1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:13,680 Speaker 1: What's surveilling my you. This is Robert Evans, host of 2 00:00:13,800 --> 00:00:18,040 Speaker 1: It Could Happen Here, a podcast about how things are 3 00:00:18,079 --> 00:00:21,400 Speaker 1: kind of falling apart uh and also advice on how 4 00:00:21,440 --> 00:00:24,919 Speaker 1: to you know, deal with that ship. UM. Today, I'm 5 00:00:25,000 --> 00:00:31,480 Speaker 1: here with my colleagues Garrison Davis. Hello, Garrison, Garrison. Hi, 6 00:00:31,640 --> 00:00:33,920 Speaker 1: Sorry Garrison, it did not know we're getting called on 7 00:00:34,080 --> 00:00:39,120 Speaker 1: Garrison and Christopher Wong. HELLU, yes, that's right. And we're 8 00:00:39,159 --> 00:00:45,480 Speaker 1: going to talk about privacy, about information, self defense, about 9 00:00:45,479 --> 00:00:48,840 Speaker 1: avoiding surveillance with somebody who knows what the funk they're 10 00:00:48,840 --> 00:00:51,360 Speaker 1: talking about, because I sure as held down. Uh. And 11 00:00:51,440 --> 00:00:54,440 Speaker 1: for that, I want to welcome Chelsea Manning. Hey, how's 12 00:00:54,440 --> 00:00:58,800 Speaker 1: it going good? Chelsea? Um? Well, why wouldn't you want 13 00:00:58,840 --> 00:01:01,800 Speaker 1: the government to no exact actually what you're doing? Well, 14 00:01:01,840 --> 00:01:05,840 Speaker 1: I mean it's not just the government. UM. So you know, 15 00:01:06,120 --> 00:01:07,680 Speaker 1: one of the things that I do as a security 16 00:01:07,680 --> 00:01:13,320 Speaker 1: consultant is I UM is I provide sort of a 17 00:01:13,319 --> 00:01:17,240 Speaker 1: an analysis as to what your actual tangible threats are. UM. 18 00:01:17,280 --> 00:01:19,280 Speaker 1: So depending on who you are, what you're doing, and 19 00:01:19,319 --> 00:01:23,080 Speaker 1: what environment you're in, UM, that that is going to change. 20 00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:26,440 Speaker 1: So in the instance of the government, it may be 21 00:01:26,640 --> 00:01:29,400 Speaker 1: that you are a political dissident. It may be that 22 00:01:29,480 --> 00:01:34,440 Speaker 1: you are UM engaged in activities that are criminalized in 23 00:01:34,440 --> 00:01:38,000 Speaker 1: that society or culture UM or or it may be 24 00:01:38,160 --> 00:01:42,840 Speaker 1: that you know, you are simply trying to get you know, 25 00:01:42,880 --> 00:01:46,039 Speaker 1: you're trying to live your life, uh and not not 26 00:01:46,120 --> 00:01:49,840 Speaker 1: have to engage with UM, you know, tax authorities or 27 00:01:50,320 --> 00:01:51,760 Speaker 1: you know, so so it could be, it could be. 28 00:01:51,800 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 1: It could depend on what you're doing, UH and who 29 00:01:54,600 --> 00:01:59,680 Speaker 1: you're trying to avoid UM with respect to the government. UM, 30 00:01:59,720 --> 00:02:05,080 Speaker 1: I'm mostly focus on political activism and dissidents, and uh, 31 00:02:05,120 --> 00:02:07,320 Speaker 1: you know a part of that is, you know, ensuring 32 00:02:07,400 --> 00:02:12,520 Speaker 1: that you are actually not being uh you know, spide 33 00:02:12,520 --> 00:02:18,240 Speaker 1: on or threatened by whoever your government is, whether it's 34 00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:25,560 Speaker 1: a local, state, national, or international threat for you. And UH, 35 00:02:26,320 --> 00:02:28,920 Speaker 1: I don't know. I guess my first question would be, 36 00:02:28,960 --> 00:02:33,680 Speaker 1: like for a person who's UM, I don't know, perhaps 37 00:02:33,680 --> 00:02:37,160 Speaker 1: a slightly lower imminent threat of I mean, any of 38 00:02:37,160 --> 00:02:40,000 Speaker 1: the stuff that that you worry about, or that perhaps 39 00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:42,800 Speaker 1: people who are much more involved in kind of organizing 40 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:45,040 Speaker 1: have to worry about, Like what is what do you 41 00:02:45,080 --> 00:02:49,600 Speaker 1: think is kind of the basic security hygiene toolkit that 42 00:02:50,040 --> 00:02:53,040 Speaker 1: you know, an average person ought to ought to at 43 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:58,519 Speaker 1: least understand, if not actively practice. Right. So the basics are, 44 00:02:58,840 --> 00:03:01,760 Speaker 1: you know, a privacy based browser, you know, something that 45 00:03:01,800 --> 00:03:07,280 Speaker 1: doesn't have cookies for your Internet browsing UM and changing 46 00:03:07,680 --> 00:03:12,240 Speaker 1: changing Firefox. No, I mean I think I think you 47 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:16,040 Speaker 1: know it's it's understanding the privacy features of your particular 48 00:03:16,400 --> 00:03:22,120 Speaker 1: UM browser. UM. There are browsers like Brave that that 49 00:03:22,120 --> 00:03:26,200 Speaker 1: that specifically specialized in this or tour browser. But UM, 50 00:03:26,240 --> 00:03:30,440 Speaker 1: you know, the vast majority of browsers today have privacy 51 00:03:30,480 --> 00:03:33,840 Speaker 1: feud features. Although you know there are there, there are 52 00:03:33,919 --> 00:03:35,560 Speaker 1: risks that come with that as to whether or not 53 00:03:35,680 --> 00:03:39,760 Speaker 1: they are UM revealing the true nature of how much 54 00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:42,720 Speaker 1: you know, information that they're collecting on you, where it's stored, 55 00:03:42,800 --> 00:03:45,040 Speaker 1: whether it's in a cloud hosting service, or whether it's 56 00:03:45,080 --> 00:03:47,560 Speaker 1: you know, on your on your device, on your phone, 57 00:03:47,600 --> 00:03:51,200 Speaker 1: on your computer, UM, or whether or not it's being 58 00:03:51,280 --> 00:03:55,480 Speaker 1: sold to a third party advertising you know company, or 59 00:03:55,520 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 1: you know to advertisers or to you know, data mining companies. 60 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:02,440 Speaker 1: So you know it it really depends, you know, like 61 00:04:02,600 --> 00:04:05,760 Speaker 1: basically basically, nothing you do, Unfortunately, nothing you do on 62 00:04:05,800 --> 00:04:09,520 Speaker 1: the Internet or on an electronic device is that is 63 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:14,400 Speaker 1: connected to another computer. UM. Is truly private. UM. So 64 00:04:14,400 --> 00:04:20,760 Speaker 1: it's about sort of reducing your um your we would 65 00:04:20,760 --> 00:04:24,800 Speaker 1: say surface area, your attack surface area or your visibility 66 00:04:24,800 --> 00:04:28,120 Speaker 1: surface area as much as possible while also maintaining a 67 00:04:28,120 --> 00:04:32,279 Speaker 1: certain amount of um, you know, usability because you know, 68 00:04:32,320 --> 00:04:34,240 Speaker 1: you can you can go out into a cabin in 69 00:04:34,520 --> 00:04:37,279 Speaker 1: Montana and live live off of live live out in 70 00:04:37,279 --> 00:04:40,400 Speaker 1: the woods if you so choose. But I mean, you're 71 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:42,960 Speaker 1: not gonna be able to accomplish you know, the things 72 00:04:42,960 --> 00:04:45,359 Speaker 1: that you need to do, um that you can that 73 00:04:45,400 --> 00:04:49,320 Speaker 1: you can do with mobile devices, with computers, with servers 74 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:55,080 Speaker 1: and with cloud cloud services. So it's about it's about balancing. 75 00:04:55,080 --> 00:04:59,080 Speaker 1: It's about balancing the risk versus what you actually want 76 00:04:59,120 --> 00:05:02,480 Speaker 1: to accomplish and how usable that is. Yeah, And I 77 00:05:02,560 --> 00:05:04,480 Speaker 1: don't know what is what is like when you think 78 00:05:04,520 --> 00:05:08,200 Speaker 1: of a of a of kind of an ideal browser solution, 79 00:05:08,200 --> 00:05:11,240 Speaker 1: because right like tour is a is a whole thing 80 00:05:11,360 --> 00:05:14,760 Speaker 1: as opposed to just like grabbing Chrome or Firefox. It's 81 00:05:14,880 --> 00:05:17,960 Speaker 1: it's it's more involved of a process to use. What 82 00:05:18,000 --> 00:05:21,000 Speaker 1: do you think, like what when when you're kind of 83 00:05:21,040 --> 00:05:23,719 Speaker 1: like recommending like what people should do, kind of what 84 00:05:23,920 --> 00:05:28,840 Speaker 1: is what is you're probably safe best practice in terms 85 00:05:28,839 --> 00:05:32,840 Speaker 1: of just browsing. In terms of just browsing, I would say, no, 86 00:05:33,000 --> 00:05:37,400 Speaker 1: the no, the sites that you're browsing, No, their privacy UM. 87 00:05:37,520 --> 00:05:43,120 Speaker 1: You know, like you don't have to read the privacy UM. 88 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:46,240 Speaker 1: You know, in terms of conditions yourself, because it's usually 89 00:05:46,240 --> 00:05:50,120 Speaker 1: in legalistic gobblegook um. What you can read articles about it. 90 00:05:50,160 --> 00:05:54,080 Speaker 1: You can find out um, you know from somebody who knows, 91 00:05:54,640 --> 00:05:57,440 Speaker 1: UM what those are and how they change. You have 92 00:05:57,480 --> 00:05:59,560 Speaker 1: to update that, so you know, they update their terms 93 00:05:59,560 --> 00:06:03,680 Speaker 1: of service sometimes every six months. I know that some 94 00:06:03,720 --> 00:06:06,880 Speaker 1: companies do this more frequently and they don't notify you. 95 00:06:06,920 --> 00:06:09,480 Speaker 1: They and they'll they'll notify you that it's been changed 96 00:06:09,600 --> 00:06:13,000 Speaker 1: like three months ago, you know, like so you know, 97 00:06:13,040 --> 00:06:16,120 Speaker 1: you gotta you gotta keep on top of it. UM 98 00:06:16,200 --> 00:06:18,360 Speaker 1: and then UM, you know we're you know just sort 99 00:06:18,400 --> 00:06:21,160 Speaker 1: of like no. I mean, another big thing is is 100 00:06:21,200 --> 00:06:25,000 Speaker 1: password hygiene. You know you've got to use. I mean, 101 00:06:25,040 --> 00:06:27,880 Speaker 1: I always recommend using a password manager, like the most 102 00:06:27,920 --> 00:06:32,920 Speaker 1: basic people should use a strong password manager UM that 103 00:06:33,560 --> 00:06:38,200 Speaker 1: generates you know, specific passwords for specific accounts UM. Because 104 00:06:38,600 --> 00:06:41,880 Speaker 1: nobody nobody can memorize no, no, no, nobody can memorize 105 00:06:41,880 --> 00:06:45,480 Speaker 1: like I I think I have like nine d passwords 106 00:06:45,480 --> 00:06:48,160 Speaker 1: that I use on a regular basis, but only I 107 00:06:48,200 --> 00:06:51,800 Speaker 1: only memorize like three or four, you know, for my 108 00:06:51,960 --> 00:06:55,440 Speaker 1: one for my device, um, one from each specific device, 109 00:06:55,520 --> 00:06:58,520 Speaker 1: and then another for the pastor manager itself. So you know, 110 00:06:58,720 --> 00:07:04,000 Speaker 1: you know it just it just mostly you know, those 111 00:07:04,040 --> 00:07:07,720 Speaker 1: are basics. So everyone should be doing those things. They aren't, 112 00:07:08,040 --> 00:07:10,560 Speaker 1: but you should, you know, even if you're even if 113 00:07:10,600 --> 00:07:17,600 Speaker 1: you are you you your uh your political views are 114 00:07:18,280 --> 00:07:22,000 Speaker 1: that you know bridge brittan nity spears should be freed, uh, 115 00:07:22,520 --> 00:07:26,840 Speaker 1: you know if it if you're not facing like an 116 00:07:26,840 --> 00:07:32,600 Speaker 1: existential threat from your from like a you know, fascist 117 00:07:33,080 --> 00:07:38,960 Speaker 1: dictator you know, or or a police state that you 118 00:07:39,000 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 1: know is discriminating against you know, a particular class of 119 00:07:42,440 --> 00:07:46,000 Speaker 1: group of people, then you should be doing these things anyway, 120 00:07:46,440 --> 00:07:48,960 Speaker 1: you know, even though they would help you in that situation. 