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Speaker 1: Fellow conspiracy realist. We're returning to you with a tale

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Speaker 1: of with a little bit of synchronicity here. We recently

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Speaker 1: received an excellent piece of correspondence from our fellow conspiracy

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Speaker 1: realist that we'll call J and Jay. You asked us

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Speaker 1: about nuclear experiments in Mississippi. Most people have heard about

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Speaker 1: Three Mile Island, but what about other nuclear tests on

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Speaker 1: US soil. Now, as we were researching your question here,

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Speaker 1: we were struck by a moment of deja vu. Things

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Speaker 1: seemed very familiar, and lo and behold, we did an

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Speaker 1: entire episode about this debacle back in twenty twenty. Do

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Speaker 1: you guys remember this one salt domes.

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Speaker 2: See, when the US government was doing a lot of

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Speaker 2: experiments blowing up nuclear weapons, hydrogen bombs, atom bombs, all

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Speaker 2: those things, they tended to do it out in the

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Speaker 2: desert way in the west of the US. But the

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Speaker 2: thing we're going to talk about today is the only

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Speaker 2: place this area, this thing also known as the Salmon

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Speaker 2: Test Site. It's the only place east of the Mississippi

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Speaker 2: that the US government has ever detonated a nuclear device.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and they did it on purpose, and they did

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Speaker 1: it without repercussions or consequence. It's a real conspiracy and Jay,

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Speaker 1: your timing is impeccable. We hope you, as well as

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Speaker 1: all our fellow listeners enjoy this. When so, without further ado,

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Speaker 1: let's drop it like drop it like a bomb. Oh

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Speaker 1: my god.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies, history is

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Speaker 3: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 3: learn this stuff they don't want you to know.

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Speaker 1: A production of.

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Speaker 2: iHeartRadio, Welcome back to the show. My name is Matt

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Speaker 2: Noel is on Adventures.

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Speaker 1: And we'll be returning soon. They call me Ben. We're

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Speaker 1: joined as always with our super producer Paul mission control deck,

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Speaker 1: and most importantly, you are you. You are here and

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Speaker 1: that makes this stuff they don't want you to know. Matt.

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Speaker 1: You know, I was having a bit of a uncharacteristic

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Speaker 1: wave of nostalgia over this past weekend and before we

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Speaker 1: went on air. It's weird because it seemed like once

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Speaker 1: again you were reading my mind when you talked about

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Speaker 1: our YouTube channel. It's strange when you think that, like

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Speaker 1: we used to do so many videos.

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Speaker 2: I know that it consumed our lives for several years there,

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Speaker 2: both before and after we got our own channel, which

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Speaker 2: by the way, is YouTube dot com slash conspiracy stuff.

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Speaker 2: If you haven't checked it out recently, you should go

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Speaker 2: check it out. And we'd actually like for you to

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Speaker 2: run a little test for us. Use your favorite internet

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Speaker 2: search engine, perhaps a Duck duck go perhaps Google, Yahoo, whatever,

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Speaker 2: and search for stuff they don't want you to know

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Speaker 2: YouTube and see what comes up. Because we found, at

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Speaker 2: least on our end, that Google seems to have forgotten

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Speaker 2: about our channel.

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Speaker 1: Which is you know, it's kind of flattering to imagine

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Speaker 1: that that channel, which has been inactive for a while,

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Speaker 1: at least up to now. It's kind of flattering to

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Speaker 1: imagine an entity as large as Google would care about that,

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Speaker 1: you know. To me, that indicates that we were doing

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Speaker 1: something right.

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Speaker 2: Now granted, well, we were either doing something right or

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Speaker 2: you know, they're categorizing us in the same way as

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Speaker 2: some of these other people who have been taken off

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Speaker 2: of YouTube and other platforms recently.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, you know, I predict that as things become more

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Speaker 1: unstable in the near to mid future, we're going to

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Speaker 1: see increasingly heavy handed use of censorship and surveillance powers.

