1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:19,920 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Hello, 4 00:00:20,000 --> 00:00:21,919 Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. My name is Max, my 5 00:00:22,000 --> 00:00:24,360 Speaker 1: name is No. They often call me Ben. You are you? 6 00:00:24,560 --> 00:00:26,840 Speaker 1: This is stuff they don't want you to know. And 7 00:00:27,200 --> 00:00:31,320 Speaker 1: let's start with a question for those of you tuning in, 8 00:00:31,920 --> 00:00:34,760 Speaker 1: how are you listening to this show? And I don't 9 00:00:34,840 --> 00:00:37,840 Speaker 1: just necessarily mean like a boom box, which would be cool. 10 00:00:37,920 --> 00:00:39,879 Speaker 1: I don't know if our shows are on cassette yet 11 00:00:40,440 --> 00:00:44,879 Speaker 1: or are you downloading it? Have you streamed it? And 12 00:00:44,920 --> 00:00:47,760 Speaker 1: if so, where are you streaming it from. If you're 13 00:00:47,800 --> 00:00:51,440 Speaker 1: like most people, you have concerns about your data plan 14 00:00:51,760 --> 00:00:55,639 Speaker 1: on your phone, and you probably want to use WiFi. 15 00:00:55,920 --> 00:00:58,600 Speaker 1: Holy Grail, I certainly do. If I'm going to listen 16 00:00:58,640 --> 00:01:01,120 Speaker 1: to a podcast, I download it through WiFi and then 17 00:01:01,160 --> 00:01:02,680 Speaker 1: throwing on my phone so I can have it for 18 00:01:02,760 --> 00:01:06,080 Speaker 1: later because I've trust issues, you know. Speaking of trust issues, 19 00:01:06,120 --> 00:01:08,560 Speaker 1: A T and T totally bamboozled me out of my 20 00:01:09,240 --> 00:01:12,320 Speaker 1: unlimited data plan to lower my bill a little bit 21 00:01:12,319 --> 00:01:13,720 Speaker 1: because I felt like it was a little too high 22 00:01:13,720 --> 00:01:14,800 Speaker 1: and they're like, well, you know, if you give up 23 00:01:14,800 --> 00:01:17,319 Speaker 1: your limited data because you're clearly not using it, we 24 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:19,720 Speaker 1: can give you this amount of data and you know 25 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:22,039 Speaker 1: you'll be good as gold. Well, it turns out that 26 00:01:22,160 --> 00:01:28,880 Speaker 1: I exceeded just so every single month, even with Pop. Yeah, 27 00:01:28,959 --> 00:01:33,400 Speaker 1: so WiFi is huge because these phone companies are tightening 28 00:01:33,440 --> 00:01:36,679 Speaker 1: down data, so it's a lot more restrictive these days. 29 00:01:36,720 --> 00:01:39,360 Speaker 1: They have these plans, these tiered plans, where you are 30 00:01:39,400 --> 00:01:41,480 Speaker 1: paying for every little bit of data that you use, 31 00:01:41,880 --> 00:01:43,759 Speaker 1: much more so than in the past. So the obvious 32 00:01:43,800 --> 00:01:48,360 Speaker 1: choices to find WiFi anywhere and everywhere that you possibly can. 33 00:01:49,040 --> 00:01:52,520 Speaker 1: So a lot of people would ask what is WiFi? 34 00:01:52,640 --> 00:01:56,800 Speaker 1: It's one of those things that the average human being 35 00:01:57,160 --> 00:01:59,960 Speaker 1: just sort of accepts as existing. You know, a lot 36 00:02:00,040 --> 00:02:02,800 Speaker 1: of people own cars but have no idea how they work. 37 00:02:03,000 --> 00:02:04,960 Speaker 1: A lot of people own phones, have no idea how 38 00:02:04,960 --> 00:02:09,480 Speaker 1: they work. WiFi is something that people just sort of accept. 39 00:02:09,520 --> 00:02:13,639 Speaker 1: You're in an airport, boom, free WiFi. That's great. Your 40 00:02:13,760 --> 00:02:17,000 Speaker 1: You could be at a restaurant at a dentist office. 41 00:02:17,160 --> 00:02:19,520 Speaker 1: There's a pizza place next to our office that I 42 00:02:19,560 --> 00:02:22,200 Speaker 1: go to just because they have free WiFi. But what 43 00:02:22,400 --> 00:02:26,440 Speaker 1: is this stuff. WiFi is the name of any wireless 44 00:02:26,520 --> 00:02:30,919 Speaker 1: networking technology that uses radio waves to send out high 45 00:02:30,919 --> 00:02:33,960 Speaker 1: speed network and internet connections. And it's it's such a 46 00:02:34,000 --> 00:02:37,079 Speaker 1: cool little term, almost like podcast and have a coined 47 00:02:37,320 --> 00:02:40,360 Speaker 1: little buzz term. And there is a organization, as it 48 00:02:40,400 --> 00:02:43,840 Speaker 1: turns out, that owns the rights to this trademark called 49 00:02:44,000 --> 00:02:48,560 Speaker 1: the WiFi Alliance. In a burst of creativity, Yes, uh, 50 00:02:48,720 --> 00:02:53,000 Speaker 1: WiFi is a registered trademark and it's in This alliance 51 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:57,800 Speaker 1: specifically defines WiFi as a wireless local area network w 52 00:02:57,919 --> 00:03:01,239 Speaker 1: LAND products that are based on the Institute of Electrical 53 00:03:01,360 --> 00:03:08,399 Speaker 1: and Electronics Engineers or I literally I Strickland by the way, 54 00:03:09,200 --> 00:03:12,240 Speaker 1: I hope be so glad to hear that. Um. Their 55 00:03:12,280 --> 00:03:15,520 Speaker 1: standards are at two dot eleven. The greatest thing about 56 00:03:15,520 --> 00:03:17,760 Speaker 1: WiFi is that you no longer have to plug in 57 00:03:17,840 --> 00:03:21,080 Speaker 1: a giant ethernet cable to get access to that beautiful, 58 00:03:21,160 --> 00:03:24,200 Speaker 1: sweet sweet Internet with all the things that you love, 59 00:03:24,280 --> 00:03:27,600 Speaker 1: all the the podcasts and videos and everything you do 60 00:03:27,639 --> 00:03:30,400 Speaker 1: on their Uh that's the best part about it. So 61 00:03:30,440 --> 00:03:34,359 Speaker 1: it uses radio frequencies to transfer all the information of packets, 62 00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:37,520 Speaker 1: all the packets of information rather from your computer to 63 00:03:37,920 --> 00:03:42,160 Speaker 1: the access point to the Internet essentially through all the 64 00:03:42,280 --> 00:03:44,200 Speaker 1: chain of servers that it goes through to get to 65 00:03:44,240 --> 00:03:46,840 Speaker 1: its end point, and then right back through all that 66 00:03:46,920 --> 00:03:49,800 Speaker 1: stuff through the access point to your computer. Just a 67 00:03:49,920 --> 00:03:54,720 Speaker 1: lovely little handshaking connection. Yeah, this RF current hits and 68 00:03:54,800 --> 00:04:00,200 Speaker 1: antenna creating an electromagnetic field that's able to propagate through space. 69 00:04:00,560 --> 00:04:03,320 Speaker 1: That's so cool. That's so science fiction e E E you know, 70 00:04:03,760 --> 00:04:07,160 Speaker 1: uh right right it is. It's the magic that we 71 00:04:07,280 --> 00:04:10,520 Speaker 1: just sort of accept And a lot of a lot 72 00:04:10,560 --> 00:04:13,800 Speaker 1: of current society in the West is built on the 73 00:04:13,840 --> 00:04:17,880 Speaker 1: premise of just accepting things because they are. That way, 74 00:04:18,080 --> 00:04:22,080 Speaker 1: we drive these death machines ad plus miles an hour 75 00:04:22,360 --> 00:04:26,560 Speaker 1: and just accept that. Everyone will pretend those yellow lines 76 00:04:26,600 --> 00:04:29,760 Speaker 1: in the middle are doing something much smarter people than 77 00:04:29,800 --> 00:04:32,800 Speaker 1: I figured out how to use radio waves so that 78 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:36,279 Speaker 1: I can go on Reddit dot com. Uh, and I 79 00:04:36,400 --> 00:04:39,479 Speaker 1: just accepted we stand on the shoulders of giants, and 80 00:04:39,520 --> 00:04:43,520 Speaker 1: every great invention you know is only uh is only 81 00:04:43,600 --> 00:04:47,040 Speaker 1: capable of being discovered or created because of prior inventions. 82 00:04:47,240 --> 00:04:50,039 Speaker 1: I guess we're getting a little spacey already, you know. Uh. 83 00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:52,520 Speaker 1: Space is the place, my friend, Space is the place 84 00:04:52,560 --> 00:04:54,720 Speaker 1: you're you're killing it with the slogans lately there is 85 00:04:54,720 --> 00:04:58,360 Speaker 1: a lot more space than stuff. Yes. Yeah, we received 86 00:04:58,400 --> 00:05:01,839 Speaker 1: a great is it a YouTube comment or an email 87 00:05:02,320 --> 00:05:05,800 Speaker 1: where where someone pointed out on our live show recording 88 00:05:05,839 --> 00:05:09,560 Speaker 1: that we released that the table. Yeah, I hit the 89 00:05:09,560 --> 00:05:13,720 Speaker 1: tables and banging on and they're like, you do realize 90 00:05:13,720 --> 00:05:16,039 Speaker 1: that there's a lot more empty space in that table 91 00:05:16,080 --> 00:05:19,599 Speaker 1: than atoms, And I was like absolutely wow. So to 92 00:05:19,680 --> 00:05:24,960 Speaker 1: propagate through this mostly empty space, your WiFi connection uses 93 00:05:25,000 --> 00:05:29,359 Speaker 1: an electromagnetic field radio frequencies, and the primary job of 94 00:05:29,400 --> 00:05:32,520 Speaker 1: an access point is to broadcast this wireless signal that 95 00:05:33,640 --> 00:05:37,200 Speaker 1: your computer can detect. And just like a radio, just 96 00:05:37,240 --> 00:05:40,400 Speaker 1: like searching for radio station you can tune into to 97 00:05:40,520 --> 00:05:43,479 Speaker 1: connect to an access point. To join a wireless network, 98 00:05:43,760 --> 00:05:46,760 Speaker 1: these computers or these devices have to be equipped with 99 00:05:46,920 --> 00:05:50,919 Speaker 1: wireless network adapters. Pretty simple, right, Yeah. And and the 100 00:05:50,960 --> 00:05:53,320 Speaker 1: great thing about it is it's not just your computer 101 00:05:53,600 --> 00:05:57,080 Speaker 1: that connects to it. It's anyone who can see the 102 00:05:57,120 --> 00:06:00,720 Speaker 1: network and has an adapter. Right, So who is anyone 103 00:06:02,200 --> 00:06:06,480 Speaker 1: within your lifetime listeners? Depending on how young or old 104 00:06:06,600 --> 00:06:10,960 Speaker 1: you are when you were born, you have probably seen 105 00:06:11,080 --> 00:06:16,040 Speaker 1: a precipitous rise in the amount of people hopping online 106 00:06:16,400 --> 00:06:21,960 Speaker 1: around of the world population has some sort of Internet connection. 