121 00:07:49,440 --> 00:07:57,040 Speaker 1: You should be doing these things baseline and um. Okay, 122 00:07:57,040 --> 00:08:00,400 Speaker 1: so outside of just kind of like browsing protection, right, like, 123 00:08:00,480 --> 00:08:05,240 Speaker 1: let's let's say, uh, that's not your primary word. Let's 124 00:08:05,280 --> 00:08:07,960 Speaker 1: say you're worried about being kind of like physically surveiled 125 00:08:08,240 --> 00:08:11,600 Speaker 1: um or physically followed, having your your your space, having 126 00:08:11,640 --> 00:08:15,600 Speaker 1: someone inter it UM, and uh, you know potentially even 127 00:08:15,640 --> 00:08:17,920 Speaker 1: when you're not there. What are kind of the physical 128 00:08:18,000 --> 00:08:21,800 Speaker 1: security measures that that you think are kind of accessible, 129 00:08:21,840 --> 00:08:24,400 Speaker 1: you know, without getting James Bond about it and buying 130 00:08:24,400 --> 00:08:26,920 Speaker 1: a bunch of bugs. Like we're talking kind of low tech, 131 00:08:27,520 --> 00:08:31,440 Speaker 1: low cost things that a person could deploy kind of 132 00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:34,160 Speaker 1: in the moment if they suddenly start to worry that 133 00:08:34,200 --> 00:08:37,199 Speaker 1: they're being targeted for that sort of thing. Right, So, 134 00:08:37,320 --> 00:08:42,760 Speaker 1: in terms of physical surveillance and protection, UM, there's again 135 00:08:42,920 --> 00:08:45,400 Speaker 1: you know, a ladder in terms of what you can 136 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:48,080 Speaker 1: do and what you should do. UM. Some basic things 137 00:08:48,120 --> 00:08:52,320 Speaker 1: are put us put a strong alpha numeric password onto 138 00:08:52,400 --> 00:08:56,959 Speaker 1: your phone. UM, even if you have uh, you know, 139 00:08:57,080 --> 00:09:01,360 Speaker 1: your facial recognition or your your touch feature enabled, UM, 140 00:09:01,400 --> 00:09:05,880 Speaker 1: your biometrics enabled. UM, maintain physical possession of your phone. 141 00:09:06,160 --> 00:09:08,920 Speaker 1: Have a strong password. And then if you're in an 142 00:09:09,000 --> 00:09:11,800 Speaker 1: environment where you feel it that you're at risk, know 143 00:09:12,320 --> 00:09:15,560 Speaker 1: how to disable the biometric feature. For instance, you know 144 00:09:15,760 --> 00:09:18,760 Speaker 1: with my phone, the iPhone twelve, you have to hold 145 00:09:18,800 --> 00:09:22,240 Speaker 1: down to buttons for five seconds. UM. You know it's 146 00:09:22,240 --> 00:09:24,439 Speaker 1: the it's the top, it's the up volume button and 147 00:09:24,480 --> 00:09:26,800 Speaker 1: the power button. If you hold those two down for 148 00:09:26,880 --> 00:09:31,280 Speaker 1: five seconds, Uh, it automatically locks the biometric featricks features, 149 00:09:31,440 --> 00:09:35,520 Speaker 1: which don't have the same protections um as. I mean, 150 00:09:35,559 --> 00:09:38,199 Speaker 1: they don't have the same for legal protections as your password. 151 00:09:38,400 --> 00:09:40,680 Speaker 1: And you know, you you you can't be forced and 152 00:09:40,679 --> 00:09:43,040 Speaker 1: even if you even if you are in a place 153 00:09:43,040 --> 00:09:45,680 Speaker 1: where they can force you to do so, you know, 154 00:09:45,880 --> 00:09:48,720 Speaker 1: they can't just hold up your phone or you know, 155 00:09:49,160 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 1: put your finger right onto your device. UM have UH 156 00:09:54,600 --> 00:09:58,400 Speaker 1: encrypt your phones, like ensure that you have hardware encryption 157 00:09:58,480 --> 00:10:01,480 Speaker 1: on your Apple on your But you know, I always 158 00:10:01,520 --> 00:10:05,040 Speaker 1: recommend like iPhones, UH in particular for people, not because 159 00:10:05,200 --> 00:10:07,520 Speaker 1: androids are bad or anything. It's just that, you know, 160 00:10:07,600 --> 00:10:11,720 Speaker 1: the type of encryption that it uses is baked into 161 00:10:11,760 --> 00:10:16,120 Speaker 1: the hardware as opposed to UM into the software. You know. 162 00:10:16,200 --> 00:10:19,160 Speaker 1: And I know there's this whole debate over and you 163 00:10:19,200 --> 00:10:21,840 Speaker 1: know Android, you know, Apple being able to dig crypt 164 00:10:21,840 --> 00:10:24,000 Speaker 1: phones and and and things like that. But I mean, 165 00:10:24,240 --> 00:10:26,080 Speaker 1: at the end of the day, an Android phone is 166 00:10:26,760 --> 00:10:30,480 Speaker 1: one hundred thousand times easier to break into than an 167 00:10:30,480 --> 00:10:34,440 Speaker 1: Apple phone, UM, just by virtue of the fact that 168 00:10:35,200 --> 00:10:38,439 Speaker 1: UH it has hardware encryption and it's baked right into 169 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:41,920 Speaker 1: the device. UH. And UM android phones use U use 170 00:10:42,280 --> 00:10:49,000 Speaker 1: software which is a type of software that is crackable. Um. 171 00:10:49,080 --> 00:10:51,600 Speaker 1: You know. Uh, and it's the type that's not used 172 00:10:51,640 --> 00:10:54,199 Speaker 1: on like a Linux computer you know crypt set up 173 00:10:54,320 --> 00:10:57,600 Speaker 1: so um and yeah. So as you're moving up the 174 00:10:57,640 --> 00:11:01,320 Speaker 1: ladder in terms of like physical surf alience, um, by 175 00:11:01,400 --> 00:11:06,839 Speaker 1: somebody who's following you, Um, there's this uh. There there 176 00:11:06,840 --> 00:11:09,160 Speaker 1: are ways in which you can detect that because you know, 177 00:11:09,200 --> 00:11:10,960 Speaker 1: you can be paranoid and you can be like, okay, 178 00:11:11,040 --> 00:11:13,000 Speaker 1: is this person following Well, but you know, there's things 179 00:11:13,040 --> 00:11:15,280 Speaker 1: that you can do. You know, you can alter your route. 180 00:11:15,320 --> 00:11:19,400 Speaker 1: You can alter the patterns of where and how you 181 00:11:19,440 --> 00:11:21,640 Speaker 1: are moving. Um. For instance, if you go to the 182 00:11:21,679 --> 00:11:25,880 Speaker 1: coffee shop at three pm every day, at the same 183 00:11:25,920 --> 00:11:28,920 Speaker 1: time every weekday that you go to your you know, 184 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:32,240 Speaker 1: wherever you go, um, change it up, you know, like 185 00:11:32,360 --> 00:11:35,000 Speaker 1: don't don't go to that coffee shop one day, or 186 00:11:35,040 --> 00:11:37,480 Speaker 1: go to a different coffee shop, or you know, change 187 00:11:37,520 --> 00:11:39,679 Speaker 1: up the pattern of how you go, like you know, 188 00:11:39,880 --> 00:11:42,400 Speaker 1: go down this street, you know, mix mix it up 189 00:11:42,440 --> 00:11:45,040 Speaker 1: a bit. Um. If you are active, if you believe 190 00:11:45,040 --> 00:11:47,000 Speaker 1: that you are actively being surrealed, you can do what's 191 00:11:47,000 --> 00:11:51,679 Speaker 1: called a surveillance detection route, which is where you alter 192 00:11:51,840 --> 00:11:58,320 Speaker 1: your path uh to a predesignated UM bottleneck where no 193 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:02,600 Speaker 1: other person where there's no there's no way of like 194 00:12:02,679 --> 00:12:05,240 Speaker 1: there's not like three passes a place, there's a bottleneck 195 00:12:05,320 --> 00:12:09,800 Speaker 1: like a bridge or a tunnel or an alleyway that 196 00:12:10,160 --> 00:12:13,520 Speaker 1: UM you would have to go through UM if you 197 00:12:13,559 --> 00:12:16,560 Speaker 1: are being followed, and then you can detect and confirm 198 00:12:16,720 --> 00:12:19,840 Speaker 1: that you are in fact being followed by by by 199 00:12:19,840 --> 00:12:23,200 Speaker 1: an individual. And physical surveillance is typically not done by 200 00:12:23,200 --> 00:12:26,360 Speaker 1: an individual. Obviously in the case of like a stalker, 201 00:12:26,720 --> 00:12:29,720 Speaker 1: it maybe, but UM if if if it's like a 202 00:12:29,840 --> 00:12:35,360 Speaker 1: law enforcement agency or an intelligence agency or even like 203 00:12:35,440 --> 00:12:41,000 Speaker 1: a paramilitary you know, militia group, UM, typically they're going 204 00:12:41,040 --> 00:12:46,280 Speaker 1: to use UH two typically at least three or more 205 00:12:46,720 --> 00:12:49,640 Speaker 1: UM people too that are in communication with each other. 206 00:12:49,720 --> 00:12:51,440 Speaker 1: And then that's another thing you can look for is 207 00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:54,559 Speaker 1: do they have radios? Do they have earpieces? Are they 208 00:12:54,600 --> 00:13:00,640 Speaker 1: wearing clothing that would um hide uh the fact that 209 00:13:00,679 --> 00:13:03,480 Speaker 1: they're wearing a radio for instance, or you know, and 210 00:13:03,559 --> 00:13:05,800 Speaker 1: all that also goes for like firearms, right, you know, 211 00:13:06,040 --> 00:13:10,480 Speaker 1: if they're wearing a baggy clothing UM or a suit 212 00:13:11,040 --> 00:13:15,000 Speaker 1: that uh is a little ill fitting, it's a little 213 00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:19,320 Speaker 1: too much then they may be trying to hide, um, 214 00:13:19,480 --> 00:13:21,880 Speaker 1: some bolts or something. Somebody who's in a tight fitting 215 00:13:21,960 --> 00:13:27,040 Speaker 1: leotard is probably not surveilling you. And um. One of 216 00:13:27,080 --> 00:13:29,320 Speaker 1: the things that kind of I always have in mind 217 00:13:29,559 --> 00:13:33,320 Speaker 1: when I'm at like a hotel or you know, an 218 00:13:33,320 --> 00:13:35,760 Speaker 1: airbnb or whatever in a strange place, if I am 219 00:13:35,840 --> 00:13:39,520 Speaker 1: concerned about like being followed, is trying to set up 220 00:13:39,640 --> 00:13:45,800 Speaker 1: little um, little catches. Uh yeah, tell tales, Um, would 221 00:13:45,800 --> 00:13:48,559 Speaker 1: you talk about that a little bit? So tell tales 222 00:13:48,720 --> 00:13:53,120 Speaker 1: and there's new there's the hundreds of methods of doing 223 00:13:53,120 --> 00:13:57,560 Speaker 1: these things. They're little, so sometimes they can be um. 224 00:13:57,640 --> 00:14:01,920 Speaker 1: Sometimes they can be simple things like setting a book 225 00:14:02,200 --> 00:14:05,319 Speaker 1: or an item on top of something or in front 226 00:14:05,320 --> 00:14:09,120 Speaker 1: of something at a particular angle and that angle maybe 227 00:14:09,640 --> 00:14:11,280 Speaker 1: you know, you can take a picture of it, or 228 00:14:11,400 --> 00:14:15,560 Speaker 1: you can mark the angle of that particular item. Um. 229 00:14:15,600 --> 00:14:17,800 Speaker 1: You know, something that that you know you would that 230 00:14:17,880 --> 00:14:20,320 Speaker 1: you would not think, you know, you would just be like, okay, 231 00:14:20,320 --> 00:14:22,160 Speaker 1: here's an item that's in the way, and you might 232 00:14:22,200 --> 00:14:26,640 Speaker 1: move that if you are trying to surreptitiously enter into something. Um, 233 00:14:26,720 --> 00:14:28,720 Speaker 1: And then they would put it back, but they wouldn't 234 00:14:28,760 --> 00:14:32,600 Speaker 1: put it back quite in the same way right. So 235 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:35,680 Speaker 1: if they if they don't see the tell tale the 236 00:14:35,720 --> 00:14:38,360 Speaker 1: fact that it's a tell tale, UM, they may they 237 00:14:38,400 --> 00:14:41,320 Speaker 1: they may it may be like completely off right. UM. 238 00:14:41,320 --> 00:14:43,560 Speaker 1: There's also things that you can do in terms of 239 00:14:43,600 --> 00:14:49,880 Speaker 1: like having seals UM. You know, I tend to keep um, 240 00:14:49,920 --> 00:14:53,800 Speaker 1: you know, evidence tape, which is difficult to break and 241 00:14:53,880 --> 00:14:57,600 Speaker 1: serialize that evidence tape at that UM to know that 242 00:14:57,640 --> 00:15:00,080 Speaker 1: you know that it has a particular serial number on it. 243 00:15:00,440 --> 00:15:02,760 Speaker 1: UM to be able to detect whether an item has 244 00:15:02,800 --> 00:15:07,520 Speaker 1: been broken into UM or that you know that seal 245 00:15:07,560 --> 00:15:10,240 Speaker 1: has been broken into and that would be very difficult. 246 00:15:10,280 --> 00:15:12,720 Speaker 1: I mean it's possible, but it would take You would 247 00:15:12,720 --> 00:15:16,040 Speaker 1: be talking about the resources of of a very sophisticated 248 00:15:16,160 --> 00:15:19,040 Speaker 1: state actor with an enormous amount of planning, an enormous 249 00:15:19,080 --> 00:15:23,640 Speaker 1: amount of intelligence gathering to be able to replicate um 250 00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:27,200 Speaker 1: that uh, that seal has been broken UM. And there's 251 00:15:27,760 --> 00:15:31,960 Speaker 1: simple things like you know, using using tape and spaghetti, 252 00:15:32,000 --> 00:15:35,280 Speaker 1: you know like drive spaghetti like prety like pre cooks spaghetti. 