WEBVTT - How To Protect Yourself in the New World (with Chelsea Manning) 0:00:04.400 --> 0:00:13.680 What's surveilling my you. This is Robert Evans, host of 0:00:13.800 --> 0:00:18.040 It Could Happen Here, a podcast about how things are 0:00:18.079 --> 0:00:21.400 kind of falling apart uh and also advice on how 0:00:21.440 --> 0:00:24.919 to you know, deal with that ship. UM. Today, I'm 0:00:25.000 --> 0:00:31.480 here with my colleagues Garrison Davis. Hello, Garrison, Garrison. Hi, 0:00:31.640 --> 0:00:33.920 Sorry Garrison, it did not know we're getting called on 0:00:34.080 --> 0:00:39.120 Garrison and Christopher Wong. HELLU, yes, that's right. And we're 0:00:39.159 --> 0:00:45.480 going to talk about privacy, about information, self defense, about 0:00:45.479 --> 0:00:48.840 avoiding surveillance with somebody who knows what the funk they're 0:00:48.840 --> 0:00:51.360 talking about, because I sure as held down. Uh. And 0:00:51.440 --> 0:00:54.440 for that, I want to welcome Chelsea Manning. Hey, how's 0:00:54.440 --> 0:00:58.800 it going good? Chelsea? Um? Well, why wouldn't you want 0:00:58.840 --> 0:01:01.800 the government to no exact actually what you're doing? Well, 0:01:01.840 --> 0:01:05.840 I mean it's not just the government. UM. So you know, 0:01:06.120 --> 0:01:07.680 one of the things that I do as a security 0:01:07.680 --> 0:01:13.320 consultant is I UM is I provide sort of a 0:01:13.319 --> 0:01:17.240 an analysis as to what your actual tangible threats are. UM. 0:01:17.280 --> 0:01:19.280 So depending on who you are, what you're doing, and 0:01:19.319 --> 0:01:23.080 what environment you're in, UM, that that is going to change. 0:01:23.560 --> 0:01:26.440 So in the instance of the government, it may be 0:01:26.640 --> 0:01:29.400 that you are a political dissident. It may be that 0:01:29.480 --> 0:01:34.440 you are UM engaged in activities that are criminalized in 0:01:34.440 --> 0:01:38.000 that society or culture UM or or it may be 0:01:38.160 --> 0:01:42.840 that you know, you are simply trying to get you know, 0:01:42.880 --> 0:01:46.039 you're trying to live your life, uh and not not 0:01:46.120 --> 0:01:49.840 have to engage with UM, you know, tax authorities or 0:01:50.320 --> 0:01:51.760 you know, so so it could be, it could be. 0:01:51.800 --> 0:01:54.520 It could depend on what you're doing, UH and who 0:01:54.600 --> 0:01:59.680 you're trying to avoid UM with respect to the government. UM, 0:01:59.720 --> 0:02:05.080 I'm mostly focus on political activism and dissidents, and uh, 0:02:05.120 --> 0:02:07.320 you know a part of that is, you know, ensuring 0:02:07.400 --> 0:02:12.520 that you are actually not being uh you know, spide 0:02:12.520 --> 0:02:18.240 on or threatened by whoever your government is, whether it's 0:02:18.280 --> 0:02:25.560 a local, state, national, or international threat for you. And UH, 0:02:26.320 --> 0:02:28.920 I don't know. I guess my first question would be, 0:02:28.960 --> 0:02:33.680 like for a person who's UM, I don't know, perhaps 0:02:33.680 --> 0:02:37.160 a slightly lower imminent threat of I mean, any of 0:02:37.160 --> 0:02:40.000 the stuff that that you worry about, or that perhaps 0:02:40.000 --> 0:02:42.800 people who are much more involved in kind of organizing 0:02:42.840 --> 0:02:45.040 have to worry about, Like what is what do you 0:02:45.080 --> 0:02:49.600 think is kind of the basic security hygiene toolkit that 0:02:50.040 --> 0:02:53.040 you know, an average person ought to ought to at 0:02:53.120 --> 0:02:58.519 least understand, if not actively practice. Right. So the basics are, 0:02:58.840 --> 0:03:01.760 you know, a privacy based browser, you know, something that 0:03:01.800 --> 0:03:07.280 doesn't have cookies for your Internet browsing UM and changing 0:03:07.680 --> 0:03:12.240 changing Firefox. No, I mean I think I think you 0:03:12.240 --> 0:03:16.040 know it's it's understanding the privacy features of your particular 0:03:16.400 --> 0:03:22.120 UM browser. UM. There are browsers like Brave that that 0:03:22.120 --> 0:03:26.200 