WEBVTT - Why the Federal Reserve Has No Control Over the Markets

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<v Speaker 1>Why the Federal Reserve has no control over the markets. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>I know that's a big statement. We're all waiting on

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<v Speaker 1>every word from the Federal Reserve. Are they going to

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<v Speaker 1>lower rates, are they going to increase rates, will they

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<v Speaker 1>stimulate the markets, or where they continue to hike and

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<v Speaker 1>cause the markets to crash. But today's guest says that

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<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve has actually no control over the markets.

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<v Speaker 1>It's completely out of their control. And he's not just nobody,

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<v Speaker 1>he's one of the most respected voices when it comes

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<v Speaker 1>to the US dollar and the bigger problem, which is

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<v Speaker 1>the euro dollar. I'm talking about Jeff Snyder from Your

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<v Speaker 1>Euro Dollar University podcast. He's also with Markets Insider pro

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<v Speaker 1>and Portfolio shield dot net. And we talked about why

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<v Speaker 1>he says the Federal Reserve has no control over the markets,

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<v Speaker 1>why the story of Paul Volker under Reagan hiking interest

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<v Speaker 1>rates to tame inflation is a complete myth, how it

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<v Speaker 1>had nothing to do with that. We're gonna talk about

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<v Speaker 1>the reality of inflation and the FED having no control

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<v Speaker 1>to affect that. We're gonna talk about what the end

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<v Speaker 1>game of all this is what he thinks happens. In

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<v Speaker 1>his best guests. Of course, we're gonna talk about sound money,

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<v Speaker 1>We're gonna talk about bitcoin, We're gonna talk about uh

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<v Speaker 1>reasons why it may or may not work, what happened

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<v Speaker 1>throughout history, so many more topics with the absolute legend.

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<v Speaker 1>Jeff Snyder was an amazing interview. Let's go ahead, just

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<v Speaker 1>jump right into it. Jeff, thank you so much for

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<v Speaker 1>your patients, and I appreciate you showing up today. Big

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<v Speaker 1>fan of work. I'm I'm excited again here Mark, thanks

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<v Speaker 1>for having me on. I love the set. It looks

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<v Speaker 1>absolutely terrific. Thanks. Thanks. Yeah, it's my first year, my

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<v Speaker 1>first guest with the new set here. So um uh

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<v Speaker 1>our guess about a month ago we were both speaking

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<v Speaker 1>at a mutual friends conference, George Gammon's conference, Rebel Capitalist Live,

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<v Speaker 1>and you gave a great presentation. I took a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of notes, um, and so I've been excited to talk

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<v Speaker 1>to you ever since. And Um, the thing that you

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<v Speaker 1>were talking about, and I think that you're a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit mad about and they want to scream to the

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<v Speaker 1>whole world about, is that the Federal Reserve has no control.

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<v Speaker 1>Is that right? Yeah? If you want to boil it

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<v Speaker 1>down into a single idea. That's probably the best way

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<v Speaker 1>to describe it. So the Federal Reserve is UH, I

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<v Speaker 1>think at the time of this recording, which by the way,

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<v Speaker 1>is UH July. I think the tomorrow they're expected to

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<v Speaker 1>come up with another rate hike. The markets are betting

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<v Speaker 1>it's going to be point seven five. Some people think

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<v Speaker 1>it would be be one point Probably doesn't really matter

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<v Speaker 1>either way. It seems that since they've announced their rate

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<v Speaker 1>hikes in November of last year, the risk on assets

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<v Speaker 1>sold off first. We saw the NASDAC and bitcoin kind

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<v Speaker 1>of sold off the same day, SMP lagged. Um. It

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<v Speaker 1>seems like their rate hikes have caused a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>problems in the markets, but yet they have no control.

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<v Speaker 1>So maybe he kind of frame that up for us

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit. Yeah, And I think that's the issue,

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<v Speaker 1>is what control do they have? Control is probably not

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<v Speaker 1>the right word. It's more of like more like along

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<v Speaker 1>the lines of influence. And so if you look at

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<v Speaker 1>what the FET actually does, let's just let's just get

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<v Speaker 1>it all the way from the beginning. They don't print money.

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<v Speaker 1>There is no money printing. They create balance sheet space,

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<v Speaker 1>they create bank reserves, but many people believe they print

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<v Speaker 1>money and as long as people believe they print money,

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<v Speaker 1>they act as if they have. And one of the

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<v Speaker 1>ways that that manifests is in the financial services industry

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<v Speaker 1>in certain asset markets. For example, in when J. Powell

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<v Speaker 1>got on TV and told you he lied to your

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<v Speaker 1>damn face and said that he printed digital dollars and

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<v Speaker 1>flooded the world with him, that was a message he

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<v Speaker 1>intended to send to asset managers to say, I've got

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<v Speaker 1>your back, don't worry about it, no matter what's going

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<v Speaker 1>on in these dark, dark times of COVID, the Federal

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<v Speaker 1>Reserve has got your back. If it doesn't have your back,

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<v Speaker 1>but if enough people actually believe it, it becomes a

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<v Speaker 1>self fulfilling prophecy. And so risk managers by risky assets

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<v Speaker 1>because they think, well, hell, J. Powell is doing something.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know what he's doing, but he's doing something.

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<v Speaker 1>So therefore I have I can call my clients and

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<v Speaker 1>tell them we're buying stocks and we're buying risky assets

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<v Speaker 1>because the FED is doing some stuff. And so that's

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<v Speaker 1>what happens the FED. The FED has it a sentimental

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<v Speaker 1>effect or a psychological effect, primarily through the financial services industry,

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<v Speaker 1>but also in other places, and then you get to

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<v Speaker 1>November of one where the FED says we're not going

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<v Speaker 1>to do the same stuff we've been doing before. Suddenly

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<v Speaker 1>financial services managers they don't have that protection, they don't

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<v Speaker 1>believe they have the same protection from J. Paul. So

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<v Speaker 1>you have that sentimental effects start to reverse and it

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<v Speaker 1>becomes self fulfilling and self realizing in the the opposite

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<v Speaker 1>direction and the from the way that it had had

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<v Speaker 1>gone in one. So without the ability to feel like J.

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<v Speaker 1>Powell has got your back because are gonna be hiking

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<v Speaker 1>interest rates and they're gonna be cutting back and scale

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<v Speaker 1>it and running off their balance sheet. There the FED

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<v Speaker 1>isn't isn't my buddy anymore. Suddenly asking assets look a lot,

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<v Speaker 1>a lot more risky than they had before. So this

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<v Speaker 1>is one area where UM, I have a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>of disagreement with UM a lot of economists, UM, because

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<v Speaker 1>I think they can be factually correct, but maybe a

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<v Speaker 1>little intellectually dishonest. I don't know if that's the right

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<v Speaker 1>way to say it. So, UM, you talk about they

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<v Speaker 1>didn't really do anything, but they had a psychological effect,

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<v Speaker 1>Well that is something, all right. So then then it's

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<v Speaker 1>like you're starting to split hairs. Um. At George's last event,

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<v Speaker 1>he had a professor. Uh uh, I'm drawn up like

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<v Speaker 1>now the German uh economist who does all the talks

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<v Speaker 1>all the central bank stuff. Uh is it Wolf anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm dronna blank. Sorry. But he gave this great talk

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<v Speaker 1>about how all this central bank printing through two thousand

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<v Speaker 1>eight and wasn't inflationary. But I said, but stock indexes

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<v Speaker 1>are up at all time highs and and house prices

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<v Speaker 1>are altimized. Well, that's assets, that's assets, that's not consumer prices.

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<v Speaker 1>And so it's like it's kind of like splitting hairs

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit to me. No, but there is a

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<v Speaker 1>real monetary issue there, and the real monetary issues that

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<v Speaker 1>the credit creation that underpinned or supported the previous housing

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<v Speaker 1>bubble and the credit bubbles of the pre crisis era

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<v Speaker 1>just disappeared. So what happened in asset prices post crisis

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<v Speaker 1>was I mean, you can call it inflation if you want,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't really care. There was definitely an effect there,

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<v Speaker 1>but it was non monetary. Was something else entirely. So

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<v Speaker 1>the real economy has been deprived of credit and money,

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<v Speaker 1>even if asset prices have done really well, certain asset

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<v Speaker 1>classes obviously done better than others, which has only led

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<v Speaker 1>to more problems because you have stocks, for example, at

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<v Speaker 1>all time highs, or they were at all time highs

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<v Speaker 1>not that long ago, while the economy is in the toilet,

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<v Speaker 1>and not just in the US, all across the world,

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<v Speaker 1>the economic growth has fallen off substantially, not coincidentally, ever

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<v Speaker 1>since this credit credit machine broke down more than a

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<v Speaker 1>dozen years ago. So you have the psychological impact where

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<v Speaker 1>there is less friction for psychology to work in certain

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<v Speaker 1>asset classes and asset prices all based on a misconception

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<v Speaker 1>of what it what it is the Federal Reserve does,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's not really spitting splitting hairs. It's a categorical

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<v Speaker 1>difference that explains a lot about explains everything about the

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<v Speaker 1>world that we're actually living at why everybody is so

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<v Speaker 1>damned piste off about everything because you have the rich

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<v Speaker 1>people getting richer and the poor people can't find a job.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's really the issue here, is that without monetary growth,

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<v Speaker 1>without credit growth, the economy stuck. And no matter what

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<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve has done over the last twelve years,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not just a fed the ECB, the Bank of

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<v Speaker 1>Japan has been doing it has been failing even longer

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<v Speaker 1>with their psychological manipulation tactics. It hasn't worked there either,

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<v Speaker 1>So you have a divergence between what the real econo

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<v Speaker 1>of he's doing because psychology doesn't work in any any

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<v Speaker 1>real sense. It does work in asset markets like stocks,

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<v Speaker 1>because there's no real fundamental tie to any tangible asset

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<v Speaker 1>or in tangible outcome. So again you have this major

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<v Speaker 1>divergence between where assets went where the real economy went,

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<v Speaker 1>which is nowhere. Good. Well, let's let's and let me

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<v Speaker 1>talk about one other things. You said that they don't

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<v Speaker 1>actually print money, which is true. So the Federal Reserve

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<v Speaker 1>gives banks reserves and they set the interest rate, but

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<v Speaker 1>the bank charges their interest rate on top of that

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<v Speaker 1>whatever they want, and they can decide whether they want

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<v Speaker 1>to loan money on or not. Right, So I think

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<v Speaker 1>that's kind of your point. Right. However, um, through the

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<v Speaker 1>bank's reserves and through their MBS policies and stuff, they

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<v Speaker 1>take toxic debt off the books and then replaced No. No,

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<v Speaker 1>see that's the thing. That's another misconception. That was not buying.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, the FED buys us treasuries and nbs, and

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<v Speaker 1>then they're not buying subprime mortgages. They're not buying subprime

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<v Speaker 1>mortgage bonds or leverage loans or some other financial products,

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<v Speaker 1>certainly not buying clos like they've made people believed either

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<v Speaker 1>in March, the FED is buying assets the market already wants.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, the FED knows this. They talk about it

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<v Speaker 1>all the time. The fact that you know famous quote

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<v Speaker 1>from Richard Fisher in two thousand eleven, and why are

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<v Speaker 1>we buying assets that the market is fleeing toward? Central

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<v Speaker 1>banks are supposed to be buying, like you said, they're

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<v Speaker 1>supposed to be buying toxic assets that people don't want.

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<v Speaker 1>But that's not what quantitative easing has been. It's not

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<v Speaker 1>what quantitative easing has ever been, which is one reason

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<v Speaker 1>why it doesn't ever work. And really, you know, we

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<v Speaker 1>stop and think about what QUEWI is supposed to bes

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<v Speaker 1>and as opposed to what it actually is. Everybody looks

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<v Speaker 1>at it from the perspective of the federal reserve. What

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<v Speaker 1>is the FED doing when you need to look at it,

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<v Speaker 1>as you just said, Mark, from the perspective of the

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<v Speaker 1>commercial bank. You can create all the reserves in the

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<v Speaker 1>world that you want. But if banks aren't going to

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<v Speaker 1>be lending, it doesn't matter. That's just an accounting fiction

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<v Speaker 1>that's created by monetary policy. Think about it this way. Before,

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<v Speaker 1>before Lehman Brothers in two thousand and eight, there were

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<v Speaker 1>hardly any bank reserves in the in the entire global

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<v Speaker 1>system that spans trillions upon trillions of dollars, there were

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<v Speaker 1>no bank reserves. Yet credit was created. We had asset

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<v Speaker 1>bubbles through the roof. You had all sorts of money

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<v Speaker 1>everywhere around the world with no bank reserves. Suddenly we

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<v Speaker 1>get to the other side of the crisis. There are

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<v Speaker 1>trillions and bank reserves, but no credit girls, no expansion,

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<v Speaker 1>no money. How is that possible? Because the FED isn't

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<v Speaker 1>creating usable money. It's responding to breakdowns in the actual

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<v Speaker 1>monetary system through this psychological tactics, through the through the

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<v Speaker 1>act of buying bonds that the market already wants anyway.

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<v Speaker 1>So the way that you were explained to me, though,

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<v Speaker 1>it sounds like there's direct and indirect influence the FED

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<v Speaker 1>has so a lot of times I think maybe you're

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<v Speaker 1>saying that. So, look, they didn't do anything. They said

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<v Speaker 1>they're gonna do something but they didn't do anything, so

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<v Speaker 1>there was no result. But at the same time, just

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<v Speaker 1>them saying it, or sometimes we might call it job

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<v Speaker 1>owning actually does do something. Would we agree on that

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<v Speaker 1>they kent? Yes, And most of those psychological impacts are

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<v Speaker 1>sentimental impact acts are short term in nature. They don't

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<v Speaker 1>have a lasting impact certainly in any real sense. Asset

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<v Speaker 1>prices a different thing. Uh, certain asset markets is a

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<v Speaker 1>different story. But in terms of the real economy, there's

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<v Speaker 1>really not much impact whatsoever. Okay, Now, Um, another thing

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<v Speaker 1>that you had talked about at this at this event

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<v Speaker 1>to the Rebel Capitalist Live, you talked about the Vulcan myth,

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<v Speaker 1>and so everyone is wondering, now if the Fed can,

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<v Speaker 1>if they'll have the stomach to tame inflation, will they

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<v Speaker 1>raise rates high enough to stomach, you know, to to

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<v Speaker 1>to finally put an end to this high inflation that

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<v Speaker 1>we have. Um, like Vulker did in the eighties where

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<v Speaker 1>he went from ten um and you had a whole

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<v Speaker 1>piece saying that that was a complete myth, which continues

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<v Speaker 1>to back up what you're saying and why the Federal

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<v Speaker 1>Reserve really has no controls. So let's talk about that

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<v Speaker 1>Vulcan myth and why you think that actually isn't true.

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<v Speaker 1>He isn't the one that stopped inflation. If if I'm

0:11:54.240 --> 0:11:56.920
<v Speaker 1>saying that right, if I'm not putting words in your mouth. Yeah,

0:11:57.080 --> 0:11:59.720
<v Speaker 1>that's where the Volker myth actually comes from, the idea

0:11:59.760 --> 0:12:03.400
<v Speaker 1>that it was Paul Wolker who skyrocketed interest rates in

0:12:03.520 --> 0:12:06.480
<v Speaker 1>seventeen starting in nineteen seventy nine, and that's the reason

0:12:06.480 --> 0:12:09.719
<v Speaker 1>why the great inflation suddenly stopped. And the funny thing is,

0:12:09.760 --> 0:12:11.800
<v Speaker 1>if you had if your time travel back to nineteen

0:12:11.800 --> 0:12:13.920
<v Speaker 1>seventy nine, he would be shocked. And by he, I

0:12:13.960 --> 0:12:16.000
<v Speaker 1>mean Paul Woker. They had no idea what they were

0:12:16.040 --> 0:12:18.120
<v Speaker 1>doing in seventy nine. And this is not something you

0:12:18.160 --> 0:12:19.480
<v Speaker 1>have to take my word for it. I gotta do

0:12:19.520 --> 0:12:22.000
<v Speaker 1>is read the transcript from the FOMC meetings at the time.

