1 00:00:05,000 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: Welcome back to It could Happen Here, a podcast about 2 00:00:08,119 --> 00:00:11,680 Speaker 1: things falling apart. This week we have an episode that 3 00:00:11,760 --> 00:00:13,399 Speaker 1: is in the vein of what my co host Garrison 4 00:00:13,440 --> 00:00:17,280 Speaker 1: Davis and I like to call Here's a Problem, goodbye episodes. Uh. 5 00:00:17,320 --> 00:00:19,560 Speaker 1: And the problem is that there has been a massive 6 00:00:19,680 --> 00:00:22,560 Speaker 1: and as far as I can tell, unprecedented wave of 7 00:00:22,680 --> 00:00:26,279 Speaker 1: swatting incidents against public schools and multiple states over the 8 00:00:26,320 --> 00:00:28,560 Speaker 1: last couple of weeks. Uh. And here with me to 9 00:00:28,600 --> 00:00:31,840 Speaker 1: talk about that is the person who noticed it first. Uh, 10 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:38,320 Speaker 1: anti fascist researcher h and community meeting note taker Molly Conjure. Molly, 11 00:00:38,479 --> 00:00:41,720 Speaker 1: you are socialist dog mom on Twitter, where you are 12 00:00:41,760 --> 00:00:45,480 Speaker 1: a sensation with your delightful little pups. Um and also 13 00:00:45,560 --> 00:00:48,000 Speaker 1: one of the best researchers that I know in the biz. 14 00:00:48,360 --> 00:00:52,960 Speaker 1: Welcome to the show. Great to be here. So uh, yeah, 15 00:00:53,320 --> 00:00:56,800 Speaker 1: you want to start? Yeah. So this has been going on, 16 00:00:56,840 --> 00:00:59,360 Speaker 1: I guess for two weeks. There's been this wave of 17 00:00:59,400 --> 00:01:02,600 Speaker 1: swatting against schools across the country. Um, and I didn't 18 00:01:02,600 --> 00:01:05,880 Speaker 1: notice it until it happened here. Um. We had to 19 00:01:05,880 --> 00:01:10,000 Speaker 1: restart this so many times. I feel like it's great, 20 00:01:10,040 --> 00:01:13,960 Speaker 1: though you should because it happened here. I love it 21 00:01:13,959 --> 00:01:15,679 Speaker 1: when you say the name of the show and we 22 00:01:15,800 --> 00:01:18,360 Speaker 1: finally get to do it. Yeah, but you know, you know, 23 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:21,959 Speaker 1: my attention is primarily local. So on Monday, when every 24 00:01:22,000 --> 00:01:24,480 Speaker 1: cop in the region was dispatched to Charlottesville High School 25 00:01:24,480 --> 00:01:27,319 Speaker 1: because there was a false report of an active shooter 26 00:01:27,360 --> 00:01:30,640 Speaker 1: inside the school. Um, it was quickly determined to be 27 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:33,600 Speaker 1: a squatting, right, so they dispatched everybody, They locked the 28 00:01:33,640 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 1: school down, they cleared the classrooms with guns. You know, 29 00:01:35,680 --> 00:01:38,880 Speaker 1: kids reported being terrified of you because it was happy 30 00:01:38,920 --> 00:01:41,840 Speaker 1: to them. They were just enjoying, you know, an afternoon 31 00:01:41,880 --> 00:01:43,200 Speaker 1: in high school and all of a sudden there's a 32 00:01:43,200 --> 00:01:46,200 Speaker 1: man with a rifle in their classroom. Um. And it 33 00:01:46,280 --> 00:01:48,080 Speaker 1: was quickly determined to have been a squatting. And I 34 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:50,240 Speaker 1: was listening over the scanner and by the time they 35 00:01:50,240 --> 00:01:52,200 Speaker 1: were clearing the scene, that's what they were calling it. 36 00:01:52,400 --> 00:01:55,160 Speaker 1: So the police identified it as a swatting, like through 37 00:01:55,280 --> 00:01:58,080 Speaker 1: over the Yeah, and I think that may have they 38 00:01:58,120 --> 00:02:01,480 Speaker 1: may have arrived at that conclusion more quickly because a 39 00:02:01,560 --> 00:02:03,760 Speaker 1: dozen other districts had it at the same time. So 40 00:02:03,800 --> 00:02:07,200 Speaker 1: across the state of Virginia, UM districts you know, from 41 00:02:07,240 --> 00:02:11,040 Speaker 1: Hampton Roads to Arlington, Culpepper, Lynchburg, like tiny towns in 42 00:02:11,040 --> 00:02:14,400 Speaker 1: Shenandoah County, like a town with four thousand people down 43 00:02:15,200 --> 00:02:17,040 Speaker 1: you know, in the southern part of the state. We're 44 00:02:17,080 --> 00:02:20,160 Speaker 1: hit almost exactly the same time with these hoax calls 45 00:02:20,200 --> 00:02:21,919 Speaker 1: about you know, I gotta get somebody down to the 46 00:02:21,919 --> 00:02:25,960 Speaker 1: school because there's somebody with a gun. Good lord. It's 47 00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:27,520 Speaker 1: so you know, it happened all over the place. All 48 00:02:27,520 --> 00:02:29,480 Speaker 1: of these schools were quickly cleared. No one was hurt, 49 00:02:29,520 --> 00:02:33,960 Speaker 1: thank god. Um, but at least think you know, as 50 00:02:34,000 --> 00:02:35,600 Speaker 1: the news was coming in, I was picking, you know, 51 00:02:35,639 --> 00:02:37,800 Speaker 1: picking through trying to find the districts where this was happening, 52 00:02:39,840 --> 00:02:41,920 Speaker 1: and I was pulling up these news articles and it 53 00:02:42,000 --> 00:02:46,080 Speaker 1: wasn't just us, and it wasn't just that day. So 54 00:02:46,160 --> 00:02:48,799 Speaker 1: it's I think the earliest I can find in this 55 00:02:48,960 --> 00:02:53,440 Speaker 1: rash was what was that two weeks ago in Texas? 56 00:02:53,440 --> 00:02:56,040 Speaker 1: A bunch of districts in Texas were hit. Uh And 57 00:02:56,080 --> 00:02:58,480 Speaker 1: the one in Houston I think is particularly grim because 58 00:02:58,520 --> 00:03:01,400 Speaker 1: the caller, the caller said, you know, oh, ten students 59 00:03:01,400 --> 00:03:03,720 Speaker 1: have already been shot there in the classroom. It's two 60 00:03:03,720 --> 00:03:06,760 Speaker 1: guys with a RS and they gave this is one 61 00:03:06,760 --> 00:03:09,280 Speaker 1: of the one of the ones that the best described 62 00:03:09,320 --> 00:03:11,600 Speaker 1: in the media is that the caller gave a description 63 00:03:11,639 --> 00:03:14,160 Speaker 1: of the two shooters. And that's what scares me, right, 64 00:03:14,240 --> 00:03:16,800 Speaker 1: is that the cops show up with a description in mind, 65 00:03:17,480 --> 00:03:20,040 Speaker 1: they're going to act with extreme prejudice if they see 66 00:03:20,040 --> 00:03:23,240 Speaker 1: someone who fits that description. There's a Hispanic guy in 67 00:03:23,240 --> 00:03:27,600 Speaker 1: the parking lot that you know, it could be a risk. Yeah, well, 68 00:03:27,600 --> 00:03:31,120 Speaker 1: and that's that's the first one. Like, when I shared 69 00:03:31,320 --> 00:03:34,920 Speaker 1: your early posts on this, people from Houston started showing 70 00:03:35,000 --> 00:03:37,000 Speaker 1: up and saying like, hey, you know, we had something 71 00:03:37,040 --> 00:03:38,800 Speaker 1: like this hit a couple of weeks ago, and it 72 00:03:38,880 --> 00:03:41,840 Speaker 1: sounds like it's the same thing. And these are i mean, 73 00:03:41,880 --> 00:03:47,520 Speaker 1: like number one, the scale of this, it feels unlikely 74 00:03:47,640 --> 00:03:50,720 Speaker 1: that at some level, I know, there's there's certainly possible, 75 00:03:51,440 --> 00:03:53,960 Speaker 1: an extreme likelihood that some of these are copycats, some 76 00:03:54,000 --> 00:03:56,640 Speaker 1: of these are people falling in, but the sheer number 77 00:03:56,680 --> 00:03:59,840 Speaker 1: of them makes it seem it's hard to believe that 78 00:03:59,840 --> 00:04:03,040 Speaker 1: this would all be unrelated, all of these calls would 79 00:04:03,040 --> 00:04:04,960 Speaker 1: be unrelated to each other. I think, you know, I 80 00:04:05,240 --> 00:04:09,560 Speaker 1: don't know what the background level of normal splottings is, right, Like, 81 00:04:09,800 --> 00:04:12,400 Speaker 1: I'm sure to a certain degree. This is happening