107 00:06:22,000 --> 00:06:24,400 Speaker 1: It's got to the point where it's almost considered like 108 00:06:24,440 --> 00:06:26,840 Speaker 1: a human right, I mean they're trying. There are all 109 00:06:26,839 --> 00:06:31,880 Speaker 1: these efforts to bring Internet access to more rural areas 110 00:06:32,120 --> 00:06:33,920 Speaker 1: and you know, third world countries and things. I mean, 111 00:06:33,960 --> 00:06:39,680 Speaker 1: it's become this thing that we expect. Yeah, in less 112 00:06:39,720 --> 00:06:43,480 Speaker 1: than one percent of the globe had some kind of connection. 113 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:47,040 Speaker 1: So in slightly less than two decades, we've gone from 114 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:51,120 Speaker 1: one percent to nearly half of the world's population. Are 115 00:06:51,160 --> 00:06:55,440 Speaker 1: you guys part of the one percent with a like 116 00:06:55,480 --> 00:07:00,479 Speaker 1: an old, old old modem, Yes, definitely, I think got me. 117 00:07:00,839 --> 00:07:03,240 Speaker 1: I think my parents may have had a O L. 118 00:07:03,680 --> 00:07:07,240 Speaker 1: We're you guys. Yeah, we had a o L and 119 00:07:07,279 --> 00:07:10,360 Speaker 1: we had compy served remember that. And I had a 120 00:07:10,400 --> 00:07:13,760 Speaker 1: friend who had Prodigy. Remember Prodigy. Not I am the 121 00:07:13,800 --> 00:07:16,760 Speaker 1: fire Starter, but the I am the Internet service productive 122 00:07:16,800 --> 00:07:22,600 Speaker 1: the same same people. Actually, seriously, No, that was a 123 00:07:22,640 --> 00:07:25,800 Speaker 1: good sigh. Yeah, that's a that's a good site gig. 124 00:07:25,960 --> 00:07:30,320 Speaker 1: And if the band's Prodigy had been part of the 125 00:07:30,360 --> 00:07:33,720 Speaker 1: Internet service Prodigy, they may have met with more long 126 00:07:33,800 --> 00:07:37,000 Speaker 1: term success for a while. Because the number of Internet 127 00:07:37,080 --> 00:07:41,800 Speaker 1: users has increased tenfold from two thirteen. So what do 128 00:07:41,880 --> 00:07:44,520 Speaker 1: we mean when we say, well, we mean that in 129 00:07:44,680 --> 00:07:48,920 Speaker 1: two thousand five we reached the first time in history 130 00:07:48,960 --> 00:07:51,600 Speaker 1: that a billion people could get on the internet. Two 131 00:07:51,640 --> 00:07:56,080 Speaker 1: thousand ten it was two billion, and then it was 132 00:07:56,440 --> 00:08:00,160 Speaker 1: three billion. And there's some really cool infographics you can grab. 133 00:08:00,480 --> 00:08:03,760 Speaker 1: Internet Live Stats is a pretty cool one if you 134 00:08:03,800 --> 00:08:06,400 Speaker 1: want to visit that, not while you're driving, if you're 135 00:08:06,440 --> 00:08:08,600 Speaker 1: driving as you listen to this, when you get a chance, 136 00:08:08,680 --> 00:08:10,800 Speaker 1: check out Internet live Stats. It will give you the 137 00:08:10,880 --> 00:08:14,080 Speaker 1: running tally of how many people have access to the Internet. 138 00:08:14,320 --> 00:08:17,040 Speaker 1: And the number just keeps it going and going and going, 139 00:08:17,120 --> 00:08:19,120 Speaker 1: and it's a live ticker. It's pretty great. Right now, 140 00:08:19,120 --> 00:08:25,360 Speaker 1: it's at three point four oh one billion, thousand three 141 00:08:26,000 --> 00:08:30,040 Speaker 1: nine and counting, yes and counter and we'll come back 142 00:08:30,120 --> 00:08:32,160 Speaker 1: right Well, so what we should do is come back 143 00:08:32,200 --> 00:08:36,280 Speaker 1: at the end of the episode and see how many 144 00:08:36,440 --> 00:08:40,640 Speaker 1: new listeners, how many new Internet users have joined us. So, 145 00:08:40,679 --> 00:08:41,920 Speaker 1: like we were saying at the top of the show, 146 00:08:41,960 --> 00:08:44,880 Speaker 1: beyond just expecting to have Internet access, which we do 147 00:08:45,480 --> 00:08:48,280 Speaker 1: part of our job, we definitely need it. Um, we 148 00:08:48,360 --> 00:08:50,400 Speaker 1: have come to a place where we expect that in 149 00:08:50,480 --> 00:08:55,080 Speaker 1: many public places, public settings, there's going to be free 150 00:08:55,440 --> 00:09:00,880 Speaker 1: and efficient wireless internet. Like what what kind of places? Well, sure, 151 00:09:00,880 --> 00:09:04,160 Speaker 1: I mean like cafes for example, you know Starbucks. It 152 00:09:04,280 --> 00:09:07,800 Speaker 1: is part and parcel of the Starbucks model to go there, 153 00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:12,680 Speaker 1: get your seven dollar prapolatte, and you know, enjoy some 154 00:09:12,840 --> 00:09:15,160 Speaker 1: Internet surfing, whether it's on your smartphone or your laptop 155 00:09:15,240 --> 00:09:16,760 Speaker 1: or you're doing work. A lot of people who work 156 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:19,480 Speaker 1: remotely like to go to coffee shops. You are literally 157 00:09:19,600 --> 00:09:25,920 Speaker 1: using this businesses internet access for your business free of charge, 158 00:09:26,760 --> 00:09:28,600 Speaker 1: and it gets you there, and it's that's become kind 159 00:09:28,600 --> 00:09:31,560 Speaker 1: of like a added benefit of like, you know, going 160 00:09:31,600 --> 00:09:34,400 Speaker 1: to certain stores like Target for example, they have free 161 00:09:34,400 --> 00:09:37,520 Speaker 1: WiFi and they also have a little cafe there. Beyond that, 162 00:09:37,559 --> 00:09:40,360 Speaker 1: you've got airports, which Matt and I were talking before 163 00:09:40,360 --> 00:09:42,760 Speaker 1: the show. We've been doing a bit of traveling lately, 164 00:09:42,800 --> 00:09:45,040 Speaker 1: and we're starting to realize that airports have kind of 165 00:09:45,040 --> 00:09:46,720 Speaker 1: wised up a little bit. You're a bit of a 166 00:09:46,720 --> 00:09:49,080 Speaker 1: captive audience at the airport, and you know, you don't 167 00:09:49,080 --> 00:09:51,400 Speaker 1: really have a choice as to whether you hang out 168 00:09:51,400 --> 00:09:54,160 Speaker 1: in that terminal or not. So they don't always have 169 00:09:54,240 --> 00:09:57,480 Speaker 1: free internet. L a x Will, for instance, they have 170 00:09:57,520 --> 00:10:01,720 Speaker 1: a model where a user will it one hour free 171 00:10:01,840 --> 00:10:04,319 Speaker 1: and then need to pay for additional time. I hope 172 00:10:04,360 --> 00:10:07,360 Speaker 1: you didn't get delayed. In case anyone's interested and want 173 00:10:07,360 --> 00:10:09,800 Speaker 1: to know which airports do have free wife WiFi, there 174 00:10:09,920 --> 00:10:13,400 Speaker 1: is a site called air fair watchdog dot com that 175 00:10:13,480 --> 00:10:17,960 Speaker 1: has a WiFi access chart. Yeah, so that you don't 176 00:10:18,000 --> 00:10:20,000 Speaker 1: you don't get stuck out out there. But you know what, 177 00:10:20,040 --> 00:10:22,040 Speaker 1: we don't always have to be connected. I'm just gonna say, 178 00:10:22,080 --> 00:10:25,600 Speaker 1: you can bring a book hotels. Though hotel hotels want 179 00:10:25,720 --> 00:10:28,120 Speaker 1: you to have a pleasant stay. They want everything to 180 00:10:28,160 --> 00:10:30,360 Speaker 1: be just. So you're paying out the nose for a 181 00:10:30,400 --> 00:10:34,480 Speaker 1: hotel room, you're gonna get decent internet access as part 182 00:10:34,520 --> 00:10:39,840 Speaker 1: of your stay, unless you're in Alberton, Georgia. Uh recently. 183 00:10:41,080 --> 00:10:44,600 Speaker 1: I mean, I mean the access was there. It was there. 184 00:10:44,640 --> 00:10:49,199 Speaker 1: It was just snail's pace. It was like dial up speed. 185 00:10:49,559 --> 00:10:51,800 Speaker 1: But that's neither here nor there. Well, I was gonna say, 186 00:10:51,840 --> 00:10:54,120 Speaker 1: just a quick story, just a quick story. We had 187 00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:57,520 Speaker 1: ami fi uh one of these little access points to 188 00:10:57,760 --> 00:11:02,480 Speaker 1: use wireless uh data like through Verizon or another service 189 00:11:02,520 --> 00:11:06,440 Speaker 1: like this, and that was what ten times faster easily 190 00:11:07,480 --> 00:11:10,319 Speaker 1: to make fair, those little boxes do kind of kick um. 191 00:11:10,320 --> 00:11:14,920 Speaker 1: But then we've got like other places like museums, aquariums, hospitals, libraries. 192 00:11:15,679 --> 00:11:18,440 Speaker 1: More and more we're having outdoor access that's even provided 193 00:11:18,440 --> 00:11:25,120 Speaker 1: by cities. So let's do a hypothetical situation. Let's say Matt, 194 00:11:25,200 --> 00:11:27,320 Speaker 1: you're going to be our main character, and Nolan I 195 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:32,360 Speaker 1: are going to tell the story of what happened to you. Uh, 196 00:11:32,679 --> 00:11:36,080 Speaker 1: let's say, you know, let's let's begin it this way. 197 00:11:38,400 --> 00:11:44,240 Speaker 1: One day, one afternoon, a traveler named Matt Frederick arrives 198 00:11:44,440 --> 00:11:50,720 Speaker 1: at the Colorado Airport and he just sits down in 199 00:11:50,960 --> 00:11:53,520 Speaker 1: one of the terminals you mentioned earlier. No, do you 200 00:11:53,520 --> 00:11:56,280 Speaker 1: remember specifically what he was doing. Oh? Sure, he had 201 00:11:56,280 --> 00:11:58,720 Speaker 1: a little time to kill and he wanted to maybe 202 00:11:58,720 --> 00:12:01,920 Speaker 1: catch up on his social media, looking at his stock tickers, 203 00:12:02,280 --> 00:12:05,680 Speaker 1: maybe check his his bank account and foe make sure 204 00:12:05,720 --> 00:12:08,640 Speaker 1: that his cash flow is good for the sweet trip 205 00:12:08,679 --> 00:12:10,320 Speaker 1: that he was about to go on. And he got 206 00:12:10,320 --> 00:12:15,600 Speaker 1: his frap his frapolatte in hand, laptop in lap like 207 00:12:15,720 --> 00:12:20,800 Speaker 1: you do, and up opens it up. Bam, pay dirt. 208 00:12:21,280 --> 00:12:25,080 Speaker 1: You know what's interesting here for our traveler is that 209 00:12:25,200 --> 00:12:31,160 Speaker 1: he notices there are several free WiFi points. Two of 210 00:12:31,200 --> 00:12:36,560 Speaker 1: them say free public WiFi. One of them says, just 211 00:12:37,600 --> 00:12:42,880 Speaker 1: airport WiFi looks good. Let's click on this one, And 212 00:12:43,000 --> 00:12:47,920 Speaker 1: that's how they get his bank account information, That's how 213 00:12:47,920 --> 00:12:52,120 Speaker 1: they get his log in for Twitter, for Facebook, for 214 00:12:52,480 --> 00:12:58,360 Speaker 1: let's see what else you want my trade trade yeah, 215 00:12:58,400 --> 00:13:02,920 Speaker 1: farmers only yeah, and you know whatever else. And it's 216 00:13:02,960 --> 00:13:06,560 Speaker 1: because there's this illusion of safety, and it's the same 217 00:13:06,600 --> 00:13:09,200 Speaker 1: illusion of safety that we find when people are driving 218 00:13:09,200 --> 00:13:12,320 Speaker 1: at high speeds on the highway right in traffic. The 219 00:13:12,440 --> 00:13:15,480 Speaker 1: convenience of WiFi, just like the convenience of driving on 220 00:13:15,520 --> 00:13:19,320 Speaker 1: an interstate, often leads us to mistakenly believe that it's 221 00:13:19,320 --> 00:13:21,559 Speaker 1: got to be safe. Everybody else is doing it right. 