253 00:15:35,320 --> 00:15:37,520 Speaker 1: Something that would break if you know a door is 254 00:15:37,600 --> 00:15:41,560 Speaker 1: open or something. Literally that photo of the cheeto over 255 00:15:42,280 --> 00:15:45,960 Speaker 1: the door latch, Yeah, I think that's from that that's 256 00:15:46,000 --> 00:15:49,800 Speaker 1: that's from death note right, I don't know. Actually, you know, 257 00:15:50,520 --> 00:15:53,160 Speaker 1: you and I talk pretty regularly. At one thing you 258 00:15:53,160 --> 00:15:55,800 Speaker 1: you've kind of are constantly going over in your head 259 00:15:56,000 --> 00:16:02,480 Speaker 1: is kind of different potential uh risk scenarios you see happening. Um. 260 00:16:02,520 --> 00:16:04,800 Speaker 1: You spend a lot of time thinking about what might happen, 261 00:16:05,200 --> 00:16:08,680 Speaker 1: um and what the what the best response would be 262 00:16:08,760 --> 00:16:11,800 Speaker 1: in that situation. Yeah, And and there's a lot of 263 00:16:11,840 --> 00:16:14,800 Speaker 1: precedent for most most things. Most things are typically a 264 00:16:14,880 --> 00:16:17,240 Speaker 1: lot of precedent. You know, it may not be because 265 00:16:17,280 --> 00:16:19,600 Speaker 1: I mean, like for instance, the US. You know, there 266 00:16:19,600 --> 00:16:23,440 Speaker 1: may be situations or you know, things that are that 267 00:16:23,560 --> 00:16:26,960 Speaker 1: have that have happened in the past, um but not recently, 268 00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:30,840 Speaker 1: or things that um have happened internationally that have not 269 00:16:30,960 --> 00:16:33,320 Speaker 1: happened recently in the US that you can look to 270 00:16:33,520 --> 00:16:36,440 Speaker 1: as a as a as a corollarya or an example. 271 00:16:38,080 --> 00:16:40,280 Speaker 1: So yeah, what do you I mean when it when 272 00:16:40,280 --> 00:16:43,240 Speaker 1: it comes to kind of threats you see for let's say, 273 00:16:43,240 --> 00:16:47,400 Speaker 1: people who are activists, community organizers, who have you know, 274 00:16:47,480 --> 00:16:50,560 Speaker 1: had their face published as part of an anti fascist 275 00:16:50,600 --> 00:16:55,600 Speaker 1: gathering or whatever. When you think about like crackdown concerns, UM, 276 00:16:55,680 --> 00:16:58,040 Speaker 1: what are kind of the what are kind of what 277 00:16:58,080 --> 00:17:00,440 Speaker 1: are the potentialities that kind of run through your head 278 00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:05,159 Speaker 1: is as kind of likely narrative events that that could happen, 279 00:17:05,160 --> 00:17:07,040 Speaker 1: and then kind of what you see is the best 280 00:17:07,640 --> 00:17:13,680 Speaker 1: reactions to those, right, So you know, I I mostly 281 00:17:13,760 --> 00:17:18,960 Speaker 1: focus on, UM, either the basics or the worst case scenario. 282 00:17:19,280 --> 00:17:21,520 Speaker 1: So obviously there's that that step ladder, right, you know, 283 00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,280 Speaker 1: So I am always thinking about, UM, you know, the 284 00:17:24,880 --> 00:17:27,119 Speaker 1: basics of you know, okay, what happens if I have 285 00:17:27,200 --> 00:17:31,320 Speaker 1: been docked? Right? You know, the vast majority of people 286 00:17:31,680 --> 00:17:35,800 Speaker 1: that come to me for assistance tend to be people 287 00:17:35,840 --> 00:17:38,640 Speaker 1: who are afraid of being docked or who have already 288 00:17:38,680 --> 00:17:42,800 Speaker 1: been docked. UM. Doxing is the this is I mean, 289 00:17:42,800 --> 00:17:45,600 Speaker 1: I'm I'm I'll just explain it real fast. You know. 290 00:17:45,640 --> 00:17:50,040 Speaker 1: Doxing is whenever either your face, your your identity, UM who, 291 00:17:50,119 --> 00:17:53,640 Speaker 1: what your name is, your age, your location, who your 292 00:17:53,640 --> 00:17:57,240 Speaker 1: family is, your associations have been revealed and pulp and 293 00:17:57,600 --> 00:18:00,919 Speaker 1: shared with a threat group or a large group of 294 00:18:00,920 --> 00:18:05,560 Speaker 1: people who may who who could potentially gather this information 295 00:18:05,720 --> 00:18:08,400 Speaker 1: and be and and use it as a threat against you, UM, 296 00:18:08,440 --> 00:18:11,119 Speaker 1: you know, to to harass you, to show up at 297 00:18:11,119 --> 00:18:15,200 Speaker 1: your house to UM find you in a crowd, um, 298 00:18:15,240 --> 00:18:18,480 Speaker 1: and to attack you, or to harass you, or to 299 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:22,840 Speaker 1: you know, um, discourage an employer from working with you 300 00:18:22,920 --> 00:18:26,359 Speaker 1: and whatnot. Um. And so you know, they're like unfortunately, 301 00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:28,800 Speaker 1: once they're docs, it's kind of hard to it's it's 302 00:18:28,880 --> 00:18:31,600 Speaker 1: it's you know, it's a it's a it's an edge 303 00:18:31,640 --> 00:18:33,879 Speaker 1: ropy cut kind of thing. Like it's it's you. You 304 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:37,359 Speaker 1: can break it, you know, like you you can. You can. 305 00:18:37,640 --> 00:18:39,800 Speaker 1: Once you make an omelet out of eggs, it's very 306 00:18:39,800 --> 00:18:44,480 Speaker 1: hard to make that the eggs back into an omelet, right, So, UM, 307 00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:46,440 Speaker 1: you've got to kind of start over after you've already 308 00:18:46,480 --> 00:18:48,760 Speaker 1: been docks and start from scratch in terms of like 309 00:18:48,760 --> 00:18:51,560 Speaker 1: how to protect yourself. And you'll never have the same 310 00:18:52,119 --> 00:18:54,239 Speaker 1: level of protection as you did if you hadn't been 311 00:18:54,320 --> 00:18:58,880 Speaker 1: docks in the first place. And that's that's the unfortunate reality. Um, 312 00:18:58,920 --> 00:19:01,919 Speaker 1: the kinds of things that you you can try to do. Obviously, 313 00:19:02,119 --> 00:19:05,520 Speaker 1: you know, if you were in a crowd where um 314 00:19:05,600 --> 00:19:09,040 Speaker 1: you may be docked, you know, where some kind of 315 00:19:09,080 --> 00:19:12,000 Speaker 1: face face covering or protection. You know, obviously we're in 316 00:19:12,000 --> 00:19:15,440 Speaker 1: a pandemic, so you know, uh, you know, masks makes 317 00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:19,359 Speaker 1: sense these days. Um. Another situation or another thing that 318 00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:23,080 Speaker 1: you can do is you can just avoid being in 319 00:19:23,320 --> 00:19:25,560 Speaker 1: the main group of a crowd or in the front 320 00:19:25,600 --> 00:19:27,760 Speaker 1: line of a crowd like that. You know, it's sometimes 321 00:19:27,840 --> 00:19:31,280 Speaker 1: it's just as simple as just not being where the 322 00:19:31,359 --> 00:19:34,760 Speaker 1: cameras are as well, like being aware of where cameras are, 323 00:19:34,960 --> 00:19:38,080 Speaker 1: where people who are maybe what you know, like documenting 324 00:19:38,119 --> 00:19:42,600 Speaker 1: things are and avoiding those locations. I personally tend to 325 00:19:43,320 --> 00:19:47,840 Speaker 1: be around the journalist gaggle myself because that way I 326 00:19:47,920 --> 00:19:50,640 Speaker 1: see where the cameras are pointed, because I'm behind them 327 00:19:50,720 --> 00:19:53,800 Speaker 1: as opposed to in front of them. So that's my 328 00:19:53,880 --> 00:19:58,879 Speaker 1: own personal little trick to not being um captured on 329 00:19:59,000 --> 00:20:01,920 Speaker 1: film or on camera. Um, you know, if if I'm 330 00:20:01,920 --> 00:20:05,919 Speaker 1: at an event. Uh, so you know, Uh, this is 331 00:20:05,920 --> 00:20:07,760 Speaker 1: something as simple as that, as just sort of knowing 332 00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:12,160 Speaker 1: your angles and knowing you know, who's watching and and 333 00:20:12,240 --> 00:20:14,639 Speaker 1: things like that, and then uh, don't put out your address, 334 00:20:14,680 --> 00:20:16,720 Speaker 1: don't give out your address, and you know, like do 335 00:20:16,880 --> 00:20:19,800 Speaker 1: surveillance detect you know, do surveillance detection routes when you 336 00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:22,520 Speaker 1: go home or when you're leaving, you know, for a 337 00:20:22,600 --> 00:20:27,639 Speaker 1: high risk event or activity. Um and um, you know, 338 00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:32,359 Speaker 1: just the more that you think about it. The more 339 00:20:32,760 --> 00:20:34,960 Speaker 1: and the more the questions that you ask, the better 340 00:20:35,040 --> 00:20:38,960 Speaker 1: off you are you tend to be. And um, I 341 00:20:38,960 --> 00:20:40,760 Speaker 1: think that a lot of people get very focused on 342 00:20:40,800 --> 00:20:44,240 Speaker 1: their phones as well as opposed to like simple things 343 00:20:44,240 --> 00:20:49,080 Speaker 1: like their faces and um, their interactions and how they 344 00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:52,400 Speaker 1: how they address and how they look in a crowd. Um, 345 00:20:52,440 --> 00:20:57,240 Speaker 1: there's this concept called the great person concept. Um prep 346 00:20:57,359 --> 00:21:00,199 Speaker 1: you know, prepper, the preper community tends to degenerate, right 347 00:21:00,440 --> 00:21:06,080 Speaker 1: and the man yeah, yeah, and you know like, okay, 348 00:21:06,119 --> 00:21:09,359 Speaker 1: so I'll wait on that. No no, no, no, go 349 00:21:09,400 --> 00:21:11,560 Speaker 1: ahead and explain it, and then I'll talk about because 350 00:21:11,600 --> 00:21:14,800 Speaker 1: I think there's a there's a difference between the wisdom 351 00:21:14,800 --> 00:21:18,280 Speaker 1: and the concept and also how idiots tend to adopt it. 352 00:21:18,359 --> 00:21:22,200 Speaker 1: So I'll chat about that after you introduce it. Right, So, 353 00:21:22,960 --> 00:21:26,000 Speaker 1: the great person concept, in my mind, it tends to 354 00:21:26,040 --> 00:21:28,280 Speaker 1: be a way of you know, just sort of blending 355 00:21:28,280 --> 00:21:31,760 Speaker 1: into a crowd, you know, or into an environment. Right. 356 00:21:32,119 --> 00:21:35,280 Speaker 1: You know, if you are in a small town in 357 00:21:35,320 --> 00:21:39,280 Speaker 1: a rural area, you know, dress like look, look how 358 00:21:39,320 --> 00:21:41,359 Speaker 1: other people dress. You know, if you show up you 359 00:21:41,400 --> 00:21:45,440 Speaker 1: know wearing a wearing a bright colored you know, um 360 00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:49,520 Speaker 1: jacket with brand names on it and a beanie cap. 361 00:21:49,560 --> 00:21:53,199 Speaker 1: You'll probably be recognizable even by people who are not 362 00:21:53,240 --> 00:21:55,520 Speaker 1: looking for you. They'll there will be people who will 363 00:21:55,560 --> 00:21:58,440 Speaker 1: be like, that person looks out of place, and then 364 00:21:58,440 --> 00:22:00,720 Speaker 1: they can go come back in their member or and 365 00:22:00,840 --> 00:22:03,520 Speaker 1: be like, you know, if somebody asks questions them, they'll 366 00:22:03,560 --> 00:22:05,320 Speaker 1: be like, oh, yeah, I remember the person in the 367 00:22:05,320 --> 00:22:11,680 Speaker 1: orange Nike jacket wearing a red cap. You know. Um. 368 00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:15,520 Speaker 1: The great person concept is about avoiding that just being 369 00:22:15,720 --> 00:22:20,600 Speaker 1: being unrememberable, unrecognizable in in a crowd an environment like that. 370 00:22:20,640 --> 00:22:24,080 Speaker 1: You know. Um, I have I have names for what 371 00:22:24,160 --> 00:22:26,760 Speaker 1: I do. Like I have my I have my my 372 00:22:26,880 --> 00:22:30,159 Speaker 1: soccer mom vibe. I have my you know for for 373 00:22:30,200 --> 00:22:34,360 Speaker 1: the suburbs. I have my business attire vibe for when 374 00:22:34,359 --> 00:22:37,760 Speaker 1: I'm in an urban area. I have, um, you know, 375 00:22:37,800 --> 00:22:39,960 Speaker 1: my street I have my street clothing, you know, for 376 00:22:40,000 --> 00:22:42,840 Speaker 1: if I'm out a protest or at a march of 377 00:22:42,920 --> 00:22:45,920 Speaker 1: some variety. Um. And and then you know, if I'm 378 00:22:45,920 --> 00:22:47,760 Speaker 1: out in the rural areas, you know, I've got my 379 00:22:48,040 --> 00:22:50,280 Speaker 1: I've got my jeans, We've got my belt buckle, and 380 00:22:50,320 --> 00:22:53,119 Speaker 1: I've got my uh, I've got my plaid, my plaid 381 00:22:53,119 --> 00:22:56,040 Speaker 1: for shirt, right, you know. So it's you know, and 382 00:22:56,240 --> 00:22:57,879 Speaker 1: with a little bit of cama, right, you know, Like 383 00:22:57,960 --> 00:23:01,360 Speaker 1: it depends on your environment. But you know, some basics 384 00:23:01,359 --> 00:23:07,440 Speaker 1: are no bright, avoid bright colors, um, avoid branding unless 385 00:23:07,920 --> 00:23:10,520 Speaker 1: everybody else is wearing the same branding. So if you're 386 00:23:10,560 --> 00:23:13,280 Speaker 1: at a sport, if you're if you're in a college town, 387 00:23:13,720 --> 00:23:17,320 Speaker 1: you know, and you have the mascot of the mascot 388 00:23:17,320 --> 00:23:20,280 Speaker 1: of that team is everywhere, then it makes sense, um 389 00:23:20,320 --> 00:23:23,880 Speaker 1: to have a jacket that has that sports team color 390 00:23:24,080 --> 00:23:28,720 Speaker 1: on it, you know, or that or that mascot on it, um. 391 00:23:28,760 --> 00:23:31,240 Speaker 1: You know. So it's about it. It's it's it's juggling. 