WEBVTT - Berman on Antitrust: View from Plaintiff Bar 0:00:14.160 --> 0:00:16.880 Welcome to Votes and Verdicts. Hosted by the Litigation and 0:00:16.960 --> 0:00:20.599 Policy team at Bloomberg Intelligence, the investment research arm of 0:00:20.640 --> 0:00:25.240 Bloomberg LP. This podcast series examines the intersection of business 0:00:25.239 --> 0:00:29.280 policy and the law. I'm Justin Terracey antitrust litigation and 0:00:29.320 --> 0:00:33.239 policy analysts here at BI. Before we jump into today's episode, 0:00:33.280 --> 0:00:36.680 just a quick word about Bloomberg Intelligence, where the investment 0:00:36.760 --> 0:00:40.239 research platform on the Bloomberg Terminal, with five hundred analysts 0:00:40.280 --> 0:00:43.440 and strategists working across the globe and focused on all 0:00:43.479 --> 0:00:47.479 major markets. Our coverage includes over two thousand equities and credits, 0:00:47.479 --> 0:00:49.920 and we have outlooks on more than ninety industries and 0:00:50.000 --> 0:00:54.240 one hundred market indices, currencies and commodities. Steve, Welcome to 0:00:54.280 --> 0:00:55.080 Votes and Verdicts. 0:00:55.680 --> 0:00:56.440 Welcome Justin. 0:00:57.440 --> 0:00:59.720 So Steve Berman is joining us today. He's the managing 0:00:59.760 --> 0:01:02.840 part of the eponymous Hoggins Berman, which he co founded 0:01:02.880 --> 0:01:04.880 in nineteen ninety three. And I can say from my 0:01:04.959 --> 0:01:07.360 own time working as a plaintiff's lawyer that Steve and 0:01:07.400 --> 0:01:10.160 the firm are truly top notch. Steve's firm has run 0:01:10.200 --> 0:01:13.720 case leading cases on everything from big tobacco to widespread 0:01:13.800 --> 0:01:17.840 automotive defects to just about every corner of antitrust, consumer protection, 0:01:17.959 --> 0:01:20.920 and securities class actions you can think of. Truly, the 0:01:20.959 --> 0:01:23.440 list of matters is endless, and the value of Hoggins 0:01:23.440 --> 0:01:26.760 Berman settlements goes unmatched by most plaintiffs, most on the 0:01:26.760 --> 0:01:30.160 plaintiffs side of the v partner. Today Today's chat, Steve 0:01:30.240 --> 0:01:33.360 leads Hoggins Berman's work on anti trust, and cases in 0:01:33.400 --> 0:01:37.040 this practice area alone have secured settlements valued at more 0:01:37.040 --> 0:01:40.959 than twenty seven billion dollars. Steve's accolades are endless, with 0:01:41.040 --> 0:01:43.679 the National Law Journal even proclaiming him as one of 0:01:43.680 --> 0:01:47.280 the one hundred most powerful lawyers in the nation. So, 0:01:47.319 --> 0:01:49.520 Steve's so glad to have you here with us today. 0:01:49.600 --> 0:01:51.920 And just kind of a threshold question, we ask all 0:01:51.960 --> 0:01:54.520 of our guests kind of brought what brought you to 0:01:54.560 --> 0:01:57.080 where you are today? You know what got you started litigating, 0:01:57.120 --> 0:01:58.680 and you know what made you kind of found the 0:01:58.680 --> 0:01:59.400 firm when you did. 0:02:00.000 --> 0:02:01.720 And I went to law school, I decided right away 0:02:01.840 --> 0:02:04.240 I wanted to be a trial lawyer. 0:02:04.880 --> 0:02:09.120 I don't know why, for better or worse, right, Yeah. 0:02:08.680 --> 0:02:11.440 And I remember I got into a big argument with 0:02:12.240 --> 0:02:18.079 my academic advisor, Justice Scalia, because I turned down law 0:02:18.120 --> 0:02:21.680 review because I wanted to go right away to the clinic, 0:02:21.720 --> 0:02:23.600 because I wanted to get into the courtroom as soon 0:02:23.600 --> 0:02:24.000 as I could. 0:02:24.280 --> 0:02:26.520 Interesting, why would you turn down law review. 0:02:26.520 --> 0:02:29.040 It's a path to a clerkship, for sure. It's like 0:02:29.120 --> 0:02:29.919 I don't want a clerk. 