222 00:13:21,559 --> 00:13:23,920 Speaker 1: There are certain rules you have to follow, and everyone's 223 00:13:23,920 --> 00:13:26,440 Speaker 1: following them. That's because we live in a society that 224 00:13:26,480 --> 00:13:29,240 Speaker 1: teaches us if something if you're in a public place 225 00:13:29,400 --> 00:13:32,800 Speaker 1: and there are multiple people doing something, then you are 226 00:13:32,880 --> 00:13:37,200 Speaker 1: somehow safe. But that is also the exact reason a 227 00:13:37,240 --> 00:13:41,840 Speaker 1: hacker would choose a terminal at the Denver airport to 228 00:13:42,040 --> 00:13:46,640 Speaker 1: set up something that just says airport WiFi or free WiFi. 229 00:13:46,920 --> 00:13:50,520 Speaker 1: I haven't checked the charpnel, but it's quite possible that 230 00:13:50,600 --> 00:13:54,160 Speaker 1: all three of those points are just separate hackers. Yeah, 231 00:13:54,360 --> 00:13:56,800 Speaker 1: it's a perfect hunting ground. And then and they're like, 232 00:13:56,880 --> 00:14:01,240 Speaker 1: we need Matt Frederick's Twitter. Yeah, yeah, I think of 233 00:14:01,280 --> 00:14:05,640 Speaker 1: the change we could affect. Yeah, I wish I had 234 00:14:05,640 --> 00:14:08,040 Speaker 1: a Twitter, so that would make sense. Yeah, I'm gonna 235 00:14:08,040 --> 00:14:10,559 Speaker 1: start one for this you start one for this episode. 236 00:14:10,880 --> 00:14:13,400 Speaker 1: So you know, we had talked at the top of 237 00:14:13,440 --> 00:14:16,559 Speaker 1: the show about Mr Robot, who's working with us on 238 00:14:16,640 --> 00:14:21,560 Speaker 1: this episode. And one thing that is really cool. You 239 00:14:21,600 --> 00:14:24,200 Speaker 1: guys were hipped to Mr Robot before I was. But 240 00:14:24,320 --> 00:14:29,120 Speaker 1: in the very first episode is a mild spoiler alert. 241 00:14:29,480 --> 00:14:34,440 Speaker 1: We see an example of WiFi gone wrong. If you 242 00:14:34,480 --> 00:14:39,120 Speaker 1: have not watched the first episode of Mr Robot Season one, 243 00:14:39,440 --> 00:14:42,160 Speaker 1: the pilot episode, go and check it out before you 244 00:14:42,200 --> 00:14:44,440 Speaker 1: listen to this. Uh, if you've seen it, then here 245 00:14:44,440 --> 00:14:46,200 Speaker 1: we go. Oh wait wait, if you haven't seen it, 246 00:14:46,240 --> 00:14:50,880 Speaker 1: go ahead, we'll wait. Okay, you're back. So, at some 247 00:14:50,920 --> 00:14:54,120 Speaker 1: point in the past, the main character that we identify 248 00:14:54,320 --> 00:14:59,200 Speaker 1: with in Mr Robot, Elliott. He notices that there's this 249 00:14:59,240 --> 00:15:02,760 Speaker 1: free WiFi at this place called Ron's Coffee that seems 250 00:15:02,760 --> 00:15:05,160 Speaker 1: to be a large chain of coffee shops that exist 251 00:15:05,280 --> 00:15:08,840 Speaker 1: in his world, his immediate vicinity, and this WiFi is great. 252 00:15:09,080 --> 00:15:12,440 Speaker 1: Oh man, it is so good. It's fast. In fact, 253 00:15:12,520 --> 00:15:17,520 Speaker 1: let's hear a little clip. Yeah something I like coming 254 00:15:17,560 --> 00:15:20,400 Speaker 1: here because your WiFi was fast. I mean, you're one 255 00:15:20,400 --> 00:15:22,640 Speaker 1: of the few spots that has a fiber connection with 256 00:15:22,720 --> 00:15:27,760 Speaker 1: gigabit speed. It's good, so good. It scratched that part 257 00:15:27,760 --> 00:15:31,880 Speaker 1: of my mind, part that doesn't allow good to exist 258 00:15:31,960 --> 00:15:35,680 Speaker 1: without condition. So I started intercepting all the traffic on 259 00:15:35,760 --> 00:15:40,560 Speaker 1: your network. That's when I noticed something strange. That's when 260 00:15:40,560 --> 00:15:45,160 Speaker 1: I decided to hack you. I know, you run a 261 00:15:45,160 --> 00:15:49,760 Speaker 1: website called Plato's Boys. You're using tor networking to keep 262 00:15:49,760 --> 00:15:52,400 Speaker 1: the servers anonymous. You made it really hard for anyone 263 00:15:52,440 --> 00:15:56,480 Speaker 1: to see it, but I saw it. The Onion routing protocol. 264 00:15:56,520 --> 00:15:59,520 Speaker 1: It's not as anonymous as you think it is. Whoever's 265 00:15:59,520 --> 00:16:02,080 Speaker 1: in control all the exit notes is also in control 266 00:16:02,120 --> 00:16:06,400 Speaker 1: of the traffic, which makes me the one in control. 267 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:10,760 Speaker 1: And you see Elliott discovers that the owner hosts a 268 00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:15,760 Speaker 1: massive horn site, the worst kind, from his server in 269 00:16:15,800 --> 00:16:20,200 Speaker 1: the cafe, and he thinks that he's hiding this because 270 00:16:20,200 --> 00:16:23,200 Speaker 1: he's using something that we've talked about before tour the 271 00:16:23,240 --> 00:16:26,320 Speaker 1: Onion router, the Onion routing protocol like you said, Ben, 272 00:16:26,400 --> 00:16:29,800 Speaker 1: something we discussed before. Uh, it's got some weird ties 273 00:16:29,840 --> 00:16:31,480 Speaker 1: and I think we'll get into it a little later 274 00:16:31,480 --> 00:16:36,400 Speaker 1: on exactly how it functions. Um. But it's supposedly or 275 00:16:36,480 --> 00:16:43,600 Speaker 1: it's meant to anonymize traffic Internet traffic. Yes, but a 276 00:16:43,640 --> 00:16:45,920 Speaker 1: little known fact about tour for a lot of people 277 00:16:45,960 --> 00:16:48,240 Speaker 1: who assume that it is safe. When we did our 278 00:16:48,240 --> 00:16:50,680 Speaker 1: stuff on the Silk Road, you know, we learned that 279 00:16:50,760 --> 00:16:55,160 Speaker 1: tour was originally created by the US government. Yes, and 280 00:16:55,360 --> 00:17:00,680 Speaker 1: there there are a set of servers amongst the Onion 281 00:17:00,760 --> 00:17:04,639 Speaker 1: router that are the endpoint for the the the last 282 00:17:04,760 --> 00:17:07,960 Speaker 1: server in the chain, the exit nodes. They're they are 283 00:17:08,000 --> 00:17:12,200 Speaker 1: referred to as exit nodes, and we have seen historically 284 00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:15,280 Speaker 1: in two thousand seven and two thousand eleven a couple 285 00:17:15,359 --> 00:17:20,040 Speaker 1: other times, we've seen that if you choose and you're 286 00:17:20,080 --> 00:17:23,320 Speaker 1: operating one of these exit nodes, you can spy on 287 00:17:23,359 --> 00:17:26,640 Speaker 1: any and all traffic that goes through that server. It's 288 00:17:26,680 --> 00:17:30,560 Speaker 1: a it's a code between the volunteer operators that run 289 00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:33,920 Speaker 1: these things that say, hey, this is all anonymous, We're 290 00:17:33,960 --> 00:17:36,840 Speaker 1: not going to spy on these people. In the end, 291 00:17:37,119 --> 00:17:40,680 Speaker 1: it's about trust, whether or not you trust I'm saying 292 00:17:40,720 --> 00:17:46,200 Speaker 1: this correctly, the volunteers who run this stuff. So Elliott, 293 00:17:46,480 --> 00:17:51,920 Speaker 1: in a very deadpan, monotonous way, explains to Ron of 294 00:17:52,040 --> 00:17:57,560 Speaker 1: Ron's coffee how he hacked the WiFi and took control 295 00:17:58,040 --> 00:18:00,760 Speaker 1: of these exit nodes, meaning he could watch all the 296 00:18:00,800 --> 00:18:04,880 Speaker 1: traffic because he wondered why this WiFi connection in particular 297 00:18:05,320 --> 00:18:10,880 Speaker 1: was so extraordinarily fast, and he found out why. And 298 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:15,000 Speaker 1: as he is telling this guy's stuff, he tells him 299 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:17,679 Speaker 1: there's a strange there's like a dark humor to it 300 00:18:17,760 --> 00:18:20,680 Speaker 1: when he tells him, you know, usually I do this online, 301 00:18:20,760 --> 00:18:23,600 Speaker 1: but I'm working on my people's skills, so I wanted 302 00:18:23,640 --> 00:18:26,359 Speaker 1: to come tell you in person. And yeah, he says, 303 00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:29,000 Speaker 1: I wanted to do this one A f K right, yes, 304 00:18:29,600 --> 00:18:31,639 Speaker 1: and uh and what does a f K stays the 305 00:18:31,640 --> 00:18:34,080 Speaker 1: same as I R L I R in real life 306 00:18:34,160 --> 00:18:36,560 Speaker 1: or away from keyboard. AFK was a great thing to 307 00:18:36,640 --> 00:18:39,240 Speaker 1: use back in the day. I did not know that one. Yeah, well, 308 00:18:39,600 --> 00:18:42,639 Speaker 1: for mm RPGs, that was a huge thing, like like 309 00:18:42,680 --> 00:18:47,040 Speaker 1: we're just saying let b RB. Well, um, now, so 310 00:18:47,080 --> 00:18:49,240 Speaker 1: this character that's obviously like an example of a white 311 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:52,840 Speaker 1: hat hacker where he is using his skills and you know, 312 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:57,000 Speaker 1: hacking this WiFi network to shut down somebody doing something 313 00:18:57,080 --> 00:19:01,960 Speaker 1: terrible and using this technology too horrible abusive ends. What 314 00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:05,800 Speaker 1: we're talking about for this episode largely is these black 315 00:19:05,840 --> 00:19:08,720 Speaker 1: hat hackers who just want to steal your stuff or 316 00:19:08,880 --> 00:19:12,040 Speaker 1: just affect chaos in some way or another. Some people 317 00:19:12,080 --> 00:19:13,879 Speaker 1: just want to see the world burn. But what I 318 00:19:13,920 --> 00:19:19,520 Speaker 1: want to know is how vulnerable are we at the airport? 