that specifically specialized in this or tour browser. But UM, 0:03:26.240 --> 0:03:30.440 you know, the vast majority of browsers today have privacy 0:03:30.480 --> 0:03:33.840 feud features. Although you know there are there, there are 0:03:33.919 --> 0:03:35.560 risks that come with that as to whether or not 0:03:35.680 --> 0:03:39.760 they are UM revealing the true nature of how much 0:03:39.840 --> 0:03:42.720 you know, information that they're collecting on you, where it's stored, 0:03:42.800 --> 0:03:45.040 whether it's in a cloud hosting service, or whether it's 0:03:45.080 --> 0:03:47.560 you know, on your on your device, on your phone, 0:03:47.600 --> 0:03:51.200 on your computer, UM, or whether or not it's being 0:03:51.280 --> 0:03:55.480 sold to a third party advertising you know company, or 0:03:55.520 --> 0:03:59.600 you know to advertisers or to you know, data mining companies. 0:04:00.320 --> 0:04:02.440 So you know it it really depends, you know, like 0:04:02.600 --> 0:04:05.760 basically basically, nothing you do, Unfortunately, nothing you do on 0:04:05.800 --> 0:04:09.520 the Internet or on an electronic device is that is 0:04:09.560 --> 0:04:14.400 connected to another computer. UM. Is truly private. UM. So 0:04:14.400 --> 0:04:20.760 it's about sort of reducing your um your we would 0:04:20.760 --> 0:04:24.800 say surface area, your attack surface area or your visibility 0:04:24.800 --> 0:04:28.120 surface area as much as possible while also maintaining a 0:04:28.120 --> 0:04:32.279 certain amount of um, you know, usability because you know, 0:04:32.320 --> 0:04:34.240 you can you can go out into a cabin in 0:04:34.520 --> 0:04:37.279 Montana and live live off of live live out in 0:04:37.279 --> 0:04:40.400 the woods if you so choose. But I mean, you're 0:04:40.400 --> 0:04:42.960 not gonna be able to accomplish you know, the things 0:04:42.960 --> 0:04:45.359 that you need to do, um that you can that 0:04:45.400 --> 0:04:49.320 you can do with mobile devices, with computers, with servers 0:04:49.400 --> 0:04:55.080 and with cloud cloud services. So it's about it's about balancing. 0:04:55.080 --> 0:04:59.080 It's about balancing the risk versus what you actually want 0:04:59.120 --> 0:05:02.480 to accomplish and how usable that is. Yeah, And I 0:05:02.560 --> 0:05:04.480 don't know what is what is like when you think 0:05:04.520 --> 0:05:08.200 of a of a of kind of an ideal browser solution, 0:05:08.200 --> 0:05:11.240 because right like tour is a is a whole thing 0:05:11.360 --> 0:05:14.760 as opposed to just like grabbing Chrome or Firefox. It's 0:05:14.880 --> 0:05:17.960 it's it's more involved of a process to use. What 0:05:18.000 --> 0:05:21.000 do you think, like what when when you're kind of 0:05:21.040 --> 0:05:23.719 like recommending like what people should do, kind of what 0:05:23.920 --> 0:05:28.840 is what is you're probably safe best practice in terms 0:05:28.839 --> 0:05:32.840 of just browsing. In terms of just browsing, I would say, no, 0:05:33.000 --> 0:05:37.400 the no, the sites that you're browsing, No, their privacy UM. 0:05:37.520 --> 0:05:43.120 You know, like you don't have to read the privacy UM. 0:05:43.160 --> 0:05:46.240 You know, in terms of conditions yourself, because it's usually 0:05:46.240 --> 0:05:50.120 in legalistic gobblegook um. What you can read articles about it. 0:05:50.160 --> 0:05:54.080 You can find out um, you know from somebody who knows, 0:05:54.640 --> 0:05:57.440 UM what those are and how they change. You have 0:05:57.480 --> 0:05:59.560 to update that, so you know, they update their terms 0:05:59.560 --> 0:06:03.680 of service sometimes every six months. I know that some 0:06:03.720 --> 0:06:06.880 companies do this more frequently and they don't notify you. 0:06:06.920 --> 0:06:09.480 They and they'll they'll notify you that it's been changed 0:06:09.600 --> 0:06:13.000 like three months ago, you know, like so you know, 0:06:13.040 --> 0:06:16.120 you gotta you gotta keep on top of it. UM 0:06:16.200 --> 0:06:18.360 and then UM, you