somewhere 82 00:04:12,400 --> 00:04:14,000 Speaker 1: all the time. You know, people are saying, oh, it's 83 00:04:14,000 --> 00:04:16,960 Speaker 1: just kids who don't want to take tests. Yeah, fifteen 84 00:04:16,960 --> 00:04:19,360 Speaker 1: schools in Minnesota were hit simultaneously yesterday. This is and 85 00:04:19,440 --> 00:04:23,200 Speaker 1: kids who don't want to take that right simultaneously, so 86 00:04:23,240 --> 00:04:26,800 Speaker 1: many schools, And it's there is a point there, which 87 00:04:26,880 --> 00:04:29,279 Speaker 1: is you know, because people when I started sharing this 88 00:04:29,320 --> 00:04:31,120 Speaker 1: and stuff, people like, what are we supposed to do? 89 00:04:31,640 --> 00:04:34,560 Speaker 1: And the first thing that occurs to me is actually 90 00:04:34,600 --> 00:04:37,040 Speaker 1: not a preventative measure, but is purely just like, well, 91 00:04:37,200 --> 00:04:38,800 Speaker 1: we should probably have some sort of at least at 92 00:04:38,800 --> 00:04:41,599 Speaker 1: a state level system in every state for letting people 93 00:04:41,640 --> 00:04:45,320 Speaker 1: know how many fake swatting attempts to get schools are happening, 94 00:04:45,360 --> 00:04:49,480 Speaker 1: how many like false reports of mass shootings at schools occur, 95 00:04:49,640 --> 00:04:53,040 Speaker 1: like it would be because otherwise we can't tell if 96 00:04:53,040 --> 00:04:55,120 Speaker 1: this is rising above the level of background. I think 97 00:04:55,120 --> 00:04:58,839 Speaker 1: it's clear this is because neither of us can think 98 00:04:58,880 --> 00:05:00,800 Speaker 1: of a time when there were us many in such 99 00:05:00,800 --> 00:05:04,440 Speaker 1: a short period of time, but dozens a day, dozens 100 00:05:04,440 --> 00:05:07,080 Speaker 1: a day, there should be some method of keeping track 101 00:05:07,160 --> 00:05:09,200 Speaker 1: of that, because it is I I thought there's a 102 00:05:09,279 --> 00:05:12,440 Speaker 1: lesson of nine eleven rights that don't have inter agency communication, 103 00:05:12,960 --> 00:05:14,640 Speaker 1: like you know, on Monday, when it was hitting all 104 00:05:14,640 --> 00:05:16,800 Speaker 1: these schools in Virginia, some of the early reports were 105 00:05:17,120 --> 00:05:19,560 Speaker 1: quotes from local authorities saying, we talked to the state 106 00:05:19,600 --> 00:05:21,680 Speaker 1: police and this happened to other people. It's like, well, 107 00:05:21,680 --> 00:05:24,719 Speaker 1: I've already found ten other reports. Did the state police 108 00:05:24,720 --> 00:05:28,719 Speaker 1: know about the hose? Yeah, and it's it's this is um. 109 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:31,880 Speaker 1: Obviously none of this is as bad as a single 110 00:05:32,040 --> 00:05:35,279 Speaker 1: actual mash shooting at a school. But this isn't like 111 00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:38,400 Speaker 1: nothing either. It's not like you you file a false 112 00:05:38,440 --> 00:05:41,080 Speaker 1: report about I don't know a break in and the 113 00:05:41,120 --> 00:05:43,840 Speaker 1: cops drive around a neighborhood for a while. Like. This 114 00:05:43,880 --> 00:05:46,040 Speaker 1: is kids getting guns pointed in their faces. This is 115 00:05:46,120 --> 00:05:48,760 Speaker 1: children thinking that like their friends have been massacred. This 116 00:05:48,839 --> 00:05:51,280 Speaker 1: is like parents thinking their kids might be dead. This 117 00:05:51,360 --> 00:05:54,279 Speaker 1: is this. This is an act of violence, like doing 118 00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:56,760 Speaker 1: this as an act of violence and it ripples. Right, 119 00:05:56,800 --> 00:06:00,480 Speaker 1: The effects of this are are compound and unfamble. You know, 120 00:06:00,520 --> 00:06:03,359 Speaker 1: I've heard from friends in the community saying, you know, 121 00:06:03,400 --> 00:06:05,760 Speaker 1: I got a text from my thirteen year old son saying, 122 00:06:05,800 --> 00:06:08,080 Speaker 1: I don't know what's happening, but I love you and 123 00:06:08,120 --> 00:06:11,000 Speaker 1: even if, even if you know, thirty minutes later the 124 00:06:11,080 --> 00:06:13,360 Speaker 1: dangerous passed and everyone knows it was a false alarm. 125 00:06:13,600 --> 00:06:17,080 Speaker 1: For that thirty minutes, those parents thought, I thought that 126 00:06:17,120 --> 00:06:18,800 Speaker 1: their kids weren't going to come home. And you know 127 00:06:18,839 --> 00:06:20,600 Speaker 1: that's a background fear of the parents have every day 128 00:06:20,600 --> 00:06:22,479 Speaker 1: when they said that. But that's the text no parent 129 00:06:22,560 --> 00:06:24,200 Speaker 1: wants to get right. You know, before we lost the 130 00:06:24,200 --> 00:06:26,640 Speaker 1: recording earlier, I was telling you about a a surgeon 131 00:06:26,720 --> 00:06:29,600 Speaker 1: here in Charletsville. She's a surgeon at EBA Hospital. So 132 00:06:29,720 --> 00:06:32,360 Speaker 1: the hospital was alerted about a possible mass casualty incident 133 00:06:32,400 --> 00:06:34,760 Speaker 1: so they could prepare their their operating rooms. And so 134 00:06:34,800 --> 00:06:37,800 Speaker 1: this woman gets the mass casualty incident alert as she's 135 00:06:37,839 --> 00:06:40,800 Speaker 1: scrubbing in for a scheduled surgery. So she has to 136 00:06:40,839 --> 00:06:42,600 Speaker 1: walk into that. She has to walk into that o 137 00:06:42,800 --> 00:06:47,279 Speaker 1: R without her phone knowing that her child's school, to 138 00:06:47,360 --> 00:06:49,559 Speaker 1: her knowledge in that moment, has a mass shooter inside 139 00:06:49,600 --> 00:06:51,120 Speaker 1: of it. And so she doesn't know if when she 140 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:54,000 Speaker 1: walks out of that o R are her children going 141 00:06:54,040 --> 00:06:58,960 Speaker 1: to be in there. That's horrific. That's horrific, and also 142 00:06:59,040 --> 00:07:02,039 Speaker 1: like that could get somebody killed. And this is nothing 143 00:07:03,320 --> 00:07:05,840 Speaker 1: care it would not be surprising if she was less 144 00:07:05,880 --> 00:07:08,920 Speaker 1: able to properly provide care in that situation. That's just 145 00:07:08,960 --> 00:07:13,560 Speaker 1: being a person. Um. So this is serious, very serious 146 00:07:14,280 --> 00:07:17,920 Speaker 1: and it um So yesterday a rash of them hit Minnesota, 147 00:07:18,320 --> 00:07:20,560 Speaker 1: and if some locals in Minnesota were saying that so 148 00:07:20,600 --> 00:07:21,960 Speaker 1: one of the schools that was hit was East main 149 00:07:22,000 --> 00:07:25,280 Speaker 1: Cato High School the day before, So the day before 150 00:07:25,360 --> 00:07:28,560 Speaker 1: yesterday that at that high school, a student at that 151 00:07:28,640 --> 00:07:31,440 Speaker 1: high school attempted suicide with a firearm in the parking lot. 152 00:07:31,960 --> 00:07:33,920 Speaker 1: So kids came back to school the day after this. 153 00:07:34,000 --> 00:07:37,760 Speaker 1: You know, the students survived in his hospitalized, but you 154 00:07:37,840 --> 00:07:40,800 Speaker 1: know they're coming to school hopefully to you know, access 155 00:07:40,840 --> 00:07:43,440 Speaker 1: counseling resources and deal with the fact that one of 156 00:07:43,440 --> 00:07:45,920 Speaker 1: their classmates shot himself in the parking lot and suddenly 157 00:07:45,960 --> 00:07:49,600 Speaker 1: they're sheltering in place and there's cops with guns. Just 158 00:07:49,680 --> 00:07:54,200 Speaker 1: there's a baseline reality for these students every day that 159 00:07:54,280 --> 00:08:07,640 Speaker 1: gun violence is present, and this is just cruel to them. 160 00:08:07,640 --> 00:08:09,920 Speaker 1: One of the things that surprises me, you and I 161 00:08:10,000 --> 00:08:13,880 Speaker 1: you started was it four days ago? Now, kind of 162 00:08:14,440 --> 00:08:16,400 Speaker 1: reporting this on your Twitter, which is where you do. 