319 00:19:19,520 --> 00:19:24,280 Speaker 1: How vulnerable is Matt at the Denver terminal? Could this 320 00:19:24,359 --> 00:19:28,239 Speaker 1: happen in real life? And we'll get right into my 321 00:19:28,320 --> 00:19:45,120 Speaker 1: vulnerabilities right after this word from our sponsor Here's where 322 00:19:45,160 --> 00:19:49,880 Speaker 1: it gets crazy. The answer is absolutely yes, this could 323 00:19:49,880 --> 00:19:53,760 Speaker 1: happen in real life. Absolutely yes, we are as vulnerable 324 00:19:54,280 --> 00:19:57,520 Speaker 1: as we allow ourselves to be. Yeah. The same things 325 00:19:57,680 --> 00:20:00,439 Speaker 1: as we said that make free WiFi so can venient, 326 00:20:00,560 --> 00:20:06,000 Speaker 1: also make it potentially and in many cases likely dangerous. 327 00:20:06,560 --> 00:20:11,080 Speaker 1: Most the most specific thing is that no authentication is needed. 328 00:20:11,320 --> 00:20:15,280 Speaker 1: Your computer just says, hey, can I ride this ride 329 00:20:15,320 --> 00:20:20,240 Speaker 1: this crazy internet train with you? And the access point says, oh, yeah, 330 00:20:20,320 --> 00:20:24,600 Speaker 1: hop on. There's room for everyone. Yes, and everyone includes 331 00:20:24,760 --> 00:20:28,720 Speaker 1: people who are interested in taking your stuff, your personal information, 332 00:20:29,240 --> 00:20:33,199 Speaker 1: any other kind of info that you're sending across that signal, 333 00:20:33,280 --> 00:20:38,240 Speaker 1: compromising photographs for instance, little texts or chat messages. You're 334 00:20:38,280 --> 00:20:43,160 Speaker 1: having anything like that. Yes, so there are dangers for 335 00:20:43,240 --> 00:20:46,560 Speaker 1: our hypothetical traveler who happens to be named Matt Frederick. 336 00:20:46,880 --> 00:20:49,520 Speaker 1: He let's see, we outlined a couple of places he 337 00:20:49,560 --> 00:20:52,119 Speaker 1: went to, so they have access to his personal information. 338 00:20:52,200 --> 00:20:55,560 Speaker 1: But it doesn't stop there. They can also install a 339 00:20:55,600 --> 00:20:59,760 Speaker 1: thing that will follow him like a shadow, and it 340 00:20:59,800 --> 00:21:03,080 Speaker 1: will see what he does when the hackers not around, 341 00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:07,000 Speaker 1: even logs, key strokes. I mean, they're any number of little, 342 00:21:07,600 --> 00:21:11,280 Speaker 1: you know, wormy type things that can be installed remotely 343 00:21:11,440 --> 00:21:14,960 Speaker 1: on someone's machine that can capture all kinds of input. 344 00:21:15,600 --> 00:21:18,919 Speaker 1: It can hijack the camera. I mean, it's sort of 345 00:21:19,440 --> 00:21:22,360 Speaker 1: all all bets are off, and depending on the security, 346 00:21:22,400 --> 00:21:27,160 Speaker 1: the network itself can be subverted. Yeah, so that the 347 00:21:27,280 --> 00:21:31,960 Speaker 1: airport WiFi one that is the actual connection that the 348 00:21:32,000 --> 00:21:35,800 Speaker 1: Colorado Airport is set up, could then be malicious or dangerous. 349 00:21:35,920 --> 00:21:38,000 Speaker 1: If I was gonna be that hacker, I would name mine. 350 00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:43,440 Speaker 1: This is the real airport WiFi. Yeah, yeah, I would 351 00:21:43,600 --> 00:21:48,320 Speaker 1: name mine super okay, fun time, free beer, What what 352 00:21:48,400 --> 00:21:53,080 Speaker 1: could go wrong? But with emphasis on free beer? Okay, 353 00:21:53,119 --> 00:21:58,120 Speaker 1: So There's there's another issue that happens that this reminds 354 00:21:58,200 --> 00:22:01,240 Speaker 1: me of, and that's a t M skin me. Oh, 355 00:22:01,280 --> 00:22:04,280 Speaker 1: you know, because it works in a similar way. If 356 00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:07,200 Speaker 1: someone is skimming an a t M, what they're doing 357 00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:11,000 Speaker 1: is installing a very small piece of hardware, usually something 358 00:22:11,040 --> 00:22:15,440 Speaker 1: that looks legit, that still allows you to interface with 359 00:22:16,520 --> 00:22:18,960 Speaker 1: the bank or even at a gas station, and it 360 00:22:19,040 --> 00:22:22,320 Speaker 1: allows you to buy gas, to access your banking information, 361 00:22:22,400 --> 00:22:25,720 Speaker 1: pull cash out, make a deposit, etcetera. But it sets 362 00:22:25,720 --> 00:22:29,480 Speaker 1: a middleman between it so that it's also capturing your information. 363 00:22:30,040 --> 00:22:33,360 Speaker 1: And they leave these things on and they come back 364 00:22:33,440 --> 00:22:35,399 Speaker 1: and then scoop it out, and you don't know until 365 00:22:35,440 --> 00:22:40,760 Speaker 1: you become a victim of identity theft. These attacks are 366 00:22:41,480 --> 00:22:45,879 Speaker 1: more common than you might think because the price of 367 00:22:45,920 --> 00:22:49,639 Speaker 1: the technology is, as you know, is going down. The 368 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:54,119 Speaker 1: software is available to anyone who wants to find it, 369 00:22:54,520 --> 00:22:57,320 Speaker 1: and there are more and more people who have these 370 00:22:57,359 --> 00:23:01,359 Speaker 1: skill sets. So what what type of threats are we 371 00:23:01,440 --> 00:23:06,960 Speaker 1: talking about? What? What? Who is out there trying to 372 00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:09,960 Speaker 1: take over Matt Frederick's life at the Denver Airport. Well, 373 00:23:10,000 --> 00:23:13,960 Speaker 1: I have identified a couple of my potential assailants here 374 00:23:14,359 --> 00:23:18,760 Speaker 1: and I've given them, Uh, maybe some names that aren't official, 375 00:23:18,800 --> 00:23:21,040 Speaker 1: but I'm going to call them some things. The first 376 00:23:21,080 --> 00:23:25,199 Speaker 1: one would be sniffers just looking around, Oh what is that? 377 00:23:25,720 --> 00:23:28,360 Speaker 1: What's what's that over there? Reminds me of just kind 378 00:23:28,359 --> 00:23:31,480 Speaker 1: of a dog that's going around the airport, just trying 379 00:23:31,520 --> 00:23:34,040 Speaker 1: to see what everything is, giving a little sniff. Is 380 00:23:34,080 --> 00:23:36,600 Speaker 1: this worth my time? Over here? Is that? Some? Is that? 381 00:23:36,680 --> 00:23:41,600 Speaker 1: Some old pizza? And maybe some banking information? Um. These 382 00:23:41,640 --> 00:23:45,080 Speaker 1: these people will use some kind of application or a 383 00:23:45,160 --> 00:23:48,119 Speaker 1: program that they would just run from their computer that 384 00:23:48,240 --> 00:23:51,760 Speaker 1: then connects up to the access point and they're going 385 00:23:51,800 --> 00:23:55,199 Speaker 1: to capture, you know, as much of the traffic as 386 00:23:55,240 --> 00:23:58,560 Speaker 1: they want. You can. You can break it down sometimes 387 00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:01,359 Speaker 1: depending on the application, or you can just gather everything. 388 00:24:01,800 --> 00:24:04,600 Speaker 1: And it is very disturbing if you just do a 389 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:09,360 Speaker 1: cursory search on the internet like hacking, WiFi hacking tools, 390 00:24:10,119 --> 00:24:13,280 Speaker 1: and the number that shows up. There's lists and lists 391 00:24:13,320 --> 00:24:15,199 Speaker 1: of you know, there was like a list of twenty 392 00:24:15,240 --> 00:24:19,560 Speaker 1: of the best WiFi hacking tools and they're simple to use. 393 00:24:19,720 --> 00:24:24,119 Speaker 1: They'll they'll break the security on the WiFi and just 394 00:24:24,200 --> 00:24:28,840 Speaker 1: let you run amok. Uh. And then there are other types, 395 00:24:28,960 --> 00:24:32,800 Speaker 1: right like gatherers might be after you, and these people 396 00:24:32,960 --> 00:24:35,919 Speaker 1: are almost like bounty hunters, so they'll take steps to 397 00:24:36,000 --> 00:24:39,960 Speaker 1: track your activity for a third party. This is something 398 00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:44,960 Speaker 1: we talked about earlier in an episode with our buddy Jonathan. Yes, 399 00:24:45,080 --> 00:24:50,320 Speaker 1: targeted advertising. Yeah, so it can be done in several ways, 400 00:24:51,160 --> 00:24:55,040 Speaker 1: having a email address or phone number required, access as server, 401 00:24:55,480 --> 00:24:59,199 Speaker 1: requiring a share on social media, or a similar action 402 00:24:59,280 --> 00:25:02,119 Speaker 1: where you're required to log into another site before using 403 00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:05,320 Speaker 1: the service, or and this is always a red flag 404 00:25:05,359 --> 00:25:08,680 Speaker 1: to me, requiring you to download something to access the WiFi. 405 00:25:09,080 --> 00:25:12,080 Speaker 1: And of course cookies, which we've talked about before and 406 00:25:12,119 --> 00:25:16,119 Speaker 1: are not as cool in the internet world as they 407 00:25:16,119 --> 00:25:19,879 Speaker 1: are in real life. Sweet sweet cookies. Is that a 408 00:25:19,880 --> 00:25:25,280 Speaker 1: cookie monster? What's the other kind? So this is delicious 409 00:25:25,280 --> 00:25:29,480 Speaker 1: sounding too, it's