know we're you know just sort 0:06:18.400 --> 0:06:21.160 of like no. I mean, another big thing is is 0:06:21.200 --> 0:06:25.000 password hygiene. You know you've got to use. I mean, 0:06:25.040 --> 0:06:27.880 I always recommend using a password manager, like the most 0:06:27.920 --> 0:06:32.920 basic people should use a strong password manager UM that 0:06:33.560 --> 0:06:38.200 generates you know, specific passwords for specific accounts UM. Because 0:06:38.600 --> 0:06:41.880 nobody nobody can memorize no, no, no, nobody can memorize 0:06:41.880 --> 0:06:45.480 like I I think I have like nine d passwords 0:06:45.480 --> 0:06:48.160 that I use on a regular basis, but only I 0:06:48.200 --> 0:06:51.800 only memorize like three or four, you know, for my 0:06:51.960 --> 0:06:55.440 one for my device, um, one from each specific device, 0:06:55.520 --> 0:06:58.520 and then another for the pastor manager itself. So you know, 0:06:58.720 --> 0:07:04.000 you know it just it just mostly you know, those 0:07:04.040 --> 0:07:07.720 are basics. So everyone should be doing those things. They aren't, 0:07:08.040 --> 0:07:10.560 but you should, you know, even if you're even if 0:07:10.600 --> 0:07:17.600 you are you you your uh your political views are 0:07:18.280 --> 0:07:22.000 that you know bridge brittan nity spears should be freed, uh, 0:07:22.520 --> 0:07:26.840 you know if it if you're not facing like an 0:07:26.840 --> 0:07:32.600 existential threat from your from like a you know, fascist 0:07:33.080 --> 0:07:38.960 dictator you know, or or a police state that you 0:07:39.000 --> 0:07:42.240 know is discriminating against you know, a particular class of 0:07:42.440 --> 0:07:46.000 group of people, then you should be doing these things anyway, 0:07:46.440 --> 0:07:48.960 you know, even though they would help you in that situation. 0:07:49.440 --> 0:07:57.040 You should be doing these things baseline and um. Okay, 0:07:57.040 --> 0:08:00.400 so outside of just kind of like browsing protection, right, like, 0:08:00.480 --> 0:08:05.240 let's let's say, uh, that's not your primary word. Let's 0:08:05.280 --> 0:08:07.960 say you're worried about being kind of like physically surveiled 0:08:08.240 --> 0:08:11.600 um or physically followed, having your your your space, having 0:08:11.640 --> 0:08:15.600 someone inter it UM, and uh, you know potentially even 0:08:15.640 --> 0:08:17.920 when you're not there. What are kind of the physical 0:08:18.000 --> 0:08:21.800 security measures that that you think are kind of accessible, 0:08:21.840 --> 0:08:24.400 you know, without getting James Bond about it and buying 0:08:24.400 --> 0:08:26.920 a bunch of bugs. Like we're talking kind of low tech, 0:08:27.520 --> 0:08:31.440 low cost things that a person could deploy kind of 0:08:31.480 --> 0:08:34.160 in the moment if they suddenly start to worry that 0:08:34.200 --> 0:08:37.199 they're being targeted for that sort of thing. Right, So, 0:08:37.320 --> 0:08:42.760 in terms of physical surveillance and protection, UM, there's again 0:08:42.920 --> 0:08:45.400 you know, a ladder in terms of what you can 0:08:45.520 --> 0:08:48.080 do and what you should do. UM. Some basic things 0:08:48.120 --> 0:08:52.320 are put us put a strong alpha numeric password onto 0:08:52.400 --> 0:08:56.959 your phone. UM, even if you have uh, you know, 0:08:57.080 --> 0:09:01.360 your facial recognition or your your touch feature enabled, UM, 0:09:01.400 --> 0:09:05.880 your biometrics enabled. UM, maintain physical possession of your phone. 0:09:06.160 --> 0:09:08.920 Have a strong password. And then if you're in an 0:09:09.000 --> 0:09:11.800 environment where you feel it that you're at risk, know 0:09:12.320 --> 0:09:15.560 how to disable the biometric feature. For instance, you know 0:09:15.760 --> 0:09:18.760 with my phone, the iPhone twelve, you have to hold 0:09:18.800 --> 0:09:22.240 down to buttons for five seconds. UM. You know it's 0:09:22.240 --> 0:09:24.439 the it's the top, it's the up volume button and 0:09:24.480 --> 0:09:26.800 the power button. If you hold those two down for 0:09:26.880 --> 0:09:31.280 five seconds, Uh, it automatically locks the biometric featricks features, 0:09:31.440 --> 0:09:35.520 which don't have the same protections um as. I mean, 0:09:35.559 --> 0:09:38.199 they don't have the same for legal protections as your password. 