or detained 544 00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:18,920 Speaker 1: in secret detention centers and interrogated and then tortured and 545 00:34:19,040 --> 00:34:23,879 Speaker 1: murdered but here's here's a consequence people didn't think about 546 00:34:23,920 --> 00:34:27,480 Speaker 1: a lot of those folks had children at one age 547 00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:31,240 Speaker 1: or another. I don't want to be alarmist or sensationalistic, 548 00:34:31,520 --> 00:34:33,280 Speaker 1: but this should be in the back of your mind 549 00:34:33,440 --> 00:34:38,680 Speaker 1: when you hear about uh, illegal detainments starting in the 550 00:34:38,800 --> 00:34:43,520 Speaker 1: US or excuse me, gaining mainstream attention in the US. 551 00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:48,800 Speaker 1: In Argentina when it escalated to the point of massive 552 00:34:48,880 --> 00:34:54,359 Speaker 1: disappearances and abductions, the children were taken and they were 553 00:34:54,640 --> 00:34:59,480 Speaker 1: put up for adoption. That's the classy way to say it. 554 00:34:59,520 --> 00:35:02,920 Speaker 1: But the mill militterry was doing at that time, and 555 00:35:02,960 --> 00:35:06,200 Speaker 1: this is according to the Harvard Women's Law Journal, so 556 00:35:06,280 --> 00:35:11,640 Speaker 1: hardly a tabloid. Uh. They were stealing. They were specifically 557 00:35:11,640 --> 00:35:14,879 Speaker 1: aiming for very young children, babies or infants, and they 558 00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:18,520 Speaker 1: were stealing them, and then they were selling them after 559 00:35:18,560 --> 00:35:21,479 Speaker 1: they had killed their parents. It's not a conspiracy theory, 560 00:35:21,520 --> 00:35:27,480 Speaker 1: it's real conspiracy thing that happened. So silver lining time, 561 00:35:28,320 --> 00:35:31,680 Speaker 1: I don't know. Yeah, there's not much still relying to 562 00:35:31,719 --> 00:35:35,360 Speaker 1: this kind of conversation. UM, silver lining would be that 563 00:35:35,360 --> 00:35:39,520 Speaker 1: we're not there yet, hopefully, although I will point out 564 00:35:39,560 --> 00:35:43,840 Speaker 1: that ICE is losing children. That is also not a 565 00:35:43,840 --> 00:35:47,759 Speaker 1: conspiracy theory. That is a fact. The big question, you know, 566 00:35:47,800 --> 00:35:52,440 Speaker 1: it's it's creating a lot of conspiracy theories, like the 567 00:35:52,480 --> 00:35:55,719 Speaker 1: Wayfair stuff, which we haven't done a full episode on 568 00:35:55,880 --> 00:35:59,359 Speaker 1: yet as we record this. Uh, they think we talked 569 00:35:59,360 --> 00:36:01,200 Speaker 1: about it a little bit. Did we talk about it 570 00:36:01,239 --> 00:36:04,400 Speaker 1: already previously? Maybe we did off air a bit. You 571 00:36:04,440 --> 00:36:06,759 Speaker 1: had a really great tweet about it, Ben that I 572 00:36:06,800 --> 00:36:11,200 Speaker 1: thought was brilliant, comparing it to uh Auji board. Uh 573 00:36:11,960 --> 00:36:14,040 Speaker 1: should not bring that up. But no, no, that's fine. 574 00:36:14,080 --> 00:36:17,399 Speaker 1: I'm just you're talking about where a point out that 575 00:36:18,000 --> 00:36:22,920 Speaker 1: saying you're busting a child trafficking ring by googling something 576 00:36:23,520 --> 00:36:27,000 Speaker 1: is kind of like saying you've been able to speak 577 00:36:27,000 --> 00:36:29,720 Speaker 1: with the dead because you have a mass marketed game. 578 00:36:30,640 --> 00:36:33,640 Speaker 1: Bye bye, I said Parker Brothers. But I think it's 579 00:36:33,680 --> 00:36:37,759 Speaker 1: I think it's Hasbro So apologies to everyone nor read that. 580 00:36:38,239 --> 00:36:40,800 Speaker 1: It sounds like we need some preemptive self defense guys 581 00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:45,239 Speaker 1: to keep to keep from getting snatched. Yeah, we preemptively 582 00:36:45,800 --> 00:36:50,359 Speaker 1: defended ourselves. These are really strong suggestions, and I think 583 00:36:50,440 --> 00:36:54,680 Speaker 1: each of them can be its own episode. Thank you 584 00:36:54,760 --> 00:36:59,919 Speaker 1: so much, Red, Rob Agent, Veggie Burger, and everyone else 585 00:37:00,280 --> 00:37:03,279 Speaker 1: listening to this. We want to hear your thoughts. We 586 00:37:03,320 --> 00:37:06,279 Speaker 1: want to know your take on each of these. We 587 00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:08,120 Speaker 1: want to know what you think about the c I 588 00:37:08,239 --> 00:37:12,239 Speaker 1: A and LSD. They're just very untrustworthy to work with, 589 00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:14,480 Speaker 1: you know what I mean. Their track records that good, 590 00:37:14,760 --> 00:37:18,080 Speaker 1: especially when they're on acid, especially when they're all on acid, 591 00:37:18,200 --> 00:37:25,960 Speaker 1: totally uninged. Yeah. Uh, the rise of mobile or vehicular tracking. 