0:12:22.400 --> 0:12:24.880
<v Speaker 1>These people had no clue what they were doing. And

0:12:24.920 --> 0:12:27.280
<v Speaker 1>the idea that Faull Volker raising rates, that's not what

0:12:27.320 --> 0:12:29.800
<v Speaker 1>he did either. But the idea, the idea of the

0:12:29.840 --> 0:12:33.640
<v Speaker 1>myth that he raised rates and tame Great inflation UHS

0:12:34.000 --> 0:12:37.160
<v Speaker 1>was something that was invented afterwards to try and explain

0:12:37.760 --> 0:12:40.280
<v Speaker 1>what happened in late from the late seventies into the

0:12:40.280 --> 0:12:42.640
<v Speaker 1>middle nineteen eighties, it was sort of like, we have

0:12:42.720 --> 0:12:45.800
<v Speaker 1>no idea what really happened. So maybe it was this

0:12:45.840 --> 0:12:48.520
<v Speaker 1>thing that Vocer did that created this the end of

0:12:48.520 --> 0:12:50.839
<v Speaker 1>the Great Inflation, And that's been the myth that we've

0:12:50.880 --> 0:12:54.160
<v Speaker 1>been told that was reinforced through the quote unquote great

0:12:54.200 --> 0:12:57.280
<v Speaker 1>moderation by Alan Greenspan, the Maestro, all that stuff in

0:12:57.280 --> 0:13:00.240
<v Speaker 1>the nineties and into the two thousand's. But if you

0:13:00.240 --> 0:13:01.880
<v Speaker 1>actually go back and look at what happened in the

0:13:01.960 --> 0:13:05.280
<v Speaker 1>late seventies and early nineteen eighties, it was a whole

0:13:05.360 --> 0:13:08.080
<v Speaker 1>bunch of clueless bureaucrats just throwing ship at the wall

0:13:08.160 --> 0:13:13.360
<v Speaker 1>hoping something stuck. So why did he raise rates so high?

0:13:13.400 --> 0:13:16.200
<v Speaker 1>Because I didn't know what else to do. Paul Voker,

0:13:16.240 --> 0:13:18.559
<v Speaker 1>you gotta give the guy at least some credit. Unlike

0:13:18.559 --> 0:13:22.080
<v Speaker 1>his predecessor, Arthur Burns, Voker at least knew that the

0:13:22.080 --> 0:13:24.920
<v Speaker 1>Great Inflation was tied to the money supply. Burns with

0:13:24.960 --> 0:13:28.319
<v Speaker 1>thought it was fiscal deficits. He convinced governments. He went

0:13:28.360 --> 0:13:31.240
<v Speaker 1>off into a neo Kenzie and Funk, And so you know,

0:13:31.280 --> 0:13:33.400
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve was looking in the wrong place. For

0:13:33.440 --> 0:13:36.439
<v Speaker 1>the reason why inflation was so out of control, as

0:13:36.440 --> 0:13:40.920
<v Speaker 1>Milton Friedman said, As Milton Friedman showed conclusively inflation is always,

0:13:40.960 --> 0:13:44.120
<v Speaker 1>at everywhere a monetary phenomenon, so at least Volker Volker

0:13:44.240 --> 0:13:47.480
<v Speaker 1>at least knew that much. However, his plan to stop

0:13:47.520 --> 0:13:50.240
<v Speaker 1>inflation was sort of a we don't know what else

0:13:50.280 --> 0:13:52.680
<v Speaker 1>to do because the federal reserve. All we have in

0:13:52.679 --> 0:13:56.560
<v Speaker 1>our toolkit are these bank reserves, and bank reserves have

0:13:56.600 --> 0:13:59.600
<v Speaker 1>a very narrow limited use, which is you have a

0:13:59.640 --> 0:14:04.200
<v Speaker 1>reserve requirement that's imposed upon the banking system by governments.

0:14:04.280 --> 0:14:07.280
<v Speaker 1>And so what happened. What the theory was was that

0:14:07.320 --> 0:14:10.520
<v Speaker 1>if the Federal Reserve undervoc or made bank reserves scarce,

0:14:10.920 --> 0:14:14.000
<v Speaker 1>he would make bank reserves expensive and the bank the

0:14:14.040 --> 0:14:18.240
<v Speaker 1>bank reserves became expensive. That would make depository money expensive.

0:14:18.559 --> 0:14:21.240
<v Speaker 1>Because if you're a commercial bank and you create a

0:14:21.240 --> 0:14:25.400
<v Speaker 1>loan in a a corresponding deposit money liability against it,

0:14:25.800 --> 0:14:28.680
<v Speaker 1>that creates a reserve requirement that you must meet, and

0:14:28.720 --> 0:14:30.520
<v Speaker 1>you have to you can meet it through vault cash,

0:14:30.600 --> 0:14:32.680
<v Speaker 1>or you can meet it through bank reserves held it

0:14:32.760 --> 0:14:35.560
<v Speaker 1>the Fed. So the idea was, if we make bank

0:14:35.600 --> 0:14:37.920
<v Speaker 1>reserves scarce, that will make that will increase the cost.

0:14:37.960 --> 0:14:40.040
<v Speaker 1>The rate will go up, as it did, the federal

0:14:40.040 --> 0:14:42.280
<v Speaker 1>funds rate will go up, and that will that will

0:14:42.320 --> 0:14:46.400
<v Speaker 1>then make banks reconsider their creation of loans and depository money,

0:14:46.640 --> 0:14:50.680
<v Speaker 1>therefore restrict economic activity, and that's the end of the inflation.

0:14:51.360 --> 0:14:53.440
<v Speaker 1>That's not how it worked. First of all, the Federal

0:14:53.520 --> 0:14:57.440
<v Speaker 1>Reserve panicked as soon as they started this, this restricting

0:14:57.520 --> 0:15:01.720
<v Speaker 1>reserve regime in nineteen seventy nine. Immediately the federal funds

0:15:01.760 --> 0:15:05.840
<v Speaker 1>rate skyrocketed to more than which nowadays people think, well, yeah,

0:15:05.880 --> 0:15:08.080
<v Speaker 1>that was the point, But no, at the time they panicked.

0:15:08.280 --> 0:15:11.600
<v Speaker 1>They actually did a repot programs starting in October of

0:15:11.680 --> 0:15:15.040
<v Speaker 1>nineteen nine to put reserves back into the system because

0:15:15.040 --> 0:15:17.760
<v Speaker 1>they thought they had gone too far. But either way

0:15:17.880 --> 0:15:20.560
<v Speaker 1>it didn't matter, because no matter what the Federal Reserve

0:15:20.640 --> 0:15:23.720
<v Speaker 1>did in terms of depriving the system or not depriving

0:15:23.720 --> 0:15:27.239
<v Speaker 1>the system of bank reserves, it had no impact whatsoever

0:15:27.320 --> 0:15:30.400
<v Speaker 1>on depository money, had no impact on M three, had

0:15:30.440 --> 0:15:33.000
<v Speaker 1>no impact on the real money, which is the shadow

0:15:33.040 --> 0:15:36.440
<v Speaker 1>money across the Euro dollar system. That's not what happened.

0:15:36.920 --> 0:15:40.400
<v Speaker 1>So after it became clear that restricting bank reserves was

0:15:40.440 --> 0:15:45.160
<v Speaker 1>having no effect on either monetary aggregates, or the real

0:15:45.200 --> 0:15:48.800
<v Speaker 1>economic outcomes. They sort of invented another kind of myth,

0:15:48.840 --> 0:15:52.760
<v Speaker 1>which was that, Okay, maybe restricting bank reserves didn't cause

0:15:52.760 --> 0:15:55.080
<v Speaker 1>the end of the end of the Great Reflation. Maybe

0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:59.000
<v Speaker 1>it was the collateral consequence of having interest rate rise,

0:15:59.080 --> 0:16:02.080
<v Speaker 1>the federal funds rate rise, that had some kind of

0:16:02.120 --> 0:16:04.160
<v Speaker 1>impact that we can't explain because it didn't have any

0:16:04.240 --> 0:16:07.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of monetary impact. It didn't impact the monetary system whatsoever.

0:16:07.920 --> 0:16:10.680
<v Speaker 1>So maybe the fact that interest rates short term federal

0:16:10.680 --> 0:16:14.160
<v Speaker 1>fund ray in particular one up. That's the reason why

0:16:14.280 --> 0:16:17.800
<v Speaker 1>the economic outcomes that we all wanted ended up happening.

0:16:18.200 --> 0:16:23.000
<v Speaker 1>It's simply looking at correlation and implying causation that isn't

0:16:23.040 --> 0:16:26.680
<v Speaker 1>actually there. Because again, the FED at the time realized

0:16:27.120 --> 0:16:30.120
<v Speaker 1>they couldn't even define, let alone measure, let alone control

0:16:30.160 --> 0:16:37.520
<v Speaker 1>the monetary system. Now, uh, let's jump I want to

0:16:37.560 --> 0:16:39.800
<v Speaker 1>talk about where we're at today. But before we jump

0:16:39.880 --> 0:16:42.920
<v Speaker 1>to there, um and I guess the part of the

0:16:42.920 --> 0:16:45.080
<v Speaker 1>reason why you say they can't really control the monetary

0:16:45.080 --> 0:16:48.080
<v Speaker 1>system is that the FED only can control basically the

0:16:48.160 --> 0:16:52.360
<v Speaker 1>dollars bank reserves. That's it. That's that's the one tool

0:16:52.440 --> 0:16:55.440
<v Speaker 1>that they have. And in the nineteen seventeen. Before the

0:16:55.520 --> 0:17:00.320
<v Speaker 1>nineteen seventies, banks invented ways to circumvent the reserver fronments

0:17:00.440 --> 0:17:04.359
<v Speaker 1>invented new ways of doing monetary transactions, things like repo,

0:17:04.560 --> 0:17:07.960
<v Speaker 1>things like eurodollars, things like currency swaps, that they could

0:17:08.000 --> 0:17:11.040
<v Speaker 1>just manipulate both the asset and liabilities side, regardless of

0:17:11.040 --> 0:17:13.359
<v Speaker 1>whatever constraints that FED tried to impose on them. And

0:17:13.359 --> 0:17:15.040
<v Speaker 1>in fact, that's one of the things that happened in

0:17:15.119 --> 0:17:20.080
<v Speaker 1>ninety The FED tried to make these reserves expensive, therefore

0:17:20.119 --> 0:17:23.920
<v Speaker 1>making depository money expensive, and so banks just encourage their

0:17:23.920 --> 0:17:27.440
<v Speaker 1>customers to shift their assets from their deposit accounts into

0:17:27.480 --> 0:17:31.040
<v Speaker 1>money market funds. Money market funds don't have a reserve requirements,

0:17:31.040 --> 0:17:33.760
<v Speaker 1>and so they went into so as the customer deposits

0:17:33.800 --> 0:17:37.200
<v Speaker 1>moved from the commercial bank that created this reserve requirement,

0:17:37.440 --> 0:17:39.440
<v Speaker 1>they moved to a money market fund. The bank was

0:17:39.560 --> 0:17:42.040
<v Speaker 1>done just borrow the funds back from the money market fund.

0:17:42.400 --> 0:17:46.080
<v Speaker 1>In wholesale markets. Banks had created all sorts of ways

0:17:46.160 --> 0:17:48.880
<v Speaker 1>to be able to manipulate their assets and liability these

0:17:48.920 --> 0:17:55.760
<v Speaker 1>monetary forms that just rendered the federal reserves tools completely obsolete,

0:17:56.920 --> 0:17:59.520
<v Speaker 1>except for if they don't believe the Fed's going to

0:17:59.600 --> 0:18:02.680
<v Speaker 1>be find them supporting them, then they'll get into they'll

0:18:02.720 --> 0:18:04.840
<v Speaker 1>get out of those risky assets, which is where we're

0:18:04.840 --> 0:18:08.240
<v Speaker 1>at today, which is a completely different animal. It's a

0:18:08.240 --> 0:18:11.399
<v Speaker 1>different animal. So the tools that they're FED is using

0:18:11.480 --> 0:18:15.480
<v Speaker 1>don't really do much. But the support that the psychological

0:18:15.480 --> 0:18:18.200
<v Speaker 1>effect of the support, either having it or not having it,

0:18:18.280 --> 0:18:22.480
<v Speaker 1>does have an effect in yeah, in certain markets. It

0:18:22.480 --> 0:18:25.199
<v Speaker 1>certainly doesn't have any impact in anything that has a

0:18:25.320 --> 0:18:28.600
<v Speaker 1>fundamental link to the real economy. So fixed income you

0:18:28.600 --> 0:18:31.520
<v Speaker 1>don't see any real psychological impact from the FED whatsoever.

0:18:31.920 --> 0:18:34.080
<v Speaker 1>It's really about manipulating the short end of the yield

0:18:34.080 --> 0:18:36.639
<v Speaker 1>curve and hoping the rest of the curve goes along.

0:18:36.680 --> 0:18:39.120
<v Speaker 1>So we've seen the FED hike rates over the last

0:18:39.160 --> 0:18:41.200
<v Speaker 1>few months. The short end of the yield curve goes out,

0:18:41.240 --> 0:18:43.320
<v Speaker 1>because of course it would if you're owning a two

0:18:43.400 --> 0:18:46.200
<v Speaker 1>year US tragedy for example, if the FED is hiking

0:18:46.600 --> 0:18:49.560
<v Speaker 1>you know these reverse repo rate, you have an alternative

0:18:49.640 --> 0:18:51.639
<v Speaker 1>rate that you can get a return on. So the

0:18:51.720 --> 0:18:53.560
<v Speaker 1>FED is able to influence the short end of the

0:18:53.600 --> 0:18:56.960
<v Speaker 1>yeel curve, but even that is somewhat illusory because over

0:18:57.040 --> 0:19:00.840
<v Speaker 1>time they lose control. Really really quickly too. And that's

0:19:00.880 --> 0:19:02.880
<v Speaker 1>that's assuming that the long end of the Yolk curve

0:19:02.960 --> 0:19:05.880
<v Speaker 1>actually falls in line, which as we see now that's

0:19:05.920 --> 0:19:08.280
<v Speaker 1>not the case either. That's why the curves are inverted

0:19:08.640 --> 0:19:10.679
<v Speaker 1>because the long end of the yeld curve is fighting

0:19:10.720 --> 0:19:16.960
<v Speaker 1>against the Feds, right heikes at the short end. H Yeah, Now, um,

0:19:17.080 --> 0:19:19.920
<v Speaker 1>the the yield curve is gotten pretty screwed up. I mean,

0:19:19.920 --> 0:19:21.720
<v Speaker 1>a lot of this, I would imagine has to do

0:19:21.800 --> 0:19:25.240
<v Speaker 1>with the continued manipulation they have with printing more currency

0:19:25.280 --> 0:19:28.240
<v Speaker 1>and manipulating the their FED funds rate. At some point,

0:19:28.320 --> 0:19:33.560
<v Speaker 1>because it's been accurate predicting recessions, which I guess for

0:19:33.720 --> 0:19:35.760
<v Speaker 1>the for the White House, we're not in a recession

0:19:35.800 --> 0:19:42.600
<v Speaker 1>anymore technically they've changed, true, but the recession is still coming. Okay,

0:19:43.320 --> 0:19:46.320
<v Speaker 1>So the yield curve is predicting that there's a recession coming,

0:19:46.640 --> 0:19:48.199
<v Speaker 1>and it's been predicting that for a while. Right there.

0:19:48.280 --> 0:19:51.680
<v Speaker 1>Yield curve was predicting that since two thousand nineteen. Well,

0:19:51.720 --> 0:19:54.199
<v Speaker 1>the yo curve predicted the recession that probably would have

0:19:54.240 --> 0:19:56.800
<v Speaker 1>happened in two thousand twenty had it not been for COVID.

0:19:57.160 --> 0:19:59.720
<v Speaker 1>So the yel curve had inverted in twenty nineteen. In fact,

0:19:59.720 --> 0:20:02.680
<v Speaker 1>parts of it inverted as early as eighteen. Your Dollar

0:20:02.720 --> 0:20:05.960
<v Speaker 1>futures curve inverted in June, which was a bet that

0:20:06.040 --> 0:20:08.159
<v Speaker 1>the Fed was going to end up cutting rates before

0:20:08.200 --> 0:20:11.399
<v Speaker 1>they continued hiking rates, which is actually proven to be true.