0:09:38.400 --> 0:09:40.680 And you know, you you you can't be forced and 0:09:40.679 --> 0:09:43.040 even if you even if you are in a place 0:09:43.040 --> 0:09:45.680 where they can force you to do so, you know, 0:09:45.880 --> 0:09:48.720 they can't just hold up your phone or you know, 0:09:49.160 --> 0:09:53.880 put your finger right onto your device. UM have UH 0:09:54.600 --> 0:09:58.400 encrypt your phones, like ensure that you have hardware encryption 0:09:58.480 --> 0:10:01.480 on your Apple on your But you know, I always 0:10:01.520 --> 0:10:05.040 recommend like iPhones, UH in particular for people, not because 0:10:05.200 --> 0:10:07.520 androids are bad or anything. It's just that, you know, 0:10:07.600 --> 0:10:11.720 the type of encryption that it uses is baked into 0:10:11.760 --> 0:10:16.120 the hardware as opposed to UM into the software. You know. 0:10:16.200 --> 0:10:19.160 And I know there's this whole debate over and you 0:10:19.200 --> 0:10:21.840 know Android, you know, Apple being able to dig crypt 0:10:21.840 --> 0:10:24.000 phones and and and things like that. But I mean, 0:10:24.240 --> 0:10:26.080 at the end of the day, an Android phone is 0:10:26.760 --> 0:10:30.480 one hundred thousand times easier to break into than an 0:10:30.480 --> 0:10:34.440 Apple phone, UM, just by virtue of the fact that 0:10:35.200 --> 0:10:38.439 UH it has hardware encryption and it's baked right into 0:10:38.480 --> 0:10:41.920 the device. UH. And UM android phones use U use 0:10:42.280 --> 0:10:49.000 software which is a type of software that is crackable. Um. 0:10:49.080 --> 0:10:51.600 You know. Uh, and it's the type that's not used 0:10:51.640 --> 0:10:54.199 on like a Linux computer you know crypt set up 0:10:54.320 --> 0:10:57.600 so um and yeah. So as you're moving up the 0:10:57.640 --> 0:11:01.320 ladder in terms of like physical surf alience, um, by 0:11:01.400 --> 0:11:06.839 somebody who's following you, Um, there's this uh. There there 0:11:06.840 --> 0:11:09.160 are ways in which you can detect that because you know, 0:11:09.200 --> 0:11:10.960 you can be paranoid and you can be like, okay, 0:11:11.040 --> 0:11:13.000 is this person following Well, but you know, there's things 0:11:13.040 --> 0:11:15.280 that you can do. You know, you can alter your route. 0:11:15.320 --> 0:11:19.400 You can alter the patterns of where and how you 0:11:19.440 --> 0:11:21.640 are moving. Um. For instance, if you go to the 0:11:21.679 --> 0:11:25.880 coffee shop at three pm every day, at the same 0:11:25.920 --> 0:11:28.920 time every weekday that you go to your you know, 0:11:28.920 --> 0:11:32.240 wherever you go, um, change it up, you know, like 0:11:32.360 --> 0:11:35.000 don't don't go to that coffee shop one day, or 0:11:35.040 --> 0:11:37.480 go to a different coffee shop, or you know, change 0:11:37.520 --> 0:11:39.679 up the pattern of how you go, like you know, 0:11:39.880 --> 0:11:42.400 go down this street, you know, mix mix it up 0:11:42.440 --> 0:11:45.040 a bit. Um. If you are active, if you believe 0:11:45.040 --> 0:11:47.000 that you are actively being surrealed, you can do what's 0:11:47.000 --> 0:11:51.679 called a surveillance detection route, which is where you alter 0:11:51.840 --> 0:11:58.320 your path uh to a predesignated UM bottleneck where no 0:11:58.520 --> 0:12:02.600 other person where there's no there's no way of like 0:12:02.679 --> 0:12:05.240 there's not like three passes a place, there's a bottleneck 0:12:05.320 --> 0:12:09.800 like a bridge or a tunnel or an alleyway that 0:12:10.160 --> 0:12:13.520 UM you would have to go through UM if you 0:12:13.559 --> 0:12:16.560 are being followed, and then you can detect and confirm 0:12:16.720 --> 0:12:19.840 that you are in fact being followed by by by 0:12:19.840 --> 0:12:23.200 an individual. And physical surveillance is typically not done by 0:12:23.200 --> 0:12:26.360 an individual. Obviously in the case of like a stalker, 0:12:26.720 --> 0:12:29.720 it maybe, but UM if if if it's like a 0:12:29.840 --> 0:12:35.360 law enforcement agency or an intelligence agency or even like 0:12:35.440 --> 0:12:41.000 a paramilitary you know, militia group, UM, typically they're going 0:12:41.040 --> 0:12:46.280 to use UH two typically at least three or more 0:12:46.720 --> 0:12:49.640 UM people too that are in communication with each other. 