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Speaker 1: But that is to tweak the old figure of speech

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Speaker 1: that's a bridge we'll burn when we get there, you

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Speaker 1: know what I mean. For now, I've got to say

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Speaker 1: I'm tremendously grateful for every one of our fellow listeners

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Speaker 1: who's been writing to us and telling us about all

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Speaker 1: these strange things that aren't making it into the news.

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Speaker 1: For years and years, you and I have always wanted

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Speaker 1: to cover the things that are just off the edge

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Speaker 1: of the mainstream map, the things that the regions of

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Speaker 1: the map where cartographers of old would draw some serpents

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Speaker 1: and say here be dragon, and things that are just

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Speaker 1: like outside the pool of the street light. And we've

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Speaker 1: only been able to do it this long because we

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Speaker 1: have help from the best part of the show, which

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Speaker 1: is specifically you. So what better way to put our

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Speaker 1: money where our mouth is then to explore an episode

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Speaker 1: topic brought to us by one of our fellow listeners.

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Speaker 2: That is correct, one of you, who hopefully is listening

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Speaker 2: to this episode send us a little voice message and

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Speaker 2: it goes a little something like this.

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Speaker 4: And Noel, this is word life in Miami.

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Speaker 2: That's a question.

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Speaker 4: And you don't think the thought that me joggle is

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Speaker 4: a tope on because it's found its own sentience that

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Speaker 4: it's there that there is something to it. Also, look

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Speaker 4: at potato salt.

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Speaker 2: See yeah, okay, first thing here. Weird Wes, and we

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Speaker 2: did not do this on purpose. Ben and I did

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Speaker 2: not discuss this prior to recording this episode. You just

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Speaker 2: asked if Google was a tulpa of some sort, some

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Speaker 2: kind of thought form that had sentience that could act

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Speaker 2: on its own. We did not. I I don't know

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Speaker 2: if Ben, if you listened to that voicemail right before

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Speaker 2: this or something. I didn't do this on purpose. Now

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Speaker 2: I'm thinking the tulpa that is Google is trying to

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Speaker 2: bring us down from a YouTube standpoint.

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Speaker 1: At least, I'm fascinated by the idea. For anyone who

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Speaker 1: is unfamiliar to tulpa is this concept that a life

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Speaker 1: form can exist without a physical body, a sentient thought

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Speaker 1: or collection of thoughts, or an algorithm. So you know,

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Speaker 1: in a way, a software program that reaches the level

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Speaker 1: of machine consciousness could be a tulpa. And you know,

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Speaker 1: the actation of algorithms that our Google could in some

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Speaker 1: ways be considered a tulpa. I've got a really weird

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Speaker 1: uh story. I'll have to I'll have to send you

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Speaker 1: off air. I've been writing a bunch of garbage. But

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Speaker 1: I've got a really weird story about a world in

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Speaker 1: which emotions shared between two or more people can become sentient,

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Speaker 1: and it's it's totally it's a Tulpa situation. I started

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Speaker 1: off trying to write it as a rom com, but

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Speaker 1: I'm terrible at rom com, so it became yet another

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Speaker 1: horror story. But you're right, You're right, Matt. It's a

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Speaker 1: fascinating concept, and it's a concept that we have, I believe,

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Speaker 1: explored in the past a little bit. But there was

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Speaker 1: one thing Wes said, one thing you said weird Wes

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Speaker 1: in Wyoming that I think Matt and I really like,

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Speaker 1: really tuned into because it was something that we had

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Speaker 1: never heard of, which is admittedly, I don't want to

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Speaker 1: say rare, but it's admittedly uncommon for us.

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Speaker 2: That is correct, that little thing, a little throwaway you

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Speaker 2: had at the end of the message that just said, hey,

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Speaker 2: look in look into the Tatum salt mines. Bye. Uh yeah, dude.

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Speaker 2: But Ben and I both and Noel actually we all

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Speaker 2: just went, wait, what is that? And we started using

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Speaker 2: Google the Tulpa now that we've established that to search, uh,

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Speaker 2: to search things about it, and my goodness, we found

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Speaker 2: an entire episode hidden deep within those salt mines.