0:02:29.960 --> 0:02:32.600 I want to get out and get into the court. 0:02:33.160 --> 0:02:36.960 As to why, you know, I founded my firm. I 0:02:37.040 --> 0:02:39.440 was at a firm that was mainly a defense firm, 0:02:40.960 --> 0:02:44.080 but I was the little plaintiffs arm and I had 0:02:44.120 --> 0:02:47.840 a case for a family who's young seven year old 0:02:47.919 --> 0:02:52.360 had lost a kidney because of Ecoli contimidation, and it 0:02:52.400 --> 0:02:53.000 was heartbreaking. 0:02:53.000 --> 0:02:55.119 My kids were the exact same age. 0:02:55.840 --> 0:02:59.160 So I went to take the case and my firm said, no, 0:02:59.760 --> 0:03:02.640 we might get we might represent one of the insurance company. 0:03:02.880 --> 0:03:04.160 Got it, you got it, get it. 0:03:04.200 --> 0:03:07.480 I got to take this case, and so we went 0:03:07.520 --> 0:03:10.799 out and started our firm. 0:03:10.840 --> 0:03:11.320 Interesting. 0:03:11.440 --> 0:03:14.200 Interesting, Yeah, I think that's why myself and many folks 0:03:14.200 --> 0:03:15.960 who ended up on the plaintiff side kind of kind 0:03:15.960 --> 0:03:17.360 of felt like doing that. You know, you kind of 0:03:17.400 --> 0:03:19.200 kind of work on the defense side after a while, 0:03:19.280 --> 0:03:21.680 and you kind of see some of the things you're 0:03:21.680 --> 0:03:23.760 working on, and maybe rubs you. 0:03:23.720 --> 0:03:24.359 The wrong way. 0:03:24.720 --> 0:03:27.799 But you know, right now, specifically on anti trust, it's 0:03:27.880 --> 0:03:30.320 an incredibly busy time, you know, I think, you know, 0:03:30.440 --> 0:03:33.639 especially in enforcers, seem really focused on things like big tech. 0:03:33.880 --> 0:03:36.120 There's been this revival of anti trust I think at 0:03:36.120 --> 0:03:38.600 the government level. But what are you kind of seeing 0:03:38.600 --> 0:03:40.640 as the largest issues are trends in the space for 0:03:40.680 --> 0:03:42.080 antitrust right now. 0:03:43.240 --> 0:03:47.080 Well, certainly big tech. So I think I have five 0:03:47.120 --> 0:03:48.760 anti trust cases against Amazon. 0:03:49.280 --> 0:03:52.000 Well, yeah, I mean I've been at the metatrial this 0:03:52.040 --> 0:03:53.760 week myself. There's so much going on. 0:03:53.920 --> 0:03:58.360 Yeah, so Amazon is resisting one of my cases saying 0:03:58.400 --> 0:04:00.600 it's too big to sort of if I remember the 0:04:00.640 --> 0:04:02.000 old banks were too big to. 0:04:02.000 --> 0:04:05.760 Fail, Yeah, yeah, this is the Yeah, we're too. 0:04:05.640 --> 0:04:08.800 Big to certify because there'll be like two hundred and 0:04:08.800 --> 0:04:12.240 thirty million Americans in this class because basically everyone who. 0:04:12.120 --> 0:04:14.880 Shopped on Amazon has been subject to their price. 0:04:14.680 --> 0:04:18.240 Fixing, right right, So we're very busy in. 0:04:20.120 --> 0:04:23.720 All kinds of high tech cases against Amazon and Apple. 0:04:23.920 --> 0:04:27.479 And then I think we're the leading edge on these 0:04:27.560 --> 0:04:34.160 cases involving using algorithms to set prices in either the 0:04:34.160 --> 0:04:41.640 hotel industry, the leasing industry, or in the protein industry would. 0:04:41.400 --> 0:04:44.520 Call it definitely. Yeah, I know we'll get we'll get 0:04:44.520 --> 0:04:47.920 into the Gibson case specifically, and you know, agricultural or 0:04:47.960 --> 0:04:50.320 protein cases I think a little bit later on too, 0:04:50.760 --> 0:04:53.240 But I guess you know those industries a lot of 0:04:53.400 --> 0:04:55.800 any other industries you're kind of seeing anti trust issues 0:04:55.839 --> 0:04:57.960 bubbling up in or those the primary ones you're you're 0:04:57.960 --> 0:04:58.960 focused on at the moment. 