163 00:08:16,440 --> 00:08:20,120 Speaker 1: You're reporting on local news and the anti fascist reporting 164 00:08:20,120 --> 00:08:23,320 Speaker 1: as well. Um, and so I started sharing your stuff 165 00:08:23,360 --> 00:08:26,000 Speaker 1: and I we started chatting about doing an episode. And 166 00:08:26,040 --> 00:08:29,680 Speaker 1: my suspicion, the thing I was expecting was that like, well, 167 00:08:30,080 --> 00:08:33,320 Speaker 1: we'll probably get scooped on this, right, Like there's probably 168 00:08:33,360 --> 00:08:35,240 Speaker 1: liked vice or somebody is going to put out something 169 00:08:35,240 --> 00:08:38,600 Speaker 1: because there's just there's too damn many of these. Um 170 00:08:38,640 --> 00:08:41,520 Speaker 1: it's Thursday now, the started Monday. I still haven't seen 171 00:08:42,000 --> 00:08:45,640 Speaker 1: any coverage of this as a as a wave of swattings, 172 00:08:45,640 --> 00:08:48,920 Speaker 1: and I'm kind of surprised by that. There's a few, Like, 173 00:08:49,000 --> 00:08:51,559 Speaker 1: you know, regionally, people are bringing together and doing these 174 00:08:51,559 --> 00:08:53,280 Speaker 1: little quick hits about like, oh, this happened in a 175 00:08:53,280 --> 00:08:55,840 Speaker 1: dozen districts in our state. Yeah, but I'm not I'm 176 00:08:55,880 --> 00:08:58,280 Speaker 1: not seeing anyone connect the dots nationally, and you know, 177 00:08:58,400 --> 00:09:00,360 Speaker 1: and some of these local stories are saying the local 178 00:09:00,360 --> 00:09:02,800 Speaker 1: authorities are talking to the FBI, But I don't know 179 00:09:02,840 --> 00:09:06,640 Speaker 1: that there's a cohesive nationwide investigation into this as as 180 00:09:06,679 --> 00:09:11,040 Speaker 1: a phenomenon. Regionally, there is some indication that like these 181 00:09:11,040 --> 00:09:12,920 Speaker 1: calls are connected. So I saw an article that just 182 00:09:12,960 --> 00:09:15,520 Speaker 1: came out an hour ago in Minnesota that all of 183 00:09:15,559 --> 00:09:18,840 Speaker 1: the Minnesota calls came from the same IP address. Ah, 184 00:09:18,880 --> 00:09:21,840 Speaker 1: So this that's I mean, that's what that's the proof 185 00:09:21,840 --> 00:09:24,200 Speaker 1: we're looking for, though, that's the evidence we're looking for. 186 00:09:24,240 --> 00:09:27,360 Speaker 1: That Like, there's a significant degree degree to which this 187 00:09:27,440 --> 00:09:31,400 Speaker 1: stuff is is coordinated. And when I because this is 188 00:09:31,440 --> 00:09:35,640 Speaker 1: something that since you started talking about it, every researcher 189 00:09:35,720 --> 00:09:38,800 Speaker 1: I know who covers extremism has been talking about at 190 00:09:38,880 --> 00:09:42,920 Speaker 1: least a little bit in like private conversation signal loops. 191 00:09:42,960 --> 00:09:44,880 Speaker 1: And the thing that keeps coming up is like, is 192 00:09:44,920 --> 00:09:46,920 Speaker 1: there some ship on Kiwi Farms? Is there some ship 193 00:09:47,040 --> 00:09:49,080 Speaker 1: on four chan? Is there some ship on like these 194 00:09:49,200 --> 00:09:53,679 Speaker 1: these little spaces. I haven't seen anything nothing, So yeah, 195 00:09:54,360 --> 00:09:56,520 Speaker 1: you know, to some degree, there is the possibility of 196 00:09:56,559 --> 00:09:58,720 Speaker 1: social contagion, right, Like I found a few stories that 197 00:09:58,760 --> 00:10:02,440 Speaker 1: don't fit the pattern, specific the cases like yesterday in Roanoke, 198 00:10:02,440 --> 00:10:04,680 Speaker 1: a fourteen year old girl was arrested for making one 199 00:10:04,720 --> 00:10:06,880 Speaker 1: of these threats. She didn't make all of them, she 200 00:10:07,000 --> 00:10:09,120 Speaker 1: made this one. Did she do this with what she 201 00:10:09,200 --> 00:10:11,719 Speaker 1: inspired to do? So? Because of this? Was it unrelated? 202 00:10:11,920 --> 00:10:14,440 Speaker 1: It's hard to say. So this at some point, even 203 00:10:14,440 --> 00:10:18,480 Speaker 1: if it did originate in one incubator, it breaks containment. 204 00:10:18,960 --> 00:10:23,480 Speaker 1: And I'm I am certain that's part of the intent, right, 205 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:26,360 Speaker 1: Like when you do the benefit of if you're thinking 206 00:10:26,360 --> 00:10:28,800 Speaker 1: about because again, we don't know who did this. We 207 00:10:28,800 --> 00:10:32,320 Speaker 1: don't know what kind of ideology or whatever or why 208 00:10:32,559 --> 00:10:35,839 Speaker 1: was behind it, but we know that a significant number 209 00:10:35,880 --> 00:10:39,079 Speaker 1: of them like occurred from a single source, which means 210 00:10:39,240 --> 00:10:42,920 Speaker 1: like something coordinated was happening at some stage of this. 211 00:10:43,160 --> 00:10:46,480 Speaker 1: That's a reasonable conclusion to draw from the extent information 212 00:10:47,160 --> 00:10:50,520 Speaker 1: um And I think it's just pure psychic terrorism, right 213 00:10:50,520 --> 00:10:53,160 Speaker 1: because my first thought on Monday was, is this someone 214 00:10:53,200 --> 00:10:56,440 Speaker 1: testing the fences? Is this someone timing response times? Is 215 00:10:56,520 --> 00:10:58,640 Speaker 1: someone watching local news coverage to see what kind of 216 00:10:58,640 --> 00:11:03,280 Speaker 1: equipment the police have? That doesn't make sense at this scale. 217 00:11:03,400 --> 00:11:05,400 Speaker 1: This isn't how you would do that, because this is 218 00:11:05,400 --> 00:11:08,439 Speaker 1: going to draw too much attention, right, And like why 219 00:11:08,440 --> 00:11:10,200 Speaker 1: would you want to know the you know, the police 220 00:11:10,240 --> 00:11:13,560 Speaker 1: capabilities in Emporia, Virginia, which is just like three truck 221 00:11:13,600 --> 00:11:16,160 Speaker 1: stops in high school, No offense to the beautiful town 222 00:11:16,160 --> 00:11:19,240 Speaker 1: of Emporia, Virginia. It is Virginia's greatest speed trap. God 223 00:11:19,280 --> 00:11:24,120 Speaker 1: bless them. But like that that theory immediately fell by 224 00:11:24,120 --> 00:11:26,520 Speaker 1: the wayside for me because it doesn't make sense. But 225 00:11:26,600 --> 00:11:28,240 Speaker 1: it is interesting. So I've been, you know, trying to 226 00:11:28,280 --> 00:11:30,839 Speaker 1: compile follow ups on some of these reports because the 227 00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:33,760 Speaker 1: initial reporting is vague and people use nine one one 228 00:11:34,160 --> 00:11:36,240 Speaker 1: as short cancel. They'll say a nine one one call, 229 00:11:36,440 --> 00:11:38,800 Speaker 1: But was it actually a nine one one call? Because 230 00:11:38,840 --> 00:11:41,560 Speaker 1: that makes a huge difference here, dialing nine one one 231 00:11:41,840 --> 00:11:45,679 Speaker 1: is you know, I'm not a genius about how technology works, 232 00:11:45,720 --> 00:11:48,079 Speaker 1: but if I die INLINEE one here from my living room, 233 00:11:48,120 --> 00:11:51,160 Speaker 1: it hits my closest emergency communications center, right, it's my 234 00:11:51,240 --> 00:11:53,480 Speaker 1: local nine one one. If these calls are being made 235 00:11:53,480 --> 00:11:57,040 Speaker 1: from out of state, it takes a high degree of 236 00:11:57,320 --> 00:12:01,000 Speaker 1: technical ability to hit a nine one one dispatch center 237 00:12:01,000 --> 00:12:03,600 Speaker 1: where you aren't. Yeah, right, So we know we're not 238 00:12:03,640 --> 00:12:07,560 Speaker 1: dealing with someone who is capable of that. Alternatively, we know, 239 00:12:08,559 --> 00:12:11,920 Speaker 1: perhaps that this person knows that making a false nine 240 00:12:11,920 --> 00:12:16,520 Speaker 1: one one call is a separately prosecutable crime. Right, So 241 00:12:16,559 --> 00:12:19,400 Speaker 1: like the articles that are specific will say that the 242 00:12:19,440 --> 00:12:22,880 Speaker 1: call came in directly to police dispatch, or the call 243 00:12:22,960 --> 00:12:25,600 Speaker 1: came in to the front desk at the sheriff's office. 