called they're called honeypots. Um. So word 410 00:25:29,560 --> 00:25:33,520 Speaker 1: to the wise, never, never, not ever, never, don't just 411 00:25:33,680 --> 00:25:37,960 Speaker 1: don't do this thing wherein you connect to an unfamiliar, 412 00:25:38,440 --> 00:25:43,920 Speaker 1: unlocked WiFi hotspot like Ben's not even super okay, Yeah, 413 00:25:43,960 --> 00:25:47,160 Speaker 1: that's that's that's red flaggy if you ask me, this 414 00:25:47,240 --> 00:25:49,680 Speaker 1: is just it's you. It is a complete and utter 415 00:25:49,720 --> 00:25:53,600 Speaker 1: crap shoot. You're gambling with your privacy, your personal information 416 00:25:53,920 --> 00:25:58,800 Speaker 1: because while not every unlocked access point is malicious, every 417 00:25:58,840 --> 00:26:03,480 Speaker 1: functioning malitia. Just access point is unlocked. It's a trap. 418 00:26:05,119 --> 00:26:06,800 Speaker 1: There are a couple of other things here that we 419 00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:09,240 Speaker 1: we should walk through real quick. So we're talking before 420 00:26:09,280 --> 00:26:15,320 Speaker 1: about data interception right easily captured by eavesdroppers even within 421 00:26:15,359 --> 00:26:18,199 Speaker 1: a few hundred feet, and their reach extends further if 422 00:26:18,240 --> 00:26:21,240 Speaker 1: they have directional antennas. Then of course d O S 423 00:26:21,400 --> 00:26:25,800 Speaker 1: right denial of service. Everyone shares the same unlicensed frequencies, 424 00:26:26,040 --> 00:26:30,360 Speaker 1: making competition inevitable in populated areas. That's why sometimes if 425 00:26:30,359 --> 00:26:33,560 Speaker 1: you're at an airport and super crowded, you're going to 426 00:26:33,640 --> 00:26:39,200 Speaker 1: have worse Internet access. Crap service, crap service. They're clogging 427 00:26:39,240 --> 00:26:42,840 Speaker 1: up the tubes with all their wifis the internet tubes 428 00:26:43,280 --> 00:26:49,640 Speaker 1: because that's how the Internet runs in tubes. You really 429 00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:52,760 Speaker 1: sold me on that one, and then rogue access points. 430 00:26:52,840 --> 00:26:56,800 Speaker 1: So that's when a business network is penetrated by an unknown, 431 00:26:56,880 --> 00:27:00,879 Speaker 1: unauthorized access point, and that's on the business. That's something 432 00:27:00,920 --> 00:27:05,399 Speaker 1: that a lot of corporations and such are very concerned about. 433 00:27:05,560 --> 00:27:11,439 Speaker 1: For example, our internet here at the office is so 434 00:27:11,800 --> 00:27:17,359 Speaker 1: tightly locked down that we sometimes have trouble doing certain things. 435 00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:20,800 Speaker 1: Connecting to certain services. Um even doing like a one 436 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:25,119 Speaker 1: to one connection with another with an outside party, whether 437 00:27:25,160 --> 00:27:28,840 Speaker 1: it's like a you know, Skype type connection or like 438 00:27:28,880 --> 00:27:31,760 Speaker 1: a more direct video chat connection. If we're trying to 439 00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:34,879 Speaker 1: do like a really high end um high quality video 440 00:27:34,920 --> 00:27:37,280 Speaker 1: stream where we're connecting one piece of hardware to another 441 00:27:37,280 --> 00:27:40,959 Speaker 1: piece of hardware, there are certain um things about our 442 00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:45,080 Speaker 1: firewall and you know lack of open ports that completely 443 00:27:45,119 --> 00:27:46,480 Speaker 1: prevent us from doing that. And it's because of this 444 00:27:46,560 --> 00:27:50,359 Speaker 1: exact reason. So to even get on our wireless here 445 00:27:50,400 --> 00:27:52,600 Speaker 1: at the office, which is different from plugging in and 446 00:27:52,720 --> 00:27:56,200 Speaker 1: being you know, jacked into the network through a land um, 447 00:27:56,240 --> 00:27:59,760 Speaker 1: we have to have these specific files on our computer 448 00:27:59,840 --> 00:28:02,840 Speaker 1: that have various credentials that we don't actually enter, their 449 00:28:02,840 --> 00:28:06,280 Speaker 1: called certificates, and they have to be authenticated every time 450 00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:09,240 Speaker 1: you log into our WiFi here. So there is we 451 00:28:09,280 --> 00:28:12,560 Speaker 1: do have a public WiFi that people who are visiting 452 00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:15,160 Speaker 1: can access, but it has a lease on it where 453 00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:16,600 Speaker 1: you can only sort of like if you go to 454 00:28:16,640 --> 00:28:19,040 Speaker 1: Starbucks and it tells you that you get you to 455 00:28:19,080 --> 00:28:22,320 Speaker 1: password and it will expire. Your session will expire in 456 00:28:22,520 --> 00:28:24,280 Speaker 1: two hours and you have to get a new password. 457 00:28:24,520 --> 00:28:28,440 Speaker 1: Same with this, but Yeah, the corporations are particularly concerned 458 00:28:28,480 --> 00:28:31,720 Speaker 1: about this stuff and they act accordingly, right, and they're 459 00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:36,359 Speaker 1: also misconfigured access points, their endpoint attacks, their evil twin 460 00:28:36,560 --> 00:28:40,200 Speaker 1: ap s, fraudulent access points that can advertise the same 461 00:28:40,240 --> 00:28:44,280 Speaker 1: network name as a legit hotspot or business land and 462 00:28:44,560 --> 00:28:48,240 Speaker 1: cause uh other WiFi clients to connect with them. So 463 00:28:48,960 --> 00:28:52,200 Speaker 1: one of the strange things about this is that it's 464 00:28:52,240 --> 00:28:54,840 Speaker 1: easier and easier for people who want to do this 465 00:28:54,920 --> 00:28:58,520 Speaker 1: sort of stuff to do it. You can find tools 466 00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:00,520 Speaker 1: that will do a lot of the head be lifting 467 00:29:00,560 --> 00:29:04,560 Speaker 1: for you, like Carmetta disploit and UH these things like 468 00:29:05,760 --> 00:29:08,520 Speaker 1: listen to nearby clients, discover s s I d s 469 00:29:08,520 --> 00:29:11,920 Speaker 1: they're willing to connect to, and automatically start advertising those 470 00:29:12,080 --> 00:29:14,400 Speaker 1: and once they connect, then d n S and d 471 00:29:14,600 --> 00:29:16,880 Speaker 1: h c P are used to route the client traffic 472 00:29:17,120 --> 00:29:21,640 Speaker 1: through the evil twin where a local web mail file 473 00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:24,720 Speaker 1: server executes those men in the middle attacks that we're 474 00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:29,200 Speaker 1: talking about. And there are different ways to well, there 475 00:29:29,200 --> 00:29:34,040 Speaker 1: are different ways to lessen the likelihood of this stuff working. 476 00:29:34,160 --> 00:29:37,880 Speaker 1: And companies, in particular, as you said, Noel, spend a 477 00:29:38,160 --> 00:29:42,240 Speaker 1: lot of scratch on this Lota Moola butter cheese what's 478 00:29:42,280 --> 00:29:46,640 Speaker 1: another word for money? Deno Dennero spent a lot of 479 00:29:46,720 --> 00:29:53,440 Speaker 1: Robert DeNiro scrilla, so much of Matt money. Uh? And 480 00:29:53,440 --> 00:29:55,840 Speaker 1: what what we have nol Nichols. I feel like you 481 00:29:56,320 --> 00:30:00,640 Speaker 1: think I need Yeah, I think you do. I don't know. 482 00:30:01,200 --> 00:30:04,760 Speaker 1: I mean, you know what the pound is, tanking? You 483 00:30:04,800 --> 00:30:08,760 Speaker 1: can just take over that. Yeah, well, we're gonna put 484 00:30:08,760 --> 00:30:11,440 Speaker 1: a pin on it and send your suggestions to us. Uh. 485 00:30:11,640 --> 00:30:14,280 Speaker 1: We do want to establish also that we are not 486 00:30:14,720 --> 00:30:19,360 Speaker 1: ourselves hackers, white hat nor black hat. And a lot 487 00:30:19,400 --> 00:30:22,160 Speaker 1: of people for those of you listening who are familiar 488 00:30:22,200 --> 00:30:25,040 Speaker 1: with this, let's say you work in network security or something, 489 00:30:25,440 --> 00:30:28,560 Speaker 1: or let's say you are a white hat or a 490 00:30:28,640 --> 00:30:33,440 Speaker 1: black hat. Uh what what you're probably irritated by will 491 00:30:33,480 --> 00:30:38,200 Speaker 1: be the so called script kitties who just borrow, borrow 492 00:30:38,240 --> 00:30:42,960 Speaker 1: code and and use it themselves without making it. Like 493 00:30:43,000 --> 00:30:45,480 Speaker 1: you said, man, I mean, there's an insane amount of 494 00:30:45,520 --> 00:30:47,800 Speaker 1: resources out there for people that just want to dabble 495 00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:49,720 Speaker 1: in this stuff. But it was you. I'm sorry, Matt. 496 00:30:49,760 --> 00:30:51,720 Speaker 1: You're just saying that you found just like you know, 497 00:30:52,120 --> 00:30:56,800 Speaker 1: ready made little apps, a little ex executable files for 498 00:30:57,000 --> 00:31:01,280 Speaker 1: probably Windows and Maclynx Lenox that you can just download 499 00:31:01,360 --> 00:31:03,680 Speaker 1: and you know, give it a try, and it's it's 500 00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:07,600 Speaker 1: total fair weather novice hacking, and it you know, like 501 00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:10,800 Speaker 1: you said, people that really devote a lot of time 502 00:31:10,800 --> 00:31:13,760 Speaker 1: and effort to this, I'm sure doing some hard eye 503 00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:16,120 Speaker 1: rolls thinking about those folks just kind of like hopping 504 00:31:16,120 --> 00:31:18,600 Speaker 1: in and dipping their toes. And again not saying that 505 00:31:18,640 --> 00:31:21,840 Speaker 1: we support doing this stuff, but there are, as we 506 00:31:21,880 --> 00:31:25,480 Speaker 1: talked about with the Mr Robot examples, interesting uses of 507 00:31:25,600 --> 00:31:30,160 Speaker 1: this technology and of these you know, of exploiting these vulnerabilities. 