0:04:59.440 --> 0:05:01.640 I think that's primary focus on the moment. 0:05:01.720 --> 0:05:04.040 Got it, got it? And kind of broader question with 0:05:04.080 --> 0:05:06.840 regard to class actions, you know, more broadly. Right, So 0:05:06.960 --> 0:05:10.080 even touching upon areas like labor or securities, are you 0:05:10.120 --> 0:05:12.320 seeing any trends there? I know we've got this Lab 0:05:12.360 --> 0:05:15.359 Corp Case coming up the Supreme Court relatively soon. Not 0:05:15.400 --> 0:05:16.800 sure if you have any thoughts on that, but I'm 0:05:16.839 --> 0:05:18.680 not seeing a lot of talk about it lately, and 0:05:18.800 --> 0:05:20.800 it interests me that I'm not, because I feel like 0:05:20.880 --> 0:05:22.720 it actually could be a really big deal for how 0:05:22.800 --> 0:05:23.480 things progress. 0:05:24.120 --> 0:05:26.599 So the Plane's bar is very worried about the Lab 0:05:26.640 --> 0:05:27.080 Court case. 0:05:27.120 --> 0:05:29.960 Sure, Sure, A small group of us have had calls 0:05:30.000 --> 0:05:33.479 with the Larriors and help them, you know, work on 0:05:33.520 --> 0:05:38.320 the briefs. We've been writing Amekas briefs but given them 0:05:38.480 --> 0:05:42.320 conservative nature of the court, anytime a PLANEFFS case comes up, 0:05:42.360 --> 0:05:46.280 no matter whether it's this class issue or right right, 0:05:46.560 --> 0:05:50.719 any issue, you're more nervous than you used to be. 0:05:51.520 --> 0:05:54.159 Definitely, I feel like it's not a small statement to 0:05:54.200 --> 0:05:56.440 say the court's been chipping away at Rule twenty three 0:05:57.040 --> 0:05:59.600 anyway again over the last decade or two. So I 0:05:59.640 --> 0:06:01.599 feel like you see the Davis case with this whole 0:06:01.640 --> 0:06:05.040 concept of an uninjured plaintiff and whether you're consisting in 0:06:05.080 --> 0:06:07.800 a class on that, and it definitely raises a little 0:06:07.839 --> 0:06:10.520 bit of concern given the composition of the court being 0:06:10.560 --> 0:06:11.040 what it is. 0:06:11.680 --> 0:06:14.800 But you never know, because when my inc Double eight 0:06:14.920 --> 0:06:17.640 case was taken by the court, I was like, oh 0:06:17.720 --> 0:06:20.440 my god, this is this is a disaster. 0:06:21.200 --> 0:06:23.839 And then I got a nine to zero opinion. 0:06:24.360 --> 0:06:25.800 Yeah, amazing, amazing. 0:06:25.960 --> 0:06:26.800 They're hard to predict. 0:06:27.240 --> 0:06:30.719 They are hard to predict. It. I think everything seems 0:06:30.720 --> 0:06:32.359 hard to predict right now, and I think maybe that 0:06:32.440 --> 0:06:35.280 rolls into the next question too. But you know, I 0:06:35.720 --> 0:06:38.120 know the plaintiffs bar, you know, sometimes gets this negative 0:06:38.160 --> 0:06:40.520 reception from Wall Street or you know, there's this view 0:06:40.839 --> 0:06:43.599 of the plaintiff's bar in a negative way. But you know, 0:06:43.720 --> 0:06:45.279 do you have any thoughts on how you kind of 0:06:45.279 --> 0:06:47.799 see the plaintiffs bar carrying the labor or on anti 0:06:47.800 --> 0:06:50.240 trust issues right now, and you know maybe what that 0:06:50.279 --> 0:06:52.719 means in the context of political landscapes and how they've 0:06:52.800 --> 0:06:55.919 changed recently from administration to administration. 0:06:56.839 --> 0:07:00.359 Well, I think the plaintiff's bar is always carried the 0:07:00.480 --> 0:07:05.080 anti trust more and generally regulators have been slow and 0:07:05.160 --> 0:07:05.800 behind us. 0:07:06.920 --> 0:07:07.880 Now it's a little. 0:07:07.680 --> 0:07:11.480 Different because you see a lot more anti trust cases 0:07:11.480 --> 0:07:15.280 being brought by state ags, and some of the state 0:07:15.320 --> 0:07:17.239 ags actually have fairly large staffs. 