0:12:49.720 --> 0:12:51.440 And then that's another thing you can look for is 0:12:51.840 --> 0:12:54.559 do they have radios? Do they have earpieces? Are they 0:12:54.600 --> 0:13:00.640 wearing clothing that would um hide uh the fact that 0:13:00.679 --> 0:13:03.480 they're wearing a radio for instance, or you know, and 0:13:03.559 --> 0:13:05.800 all that also goes for like firearms, right, you know, 0:13:06.040 --> 0:13:10.480 if they're wearing a baggy clothing UM or a suit 0:13:11.040 --> 0:13:15.000 that uh is a little ill fitting, it's a little 0:13:15.080 --> 0:13:19.320 too much then they may be trying to hide, um, 0:13:19.480 --> 0:13:21.880 some bolts or something. Somebody who's in a tight fitting 0:13:21.960 --> 0:13:27.040 leotard is probably not surveilling you. And um. One of 0:13:27.080 --> 0:13:29.320 the things that kind of I always have in mind 0:13:29.559 --> 0:13:33.320 when I'm at like a hotel or you know, an 0:13:33.320 --> 0:13:35.760 airbnb or whatever in a strange place, if I am 0:13:35.840 --> 0:13:39.520 concerned about like being followed, is trying to set up 0:13:39.640 --> 0:13:45.800 little um, little catches. Uh yeah, tell tales, Um, would 0:13:45.800 --> 0:13:48.559 you talk about that a little bit? So tell tales 0:13:48.720 --> 0:13:53.120 and there's new there's the hundreds of methods of doing 0:13:53.120 --> 0:13:57.560 these things. They're little, so sometimes they can be um. 0:13:57.640 --> 0:14:01.920 Sometimes they can be simple things like setting a book 0:14:02.200 --> 0:14:05.319 or an item on top of something or in front 0:14:05.320 --> 0:14:09.120 of something at a particular angle and that angle maybe 0:14:09.640 --> 0:14:11.280 you know, you can take a picture of it, or 0:14:11.400 --> 0:14:15.560 you can mark the angle of that particular item. Um. 0:14:15.600 --> 0:14:17.800 You know, something that that you know you would that 0:14:17.880 --> 0:14:20.320 you would not think, you know, you would just be like, okay, 0:14:20.320 --> 0:14:22.160 here's an item that's in the way, and you might 0:14:22.200 --> 0:14:26.640 move that if you are trying to surreptitiously enter into something. Um, 0:14:26.720 --> 0:14:28.720 And then they would put it back, but they wouldn't 0:14:28.760 --> 0:14:32.600 put it back quite in the same way right. So 0:14:33.040 --> 0:14:35.680 if they if they don't see the tell tale the 0:14:35.720 --> 0:14:38.360 fact that it's a tell tale, UM, they may they 0:14:38.400 --> 0:14:41.320 they may it may be like completely off right. UM. 0:14:41.320 --> 0:14:43.560 There's also things that you can do in terms of 0:14:43.600 --> 0:14:49.880 like having seals UM. You know, I tend to keep um, 0:14:49.920 --> 0:14:53.800 you know, evidence tape, which is difficult to break and 0:14:53.880 --> 0:14:57.600 serialize that evidence tape at that UM to know that 0:14:57.640 --> 0:15:00.080 you know that it has a particular serial number on it. 0:15:00.440 --> 0:15:02.760 UM to be able to detect whether an item has 0:15:02.800 --> 0:15:07.520 been broken into UM or that you know that seal 0:15:07.560 --> 0:15:10.240 has been broken into and that would be very difficult. 