508 00:31:30,520 --> 00:31:32,120 Speaker 1: But the point of this show, I think, is to 509 00:31:33,720 --> 00:31:39,120 Speaker 1: give people information they need to protect themselves from malicious intent, right. 510 00:31:39,200 --> 00:31:42,040 Speaker 1: And this is one of those things where we'll have 511 00:31:42,080 --> 00:31:44,880 Speaker 1: a lot of people say we'll just use common sense. 512 00:31:45,360 --> 00:31:49,120 Speaker 1: But common sense itself, and I think anybody can attest 513 00:31:49,160 --> 00:31:51,520 Speaker 1: to this. Common sense itself is a rather uncommon trait, 514 00:31:51,920 --> 00:31:55,440 Speaker 1: especially when people feel that they're already again in a 515 00:31:55,680 --> 00:32:00,000 Speaker 1: safe place, public place, a bunch of people. Crime doesn't 516 00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:02,760 Speaker 1: happened like that. Crime happens in dark alleys, right, Crime 517 00:32:02,760 --> 00:32:06,880 Speaker 1: happens to other people. Crime happens to other people, right. 518 00:32:06,960 --> 00:32:09,920 Speaker 1: So let's face facts, most of us will continue to 519 00:32:10,040 --> 00:32:14,960 Speaker 1: use public WiFi, either for its convenience or out of necessity, What, 520 00:32:15,120 --> 00:32:17,960 Speaker 1: if anything, can we do to protect ourselves? The best 521 00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:21,360 Speaker 1: way to stay safe while you're using a public WiFi network, 522 00:32:22,080 --> 00:32:25,960 Speaker 1: it's one rule. Don't do anything on there that you 523 00:32:25,960 --> 00:32:30,440 Speaker 1: wouldn't be comfortable doing with the pope standing directly behind 524 00:32:30,480 --> 00:32:37,440 Speaker 1: you and watching your screen. Hello, my son? What what 525 00:32:37,520 --> 00:32:42,600 Speaker 1: the yeah? I can explain this doesn't look holy. Well, 526 00:32:43,040 --> 00:32:47,840 Speaker 1: this is a subreddit. It's called it's called funny. Yeah. 527 00:32:48,120 --> 00:32:51,160 Speaker 1: Do you see that that's a kangaroo just like a person? 528 00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:55,240 Speaker 1: Pless you pretty cool guy? Yeah? That was that was 529 00:32:55,280 --> 00:32:58,280 Speaker 1: all right? To be fair, we have a very accepting pope, 530 00:32:58,360 --> 00:33:04,680 Speaker 1: right picture, perhaps a slightly you know, more judgmental post 531 00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:08,200 Speaker 1: or a pope with a pad and paper just writing. 532 00:33:08,320 --> 00:33:10,640 Speaker 1: Nothing worse than a pope with a pad. Pope with 533 00:33:10,680 --> 00:33:13,440 Speaker 1: a pad, which was originally the name of our podcast. 534 00:33:13,920 --> 00:33:16,560 Speaker 1: I'm kidding, but yeah, that's that's a great point. I 535 00:33:16,560 --> 00:33:20,240 Speaker 1: assume that everything is public. I would add that just 536 00:33:20,520 --> 00:33:23,600 Speaker 1: for the record, Uh, the best way to avoid that 537 00:33:23,680 --> 00:33:26,480 Speaker 1: kind of stuff is to not use it at all, 538 00:33:26,640 --> 00:33:29,680 Speaker 1: But you'll want to, and sometimes you'll have to. If 539 00:33:29,720 --> 00:33:32,120 Speaker 1: you do confirm the exact name of the access point 540 00:33:32,160 --> 00:33:36,920 Speaker 1: at any given location and be very very very aware 541 00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:42,320 Speaker 1: similar names that are they're not quite the same. Usually 542 00:33:42,320 --> 00:33:45,400 Speaker 1: those are the most dangerous, right, Yeah, and then you 543 00:33:45,440 --> 00:33:47,880 Speaker 1: know you can also use if you're on a laptop, 544 00:33:47,880 --> 00:33:50,920 Speaker 1: you can also use browser tools to prevent unwanted cookies, 545 00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:55,720 Speaker 1: other tracking techniques, and there's some stuff that's a little 546 00:33:55,760 --> 00:33:58,600 Speaker 1: more advanced but worth your time to do as well. Yeah. 547 00:33:58,720 --> 00:34:02,640 Speaker 1: Big one that's offered now is HTTPS, which is just 548 00:34:02,680 --> 00:34:06,480 Speaker 1: the hypertext transfer protocol that you know, and this is 549 00:34:06,520 --> 00:34:08,759 Speaker 1: pretty great. There's an extra layer of security when you 550 00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:12,840 Speaker 1: use HTTPS. There are some browsers like Chrome that have 551 00:34:13,000 --> 00:34:17,680 Speaker 1: options that will say always use HDT in other words, 552 00:34:17,719 --> 00:34:19,720 Speaker 1: as the prefix to the U r L you're visiting. 553 00:34:19,800 --> 00:34:21,879 Speaker 1: You can't type that in, but but if you do that, 554 00:34:22,000 --> 00:34:25,920 Speaker 1: then the protocol is more secure. Uses transport layer security. 555 00:34:26,560 --> 00:34:30,239 Speaker 1: The previous iteration of this was secure sockets layer. And 556 00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:33,960 Speaker 1: doing this just adds an extra layer of authentication with 557 00:34:34,040 --> 00:34:37,520 Speaker 1: your communication. Wow, some of these words strung together like this, 558 00:34:37,640 --> 00:34:44,120 Speaker 1: it's it's pretty fun. Extra communication authentication, authentication of your 559 00:34:44,160 --> 00:34:50,040 Speaker 1: communication across the nation, regardless of mobile device or PC, 560 00:34:50,239 --> 00:34:53,840 Speaker 1: MAC persuasion. Yes, But the great thing about using a 561 00:34:54,000 --> 00:34:58,680 Speaker 1: browser that says HTTPS always on. Is that when you're 562 00:34:58,719 --> 00:35:01,279 Speaker 1: not on a secure site like that, it lets you 563 00:35:01,320 --> 00:35:03,319 Speaker 1: know and you can get the heck out of there 564 00:35:03,320 --> 00:35:06,080 Speaker 1: if you want to. So then there's another thing that 565 00:35:06,120 --> 00:35:11,759 Speaker 1: you've heard about, probably, which is VPN, a virtual private network. 566 00:35:12,000 --> 00:35:17,200 Speaker 1: What is a VPN. Well, a VPN, virtual private network, 567 00:35:17,280 --> 00:35:20,479 Speaker 1: can be used in several different ways, and UM, like Matt, 568 00:35:21,200 --> 00:35:24,160 Speaker 1: I do not purport to be an expert in all things, 569 00:35:24,280 --> 00:35:28,560 Speaker 1: all the minutia of of these various internet tools. But 570 00:35:28,960 --> 00:35:30,960 Speaker 1: what I can't tell you is that the VPN essentially 571 00:35:31,120 --> 00:35:35,319 Speaker 1: reroutes your signal through a third party more or less, 572 00:35:35,320 --> 00:35:38,680 Speaker 1: so instead of being a direct connection between you, the 573 00:35:38,719 --> 00:35:42,680 Speaker 1: wireless network you're connecting to, and the Internet being provided, 574 00:35:43,280 --> 00:35:47,040 Speaker 1: you are sent out and then back in through this 575 00:35:47,200 --> 00:35:51,560 Speaker 1: third party tool, which is the virtual private network. Using that, 576 00:35:52,120 --> 00:35:56,120 Speaker 1: you can do several things. For example, if you were 577 00:35:56,200 --> 00:35:58,719 Speaker 1: using a VPN at home, you might do it to 578 00:35:58,880 --> 00:36:05,240 Speaker 1: get around UM certain region restrictions for content. For example, 579 00:36:05,400 --> 00:36:08,120 Speaker 1: so like if you want to watch a clip on 580 00:36:08,160 --> 00:36:12,319 Speaker 1: the BBC that is only meant for people in the 581 00:36:12,400 --> 00:36:16,439 Speaker 1: United Kingdom, you could conceivably use a VPN to make 582 00:36:16,480 --> 00:36:18,400 Speaker 1: it look like you are in the United Kingdom and 583 00:36:18,400 --> 00:36:20,200 Speaker 1: then you can access that content, it will not be 584 00:36:20,280 --> 00:36:24,360 Speaker 1: restricted to you. You can also use it to anonymize 585 00:36:24,760 --> 00:36:28,040 Speaker 1: your browsing. So if, for example, if you're God forbid 586 00:36:28,640 --> 00:36:34,080 Speaker 1: downloading torrents or illegal pirated content. Um. You know, we 587 00:36:34,160 --> 00:36:37,239 Speaker 1: all know that Internet service providers get reports of that 588 00:36:37,280 --> 00:36:39,239 Speaker 1: stuff and they can pay you for it, and they 589 00:36:39,239 --> 00:36:41,560 Speaker 1: can send you a letter a cease and desist. You know, 590 00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:44,440 Speaker 1: they they will serve you that letter that HBO or 591 00:36:44,480 --> 00:36:47,439 Speaker 1: whoever sends to them. By using one of these VPNs, 592 00:36:47,480 --> 00:36:53,880 Speaker 1: in this way, you can disguise your IP address somewhat exactly. 