592 00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:29,000 Speaker 1: There's one great point you made, Matt in that earlier episode, 593 00:37:29,360 --> 00:37:32,600 Speaker 1: which is that the figured of horse or I guess 594 00:37:32,640 --> 00:37:35,319 Speaker 1: the figured of horse power has already left the left, 595 00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:38,120 Speaker 1: the stable, left the barn, because we're all being tracked 596 00:37:38,160 --> 00:37:42,439 Speaker 1: already by smartphones. But to your point, Noll, this kind 597 00:37:42,440 --> 00:37:46,640 Speaker 1: of tracking is much more uh what's the word, uh, 598 00:37:47,080 --> 00:37:49,960 Speaker 1: sophisticated and and robust. I mean, it's just like a 599 00:37:49,960 --> 00:37:54,040 Speaker 1: lot more ubiquitous, right, Like, it's sophisticated, and it's widespread, 600 00:37:54,160 --> 00:37:57,759 Speaker 1: and it seems to skirt the law pretty efficiently so far. 601 00:37:58,440 --> 00:38:00,960 Speaker 1: I mean I say skirt the law. That's that's accurate. 602 00:38:01,280 --> 00:38:04,080 Speaker 1: It's loophole city, you know what I mean. Um, that's 603 00:38:04,120 --> 00:38:08,560 Speaker 1: what it feels like exactly. And then of course, thank 604 00:38:08,600 --> 00:38:11,919 Speaker 1: you Agent Veggie, Like we said that name enough. Now 605 00:38:11,960 --> 00:38:16,160 Speaker 1: we can just shortnit I'm kidding, give you a little 606 00:38:16,160 --> 00:38:19,439 Speaker 1: full Moniker. Thank you Agent Veggie Burger for bringing up 607 00:38:19,760 --> 00:38:23,080 Speaker 1: the concept of forced disappearances. It's one of those things 608 00:38:23,120 --> 00:38:26,000 Speaker 1: that's surprising that we haven't covered this before. But before 609 00:38:26,120 --> 00:38:29,400 Speaker 1: we tell you, fellow listeners how to get in touch 610 00:38:29,440 --> 00:38:32,879 Speaker 1: with us, how to take a page from Red Rob 611 00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:35,719 Speaker 1: in Agent Veggie Burger's book, I have to ask, guys, 612 00:38:35,760 --> 00:38:37,920 Speaker 1: what do you think? Do these feel like? Does our 613 00:38:38,040 --> 00:38:42,600 Speaker 1: mutual spider sense say that these could be standalone episodes? Absolutely, 614 00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:46,319 Speaker 1: let's do it. I'm all about it. Let's take some 615 00:38:46,520 --> 00:38:51,000 Speaker 1: LSD track some cars and uh, you know, disappear into 616 00:38:51,040 --> 00:38:53,719 Speaker 1: our minds. Man, No, it's true. I think we're gonna 617 00:38:53,719 --> 00:38:55,640 Speaker 1: see a lot of that as we uh scratch the 618 00:38:55,680 --> 00:38:58,360 Speaker 1: surface with some of these little many segments. I guess 619 00:38:58,360 --> 00:39:00,239 Speaker 1: on these, I think we're gonna find a handful of 620 00:39:00,560 --> 00:39:04,920 Speaker 1: not a badger bag full of future deep dive topics, 621 00:39:04,960 --> 00:39:07,320 Speaker 1: which is exciting. And Hey, if you've got an idea 622 00:39:07,680 --> 00:39:10,160 Speaker 1: that absolutely needs to be on the show that we 623 00:39:10,200 --> 00:39:13,319 Speaker 1: need to look into or right now, please find us. 624 00:39:13,360 --> 00:39:15,799 Speaker 1: You can check us out on Facebook and Twitter, where 625 00:39:15,800 --> 00:39:20,120 Speaker 1: we're conspiracy stuff. You can check out our Facebook discussion page. 626 00:39:20,320 --> 00:39:22,359 Speaker 1: Here's where it gets crazy. You can jump on there 627 00:39:22,400 --> 00:39:25,439 Speaker 1: with all the other conspiracy realists and talk about this 628 00:39:25,560 --> 00:39:28,960 Speaker 1: and other topics, suggests, topics, do whatever you want to do, 629 00:39:29,280 --> 00:39:32,440 Speaker 1: post those memes. Uh, we'd love to see over there. 