0:15:10.280 --> 0:15:12.720 I mean it's possible, but it would take You would 0:15:12.720 --> 0:15:16.040 be talking about the resources of of a very sophisticated 0:15:16.160 --> 0:15:19.040 state actor with an enormous amount of planning, an enormous 0:15:19.080 --> 0:15:23.640 amount of intelligence gathering to be able to replicate um 0:15:23.720 --> 0:15:27.200 that uh, that seal has been broken UM. And there's 0:15:27.760 --> 0:15:31.960 simple things like you know, using using tape and spaghetti, 0:15:32.000 --> 0:15:35.280 you know like drive spaghetti like prety like pre cooks spaghetti. 0:15:35.320 --> 0:15:37.520 Something that would break if you know a door is 0:15:37.600 --> 0:15:41.560 open or something. Literally that photo of the cheeto over 0:15:42.280 --> 0:15:45.960 the door latch, Yeah, I think that's from that that's 0:15:46.000 --> 0:15:49.800 that's from death note right, I don't know. Actually, you know, 0:15:50.520 --> 0:15:53.160 you and I talk pretty regularly. At one thing you 0:15:53.160 --> 0:15:55.800 you've kind of are constantly going over in your head 0:15:56.000 --> 0:16:02.480 is kind of different potential uh risk scenarios you see happening. Um. 0:16:02.520 --> 0:16:04.800 You spend a lot of time thinking about what might happen, 0:16:05.200 --> 0:16:08.680 um and what the what the best response would be 0:16:08.760 --> 0:16:11.800 in that situation. Yeah, And and there's a lot of 0:16:11.840 --> 0:16:14.800 precedent for most most things. Most things are typically a 0:16:14.880 --> 0:16:17.240 lot of precedent. You know, it may not be because 0:16:17.280 --> 0:16:19.600 I mean, like for instance, the US. You know, there 0:16:19.600 --> 0:16:23.440 may be situations or you know, things that are that 0:16:23.560 --> 0:16:26.960 have that have happened in the past, um but not recently, 0:16:27.440 --> 0:16:30.840 or things that um have happened internationally that have not 0:16:30.960 --> 0:16:33.320 happened recently in the US that you can look to 0:16:33.520 --> 0:16:36.440 as a as a as a corollarya or an example. 0:16:38.080 --> 0:16:40.280 So yeah, what do you I mean when it when 0:16:40.280 --> 0:16:43.240 it comes to kind of threats you see for let's say, 0:16:43.240 --> 0:16:47.400 people who are activists, community organizers, who have you know, 0:16:47.480 --> 0:16:50.560 had their face published as part of an anti fascist 0:16:50.600 --> 0:16:55.600 gathering or whatever. When you think about like crackdown concerns, UM, 0:16:55.680 --> 0:16:58.040 what are kind of the what are kind of what 0:16:58.080 --> 0:17:00.440 are the potentialities that kind of run through your head 0:17:00.480 --> 0:17:05.159 is as kind of likely narrative events that that could happen, 0:17:05.160 --> 0:17:07.040 and then kind of what you see is the best 0:17:07.640 --> 0:17:13.680 reactions to those, right, So you know, I I mostly 0:17:13.760 --> 0:17:18.960 focus on, UM, either the basics or the worst case scenario. 0:17:19.280 --> 0:17:21.520 So obviously there's that that step ladder, right, you know, 0:17:21.840 --> 0:17:24.280 So I am always thinking about, UM, you know, the 0:17:24.880 --> 0:17:27.119 basics of you know, okay, what happens if I have 0:17:27.200 --> 0:17:31.320 been docked? Right? You know, the vast majority of people 0:17:31.680 --> 0:17:35.800 that come to me for assistance tend to be people 0:17:35.840 --> 0:17:38.640 who are afraid of being docked or who have already 0:17:38.680 --> 0:17:42.800 been docked. UM. Doxing is the this is I mean, 0:17:42.800 --> 0:17:45.600 I'm I'm I'll just explain it real fast. You know. 0:17:45.640 --> 0:17:50.040 Doxing is whenever either your face, your your identity, UM who, 0:17:50.119 --> 0:17:53.640 what your name is, your age, your location, who your 0:17:53.640 --> 0:17:57.240 family is, your associations have been revealed and pulp and 0:17:57.600 --> 0:18:00.919 shared with a threat group or a large group of 0:18:00.920 --> 0:18:05.560 people who may who who could potentially gather this information 0:18:05.720 --> 0:18:08.400 and be and and use it as a threat against you, UM, 0:18:08.440 --> 0:18:11.119 you know, to to harass you, to show up at 0:18:11.119 --> 0:18:15.200 your house to UM find you in a crowd, um, 0:18:15.240 --> 0:18:18.480 and to attack you, or to harass you, or to 0:18:19.280 --> 0:18:22.840 