244 00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:28,600 Speaker 1: So these people know well enough how to contact the 245 00:12:28,760 --> 00:12:30,880 Speaker 1: you know, the front desk at the police department, and 246 00:12:30,920 --> 00:12:32,960 Speaker 1: the name of a school that's nearby right there. It's 247 00:12:32,960 --> 00:12:36,360 Speaker 1: not it's not so vague as as to just be 248 00:12:36,520 --> 00:12:38,960 Speaker 1: dialing random police stations and saying go to the high school. 249 00:12:39,160 --> 00:12:42,440 Speaker 1: Well no, And that also again because we we've just 250 00:12:42,480 --> 00:12:45,440 Speaker 1: mentioned I haven't seen any evidence of this in the 251 00:12:45,520 --> 00:12:48,760 Speaker 1: places you would expect if this was the way. It's 252 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:51,000 Speaker 1: a lot of these docksing campaigns have gone the way 253 00:12:51,040 --> 00:12:52,760 Speaker 1: a lot of Kiwi farm stuff goes the way a 254 00:12:52,800 --> 00:12:55,640 Speaker 1: lot of swatting happens, where like you have a shipload 255 00:12:55,679 --> 00:12:59,080 Speaker 1: of people openly talking about and talking about bad things 256 00:12:59,160 --> 00:13:02,080 Speaker 1: happening to a targeted person, and then some of those 257 00:13:02,080 --> 00:13:06,480 Speaker 1: people do swattings. Right, there's no evidence of that, And 258 00:13:06,520 --> 00:13:09,360 Speaker 1: the way in which it seems like the bulk of 259 00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:12,839 Speaker 1: these have gone doesn't seem like the way it would 260 00:13:12,840 --> 00:13:15,360 Speaker 1: happen if you were just kind of targeting someone in 261 00:13:15,400 --> 00:13:18,640 Speaker 1: a public area and hoping that enough people made the 262 00:13:18,679 --> 00:13:23,320 Speaker 1: decision independently to make these calls. Um. The other My 263 00:13:23,360 --> 00:13:24,960 Speaker 1: other thought too is that you know, it's sort of 264 00:13:25,080 --> 00:13:28,199 Speaker 1: a limpse of TikTok phenomenon, like they're targeting schools with 265 00:13:28,400 --> 00:13:31,600 Speaker 1: you know, woke policies CRT gender include, they're not I 266 00:13:31,600 --> 00:13:34,800 Speaker 1: mean they hit Lynchburg, Virginia, which is Jerry Folwell country. 267 00:13:34,840 --> 00:13:39,480 Speaker 1: There's no demographic or political consistency to the district's being 268 00:13:39,480 --> 00:13:42,280 Speaker 1: targeted well, and the right hasn't picked this up at all. 269 00:13:42,520 --> 00:13:44,920 Speaker 1: I haven't seen any kind of like, very no one, 270 00:13:45,720 --> 00:13:47,880 Speaker 1: very few people seem to have at this point. So 271 00:13:48,400 --> 00:13:52,200 Speaker 1: this is just such a if I if I were 272 00:13:52,240 --> 00:13:56,920 Speaker 1: to guess where this is going down, it's some some 273 00:13:57,000 --> 00:14:02,000 Speaker 1: sort of communications platform where people have a degree of privacy. Um, 274 00:14:02,360 --> 00:14:05,520 Speaker 1: And I don't know, if it's not testing the fences, 275 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:08,760 Speaker 1: which at this point it seems too widespread to be, 276 00:14:09,440 --> 00:14:13,640 Speaker 1: then it may just be kind of pure. I mean, 277 00:14:13,800 --> 00:14:15,360 Speaker 1: one thing that occurs to me is just like there's 278 00:14:15,400 --> 00:14:20,480 Speaker 1: the pure accelerationist value of of setting up this wave 279 00:14:20,640 --> 00:14:23,320 Speaker 1: and hoping that that the copycat effect will just keep 280 00:14:23,360 --> 00:14:26,400 Speaker 1: it going for a significant period of time, of shutting 281 00:14:26,400 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 1: down dozens of schools around the country, of traumatizing kids, 282 00:14:29,480 --> 00:14:32,800 Speaker 1: of continually making those schools roll the dice, because anytime 283 00:14:32,840 --> 00:14:34,480 Speaker 1: you have a cop with an a R bust into 284 00:14:34,480 --> 00:14:37,160 Speaker 1: a fucking school hyped up thinking there's a shooting, there's 285 00:14:37,160 --> 00:14:39,600 Speaker 1: a chance someone's going to get shot, right, So there's 286 00:14:39,720 --> 00:14:42,440 Speaker 1: and that's that's I mean, there have been deaths from swattings, 287 00:14:42,440 --> 00:14:45,240 Speaker 1: and that was that was but so it happened here 288 00:14:45,280 --> 00:14:47,560 Speaker 1: two days in a row. On Tuesday, it happened in 289 00:14:47,600 --> 00:14:50,600 Speaker 1: our middle school. And so like the second time they responded, 290 00:14:50,600 --> 00:14:54,120 Speaker 1: they didn't respond. Is hot and heavy. Uh yeah. Anytime 291 00:14:54,120 --> 00:14:56,080 Speaker 1: you get, you know, cops charging into a scenario where 292 00:14:56,080 --> 00:14:58,120 Speaker 1: they think they might get to or have to, depending 293 00:14:58,120 --> 00:15:00,360 Speaker 1: on how you feel about it, use their guns, the 294 00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:03,560 Speaker 1: risk of someone being shot by accident is pastronomical. Yeah, 295 00:15:03,640 --> 00:15:06,520 Speaker 1: and I honestly I'm kind of shocked that has it happened, 296 00:15:06,600 --> 00:15:10,240 Speaker 1: especially in the cases where you know, the caller gives 297 00:15:10,240 --> 00:15:13,240 Speaker 1: a specific suspect description that you know, puts anybody who 298 00:15:13,320 --> 00:15:16,680 Speaker 1: vaguely meets that description at great risk. But I think 299 00:15:16,680 --> 00:15:20,800 Speaker 1: this is just you know, joker mode nihilism. Yeah, that's 300 00:15:21,000 --> 00:15:23,840 Speaker 1: that is if I were to like make a raw 301 00:15:24,160 --> 00:15:28,760 Speaker 1: irresponsible like public guests. Um, not that I don't think 302 00:15:28,760 --> 00:15:31,040 Speaker 1: this is actually that irresponsible, but like we just don't know. 303 00:15:31,560 --> 00:15:35,720 Speaker 1: But that's that's what this that's the the mo this 304 00:15:35,840 --> 00:15:39,640 Speaker 1: fits best so far is kind of raw. I want 305 00:15:39,680 --> 00:15:42,640 Speaker 1: to disrupt the system. I want to scare people, and 306 00:15:42,680 --> 00:15:45,000 Speaker 1: I want to do so in a way. That's the 307 00:15:45,040 --> 00:15:47,720 Speaker 1: problem with a mass shooting from the perspective of someone 308 00:15:47,800 --> 00:15:50,480 Speaker 1: like this is that you're gonna die or get arrested 309 00:15:50,520 --> 00:15:52,360 Speaker 1: doing it, right, That's the way all of them end. 310 00:15:52,840 --> 00:15:55,040 Speaker 1: And so that limits the number of people who are 311 00:15:55,040 --> 00:15:57,200 Speaker 1: going to be inspired to carry out a mass shooting. 312 00:15:57,600 --> 00:16:00,680 Speaker 1: If you can show that, yeah, people can can call 313 00:16:00,760 --> 00:16:02,880 Speaker 1: in dozens of these fake reports and some of them 314 00:16:02,920 --> 00:16:06,480 Speaker 1: you know, we're going to end violently, Uh, then maybe 315 00:16:06,520 --> 00:16:08,320 Speaker 1: a bunch more people are willing to do that, and 316 00:16:08,360 --> 00:16:11,240 Speaker 1: the overall level of disruption and chaos that you cause 317 00:16:11,320 --> 00:16:15,680 Speaker 1: is substantially higher. Right, So it's a relatively low threshold 318 00:16:15,720 --> 00:16:18,560 Speaker 1: for involvement. Right, you don't have to be ready to die, 319 00:16:18,720 --> 00:16:21,440 Speaker 1: and maybe you won't get caught, although I think because 320 00:16:21,520 --> 00:16:24,280 Speaker 1: especially in the Minnesota case, they're going to catch somebody. 