392 00:23:31,280 --> 00:23:33,480 Speaker 1: It's an adjustment, and no situation is the same. Like 393 00:23:33,520 --> 00:23:36,480 Speaker 1: this idea that there there's this one great person outfit 394 00:23:37,080 --> 00:23:40,240 Speaker 1: is kind of absurd. And uh, I think a lot 395 00:23:40,240 --> 00:23:42,040 Speaker 1: a lot of a lot of a lot of a 396 00:23:42,080 --> 00:23:44,200 Speaker 1: lot of a lot of people who do this stuff. 397 00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:46,320 Speaker 1: They tend to like buy the most tactical stuff like 398 00:23:46,320 --> 00:23:50,199 Speaker 1: don't wear don't we don't wear tactical gear and Hawaiian shirts, 399 00:23:50,280 --> 00:23:52,520 Speaker 1: you know, in the middle of in the middle of 400 00:23:53,160 --> 00:23:56,360 Speaker 1: in the middle of like upstate New York for instance. Right, 401 00:23:56,480 --> 00:23:59,280 Speaker 1: you're gonna stay, You're gonna stand out. So the gray 402 00:23:59,359 --> 00:24:01,560 Speaker 1: man in a it's usually referred to in like kind 403 00:24:01,560 --> 00:24:04,800 Speaker 1: of the tactical prepper community is like gray man um 404 00:24:05,160 --> 00:24:09,000 Speaker 1: has has turned into its its whole fashioned brand, which 405 00:24:09,040 --> 00:24:11,560 Speaker 1: is like literally the opposite of the point. The point 406 00:24:11,600 --> 00:24:13,800 Speaker 1: is that like nothing about you would stand out in 407 00:24:13,800 --> 00:24:16,320 Speaker 1: a crowd um. But people have this like if you, 408 00:24:16,359 --> 00:24:18,680 Speaker 1: if you're, if you're, if you, if you're like me, 409 00:24:18,840 --> 00:24:21,159 Speaker 1: and you talk about guns at all on social media, 410 00:24:21,200 --> 00:24:23,520 Speaker 1: you get a bunch of targeted ads for like specific 411 00:24:23,560 --> 00:24:26,560 Speaker 1: backpacks that are meant to carry entire rifles and have 412 00:24:26,680 --> 00:24:30,040 Speaker 1: like body armor panels in them, and like yeah, hoodies 413 00:24:30,160 --> 00:24:32,919 Speaker 1: with gun holsters, and we know it and we see it. 414 00:24:33,040 --> 00:24:35,720 Speaker 1: So if we if we're you know, I I can 415 00:24:35,760 --> 00:24:38,320 Speaker 1: tell if I wileven tactical bag from mile away. You know, 416 00:24:38,400 --> 00:24:41,320 Speaker 1: I I own them a car, I own my own 417 00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:44,800 Speaker 1: good bags. I carry good bags. But the idea that 418 00:24:44,960 --> 00:24:47,240 Speaker 1: the idea that a threat, that that a potential threat 419 00:24:47,280 --> 00:24:51,240 Speaker 1: isn't going to immediately recognize those brands, uh, those brands 420 00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:54,960 Speaker 1: of bags and those foreign factors of bags and jackets 421 00:24:54,960 --> 00:24:58,320 Speaker 1: and pants is absurd. You know, any law enforcement person 422 00:24:58,400 --> 00:25:01,040 Speaker 1: is going to know, you know, any law enforcement or 423 00:25:01,040 --> 00:25:04,159 Speaker 1: intelligence or paramilitary group is going to be able to 424 00:25:04,200 --> 00:25:06,680 Speaker 1: be like I know that, I know those pants. Yeah, 425 00:25:07,480 --> 00:25:11,959 Speaker 1: you'd be much more useful to basically Jerry Jerry your 426 00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:14,159 Speaker 1: own of these scenarios kind of like what booster Begs 427 00:25:14,240 --> 00:25:17,600 Speaker 1: used to be brands that like seldom now, which is like, no, 428 00:25:17,640 --> 00:25:22,720 Speaker 1: that's not the point of Yeah, that's not the thing. 429 00:25:23,600 --> 00:25:25,480 Speaker 1: If you want, if you want, if you want strong, 430 00:25:25,560 --> 00:25:27,760 Speaker 1: sturdy wear, then go for the tactical stuff. But if 431 00:25:27,760 --> 00:25:32,080 Speaker 1: you're trying to do the great person concept, go to target. Yeah. Yeah, 432 00:25:32,600 --> 00:25:35,080 Speaker 1: like the the the way it's been taken by like 433 00:25:35,160 --> 00:25:38,359 Speaker 1: the prepper tactical communities. You have to like dress like 434 00:25:38,480 --> 00:25:41,439 Speaker 1: Jason Bourne, right, and like so everybody who winds up 435 00:25:41,480 --> 00:25:43,919 Speaker 1: doing gray Man in that community woinds up looking like 436 00:25:43,960 --> 00:25:47,840 Speaker 1: a federal agent. Right. They have like the cargo pants 437 00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:53,159 Speaker 1: and they've got like yeah, but if everyone can see you, 438 00:25:54,080 --> 00:25:57,000 Speaker 1: But if you're in Northern Virginia, that is the great person. 439 00:25:57,200 --> 00:26:00,120 Speaker 1: Like if you are if you're in the country, dress 440 00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:07,320 Speaker 1: like a fed for sure. Um. But if you're smaller, yeah, 441 00:26:07,480 --> 00:26:11,159 Speaker 1: and there's even like smaller simple things like my I 442 00:26:11,200 --> 00:26:14,240 Speaker 1: have a friend who is decently good at like this 443 00:26:14,320 --> 00:26:16,800 Speaker 1: great person concept I don't think he uses that term, 444 00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:19,520 Speaker 1: but he teaches stealth classes at a park ordium. I 445 00:26:19,600 --> 00:26:22,240 Speaker 1: used to go at um And one of the main 446 00:26:22,400 --> 00:26:26,320 Speaker 1: things that gets talked about is like even like controlling 447 00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:28,719 Speaker 1: where your eyes are and controlling where your head is 448 00:26:29,000 --> 00:26:31,080 Speaker 1: is super useful for trying to do that. Like if 449 00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:33,720 Speaker 1: you're like looking around always, if always parked up, if 450 00:26:33,760 --> 00:26:36,160 Speaker 1: you're trying, if you're like very focused on things, people 451 00:26:36,160 --> 00:26:38,080 Speaker 1: are gonna pay attention to you. If if you keep 452 00:26:38,119 --> 00:26:40,119 Speaker 1: your head down, if you keep your body kind of 453 00:26:40,160 --> 00:26:45,520 Speaker 1: slouched of people's eyes graze over you so so much more. Yeah, 454 00:26:45,600 --> 00:26:48,520 Speaker 1: be the loser kid in the hallway and be the 455 00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:53,080 Speaker 1: good to a grocery store, and like watch the moms right, 456 00:26:53,320 --> 00:26:56,320 Speaker 1: like watch the kind of clothing they're wearing, or like 457 00:26:56,359 --> 00:26:59,280 Speaker 1: watch you know, dad's with their kids. Like watch people 458 00:26:59,320 --> 00:27:01,199 Speaker 1: who normally you would just kind of like, oh, these 459 00:27:01,240 --> 00:27:04,640 Speaker 1: are just other people around in the world. Um and 460 00:27:04,640 --> 00:27:08,480 Speaker 1: and and dress like those people like they don't. That 461 00:27:08,520 --> 00:27:11,119 Speaker 1: doesn't attract much in the way of attention. Like you 462 00:27:11,119 --> 00:27:13,000 Speaker 1: you are, you are being less of a gray man 463 00:27:13,160 --> 00:27:16,760 Speaker 1: if you're wearing the specific gun concealing tactical pants. Then 464 00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:20,199 Speaker 1: if you're wearing I don't know, sweat pants and a 465 00:27:20,240 --> 00:27:24,280 Speaker 1: flannel you know, like just just just like think about 466 00:27:24,359 --> 00:27:26,840 Speaker 1: how people actually dress in the world and go like 467 00:27:26,960 --> 00:27:31,000 Speaker 1: part of effectively doing that is actually paying attention. It's 468 00:27:31,040 --> 00:27:33,320 Speaker 1: like Chelsea said, if you live in a place where 469 00:27:33,359 --> 00:27:36,320 Speaker 1: like every third person as a government contractor, then yeah, 470 00:27:36,359 --> 00:27:39,680 Speaker 1: maybe maybe go with the khakis and the polo and whatever, like, right, 471 00:27:39,880 --> 00:27:43,120 Speaker 1: Like that's that maybe your best bet, um, But if 472 00:27:43,160 --> 00:27:46,320 Speaker 1: you're in Williamsburg or whatever you're going to have, there's 473 00:27:46,320 --> 00:27:48,439 Speaker 1: going to be different clothing that isn't going to like 474 00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:53,040 Speaker 1: arouse any suspicion, right, And you know, you know, you 475 00:27:53,119 --> 00:27:55,439 Speaker 1: we you all often saw this as an example, you 476 00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:57,320 Speaker 1: know from my own military background. You know, you would 477 00:27:57,320 --> 00:27:59,959 Speaker 1: see this with um, with special forces, right, the special 478 00:28:00,000 --> 00:28:03,080 Speaker 1: operators would come in wearing you know, and come into 479 00:28:03,119 --> 00:28:07,280 Speaker 1: a village wearing just decked out in tactical gear with 480 00:28:07,320 --> 00:28:10,760 Speaker 1: their beer, with their beards and their um and their schmods, right, 481 00:28:11,040 --> 00:28:13,600 Speaker 1: and you know, of course, of course they stand out, right, 482 00:28:13,880 --> 00:28:17,159 Speaker 1: you know it it's the idea that they were that 483 00:28:17,240 --> 00:28:21,479 Speaker 1: they were secret or that they were invisible is you know, 484 00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:24,120 Speaker 1: they may they may fit into the culture and they 485 00:28:24,119 --> 00:28:28,760 Speaker 1: may look cool, but they you know, a true operator, 486 00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:31,600 Speaker 1: uh is not going to do those things. I mean, 487 00:28:31,680 --> 00:28:33,800 Speaker 1: at least one who is who is actually trying to 488 00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:37,399 Speaker 1: do the great person concept. Yeah, and it's um it 489 00:28:37,760 --> 00:28:41,320 Speaker 1: kind of dovetails into one of the other things I 490 00:28:41,320 --> 00:28:43,160 Speaker 1: think is the dumbest thing you see on kind of 491 00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:47,000 Speaker 1: like the prepper whatever, right, is like open carry, which 492 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:50,360 Speaker 1: is like, you can't get further from this concept than 493 00:28:50,560 --> 00:28:55,080 Speaker 1: than visibly carrying a weapon. Um, which if your your goal, 494 00:28:55,160 --> 00:28:57,800 Speaker 1: and it always should be in a violent situation, yeah, 495 00:28:58,000 --> 00:29:00,800 Speaker 1: it should be, it should be concealed, but X yeah, 496 00:29:00,840 --> 00:29:04,120 Speaker 1: if if you're carrying a firearm. But in general, um, 497 00:29:04,160 --> 00:29:08,600 Speaker 1: there's there's a concept within kind of like the military 498 00:29:08,640 --> 00:29:11,600 Speaker 1: and people who like particularly within kind of like special 499 00:29:11,600 --> 00:29:15,720 Speaker 1: forces of it's called the onion of survivability, and the 500 00:29:15,760 --> 00:29:18,000 Speaker 1: basic idea, you know, it's a it's a diagram of 501 00:29:18,040 --> 00:29:20,520 Speaker 1: an onion that's supposed to kind of explain to you 502 00:29:20,560 --> 00:29:22,440 Speaker 1: the different things you can do that make you more 503 00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:27,400 Speaker 1: survivable in a gunfight or another dangerous situation, and stuff 504 00:29:27,480 --> 00:29:29,960 Speaker 1: like having body armor is the tiniest part of the 505 00:29:30,000 --> 00:29:32,760 Speaker 1: onion because if body armor is useful to you, a 506 00:29:32,880 --> 00:29:36,280 Speaker 1: number of things have gone wrong because you've been shot. Like, 507 00:29:36,400 --> 00:29:38,840 Speaker 1: it's not the worst case scenario, but it's the second 508 00:29:38,880 --> 00:29:41,720 Speaker 1: worst case scenario. The things that protect you most are 509 00:29:41,720 --> 00:29:45,040 Speaker 1: not having body armor, they're not being seen, if you 510 00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:48,320 Speaker 1: are seen, not being acquired, which means not but not 511 00:29:48,400 --> 00:29:51,400 Speaker 1: being seen, not being noticed. Not being targeted is by 512 00:29:51,400 --> 00:29:55,800 Speaker 1: far like the biggest thing, um. And so if you 513 00:29:55,800 --> 00:29:59,080 Speaker 1: know you are, wherever you are becomes a markedly more 514 00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:02,080 Speaker 1: dangerous place, whether you specifically you're targeted or if there's 515 00:30:02,080 --> 00:30:05,040 Speaker 1: just a lot of random violence going on, your best 516 00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:09,800 Speaker 1: bet for safety is always going to be not being targeted. Um. 517 00:30:10,080 --> 00:30:13,240 Speaker 1: And obviously there's no perfectly doing that right as you know, 518 00:30:13,280 --> 00:30:16,040 Speaker 1: we've all seen enough stories of mass shootings where the 519 00:30:16,120 --> 00:30:18,560 Speaker 1: victim is a bunch of kids in a fucking elementary school. 520 00:30:18,600 --> 00:30:20,840 Speaker 1: I'm not trying to like victim blame people who do 521 00:30:20,920 --> 00:30:23,520 Speaker 1: get targeted, but there are things that you can do 522 00:30:23,960 --> 00:30:26,240 Speaker 1: to make it less likely that you'll be targeted, because 523 00:30:26,280 --> 00:30:28,960 Speaker 1: anyone looking to do well there there's you know, there 524 00:30:29,000 --> 00:30:30,960 Speaker 1: are there are also things that you can't do, like, 525 00:30:31,040 --> 00:30:32,600 Speaker 1: you know, like you can't change that, you can't choose 526 00:30:32,600 --> 00:30:35,040 Speaker 1: the color of his skin, you can't the language that 527 00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:37,760 Speaker 1: you speak. You know, and these are these are things 528 00:30:37,840 --> 00:30:40,719 Speaker 1: that the proper community just don't take into effect. It's 529 00:30:40,720 --> 00:30:42,920 Speaker 1: always it's always a white it's always a white dude, right, 530 00:30:43,160 --> 00:30:45,840 Speaker 1: you know, uh, you know, and I'm me being a 531 00:30:45,840 --> 00:30:50,320 Speaker 1: FIM presenting trans person, right, My outfits tend to lean 532 00:30:50,400 --> 00:30:53,520 Speaker 1: towards something that is non threatening in a in a 533 00:30:53,560 --> 00:30:56,800 Speaker 1: great person situation. And that's why I have my sort 534 00:30:56,840 --> 00:30:59,600 Speaker 1: of uh my soccer mom, get up right, you know 535 00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:03,040 Speaker 1: which is you know, it's the kind of thing where 536 00:31:03,240 --> 00:31:05,880 Speaker 1: you know, you wouldn't notice me in a in in 537 00:31:05,960 --> 00:31:11,320 Speaker 1: a in a Walmart, right, you know it's I'm not 538 00:31:11,360 --> 00:31:13,560 Speaker 1: wearing you know, I'm not wearing boots, I'm not wearing 539 00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:16,080 Speaker 1: you know, fancy clothes. I'm not wearing. You know. It's 540 00:31:16,120 --> 00:31:18,479 Speaker 1: it's it's stuff that you get at Target. It's and 541 00:31:18,520 --> 00:31:22,080 Speaker 1: it's like faded clothe It's it's it's faded clothing that 542 00:31:22,160 --> 00:31:26,360 Speaker 1: maybe like one that's been worn a bit, but you know, uh, 543 00:31:26,720 --> 00:31:30,840 Speaker 1: neutral neutral tones of clothing. Um, you know, a bag, 544 00:31:30,960 --> 00:31:34,680 Speaker 1: you know, just what fits for that particular environment, right, 545 00:31:35,080 --> 00:31:38,640 Speaker 1: you know, and and who you are, it will affect that. 546 00:31:38,760 --> 00:31:41,440 Speaker 1: You know, if you have brown skin, you are not 547 00:31:41,520 --> 00:31:43,800 Speaker 1: going to be able to dress up the same way 548 00:31:43,920 --> 00:31:46,000 Speaker 1: as you would in West Texas. Like you're not going 549 00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:48,480 Speaker 1: to be able to blend in, um the same way 550 00:31:48,560 --> 00:31:51,520 Speaker 1: that a that a white you know, guy in a 551 00:31:51,560 --> 00:31:54,680 Speaker 1: cowboy in a you know, in a gallon sized cowboy hat, 552 00:31:54,680 --> 00:32:09,000 Speaker 1: it is able to do. I would like to talk 553 00:32:09,000 --> 00:32:11,280 Speaker 1: about something that was brought up a lot last year, 554 00:32:11,760 --> 00:32:14,680 Speaker 1: mostly towards the end of the protests, with stuff like 555 00:32:14,800 --> 00:32:19,440 Speaker 1: sell Bright and Pegasus UM. Oh boy, Yeah, the the 556 00:32:19,440 --> 00:32:23,280 Speaker 1: the ms I catchers or whatever they are, the phone 557 00:32:23,280 --> 00:32:27,800 Speaker 1: hacking slash phone cloning UM. Specifically, those two brands boast 558 00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:33,280 Speaker 1: for their abilities two break into Apple phones, both from 559 00:32:33,280 --> 00:32:35,920 Speaker 1: a distance and you know when once the phone is 560 00:32:35,960 --> 00:32:39,280 Speaker 1: actually like once they have physical possession of the phone. UM. 561 00:32:39,320 --> 00:32:40,880 Speaker 1: And you know, this freaked out a lot of people 562 00:32:40,880 --> 00:32:42,680 Speaker 1: and people, you know, there's a lot of people when 563 00:32:42,680 --> 00:32:44,640 Speaker 1: they go to demos they're talking about like not not 564 00:32:44,720 --> 00:32:46,640 Speaker 1: bringing your phone, which can be very very useful for 565 00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:49,880 Speaker 1: a lot of ways, but for some people it is 566 00:32:49,480 --> 00:32:52,719 Speaker 1: and it is it is a necessity, um, because they 567 00:32:52,760 --> 00:32:55,960 Speaker 1: need for for various reasons, they needed to like get 568 00:32:55,960 --> 00:32:59,320 Speaker 1: around and can get in contact with certain people. UM. 569 00:33:00,000 --> 00:33:02,960 Speaker 1: So what are good security things to kind of get 570 00:33:02,960 --> 00:33:04,680 Speaker 1: in the habit of if you need to have your 571 00:33:04,680 --> 00:33:07,280 Speaker 1: phone at places and you are thinking of these types 572 00:33:07,320 --> 00:33:10,160 Speaker 1: of raiance technologies. You know, it's stuff like our our 573 00:33:10,240 --> 00:33:13,600 Speaker 1: Faraday begs useful are are a certain dance better than others? 574 00:33:13,680 --> 00:33:15,200 Speaker 1: What are like? I know, there's there's a lot of 575 00:33:15,200 --> 00:33:17,520 Speaker 1: like grifting in this kind of sphere online as well. 576 00:33:17,560 --> 00:33:20,360 Speaker 1: If people could like make these like you know, security 577 00:33:20,480 --> 00:33:22,920 Speaker 1: type of things, you know, to protect yourself. There's a 578 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:27,400 Speaker 1: lot of like dubious websites claiming that they can protect you. Um. Yeah, 579 00:33:27,440 --> 00:33:29,600 Speaker 1: how how would one go about, well, at first to 580 00:33:29,600 --> 00:33:31,040 Speaker 1: give if you give, if you would be able to 581 00:33:31,040 --> 00:33:34,840 Speaker 1: explain what celebrate is? Um, and like what what would 582 00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:37,920 Speaker 1: people can do too? Well? Yeah, to try to prevent 583 00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:40,280 Speaker 1: some of the worst effects. So there are a number 584 00:33:40,320 --> 00:33:46,040 Speaker 1: of tools that law enforcement and forensics UM offices use. Um, 585 00:33:46,080 --> 00:33:48,760 Speaker 1: they're not as good as the intelligence agencies. You know, 586 00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:51,000 Speaker 1: I think people just jumped immediately to the n s 587 00:33:51,040 --> 00:33:56,200 Speaker 1: A because of the Stone leaks. UM. You know, your 588 00:33:56,240 --> 00:33:58,600 Speaker 1: biggest threat groups are actually going to be much lower 589 00:33:58,640 --> 00:34:02,280 Speaker 1: tier if if you're pro tester UM, since those are 590 00:34:02,480 --> 00:34:05,360 Speaker 1: those those methods tend to be reserved for the most 591 00:34:05,520 --> 00:34:08,319 Speaker 1: uh um for the most extreme cases, you know, not 592 00:34:08,520 --> 00:34:13,640 Speaker 1: anything involving like large math casualty incidents, national security, or 593 00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:16,800 Speaker 1: you know, foreign foreign states. Right, if you're a protester 594 00:34:16,880 --> 00:34:19,520 Speaker 1: on the street, UM, your biggest threat group is going 595 00:34:19,600 --> 00:34:22,360 Speaker 1: to be your local law enforcement and your local federal 596 00:34:23,040 --> 00:34:26,640 Speaker 1: eight federal agencies in the US UM, and the methods 597 00:34:26,640 --> 00:34:28,200 Speaker 1: that they use are going to be these these tools 598 00:34:28,239 --> 00:34:30,040 Speaker 1: called you know they're there are different brands. There are 599 00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:32,520 Speaker 1: different brands for it UM. There are different there are 600 00:34:32,520 --> 00:34:37,160 Speaker 1: different methods UM. You know for MZ catching, which is 601 00:34:37,239 --> 00:34:41,120 Speaker 1: an older methods UM for uh, you know, capturing your 602 00:34:41,160 --> 00:34:45,239 Speaker 1: location both your location uh and uh what you know, 603 00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:48,359 Speaker 1: any text messages that you're doing over SMS UM can 604 00:34:48,400 --> 00:34:52,120 Speaker 1: be just sort of grabbed out of the air um uh. 605 00:34:52,239 --> 00:34:55,879 Speaker 1: If you're using a data plan UM, you know, like 606 00:34:56,000 --> 00:34:58,080 Speaker 1: just tend to you know, your your your stuff is 607 00:34:58,080 --> 00:35:00,480 Speaker 1: gonna be at a higher level of encryption, so you 608 00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:02,239 Speaker 1: want to keep your If you are going to use 609 00:35:02,239 --> 00:35:06,719 Speaker 1: your communications using cryptic communications, I highly recommend signal UM. 610 00:35:06,760 --> 00:35:09,400 Speaker 1: There are a number of problems with WhatsApp, there's a 611 00:35:09,480 --> 00:35:12,720 Speaker 1: number of problems with Telegram. There's another number of problems 612 00:35:12,719 --> 00:35:15,760 Speaker 1: with all these different applications. They will they will provide 613 00:35:15,800 --> 00:35:18,799 Speaker 1: you some level of protection. But but signal I think 614 00:35:18,880 --> 00:35:20,840 Speaker 1: is just the most is just the safest and the 615 00:35:20,840 --> 00:35:23,560 Speaker 1: most reliable, But it also is it perfect. And there 616 00:35:23,560 --> 00:35:25,919 Speaker 1: are going to be situations where where you know, using 617 00:35:25,960 --> 00:35:29,560 Speaker 1: signal fails. Um I you know, I can think of 618 00:35:29,560 --> 00:35:32,880 Speaker 1: a number of situations where signal in particular failed on 619 00:35:32,960 --> 00:35:38,280 Speaker 1: Android devices that were physics that physical possession was obtained 620 00:35:38,280 --> 00:35:40,480 Speaker 1: by a law enforcement agency and they were able to 621 00:35:40,520 --> 00:35:44,160 Speaker 1: even see disappeared messages. And that that brings us back 622 00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:47,040 Speaker 1: a little bit to the turning off. You know, the 623 00:35:47,040 --> 00:35:50,000 Speaker 1: thing that is often recommended for protesters. Turn off biometrics 624 00:35:50,040 --> 00:35:52,520 Speaker 1: if you're going, if you're bringing your phone to a protest, 625 00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:57,319 Speaker 1: which is not ideal, turn off biometrics, and uh, turn 626 00:35:57,360 --> 00:36:01,600 Speaker 1: off like visible notifications, so like when they aren't popping 627 00:36:01,680 --> 00:36:04,760 Speaker 1: up with people's names and all the contents of the message, 628 00:36:04,920 --> 00:36:06,640 Speaker 1: because then I don't need to break into the phone. 