0:20:11.880 --> 0:20:15.840
<v Speaker 1>These markets have been have proven in general terms, incredibly

0:20:15.880 --> 0:20:19.359
<v Speaker 1>accurate over each of these particular cycles. And so the

0:20:19.400 --> 0:20:22.560
<v Speaker 1>your Dollar futures curve inverted back in December of last year,

0:20:22.920 --> 0:20:25.359
<v Speaker 1>which was a bet despite the feds ultra hawk is

0:20:25.480 --> 0:20:28.600
<v Speaker 1>stance and growing ultra hal care stance that eventually the

0:20:28.640 --> 0:20:30.720
<v Speaker 1>FED was going to have to stop hiking rates and

0:20:30.800 --> 0:20:34.000
<v Speaker 1>maybe start is turn around and start cutting them before

0:20:34.040 --> 0:20:37.520
<v Speaker 1>the FED realized it it. Ever, since December, the inversion

0:20:37.520 --> 0:20:39.960
<v Speaker 1>of your at All the futures has grown to two

0:20:40.000 --> 0:20:44.720
<v Speaker 1>thousand eight proportions. Uh. It is comcredibly inverted at the

0:20:44.880 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 1>as we speak right now, which is the market betting

0:20:47.760 --> 0:20:50.080
<v Speaker 1>that the FED only has a couple maybe more rate

0:20:50.160 --> 0:20:53.840
<v Speaker 1>hikes left this year before something happens. We don't know

0:20:53.920 --> 0:20:57.120
<v Speaker 1>what we can guess before something happens, and the FED

0:20:57.200 --> 0:20:59.560
<v Speaker 1>has to turn around, stop hiking rates, and turn around

0:20:59.600 --> 0:21:03.680
<v Speaker 1>and start cutting them aggressively. Maybe as soon as this year,

0:21:04.200 --> 0:21:07.120
<v Speaker 1>probably next early next year at the latest, and then

0:21:07.119 --> 0:21:11.000
<v Speaker 1>the Yeal curve is essentially agreeing with the premise behind

0:21:11.000 --> 0:21:14.280
<v Speaker 1>the rod dollar futures inversion, which is that there's probably

0:21:14.359 --> 0:21:18.359
<v Speaker 1>something like like recession, if not nasty recession, still in

0:21:18.440 --> 0:21:20.800
<v Speaker 1>front of us. So think about it that way. We've

0:21:20.840 --> 0:21:23.760
<v Speaker 1>already had two straight quarters, likely we'll find out Thursday,

0:21:24.000 --> 0:21:26.959
<v Speaker 1>but we'll likely have had two straight quarters of negative

0:21:27.000 --> 0:21:30.640
<v Speaker 1>GDP to start the year, and the markets are all

0:21:30.800 --> 0:21:34.200
<v Speaker 1>uniformly saying, that's not the thing we're worried about. We're

0:21:34.200 --> 0:21:38.040
<v Speaker 1>worried about what comes after. We've already had a technical recession,

0:21:38.040 --> 0:21:40.520
<v Speaker 1>as so many you believe that that's the definition. So

0:21:40.560 --> 0:21:46.000
<v Speaker 1>the markets are all positioned for a deflationary monetary condition

0:21:46.080 --> 0:21:49.400
<v Speaker 1>on top of what might be a pretty nasty recession too.

0:21:50.560 --> 0:21:52.800
<v Speaker 1>When you go back and and look through history, which

0:21:52.840 --> 0:21:55.199
<v Speaker 1>I know you have many times, um, it seems like

0:21:55.240 --> 0:21:58.960
<v Speaker 1>it's not the it's not the reversal. So when they've

0:21:59.000 --> 0:22:00.760
<v Speaker 1>been lowering lower and lower and then they go back

0:22:00.760 --> 0:22:02.919
<v Speaker 1>to raising, which they're on right now, it's when they

0:22:03.000 --> 0:22:06.080
<v Speaker 1>reverse back off of that which seems to be kind

0:22:06.080 --> 0:22:08.120
<v Speaker 1>of the trigger. Is that kind of what you're saying,

0:22:08.160 --> 0:22:09.679
<v Speaker 1>the markets are kind of seeing that in the in

0:22:09.720 --> 0:22:12.360
<v Speaker 1>the in the forefront, and that's the trigger that they're

0:22:12.640 --> 0:22:15.840
<v Speaker 1>aways the longer, longer to these curves are simply ignoring

0:22:15.880 --> 0:22:20.040
<v Speaker 1>the Fed entirely. What the you know, Irving Fisher decomposition

0:22:20.040 --> 0:22:23.200
<v Speaker 1>of yields into growth and inflation expectations. A longer long

0:22:23.280 --> 0:22:26.560
<v Speaker 1>end treasury yield is essentially building upon the short end

0:22:26.600 --> 0:22:30.200
<v Speaker 1>interest rates, so the money alternatives, but then implying growth

0:22:30.240 --> 0:22:32.919
<v Speaker 1>and inflation expectations on top of them. And so what

0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:34.919
<v Speaker 1>the what the curves are telling us, and they have

0:22:34.960 --> 0:22:38.360
<v Speaker 1>been telling us all years. They disagree with the very

0:22:38.400 --> 0:22:41.199
<v Speaker 1>premise behind the FEDS rate hikes to begin with, that

0:22:41.280 --> 0:22:43.879
<v Speaker 1>the economy is not overheating, the labor market is not

0:22:43.960 --> 0:22:47.639
<v Speaker 1>in any great situation, and that the rate hikes to

0:22:47.960 --> 0:22:52.320
<v Speaker 1>quote unquote end inflation aren't necessary because the recession that

0:22:52.400 --> 0:22:55.560
<v Speaker 1>the market is afraid of is the instrument that will

0:22:55.680 --> 0:22:59.240
<v Speaker 1>end inflation, that will end consumer prices. It will likely

0:22:59.320 --> 0:23:04.080
<v Speaker 1>result in renewed disinflation, if not deflation, at least in

0:23:04.119 --> 0:23:07.520
<v Speaker 1>the intermediate term. So the markets, and especially along into

0:23:07.560 --> 0:23:10.240
<v Speaker 1>the curves, outside of the Fed's window, out of the

0:23:10.280 --> 0:23:12.679
<v Speaker 1>same thing with your or dollar futures that the markets

0:23:12.680 --> 0:23:15.120
<v Speaker 1>have been betting against rate hikes from the very beginning.

0:23:15.480 --> 0:23:19.040
<v Speaker 1>M Now, I want to get into this end game,

0:23:19.080 --> 0:23:21.200
<v Speaker 1>the few hikes before it breaks. You said, we can

0:23:21.240 --> 0:23:23.400
<v Speaker 1>guess at what breaks and what we'll get back to that.

0:23:23.440 --> 0:23:26.120
<v Speaker 1>But um, you had also talked about how really what

0:23:26.160 --> 0:23:29.560
<v Speaker 1>we have is a problem. Um that that signals these uh,

0:23:29.960 --> 0:23:33.320
<v Speaker 1>these crashes, these recessions, is these dollar shortages that happen

0:23:33.359 --> 0:23:37.600
<v Speaker 1>all over the world. And I think that's probably we're at.

0:23:38.040 --> 0:23:39.600
<v Speaker 1>We'll have a dollar shortage right now, which is why

0:23:39.600 --> 0:23:42.240
<v Speaker 1>the Dixie is shooting so high. So explain this dollar

0:23:42.320 --> 0:23:46.760
<v Speaker 1>shortage over the world to us. That's the hardest part

0:23:46.760 --> 0:23:49.440
<v Speaker 1>for people to come to terms with because, as you said, Mark,

0:23:49.520 --> 0:23:51.919
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you see the Fed's balance sheet go up.

0:23:52.000 --> 0:23:54.480
<v Speaker 1>You see there's trillions upon trillions of bank reserves, and

0:23:54.520 --> 0:23:57.760
<v Speaker 1>you assume the bank reserves are useful money. In fact,

0:23:57.800 --> 0:24:00.440
<v Speaker 1>some people call them base money. And if you see

0:24:00.440 --> 0:24:03.240
<v Speaker 1>the Fed's balance sheets skyrocket, you see all these trillions

0:24:03.280 --> 0:24:06.000
<v Speaker 1>of reserves suddenly appear out of thin air. You think

0:24:06.040 --> 0:24:08.520
<v Speaker 1>a lot of money has been printed. So how in

0:24:08.560 --> 0:24:11.399
<v Speaker 1>the world can we possibly have a dollar shortage when

0:24:11.400 --> 0:24:13.960
<v Speaker 1>the FET has created all these dollars. And the answer

0:24:14.040 --> 0:24:16.480
<v Speaker 1>is simply when you realize that bankerserves are not useful

0:24:16.520 --> 0:24:18.840
<v Speaker 1>money and the FET is simply created there just a

0:24:18.840 --> 0:24:22.840
<v Speaker 1>byproduct of quantitative easing, UM, then you can okay, the

0:24:22.880 --> 0:24:25.840
<v Speaker 1>FETE isn't part of the monetary system. Bank reserves are

0:24:25.840 --> 0:24:29.439
<v Speaker 1>not really useful money. What actually is useful money is

0:24:29.520 --> 0:24:32.480
<v Speaker 1>telling you that there is nothing. There's a dollar shortage,

0:24:32.480 --> 0:24:34.359
<v Speaker 1>and it's getting worse and worse all the time. And

0:24:34.359 --> 0:24:37.359
<v Speaker 1>we see this in any number of ways. UM. We

0:24:37.400 --> 0:24:40.680
<v Speaker 1>don't have any direct insight into the uh Euro dollar

0:24:40.760 --> 0:24:44.000
<v Speaker 1>system as a whole, but these markets, these curves, you know,

0:24:44.080 --> 0:24:48.000
<v Speaker 1>the tarasury market, German global bond markets, UM. The dollars

0:24:48.000 --> 0:24:50.920
<v Speaker 1>exchange it's a good one too. When the dollars exchange

0:24:50.960 --> 0:24:54.639
<v Speaker 1>values goes up, that's a bell weather for global financial conditions.

0:24:54.640 --> 0:24:58.080
<v Speaker 1>In US dollars, it's telling you there are not enough dollars.

0:24:58.119 --> 0:25:01.439
<v Speaker 1>The price of participating in the global monetary system has

0:25:01.480 --> 0:25:04.119
<v Speaker 1>gone way up because there aren't enough of them available

0:25:04.400 --> 0:25:06.360
<v Speaker 1>to be used around the world. So we see all

0:25:06.359 --> 0:25:10.320
<v Speaker 1>of these signals from the monetary system itself telling us

0:25:10.359 --> 0:25:13.879
<v Speaker 1>there must be a not a dollar shortage, but not

0:25:13.920 --> 0:25:16.520
<v Speaker 1>just a dollar shortage, but growing in a more severe

0:25:16.600 --> 0:25:19.480
<v Speaker 1>one as we go through this year. That's why these

0:25:19.520 --> 0:25:23.359
<v Speaker 1>curves are so distorted, so inverted, because the markets aren't

0:25:23.400 --> 0:25:26.479
<v Speaker 1>just thinking about recession. They're thinking about what happens when

0:25:26.520 --> 0:25:30.359
<v Speaker 1>you have a recession plus a possible deflationary breakdown in

0:25:30.440 --> 0:25:35.600
<v Speaker 1>terms of another monetary event like maybe March of maybe

0:25:35.640 --> 0:25:38.119
<v Speaker 1>something on the lines, not in the same way, but

0:25:38.480 --> 0:25:41.200
<v Speaker 1>something similar to the two thousand eight crisis. We want.

0:25:41.240 --> 0:25:43.400
<v Speaker 1>We're not gonna see banks failure. We're not gonna see

0:25:43.400 --> 0:25:45.159
<v Speaker 1>bank failures and banks failure like they did in two

0:25:45.200 --> 0:25:47.239
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight. But that doesn't mean we can't have

0:25:47.359 --> 0:25:51.400
<v Speaker 1>a liquidity squeeze or a deflationary monetary event of similar

0:25:51.440 --> 0:25:54.960
<v Speaker 1>type of proportions. So the markets are worried about this already.

0:25:55.000 --> 0:25:58.480
<v Speaker 1>They're telling you from inside the monetary system that there

0:25:58.520 --> 0:26:00.680
<v Speaker 1>are not enough dollars around the world and has nothing

0:26:00.720 --> 0:26:02.600
<v Speaker 1>to do with the Fed. It's all about the monetary

0:26:02.600 --> 0:26:05.600
<v Speaker 1>system itself. Now, when you say the bank, the FED

0:26:05.680 --> 0:26:09.440
<v Speaker 1>gave bank reserves, which is not useful money, Um, does

0:26:09.520 --> 0:26:13.119
<v Speaker 1>it give them confidence? Is that an indirect benefit to

0:26:13.119 --> 0:26:15.720
<v Speaker 1>the market. Does it give the banks confidence to loan

0:26:15.720 --> 0:26:19.720
<v Speaker 1>more money out. It doesn't. I mean it does for

0:26:19.800 --> 0:26:22.560
<v Speaker 1>portfolio managers looking to buy stocks. That has absolutely no

0:26:22.600 --> 0:26:25.960
<v Speaker 1>effect whatsoever on the actual banking system and credit creation.

0:26:26.520 --> 0:26:29.440
<v Speaker 1>And this is, you know, quantitative easing is the most

0:26:29.480 --> 0:26:33.080
<v Speaker 1>empirically tested program maybe in human history. It's been used

0:26:33.200 --> 0:26:35.960
<v Speaker 1>over and over and over again, and the the results

0:26:36.000 --> 0:26:38.600
<v Speaker 1>are uniformly the same. They're just not what you hear

0:26:38.640 --> 0:26:40.840
<v Speaker 1>on on mainstream media. And again you don't have to

0:26:40.840 --> 0:26:43.280
<v Speaker 1>take my word for it. Just read the academic scholarship

0:26:43.320 --> 0:26:47.000
<v Speaker 1>that's been written by the QWI people themselves UM Bank

0:26:47.040 --> 0:26:49.640
<v Speaker 1>of Japan. A number of studies that have shown quantitative

0:26:49.680 --> 0:26:52.080
<v Speaker 1>easing has no effect in any of the three proposed

0:26:52.119 --> 0:26:54.840
<v Speaker 1>channels that it's opposed to. The Federal Reserve studies the

0:26:54.880 --> 0:26:56.680
<v Speaker 1>same thing. The last study I think from the FED

0:26:57.320 --> 0:27:00.280
<v Speaker 1>UM or maybe it was a researcher associated of the FED,

0:27:00.320 --> 0:27:02.280
<v Speaker 1>I forget, just going off the top of my head,

0:27:02.840 --> 0:27:05.520
<v Speaker 1>they said that a six hundred billion dollar QUEI program

0:27:05.560 --> 0:27:09.080
<v Speaker 1>that targeted specifically U S Treasury buying would we maybe

0:27:09.119 --> 0:27:12.320
<v Speaker 1>should expect about fifteen basis points of effect on the

0:27:12.359 --> 0:27:15.359
<v Speaker 1>ten year U S treasury. Think about that six hundred

0:27:15.400 --> 0:27:19.040
<v Speaker 1>billion in treasury buying lowers the tenure treasury by fifteen

0:27:19.080 --> 0:27:23.440
<v Speaker 1>basis points. That's basically a rounding error if it's statistically

0:27:23.480 --> 0:27:26.800
<v Speaker 1>significant at all. So what I'm saying is that quantitative

0:27:26.840 --> 0:27:30.119
<v Speaker 1>easing has no effect on the real economy because it

0:27:30.160 --> 0:27:34.240
<v Speaker 1>has no effect on banks. The banking system is constrained

0:27:34.280 --> 0:27:38.280
<v Speaker 1>by its own internal as well as external parameters that

0:27:38.359 --> 0:27:41.560
<v Speaker 1>have been doesn't matter what the FED does. There's no

0:27:41.560 --> 0:27:44.720
<v Speaker 1>no amount of jab booning or psychological manipulation or you know,

0:27:44.880 --> 0:27:47.200
<v Speaker 1>the FED being your best friend because it's buying bonds

0:27:47.520 --> 0:27:50.560
<v Speaker 1>has been able to get banks in the US, in Europe,

0:27:50.640 --> 0:27:53.640
<v Speaker 1>in Japan for thirty years out of the same rut.

0:27:53.920 --> 0:27:57.679
<v Speaker 1>Credit creation does not correspond to bank reserves or federal

0:27:57.720 --> 0:28:01.760
<v Speaker 1>reserve policies, which is the very lesson that Paul Voker

0:28:01.920 --> 0:28:05.159
<v Speaker 1>learned forty years ago. Bank reserves just don't care. If

0:28:05.240 --> 0:28:07.879
<v Speaker 1>banks want to do something, it doesn't matter if they

0:28:07.880 --> 0:28:10.840
<v Speaker 1>have reserves or not. They'll create the liquidity to do it.