321 00:16:24,280 --> 00:16:27,520 Speaker 1: Governor Tim Waltz's son goes to man Cato High School. No, 322 00:16:27,640 --> 00:16:30,520 Speaker 1: I mean you you you upset the governor's son. You're 323 00:16:30,520 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 1: gonna get Yeah, and you did it all from a 324 00:16:33,120 --> 00:16:38,280 Speaker 1: single like And I have to suspect the FBI is 325 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:42,320 Speaker 1: looking at this. They never I mean, it's policy, They're 326 00:16:42,360 --> 00:16:45,040 Speaker 1: never going to confirm that until the point at which 327 00:16:45,080 --> 00:16:47,760 Speaker 1: like it becomes there's it's a big enough story that 328 00:16:47,800 --> 00:16:50,480 Speaker 1: they kind of have to for pr reasons. But I 329 00:16:50,480 --> 00:16:53,080 Speaker 1: would be surprised if there was not an investigation at 330 00:16:53,120 --> 00:16:55,000 Speaker 1: the moment. Every couple days when one of these regional 331 00:16:55,040 --> 00:16:57,520 Speaker 1: stories comes out, you know, they'll quote the local FBI 332 00:16:57,560 --> 00:17:00,280 Speaker 1: field officing, you know, we're working with local authority EIS 333 00:17:00,360 --> 00:17:03,680 Speaker 1: to help them investing. The FBI is absolutely investigating this nationwide. 334 00:17:03,680 --> 00:17:06,479 Speaker 1: There's no chance that they're not. Yeah, it's it's too 335 00:17:06,520 --> 00:17:09,959 Speaker 1: it's too clear of a pattern, and it's not unprecedented, 336 00:17:10,080 --> 00:17:11,639 Speaker 1: right that a couple of years ago there was that 337 00:17:11,720 --> 00:17:13,840 Speaker 1: Adam Wofin swatting ring that those guys did go to 338 00:17:13,840 --> 00:17:16,000 Speaker 1: prison for. So it doesn't have to be a lot 339 00:17:16,040 --> 00:17:18,320 Speaker 1: of guys. This could just be a couple of people. 340 00:17:18,359 --> 00:17:20,040 Speaker 1: So you know, we're saying we're not seeing this leak 341 00:17:20,119 --> 00:17:22,000 Speaker 1: out anywhere, it's not being disgusting. Or it could just 342 00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:23,960 Speaker 1: be you know, three or four guys. It could be 343 00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:26,760 Speaker 1: for four people in a discord with some like auto 344 00:17:26,840 --> 00:17:30,879 Speaker 1: dialing apps that they've they've either coded, are found somewhere 345 00:17:30,920 --> 00:17:33,880 Speaker 1: on the internet, um, which if they if they are 346 00:17:34,000 --> 00:17:36,800 Speaker 1: using some sort of like program to do this that's 347 00:17:36,840 --> 00:17:40,440 Speaker 1: meant for I don't know, sketchy uh salesman or whatever. 348 00:17:40,520 --> 00:17:43,440 Speaker 1: There's a decent chance that's what brings them down, um 349 00:17:43,520 --> 00:17:47,520 Speaker 1: because all of that ship has terrible security, but um 350 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:51,120 Speaker 1: so does discord. I don't know, Like it'll be interesting 351 00:17:51,160 --> 00:17:53,639 Speaker 1: to see what happens here. I think one of the 352 00:17:53,760 --> 00:17:58,520 Speaker 1: questions for from the perspective certainly of like people listening, 353 00:17:58,680 --> 00:18:01,200 Speaker 1: what can be done here? Well? On a a local level, 354 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:04,960 Speaker 1: one thing people can fight for and advocate for especialty, 355 00:18:05,080 --> 00:18:07,879 Speaker 1: especially if you're involved in local government, is like I 356 00:18:07,920 --> 00:18:11,639 Speaker 1: would like to know every year, how many times the 357 00:18:11,680 --> 00:18:14,280 Speaker 1: police go to a school over a false report of 358 00:18:14,320 --> 00:18:17,399 Speaker 1: a shooting? Right? How many times are classrooms being cleared? 359 00:18:17,400 --> 00:18:20,280 Speaker 1: How many times are the cops showing up for this? Um? 360 00:18:20,280 --> 00:18:23,919 Speaker 1: Because that's important information, and that also should tailor the 361 00:18:23,960 --> 00:18:26,800 Speaker 1: way the police are being trained for this and the 362 00:18:26,840 --> 00:18:29,560 Speaker 1: ways like the there's a number of things that you 363 00:18:29,560 --> 00:18:32,399 Speaker 1: should be doing. If you know, hey, we had no 364 00:18:32,640 --> 00:18:34,679 Speaker 1: mass shootings this year, but the cops showed up with 365 00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:38,280 Speaker 1: guns drawn forty five times, right, that that should inform 366 00:18:38,400 --> 00:18:40,360 Speaker 1: the way you do things in the future in order 367 00:18:40,400 --> 00:18:42,880 Speaker 1: to minimize the trauma these kids go through. That's one 368 00:18:42,960 --> 00:18:45,280 Speaker 1: thing that is an immediate thing people can take and 369 00:18:45,280 --> 00:18:49,040 Speaker 1: that you can do, people can advocate for locally. But 370 00:18:49,119 --> 00:18:50,800 Speaker 1: it's I mean, it's a tough line here, right, because 371 00:18:50,840 --> 00:18:52,919 Speaker 1: you know, I think every district is really eager not 372 00:18:52,960 --> 00:18:55,320 Speaker 1: to be the next bal day police. Of course, so 373 00:18:55,400 --> 00:18:58,520 Speaker 1: showing up hot and heavy right in there, knocking down 374 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:01,320 Speaker 1: doors and pointing guns kids. You know that the video 375 00:19:01,359 --> 00:19:04,440 Speaker 1: that came out from that classroom in Houston, they frisked 376 00:19:04,560 --> 00:19:07,520 Speaker 1: several children at gunpoint. I'm not sure why that they 377 00:19:07,520 --> 00:19:09,359 Speaker 1: were sitting at their desks, they were obviously not committing 378 00:19:09,359 --> 00:19:12,320 Speaker 1: a mass shooting. Or in Denver on Monday, they evacuated 379 00:19:12,359 --> 00:19:14,320 Speaker 1: the whole school onto the football field with their hands 380 00:19:14,320 --> 00:19:17,879 Speaker 1: in the air, like necessarily horror, right, And you know, 381 00:19:18,119 --> 00:19:21,320 Speaker 1: even even as a police abolitionist and recognize that in 382 00:19:21,359 --> 00:19:24,440 Speaker 1: the system in which we currently live, there is no 383 00:19:24,520 --> 00:19:27,280 Speaker 1: response to a school shooting that does not involve the police. 384 00:19:27,520 --> 00:19:30,800 Speaker 1: That's right where we are. But are they are they 385 00:19:30,840 --> 00:19:33,600 Speaker 1: doing this smart? Yeah? As a as a rule, I 386 00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:36,560 Speaker 1: think everyone can agree that given the current realities of 387 00:19:36,560 --> 00:19:38,400 Speaker 1: the world we live in, if a guy is shooting 388 00:19:38,520 --> 00:19:43,000 Speaker 1: up a school or a lady, Um, it's good for 389 00:19:43,080 --> 00:19:45,679 Speaker 1: people with guns to come and stop them, and that 390 00:19:45,680 --> 00:19:48,960 Speaker 1: that's realistically going to be the police in our current system. 391 00:19:49,000 --> 00:19:50,880 Speaker 1: But that doesn't mean we can't be like, well, okay, 392 00:19:50,960 --> 00:19:54,600 Speaker 1: they came up fifty times falsely and traumatized all these 393 00:19:54,680 --> 00:19:57,320 Speaker 1: kids by pointing guns at them on the fucking football field. 