0:07:17.920 --> 0:07:20.640 Sure, sure, that's different, but I. 0:07:20.600 --> 0:07:23.760 Still think there's a large role for the plaintiffs bar 0:07:24.320 --> 0:07:24.840 not only. 0:07:24.720 --> 0:07:26.480 An anti trust but in all kinds of areas to 0:07:26.520 --> 0:07:28.840 be the regulator. 0:07:29.400 --> 0:07:31.200 Yep, that makes a lot of sense. And to your 0:07:31.240 --> 0:07:34.040 point too, you know, I was reading somewhat recently about 0:07:34.600 --> 0:07:37.240 the insulin cases you have brought you a few years back, 0:07:37.280 --> 0:07:40.280 and we're just seeing the FTC now right trying to 0:07:40.280 --> 0:07:43.240 go after pharmacy benefit managers. For I think a lot 0:07:43.240 --> 0:07:45.440 of the very same subject matter that there was at 0:07:45.440 --> 0:07:48.520 the heart of your your litigation around those issues. So 0:07:49.480 --> 0:07:51.920 I think to your point, yeah, the plaintiff's bar really 0:07:51.920 --> 0:07:55.200 does seem to be in many ways suggesting a direction 0:07:55.280 --> 0:07:58.200 that regulators should or could go in with relation to 0:07:58.200 --> 0:07:59.960 a wide range of different industry. 0:08:00.560 --> 0:08:04.920 If I recall in that case the President Trump his 0:08:05.080 --> 0:08:06.560 first term. 0:08:06.320 --> 0:08:08.160 Sure was a fan of that case. 0:08:08.560 --> 0:08:09.080 Interesting. 0:08:09.200 --> 0:08:12.960 Interesting, Yes, we need to do something about this. And 0:08:13.240 --> 0:08:16.840 here we are, like eight years later. Yeah, that litigation 0:08:16.920 --> 0:08:17.640 is still going on. 0:08:18.320 --> 0:08:20.720 Still makes sense. And you know, really you know the 0:08:20.840 --> 0:08:22.840 FTC case too, It's just there's a lot, a whole 0:08:22.880 --> 0:08:24.760 lot of issues going on with that one too, and 0:08:24.800 --> 0:08:28.160 who knows if that resolves, you know, anytime, anytime soon. 0:08:29.080 --> 0:08:31.280 But I guess turning to to the Gibson case, and 0:08:31.360 --> 0:08:34.240 you know, these AI rate algorithm cases a little bit 0:08:34.240 --> 0:08:36.640 more more broadly, you know, I have to say it 0:08:36.640 --> 0:08:38.959 was at the ABA Spring Anti Trust meeting a couple 0:08:38.960 --> 0:08:41.120 of weeks ago, and the hot topic seemed to be 0:08:41.760 --> 0:08:45.120 these AI price setting algorithms and you know what they 0:08:45.160 --> 0:08:48.440 mean for antitrust and you know, can they even be 0:08:48.480 --> 0:08:51.280 addressed by existing anti trust law? And I know your 0:08:51.679 --> 0:08:53.800 firm has done a lot of work on this, I think, really, 0:08:54.200 --> 0:08:56.200 you know, and very soon going to be leading one 0:08:56.200 --> 0:08:59.040 of the first appellate arguments related to the issue itself, 0:08:59.360 --> 0:09:00.920 But could you talk talk a little bit about the 0:09:01.000 --> 0:09:03.240 Gibson case, and you know the oral arguments you have 0:09:03.280 --> 0:09:04.959 slated for next month in the Ninth Circuit. 0:09:05.960 --> 0:09:10.680 Well, the Gibson case, like our other AI price mixing cases, 0:09:11.760 --> 0:09:16.920 alleges that the hotel casinos hired the defendant to use 0:09:16.960 --> 0:09:23.080 their rent maximizing services I think they call them. And 0:09:24.480 --> 0:09:30.000 so the AI company collects non public information and public 0:09:30.040 --> 0:09:34.480 information from the casinos or the landlords or. 0:09:34.360 --> 0:09:36.880 The protein you know, processors. 0:09:37.679 --> 0:09:41.880 They then take that information and they send it back 0:09:42.440 --> 0:09:45.360 to the casino and they say, hey, here's what Steve's 0:09:45.360 --> 0:09:49.760 casino is charging for that room, here's what Justin's casino 0:09:49.880 --> 0:09:52.960 is charging, and here's what we think you should charge. 