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Speaker 1: M and I like, I liked the waxing poetic there

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Speaker 1: at the end of that. It's true on multiple levels.

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Speaker 1: Today's episode is inspired by you, Weird Wes and Wyoming.

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Speaker 1: You contacted us about a strange, largely unknown event that

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Speaker 1: occurred right here in the good old us of A.

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Speaker 1: It's a bit of hidden history. It's a story the

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Speaker 1: Jedi won't tell you. It concerns one of the most powerful,

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Speaker 1: one of the dangerous forces ever wielded by human hands,

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Speaker 1: nuclear power. Here are the facts.

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Speaker 2: Before we jump into this, I just want to point

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Speaker 2: out that Ben, you and nol got to do a

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Speaker 2: bit of a nuclear story while I was out recently,

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Speaker 2: and now Nola's out and you and I get to

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Speaker 2: do a nuclear story, and I'm liking this. That's true.

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Speaker 1: That's true, and they're very They're very different as well, but.

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Speaker 2: Disturbing, absolutely. So one of the major things here as

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Speaker 2: we begin into the facts is just to talk about

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Speaker 2: nuclear power within the United States. And you know, I

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Speaker 2: would I would wager that there are several of you

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Speaker 2: out there listening who remember the protesting that occurred within

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Speaker 2: this country when nuclear power plants were beginning to be

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Speaker 2: constructed across the states in various places that were deemed

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Speaker 2: to be you know, good places for these things because

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Speaker 2: they were safer there, you know. But like a lot

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Speaker 2: of the other protests that have occurred for various things

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Speaker 2: in this country across time, they you know, appear to

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Speaker 2: have done very little and actually preventing things from happening,

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Speaker 2: and in this case, nuclear power plants from being built

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Speaker 2: and or nuclear tests from being run. And a lot

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Speaker 2: of this is because there are some tremendously beneficial things

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Speaker 2: that can come from something like nuclear power that you know,

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Speaker 2: isn't just your traditional burning of coal or other fossil

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Speaker 2: fuels or natural gases or something like that. And these benefits,

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Speaker 2: many times, let's say almost all the time, are going

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Speaker 2: to outweigh the dangers, at least if you're looking at

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Speaker 2: it from a monetary standpoint, from a clean energy standpoint

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Speaker 2: or a cleanish energy standpoint, and you know, the dollar signs,

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Speaker 2: really that's what speaks to the most benefits, right.

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Speaker 1: Yes, make no mistake, the vast majority of large scale

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Speaker 1: actions that occur like this, especially in the energy industry,

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Speaker 1: are the results of a cost benefit calculation the same

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Speaker 1: way that we all individually use cost benefit logic in

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Speaker 1: our own daily lives. This just affects people in many,

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Speaker 1: many unforeseen ways. So the protesters failed. Let's just be honest,

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Speaker 1: the protesters failed. According to the World Nuclear Association, as

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Speaker 1: of now twenty twenty, the United States is the world's

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Speaker 1: largest producer of nuclear power a single country out of

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Speaker 1: the one hundred and ninety three ish countries in the world.

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Speaker 1: It produces more than thirty percent of all of the

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Speaker 1: nuclear generated electricity on the planet, full stop. And this

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Speaker 1: is the result of a concerted effort that goes across

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Speaker 1: both sides of the political divide in the US. Multiple

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Speaker 1: companies are on board with it, even if they compete

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Speaker 1: with each other. Government policy changes since about the late

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Speaker 1: nineteen nineties paved the way for a significant rise in

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Speaker 1: nuclear capacity, and as of now, Uncle Sam officially has

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Speaker 1: ninety eight nuclear power centers. They're across thirty states, and

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Speaker 1: they're operated by a group of around thirty maybe more

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Speaker 1: different power companies.

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Speaker 2: And just like Ben You and Noel discovered when covering

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Speaker 2: the Santa Susanna experiment recently that occurred out in California,

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Speaker 2: where some of this nuclear power was being generated and

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Speaker 2: tested to see if there are new ways to generate

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Speaker 2: the power, and something went wrong. We have to remember

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Speaker 2: that these things, if something does go wrong, the consequences

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Speaker 2: are massive. Right. So it's that's when you're getting back

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Speaker 2: into that cost benefit analysis. A nuclear power can be terrifying.