394 00:19:57,600 --> 00:19:59,920 Speaker 1: We should change the way in which they're responding to 395 00:20:00,000 --> 00:20:03,719 Speaker 1: to these like that should be the default. These are 396 00:20:03,760 --> 00:20:06,199 Speaker 1: things people can lobby for at a local level that 397 00:20:06,240 --> 00:20:08,240 Speaker 1: will have an impact on at least the quality of 398 00:20:08,240 --> 00:20:11,679 Speaker 1: life for kids in the schools and for parents, you know, 399 00:20:11,800 --> 00:20:13,960 Speaker 1: like you know, in All Day there was the parent 400 00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:15,880 Speaker 1: who you know slipped around the police line and got 401 00:20:15,880 --> 00:20:19,080 Speaker 1: into the school and got her kid yesterday, no, two 402 00:20:19,119 --> 00:20:21,879 Speaker 1: days two days ago in San Antonio, they had a 403 00:20:22,040 --> 00:20:25,520 Speaker 1: you know, a hoax call. Somebody called in swatch showed up, uh, 404 00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:28,640 Speaker 1: and parents showed up because they got the emergency alert text. 405 00:20:28,680 --> 00:20:32,080 Speaker 1: So the parking lot fills with parents. A father punched 406 00:20:32,119 --> 00:20:34,880 Speaker 1: through a window, cut his arm up, and was hand 407 00:20:34,920 --> 00:20:37,119 Speaker 1: look tackled and handcuffed by the police because I just 408 00:20:37,119 --> 00:20:40,280 Speaker 1: wanted this fucking kid. Of course, this is gonna keep 409 00:20:40,280 --> 00:20:42,679 Speaker 1: playing out or here on Tuesday at the middle school, 410 00:20:42,720 --> 00:20:44,200 Speaker 1: you know, I was listening to my scanner. After the 411 00:20:44,240 --> 00:20:46,440 Speaker 1: you know, they cleared buildings, the police left, and then 412 00:20:46,480 --> 00:20:48,320 Speaker 1: a call came over the scanner and said, the school's 413 00:20:48,359 --> 00:20:51,120 Speaker 1: requesting that the police come back to handle the parents 414 00:20:52,280 --> 00:20:55,679 Speaker 1: because parents are angry. Of course they are. So how 415 00:20:55,680 --> 00:20:58,960 Speaker 1: do we how do we navigate this tension of yes, 416 00:20:59,240 --> 00:21:02,439 Speaker 1: we need police to respond if there is a school shooting. 417 00:21:03,359 --> 00:21:06,240 Speaker 1: But how do we as community communities navigate this space 418 00:21:06,280 --> 00:21:08,560 Speaker 1: where we also don't want them to point guns at 419 00:21:08,600 --> 00:21:12,119 Speaker 1: our kids. We don't we don't have a lot of 420 00:21:12,240 --> 00:21:14,480 Speaker 1: trust and communication with our police department. So I don't 421 00:21:14,480 --> 00:21:26,240 Speaker 1: know if that's a space we can navigate. This is 422 00:21:26,240 --> 00:21:28,360 Speaker 1: a problem that has to be adapted to. Right. There 423 00:21:28,440 --> 00:21:30,720 Speaker 1: is the potential you have this problem, right, which is 424 00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:33,840 Speaker 1: that it is apparently easy to weaponize the reporting system 425 00:21:33,880 --> 00:21:36,560 Speaker 1: for mass shootings. The problem that's compounded by the fact 426 00:21:36,560 --> 00:21:38,879 Speaker 1: that you can't ignore the risk of a mass shooting 427 00:21:38,920 --> 00:21:41,480 Speaker 1: because kids can die, people will get killed if you 428 00:21:41,560 --> 00:21:44,359 Speaker 1: are wrong about that. At the same time, it is 429 00:21:44,440 --> 00:21:47,080 Speaker 1: unreasonable to say that every single time one of these 430 00:21:47,080 --> 00:21:50,160 Speaker 1: reports happens, if the ratio is hundreds of false reports 431 00:21:50,240 --> 00:21:53,199 Speaker 1: to one actual shooting, every time it happens. You go 432 00:21:53,240 --> 00:21:55,120 Speaker 1: and you stick guns in the face of a bunch 433 00:21:55,119 --> 00:21:57,440 Speaker 1: of kids, and you traumatize all these parents who wind 434 00:21:57,520 --> 00:22:00,560 Speaker 1: up going crazy for understandable reasons. They're a way there 435 00:22:00,560 --> 00:22:03,159 Speaker 1: are structures that can be built into the system to 436 00:22:03,400 --> 00:22:06,040 Speaker 1: mitigate those harms at least, and I think that is, 437 00:22:07,040 --> 00:22:09,120 Speaker 1: you know, from the perspective of who is doing this 438 00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:11,119 Speaker 1: and how can they be stopped? That is a question 439 00:22:11,119 --> 00:22:14,560 Speaker 1: that will be answered either by law enforcement or by 440 00:22:14,600 --> 00:22:18,119 Speaker 1: independent researchers. But but that's that's a research problem, right, 441 00:22:18,160 --> 00:22:20,560 Speaker 1: that's a cracking case problem. My fear is that the 442 00:22:20,600 --> 00:22:24,880 Speaker 1: response to this will be um putting more cops in schools. Right. 443 00:22:24,960 --> 00:22:27,879 Speaker 1: It's you know, the Coppy school doesn't stop the school shooting. 444 00:22:27,920 --> 00:22:31,320 Speaker 1: We know that from you know, empirical evidence. Maybe in 445 00:22:31,359 --> 00:22:33,560 Speaker 1: several of these cases. You know, the news story says, 446 00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:37,000 Speaker 1: you know, Dispatch contacted the school resource officer who said, no, 447 00:22:37,080 --> 00:22:39,040 Speaker 1: I don't see anything. So is the solution going to 448 00:22:39,080 --> 00:22:41,760 Speaker 1: be put a guy in there who can look. Yeah, 449 00:22:41,800 --> 00:22:45,720 Speaker 1: and he's not gonna do anything, but he's gonna Charlottsville, 450 00:22:45,880 --> 00:22:48,800 Speaker 1: the city of Charletsville took our took school resource officers 451 00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:51,840 Speaker 1: out of schools last year, two years ago, time scaped now. 452 00:22:52,480 --> 00:22:56,600 Speaker 1: So my my fear is that even people who applauded 453 00:22:56,640 --> 00:22:59,600 Speaker 1: that decision will at this point say, maybe we should 454 00:22:59,640 --> 00:23:01,560 Speaker 1: put them at Maybe we need a guy in there 455 00:23:01,640 --> 00:23:04,960 Speaker 1: with a direct line to dispatch. Yeah, and I and 456 00:23:05,000 --> 00:23:06,960 Speaker 1: maybe we do. I don't don't think they need to 457 00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:08,600 Speaker 1: have It needs to be a man with a gun 458 00:23:08,640 --> 00:23:11,520 Speaker 1: who has the ability to arrest children, right having having 459 00:23:11,560 --> 00:23:14,200 Speaker 1: a first responder on scene at every school who can 460 00:23:14,240 --> 00:23:16,600 Speaker 1: be the yes, there actually is a shooting, or no, 461 00:23:16,720 --> 00:23:19,679 Speaker 1: there's not. Maybe a se medical training is perhaps a 462 00:23:19,720 --> 00:23:22,360 Speaker 1: different thing that could happen, rather than let's put more 463 00:23:22,440 --> 00:23:25,119 Speaker 1: armed men in schools, right like that, That's not an 464 00:23:25,160 --> 00:23:28,639 Speaker 1: inherently unreasonable proposition. But I don't know. I don't know 465 00:23:28,680 --> 00:23:30,960 Speaker 1: that police are going to be receptive to the idea. 466 00:23:31,320 --> 00:23:33,399 Speaker 1: Let's ask some questions first, right Because as I was 467 00:23:33,440 --> 00:23:35,119 Speaker 1: listening to the scanner again, you know, I have the 468 00:23:35,119 --> 00:23:38,320 Speaker 1: most information about the two incidents is that were in 469 00:23:38,359 --> 00:23:41,000 Speaker 1: my neighborhood. Um, I was listening to the scanner on Tuesday, 470 00:23:41,080 --> 00:23:43,480 Speaker 1: and it takes time for cops to arrive at a scene, 471 00:23:43,520 --> 00:23:46,800 Speaker 1: even in a relatively small town. By the time they 472 00:23:46,840 --> 00:23:49,520 Speaker 1: had dispatched this response to the scene. They had already 473 00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:52,359 Speaker 1: spoken to the principle over the fall. They already knew 474 00:23:52,400 --> 00:23:56,760 Speaker 1: this was not true. We'll see, And there's another solvable problem, 475 00:23:56,760 --> 00:23:59,720 Speaker 1: because if you're if you're having guys with guns still 476 00:23:59,760 --> 00:24:02,439 Speaker 1: show up because it's policy. When someone at the school 477 00:24:02,440 --> 00:24:05,760 Speaker 1: has said no, there's not a shooting, well that's again, 478 00:24:05,800 --> 00:24:08,439 Speaker 1: that is a problem that can be altered or that 479 00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:12,040 Speaker 1: can be fixed to mitigate harm. That seems pretty simple, 480 00:24:12,080 --> 00:24:14,320 Speaker 1: which is be like, well, maybe if somebody at this 481 00:24:14,560 --> 00:24:17,720 Speaker 1: maybe if the school's principle says no, nothing is happening here, 482 00:24:17,920 --> 00:24:20,160 Speaker 1: you don't send the gun guys. Maybe you still send 483 00:24:20,200 --> 00:24:23,160 Speaker 1: a squad car to check it out for die hard purposes. 