593 00:36:53,920 --> 00:36:56,120 Speaker 1: And none o thing's perfect, but a VPN in a 594 00:36:56,239 --> 00:37:00,120 Speaker 1: public WiFi setting essentially acts as an additional layer of 595 00:37:00,280 --> 00:37:03,839 Speaker 1: encryption for your for your data. The thing is, though, 596 00:37:04,600 --> 00:37:06,920 Speaker 1: like many things, there are free versions and there are 597 00:37:06,960 --> 00:37:13,000 Speaker 1: pay versions. More often than not, the free versions are 598 00:37:13,040 --> 00:37:16,960 Speaker 1: really just proxies. They don't actually offer the full layer 599 00:37:17,120 --> 00:37:21,040 Speaker 1: of security that a proper VPN offers. They just reroute 600 00:37:21,040 --> 00:37:27,000 Speaker 1: your your your traffic traffic exactly, and they log everything 601 00:37:27,040 --> 00:37:30,319 Speaker 1: that you do, all of your browsing habits, and they 602 00:37:30,400 --> 00:37:33,040 Speaker 1: sell it off to third parties. That's how these free 603 00:37:33,480 --> 00:37:36,520 Speaker 1: sites support you know, the work that they're doing. A 604 00:37:36,640 --> 00:37:40,759 Speaker 1: pay VPN will encrypt your stuff, and they claim you 605 00:37:40,800 --> 00:37:44,120 Speaker 1: never know that they don't store your information, that it 606 00:37:44,200 --> 00:37:47,399 Speaker 1: is destroyed, that no one has access to it. So 607 00:37:47,600 --> 00:37:49,840 Speaker 1: those are definitely things to consider it. If you're traveling 608 00:37:49,840 --> 00:37:51,920 Speaker 1: a lot, there's a lot of places you can do 609 00:37:52,000 --> 00:37:54,840 Speaker 1: some research on. In fact, Gizmoto has a great article 610 00:37:54,920 --> 00:37:58,120 Speaker 1: called VPNs What they do, how they work, and why 611 00:37:58,160 --> 00:38:01,000 Speaker 1: you're dumb for not using one. Um I recommend that 612 00:38:01,120 --> 00:38:04,000 Speaker 1: highly for which ones to go with, and a little 613 00:38:04,000 --> 00:38:07,719 Speaker 1: more in depth explanation of what VPNs are careful. How 614 00:38:07,760 --> 00:38:11,279 Speaker 1: I say this because I don't want to let the 615 00:38:11,880 --> 00:38:14,440 Speaker 1: let the badger out of the bag just yet. But 616 00:38:16,040 --> 00:38:20,480 Speaker 1: another thing that I think we should always emphasize about 617 00:38:20,560 --> 00:38:25,960 Speaker 1: VPNs is that it's not just for you know, pornography 618 00:38:26,080 --> 00:38:30,919 Speaker 1: or getting the latest Star Wars film right without having 619 00:38:30,920 --> 00:38:34,200 Speaker 1: a pay to see in the theater. In parts of 620 00:38:34,239 --> 00:38:38,960 Speaker 1: the world where access to information is restricted, such as 621 00:38:39,000 --> 00:38:41,600 Speaker 1: the use of social media in some places because it's 622 00:38:41,600 --> 00:38:46,680 Speaker 1: associated with protests or it's associated with coup's, VPNs are 623 00:38:46,760 --> 00:38:50,040 Speaker 1: crucial for people to be able to communicate with the 624 00:38:50,040 --> 00:38:53,520 Speaker 1: world at large or to visit sites that have been banned. 625 00:38:53,560 --> 00:38:55,359 Speaker 1: That is a really good point, something that hadn't even 626 00:38:55,400 --> 00:38:57,600 Speaker 1: really considered. But sure, like in China, I mean, where 627 00:38:57,680 --> 00:39:01,799 Speaker 1: you don't get access us to certain sites that give 628 00:39:01,880 --> 00:39:05,640 Speaker 1: you unbiased, let's say, or at least biased in a 629 00:39:05,640 --> 00:39:09,560 Speaker 1: different direction versions of the news. I mean, that is 630 00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:14,640 Speaker 1: pretty important to being a you know, fully informed member 631 00:39:14,960 --> 00:39:19,200 Speaker 1: of the global community. And it's it's it's almost a 632 00:39:19,239 --> 00:39:21,160 Speaker 1: form of protest to be able to say, hey, we 633 00:39:21,280 --> 00:39:25,200 Speaker 1: reject this restriction and we're able to use this technology 634 00:39:25,280 --> 00:39:30,319 Speaker 1: to equip ourselves with the information we need. Yeah, I 635 00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:33,320 Speaker 1: think that's I think that's a good point because often 636 00:39:33,320 --> 00:39:36,440 Speaker 1: this will be painted as one of those what you 637 00:39:36,440 --> 00:39:38,520 Speaker 1: need VPN for? Huh, will you do it? Will you 638 00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:40,879 Speaker 1: do it? Will you do it? If you're not doing 639 00:39:40,880 --> 00:39:44,839 Speaker 1: something wrong, regular connection, let me just see what you're doing. 640 00:39:44,840 --> 00:39:46,360 Speaker 1: Come on, let me just see it. Why are you 641 00:39:46,400 --> 00:39:49,000 Speaker 1: ashamed of what you are looking at? My son? No, look, 642 00:39:49,080 --> 00:39:54,920 Speaker 1: because it's a kind but the VPN, VPN show me 643 00:39:54,960 --> 00:39:59,480 Speaker 1: your history, my son, I can't come on, man. So 644 00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:02,960 Speaker 1: and uh, then there's another aspect here that we we 645 00:40:03,000 --> 00:40:07,719 Speaker 1: talked about briefly, which is the tour right the onion router. Uh, 646 00:40:08,160 --> 00:40:11,920 Speaker 1: there are issues here that Elliott stated in our example 647 00:40:11,960 --> 00:40:17,959 Speaker 1: from Mr Robot right, Volunteer operators maintain most of these 648 00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:21,239 Speaker 1: tour network's final set of servers right the exit notes. 649 00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:27,600 Speaker 1: And this excludes the course servers run by law enforcement. Sure, sure, 650 00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:30,920 Speaker 1: because they are used. There are other private tour servers 651 00:40:31,040 --> 00:40:33,880 Speaker 1: that can be set up, um, but the vast majority 652 00:40:33,880 --> 00:40:36,080 Speaker 1: of ones, if you're just a user and connecting up, 653 00:40:36,360 --> 00:40:39,759 Speaker 1: you're going through one of these, uh, one of these 654 00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:42,640 Speaker 1: that has volunteers and operators who are just you're just 655 00:40:42,680 --> 00:40:46,880 Speaker 1: trusting that they're going to keep it anonymous, right, right, 656 00:40:47,120 --> 00:40:49,280 Speaker 1: And as we said, it's easy to see the traffic 657 00:40:49,360 --> 00:40:52,480 Speaker 1: flowing through these servers if you control an exit node. 658 00:40:53,080 --> 00:40:57,080 Speaker 1: So one of the questions that you might have listening 659 00:40:57,120 --> 00:41:01,400 Speaker 1: to this will be the following the question that we 660 00:41:01,440 --> 00:41:06,520 Speaker 1: get asked often, who exactly are they in this situation 661 00:41:06,719 --> 00:41:13,920 Speaker 1: we're talking about compromising public WiFi. There's more than one they, uh, 662 00:41:14,680 --> 00:41:18,880 Speaker 1: there are many of them, and often one thing that 663 00:41:19,000 --> 00:41:22,719 Speaker 1: one thing that I dislike is that often this will 664 00:41:22,760 --> 00:41:27,600 Speaker 1: be painted as oh, here is an individual who has 665 00:41:28,480 --> 00:41:32,120 Speaker 1: low morals or just likes to mess with people because 666 00:41:32,520 --> 00:41:35,920 Speaker 1: they're statistic or their board or they had a bad childhood. 667 00:41:35,960 --> 00:41:38,960 Speaker 1: But the thing is it's not necessarily an individual. Yes, 668 00:41:38,960 --> 00:41:41,560 Speaker 1: there are many individuals doing that, some of who may 669 00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:43,719 Speaker 1: be listening to this show. And if so, I hope 670 00:41:43,760 --> 00:41:46,680 Speaker 1: to stay on your good side, Hank the hacker, We 671 00:41:46,760 --> 00:41:50,560 Speaker 1: mean you no ill will Yeah, big fans actually. And 672 00:41:50,600 --> 00:41:53,240 Speaker 1: then the thing that doesn't get talked about as often 673 00:41:53,280 --> 00:41:56,279 Speaker 1: but should be talked about more is that they're organized 674 00:41:56,840 --> 00:41:59,000 Speaker 1: rings of people doing this. And I don't just mean 675 00:41:59,080 --> 00:42:04,680 Speaker 1: private orizations. State sponsored hacking like this is real, it 676 00:42:04,800 --> 00:42:09,919 Speaker 1: is continual. Make no mistake if the country you live 677 00:42:09,960 --> 00:42:16,239 Speaker 1: in has an active interest in surveillance and hacking, and 678 00:42:16,280 --> 00:42:19,240 Speaker 1: it doesn't matter which country it is, and the US 679 00:42:19,480 --> 00:42:22,960 Speaker 1: is no better than the other countries that you might 680 00:42:23,040 --> 00:42:27,040 Speaker 1: hear about doing state sponsored hacking. One example would be 681 00:42:27,280 --> 00:42:31,719 Speaker 1: UH hackers using hotel internet to steal nuclear secrets. There's 682 00:42:31,719 --> 00:42:35,040 Speaker 1: a great article in Gizmoto from two thousand fourteen, so 683 00:42:35,120 --> 00:42:38,759 Speaker 1: this is old stuff. There was an elite team of 684 00:42:39,040 --> 00:42:43,640 Speaker 1: possibly state sponsored hackers that were infiltrating WiFi networks, although 685 00:42:43,680 --> 00:42:47,160 Speaker 1: that they wouldn't have that much luck in Alberton. They 686 00:42:47,160 --> 00:42:53,239 Speaker 1: were infiltrating WiFi networks, probably to steal nuclear secrets and 687 00:42:53,280 --> 00:42:56,560 Speaker 1: the security researchers who discovered this called the cyber spies 688 00:42:56,880 --> 00:43:00,480 Speaker 1: Dark Hotel, and their efforts to track down a scroup 689 00:43:01,880 --> 00:43:06,760 Speaker 1: we're tenacious. But the further they went, the more disturbing 690 00:43:06,800 --> 00:43:12,480 Speaker 1: stuff they discovered. These people were insanely talented. They're some 691 00:43:12,520 --> 00:43:15,520 Speaker 1: of the members were traced back to South Korea, but 692 00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:18,840 Speaker 1: at the time of writing, they still weren't, at least 693 00:43:19,320 --> 00:43:25,640 Speaker 1: publicly sure what these people were doing and why. And 694 00:43:25,960 --> 00:43:32,600 Speaker 1: this was ben Do you remember the Winter Olympics so stuff, Yeah, 695 00:43:32,719 --> 00:43:35,240 Speaker 1: tell me about it. Well, it sounds very similar to 696 00:43:35,239 --> 00:43:37,839 Speaker 1: to what you're talking about, where there were reports coming 697 00:43:37,920 --> 00:43:41,719 Speaker 1: out of American media that if you're using the WiFi 698 00:43:41,760 --> 00:43:45,600 Speaker 1: in restaurants around Sochi while you're at the Olympics, there's 699 00:43:45,640 --> 00:43:48,360 Speaker 1: a very high chance that you're going to get hacked. 700 00:43:49,320 --> 00:43:53,640 Speaker 1: There's a lot of fear about that stuff. So there's 701 00:43:53,719 --> 00:43:56,880 Speaker 1: also you know, this group Dark Hotel is still active 702 00:43:57,520 --> 00:44:01,360 Speaker 1: as of March of They also have a goth band 703 00:44:01,600 --> 00:44:04,400 Speaker 1: on the side. They have a goth band on the side. Oh, 704 00:44:04,440 --> 00:44:06,839 Speaker 1: it's kind of like Prodigy all over again. Wait, wait, 705 00:44:06,920 --> 00:44:11,440 Speaker 1: is this real? It could be excited, it could be 706 00:44:11,560 --> 00:44:13,920 Speaker 1: Maybe maybe you should ask them what kind of music 707 00:44:13,960 --> 00:44:15,759 Speaker 1: they like. Okay, those of you who don't know Matt 708 00:44:15,800 --> 00:44:18,319 Speaker 1: and haven't maybe seen him, he is so goth right now. 709 00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:24,640 Speaker 1: Guyliner for Days. Uh yeah, So Dark Hotel is still active. 