0:09:53.840 --> 0:09:58.520 And we believe there's an agreement among the people subscribing 0:09:58.600 --> 0:10:04.520 to this service that we will price where the AI 0:10:04.600 --> 0:10:08.560 company suggests we should price. So you're taking away independent 0:10:08.600 --> 0:10:13.720 decision making and there's a tacit understanding that you know, 0:10:13.760 --> 0:10:16.480 we're all going to set the price recommended by someone else. 0:10:17.480 --> 0:10:20.920 So it's just as I told Judge Lasnik when I 0:10:21.000 --> 0:10:23.280 was arguing the Yardy motion. 0:10:23.120 --> 0:10:26.040 To dismiss sure Sure, It's like, hey, it used to be. 0:10:26.800 --> 0:10:28.880 You know, a bunch of old guys got in a room, right, 0:10:29.520 --> 0:10:32.800 they smoked cigars, and they said, I said, look, imagine 0:10:32.840 --> 0:10:35.880 if we were right before the Federal bar dinner, all 0:10:35.920 --> 0:10:40.160 the leading CEOs of law firms got together and said, hey, 0:10:40.760 --> 0:10:43.199 Microsoft is killing us on the rates. 0:10:43.240 --> 0:10:43.480 Man. 0:10:43.960 --> 0:10:45.760 You know, I don't want to charge four hundred. I 0:10:45.800 --> 0:10:48.840 want to charge six hundred. But apparently some of you 0:10:48.880 --> 0:10:51.680 are charging four hundred. You know, we should all charge 0:10:51.679 --> 0:10:55.960 six hundred. And then everyone took that suggestion and they 0:10:56.000 --> 0:11:00.400 all charged six Would anyone doubt that that was price fixing? No, 0:11:00.600 --> 0:11:03.000 And that's what's going on with these AI things. He 0:11:03.080 --> 0:11:05.480 got it, He got it that it was per se 0:11:05.520 --> 0:11:09.000 price fixing, where the judge Tennessee said, oh no, it's 0:11:09.000 --> 0:11:11.840 not per se. For a reason, Well, it's price fixing, 0:11:11.960 --> 0:11:14.600 and price fixing is per se period. 0:11:14.840 --> 0:11:15.240 Right right. 0:11:15.240 --> 0:11:18.960 I mean, and to your point, I mean talk yeah, yeah, yeah, 0:11:19.000 --> 0:11:20.160 I mean it's good, it's good. 0:11:20.200 --> 0:11:21.719 I mean, and I haven't read anything yet. 0:11:22.000 --> 0:11:24.480 Perfect, You're gonna do great, I have no doubt about that. 0:11:24.559 --> 0:11:26.440 But I mean, to your point, this is really I 0:11:26.440 --> 0:11:28.680 think something coming together and something that could be teed 0:11:28.760 --> 0:11:31.040 up for a Supreme Court ruling at some point down 0:11:31.040 --> 0:11:34.000 the road too, because the ruling so far has been 0:11:34.040 --> 0:11:36.440 so disparate on this subject from place to place, right, 0:11:36.480 --> 0:11:39.400 and in the Gibson case, the dismissal that you'll obviously 0:11:39.400 --> 0:11:41.480 be arguing the appeal on next about the Lardy to 0:11:41.520 --> 0:11:43.959 your point, the per se finding, you know, with the 0:11:44.200 --> 0:11:46.719 use of these algorithms, and then in Tennessee kind of 0:11:46.800 --> 0:11:49.360 this halfway step right with using the rule of reason. 0:11:49.480 --> 0:11:52.679 So yeah, just so so much going on there. 0:11:52.720 --> 0:11:54.959 And you know, I suppose you know you've already. 0:11:54.720 --> 0:11:57.400 Touched this one. 0:11:57.400 --> 0:11:58.839 I wouldn't mind going to the Supreme. 0:11:58.600 --> 0:12:00.760 Court with sure, sure, but they have been. 0:12:00.640 --> 0:12:03.840 Pretty good on anti trust matters. 0:12:04.200 --> 0:12:05.720 Yeah, Like if you read their. 0:12:05.760 --> 0:12:09.760 Opinion in my alstin case, they were right on sure. 0:12:10.120 --> 0:12:12.040 Sure couldn't have written it better myself. 