484 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:25,600 Speaker 1: I'm sure we all remember what that movie has to 485 00:24:25,600 --> 00:24:28,919 Speaker 1: say about these kinds of problems. But um, you know, 486 00:24:29,000 --> 00:24:33,800 Speaker 1: I I there's a lot that can be done with 487 00:24:33,840 --> 00:24:35,840 Speaker 1: the information that this is a problem, And to a 488 00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:41,320 Speaker 1: certain extent, I think I'm hopeful that once this kind 489 00:24:41,359 --> 00:24:43,680 Speaker 1: of blows up, and I'm certain this well, I'm certain 490 00:24:43,720 --> 00:24:45,600 Speaker 1: that maybe even by the time this launches, there will 491 00:24:45,600 --> 00:24:48,240 Speaker 1: be some big national stories about this, because this is 492 00:24:48,440 --> 00:24:51,399 Speaker 1: this is a really substantial problem. Very obviously is a 493 00:24:51,440 --> 00:24:55,960 Speaker 1: substantial problem. Um. I hope that one of the things 494 00:24:55,960 --> 00:25:00,240 Speaker 1: that does is perhaps lead to the authorities take king 495 00:25:00,320 --> 00:25:03,560 Speaker 1: swatting and threats of swatting and communities that engage in 496 00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:06,280 Speaker 1: swatting much more seriously, because by god, they have not 497 00:25:06,400 --> 00:25:09,840 Speaker 1: so far, and it's not the laws about it are 498 00:25:09,880 --> 00:25:12,720 Speaker 1: not super consistent state to state that you know, there's 499 00:25:12,760 --> 00:25:14,919 Speaker 1: been some attempts on the federal level to make you know, 500 00:25:15,040 --> 00:25:18,040 Speaker 1: blanket legislation about this specific because you know, it's it's 501 00:25:18,040 --> 00:25:19,720 Speaker 1: illegal to make a false report to the police, it's 502 00:25:19,720 --> 00:25:21,480 Speaker 1: illegal to make, you know, a false nine one one call, 503 00:25:21,760 --> 00:25:26,040 Speaker 1: but to specifically and intentionally weaponize an armed police response 504 00:25:26,080 --> 00:25:29,000 Speaker 1: because you hope it will hurt someone. In most states, 505 00:25:29,080 --> 00:25:32,560 Speaker 1: isn't its own crime, right, Like, and I think in 506 00:25:32,600 --> 00:25:36,000 Speaker 1: California they have specific legislation that like, you can be charred, 507 00:25:36,040 --> 00:25:40,240 Speaker 1: like financially responsible for whatever it costs to have that response. Like, 508 00:25:40,680 --> 00:25:45,159 Speaker 1: there's not uniform agreement that this is a separate crime. 509 00:25:45,200 --> 00:25:47,240 Speaker 1: This is a separate harm that should be punished in 510 00:25:47,240 --> 00:25:49,640 Speaker 1: a specific way. And maybe maybe we'll get that out 511 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:52,240 Speaker 1: of this. I don't know that that solves it, but again, 512 00:25:52,240 --> 00:25:54,159 Speaker 1: it will, Like you were saying, that this is a 513 00:25:54,200 --> 00:25:58,119 Speaker 1: lower barrier to entry crime. But if you up the punishment, 514 00:25:58,160 --> 00:26:03,359 Speaker 1: maybe the threshold to just to do it goes up. Yeah. Yeah, again, 515 00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:06,840 Speaker 1: I think there's there's a variety of things that can 516 00:26:06,880 --> 00:26:09,000 Speaker 1: be done. So now that we know this is a problem, 517 00:26:09,000 --> 00:26:10,359 Speaker 1: and one of the reasons why I think this is 518 00:26:10,400 --> 00:26:12,080 Speaker 1: important for us to cover on a show like this 519 00:26:12,160 --> 00:26:14,119 Speaker 1: is a lot of these are problems that can at 520 00:26:14,200 --> 00:26:16,719 Speaker 1: least be mitigated at the local level. Right, you do 521 00:26:16,840 --> 00:26:20,119 Speaker 1: have power if you're involving yourself in local politics to 522 00:26:20,200 --> 00:26:22,320 Speaker 1: do things like advocate for a system in which you 523 00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:24,439 Speaker 1: track how often this is happening, to do things like 524 00:26:24,520 --> 00:26:27,920 Speaker 1: advocate for changes in how the school handles this sort 525 00:26:27,960 --> 00:26:30,080 Speaker 1: of thing like that is a thing that you that 526 00:26:30,160 --> 00:26:34,520 Speaker 1: people can handle locally, um, and that is you'll get 527 00:26:34,520 --> 00:26:37,159 Speaker 1: a faster response handling it locally as well than you 528 00:26:37,200 --> 00:26:39,560 Speaker 1: will trying to advocate for some sort of big national 529 00:26:39,600 --> 00:26:42,560 Speaker 1: swatting law and you're gonna get You're going to get 530 00:26:42,760 --> 00:26:47,080 Speaker 1: faster and better results changing local departmental policy than you 531 00:26:47,119 --> 00:26:49,680 Speaker 1: will getting any law that changes how the police be 532 00:26:50,720 --> 00:26:54,960 Speaker 1: highly unlikely. Yeah, And so I I think this is important. 533 00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:56,800 Speaker 1: I think it's important for people to engage with this 534 00:26:57,359 --> 00:26:59,879 Speaker 1: from the perspective of, like, we don't know why the 535 00:27:00,160 --> 00:27:02,040 Speaker 1: is happening or who is doing it yet, and it 536 00:27:02,080 --> 00:27:04,320 Speaker 1: maybe a while before I'm certain we will find out. 537 00:27:04,320 --> 00:27:07,280 Speaker 1: At some point these people will get caught, but um, 538 00:27:07,320 --> 00:27:10,639 Speaker 1: it almost doesn't matter because the system is so easy 539 00:27:10,680 --> 00:27:15,199 Speaker 1: to weaponize. The solution is to try to find ways 540 00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:20,159 Speaker 1: to make it less harmful without reducing the ability of 541 00:27:20,359 --> 00:27:22,720 Speaker 1: people with guns to show up if they need to 542 00:27:22,720 --> 00:27:25,560 Speaker 1: to stop someone who's murdering kids. Right, those are the 543 00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:27,960 Speaker 1: two things that need to be done, not reduce the 544 00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:30,520 Speaker 1: efficacy of the system, which is not very good to 545 00:27:30,560 --> 00:27:33,720 Speaker 1: be honest at stopping mass shootings, and and it's pissport 546 00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:35,520 Speaker 1: at that, so it would be hard to make it worse. 547 00:27:35,560 --> 00:27:37,879 Speaker 1: I will say when people talk about, well, what happens 548 00:27:37,880 --> 00:27:40,119 Speaker 1: if they well, they're bad at it now. They're terrible 549 00:27:40,160 --> 00:27:43,159 Speaker 1: at it now. So it's not like I'm not worried 550 00:27:43,160 --> 00:27:48,000 Speaker 1: about making a change to like mitigate the response of swattings, 551 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:51,399 Speaker 1: in this instance, harming kids, because as it is, the 552 00:27:51,480 --> 00:27:54,480 Speaker 1: system almost never saves them when there is an actual 553 00:27:54,520 --> 00:27:58,080 Speaker 1: mass shooting. So simply reducing the amount of time that 554 00:27:58,200 --> 00:28:02,720 Speaker 1: kids have cops pull guns on them and these false reports. Um, 555 00:28:02,800 --> 00:28:07,840 Speaker 1: that's more of a priority to me than anything else. Um. Yeah, 556 00:28:08,040 --> 00:28:10,000 Speaker 1: when when we're talking about the issue of swatting and 557 00:28:10,320 --> 00:28:12,399 Speaker 1: I think there again, there's just there's things that can 558 00:28:12,440 --> 00:28:14,680 Speaker 1: be done there Molly, is there anything else you wanted 559 00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:18,159 Speaker 1: to get to on this on this subject? No, I 560 00:28:18,200 --> 00:28:20,919 Speaker 1: think that covers it. I just this is still happening. 