629 00:36:06,640 --> 00:36:10,000 Speaker 1: They could just watch your screen. Yeah yeah, yeah exactly, 630 00:36:10,200 --> 00:36:12,719 Speaker 1: Um yeah, Put it and do not disturb. Stick it 631 00:36:12,760 --> 00:36:16,160 Speaker 1: in the Faraday bag. Put the Faraday bag in one 632 00:36:16,200 --> 00:36:19,279 Speaker 1: of your holes. Turn off your phone importantly if you're 633 00:36:19,320 --> 00:36:21,240 Speaker 1: if you put it, if if you have a fairity bag. 634 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:24,600 Speaker 1: There's no there's no point if you put your bag 635 00:36:24,640 --> 00:36:26,640 Speaker 1: into a fairy if you put your if you have 636 00:36:26,760 --> 00:36:30,120 Speaker 1: your cell phone not on airplane mode and it's on 637 00:36:30,160 --> 00:36:32,360 Speaker 1: the data, it's on the cell network, and it's and 638 00:36:32,920 --> 00:36:36,000 Speaker 1: you know it's pinging, and you've got bars, and you 639 00:36:36,120 --> 00:36:38,160 Speaker 1: leave it on and you put it into a fairity bag, 640 00:36:38,320 --> 00:36:40,640 Speaker 1: you may as well. You may as well just be 641 00:36:40,680 --> 00:36:42,719 Speaker 1: in an elevator at that point, because that's the best 642 00:36:42,760 --> 00:36:45,120 Speaker 1: protection you're going to get. You can double wrap it, 643 00:36:45,200 --> 00:36:50,000 Speaker 1: but actually physically like turn it off into completely off 644 00:36:50,160 --> 00:36:52,399 Speaker 1: where you actually have to turn it on if you're 645 00:36:52,400 --> 00:36:54,400 Speaker 1: going to put it into a fairity bag, because you 646 00:36:54,480 --> 00:36:57,040 Speaker 1: are reducing the purpose on the level of protection that 647 00:36:57,080 --> 00:36:58,319 Speaker 1: you have. And I know a number of people who 648 00:36:58,320 --> 00:37:00,520 Speaker 1: have made this mistake where they think, oh, my my 649 00:37:00,520 --> 00:37:02,359 Speaker 1: phone is safe because it's an a fairity bag. Well, 650 00:37:02,600 --> 00:37:05,879 Speaker 1: you know, you have, you are muffling your you're you're 651 00:37:05,920 --> 00:37:09,120 Speaker 1: getting one bar, but you're you're still if somebody is 652 00:37:09,160 --> 00:37:11,799 Speaker 1: close enough and they have if they have, if they're 653 00:37:11,800 --> 00:37:14,520 Speaker 1: physically close enough, they can still MC catch, they can 654 00:37:14,520 --> 00:37:18,080 Speaker 1: still identify you, and your phone is automatically going to 655 00:37:18,080 --> 00:37:21,880 Speaker 1: try to transmit harder and and use up more battery power. 656 00:37:21,960 --> 00:37:24,080 Speaker 1: So it's it's even a risk in terms of like 657 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:28,560 Speaker 1: you know, just soaking sucking up all the juice out 658 00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:31,279 Speaker 1: of out of your battery as quickly as possible, you know, 659 00:37:31,320 --> 00:37:35,200 Speaker 1: by putting it in there, and it's not it's not off. Um. 660 00:37:35,239 --> 00:37:37,560 Speaker 1: And yeah, I think that turning off your phone and 661 00:37:37,640 --> 00:37:40,760 Speaker 1: keep putting it into a fairity bag is the best 662 00:37:41,000 --> 00:37:44,359 Speaker 1: is the best compromise for not bringing your phone at all. Um. 663 00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:46,879 Speaker 1: That's what I tend to do, is I turn off 664 00:37:46,920 --> 00:37:50,200 Speaker 1: my phone, put it into a feririty bag, dig it 665 00:37:50,200 --> 00:37:51,680 Speaker 1: into my bag, and then if I need it, I 666 00:37:51,719 --> 00:37:55,759 Speaker 1: can pull it out and I keep my phone on 667 00:37:55,800 --> 00:37:59,280 Speaker 1: airplane mode and use you know, like whatever WiFi services 668 00:37:59,320 --> 00:38:01,200 Speaker 1: there are with a V Like. These are things that 669 00:38:01,280 --> 00:38:04,120 Speaker 1: I do if I'm if I'm in a situation like that. Um. 670 00:38:04,239 --> 00:38:06,120 Speaker 1: One thing that's been on my mind more and more, 671 00:38:06,120 --> 00:38:11,600 Speaker 1: are you know, situations where which are more extreme and 672 00:38:11,600 --> 00:38:14,560 Speaker 1: which are less of what we've been seeing for the 673 00:38:14,640 --> 00:38:19,040 Speaker 1: last you know, decade or so. And what do you 674 00:38:19,080 --> 00:38:22,040 Speaker 1: mean by that? Well, I mean what I mean is 675 00:38:22,040 --> 00:38:28,520 Speaker 1: is imagine such a situations where, um, you know, the 676 00:38:28,560 --> 00:38:31,319 Speaker 1: people in the United States haven't seen, haven't seen very 677 00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:40,120 Speaker 1: often the full effects of the security establishment just unleashed, unshamped, right, 678 00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:43,920 Speaker 1: Boomerang hasn't come all the way back around yet, right, 679 00:38:43,920 --> 00:38:47,520 Speaker 1: so it has. It's just the people forgotten about situations 680 00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:54,120 Speaker 1: where the government has unleashed its full potential, right you know, yeah, oh, 681 00:38:54,200 --> 00:38:58,560 Speaker 1: even even bigger, like, you know, the biggest, the biggest 682 00:38:58,560 --> 00:39:00,920 Speaker 1: example that I can think of is the Boston bombing, 683 00:39:01,040 --> 00:39:06,239 Speaker 1: right where essentially West Boston and Cambridge and Watertown were 684 00:39:06,239 --> 00:39:09,160 Speaker 1: turning to a we're turned into a military occupation, right 685 00:39:09,200 --> 00:39:13,120 Speaker 1: where they were just worrelessly busting down doors using every 686 00:39:13,120 --> 00:39:17,200 Speaker 1: single surveillance method you know, and and just you know, 687 00:39:18,280 --> 00:39:21,120 Speaker 1: somebody you know push the you know, somebody in Washington 688 00:39:21,200 --> 00:39:24,239 Speaker 1: pushed the button and said we're going to you know, 689 00:39:25,120 --> 00:39:28,400 Speaker 1: unleash the full potential, you know, And it was it 690 00:39:28,440 --> 00:39:31,960 Speaker 1: was over two guys you know who and and who 691 00:39:32,040 --> 00:39:34,719 Speaker 1: murdered a couple of people you know, uh, you know, 692 00:39:34,760 --> 00:39:36,799 Speaker 1: and more people have done more, more people have died 693 00:39:36,800 --> 00:39:38,600 Speaker 1: in some of these protests than you know than they 694 00:39:38,680 --> 00:39:41,120 Speaker 1: killed and injured in that bombing. So, you know, like 695 00:39:41,160 --> 00:39:44,000 Speaker 1: the government has the option and the choice to fully 696 00:39:44,080 --> 00:39:46,360 Speaker 1: unleash its full potential. And those are the kinds of 697 00:39:46,400 --> 00:39:49,280 Speaker 1: situations that I've been trying to sort of threaten model 698 00:39:49,360 --> 00:39:52,480 Speaker 1: for its situations that are more extreme and that are 699 00:39:52,760 --> 00:39:56,319 Speaker 1: that we haven't really encountered before. Um, you know, what, 700 00:39:56,320 --> 00:39:59,480 Speaker 1: what happens whenever you know, warrants don't mean anything. What 701 00:39:59,600 --> 00:40:02,200 Speaker 1: happens whever you know, like what happens whenever you have 702 00:40:02,239 --> 00:40:05,399 Speaker 1: a blend, a hybridized blend between a para between whether 703 00:40:05,640 --> 00:40:08,399 Speaker 1: you know, you can't tell whether it's a whether it's 704 00:40:08,440 --> 00:40:11,719 Speaker 1: a paramilitary street gang, or if it's a or if 705 00:40:11,760 --> 00:40:15,359 Speaker 1: it's a legitimate law enforcement agency. You know, like and 706 00:40:15,440 --> 00:40:17,920 Speaker 1: something that happened to people in Oregon last year with 707 00:40:17,960 --> 00:40:20,799 Speaker 1: the checkpoints during fire season, where there were folks who 708 00:40:20,840 --> 00:40:25,320 Speaker 1: looked almost indistinguishable from cops in in their body armor 709 00:40:25,320 --> 00:40:29,919 Speaker 1: and guns, checking people for driving into certain towns. Yeah, 710 00:40:30,560 --> 00:40:32,920 Speaker 1: it's a mild version of the thing you're talking about. 711 00:40:32,960 --> 00:40:36,520 Speaker 1: But like this isn't you know, this isn't uh what 712 00:40:36,520 --> 00:40:40,080 Speaker 1: what you're modeling is like five minutes ahead. It's not 713 00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:43,319 Speaker 1: a not a huge leap. Yeah, So you know in 714 00:40:43,360 --> 00:40:46,319 Speaker 1: those kinds of situations, you know, Um, your threat models 715 00:40:46,360 --> 00:40:49,080 Speaker 1: are going to change for everyone, right, you know in 716 00:40:49,080 --> 00:40:52,920 Speaker 1: that instance, you know, um, you may not have Internet access, 717 00:40:52,960 --> 00:40:55,200 Speaker 1: it may be shut down, it may be restricted, right, 718 00:40:55,280 --> 00:40:57,759 Speaker 1: you know, So a lot of those things, a lot 719 00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:00,680 Speaker 1: of those resources that I was suggesting before in terms 720 00:41:00,719 --> 00:41:04,400 Speaker 1: of protecting yourself are you know, uh are for situations 721 00:41:04,440 --> 00:41:11,040 Speaker 1: where you have a somewhat functioning you know, liberal society 722 00:41:11,040 --> 00:41:14,200 Speaker 1: and government, right with with with some norms and protections, right, 723 00:41:14,360 --> 00:41:18,160 Speaker 1: But if those norms and protections are eroded to a 724 00:41:18,280 --> 00:41:21,640 Speaker 1: to a certain point, or they are removed, then you 725 00:41:21,640 --> 00:41:24,200 Speaker 1: need to start look thinking about like the kinds of 726 00:41:24,239 --> 00:41:27,480 Speaker 1: methods that are used by more extreme situation and more 727 00:41:27,480 --> 00:41:30,839 Speaker 1: extreme situations such as in conflict zones like where you were, 728 00:41:31,440 --> 00:41:33,719 Speaker 1: you might not use your cell phone at all. You 729 00:41:33,760 --> 00:41:38,160 Speaker 1: may only use a laptop you know that is disconnected 730 00:41:38,160 --> 00:41:40,360 Speaker 1: from the Internet, and to do all of your things, 731 00:41:40,719 --> 00:41:44,040 Speaker 1: you may have to physically carry you know, um USB 732 00:41:44,160 --> 00:41:49,319 Speaker 1: devices to transfer information you may need. You know, your 733 00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:51,800 Speaker 1: your your least concern may maybe showing out a p 734 00:41:52,160 --> 00:41:55,400 Speaker 1: up at a protest, Your your your your primary motivation 735 00:41:55,400 --> 00:41:58,040 Speaker 1: maybe to avoid all crowds at all. You know, in 736 00:41:58,080 --> 00:42:02,239 Speaker 1: those kinds of situations, you know, you you know, and 737 00:42:02,320 --> 00:42:04,080 Speaker 1: that's what what I've been talking about in terms of 738 00:42:04,120 --> 00:42:06,759 Speaker 1: like threat modeling, you have to understand what your threat is, 739 00:42:07,239 --> 00:42:10,200 Speaker 1: and that can change. You know, if you're a normally 740 00:42:11,160 --> 00:42:13,360 Speaker 1: that can that can shoot up if you're in a 741 00:42:13,400 --> 00:42:18,080 Speaker 1: situation where you're not sure who the actual governing authority is. 742 00:42:29,800 --> 00:42:31,960 Speaker 1: I