710 00:44:24,640 --> 00:44:28,640 Speaker 1: They were reported exploiting a Chinese telecom. I'm not condoning 711 00:44:28,680 --> 00:44:33,040 Speaker 1: these actions, but the three of us feel that it 712 00:44:33,160 --> 00:44:36,600 Speaker 1: is important to be aware of the situation that you're 713 00:44:36,640 --> 00:44:40,920 Speaker 1: in when you're in an airport, and also to be 714 00:44:40,960 --> 00:44:44,760 Speaker 1: aware that governments are doing this. Don't let the don't 715 00:44:44,840 --> 00:44:48,760 Speaker 1: let the Sunday News or whatever fool you into thinking 716 00:44:49,000 --> 00:44:52,239 Speaker 1: it's just a couple of missing thropes in every airport. Now, 717 00:44:52,239 --> 00:44:54,319 Speaker 1: I would imagine the government is doing things like this 718 00:44:54,440 --> 00:44:58,319 Speaker 1: anyway and anywhere they can, well, especially in airports. I mean, 719 00:44:58,360 --> 00:45:02,320 Speaker 1: you're you're gonna want to have a lockdown on every 720 00:45:02,400 --> 00:45:06,080 Speaker 1: packet that goes to and from within an airport from 721 00:45:06,080 --> 00:45:09,680 Speaker 1: the user. And airport's great because it has instant distance 722 00:45:09,840 --> 00:45:14,319 Speaker 1: baked in yep, so uh, you know which terminal you're 723 00:45:14,320 --> 00:45:18,040 Speaker 1: at and probably where you're sitting right and then you're gone, 724 00:45:18,840 --> 00:45:21,480 Speaker 1: so it's not like there's someone in the cafe with 725 00:45:21,520 --> 00:45:26,600 Speaker 1: you anymore. So we hope that you have enjoyed this episode, 726 00:45:26,760 --> 00:45:29,080 Speaker 1: and we would like to hear from you if you 727 00:45:29,160 --> 00:45:32,400 Speaker 1: have any war stories about free WiFi, or you have 728 00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:35,080 Speaker 1: any tips or tricks that you think your fellow listeners 729 00:45:35,239 --> 00:45:39,480 Speaker 1: should hear. And to prove that we have ears, what 730 00:45:39,680 --> 00:45:44,920 Speaker 1: listen and eyes, let's see, we'd like to jump into 731 00:45:44,960 --> 00:45:48,160 Speaker 1: a little thing we like to call shut ut Corner. 732 00:45:50,760 --> 00:45:54,440 Speaker 1: Our first shout out goes to Paula. She and her 733 00:45:54,480 --> 00:45:57,400 Speaker 1: thirteen year old nephew. You guys are going to space 734 00:45:57,400 --> 00:46:00,600 Speaker 1: camp in July. Another another person of writing in to 735 00:46:00,680 --> 00:46:03,360 Speaker 1: let us know they're they're excited to go to space Camp. 736 00:46:03,719 --> 00:46:05,719 Speaker 1: She's so happy about it. She's been dancing a jig 737 00:46:05,760 --> 00:46:08,920 Speaker 1: for several days. She said, Well, Paula, we're dancing a 738 00:46:08,960 --> 00:46:12,319 Speaker 1: little jig for you right now. Nola's but I am 739 00:46:12,360 --> 00:46:15,720 Speaker 1: nodding my head rhythmically. Space camp is cool. I'm sorry, 740 00:46:15,719 --> 00:46:18,279 Speaker 1: We'll take you, I promise. Do you want to go 741 00:46:19,840 --> 00:46:23,080 Speaker 1: so much? Okay, Well, while we're getting our stuff together 742 00:46:23,120 --> 00:46:26,760 Speaker 1: for space Camp, let's hear from Chase from Alabama. Chase says, 743 00:46:26,920 --> 00:46:29,560 Speaker 1: uh it doesn't believe in the Illuminati per se, but 744 00:46:29,640 --> 00:46:32,640 Speaker 1: wants us to further explore the connections between separate groups 745 00:46:32,640 --> 00:46:35,760 Speaker 1: we've covered in the past, the builder, Berg's skull and Bones, 746 00:46:35,960 --> 00:46:41,440 Speaker 1: Trilateral Commission, Central Banks, etcetera, all of which are real 747 00:46:41,880 --> 00:46:45,279 Speaker 1: and all of which have been accused of doing some 748 00:46:45,360 --> 00:46:48,000 Speaker 1: shady things. So to take a page from the book 749 00:46:48,000 --> 00:46:52,360 Speaker 1: of Beyonce and perhaps some up Chase's position. Y'all haters 750 00:46:52,400 --> 00:46:56,120 Speaker 1: corny talking that Illuminati mess, but I think it warrants 751 00:46:56,160 --> 00:46:59,040 Speaker 1: further exploration, So we're gonna do that thing. Yep. Finally 752 00:46:59,040 --> 00:47:01,120 Speaker 1: we have one from Dan who wants us to take 753 00:47:01,160 --> 00:47:05,000 Speaker 1: a look at the French alchemist and author Fulconelli, who 754 00:47:05,080 --> 00:47:09,200 Speaker 1: allegedly attempted to warn a French physicist about the potential 755 00:47:09,280 --> 00:47:14,480 Speaker 1: dangers of weaponized nuclear fission in nineteen thirty seven, and 756 00:47:14,520 --> 00:47:17,080 Speaker 1: he claimed that it had been used on humanity before. 757 00:47:18,160 --> 00:47:21,799 Speaker 1: And this is one interesting customer. Yeah, that's right. He 758 00:47:21,880 --> 00:47:25,960 Speaker 1: even goes into the great work and trying to find 759 00:47:26,000 --> 00:47:29,239 Speaker 1: that place that all alchemists search for, where you can 760 00:47:29,600 --> 00:47:34,120 Speaker 1: it's a point, some point where you can access all 761 00:47:34,160 --> 00:47:36,879 Speaker 1: of space and time at once, all that has ever 762 00:47:36,960 --> 00:47:41,560 Speaker 1: existed and will never exist traveling without moving time is 763 00:47:41,600 --> 00:47:46,160 Speaker 1: a flat circle. He allegedly found this and was able 764 00:47:46,200 --> 00:47:48,880 Speaker 1: to truly access it at least you know according to 765 00:47:48,960 --> 00:47:51,680 Speaker 1: articles written about him. If you haven't listened to our 766 00:47:51,800 --> 00:47:55,799 Speaker 1: episode on alchemy, we had a guest, dear friend of 767 00:47:55,880 --> 00:47:59,160 Speaker 1: Ben's and now the show, Mr Damian Patrick Williams. We 768 00:47:59,200 --> 00:48:03,840 Speaker 1: had a fantastic versation about um the nature of alchemy, 769 00:48:04,280 --> 00:48:06,400 Speaker 1: and then there's a nice companion episode we did on 770 00:48:06,440 --> 00:48:09,760 Speaker 1: the same day about technology and its relationship with the occult. 771 00:48:09,760 --> 00:48:11,760 Speaker 1: As are some of my favorite episodes. I really recommend 772 00:48:11,920 --> 00:48:14,480 Speaker 1: going back into the archives and checking those out. And 773 00:48:14,560 --> 00:48:21,600 Speaker 1: this concludes our Gosh but wait, as Billy Mays was 774 00:48:21,640 --> 00:48:26,400 Speaker 1: wont to say Durina's glory days, there is more. This 775 00:48:26,520 --> 00:48:28,439 Speaker 1: is usually the part of the show where we talked 776 00:48:28,440 --> 00:48:31,520 Speaker 1: about our Facebook and Twitter and ask you to check 777 00:48:31,560 --> 00:48:34,719 Speaker 1: it out because you'll see suth that doesn't make it 778 00:48:34,760 --> 00:48:37,320 Speaker 1: onto the air for one reason or another. You'll also 779 00:48:37,760 --> 00:48:42,040 Speaker 1: see us actively taking suggestions were conspiracy stuff at those 780 00:48:42,280 --> 00:48:46,040 Speaker 1: We're also on Instagram now that's right, and we are 781 00:48:46,120 --> 00:48:49,920 Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff show there, and you guys, we haven't done 782 00:48:49,960 --> 00:48:51,960 Speaker 1: this before, but we would really appreciate it. Wherever you 783 00:48:52,040 --> 00:48:55,279 Speaker 1: listen to the podcast, be at iTunes, Stitcher, We're now 784 00:48:55,320 --> 00:48:58,920 Speaker 1: on Spotify, We're on Google Play, tons of places you 785 00:48:58,920 --> 00:49:00,719 Speaker 1: can get it. Leave us a review. I mean that 786 00:49:00,760 --> 00:49:03,279 Speaker 1: really helps the algorithm. It helps more people find out 787 00:49:03,280 --> 00:49:05,560 Speaker 1: about the show, and you know, it makes us feel 788 00:49:05,560 --> 00:49:08,840 Speaker 1: good in our hearts a need that every time we 789 00:49:08,920 --> 00:49:13,640 Speaker 1: get a review, our boss goes up to this thing 790 00:49:13,719 --> 00:49:15,920 Speaker 1: he painted on the wall. You know how they're like 791 00:49:16,040 --> 00:49:19,239 Speaker 1: fundraisers for schools and stuff where they'll have you know, 792 00:49:19,280 --> 00:49:22,920 Speaker 1: like a thermometer with the levels of money. Well, ours 793 00:49:23,080 --> 00:49:25,719 Speaker 1: is the level of likelihood of us being fired. And 794 00:49:25,719 --> 00:49:28,000 Speaker 1: if it gets to the top, and we've been very 795 00:49:28,080 --> 00:49:30,319 Speaker 1: close to the top for a while, then boom, we're 796 00:49:30,320 --> 00:49:33,440 Speaker 1: out here. So every like and every review ticks us 797 00:49:33,440 --> 00:49:36,880 Speaker 1: down just a little bit further away from being fired. Because, 798 00:49:36,880 --> 00:49:40,080 Speaker 1: as Ben Is said in the past, the biggest investment 799 00:49:40,120 --> 00:49:42,680 Speaker 1: that you make and the show is with your time. 800 00:49:43,160 --> 00:49:45,239 Speaker 1: So we would really really appreciate if you would take 801 00:49:45,280 --> 00:49:47,319 Speaker 1: just a little more of your time and say how 802 00:49:47,360 --> 00:49:49,759 Speaker 1: you feel about the show. All right, we said we 803 00:49:49,760 --> 00:49:52,600 Speaker 1: were gonna do it. The active Internet users in the 804 00:49:52,600 --> 00:50:00,600 Speaker 1: world right now total comes to three billion and one million, 805 00:50:00,800 --> 00:50:03,920 Speaker 1: one d and twenty one thousand, five hundred and forty 806 00:50:04,440 --> 00:50:08,000 Speaker 1: and counting. And you out there who are part of 807 00:50:08,040 --> 00:50:11,680 Speaker 1: this massive number Please do us a solid Send us 808 00:50:11,719 --> 00:50:16,200 Speaker 1: your thoughts, send us your episode recommendations. We are conspiracy 809 00:50:16,400 --> 00:50:36,640 Speaker 1: at house stop works dot com.