0:28:10.840 --> 0:28:15.480
<v Speaker 1>It's really about the commercial banking system. So, um, so

0:28:15.560 --> 0:28:18.760
<v Speaker 1>if if quantitative easing isn't inflationary, and what I'm trying

0:28:18.760 --> 0:28:21.240
<v Speaker 1>to do is I'm trying to um I understand the

0:28:21.280 --> 0:28:25.239
<v Speaker 1>academic and factually correct argument. But then like what does

0:28:25.240 --> 0:28:27.880
<v Speaker 1>it mean to the average person? And so like, how

0:28:27.920 --> 0:28:31.520
<v Speaker 1>do we see this? So since two we've had massive

0:28:31.640 --> 0:28:34.480
<v Speaker 1>QUEI for the last decade or a dozen years, and

0:28:34.520 --> 0:28:36.720
<v Speaker 1>we've seen stock markets and and real estate go to

0:28:36.760 --> 0:28:40.080
<v Speaker 1>all time highs. And so even if that hasn't affected

0:28:40.080 --> 0:28:43.000
<v Speaker 1>the commercial banks to create more money, um, has it

0:28:43.120 --> 0:28:45.680
<v Speaker 1>led into a wealth effect Where my stock account, my

0:28:45.680 --> 0:28:48.040
<v Speaker 1>retirement accounts higher, my house is higher, I spend more money.

0:28:48.080 --> 0:28:50.440
<v Speaker 1>That's inflationary. Today we're seeing the opposite of that, even

0:28:50.480 --> 0:28:53.720
<v Speaker 1>though they haven't really done anything. People feel less wealthy today,

0:28:53.720 --> 0:28:56.320
<v Speaker 1>they're spending less money. So if we if we if

0:28:56.600 --> 0:28:59.240
<v Speaker 1>we don't look at just the purely you know, like

0:28:59.280 --> 0:29:03.040
<v Speaker 1>I said, um effects, or if we take the total

0:29:03.080 --> 0:29:06.480
<v Speaker 1>effects together, I mean, is there some causation or correlation there?

0:29:08.080 --> 0:29:10.000
<v Speaker 1>There should be, And that's one of the theoretical channels

0:29:10.000 --> 0:29:12.040
<v Speaker 1>for quantitative easing. And that's one of the reasons why

0:29:12.080 --> 0:29:14.560
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve and all central banks pay attention to

0:29:14.600 --> 0:29:17.880
<v Speaker 1>the stock markets because they believe they can manipulate stocks

0:29:17.880 --> 0:29:20.760
<v Speaker 1>and they're correct about that into creating, as you said,

0:29:20.760 --> 0:29:24.120
<v Speaker 1>mark the wealth effect. But there's no correlation between the

0:29:24.160 --> 0:29:27.160
<v Speaker 1>stock prices and actual spending in any in any economy.

0:29:27.600 --> 0:29:31.680
<v Speaker 1>It's simply a theoretical idea you talk about academics. The

0:29:31.760 --> 0:29:34.320
<v Speaker 1>wealth effect is is more of an economic idea than

0:29:34.360 --> 0:29:37.320
<v Speaker 1>any real phenomenon. There's no evidence for it whatsoever, And

0:29:37.320 --> 0:29:40.160
<v Speaker 1>of course why would there be, just because that's your

0:29:40.320 --> 0:29:42.240
<v Speaker 1>your four oh one K goes up. You can't spend

0:29:42.240 --> 0:29:44.160
<v Speaker 1>a four oh one k until you actually retire. But

0:29:44.560 --> 0:29:46.600
<v Speaker 1>now you might think, well, my four oh one K

0:29:46.720 --> 0:29:48.320
<v Speaker 1>is up, so I can spend other money because I

0:29:48.360 --> 0:29:51.080
<v Speaker 1>don't have to save it. But that doesn't happen. There's

0:29:51.080 --> 0:29:53.760
<v Speaker 1>no evidence, there's no data the shows. And first, and

0:29:53.800 --> 0:29:57.000
<v Speaker 1>more than that, the economic growth since two thousand eight,

0:29:57.080 --> 0:30:01.200
<v Speaker 1>since the FEDS started on quantitative easing, has been materially

0:30:01.360 --> 0:30:05.040
<v Speaker 1>different than it had been before the precrdy. Materially different,

0:30:05.360 --> 0:30:09.239
<v Speaker 1>I mean much much worse. So if there is a

0:30:09.280 --> 0:30:13.000
<v Speaker 1>wealth effect, then it is is not only undetectable, it's

0:30:13.040 --> 0:30:15.920
<v Speaker 1>led us into worse situations than we would have been

0:30:16.040 --> 0:30:18.920
<v Speaker 1>had nothing happened in two thousand and eight. I I

0:30:18.920 --> 0:30:20.560
<v Speaker 1>don't know if I agree with that, and some of

0:30:20.560 --> 0:30:23.080
<v Speaker 1>it is just gut right. So like myself included like

0:30:23.080 --> 0:30:24.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to retire for a long time, but

0:30:25.000 --> 0:30:27.040
<v Speaker 1>right now, the way the markets are right now, like

0:30:27.080 --> 0:30:29.680
<v Speaker 1>I'm second guessing vacations, I'm second guessing added onto my

0:30:29.720 --> 0:30:31.920
<v Speaker 1>house like I was going to because like, oh we,

0:30:32.160 --> 0:30:33.760
<v Speaker 1>like you said, the Yolk curve showing there could be

0:30:33.760 --> 0:30:36.160
<v Speaker 1>something there, I'm spending less money. So how do we

0:30:36.200 --> 0:30:37.840
<v Speaker 1>measure that? I don't know, but I do know there

0:30:37.920 --> 0:30:40.800
<v Speaker 1>is some measurement. So for example, we saw last year,

0:30:41.160 --> 0:30:44.640
<v Speaker 1>we saw record amounts of job quits, record amounts, and

0:30:44.640 --> 0:30:46.200
<v Speaker 1>we broke it month after month. And why were those

0:30:46.200 --> 0:30:47.800
<v Speaker 1>people quitting jobs? Well, a lot of polls should they

0:30:47.840 --> 0:30:50.480
<v Speaker 1>were going to trade options on robin hood and trade

0:30:50.480 --> 0:30:54.400
<v Speaker 1>cryptocurrencies and so that, Yeah, that did cause a wealth effect,

0:30:54.400 --> 0:30:58.440
<v Speaker 1>and that wasn't measurable, right, And that's an anecdote. It's

0:30:58.480 --> 0:31:01.480
<v Speaker 1>not acttionally that Okay, Um, yes there were you know.

0:31:01.600 --> 0:31:03.920
<v Speaker 1>The sad fact of the matter is the labor market

0:31:04.120 --> 0:31:06.239
<v Speaker 1>is not as robust as it would seem from that

0:31:06.280 --> 0:31:09.320
<v Speaker 1>metric because according to the Establishment Survey or any of

0:31:09.320 --> 0:31:13.240
<v Speaker 1>the survey the labor market that data, we have fewer

0:31:13.360 --> 0:31:17.360
<v Speaker 1>jobs today than we did in February. Um, so you

0:31:17.360 --> 0:31:19.440
<v Speaker 1>can blame that on the Great resignation and so called

0:31:19.440 --> 0:31:21.800
<v Speaker 1>Great resignation, but it also could be and I think

0:31:21.840 --> 0:31:24.920
<v Speaker 1>it is consistent with what markets are telling us. Not

0:31:25.000 --> 0:31:27.200
<v Speaker 1>stock markets, but other markets are telling us that there

0:31:27.280 --> 0:31:30.160
<v Speaker 1>was no wealth effect and that we're picking and choosing

0:31:30.200 --> 0:31:33.600
<v Speaker 1>anecdotes that fit preconceived narratives, the idea that the FED

0:31:33.640 --> 0:31:35.840
<v Speaker 1>created this bubble, when the FED really didn't do much

0:31:35.840 --> 0:31:40.640
<v Speaker 1>of anything. The real economy suffered for the breakdown. I mean,

0:31:40.720 --> 0:31:43.560
<v Speaker 1>of course it did. We put how many small businesses

0:31:43.600 --> 0:31:46.480
<v Speaker 1>out of work are out of business in Do we

0:31:46.480 --> 0:31:48.560
<v Speaker 1>really think that we're going to have a robust recovery

0:31:48.600 --> 0:31:52.440
<v Speaker 1>from that just on that alone, um, And so that's

0:31:52.440 --> 0:31:54.160
<v Speaker 1>what the markets are telling us, and that's what the

0:31:54.240 --> 0:31:56.440
<v Speaker 1>data tells us. With the fact that we have fewer jobs,

0:31:56.440 --> 0:32:00.960
<v Speaker 1>the participation rate took another leg down. These are similar

0:32:01.120 --> 0:32:04.360
<v Speaker 1>types of results that we saw in the aftermath of

0:32:04.400 --> 0:32:06.600
<v Speaker 1>the first financial crisis in two thousand nine and two

0:32:06.640 --> 0:32:10.160
<v Speaker 1>thousand ten. So what we're seeing is that that process

0:32:10.200 --> 0:32:13.120
<v Speaker 1>is being repeated for the second time. And so some

0:32:13.160 --> 0:32:17.120
<v Speaker 1>of these other ancillary anecdotes are just inconsistent or seemingly

0:32:17.160 --> 0:32:19.960
<v Speaker 1>inconsistent with the data, which tells US. There was no

0:32:20.040 --> 0:32:23.000
<v Speaker 1>wealth effect. There's no widespread wealth effect. It certainly had

0:32:23.040 --> 0:32:28.000
<v Speaker 1>an effect on certain certain proportions of the population, but

0:32:28.080 --> 0:32:31.320
<v Speaker 1>that wasn't enough to create an overall environment that was

0:32:31.400 --> 0:32:34.960
<v Speaker 1>actually consistent with a booming economy. Yeah. I know, with

0:32:35.080 --> 0:32:38.600
<v Speaker 1>these complex systems, it's it's hard to like pull things out.

0:32:38.640 --> 0:32:41.240
<v Speaker 1>But like say, let's say, for example, supply chains have

0:32:41.320 --> 0:32:43.880
<v Speaker 1>been overtaxed and we've had massive supply chain problems. Everybody

0:32:43.920 --> 0:32:45.920
<v Speaker 1>knows that. Now why, Well, there's a there's a trillion

0:32:45.960 --> 0:32:49.280
<v Speaker 1>reasons why. But one of the reasons why is excess demand,

0:32:49.320 --> 0:32:51.400
<v Speaker 1>and one of them is not enough product. Right, So

0:32:51.440 --> 0:32:54.720
<v Speaker 1>supply chains broke down, COVID shut them down, turn back on, etcetera.

0:32:54.760 --> 0:32:57.320
<v Speaker 1>People quit. There's all that. But I look at some

0:32:57.400 --> 0:33:00.240
<v Speaker 1>data that showed that our imports had were twenty sent

0:33:00.360 --> 0:33:03.040
<v Speaker 1>more than they were previously on average, So we were

0:33:03.080 --> 0:33:05.520
<v Speaker 1>buying more stuff. We were ordering more stuff. I know

0:33:05.600 --> 0:33:09.360
<v Speaker 1>people with in industries, Um, how are there There's record

0:33:09.440 --> 0:33:13.360
<v Speaker 1>sales in outdoor equipment and products and things like that, So, um,

0:33:13.400 --> 0:33:17.440
<v Speaker 1>there were record amounts of buying. We did order more stuff,

0:33:17.440 --> 0:33:21.240
<v Speaker 1>which overtaxed the supply demand equation of the equilibrium of

0:33:21.240 --> 0:33:23.400
<v Speaker 1>the supply chain. So there was some of that. We

0:33:23.440 --> 0:33:26.920
<v Speaker 1>can't quantify that, no, we can, but that's a that

0:33:27.080 --> 0:33:29.840
<v Speaker 1>was a reallocation of resources. Because Americans were locked in

0:33:29.880 --> 0:33:32.520
<v Speaker 1>their homes, they went not spending money on Amazon, which

0:33:32.560 --> 0:33:35.120
<v Speaker 1>meant we were buying goods from overseas producers. That only

0:33:35.160 --> 0:33:38.000
<v Speaker 1>made things worse because we couldn't move goods around. As

0:33:38.000 --> 0:33:40.480
<v Speaker 1>you said, Mark, there was supply bottlenecks and things like that.

0:33:40.800 --> 0:33:44.240
<v Speaker 1>But what people don't realize is that as Americans were

0:33:44.240 --> 0:33:47.840
<v Speaker 1>spending goods and record amounts, that's absolutely true, in record

0:33:47.880 --> 0:33:51.760
<v Speaker 1>amounts on goods, they were not spending on services. So

0:33:51.840 --> 0:33:54.800
<v Speaker 1>the goods economy made it seem like everything was terrific,

0:33:54.880 --> 0:33:58.120
<v Speaker 1>if not overheating. But then you look at services that

0:33:58.240 --> 0:34:00.840
<v Speaker 1>forgotten as the forgotten part of the whole thing because

0:34:00.840 --> 0:34:04.520
<v Speaker 1>it's not sexy, because it wasn't exciting. We've spent less

0:34:04.520 --> 0:34:06.760
<v Speaker 1>on services over the last couple of years than than

0:34:06.920 --> 0:34:09.840
<v Speaker 1>and and before we're in real terms, the spending on

0:34:09.920 --> 0:34:13.279
<v Speaker 1>services is still not back where it was before the

0:34:13.320 --> 0:34:17.399
<v Speaker 1>COVID crisis. Let me say that again, we're two years later,

0:34:17.480 --> 0:34:20.000
<v Speaker 1>we're spending less on services than we did before the

0:34:20.400 --> 0:34:24.000
<v Speaker 1>before the recession. In so if you look only at goods,

0:34:24.360 --> 0:34:26.600
<v Speaker 1>you look only at the prices of goods, it looks

0:34:26.640 --> 0:34:29.719
<v Speaker 1>like the economy went completely crazy. Because it did. It

0:34:29.760 --> 0:34:32.200
<v Speaker 1>was insane in that one part of the economy, but

0:34:32.239 --> 0:34:35.719
<v Speaker 1>the rest of the economy, which explains why job creation

0:34:35.840 --> 0:34:38.319
<v Speaker 1>hasn't been as robust as some of the numbers make

0:34:38.360 --> 0:34:41.920
<v Speaker 1>it seems because the whole economy, the entire system as

0:34:41.920 --> 0:34:46.560
<v Speaker 1>a whole, didn't really recover. So what happened in one

0:34:46.880 --> 0:34:49.560
<v Speaker 1>as the demand curve was artificially shifted to the right,

0:34:49.880 --> 0:34:52.399
<v Speaker 1>it was only artificially shifted to the right for part

0:34:52.520 --> 0:34:55.840
<v Speaker 1>of the economy, and so that created the imbalance, a

0:34:55.920 --> 0:34:59.320
<v Speaker 1>reallocation imbalance that led to consumer prices going up, in

0:34:59.440 --> 0:35:02.280
<v Speaker 1>oil price and gasoline, everything else that you just mentioned.

0:35:02.640 --> 0:35:07.560
<v Speaker 1>That exacerbated supply problems from the pandemic and everything else, shipments,

0:35:07.560 --> 0:35:11.000
<v Speaker 1>logistical issues all over the economy. But it didn't address

0:35:11.200 --> 0:35:15.480
<v Speaker 1>the lack of spending, the really seriously serious and alarming

0:35:15.560 --> 0:35:17.640
<v Speaker 1>lack of spending on the services. So if you look

0:35:17.680 --> 0:35:21.120
<v Speaker 1>at those combined and aggregate, we didn't actually increase that much.

0:35:21.480 --> 0:35:24.399
<v Speaker 1>That would just shifted from you if you actually draw mark,

0:35:24.480 --> 0:35:27.799
<v Speaker 1>if you draw a line from you know, where services

0:35:27.920 --> 0:35:31.480
<v Speaker 1>or where personal consumption expenditures as a whole, goods and

0:35:31.560 --> 0:35:34.920
<v Speaker 1>services together would have been had there been no great

0:35:34.920 --> 0:35:37.919
<v Speaker 1>no COVID recession. That's right where we are right now.

0:35:38.480 --> 0:35:41.360
<v Speaker 1>So essentially all the money that was spent on goods

0:35:41.640 --> 0:35:43.239
<v Speaker 1>that would have been or all the money that would

0:35:43.239 --> 0:35:45.320
<v Speaker 1>have been spent on services was just spent on goods

0:35:45.320 --> 0:35:48.160
<v Speaker 1>for a while. Okay, I was going to ask you

0:35:48.200 --> 0:35:52.120
<v Speaker 1>about the endgame, which you had alluded to. You think

0:35:52.160 --> 0:35:55.040
<v Speaker 1>there's potentially a few more hikes coming before something breaks.