0:12:12.280 --> 0:12:15.240 Yeah, the court does, the core current composition of the 0:12:15.280 --> 0:12:17.199 court does seem to get anti trust, which you can't 0:12:17.240 --> 0:12:20.000 say for all judges. So it's definitely nice. Nice to 0:12:20.040 --> 0:12:22.160 see that too. And I think you know you've probably 0:12:22.240 --> 0:12:24.680 hit upon this too in what you said already, but 0:12:25.160 --> 0:12:27.600 in terms of what the District Court got wrong in 0:12:27.679 --> 0:12:30.160 Gibson or you might have gotten wrong, you know, I 0:12:30.160 --> 0:12:32.520 think an important feature of these algorithms seems to be 0:12:32.640 --> 0:12:35.600 that folks kind of auto accept them sometimes too, if 0:12:35.640 --> 0:12:38.320 I'm not mistaken, right, you know, to your point about 0:12:38.360 --> 0:12:42.280 there being in agreement, there isn't this independent decision making. 0:12:42.360 --> 0:12:44.360 I think a lot of times when these folks use 0:12:44.360 --> 0:12:47.079 an algorithm and you know, the price is then displayed 0:12:47.120 --> 0:12:49.719 to the consumer. So if you have any thoughts about that, 0:12:49.760 --> 0:12:51.400 you know, I think that probably is someone that really 0:12:51.440 --> 0:12:54.040 points to an agreement being in place in terms of 0:12:54.040 --> 0:12:57.600 how these cases look under an anti trust review as well, I. 0:12:57.800 --> 0:13:01.680 Would agree with you that you know it's either a 0:13:01.760 --> 0:13:05.680 tacit understanding or express understanding. Got it, You're going to 0:13:05.720 --> 0:13:08.959 accept the recommend the price, got it? Why would you 0:13:09.000 --> 0:13:12.080 be paying the money to that to the AI company? 0:13:12.520 --> 0:13:14.920 Sure, they're given you something that's what it sounds like. 0:13:15.040 --> 0:13:19.440 So definitely, so, you know, interesting and I certainly don't 0:13:19.440 --> 0:13:21.160 know the answer to this, but you know, to your point, 0:13:21.200 --> 0:13:23.880 we've seen these these algorithms that use in real estate 0:13:24.000 --> 0:13:27.400 and with hotels, lodging, those kinds of those industries. But 0:13:27.720 --> 0:13:29.520 you know, are you aware or you know kind of 0:13:29.520 --> 0:13:32.000 think that maybe these algorithms are being used in a 0:13:32.000 --> 0:13:34.920 more widespread way across different industries, and it was something 0:13:34.920 --> 0:13:36.480 to kind of keep our eye on, you know, for 0:13:36.520 --> 0:13:37.040 the future. 0:13:37.920 --> 0:13:41.800 Yes, I think it is more widespread than what's currently 0:13:43.280 --> 0:13:47.520 targeted by litigation, and we're looking at some industries right now. 0:13:47.800 --> 0:13:49.520 So you know, I know you've been involved in a 0:13:49.640 --> 0:13:53.360 large antitrust MDL for years now about beef prices and 0:13:53.400 --> 0:13:57.160 a whole lot of other agricultural areas as well. You know, 0:13:57.200 --> 0:13:59.600 I think just the other day we saw Tyson, you know, 0:13:59.640 --> 0:14:02.800 agree to a settlement with relation to pork for example. Right, 0:14:02.840 --> 0:14:04.400 you know, a lot of folks don't know about this, 0:14:04.480 --> 0:14:07.200 but what's going on in agriculture, right, what's going on 0:14:07.240 --> 0:14:07.880 with proteins? 0:14:07.920 --> 0:14:08.520 Why is this? 0:14:08.800 --> 0:14:12.079 Why is antitrust and price fixing such a pervasive allegation 0:14:12.160 --> 0:14:13.320 proceeeding in these markets? 0:14:13.960 --> 0:14:17.679 So we have anti trust cases and we actually kind 0:14:17.679 --> 0:14:22.040 of started these in the pork industry, the chicken industry, 0:14:22.120 --> 0:14:24.200 the turkey and beef. 0:14:24.680 --> 0:14:26.320 You know, all these industries. 