630 00:39:32,440 --> 00:39:34,680 Speaker 1: We've got some fantastic mods who will help you in. 631 00:39:34,760 --> 00:39:37,880 Speaker 1: All you have to do is say who hosts this show? Hey, 632 00:39:38,120 --> 00:39:41,480 Speaker 1: what are our names? I don't know. Bonus points if 633 00:39:41,560 --> 00:39:45,400 Speaker 1: you can name our new super producer. And I'm not 634 00:39:45,400 --> 00:39:48,240 Speaker 1: gonna say her name again right now, but bonus points 635 00:39:48,239 --> 00:39:51,000 Speaker 1: for you if you know her name. Double bonus points 636 00:39:51,040 --> 00:39:53,719 Speaker 1: on my part if you spell my name correctly. Uh 637 00:39:53,719 --> 00:39:55,759 Speaker 1: it's n O e L not n O l e 638 00:39:56,120 --> 00:40:01,000 Speaker 1: r k n O l l ah. Yes, yes, very honestly, 639 00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:04,400 Speaker 1: just make me laugh. If I'm approving people and you 640 00:40:04,440 --> 00:40:08,799 Speaker 1: give a chuckle, even a slightly louder than average exhalation 641 00:40:08,920 --> 00:40:12,400 Speaker 1: of air through the nasal passages, I'll take that. In 642 00:40:12,440 --> 00:40:16,400 Speaker 1: these dark and trying and frankly, uh terrifying troubling times, 643 00:40:16,920 --> 00:40:20,440 Speaker 1: puns are one of the new leading currencies in uh this. 644 00:40:22,280 --> 00:40:25,160 Speaker 1: If you don't like the Internet totally get it. You 645 00:40:25,200 --> 00:40:28,799 Speaker 1: can call us directly. We have a phone number. It's 646 00:40:28,800 --> 00:40:31,960 Speaker 1: available any time that you are near a phone. I 647 00:40:31,960 --> 00:40:33,680 Speaker 1: want you to hold a phone and look at it 648 00:40:33,719 --> 00:40:36,400 Speaker 1: and be like I could be talking right now to 649 00:40:36,520 --> 00:40:39,759 Speaker 1: these guys, because it's true. Just I one eight three 650 00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:43,759 Speaker 1: three say it with me std W y t K. 651 00:40:44,719 --> 00:40:47,600 Speaker 1: When you dial in here, you're going to have about 652 00:40:47,719 --> 00:40:52,720 Speaker 1: ballpark three minutes to share with your fellow listens, to 653 00:40:52,800 --> 00:40:55,719 Speaker 1: share your story, your reaction, your feedback, your proposal for 654 00:40:55,760 --> 00:40:59,000 Speaker 1: a new topic with us. One thing we're running into 655 00:40:59,080 --> 00:41:02,279 Speaker 1: is I think having that three minute clock ticking in 656 00:41:02,320 --> 00:41:05,600 Speaker 1: your head can be a little daunting. I tried it 657 00:41:05,680 --> 00:41:09,120 Speaker 1: myself once when I called into when I called into 658 00:41:09,160 --> 00:41:12,880 Speaker 1: this show from a different country, and that three minutes 659 00:41:12,920 --> 00:41:16,760 Speaker 1: goes by quickly, So it might be helpful to maybe 660 00:41:16,800 --> 00:41:20,160 Speaker 1: take just a second and write down like two to 661 00:41:20,239 --> 00:41:22,000 Speaker 1: three bullet points, just like this is what I'm gonna 662 00:41:22,080 --> 00:41:24,719 Speaker 1: talk about, and then boom, boom boom, you're in and 663 00:41:24,760 --> 00:41:26,640 Speaker 1: we can't wait to hear from you. It's like they say, 664 00:41:26,800 --> 00:41:29,200 Speaker 1: brevity is the soul of wit. Yes, and if you 665 00:41:29,440 --> 00:41:32,520 Speaker 1: are not interested in doing social media or calling us, 666 00:41:32,560 --> 00:41:35,120 Speaker 1: you can always send us a good old fashioned email, 667 00:41:35,280 --> 00:41:38,839 Speaker 1: just like Agent Vegetable Burger did, and we will check 668 00:41:38,880 --> 00:41:40,759 Speaker 1: it out for sure, and it might end up on 669 00:41:40,760 --> 00:41:43,400 Speaker 1: one of these episodes. So if you do want to 670 00:41:43,440 --> 00:41:46,279 Speaker 1: email us, you can find us. We are conspiracy at 671 00:41:46,280 --> 00:42:07,080 Speaker 1: iHeart radio dot com. Yeah. Stuff they don't want you 672 00:42:07,120 --> 00:42:09,759 Speaker 1: to know is a production of I heart Radio. For 673 00:42:09,840 --> 00:42:12,200 Speaker 1: more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the i heart 674 00:42:12,280 --> 00:42:15,040 Speaker 1: Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your 675 00:42:15,080 --> 00:42:15,720 Speaker 1: favorite shows.