0:35:55.040 --> 0:35:56.960
<v Speaker 1>We don't know what it is, we'll guess, and then

0:35:56.960 --> 0:35:59.080
<v Speaker 1>the reverse course. I'm gonna come back to that in

0:35:59.120 --> 0:36:01.600
<v Speaker 1>a minute, but before we jump into that, I want

0:36:01.640 --> 0:36:05.960
<v Speaker 1>to talk about this inelasticity of the money supply. So

0:36:06.000 --> 0:36:09.960
<v Speaker 1>you talked about one of the failures of gold, specifically

0:36:09.960 --> 0:36:13.040
<v Speaker 1>going into the Great Depression, was that the inelasticity of

0:36:13.080 --> 0:36:15.000
<v Speaker 1>the money supply and then the need to kind of

0:36:15.000 --> 0:36:18.120
<v Speaker 1>put the credit on top of that. Um Am, I

0:36:18.200 --> 0:36:21.840
<v Speaker 1>framing that up correctly. Yeah, what you've seen throughout history

0:36:22.080 --> 0:36:25.480
<v Speaker 1>was that in elastic money supplies always led to periods

0:36:25.480 --> 0:36:28.840
<v Speaker 1>of hoarding. Well, first you got risk taking, bubble type behavior,

0:36:28.920 --> 0:36:33.040
<v Speaker 1>that eventually leads to hoarding with no ability to have

0:36:33.160 --> 0:36:38.200
<v Speaker 1>elastic money supply. That causes bank panics, destruction, economic destruction,

0:36:38.200 --> 0:36:43.000
<v Speaker 1>demand destruction, deflation, and then depression. That happened repeatedly throughout

0:36:43.080 --> 0:36:47.200
<v Speaker 1>history when whenever we got into these uh, these deflationary periods,

0:36:47.239 --> 0:36:51.120
<v Speaker 1>and that's the reason why many countries turned to central banks,

0:36:51.120 --> 0:36:55.319
<v Speaker 1>hoping that a public utility could provide an element of elasticity.

0:36:55.360 --> 0:36:57.399
<v Speaker 1>Of course, that that didn't prove to work very well,

0:36:57.800 --> 0:37:01.000
<v Speaker 1>certainly in the Great Depression with the the brand new

0:37:01.040 --> 0:37:04.279
<v Speaker 1>Federal Reserve only fifteen years into its history and it

0:37:04.360 --> 0:37:07.640
<v Speaker 1>leads to the worst economic calamity in history. So that

0:37:07.719 --> 0:37:11.480
<v Speaker 1>didn't really settle the elasticity question either. But that's still

0:37:12.160 --> 0:37:15.160
<v Speaker 1>in a fixed money or hard money system, we always

0:37:15.200 --> 0:37:18.560
<v Speaker 1>have this defect where it leads to pooling and hoarding

0:37:18.920 --> 0:37:22.400
<v Speaker 1>that produces some of the worst economic consequences. Well, it

0:37:22.520 --> 0:37:26.600
<v Speaker 1>seems though to me, is that it's one I would say,

0:37:26.640 --> 0:37:29.359
<v Speaker 1>booms and bus are natural part of the world, right,

0:37:29.360 --> 0:37:32.520
<v Speaker 1>we have seasons in life, and we were we're humans

0:37:32.560 --> 0:37:35.759
<v Speaker 1>and so um we like neon colors and none. Next

0:37:35.800 --> 0:37:37.120
<v Speaker 1>thing you know, they're out of fashion and we just

0:37:37.200 --> 0:37:39.799
<v Speaker 1>want white and black for example, right, and people made

0:37:39.800 --> 0:37:42.560
<v Speaker 1>too many of the neon clothes, and then fidget spinners

0:37:42.600 --> 0:37:44.840
<v Speaker 1>are popular, and then people bought too many fidget spinners,

0:37:44.920 --> 0:37:47.800
<v Speaker 1>and like it just happens. Right. So there's like natural cycles,

0:37:47.920 --> 0:37:50.640
<v Speaker 1>and it seems like it's the creation of the money

0:37:50.640 --> 0:37:53.960
<v Speaker 1>supply that creates this this artificial boom, and then it's

0:37:54.000 --> 0:37:57.239
<v Speaker 1>the restriction of the supply and not continuing to grow

0:37:57.280 --> 0:37:59.440
<v Speaker 1>at the same pace, almost like a Ponzi scheme, that

0:37:59.480 --> 0:38:01.719
<v Speaker 1>then seem to crash it. And so maybe on a

0:38:01.760 --> 0:38:04.360
<v Speaker 1>hard money system we would still have booms and bus

0:38:04.640 --> 0:38:07.080
<v Speaker 1>which we've seen throughout hundreds of years of history, but

0:38:07.160 --> 0:38:09.880
<v Speaker 1>those booms and bus are small in comparison to the

0:38:10.200 --> 0:38:13.280
<v Speaker 1>ever growing booms and bus that we have now under

0:38:13.360 --> 0:38:17.760
<v Speaker 1>these artificially stimulated bubbles. Yeah, I don't that's a tough question.

0:38:17.840 --> 0:38:19.800
<v Speaker 1>It's in some In some ways it's a counter factual

0:38:19.800 --> 0:38:23.279
<v Speaker 1>because you can't go back and redo historical depressions and

0:38:23.320 --> 0:38:26.640
<v Speaker 1>see how it will worked out under different circumstances. But

0:38:26.680 --> 0:38:29.880
<v Speaker 1>as you said, Mark, that there is a in eight

0:38:30.480 --> 0:38:32.880
<v Speaker 1>human boom and bus cycle built within us, and I

0:38:32.920 --> 0:38:35.520
<v Speaker 1>don't think we'll ever ever solve that problem because there

0:38:35.600 --> 0:38:38.040
<v Speaker 1>is no way to solve that problem unless humans can

0:38:38.080 --> 0:38:41.239
<v Speaker 1>start working from perfect future information. Unless we do get

0:38:41.480 --> 0:38:44.200
<v Speaker 1>crystal balls where we can tell the future. There's always

0:38:44.200 --> 0:38:46.000
<v Speaker 1>gonna be as you said, there's always gonna be six

0:38:46.040 --> 0:38:49.000
<v Speaker 1>cycles and fashions. There's gonna be cycles and building. Uh,

0:38:49.040 --> 0:38:51.680
<v Speaker 1>there's gonna be too much risk taking whatever. And I

0:38:51.719 --> 0:38:55.480
<v Speaker 1>think and I fear most people nowadays have confused and

0:38:55.480 --> 0:38:59.359
<v Speaker 1>conflated an elasticity or elasticity with something like too big

0:38:59.400 --> 0:39:02.520
<v Speaker 1>to fail, which is, you know, sort of the quasi

0:39:02.840 --> 0:39:06.560
<v Speaker 1>haphazard program that Ben Bernanke's fed tried to put together

0:39:06.600 --> 0:39:09.600
<v Speaker 1>in the wake of the first financial crisis. That's not elasticity.

0:39:09.680 --> 0:39:13.080
<v Speaker 1>That was something else. Entirely elasticity is that when we

0:39:13.160 --> 0:39:16.359
<v Speaker 1>go into a bust cycle, that we don't end up

0:39:16.360 --> 0:39:20.080
<v Speaker 1>with a monetary shortage that then produces deflation. You can

0:39:20.120 --> 0:39:23.280
<v Speaker 1>still have a bus cycle without the deflation that leads

0:39:23.320 --> 0:39:28.120
<v Speaker 1>to the necessary um a creative destruction a Shompeter called it.

0:39:28.480 --> 0:39:31.000
<v Speaker 1>We still want that to happen. We still want bad

0:39:31.000 --> 0:39:34.400
<v Speaker 1>banks that have bad ideas to give out bad loans

0:39:34.400 --> 0:39:36.880
<v Speaker 1>to bad people. We want them to go out of business.

0:39:36.880 --> 0:39:39.399
<v Speaker 1>But we don't want to have happened, and what does

0:39:39.560 --> 0:39:43.200
<v Speaker 1>happen during these deflationary depressions is that when bad banks

0:39:43.200 --> 0:39:45.719
<v Speaker 1>go out of business, it leads to good banks going

0:39:45.719 --> 0:39:48.640
<v Speaker 1>out of business and good businesses going out of business

0:39:48.680 --> 0:39:52.880
<v Speaker 1>at the same time. Because money becomes too dear, everybody

0:39:52.960 --> 0:39:55.239
<v Speaker 1>holds onto money and there's not enough liquidity in the

0:39:55.280 --> 0:39:59.040
<v Speaker 1>economy that bad banks and good banks alike end up

0:39:59.080 --> 0:40:01.920
<v Speaker 1>going out of business, which harms the economy not just

0:40:01.960 --> 0:40:04.400
<v Speaker 1>in the short run but the long run. So the

0:40:04.440 --> 0:40:08.200
<v Speaker 1>idea behind elasticity, the real idea behind elasticity not too

0:40:08.239 --> 0:40:11.040
<v Speaker 1>big to fail, is that we sort the good from

0:40:11.040 --> 0:40:12.680
<v Speaker 1>the bad. And the only way to do that is

0:40:12.719 --> 0:40:15.400
<v Speaker 1>to make sure the good, good firms and good banks

0:40:15.480 --> 0:40:18.759
<v Speaker 1>have enough money, have enough liquidity available that they can

0:40:18.800 --> 0:40:22.399
<v Speaker 1>survive any bust cycle. That's what Walter Badgett was talking

0:40:22.400 --> 0:40:24.840
<v Speaker 1>about in the nineteenth century from the Bank of England.

0:40:25.200 --> 0:40:28.480
<v Speaker 1>You know, you lend freely at high rates on good collateral.

0:40:29.000 --> 0:40:31.640
<v Speaker 1>That was that was that was the central bank dictum

0:40:31.760 --> 0:40:35.799
<v Speaker 1>of elasticity and currency. Now central banks nowadays don't do

0:40:35.840 --> 0:40:38.960
<v Speaker 1>that because they can't They can't even define elasticity, or

0:40:39.040 --> 0:40:42.360
<v Speaker 1>they can't even define liquidity, let alone create elasticity. But

0:40:42.480 --> 0:40:44.799
<v Speaker 1>still that's the idea that I think that we need

0:40:44.880 --> 0:40:48.000
<v Speaker 1>to be come to terms with is that elasticity doesn't

0:40:48.000 --> 0:40:51.120
<v Speaker 1>mean too big to fail. It means limiting the downside

0:40:51.160 --> 0:40:55.200
<v Speaker 1>to only those who made big mistakes. Where would you

0:40:55.239 --> 0:41:00.000
<v Speaker 1>put yourself? Um, from an economist viewpoint like on Austria

0:41:00.040 --> 0:41:02.480
<v Speaker 1>an economist view and then maybe the opposite, being a

0:41:02.560 --> 0:41:05.439
<v Speaker 1>Kinsian kind of view. Where do you? Where would you say?

0:41:05.520 --> 0:41:07.319
<v Speaker 1>Are you somewhere in the middle? Are you would you

0:41:07.320 --> 0:41:10.120
<v Speaker 1>consider yourself Austrian Kinsian? Or how how do you think

0:41:10.160 --> 0:41:14.520
<v Speaker 1>about that? I've first of all, I'm not an economist.

0:41:14.719 --> 0:41:16.200
<v Speaker 1>I'm just talking about your view. I'm talking about your

0:41:16.239 --> 0:41:19.840
<v Speaker 1>view that. Yeah, I'm not economist either, but I aligned

0:41:19.880 --> 0:41:22.799
<v Speaker 1>with the Austrians, but I'm not ECONOMI No, that's I

0:41:22.840 --> 0:41:25.680
<v Speaker 1>think being not being an economist is actually helpful because

0:41:25.719 --> 0:41:27.719
<v Speaker 1>part of the problem is that you find yourself in

0:41:27.760 --> 0:41:31.480
<v Speaker 1>a box. I've been accused of being a Kinsian, a Monitorist,

0:41:31.520 --> 0:41:36.000
<v Speaker 1>and Austrian, a Marxist, pretty much anything around around the spectrum.

0:41:36.120 --> 0:41:38.000
<v Speaker 1>I would I would like to think of myself as

0:41:38.120 --> 0:41:42.080
<v Speaker 1>just a realist. UM. I started out with Austrian sympathies,

0:41:42.160 --> 0:41:45.000
<v Speaker 1>hard money, gold standard free market capital. Is it mean

0:41:45.360 --> 0:41:48.280
<v Speaker 1>you just can't get over the history of what happens

0:41:48.760 --> 0:41:51.799
<v Speaker 1>when you get into these deflationary depressions, which is the

0:41:51.840 --> 0:41:54.759
<v Speaker 1>worst of the worst case. So for I, you know,

0:41:54.840 --> 0:41:57.279
<v Speaker 1>I disagree with most of what Keene said about some

0:41:57.360 --> 0:42:00.319
<v Speaker 1>of the implications and what what government should do in

0:42:00.360 --> 0:42:03.200
<v Speaker 1>the wake of deflationary crisis. But yet you can't argue

0:42:03.200 --> 0:42:07.400
<v Speaker 1>with how Keens framed at least the deflationary disease you

0:42:07.440 --> 0:42:10.040
<v Speaker 1>call what the worst evil there is because in a

0:42:10.200 --> 0:42:15.160
<v Speaker 1>deflationary depression, the deflation, the consequences of that deflationary depression

0:42:15.239 --> 0:42:19.719
<v Speaker 1>depression fall mostly on workers. So the poorest members of

0:42:20.080 --> 0:42:23.120
<v Speaker 1>society are the ones who suffer in these worst cases.

0:42:23.160 --> 0:42:26.320
<v Speaker 1>So we have a very vested interest as a society

0:42:26.320 --> 0:42:28.600
<v Speaker 1>in the system to make sure that we don't have

0:42:28.680 --> 0:42:32.560
<v Speaker 1>deflationary depression. So if that makes me a monitorist, I

0:42:32.600 --> 0:42:35.480
<v Speaker 1>don't care if that makes me, uh, certainly not an Austrian.

0:42:35.480 --> 0:42:38.840
<v Speaker 1>But you know, sympathies for some of these other schools

0:42:38.840 --> 0:42:42.400
<v Speaker 1>and doctrines. I think most of them have have at

0:42:42.480 --> 0:42:45.400
<v Speaker 1>least some good ideas that you should listen to. But

0:42:45.480 --> 0:42:47.640
<v Speaker 1>I really think part of the problem here is that

0:42:47.680 --> 0:42:52.560
<v Speaker 1>everybody gets very rigidly doctrinaire and ideological and stops thinking

0:42:52.600 --> 0:42:55.040
<v Speaker 1>about and thinking about things in terms of evidence and

0:42:55.080 --> 0:42:58.279
<v Speaker 1>actual history. Yeah. Just you had said that in you know,

0:42:58.360 --> 0:43:00.279
<v Speaker 1>you do believe banks should be able to fail and

0:43:00.320 --> 0:43:02.520
<v Speaker 1>wash out the bad ones and creative destruction. I agree

0:43:02.560 --> 0:43:04.480
<v Speaker 1>with that. But then you talked about the in a

0:43:04.560 --> 0:43:06.560
<v Speaker 1>in a deflationary event, that the good banks go out

0:43:06.600 --> 0:43:10.320
<v Speaker 1>of business with the bad banks. And we just recently

0:43:10.360 --> 0:43:12.880
<v Speaker 1>saw this in the crypto markets right where well we

0:43:12.920 --> 0:43:14.600
<v Speaker 1>saw in two thousand and eight obviously when with the

0:43:14.640 --> 0:43:17.560
<v Speaker 1>investment banks, and recently in the crypto markets, and a

0:43:17.560 --> 0:43:19.839
<v Speaker 1>lot of that is because the contagion that's taken so

0:43:19.920 --> 0:43:23.000
<v Speaker 1>too much leverage built up in the system, the contagion

0:43:23.080 --> 0:43:26.279
<v Speaker 1>because they're all um, you know, doing loans with each other,

0:43:26.320 --> 0:43:28.319
<v Speaker 1>and so when one goes down, then they lose that

0:43:28.800 --> 0:43:31.880
<v Speaker 1>those assets and dominoes the whole thing and so um.

0:43:31.920 --> 0:43:34.320
<v Speaker 1>In a it's the leverage that seems to be the problem.