you know, um, discourage an employer from working with you 0:18:22.920 --> 0:18:26.359 and whatnot. Um. And so you know, they're like unfortunately, 0:18:26.400 --> 0:18:28.800 once they're docs, it's kind of hard to it's it's 0:18:28.880 --> 0:18:31.600 it's you know, it's a it's a it's an edge 0:18:31.640 --> 0:18:33.879 ropy cut kind of thing. Like it's it's you. You 0:18:33.920 --> 0:18:37.359 can break it, you know, like you you can. You can. 0:18:37.640 --> 0:18:39.800 Once you make an omelet out of eggs, it's very 0:18:39.800 --> 0:18:44.480 hard to make that the eggs back into an omelet, right, So, UM, 0:18:44.520 --> 0:18:46.440 you've got to kind of start over after you've already 0:18:46.480 --> 0:18:48.760 been docks and start from scratch in terms of like 0:18:48.760 --> 0:18:51.560 how to protect yourself. And you'll never have the same 0:18:52.119 --> 0:18:54.239 level of protection as you did if you hadn't been 0:18:54.320 --> 0:18:58.880 docks in the first place. And that's that's the unfortunate reality. Um, 0:18:58.920 --> 0:19:01.919 the kinds of things that you you can try to do. Obviously, 0:19:02.119 --> 0:19:05.520 you know, if you were in a crowd where um 0:19:05.600 --> 0:19:09.040 you may be docked, you know, where some kind of 0:19:09.080 --> 0:19:12.000 face face covering or protection. You know, obviously we're in 0:19:12.000 --> 0:19:15.440 a pandemic, so you know, uh, you know, masks makes 0:19:15.440 --> 0:19:19.359 sense these days. Um. Another situation or another thing that 0:19:19.400 --> 0:19:23.080 you can do is you can just avoid being in 0:19:23.320 --> 0:19:25.560 the main group of a crowd or in the front 0:19:25.600 --> 0:19:27.760 line of a crowd like that. You know, it's sometimes 0:19:27.840 --> 0:19:31.280 it's just as simple as just not being where the 0:19:31.359 --> 0:19:34.760 cameras are as well, like being aware of where cameras are, 0:19:34.960 --> 0:19:38.080 where people who are maybe what you know, like documenting 0:19:38.119 --> 0:19:42.600 things are and avoiding those locations. I personally tend to 0:19:43.320 --> 0:19:47.840 be around the journalist gaggle myself because that way I 0:19:47.920 --> 0:19:50.640 see where the cameras are pointed, because I'm behind them 0:19:50.720 --> 0:19:53.800 as opposed to in front of them. So that's my 0:19:53.880 --> 0:19:58.879 own personal little trick to not being um captured on 0:19:59.000 --> 0:20:01.920 film or on camera. Um, you know, if if I'm 0:20:01.920 --> 0:20:05.919 at an event. Uh, so you know, Uh, this is 0:20:05.920 --> 0:20:07.760 something as simple as that, as just sort of knowing 0:20:07.800 --> 0:20:12.160 your angles and knowing you know, who's watching and and 0:20:12.240 --> 0:20:14.639 things like that, and then uh, don't put out your address, 0:20:14.680 --> 0:20:16.720 don't give out your address, and you know, like do 0:20:16.880 --> 0:20:19.800 surveillance detect you know, do surveillance detection routes when you 0:20:19.800 --> 0:20:22.520 go home or when you're leaving, you know, for a 0:20:22.600 --> 0:20:27.639 high risk event or activity. Um and um, you know, 0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:32.359 just the more that you think about it. The more 0:20:32.760 --> 0:20:34.960 and the more the questions that you ask, the better 0:20:35.040 --> 0:20:38.960 off you are you tend to be. And um, I 0:20:38.960 --> 0:20:40.760 think that a lot of people get very focused on 0:20:40.800 --> 0:20:44.240 their phones as well as opposed to like simple things 0:20:44.240 --> 0:20:49.080 like their faces and um, their interactions and how they 0:20:49.600 --> 0:20:52.400 how they address and how they look in a crowd. Um, 0:20:52.440 --> 0:20:57.240 there's this concept called the great person concept. Um prep 0:20:57.359 --> 0:21:00.199 you know, prepper, the preper community tends to degenerate, right 0:21:00.440 --> 0:21:06.080 and the man yeah, yeah, and you know like, okay, 0:21:06.119 --> 0:21:09.359 so I'll wait on that. No no, no, no, go 0:21:09.400 --> 0:21:11.560 ahead and explain it, and then I'll talk about because 0:21:11.600 --> 0:21:14.800 I think there's a there's a difference between the wisdom 0:21:14.800 --> 0:21:18.280 and the concept and also how idiots tend to adopt it. 0:21:18.359 --> 0:21:22.200 So I'll chat about that after you introduce it. Right, So, 0:21:22.960 --> 0:21:26.000 the great person concept, in my mind, it tends to 0:21:26.040 --> 0:21:28.280 be a way of you know, just sort of blending 0:21:28.280 --> 0:21:31.760 into a crowd, you know, or into an environment. Right. 