561 00:28:20,920 --> 00:28:24,199 Speaker 1: It's happening today like it's it is still ongoing. This 562 00:28:24,280 --> 00:28:26,520 Speaker 1: phenomenon is ongoing, and I think it will continue to 563 00:28:26,520 --> 00:28:28,560 Speaker 1: build until it hits a breaking point. Like you said, 564 00:28:28,600 --> 00:28:31,240 Speaker 1: I definitely think some of these people will be caught, 565 00:28:32,840 --> 00:28:34,480 Speaker 1: But I don't know what that changes, right, Like once 566 00:28:34,480 --> 00:28:36,639 Speaker 1: this breaks containment, once people see that this is a 567 00:28:36,720 --> 00:28:40,880 Speaker 1: thing that they could do. Yeah, yeah, do we do 568 00:28:41,000 --> 00:28:43,440 Speaker 1: we deal with a wave of this before it gets 569 00:28:43,560 --> 00:28:46,920 Speaker 1: under control that gets even bigger? Or is that what's 570 00:28:46,920 --> 00:28:50,080 Speaker 1: actually happening right now? I don't know. And when does 571 00:28:50,080 --> 00:28:52,440 Speaker 1: this When does this, I don't know desensitize people to 572 00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:55,600 Speaker 1: the idea of these threats. Yeah, I don't know. I 573 00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:59,240 Speaker 1: don't know. But no kids get shot. I hope no 574 00:28:59,360 --> 00:29:03,680 Speaker 1: kids get If you're a journalist and you're trying to 575 00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:08,120 Speaker 1: you are trying to report on this in some sort 576 00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:12,600 Speaker 1: of concerted way. Uh, you can find Molly on Twitter 577 00:29:12,640 --> 00:29:16,520 Speaker 1: and socialist stuck Mom. She's she's riding most of your 578 00:29:16,600 --> 00:29:20,600 Speaker 1: article for you. You can stee like. But I think 579 00:29:20,720 --> 00:29:22,960 Speaker 1: there are journalists listening to this. I think it's important 580 00:29:23,000 --> 00:29:26,600 Speaker 1: to tell them ask the right questions right, like when 581 00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:28,800 Speaker 1: you're you know, when you're getting your three questions into 582 00:29:28,800 --> 00:29:32,000 Speaker 1: the press conference with the local shriff's office, ask specifically 583 00:29:32,720 --> 00:29:35,480 Speaker 1: where did the call come in? What number was dialed 584 00:29:35,480 --> 00:29:39,200 Speaker 1: by the caller? Right? Because I don't think these are 585 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:40,800 Speaker 1: nine one one calls. I think people are using nine 586 00:29:40,920 --> 00:29:42,840 Speaker 1: one in shorthand, So asked where the call came from, 587 00:29:43,440 --> 00:29:46,560 Speaker 1: the substance of the call, because I think, I imagine 588 00:29:46,560 --> 00:29:48,760 Speaker 1: that some of these calls are verbatim and we just 589 00:29:48,840 --> 00:29:51,360 Speaker 1: don't know that. I think some of them are probably identical, 590 00:29:51,360 --> 00:29:53,240 Speaker 1: and we just don't have a way of It's hard 591 00:29:53,280 --> 00:29:56,200 Speaker 1: to connect the dots when the police won't tell us. Um. 592 00:29:56,240 --> 00:29:57,920 Speaker 1: So I think if you know, if journalists are listening, 593 00:29:58,840 --> 00:30:01,360 Speaker 1: ask more questions then you got in the press release. 594 00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:04,280 Speaker 1: That's critical because if there were if there was a 595 00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:07,840 Speaker 1: if there was a Virginia State like repository where every 596 00:30:07,840 --> 00:30:10,080 Speaker 1: time we get a false swatting attempt against the school, 597 00:30:10,440 --> 00:30:14,560 Speaker 1: we report when it came in, who was called, and 598 00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:17,360 Speaker 1: what was said over the call, right, Um, all of 599 00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:19,520 Speaker 1: which are things that they could pretty easily get because 600 00:30:19,520 --> 00:30:22,520 Speaker 1: this ship is always recorded. Um. I don't know that 601 00:30:22,520 --> 00:30:25,080 Speaker 1: that's true though, and that's that's another sort of tactical 602 00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:28,600 Speaker 1: nine one one call. But if you call the front 603 00:30:28,600 --> 00:30:30,840 Speaker 1: desk at the police station, it probably isn't. That is 604 00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:33,800 Speaker 1: a fucking good point, um. In any case, that is 605 00:30:33,840 --> 00:30:35,480 Speaker 1: another thing that could be dealt with, because then you 606 00:30:35,520 --> 00:30:37,400 Speaker 1: would at least be able to see, Oh, there's forty 607 00:30:37,440 --> 00:30:40,120 Speaker 1: swatting attempts in the state in the last five days, 608 00:30:40,600 --> 00:30:43,880 Speaker 1: and thirty eight of them it was the exact same script. 609 00:30:43,920 --> 00:30:46,080 Speaker 1: There's probably a single source of this that we should 610 00:30:46,120 --> 00:30:49,080 Speaker 1: be like looking at, um, and that can help not 611 00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:53,120 Speaker 1: just law enforcement who's generally bad at these sort of investigations, 612 00:30:53,160 --> 00:30:55,600 Speaker 1: but people like you who are good at these sort 613 00:30:55,600 --> 00:30:58,720 Speaker 1: of investigations and can maybe then start doing keyword searches 614 00:30:58,840 --> 00:31:01,400 Speaker 1: and figure out where the fun this stuff is originating from, 615 00:31:01,440 --> 00:31:05,960 Speaker 1: if it's anywhere on the semi open internet. Um. Again, things, 616 00:31:06,040 --> 00:31:08,560 Speaker 1: there's a lot to be done to respond to this 617 00:31:08,640 --> 00:31:12,440 Speaker 1: problem that that doesn't start with like throwing more cops 618 00:31:12,480 --> 00:31:15,080 Speaker 1: at it or or or whatever. Like. There's there's a 619 00:31:15,160 --> 00:31:18,719 Speaker 1: number of different problems that this is revealed. Um, so 620 00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:24,440 Speaker 1: hopefully those get solved anyway, Molly, you got anything else 621 00:31:24,440 --> 00:31:28,840 Speaker 1: in the plug before we go? Oh, defund your local 622 00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:33,840 Speaker 1: police department, subscribe your local newspaper. Sure, um, and uh 623 00:31:34,840 --> 00:31:38,120 Speaker 1: yeah if if you're at a school right now, good 624 00:31:38,160 --> 00:31:44,640 Speaker 1: good luck those kids. Yeah, they are really the kids 625 00:31:44,680 --> 00:31:47,920 Speaker 1: these days are dealing with a lot. Um. I'm I'm 626 00:31:47,960 --> 00:31:50,680 Speaker 1: I'm more grateful every year that my my childhood was 627 00:31:50,680 --> 00:31:53,680 Speaker 1: as uneventful as it was, because, boy, howdy is it 628 00:31:53,760 --> 00:31:56,880 Speaker 1: rough to be a student today? And they still have 629 00:31:56,960 --> 00:32:00,920 Speaker 1: to take their test teach your fucking tests. Yeah, they 630 00:32:00,920 --> 00:32:02,520 Speaker 1: have to go to school. They got to read The 631 00:32:02,560 --> 00:32:08,240 Speaker 1: Great Gatsby while this is going on. Unbelievable. Um, sorry kids. 632 00:32:12,920 --> 00:32:15,280 Speaker 1: It could happen here as a production of cool Zone Media. 633 00:32:15,520 --> 00:32:18,200 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 634 00:32:18,200 --> 00:32:20,320 Speaker 1: cool zone media dot com, or check us out on 635 00:32:20,360 --> 00:32:22,920 Speaker 1: the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 636 00:32:22,960 --> 00:32:25,760 Speaker 1: listen to podcasts. You can find sources for It could 637 00:32:25,760 --> 00:32:28,760 Speaker 1: Happen Here, Updated monthly at cool zone, media dot com, 638 00:32:28,800 --> 00:32:30,720 Speaker 1: slash sources, thanks for listening.