0:43:34.320 --> 0:43:36.480
<v Speaker 1>And so in a system where we didn't have all

0:43:36.520 --> 0:43:40.120
<v Speaker 1>this in uh in monetary inflation, um, and we didn't

0:43:40.160 --> 0:43:42.799
<v Speaker 1>have all this leverage that built up, and we had

0:43:43.160 --> 0:43:46.759
<v Speaker 1>banks that were on full reserve for example, then those

0:43:46.800 --> 0:43:49.360
<v Speaker 1>banks wouldn't go out of business, they wouldn't be subject

0:43:49.360 --> 0:43:51.080
<v Speaker 1>to the mistakes at those and you would never have

0:43:51.160 --> 0:43:56.839
<v Speaker 1>economic growth because of the inelasticity of the money. Yeah,

0:43:56.880 --> 0:43:59.439
<v Speaker 1>because they're That's the thing I think that's the other

0:43:59.480 --> 0:44:01.279
<v Speaker 1>part of this that we're forgetting is that, you know,

0:44:01.400 --> 0:44:03.880
<v Speaker 1>we live in a dynamic world where demand for money

0:44:03.960 --> 0:44:07.120
<v Speaker 1>is not static. Demand for money changes, and I'm talking

0:44:07.120 --> 0:44:11.440
<v Speaker 1>about legitimate demand, not just speculative demand. Legitimate demand rises

0:44:11.480 --> 0:44:14.600
<v Speaker 1>and falls, and we're supposed to be able to to

0:44:13.920 --> 0:44:16.840
<v Speaker 1>u to get a sense of that by the you know,

0:44:16.880 --> 0:44:20.560
<v Speaker 1>interest rates. For example, if there's a legitimate demand for money.

0:44:20.560 --> 0:44:22.919
<v Speaker 1>I know, legitimate is a sort of a weasel work here,

0:44:22.920 --> 0:44:25.360
<v Speaker 1>and it's doing a lot of work, but legitimate demand

0:44:25.400 --> 0:44:28.080
<v Speaker 1>for money goes up. You know, do we really want

0:44:28.080 --> 0:44:30.719
<v Speaker 1>the price of money to skyrocket because it's fixed. If

0:44:30.760 --> 0:44:34.800
<v Speaker 1>there's legitimate demand for money for legitimately productive and sustainable purposes,

0:44:35.160 --> 0:44:37.600
<v Speaker 1>why wouldn't we want the dynamic money supply on the

0:44:37.600 --> 0:44:40.200
<v Speaker 1>supply side to be able to meet that demand for

0:44:40.280 --> 0:44:44.520
<v Speaker 1>money without causing frictions and harms and inefficiencies. So if

0:44:44.600 --> 0:44:48.080
<v Speaker 1>you have a fixed money system where you don't dynamically

0:44:48.080 --> 0:44:51.440
<v Speaker 1>meet demand. Two things happen. One thing is you'll get

0:44:51.520 --> 0:44:54.080
<v Speaker 1>lack of economic growth, and the second thing is the

0:44:54.080 --> 0:44:56.960
<v Speaker 1>commercial system will invent new ways of new forms of

0:44:57.000 --> 0:45:00.000
<v Speaker 1>money to circumvent the hard money, uh, the hard money

0:45:00.280 --> 0:45:02.960
<v Speaker 1>cap so to speak. Let's this happened throughout I mean

0:45:03.000 --> 0:45:06.840
<v Speaker 1>the Euro dollar system itself was an answer to Triffin's paradox,

0:45:06.840 --> 0:45:10.000
<v Speaker 1>because Triffin's paradox wasn't really a paradox. It was simply

0:45:10.040 --> 0:45:14.000
<v Speaker 1>the the international reserve system under Breton Woods was incapable

0:45:14.080 --> 0:45:17.440
<v Speaker 1>of re of meeting rising global demand for money in

0:45:17.480 --> 0:45:20.480
<v Speaker 1>a dynamic setting. So I don't you know, I don't

0:45:20.520 --> 0:45:24.040
<v Speaker 1>agree that demand for money or the supply of money

0:45:24.040 --> 0:45:26.440
<v Speaker 1>needs to be fixed in order to make sure that

0:45:26.440 --> 0:45:28.600
<v Speaker 1>we don't ever have an asset bubble, because, like I said,

0:45:28.920 --> 0:45:32.759
<v Speaker 1>I think business cycles happen anyway. They're gonna happen regardless

0:45:32.840 --> 0:45:34.400
<v Speaker 1>of whether or not there's fixed money or not. You

0:45:34.480 --> 0:45:37.280
<v Speaker 1>saw that, I'll throughout the nineteenth century, on the best

0:45:37.320 --> 0:45:40.280
<v Speaker 1>of the best, the classical gold standard, there were bubbles everywhere.

0:45:40.680 --> 0:45:43.280
<v Speaker 1>It happens. It's it's it's a flaw and human nature

0:45:43.320 --> 0:45:45.160
<v Speaker 1>not in the monitor. And I would agree with that

0:45:45.239 --> 0:45:47.279
<v Speaker 1>they happen. And that's the problem that we see all

0:45:47.280 --> 0:45:50.279
<v Speaker 1>throughout the world today. Um. For example, with a look

0:45:50.280 --> 0:45:53.160
<v Speaker 1>at the rise of antidepressants US, especially in the United

0:45:53.160 --> 0:45:56.239
<v Speaker 1>States for example. Well like, uh, you need you know,

0:45:56.280 --> 0:45:58.360
<v Speaker 1>without we we can't always just be happy humbers at

0:45:58.360 --> 0:46:00.359
<v Speaker 1>the time, like we have to have pain in order

0:46:00.400 --> 0:46:03.200
<v Speaker 1>to know joy for example, right, And how how do

0:46:03.239 --> 0:46:04.680
<v Speaker 1>we know the happiest time of our life if we

0:46:04.680 --> 0:46:06.520
<v Speaker 1>don't have sad times and things like that, and so

0:46:07.640 --> 0:46:10.560
<v Speaker 1>a lot of that. But but jumping back, stay staying

0:46:10.560 --> 0:46:13.040
<v Speaker 1>on track here with the money supply, so um, like

0:46:13.160 --> 0:46:15.640
<v Speaker 1>with bitcoin you've mentioned many times and I've seen your

0:46:15.680 --> 0:46:18.600
<v Speaker 1>interviews with one of my good buddies, Robert Breedlove Um,

0:46:18.640 --> 0:46:22.440
<v Speaker 1>and you mentioned, now bitcoin has some superior attributes transparency,

0:46:22.640 --> 0:46:26.240
<v Speaker 1>lack of asymmetric things like that, but it's the inelasticity

0:46:26.360 --> 0:46:28.240
<v Speaker 1>with that because of bitcoin of course has a fixed

0:46:28.239 --> 0:46:30.280
<v Speaker 1>mon terary supply and over more than twenty one million,

0:46:30.680 --> 0:46:33.720
<v Speaker 1>then you think that leads us back into the Triffan's

0:46:33.760 --> 0:46:37.359
<v Speaker 1>dilemma paradox kind of thing, um, and then back into

0:46:37.480 --> 0:46:39.160
<v Speaker 1>some sort of a euro dollar or some sort of

0:46:39.200 --> 0:46:43.880
<v Speaker 1>a new emergence of a credit based system. Yeah, I

0:46:43.960 --> 0:46:46.040
<v Speaker 1>think that's the primary drawback. You're right, because I think

0:46:46.040 --> 0:46:49.799
<v Speaker 1>bitcoin is an elegant idea, an elegant step in the

0:46:49.880 --> 0:46:52.719
<v Speaker 1>right direction, because one of the problems with the Euro

0:46:52.760 --> 0:46:55.840
<v Speaker 1>dollar system is that it is a distributed ledger, virtual currency,

0:46:55.880 --> 0:46:59.680
<v Speaker 1>digital currency technology, but it's maintained by just the banking

0:46:59.680 --> 0:47:02.840
<v Speaker 1>system them and it's completely opaque. We don't really know

0:47:02.880 --> 0:47:04.840
<v Speaker 1>what goes on inside of it, which has privileged the

0:47:04.880 --> 0:47:08.960
<v Speaker 1>banks even that much more. An Austrian concept called cantilling effects,

0:47:08.960 --> 0:47:12.000
<v Speaker 1>which if you're able to create money more than if

0:47:12.040 --> 0:47:14.680
<v Speaker 1>you're able to create money and nobody else's you get

0:47:14.719 --> 0:47:18.200
<v Speaker 1>the benefits first, which of course then leads to over financialization,

0:47:18.560 --> 0:47:20.920
<v Speaker 1>if not hyper financialization, which we saw in the pre

0:47:21.000 --> 0:47:23.799
<v Speaker 1>crisis era. So Bitcoin, in a lot of ways was

0:47:23.840 --> 0:47:27.120
<v Speaker 1>a step in the right direction, certainly in terms of transparency,

0:47:27.160 --> 0:47:30.279
<v Speaker 1>but also in terms of just simplicity. Um, we don't

0:47:30.320 --> 0:47:32.960
<v Speaker 1>need an overly complicated monetary system. In fact, we don't

0:47:32.960 --> 0:47:36.440
<v Speaker 1>want an over overly complicated monetary system because money is

0:47:36.440 --> 0:47:39.480
<v Speaker 1>supposed to be a commercial tool. It's not wealth, it's

0:47:39.480 --> 0:47:42.839
<v Speaker 1>not anything else. It's supposed to allow a modern capitalist,

0:47:42.920 --> 0:47:46.719
<v Speaker 1>free market economy to do what it does best, and

0:47:46.760 --> 0:47:50.080
<v Speaker 1>that's that's we focus on productive uses of our time.

0:47:50.400 --> 0:47:53.080
<v Speaker 1>We're not hiring all sorts of accountants and lawyers and

0:47:53.080 --> 0:47:56.120
<v Speaker 1>attorneys and banks to hedge our financial risk. We should

0:47:56.120 --> 0:47:58.520
<v Speaker 1>not think about money whatsoever. It's one of those things

0:47:58.800 --> 0:48:00.359
<v Speaker 1>you should just be in the back of your mind

0:48:00.360 --> 0:48:01.960
<v Speaker 1>and you never really have to deal much, you know,

0:48:01.920 --> 0:48:04.040
<v Speaker 1>I never have to think much about it. And that's

0:48:04.040 --> 0:48:05.759
<v Speaker 1>one of the problems with the system that we have

0:48:05.880 --> 0:48:08.080
<v Speaker 1>is we spend so much time talking about this stuff

0:48:08.239 --> 0:48:11.200
<v Speaker 1>and worrying about this stuff and watching it go crazy,

0:48:11.200 --> 0:48:14.000
<v Speaker 1>that we've kind of lost focus here on the real economy,

0:48:14.040 --> 0:48:18.040
<v Speaker 1>which is what's supposed to so Bitcoin I think represented

0:48:18.400 --> 0:48:20.800
<v Speaker 1>at least a couple of good steps in the right direction.

0:48:21.280 --> 0:48:23.200
<v Speaker 1>I worried though, that it didn't take enough of them

0:48:23.200 --> 0:48:24.920
<v Speaker 1>in the right direction, and it leaves us in the

0:48:24.960 --> 0:48:28.640
<v Speaker 1>same sort of inherent flaws that we had before. And again,

0:48:29.160 --> 0:48:33.880
<v Speaker 1>the an elasticity problem is that yes, we're gonna have pain,

0:48:33.920 --> 0:48:36.200
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna have business cycles. They're gonna be good times

0:48:36.200 --> 0:48:38.960
<v Speaker 1>and bad times, but there really is no reason for

0:48:39.000 --> 0:48:42.440
<v Speaker 1>the bad times to be so bad that it endangers

0:48:42.480 --> 0:48:44.840
<v Speaker 1>the long run future, which is what we saw in

0:48:44.840 --> 0:48:48.319
<v Speaker 1>the nineteen thirties or in three but we didn't see

0:48:48.320 --> 0:48:50.800
<v Speaker 1>it in nineteen o seven because there was elasticity in

0:48:50.840 --> 0:48:55.200
<v Speaker 1>the banking system created by the banking system itself. So, yes,

0:48:55.280 --> 0:48:58.239
<v Speaker 1>boom bus cycles will happen, but we don't need to

0:48:58.280 --> 0:49:00.920
<v Speaker 1>have the worst of the worst case present to be

0:49:00.960 --> 0:49:02.920
<v Speaker 1>presented with the worst of the worst case when we

0:49:02.960 --> 0:49:05.160
<v Speaker 1>do get into the bud But if we hadn't, if

0:49:05.160 --> 0:49:08.399
<v Speaker 1>we hadn't built the money supply up so big, Um,

0:49:08.440 --> 0:49:10.799
<v Speaker 1>the boom wouldn't have gotten so big, wouldn't, And then

0:49:10.800 --> 0:49:13.080
<v Speaker 1>it would have made the bus so fall so bad.

0:49:13.160 --> 0:49:15.440
<v Speaker 1>So if I'm walking on a one foot wall and

0:49:15.480 --> 0:49:16.960
<v Speaker 1>I fall off, it's not that bad. If I'm walking

0:49:16.960 --> 0:49:19.040
<v Speaker 1>on a hunter football and I fall off, it's really bad.

0:49:19.120 --> 0:49:20.880
<v Speaker 1>And so if we look at if we look at

0:49:20.920 --> 0:49:26.240
<v Speaker 1>it from that perspective. So for example, um, the problem

0:49:26.280 --> 0:49:28.399
<v Speaker 1>that we're in today, right, So they the last couple

0:49:28.440 --> 0:49:30.600
<v Speaker 1>of years, and to the point you're saying, I mean

0:49:30.640 --> 0:49:32.799
<v Speaker 1>the creation of the money supply. This increased the money supply,

0:49:32.920 --> 0:49:35.359
<v Speaker 1>the Fed Fed Treasury stimulus of the last two years.

0:49:35.440 --> 0:49:37.200
<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to dig into the intricacies of that,

0:49:37.480 --> 0:49:39.839
<v Speaker 1>but we saw a rise in stock market at home,

0:49:39.880 --> 0:49:44.120
<v Speaker 1>prices have doubled, etcetera, etcetera, and so the average person, um,

0:49:44.160 --> 0:49:47.280
<v Speaker 1>if they don't participate in that, they get left behind.

0:49:47.600 --> 0:49:50.320
<v Speaker 1>So I'm a contractor. You know, I work on homes,

0:49:50.640 --> 0:49:52.720
<v Speaker 1>and let's say that. You know, I have all these jobs,

0:49:52.719 --> 0:49:54.279
<v Speaker 1>and it's like, well, I need to take on these

0:49:54.280 --> 0:49:57.160
<v Speaker 1>additional jobs. I need to hire more employees, I need

0:49:57.200 --> 0:49:59.160
<v Speaker 1>to go finance more vehicles, I need to move into

0:49:59.160 --> 0:50:01.440
<v Speaker 1>a new office to keep up with that demand. Now

0:50:01.480 --> 0:50:03.200
<v Speaker 1>I could choose not to and I could just store

0:50:03.239 --> 0:50:05.000
<v Speaker 1>my money, to your point and not have to worry

0:50:05.000 --> 0:50:06.440
<v Speaker 1>about it, which is, I agree, is the way it

0:50:06.440 --> 0:50:08.520
<v Speaker 1>should be. But if I play that game, I'm just

0:50:08.520 --> 0:50:10.279
<v Speaker 1>gonna put my money to banking and ignore it. I'm

0:50:10.280 --> 0:50:12.279
<v Speaker 1>not going to scale my business to keep up with demand.

0:50:12.480 --> 0:50:15.320
<v Speaker 1>Then I get left behind. So I'm forced to play

0:50:15.360 --> 0:50:17.920
<v Speaker 1>that game. But then all of a sudden, let's just

0:50:17.920 --> 0:50:20.040
<v Speaker 1>suck the money out of the system, and then everything crashes,

0:50:20.080 --> 0:50:22.160
<v Speaker 1>and now I'm stuck with all these trucks and these

0:50:22.160 --> 0:50:25.319
<v Speaker 1>extra buildings because I had played in that game, and

0:50:25.360 --> 0:50:28.360
<v Speaker 1>so um, if we didn't have this boom that I

0:50:28.400 --> 0:50:30.440
<v Speaker 1>had to I was forced to play along with and

0:50:30.520 --> 0:50:34.640
<v Speaker 1>keep up and then the inevitable bus that now crushes me. Um,

0:50:34.719 --> 0:50:36.560
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't seem like the worst thing in the world.