don't want to with this get to the place 743 00:42:31,960 --> 00:42:34,200 Speaker 1: where we're like we're like trying to hunt people up 744 00:42:34,360 --> 00:42:36,160 Speaker 1: or freak them out. Part of the point of like 745 00:42:36,239 --> 00:42:41,080 Speaker 1: thinking about this stuff and and understanding, um, kind of 746 00:42:41,080 --> 00:42:44,880 Speaker 1: the risks and what could happen and how to mitigate 747 00:42:44,920 --> 00:42:48,400 Speaker 1: it is so that um, it's less freaky if something 748 00:42:48,480 --> 00:42:52,320 Speaker 1: like it happens, and so that you're kind of prepared 749 00:42:52,400 --> 00:42:57,240 Speaker 1: and understand what the possibilities are. UM. And I wonder 750 00:42:57,360 --> 00:43:01,680 Speaker 1: kind of why you think we didn't hit things didn't 751 00:43:01,719 --> 00:43:05,040 Speaker 1: go as like to the extent you're talking about, like 752 00:43:05,080 --> 00:43:09,480 Speaker 1: what happens if this national security apparatus turns like it 753 00:43:09,680 --> 00:43:12,000 Speaker 1: on fully and hits people kind of like full in 754 00:43:12,040 --> 00:43:16,719 Speaker 1: the face. Where do you think that didn't happen last year? So? 755 00:43:16,800 --> 00:43:18,719 Speaker 1: I think it didn't happen last year because you know, 756 00:43:18,840 --> 00:43:24,040 Speaker 1: the it was it wasn't it was too big of 757 00:43:24,080 --> 00:43:27,400 Speaker 1: a protest movement for the government to to try to 758 00:43:27,680 --> 00:43:32,440 Speaker 1: suppress fully. Um, and it would lead the backlash. And 759 00:43:32,480 --> 00:43:36,360 Speaker 1: also it wasn't it wasn't enough of a threat to 760 00:43:36,719 --> 00:43:39,680 Speaker 1: the order of things, so to speak, um for it 761 00:43:39,719 --> 00:43:44,560 Speaker 1: to be for that level of you know, of extreme 762 00:43:44,640 --> 00:43:49,840 Speaker 1: measures to be uh enacted and and and used. Right, Um, 763 00:43:49,880 --> 00:43:52,520 Speaker 1: those are those those methods tend to be used for 764 00:43:52,680 --> 00:43:56,440 Speaker 1: the most extreme situations in which the federal which the 765 00:43:56,440 --> 00:43:59,960 Speaker 1: federal government in particular, not just the state of local authorities, 766 00:44:00,040 --> 00:44:02,520 Speaker 1: The federal government feels that there is that there is 767 00:44:02,520 --> 00:44:05,040 Speaker 1: a distinct threat. I mean obviously in the case of 768 00:44:05,040 --> 00:44:10,080 Speaker 1: the Boston bombing, Um, they viewed, they viewed the you know, 769 00:44:10,320 --> 00:44:14,120 Speaker 1: they they viewed that situation very differently than they do 770 00:44:14,680 --> 00:44:17,760 Speaker 1: you know, a couple of thousand people protesting, you know. Um, 771 00:44:18,040 --> 00:44:21,319 Speaker 1: it just it just has very very different Um, it 772 00:44:21,320 --> 00:44:25,600 Speaker 1: has a very very different intent. What my concern is 773 00:44:25,640 --> 00:44:29,520 Speaker 1: what happens when um, you know, local state and local 774 00:44:29,560 --> 00:44:33,640 Speaker 1: authority is in a particular region or locality cease to function, 775 00:44:34,040 --> 00:44:37,320 Speaker 1: you know, they just stop showing up. And what the 776 00:44:37,360 --> 00:44:40,320 Speaker 1: federal government does in that situation, right you know, where 777 00:44:40,760 --> 00:44:43,560 Speaker 1: you know, law enforcement decide actually we're we're gonna let 778 00:44:43,600 --> 00:44:45,879 Speaker 1: you know, We're we're gonna let people murder each other, 779 00:44:45,960 --> 00:44:48,839 Speaker 1: we don't care. You know. Um, we're gonna let We're 780 00:44:48,840 --> 00:44:53,719 Speaker 1: gonna let paramilitary groups do policing operations, we don't care. 781 00:44:53,960 --> 00:44:56,760 Speaker 1: You know. In that kind of situation, the federal government 782 00:44:56,840 --> 00:45:01,520 Speaker 1: may step in, uh and assert its authority. You know, 783 00:45:01,560 --> 00:45:05,440 Speaker 1: And it has happened before, you know, reconstruction. Um, you 784 00:45:05,480 --> 00:45:08,319 Speaker 1: know where you know, there wasn't really a share. There 785 00:45:08,320 --> 00:45:10,960 Speaker 1: weren't really sheriffs that you could go to in the South. 786 00:45:11,160 --> 00:45:15,200 Speaker 1: So you know, the military essentially established its own court system, 787 00:45:15,239 --> 00:45:19,000 Speaker 1: its own government. Um. So there is precedent, but it's 788 00:45:19,040 --> 00:45:23,120 Speaker 1: never been used in the twenty one century high technology, 789 00:45:23,280 --> 00:45:28,040 Speaker 1: high surveillance like you know, like the the Union Army 790 00:45:28,160 --> 00:45:33,600 Speaker 1: in in South Carolina was not using drones, right. I 791 00:45:33,640 --> 00:45:36,200 Speaker 1: wonder if the closest thing we've gotten to that sort 792 00:45:36,200 --> 00:45:38,680 Speaker 1: of recently was during the La riots in the nineties 793 00:45:39,280 --> 00:45:40,560 Speaker 1: because I mean, like ye know that they have to 794 00:45:40,560 --> 00:45:42,880 Speaker 1: play the army there. I think we almost got that 795 00:45:42,960 --> 00:45:47,160 Speaker 1: last summer, we did. Um. The problem the problem there, 796 00:45:47,520 --> 00:45:49,320 Speaker 1: The problem is is that there there were it was 797 00:45:49,360 --> 00:45:52,080 Speaker 1: happening in too many cities, and the federal the military 798 00:45:52,120 --> 00:45:54,600 Speaker 1: only like people forget the military only has so many 799 00:45:54,640 --> 00:45:57,279 Speaker 1: logistics that it can move at a time. Right, It 800 00:45:57,320 --> 00:46:00,520 Speaker 1: actually takes time to move a division of true, right, 801 00:46:01,200 --> 00:46:03,879 Speaker 1: you know, uh, you can move a brigade combat team 802 00:46:03,880 --> 00:46:07,520 Speaker 1: in ninety six hours only because that that brigade combat 803 00:46:07,520 --> 00:46:10,279 Speaker 1: team has been designated and has been trained for and 804 00:46:10,440 --> 00:46:12,600 Speaker 1: been tooled up for six months to be able to 805 00:46:12,680 --> 00:46:14,480 Speaker 1: do that. And it can only do that. It only 806 00:46:14,480 --> 00:46:18,960 Speaker 1: has that capability for a year. Right. So A the 807 00:46:19,040 --> 00:46:21,560 Speaker 1: idea that you can move multiple divisions of troops to 808 00:46:21,760 --> 00:46:26,360 Speaker 1: a to multiple major cities, uh in a in the 809 00:46:26,400 --> 00:46:30,040 Speaker 1: span of a week or a month, is is a reaching. 810 00:46:30,680 --> 00:46:33,040 Speaker 1: You know, you have to pre stage that stuff. It 811 00:46:33,120 --> 00:46:35,600 Speaker 1: takes time. It takes time to move this stuff, even 812 00:46:36,000 --> 00:46:38,800 Speaker 1: even if you cut corners. You know, the redeployment in 813 00:46:38,800 --> 00:46:41,239 Speaker 1: Afghanistan is about the speed that you're going to see 814 00:46:42,200 --> 00:46:45,560 Speaker 1: a deployment within the United States of say, um the 815 00:46:45,600 --> 00:46:49,800 Speaker 1: military or and that's essentially like a deployment to a 816 00:46:49,960 --> 00:46:52,480 Speaker 1: city and as even in some ways kind of less 817 00:46:52,920 --> 00:46:55,560 Speaker 1: than you would need because of the limited scope of 818 00:46:55,600 --> 00:46:57,839 Speaker 1: the mission. If you were trying to like lockdown New 819 00:46:57,920 --> 00:47:02,239 Speaker 1: York or Los Angeles, you can you can send you 820 00:47:02,280 --> 00:47:05,319 Speaker 1: could send activity troops to Los Angeles. And two because 821 00:47:05,320 --> 00:47:08,360 Speaker 1: it's it's limited to Los Angeles, you have a specific mission. 822 00:47:08,560 --> 00:47:10,920 Speaker 1: You also have you know, there used to be a 823 00:47:10,960 --> 00:47:14,239 Speaker 1: military base that was nearby, um, you know, not not 824 00:47:14,360 --> 00:47:17,400 Speaker 1: nearby like you know probably in military terms like a 825 00:47:17,400 --> 00:47:19,839 Speaker 1: three hour drive. You know you had you had, um 826 00:47:20,680 --> 00:47:24,760 Speaker 1: what is it for Ordo uh in? Yeah, by Monterey 827 00:47:24,800 --> 00:47:27,000 Speaker 1: you know if it was called basilone yet. But yeah, 828 00:47:27,080 --> 00:47:32,279 Speaker 1: there's like Marine Corps training bases near San Diego. Yeah. Yeah, 829 00:47:32,320 --> 00:47:34,680 Speaker 1: so you know, like it it's feasible. Right. The idea 830 00:47:34,719 --> 00:47:37,200 Speaker 1: that you can that you can do this in in 831 00:47:37,920 --> 00:47:42,120 Speaker 1: what fifty sixty cities is you can't do it's we 832 00:47:42,160 --> 00:47:46,120 Speaker 1: couldn't do it Iraq with troops. So you know, the 833 00:47:46,160 --> 00:47:48,840 Speaker 1: best the best we could do was like deploy was deployed, 834 00:47:49,680 --> 00:47:51,640 Speaker 1: was deploy a division here and there and play you 835 00:47:51,640 --> 00:47:55,759 Speaker 1: know what John McCain called black Amole. Yeah. Yeah, I 836 00:47:55,840 --> 00:47:58,839 Speaker 1: did ask the military to come to Portland. They just 837 00:47:58,880 --> 00:48:04,239 Speaker 1: said no because they thought it would be a bad idea. Yeah. 838 00:48:04,760 --> 00:48:07,560 Speaker 1: And where where where this Where wud this troops come from? 839 00:48:07,680 --> 00:48:09,640 Speaker 1: What affiliate? You know, what kind of what kind of 840 00:48:10,080 --> 00:48:13,800 Speaker 1: affiliation would they have? What kind of you know, um. 841 00:48:14,000 --> 00:48:17,799 Speaker 1: National Guard to National Guard troops tend to reflect the 842 00:48:18,800 --> 00:48:22,759 Speaker 1: sentiment of a slightly more right wing um, you know, 843 00:48:23,280 --> 00:48:26,200 Speaker 1: version of the population. Maybe maybe the Overton window is 844 00:48:26,200 --> 00:48:28,319 Speaker 1: a little bit more to the right, but not that much, 845 00:48:28,719 --> 00:48:31,080 Speaker 1: you know, Yeah, they're not not certainly not as much 846 00:48:31,120 --> 00:48:34,560 Speaker 1: as like cops. It's a much more mainstream chunk of 847 00:48:34,600 --> 00:48:37,319 Speaker 1: the populace um, which is why when we did have 848 00:48:37,440 --> 00:48:40,360 Speaker 1: National Guard in Portland, they were a lot less violent 849 00:48:40,360 --> 00:48:42,480 Speaker 1: than the federal agents had been, or than the kind 850 00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:45,279 Speaker 1: they're also green, you know, they're they don't have the 851 00:48:45,280 --> 00:48:49,480 Speaker 1: They don't they have They haven't been inculcated or indoctrinated 852 00:48:49,800 --> 00:48:53,279 Speaker 1: for years with this idea that we are we are 853 00:48:53,520 --> 00:48:59,120 Speaker 1: here too occupy and to suppress right um. In this 854 00:48:59,440 --> 00:49:01,920 Speaker 1: very it takes a while for that mindset to sort 855 00:49:01,960 --> 00:49:05,560 Speaker 1: of set in. It did happen interack in Afghanistan. So 856 00:49:05,719 --> 00:49:08,080 Speaker 1: it doesn't mean that troops can't won't won't gain that 857 00:49:08,120 --> 00:49:10,840 Speaker 1: mindset if there's if there was a domestic occupation of 858 00:49:10,880 --> 00:49:14,560 Speaker 1: some variety um from a federalization of troops, but it 859 00:49:14,600 --> 00:49:17,120 Speaker 1: would it would start to kick in, and it wouldn't 860 00:49:17,160 --> 00:49:19,239 Speaker 1: it wouldn't take It wouldn't take as long as you 861 00:49:19,280 --> 00:49:22,759 Speaker 1: think maybe maybe maybe a few and maybe a few 862 00:49:22,920 --> 00:49:27,120 Speaker 1: violent incidents, you know, before that mentality starts to to 863 00:49:27,280 --> 00:49:31,880 Speaker 1: kick in. One other interesting thing to look at, like 864 00:49:32,440 --> 00:49:35,960 Speaker 1: in terms of like how fast the apabis can be deployed. 