0:14:25.840 --> 0:14:28.560 Are you have a small group of processors do the same, 0:14:28.640 --> 0:14:31.120 the Tysons and everyone. 0:14:30.680 --> 0:14:32.920 Cargills and everyone. 0:14:32.280 --> 0:14:38.640 And they can't control supply. So people supplied too many chickens, 0:14:38.680 --> 0:14:41.680 too many pigs, and then the price goes down, the 0:14:41.760 --> 0:14:44.000 allm you know, get hurt. 0:14:44.000 --> 0:14:47.320 So they came together and said, let's control our supply. 0:14:47.400 --> 0:14:48.280 They we'll all do better. 0:14:48.880 --> 0:14:51.160 And they did that in every industry, and they did 0:14:51.200 --> 0:14:53.320 it through one of these third parties. 0:14:53.360 --> 0:14:55.280 Now it's not a AI. 0:14:55.480 --> 0:14:58.080 It was kind of more old school, right, more traditional. 0:14:58.200 --> 0:15:04.520 Yeah, agristats would go meet with every processor and then 0:15:05.000 --> 0:15:08.640 they would send the other processors pricing and supply information 0:15:09.240 --> 0:15:12.640 back to you as a customer, and they wouldn't have 0:15:12.680 --> 0:15:16.240 the name of the other processor on it, but these 0:15:16.240 --> 0:15:19.200 people could figure it out. So they knew what Tyson 0:15:19.440 --> 0:15:24.080 was charging, and they knew what you know, JD was charging, 0:15:24.600 --> 0:15:26.440 and what the supply was and they were able to 0:15:26.440 --> 0:15:27.200 control supply. 0:15:27.560 --> 0:15:27.920 Got it. 0:15:28.080 --> 0:15:28.520 Got it. 0:15:28.760 --> 0:15:31.560 And I'm assuming this is kind of similar to what 0:15:31.600 --> 0:15:34.800 we're seeing around DOJ investigating eggs right now. And you know, 0:15:35.000 --> 0:15:37.440 it seems like there's been litigation around that subject in 0:15:37.480 --> 0:15:39.520 the past, but the same general idea I think with 0:15:39.560 --> 0:15:41.680 regard to that particular corner of the market. 0:15:41.920 --> 0:15:44.560 I will tell you that half of my team, I 0:15:44.600 --> 0:15:48.920 think has become vegetarians on those cases where we had 0:15:48.960 --> 0:15:50.520 to see actually how they make all this. 0:15:50.760 --> 0:15:53.440 Yeah, yeah, I have a colleague who was involved in 0:15:53.440 --> 0:15:55.680 an anti trust case. It's the same place, it's right, Yeah, 0:15:55.800 --> 0:15:58.000 I think once you experience that, it's not something you 0:15:58.040 --> 0:15:59.640 really want to want to adjust. 0:16:00.280 --> 0:16:04.400 Disgusting that in the case the judge granted their motion 0:16:04.480 --> 0:16:09.400 eliminated that we couldn't show any pictures of processing their chickens. 0:16:09.600 --> 0:16:15.000 Wow wow, interesting Yeah, right, that speaks volumes then definitely, definitely. 0:16:14.960 --> 0:16:16.840 Sometimes there's fun facts in these cases. 0:16:17.160 --> 0:16:19.440 Yeah, yeah, no, definitely. You know, I feel like that's 0:16:19.480 --> 0:16:20.920 the interesting thing about anti trust. 0:16:20.960 --> 0:16:24.040 I think that one of the big issues in anitrust cases. Yeah, that. 0:16:26.840 --> 0:16:29.800 I think judges are struggling with, and I've heard particularly 0:16:29.880 --> 0:16:31.080 Judge Kenzalas. 0:16:30.720 --> 0:16:34.720 Rogers talking about yes, yeah, and that is the complexity. 0:16:35.280 --> 0:16:35.520 Sure. 0:16:35.560 --> 0:16:39.960 So, you know, I just got done with the deposition 0:16:39.960 --> 0:16:42.480 of my expert in the Amazon price fixing case. This 0:16:42.600 --> 0:16:47.040 reports like fifteen hundred pages with like two thousand footnotes. 0:16:47.240 --> 0:16:49.080 Sure, sure, both. 0:16:48.880 --> 0:16:51.560 Sides have done this right, and then the judge gets 0:16:51.600 --> 0:16:55.320 all us and the judge is not an economist, right, 0:16:55.360 --> 0:16:58.920 and you know, both sides say, well, the other expert 0:16:59.040 --> 0:17:02.440 should be Dauber and he's full of beans. 