0:50:36.560 --> 0:50:38.279
<v Speaker 1>That we'd stop booms and bus but they wouldn't be

0:50:38.320 --> 0:50:40.279
<v Speaker 1>so massive, and I could just store my wealth. But

0:50:42.120 --> 0:50:44.319
<v Speaker 1>under the terms that you've dictated. But isn't that what's

0:50:44.320 --> 0:50:46.440
<v Speaker 1>happened is true. But that's not how it That's not

0:50:46.480 --> 0:50:49.440
<v Speaker 1>what actually happened. What we actually happened was we had

0:50:49.600 --> 0:50:52.880
<v Speaker 1>a legitimate economic growth before the pre crisis, before the

0:50:52.880 --> 0:50:56.480
<v Speaker 1>crisis UH showed up. Yes, there were bubbles, there were

0:50:56.520 --> 0:50:59.600
<v Speaker 1>imbalances in certainly US real estate, but you look around

0:50:59.600 --> 0:51:02.840
<v Speaker 1>most of the rest of the world emerging markets, China,

0:51:02.920 --> 0:51:07.799
<v Speaker 1>for example, backwards communist subsistence agriculture. China turned into a

0:51:07.880 --> 0:51:11.440
<v Speaker 1>global powerhouse, which we all benefited from. By the way,

0:51:11.920 --> 0:51:14.560
<v Speaker 1>in some ways some people more than others. Obviously was

0:51:14.600 --> 0:51:17.000
<v Speaker 1>at the expense of certain parts of the US. I

0:51:17.000 --> 0:51:18.720
<v Speaker 1>grew up in the rust belt, so I knew exactly

0:51:18.719 --> 0:51:21.240
<v Speaker 1>where all those jobs went. They certainly went to China.

0:51:21.320 --> 0:51:25.759
<v Speaker 1>But by and large, the the growth cycle, certainly from

0:51:25.760 --> 0:51:29.319
<v Speaker 1>the nineteen eighties forward, was a legitimate growth cycle, and

0:51:29.400 --> 0:51:31.399
<v Speaker 1>you can make it. I would make a strong case

0:51:31.440 --> 0:51:33.880
<v Speaker 1>that that wouldn't have never that would never would have happened.

0:51:34.120 --> 0:51:37.080
<v Speaker 1>In a restrained fixed money system, we never would have

0:51:37.160 --> 0:51:40.000
<v Speaker 1>had that growth, and so it's difficult to prove the

0:51:40.080 --> 0:51:43.839
<v Speaker 1>counter factual that, hey, um, maybe we shouldn't have had

0:51:43.840 --> 0:51:45.920
<v Speaker 1>that growth to begin with. I don't know. I think

0:51:45.960 --> 0:51:49.000
<v Speaker 1>the world is a better place because of the globalization

0:51:49.440 --> 0:51:52.600
<v Speaker 1>that certainly showed up from the nineteen fifties four as

0:51:52.600 --> 0:51:55.359
<v Speaker 1>soon as the euro dollars started really producing, you know,

0:51:55.440 --> 0:51:59.520
<v Speaker 1>these virtual dollars in in in excess. That's really I

0:51:59.520 --> 0:52:01.960
<v Speaker 1>think there was a very real benefit to that, and

0:52:02.080 --> 0:52:05.080
<v Speaker 1>had it not happened, the world would have looked very

0:52:05.160 --> 0:52:07.759
<v Speaker 1>differently than it does today, or at least in two

0:52:07.760 --> 0:52:11.280
<v Speaker 1>thousand eight. And the problem was not that we printed

0:52:11.320 --> 0:52:14.120
<v Speaker 1>money after the crisis, is that we didn't that we

0:52:14.160 --> 0:52:16.799
<v Speaker 1>didn't fix the monetary issue in two thousand eight, we

0:52:16.840 --> 0:52:20.800
<v Speaker 1>didn't create elasticity, and that has led to a permanent change,

0:52:20.920 --> 0:52:23.839
<v Speaker 1>at least so far permanent change in economic growth. So

0:52:23.880 --> 0:52:27.359
<v Speaker 1>that we are over the last fifteen years, we are

0:52:27.560 --> 0:52:31.040
<v Speaker 1>seeing what the global economy would have looked like had

0:52:31.080 --> 0:52:35.000
<v Speaker 1>it not had enough money, and it looks increasingly ugly

0:52:35.120 --> 0:52:39.680
<v Speaker 1>by the year. There's a reason why we were witnessing social, political,

0:52:39.680 --> 0:52:42.960
<v Speaker 1>and economic upheaval all over the world. It's because of

0:52:43.040 --> 0:52:46.719
<v Speaker 1>we're seeing what happens in in an economic system that

0:52:46.840 --> 0:52:50.319
<v Speaker 1>is deprived of any monetary elastics. Well, I certainly agree

0:52:50.320 --> 0:52:52.719
<v Speaker 1>with that. I think a lot of the upheavals that

0:52:52.760 --> 0:52:54.560
<v Speaker 1>we're having around the world is also because of other

0:52:54.600 --> 0:52:58.280
<v Speaker 1>bad policies such as restricting energy, whostend, restricting enough food.

0:52:58.680 --> 0:53:00.399
<v Speaker 1>But those are different topics for it difer in time.

0:53:00.680 --> 0:53:03.200
<v Speaker 1>But sticking back on this topic of the inelasticity of

0:53:03.200 --> 0:53:06.560
<v Speaker 1>the money supply, um, I would agree that. I would

0:53:06.560 --> 0:53:09.440
<v Speaker 1>think that we both agree that we don't need money.

0:53:09.640 --> 0:53:12.120
<v Speaker 1>Nobody wants money. What we want is the things that

0:53:12.160 --> 0:53:14.320
<v Speaker 1>money buys us, which is back to the point, we

0:53:14.400 --> 0:53:16.680
<v Speaker 1>made goods and services, right, That's what economy makes, goods

0:53:16.680 --> 0:53:17.960
<v Speaker 1>and services. So I don't want the money. I want

0:53:17.960 --> 0:53:21.160
<v Speaker 1>the goods and services. Now I would ask people typically

0:53:21.160 --> 0:53:23.360
<v Speaker 1>when they say, well, doesn't the money so I always

0:53:23.360 --> 0:53:26.400
<v Speaker 1>need to increase or expand, I would say, um, wouldn't

0:53:26.440 --> 0:53:28.120
<v Speaker 1>you rather? And to the point that you made, which

0:53:28.120 --> 0:53:31.480
<v Speaker 1>I agree with Like a brain surgeon, the world, the

0:53:31.520 --> 0:53:35.239
<v Speaker 1>world blew up into prosperity because of specialization right, and

0:53:35.280 --> 0:53:37.440
<v Speaker 1>now I could be the best brain surgeon. I could

0:53:37.440 --> 0:53:39.480
<v Speaker 1>focus on brain surgery, and I should just focus on

0:53:39.560 --> 0:53:43.040
<v Speaker 1>curing cancer or whatever that is, finding perpetual energy. Focus

0:53:43.080 --> 0:53:44.600
<v Speaker 1>on that, and then my money should just go sit

0:53:44.640 --> 0:53:46.200
<v Speaker 1>and it should just I shouldn't have to think about

0:53:46.200 --> 0:53:48.440
<v Speaker 1>it to the point that you made I agree, And

0:53:48.480 --> 0:53:51.120
<v Speaker 1>so then I would just ask the average person, wouldn't

0:53:51.120 --> 0:53:54.280
<v Speaker 1>you or would you rather your money that you've saved

0:53:54.280 --> 0:53:56.520
<v Speaker 1>today buy you more goods and services in the future

0:53:56.800 --> 0:53:59.440
<v Speaker 1>or less? And I think everybody agrees they would want

0:53:59.480 --> 0:54:02.560
<v Speaker 1>their money to buy them more goods and services, not less.

0:54:02.600 --> 0:54:04.960
<v Speaker 1>But through an inflationary system, the money continues to buy

0:54:05.040 --> 0:54:08.000
<v Speaker 1>us less and less goods and services. And so if

0:54:08.000 --> 0:54:09.840
<v Speaker 1>we look at what we really want is goods and services,

0:54:09.880 --> 0:54:12.520
<v Speaker 1>the money is a proxy of that, so a minium

0:54:12.560 --> 0:54:14.680
<v Speaker 1>exchange for that. So we have all the wealth of

0:54:14.719 --> 0:54:16.399
<v Speaker 1>the world, all the goods and services of the world,

0:54:16.680 --> 0:54:19.080
<v Speaker 1>divided by the money. And if we're trying to keep

0:54:19.120 --> 0:54:22.920
<v Speaker 1>the money at one, then all the value goes to

0:54:23.040 --> 0:54:25.719
<v Speaker 1>the goods and service, so everything gets more expensive. But

0:54:25.960 --> 0:54:29.480
<v Speaker 1>if we had a fixed money supply, then the value

0:54:29.480 --> 0:54:31.520
<v Speaker 1>could accrue to the money and the goods and services

0:54:31.560 --> 0:54:37.759
<v Speaker 1>would go down? Am I seeing that right? In theory theory? Yes,

0:54:38.480 --> 0:54:41.400
<v Speaker 1>the problem is that leads to all these similar boom busts,

0:54:41.480 --> 0:54:43.279
<v Speaker 1>but not if we not if we don't sure it

0:54:43.320 --> 0:54:46.200
<v Speaker 1>looks good and in terms of prices, but what happens

0:54:46.200 --> 0:54:49.520
<v Speaker 1>when everybody's thrown out of work. That's really the issue

0:54:49.560 --> 0:54:52.239
<v Speaker 1>here is that, Yeah, okay, so my money buys me

0:54:52.280 --> 0:54:53.799
<v Speaker 1>more on the other side of a crisis, but I

0:54:53.880 --> 0:54:57.400
<v Speaker 1>also don't have a job today, So that's not a

0:54:57.400 --> 0:54:59.919
<v Speaker 1>really good trade off by any stretch of the imagination,

0:55:00.400 --> 0:55:02.439
<v Speaker 1>particularly when those who are thrown out of the work

0:55:02.440 --> 0:55:05.040
<v Speaker 1>are the most vulnerable in society. And you do that

0:55:05.200 --> 0:55:07.200
<v Speaker 1>enough times and then you end up with what we're

0:55:07.239 --> 0:55:12.919
<v Speaker 1>seeing now, which is increasing discontent, extremism, and anarchy. Okay,

0:55:13.080 --> 0:55:14.840
<v Speaker 1>And to your point, we don't we don't know, We

0:55:14.920 --> 0:55:16.719
<v Speaker 1>don't have a we we don't have an A B

0:55:16.840 --> 0:55:19.560
<v Speaker 1>test to really run, although we do have five thousand

0:55:19.640 --> 0:55:21.640
<v Speaker 1>years of history without a Fiat money system, so we

0:55:21.640 --> 0:55:23.040
<v Speaker 1>do kind of have that. And to your point, there

0:55:23.080 --> 0:55:26.600
<v Speaker 1>are booms and bus because cycles change, creative destruction happens,

0:55:27.200 --> 0:55:29.920
<v Speaker 1>but we don't have the massive amount of misallocation that

0:55:29.960 --> 0:55:32.640
<v Speaker 1>we would have today. Um, but again we don't really

0:55:32.680 --> 0:55:35.759
<v Speaker 1>have that. I guess what I would say then, is, um,

0:55:35.800 --> 0:55:39.400
<v Speaker 1>what problems would a bitcoin underwritten capital market need to

0:55:39.600 --> 0:55:45.560
<v Speaker 1>solve in order to be viable in your mind? Well,

0:55:45.560 --> 0:55:47.359
<v Speaker 1>first of all, it has to have a wide enough base,

0:55:47.440 --> 0:55:49.440
<v Speaker 1>so it's wide enough it could be used in a wide,

0:55:49.719 --> 0:55:52.520
<v Speaker 1>widespread Uh, it needs to be. That's really what a

0:55:52.520 --> 0:55:55.319
<v Speaker 1>global reserve currency. And that's what we're talking about, right Mark.

0:55:55.640 --> 0:55:57.719
<v Speaker 1>You look at it bitcoin not just for a niche use.

0:55:57.880 --> 0:55:59.520
<v Speaker 1>You want it to be a medium of exchange, not

0:55:59.640 --> 0:56:02.320
<v Speaker 1>just a or value, but a medium, a useful medium

0:56:02.320 --> 0:56:05.160
<v Speaker 1>of exchange that can be used in enough places that

0:56:05.200 --> 0:56:07.719
<v Speaker 1>it becomes a useful medium of exchange. And so it's

0:56:07.760 --> 0:56:10.360
<v Speaker 1>sort of like a self fulfilling prophecy there. That's what

0:56:10.440 --> 0:56:13.680
<v Speaker 1>a global reserve currency actually means. It means it's available,

0:56:14.120 --> 0:56:18.439
<v Speaker 1>freely usable, and widely used in all in as many

0:56:18.480 --> 0:56:21.279
<v Speaker 1>places and as many circumstances as it can possibly do.

0:56:21.960 --> 0:56:25.240
<v Speaker 1>And a fixed monetary system makes that incredibly difficult, especially

0:56:25.239 --> 0:56:28.240
<v Speaker 1>when it's not widely distributed. And let's face it, money,

0:56:28.280 --> 0:56:30.880
<v Speaker 1>money is always going to pool, It's always gonna tend up,

0:56:31.120 --> 0:56:33.880
<v Speaker 1>It's always gonna end up in fewer and fewer hands,

0:56:33.920 --> 0:56:38.160
<v Speaker 1>because that's how free market capitalism works. Successful people are

0:56:38.160 --> 0:56:39.920
<v Speaker 1>going to end up with more money in their hands.

0:56:40.320 --> 0:56:42.560
<v Speaker 1>And what ends up happening in that situation is you

0:56:42.640 --> 0:56:46.000
<v Speaker 1>need some form of financialization to get that money moving

0:56:46.040 --> 0:56:49.600
<v Speaker 1>back into the real economy. So you can't escape financialization

0:56:49.680 --> 0:56:53.360
<v Speaker 1>unless you're willing to go back to a completely commodity

0:56:53.400 --> 0:56:57.200
<v Speaker 1>physically owned system or the digital equivalent of that, which

0:56:57.239 --> 0:57:00.360
<v Speaker 1>means you're actually reducing the potential of that economics system.

0:57:00.840 --> 0:57:03.800
<v Speaker 1>So bitcoin, I think, has a couple of problems, including

0:57:03.840 --> 0:57:06.799
<v Speaker 1>what happens when it's hoarded, as well as is there

0:57:06.960 --> 0:57:10.080
<v Speaker 1>enough of it to be used any widely, widely used

0:57:10.080 --> 0:57:12.760
<v Speaker 1>across enough places in the real economy. And of course

0:57:13.080 --> 0:57:16.600
<v Speaker 1>geography is another part of another. So a couple of things.

0:57:16.600 --> 0:57:18.160
<v Speaker 1>So one to your point, sure, it has to be

0:57:18.200 --> 0:57:20.120
<v Speaker 1>widely accepted, right, So money has to have a bunch

0:57:20.120 --> 0:57:21.880
<v Speaker 1>of attributes, five of them that I really like the

0:57:21.920 --> 0:57:23.800
<v Speaker 1>key on. But one of them of course is sailable, right,

0:57:23.800 --> 0:57:25.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, recognizable people have to be able to day

0:57:25.480 --> 0:57:27.440
<v Speaker 1>take it. And so to your point today, right, I

0:57:27.440 --> 0:57:29.800
<v Speaker 1>mean it's it's very small, but we're a dozen years

0:57:29.800 --> 0:57:32.200
<v Speaker 1>into it, So I believe money is like an evolution.