0:21:32.119 --> 0:21:35.280 You know, if you are in a small town in 0:21:35.320 --> 0:21:39.280 a rural area, you know, dress like look, look how 0:21:39.320 --> 0:21:41.359 other people dress. You know, if you show up you 0:21:41.400 --> 0:21:45.440 know wearing a wearing a bright colored you know, um 0:21:45.600 --> 0:21:49.520 jacket with brand names on it and a beanie cap. 0:21:49.560 --> 0:21:53.199 You'll probably be recognizable even by people who are not 0:21:53.240 --> 0:21:55.520 looking for you. They'll there will be people who will 0:21:55.560 --> 0:21:58.440 be like, that person looks out of place, and then 0:21:58.440 --> 0:22:00.720 they can go come back in their member or and 0:22:00.840 --> 0:22:03.520 be like, you know, if somebody asks questions them, they'll 0:22:03.560 --> 0:22:05.320 be like, oh, yeah, I remember the person in the 0:22:05.320 --> 0:22:11.680 orange Nike jacket wearing a red cap. You know. Um. 0:22:11.720 --> 0:22:15.520 The great person concept is about avoiding that just being 0:22:15.720 --> 0:22:20.600 being unrememberable, unrecognizable in in a crowd an environment like that. 0:22:20.640 --> 0:22:24.080 You know. Um, I have I have names for what 0:22:24.160 --> 0:22:26.760 I do. Like I have my I have my my 0:22:26.880 --> 0:22:30.159 soccer mom vibe. I have my you know for for 0:22:30.200 --> 0:22:34.360 the suburbs. I have my business attire vibe for when 0:22:34.359 --> 0:22:37.760 I'm in an urban area. I have, um, you know, 0:22:37.800 --> 0:22:39.960 my street I have my street clothing, you know, for 0:22:40.000 --> 0:22:42.840 if I'm out a protest or at a march of 0:22:42.920 --> 0:22:45.920 some variety. Um. And and then you know, if I'm 0:22:45.920 --> 0:22:47.760 out in the rural areas, you know, I've got my 0:22:48.040 --> 0:22:50.280 I've got my jeans, We've got my belt buckle, and 0:22:50.320 --> 0:22:53.119 I've got my uh, I've got my plaid, my plaid 0:22:53.119 --> 0:22:56.040 for shirt, right, you know. So it's you know, and 0:22:56.240 --> 0:22:57.879 with a little bit of cama, right, you know, Like 0:22:57.960 --> 0:23:01.360 it depends on your environment. But you know, some basics 0:23:01.359 --> 0:23:07.440 are no bright, avoid bright colors, um, avoid branding unless 0:23:07.920 --> 0:23:10.520 everybody else is wearing the same branding. So if you're 0:23:10.560 --> 0:23:13.280 at a sport, if you're if you're in a college town, 0:23:13.720 --> 0:23:17.320 you know, and you have the mascot of the mascot 0:23:17.320 --> 0:23:20.280 of that team is everywhere, then it makes sense, um 0:23:20.320 --> 0:23:23.880 to have a jacket that has that sports team color 0:23:24.080 --> 0:23:28.720 on it, you know, or that or that mascot on it, um. 0:23:28.760 --> 0:23:31.240 You know. So it's about it. It's it's it's juggling. 0:23:31.280 --> 0:23:33.480 It's an adjustment, and no situation is the same. Like 0:23:33.520 --> 0:23:36.480 this idea that there there's this one great person outfit 0:23:37.080 --> 0:23:40.240 is kind of absurd. And uh, I think a lot 0:23:40.240 --> 0:23:42.040 a lot of a lot of a lot of a 0:23:42.080 --> 0:23:44.200 lot of a lot of people who do this stuff. 0:23:44.240 --> 0:23:46.320 They tend to like buy the most tactical stuff like 0:23:46.320 --> 0:23:50.199 don't wear don't we don't wear tactical gear and Hawaiian shirts, 0:23:50.280 --> 0:23:52.520 you know, in the middle of in the middle of 0:23:53.160 --> 0:23:56.360 in the middle of like upstate New York for instance. Right, 0:23:56.480 --> 0:23:59.280