0:17:02.480 --> 0:17:03.360 He doesn't know what he's doing. 0:17:03.600 --> 0:17:06.040 Sure. Sure, What are you supposed to do with all this? 0:17:06.720 --> 0:17:07.760 It's just too much? 0:17:08.160 --> 0:17:11.399 Yes, yes, I don't know that I have an answer 0:17:11.440 --> 0:17:14.520 to it other than I keep telling my lawyers and 0:17:14.720 --> 0:17:16.240 they're so tired of hearing it. 0:17:17.040 --> 0:17:18.359 Every time I get an ex report. 0:17:18.400 --> 0:17:23.440 I want to summary that is in plain English, that's 0:17:23.480 --> 0:17:27.400 actually exciting that the judge will read, because I don't 0:17:27.400 --> 0:17:29.320 believe any judge is going to read twelve hundred pages 0:17:29.400 --> 0:17:29.840 or sure. 0:17:29.960 --> 0:17:31.720 Sure, I mean they might endeavor to do it, but 0:17:31.760 --> 0:17:33.560 if you can stay away for it, that's a miracle 0:17:33.640 --> 0:17:34.399 in and of itself. 0:17:35.240 --> 0:17:37.159 Get him interested in the summary, and then if they 0:17:37.160 --> 0:17:38.080 want to read a little. 0:17:37.840 --> 0:17:40.560 Bit more they will, Sure, but please. 0:17:40.200 --> 0:17:45.400 Make it understandable. I think that's just a big challenge. 0:17:45.520 --> 0:17:48.280 Sure, I think you're right, Especially with the economics involved 0:17:48.320 --> 0:17:51.520 with all these cases too, it could be really difficult 0:17:51.560 --> 0:17:53.520 to follow sometimes and that makes a lot of sense 0:17:53.640 --> 0:17:54.040 for sure. 0:17:54.080 --> 0:17:56.480 And another thing that I've seen because of the complexity 0:17:56.600 --> 0:18:00.600 of the marketplace, So you know, in the protein cases, 0:18:01.400 --> 0:18:06.119 we had to digest like every sale of chicken in 0:18:06.200 --> 0:18:09.800 the nation at every single place, and same thing, and 0:18:10.200 --> 0:18:14.280 so you're talking about mega bites of information that the 0:18:14.320 --> 0:18:18.640 experts have to digest. In the Amazon case, imagine we've 0:18:18.720 --> 0:18:21.960 examined I think eighty three billion transactions. 0:18:22.840 --> 0:18:23.159 Wow. 0:18:23.480 --> 0:18:26.640 Right the cost of all this, you know, it used 0:18:26.640 --> 0:18:28.600 to be that as a plaintiff story, you might spend 0:18:28.640 --> 0:18:30.080 a couple hundred grand on an expert. 0:18:30.200 --> 0:18:31.320 Oh yeah, it's incredible. 0:18:31.600 --> 0:18:32.400 Now we're talking. 0:18:32.160 --> 0:18:35.639 About spending five to ten million dollars. Sure, sure in 0:18:35.720 --> 0:18:37.160 your economic experts. 0:18:37.200 --> 0:18:38.800 That is a huge change. 0:18:39.200 --> 0:18:41.800 Absolutely, And the government when it brings a case incurring 0:18:41.800 --> 0:18:44.240 substantially the same cost too, right, So I mean it's 0:18:44.280 --> 0:18:46.400 not even just the law firms, and you know if 0:18:46.400 --> 0:18:49.640 they're if they're pursuing it as a plaintiff, is very 0:18:49.680 --> 0:18:50.359 interesting stuff. 0:18:50.440 --> 0:18:50.840 Yeah. 0:18:51.240 --> 0:18:53.280 So, Steve, is there anything else you want to add 0:18:53.320 --> 0:18:55.280 before we wrap up here? Outside of these cases, I 0:18:55.280 --> 0:18:55.840 would say. 0:18:55.680 --> 0:18:58.960 Two things about it if you're thinking about plaintiff's law 0:18:59.040 --> 0:19:03.000 and impact. So I've done two cases that I call 0:19:03.119 --> 0:19:05.400 transformative cases in the last got it? 0:19:06.160 --> 0:19:08.440 And the first is the real estate. 0:19:08.680 --> 0:19:13.280 Case about commissions, and the New York Times and others 0:19:13.280 --> 0:19:17.280