0:57:32.240 --> 0:57:34.320
<v Speaker 1>If we look through the history of money, it's evolutionary,

0:57:34.320 --> 0:57:36.920
<v Speaker 1>it's emergent, right, So we use rocks and feathers and

0:57:36.920 --> 0:57:39.640
<v Speaker 1>seashells and all these things, but one emerged as the

0:57:39.640 --> 0:57:42.520
<v Speaker 1>best because I had the best money properties. Um, and

0:57:42.600 --> 0:57:44.840
<v Speaker 1>so I think, you know, there's like a store, like

0:57:44.880 --> 0:57:46.640
<v Speaker 1>a collectible. Oh this is kind of cool, like I'll

0:57:46.680 --> 0:57:49.400
<v Speaker 1>hang onto this feather, this rock, and then eventually maybe

0:57:49.440 --> 0:57:52.680
<v Speaker 1>that collectible maybe evolves into a store of value. So

0:57:52.800 --> 0:57:54.640
<v Speaker 1>we see the wealth holding fine art and cars and

0:57:54.680 --> 0:57:57.200
<v Speaker 1>things like that, but those don't have money attributes, and

0:57:57.240 --> 0:58:00.080
<v Speaker 1>so maybe a store value could then evolve to need

0:58:00.120 --> 0:58:03.040
<v Speaker 1>him of exchange. And I'm happy to admit I don't

0:58:03.040 --> 0:58:05.720
<v Speaker 1>think bitcoin is the best medium exchange today. It's certainly

0:58:05.760 --> 0:58:08.240
<v Speaker 1>too volatible. Were paying your bills with on a monthly basis,

0:58:08.280 --> 0:58:11.200
<v Speaker 1>and and it hasn't reached that wide scale adoption to

0:58:11.240 --> 0:58:13.800
<v Speaker 1>your point. So I think there's an evolutionary path, but

0:58:13.840 --> 0:58:15.960
<v Speaker 1>it does have the attributes I think for it. The

0:58:15.960 --> 0:58:18.160
<v Speaker 1>one thing I would just point out, and I'm sure

0:58:18.200 --> 0:58:20.880
<v Speaker 1>you're probably aware, but uh, you know, one one of

0:58:20.920 --> 0:58:24.600
<v Speaker 1>the many things with bitcoin is that it's the first uh,

0:58:25.080 --> 0:58:29.360
<v Speaker 1>first asset, the first commodity that doesn't need debt to

0:58:29.440 --> 0:58:33.320
<v Speaker 1>reach velocity. Right. So gold is very slow, right, it's

0:58:33.320 --> 0:58:35.640
<v Speaker 1>not portable. I can't send it to England very or

0:58:35.920 --> 0:58:37.840
<v Speaker 1>over over zoom to you right now. And so we

0:58:37.880 --> 0:58:39.440
<v Speaker 1>had to add the debt on top of it in

0:58:39.520 --> 0:58:42.920
<v Speaker 1>order to get the velocity. But bitcoin has velocity with

0:58:43.040 --> 0:58:47.920
<v Speaker 1>a bare instrument, which is which is pretty interesting. But anyway,

0:58:47.920 --> 0:58:50.160
<v Speaker 1>so back to the question. So, I guess you answered

0:58:50.200 --> 0:58:52.000
<v Speaker 1>my question so that what it would need to solve

0:58:52.080 --> 0:58:54.720
<v Speaker 1>was it would need to be more widely accepted. I

0:58:54.720 --> 0:59:00.920
<v Speaker 1>guess was the point more widely US and and usual

0:59:00.960 --> 0:59:02.800
<v Speaker 1>meaning more people are able to use it? Right, it's

0:59:02.920 --> 0:59:06.960
<v Speaker 1>it's friendly enough and easy enough. Yeah, not just the

0:59:07.200 --> 0:59:11.440
<v Speaker 1>more people, people in all kinds all types of use cases,

0:59:11.560 --> 0:59:15.200
<v Speaker 1>got it? Yeah? Okay, good um. Now let's jump back

0:59:15.240 --> 0:59:18.240
<v Speaker 1>to the final uh discussion here that you had set

0:59:18.280 --> 0:59:20.280
<v Speaker 1>up earlier. It wasn't on my list of questions, but

0:59:20.320 --> 0:59:22.760
<v Speaker 1>you talked about you know, maybe or I'm framing up

0:59:22.800 --> 0:59:25.920
<v Speaker 1>as as this endgame. So you said the yield curves

0:59:25.920 --> 0:59:29.120
<v Speaker 1>are predicting, predicting that you know, there's probably one more

0:59:29.200 --> 0:59:31.960
<v Speaker 1>pivot in front of us. That's where they're really worried. Um,

0:59:32.040 --> 0:59:34.160
<v Speaker 1>you had said that maybe there's a few rate hikes

0:59:34.200 --> 0:59:36.960
<v Speaker 1>before something breaks. Um. I don't know if you had

0:59:36.960 --> 0:59:38.760
<v Speaker 1>said or maybe this is where I think, but probably

0:59:38.760 --> 0:59:41.000
<v Speaker 1>before the end of this year, we'll probably see that

0:59:41.920 --> 0:59:44.280
<v Speaker 1>before something breaks and then they reverse course. We don't

0:59:44.280 --> 0:59:46.520
<v Speaker 1>know what that is. We can only speculate. What would

0:59:46.560 --> 0:59:48.840
<v Speaker 1>you what do you think is the base case of

0:59:48.880 --> 0:59:51.040
<v Speaker 1>the speculation? I know we're only talking in terms of

0:59:51.040 --> 0:59:54.480
<v Speaker 1>probabilities here, Um, credit markets dry up or what do

0:59:54.520 --> 0:59:56.840
<v Speaker 1>you what do you see there? Yeah, there's a lot

0:59:56.880 --> 1:00:00.520
<v Speaker 1>of potential potential sparks or potential shot that we could

1:00:00.560 --> 1:00:02.640
<v Speaker 1>go through, and I think we already did when oil

1:00:02.680 --> 1:00:05.560
<v Speaker 1>prices skyrocketed in early March. I think that was the

1:00:05.560 --> 1:00:08.480
<v Speaker 1>trigger for what we're seeing in terms of a base

1:00:08.600 --> 1:00:12.040
<v Speaker 1>case recession. So the first half of the year technical recession.

1:00:12.040 --> 1:00:14.600
<v Speaker 1>As you said, Mark, that's that's that's completely a distraction.

1:00:14.600 --> 1:00:18.320
<v Speaker 1>That's not really Markets are not worried about what's already happened.

1:00:18.480 --> 1:00:21.320
<v Speaker 1>They're worried about what's coming next. And what's coming next

1:00:21.400 --> 1:00:23.960
<v Speaker 1>looks like, okay, we start with the recession, but there

1:00:23.960 --> 1:00:27.800
<v Speaker 1>are also any number of problems from geopolitics to money itself.

1:00:28.360 --> 1:00:31.280
<v Speaker 1>A big part of the monetary system is repo and

1:00:31.360 --> 1:00:35.480
<v Speaker 1>collateralized transactions and derivative things like currency swaps, and believe

1:00:35.520 --> 1:00:38.400
<v Speaker 1>it or not, there's just not enough good quality collateral

1:00:38.440 --> 1:00:41.400
<v Speaker 1>to go around, and so we get into these situations

1:00:41.440 --> 1:00:45.640
<v Speaker 1>where dealers in particularly become risk averse, certain junk quality

1:00:45.640 --> 1:00:49.400
<v Speaker 1>collateral becomes less negotiable. It acts every bit as if

1:00:49.840 --> 1:00:53.760
<v Speaker 1>monetary system was being tightened from the inside. And so

1:00:53.800 --> 1:00:56.600
<v Speaker 1>I think one of the things that is forcing these

1:00:56.640 --> 1:00:59.720
<v Speaker 1>curves to be and as inverted as they are, is

1:00:59.760 --> 1:01:03.439
<v Speaker 1>cancerns about a collateral run as we saw in March

1:01:03.480 --> 1:01:06.360
<v Speaker 1>of and again in two thousand seven and two thousand

1:01:06.360 --> 1:01:09.240
<v Speaker 1>and eight, because we've been stuck in this collateral shortage

1:01:09.240 --> 1:01:12.280
<v Speaker 1>situation for the last fifteen years and it has never

1:01:12.320 --> 1:01:15.200
<v Speaker 1>really been handled, and it is lee it leaves the

1:01:15.240 --> 1:01:17.520
<v Speaker 1>system and I mean the global financial system as well

1:01:17.560 --> 1:01:21.200
<v Speaker 1>as the economy, and it precarious situation when it becomes

1:01:21.400 --> 1:01:23.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, when we get into these risk averse situations

1:01:23.360 --> 1:01:27.040
<v Speaker 1>where collado becomes scarce. So I think collateral shortages, which

1:01:27.080 --> 1:01:31.120
<v Speaker 1>are prominent in every marketplace that we see, especially something

1:01:31.160 --> 1:01:34.640
<v Speaker 1>like treasury bills repot fails, and again the US dollar skyrocketing.

1:01:34.640 --> 1:01:37.200
<v Speaker 1>Why is it going up Because there's problems in the

1:01:37.280 --> 1:01:40.240
<v Speaker 1>in the collateral system. That's part of what's going on.

1:01:40.320 --> 1:01:43.040
<v Speaker 1>And then, um, the other part of it is something

1:01:43.080 --> 1:01:46.360
<v Speaker 1>like geopolitics. What if the Russians do turn off gas

1:01:46.440 --> 1:01:50.600
<v Speaker 1>to Europe? What is that gonna look like for the world.

1:01:51.320 --> 1:01:53.640
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's something that I if I was, you know,

1:01:53.720 --> 1:01:57.040
<v Speaker 1>running a massive portfolio of hundreds and hundreds of billions,

1:01:57.160 --> 1:01:59.920
<v Speaker 1>I would probably want to hedge against something like that happening.

1:02:00.240 --> 1:02:02.240
<v Speaker 1>Or not just gas to Europe, how about food to

1:02:02.280 --> 1:02:05.120
<v Speaker 1>the Middle East. I mean, so there's any number of

1:02:05.800 --> 1:02:10.400
<v Speaker 1>real potential shocks that could make a already bad situation worse.

1:02:10.440 --> 1:02:12.160
<v Speaker 1>And I think that's really the issue here, is that

1:02:12.560 --> 1:02:16.280
<v Speaker 1>we're heading into the second half of this year all

1:02:16.320 --> 1:02:19.320
<v Speaker 1>sorts of potential concerns in front of us, and we're

1:02:19.360 --> 1:02:21.240
<v Speaker 1>starting off the second half of the year on the

1:02:21.240 --> 1:02:24.479
<v Speaker 1>wrong foot anyway. So, I mean, I can understand why

1:02:24.480 --> 1:02:26.880
<v Speaker 1>curves are priced the way they are in ways that

1:02:26.920 --> 1:02:30.000
<v Speaker 1>we haven't seen since two thousand eight, because the risks

1:02:30.080 --> 1:02:33.400
<v Speaker 1>as well as the reality are that on appealing. And

1:02:33.840 --> 1:02:35.720
<v Speaker 1>you you highlighted a number of those and we have

1:02:35.840 --> 1:02:38.120
<v Speaker 1>even more. There's all types of land mines out there

1:02:38.160 --> 1:02:41.680
<v Speaker 1>that could that could blow up on us. So, UM, now,

1:02:41.760 --> 1:02:43.800
<v Speaker 1>I guess the last question we'll just kind of end

1:02:43.800 --> 1:02:46.320
<v Speaker 1>it with. And maybe it's not a big one, but

1:02:46.560 --> 1:02:49.480
<v Speaker 1>if the FED has no control, uh, the euro dollar

1:02:49.520 --> 1:02:52.760
<v Speaker 1>market is much bigger. Um. Let's say that we have

1:02:52.880 --> 1:02:56.000
<v Speaker 1>this uh you know, they end they end up with

1:02:56.040 --> 1:02:59.200
<v Speaker 1>a few more hikes, they stop. We have any of

1:02:59.200 --> 1:03:01.600
<v Speaker 1>these signal again events that could happen to the points

1:03:01.600 --> 1:03:04.440
<v Speaker 1>you said with the food crisis the energy crisis, those

1:03:04.440 --> 1:03:07.440
<v Speaker 1>are two big looming ones of another potential pandemic lockdown.

1:03:07.440 --> 1:03:10.680
<v Speaker 1>That's it seems to be rearing its head again potentially. Um,

1:03:10.720 --> 1:03:12.840
<v Speaker 1>then the FED would have to reverse its course and

1:03:12.960 --> 1:03:15.760
<v Speaker 1>would try to do something, which to your point, maybe

1:03:15.760 --> 1:03:18.360
<v Speaker 1>they can't. But if it was whatever seven billion in

1:03:18.400 --> 1:03:21.720
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and eight, it was six seven trillion, and

1:03:21.720 --> 1:03:26.240
<v Speaker 1>I mean, is the next one ten twenty trillion? And

1:03:26.400 --> 1:03:29.160
<v Speaker 1>will that have any effect? Can they even keep the

1:03:29.200 --> 1:03:33.080
<v Speaker 1>bubble from d leveraging? I think the next one is

1:03:33.360 --> 1:03:35.120
<v Speaker 1>I think that what the FED will look at is

1:03:35.160 --> 1:03:38.840
<v Speaker 1>not so much size, sort of take a playbook. Because

1:03:38.960 --> 1:03:41.520
<v Speaker 1>everybody follows the Bank of Japan anyway. I think what

1:03:41.560 --> 1:03:42.760
<v Speaker 1>they do is to take a page out of the

1:03:42.960 --> 1:03:46.640
<v Speaker 1>Bank of Japan's book where they say, okay, we've bought treasuries.

1:03:46.680 --> 1:03:49.080
<v Speaker 1>If nbs in the past I didn't really have much

1:03:49.080 --> 1:03:51.440
<v Speaker 1>of an effect. Maybe this time we're going to actually

1:03:51.440 --> 1:03:55.040
<v Speaker 1>buy corporate bonds. I know they pretended to into didn't

1:03:55.040 --> 1:03:58.560
<v Speaker 1>actually buying many actually buy corporate bonds. They'll start buying

1:03:58.600 --> 1:04:02.320
<v Speaker 1>et still, start buying different asset classes, because this is

1:04:02.320 --> 1:04:04.840
<v Speaker 1>all about psychologist, is all about trying to shock the

1:04:04.880 --> 1:04:07.440
<v Speaker 1>system in ways that the FED wants the system to

1:04:07.480 --> 1:04:10.520
<v Speaker 1>be shocked. So I think rather than rather than seeing

1:04:10.600 --> 1:04:15.000
<v Speaker 1>an increase in size of quantitative easing, you'll see like

1:04:15.080 --> 1:04:18.200
<v Speaker 1>Japan where they'll they'll add to the target of the

1:04:18.240 --> 1:04:21.320
<v Speaker 1>list of targets for asset purchasing. Okay, all right, more

1:04:21.320 --> 1:04:25.800
<v Speaker 1>strategic or just again just like vocal throwing something against

1:04:25.800 --> 1:04:28.800
<v Speaker 1>the wall and hoping it works. Well, man, there's so

1:04:28.880 --> 1:04:30.400
<v Speaker 1>much more we could go on with, but we've we've

1:04:30.480 --> 1:04:32.840
<v Speaker 1>gone super long. I appreciate you taking the time and

1:04:33.240 --> 1:04:36.160
<v Speaker 1>to everyone listening. We had some some frustrations with my

1:04:36.320 --> 1:04:38.480
<v Speaker 1>on my own the recordings. Appreciate your patience with that.

1:04:38.600 --> 1:04:42.160
<v Speaker 1>Jeff UM, I know you do the euro Dollar University

1:04:42.200 --> 1:04:45.160
<v Speaker 1>podcast which I listened to, and uh, I recommend everybody

1:04:45.200 --> 1:04:47.720
<v Speaker 1>check that out. Will link to that below. Markets insider

1:04:47.760 --> 1:04:50.760
<v Speaker 1>pro dot com and portfolio portfolio shield dot net I believe,

1:04:50.840 --> 1:04:53.600
<v Speaker 1>or two other projects you're working on will link to those. Um,

1:04:53.600 --> 1:04:57.080
<v Speaker 1>anything else that you want to call out. I writed

1:04:57.160 --> 1:05:00.280
<v Speaker 1>a different places to real clear markets epic time times,

1:05:00.280 --> 1:05:03.480
<v Speaker 1>so you know you can find the research anywhere around

1:05:03.480 --> 1:05:07.000
<v Speaker 1>the research writing commentary. You are all over the internet

1:05:07.120 --> 1:05:09.960
<v Speaker 1>right now, and it's never been been more important to

1:05:10.000 --> 1:05:12.120
<v Speaker 1>understand how that works. So anyway, Jeff, we'll go ahead

1:05:12.120 --> 1:05:13.840
<v Speaker 1>and in it with that. Thanks so much for for

1:05:13.960 --> 1:05:16.840
<v Speaker 1>coming on today. My pleasure, Mark, thanks for the invitation.

1:05:16.880 --> 1:05:19.880
<v Speaker 1>I really appreciate it. All Right, that's a wrap. Thanks

1:05:19.920 --> 1:05:22.760
<v Speaker 1>for listening to this interview with Jeff Snyder. We've covered

1:05:22.760 --> 1:05:25.000
<v Speaker 1>a lot of topics, a lot of topics that are

1:05:25.240 --> 1:05:29.320
<v Speaker 1>maybe not so much conspiratorial or controversial, but definitely outside

1:05:29.320 --> 1:05:32.880
<v Speaker 1>the mainstream view. The vulkar myth the FED has no

1:05:32.960 --> 1:05:35.960
<v Speaker 1>control of course. Check him out Jeff Snyder at the

1:05:36.000 --> 1:05:39.000
<v Speaker 1>euro Dollar University Podcast. We'll have all his links down below.

1:05:39.440 --> 1:05:40.640
<v Speaker 1>And that's what I got for you today. All right

1:05:40.680 --> 1:05:41.880
<v Speaker 1>to your success. I'm out.