865 00:49:35,960 --> 00:49:39,239 Speaker 1: It's like in the days after January six, there was 866 00:49:39,320 --> 00:49:43,160 Speaker 1: like a lot of people, um, we're getting doortalks in 867 00:49:43,239 --> 00:49:45,319 Speaker 1: the FBI. Like there was a lot of there's a 868 00:49:45,360 --> 00:49:47,200 Speaker 1: lot of people, like to the point where there was 869 00:49:47,239 --> 00:49:51,120 Speaker 1: like bystanders who were just watching were like, the FBI 870 00:49:51,160 --> 00:49:53,160 Speaker 1: should have at my house, and they said that they 871 00:49:53,239 --> 00:49:55,960 Speaker 1: knew I was around January six, and they like they 872 00:49:56,000 --> 00:49:58,200 Speaker 1: showed me on a map the actual spot where I 873 00:49:58,239 --> 00:50:01,239 Speaker 1: was standing on the sidewalk, and like the FBI very 874 00:50:01,320 --> 00:50:06,600 Speaker 1: quickly got tons of phone records. Yeah, that was like immediate, 875 00:50:06,840 --> 00:50:09,960 Speaker 1: So like they don't always have them all the time, 876 00:50:10,040 --> 00:50:15,759 Speaker 1: but they can get them very quickly whenever they watched too. Yeah. Yeah, 877 00:50:15,800 --> 00:50:17,759 Speaker 1: they were reaching out to so many people that like 878 00:50:18,320 --> 00:50:21,680 Speaker 1: FBI agents whose job is not at all doing anything 879 00:50:21,760 --> 00:50:25,400 Speaker 1: like that. Like everybody who was like not outsick for 880 00:50:25,440 --> 00:50:28,399 Speaker 1: work was doing door knob knocks, Like people who were 881 00:50:28,400 --> 00:50:31,359 Speaker 1: in completely different branches because they were they were they 882 00:50:31,360 --> 00:50:33,960 Speaker 1: had gotten so many people's records, and they were just 883 00:50:34,040 --> 00:50:37,960 Speaker 1: kind of flooding the zone. Yeah, which I think is 884 00:50:38,160 --> 00:50:42,400 Speaker 1: less less about fact finding because I don't think I 885 00:50:42,400 --> 00:50:44,080 Speaker 1: don't know how munch. I think it was less about 886 00:50:44,120 --> 00:50:46,400 Speaker 1: fact finding and more about kind of a show of force, 887 00:50:47,400 --> 00:50:49,440 Speaker 1: you know, the kind of force that the FBI does exert, 888 00:50:49,480 --> 00:50:53,719 Speaker 1: which is information force primarily. Yeah, I mean that in 889 00:50:53,880 --> 00:50:56,799 Speaker 1: presence you know the fact that they can knock on door. 890 00:50:56,880 --> 00:50:59,239 Speaker 1: They can knock on your doors even though they met. 891 00:50:59,239 --> 00:51:02,719 Speaker 1: There may not be actual purpose, you might not have information, 892 00:51:02,760 --> 00:51:05,160 Speaker 1: but they don't care because the whole point is we 893 00:51:05,320 --> 00:51:09,080 Speaker 1: knocked on your door, like we you know. Um that 894 00:51:10,560 --> 00:51:14,400 Speaker 1: it won. Six was the second I mean, I was 895 00:51:14,440 --> 00:51:17,160 Speaker 1: I think the largest investigation, I mean, which is quite 896 00:51:17,360 --> 00:51:19,760 Speaker 1: something if you look at the fact that nine eleven 897 00:51:19,960 --> 00:51:23,480 Speaker 1: was previously the largest investigation, Like nine eleven is now 898 00:51:23,600 --> 00:51:28,240 Speaker 1: the second largest federal law enforcement investigation in US history, 899 00:51:28,719 --> 00:51:33,560 Speaker 1: with one six being higher. Um, we did it, everybody, 900 00:51:33,600 --> 00:51:37,280 Speaker 1: We beat bin Laden. Yeah, so you know, it's ladies 901 00:51:37,320 --> 00:51:40,839 Speaker 1: and gentlemen, the capability exist. The capability exists a matter 902 00:51:40,880 --> 00:51:45,319 Speaker 1: of of of of actually enabling those resources, you know. 903 00:51:45,600 --> 00:51:48,440 Speaker 1: So um, and in that instance, it was for eighteen 904 00:51:48,480 --> 00:51:51,279 Speaker 1: people in this instance, it was for several hundred, which 905 00:51:51,280 --> 00:51:53,200 Speaker 1: is one of the reasons why it's scaled out. But 906 00:51:53,560 --> 00:51:57,840 Speaker 1: the consequence of the consequences from lawn from from the 907 00:51:57,880 --> 00:52:02,960 Speaker 1: federal agency's perspective of the of this investigation are different. 908 00:52:03,000 --> 00:52:05,080 Speaker 1: Like I don't think anybody's gonna I don't think you're 909 00:52:05,160 --> 00:52:09,600 Speaker 1: looking at a death penalty Guantanamo case. I guess one 910 00:52:09,640 --> 00:52:13,200 Speaker 1: other thing that I wouldn't see if you think there's 911 00:52:13,200 --> 00:52:16,000 Speaker 1: something you can take from it, which is that you know, 912 00:52:16,120 --> 00:52:18,600 Speaker 1: if if you look at the response between like the 913 00:52:18,600 --> 00:52:21,280 Speaker 1: people fighting outside the White House last summer and then 914 00:52:22,640 --> 00:52:27,399 Speaker 1: January six, is that there there's kind of you get 915 00:52:27,400 --> 00:52:30,080 Speaker 1: safety and numbers to some extent, Like it isn't always 916 00:52:30,080 --> 00:52:31,640 Speaker 1: protect you know a lot of people, Like I mean, 917 00:52:31,640 --> 00:52:33,120 Speaker 1: there's there's a bunch of FED or a bunch of 918 00:52:33,120 --> 00:52:35,319 Speaker 1: FED raids in Atlanta at the end of last year, 919 00:52:36,000 --> 00:52:39,759 Speaker 1: people who were involved in protest stuff. But yeah, like 920 00:52:39,880 --> 00:52:43,200 Speaker 1: I guess it. You know, the the more unrest is happening, 921 00:52:43,239 --> 00:52:47,160 Speaker 1: the more sort of but the harder it is for 922 00:52:47,200 --> 00:52:50,719 Speaker 1: the crackdown to come. Yes, um, which is why they 923 00:52:50,719 --> 00:52:54,000 Speaker 1: tend to hold that you know, UM security forces have 924 00:52:54,040 --> 00:52:55,680 Speaker 1: it to. I mean, this is why I think it's 925 00:52:55,800 --> 00:53:00,839 Speaker 1: very important if there is another uprising situation like last year. Um, 926 00:53:00,880 --> 00:53:02,320 Speaker 1: you know, and I don't think I don't think. I 927 00:53:02,360 --> 00:53:04,480 Speaker 1: don't think that they've I don't think that that that 928 00:53:04,600 --> 00:53:06,520 Speaker 1: is that that is over. From their perspective. They are 929 00:53:06,520 --> 00:53:10,160 Speaker 1: going to continue to do investigations into what happened in summer. 930 00:53:11,239 --> 00:53:13,480 Speaker 1: You know, there are investigations still ongoing from the stuff 931 00:53:13,480 --> 00:53:15,879 Speaker 1: that happened in sen you know, with Standing Rock. So 932 00:53:16,400 --> 00:53:19,960 Speaker 1: you know, um, obviously you know, like the investigation in 933 00:53:19,960 --> 00:53:22,760 Speaker 1: in my own in my own personal case in twenty 934 00:53:22,800 --> 00:53:26,000 Speaker 1: ten seems to never end, right you know, so, uh, 935 00:53:26,880 --> 00:53:31,759 Speaker 1: something happen, Yeah I had, Yeah, I got. I won't 936 00:53:31,760 --> 00:53:35,520 Speaker 1: get into that, but you know that. But the point 937 00:53:35,560 --> 00:53:38,239 Speaker 1: is is that is that the the one of the 938 00:53:38,280 --> 00:53:42,479 Speaker 1: advantages that a federal that the federal government or state 939 00:53:42,560 --> 00:53:46,000 Speaker 1: law enforcement has is time. You know, they don't have 940 00:53:46,120 --> 00:53:49,600 Speaker 1: to always be there in a show of force. Um, 941 00:53:49,760 --> 00:53:51,200 Speaker 1: so you want to re do you know if if 942 00:53:51,239 --> 00:53:56,680 Speaker 1: you and that time can mean political changes, right, you know, 943 00:53:57,160 --> 00:54:01,840 Speaker 1: where a situation like under a Republican president will be 944 00:54:01,840 --> 00:54:05,480 Speaker 1: different than a democratic president will be different than a 945 00:54:05,520 --> 00:54:10,280 Speaker 1: situation where there where it's unclear who the president is. Well, 946 00:54:10,640 --> 00:54:14,200 Speaker 1: this has been a fun one. UM, fun stuff to 947 00:54:14,239 --> 00:54:20,080 Speaker 1: think about. Um, Chelsea, where can the good people or 948 00:54:20,120 --> 00:54:23,560 Speaker 1: the bad people find you? The good people or the 949 00:54:23,600 --> 00:54:26,520 Speaker 1: bad people can find me at x y chelsea on Twitter. 950 00:54:26,680 --> 00:54:29,640 Speaker 1: I am at x y chelse eight seven on Twitch. 951 00:54:30,280 --> 00:54:33,520 Speaker 1: I do some game streams periodically. I have slowed that 952 00:54:33,560 --> 00:54:36,000 Speaker 1: down a bit though. UM. I have a Patreon at 953 00:54:36,520 --> 00:54:39,359 Speaker 1: UH patreon dot com forward slash x y Chelsea UM 954 00:54:39,440 --> 00:54:43,000 Speaker 1: for content that I am currently in the late stages 955 00:54:43,000 --> 00:54:48,200 Speaker 1: of producing UH for tech related things, including you know, 956 00:54:48,320 --> 00:54:52,680 Speaker 1: things like cryptocurrency, are official intelligence, surveillance, those kinds of 957 00:54:52,719 --> 00:54:57,120 Speaker 1: concepts UM. And I am also on Instagram at x 958 00:54:57,480 --> 00:55:00,520 Speaker 1: l c oh and I have a TikTok now so 959 00:55:00,600 --> 00:55:03,279 Speaker 1: I will be I'm working on several TikTok's that are 960 00:55:03,320 --> 00:55:09,200 Speaker 1: related to these kinds of things, UM, privacy, surveillance, and 961 00:55:09,680 --> 00:55:13,160 Speaker 1: protecting yourself. UM. As I showed my my everyday carry 962 00:55:13,160 --> 00:55:17,080 Speaker 1: bag was one of the first things that I showed. Awesome. Well, 963 00:55:17,120 --> 00:55:21,319 Speaker 1: all right, UH, find Chelsea there and find us tomorrow 964 00:55:21,480 --> 00:55:24,720 Speaker 1: with another episode of it could happen here talking about 965 00:55:25,440 --> 00:55:32,680 Speaker 1: I don't know something something something, let's go oh, actually, Garrison. 966 00:55:32,719 --> 00:55:34,000 Speaker 1: We know what it'll be. Why don't you put in 967 00:55:34,040 --> 00:55:37,239 Speaker 1: a plug for the thing you did? Oh yeah, tomorrow 968 00:55:37,400 --> 00:55:39,400 Speaker 1: we uh, I will be releasing the first of a 969 00:55:39,440 --> 00:55:44,200 Speaker 1: two part episode. On my trip to northern Minnesota, I 970 00:55:44,280 --> 00:55:47,520 Speaker 1: traveled to an Earth First gathering and subsequent Stop Playing 971 00:55:47,600 --> 00:55:52,440 Speaker 1: three protest camp. UM was there for a little little 972 00:55:52,480 --> 00:55:57,120 Speaker 1: over a week, was present and documenting multiple kind of 973 00:55:57,160 --> 00:56:00,359 Speaker 1: direct actions. And yeah, we'll be talking about with like 974 00:56:01,120 --> 00:56:04,040 Speaker 1: Earth First and like the history of environmental organizing and 975 00:56:04,080 --> 00:56:06,839 Speaker 1: then the more modern kind of Stop Line three UM 976 00:56:07,080 --> 00:56:10,879 Speaker 1: protests going on and what Mbridge is doing, so that 977 00:56:10,880 --> 00:56:13,320 Speaker 1: that is going to be the next next two episodes 978 00:56:13,360 --> 00:56:18,319 Speaker 1: will be covering that topic. And actually, in another fun, 979 00:56:18,400 --> 00:56:20,600 Speaker 1: fun little side note, I had just finished a video 980 00:56:20,640 --> 00:56:25,200 Speaker 1: game called Telling Lies, which is about the federal surveillance 981 00:56:25,239 --> 00:56:29,839 Speaker 1: operation into an environmental protest group. And I think they 982 00:56:29,880 --> 00:56:32,520 Speaker 1: hand this game was done very well. UM. I would 983 00:56:32,560 --> 00:56:35,600 Speaker 1: love to talk about it more on the podcast eventually, UM, 984 00:56:35,640 --> 00:56:37,719 Speaker 1: after I do some more like reading on its development. 985 00:56:37,800 --> 00:56:39,799 Speaker 1: But um, if you want to, if you want to 986 00:56:39,800 --> 00:56:43,279 Speaker 1: get a look at like potential ways FEDS do like surveillance, 987 00:56:43,480 --> 00:56:45,239 Speaker 1: this game is actually a great example of how they 988 00:56:45,320 --> 00:56:49,680 Speaker 1: infiltrate um in in the environmental activist groups and different 989 00:56:49,880 --> 00:56:53,680 Speaker 1: different methods they use to survey surveil people, and how 990 00:56:53,719 --> 00:56:57,040 Speaker 1: they can pull like, um, you know, videos and phone 991 00:56:57,040 --> 00:56:59,759 Speaker 1: records that kind of stuff. So it was fun, fun 992 00:56:59,800 --> 00:57:02,960 Speaker 1: to entent on these all these topic. Yeah, this has 993 00:57:03,000 --> 00:57:05,960 Speaker 1: been a fun, fun day for everybody. Well that's going 994 00:57:06,000 --> 00:57:08,719 Speaker 1: to do it for us that it could happen here. Oh, 995 00:57:08,880 --> 00:57:11,000 Speaker 1: this wasn't even the heaviest stuff that I could get into. 996 00:57:11,560 --> 00:57:16,040 Speaker 1: Well we'll do that maybe in another week, thanks Chelsea. Alright, 997 00:57:16,720 --> 00:57:23,160 Speaker 1: well until next week or tomorrow whatever. Bye, it happened.