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Speaker 2: There's we're going to look right here at words from

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Speaker 2: an author Benjamin k Sova cool He wrote a Critical

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Speaker 2: Evaluation of Nuclear power and Renewable Electricity in Asia. It

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Speaker 2: was written in twenty ten. This guy says that there

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Speaker 2: have been at least fifty six nuclear reactor accidents within

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Speaker 2: the United States. That seems like more than I've heard of, right,

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Speaker 2: So you know what he's saying is that there are

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Speaker 2: there's a large scale here in what could be called

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Speaker 2: a nuclear accident, right because the definition it covers a

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Speaker 2: wide range of things that could go wrong and that

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Speaker 2: have go wrong. But there are some commonalities here with

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Speaker 2: all fifty six of these that Benjamin is pointing to.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, absolutely, the these fifty six accidents, again, that's

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Speaker 1: a huge number.

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Speaker 2: By the way, these.

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Speaker 1: Fifty accidents, fifty six accidents all have two things in common.

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Speaker 1: They either resulted in an immediate loss of human life,

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Speaker 1: and the media is important there we'll see why, or

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Speaker 1: they cause more than fifty thousand dollars US worth of

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Speaker 1: property damage. That last part's very interesting to me because

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Speaker 1: fifty thousand dollars is far more than the average US

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Speaker 1: resident is going to have on hand right just to

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Speaker 1: pull out and use. But it's also a cartoonishly low

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Speaker 1: threshold when we consider the overall cost of specialized nuclear equipment,

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Speaker 1: particularly because that specialized equipment is inevitably going to be

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Speaker 1: some of the first stuff damaged when things go south.

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Speaker 1: And you know, again you should be weirded out by

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Speaker 1: that how high that number is of proven nuclear incidents

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Speaker 1: in the US nuclear meltdowns, disasters, malfunctions. But there's one

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Speaker 1: you're definitely familiar with. It's one that Nol and I

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Speaker 1: mentioned in our previous episode, and that is Three Mile Island.

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Speaker 1: Three Mile Island, for a quick recap, was a partial

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Speaker 1: core meltdown at the Three Mile Island Nuclear plant on

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Speaker 1: March twenty eighth, nineteen seventy nine. And it, you know,

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Speaker 1: it's safe to say it exceeded that fifty thousand dollars threshold.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, the cleanup costs alone ranged somewhere within the billion dollars,

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Speaker 2: like as in Doctor Evil one billion dollars and an

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Speaker 2: estimated total of two point four billion dollars in property

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Speaker 2: damage that was done because as a result of this accident,

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Speaker 2: and you know, over the years, in various forms of reporting,

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Speaker 2: you're going to hear all kinds of different claims about

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Speaker 2: the health effects, both short term and long term of

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Speaker 2: this disaster, but officially, a lot of experts note that

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Speaker 2: the health effects are of a very low level, like

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Speaker 2: as in, you know, not much bad really happened on

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Speaker 2: a human level because of Three Mile Island. Guys, we're

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Speaker 2: going to reassure you, just to let you know everything's okay,

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Speaker 2: You're gonna be okay, your family's gonna be fine.

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Speaker 1: Not everyone agrees, of course, because you know, even as

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Speaker 1: recently as nineteen seventy nine, there there was a lot

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Speaker 1: of debate about the possible long term ramifications of these

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Speaker 1: sorts of disasters, you know, or the possible long term

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Speaker 1: consequences to the life forms in their vicinity. Again officially, right,

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Speaker 1: this is all officially, and that's the problem with nuclear

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Speaker 1: reporting in general. Right. We threw out a couple numbers,

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Speaker 1: just a few minutes ago. But if you remember only

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Speaker 1: one of those numbers, remember this, when fifty six incidents,

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Speaker 1: more than fifty times in this country, nuclear power almost

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Speaker 1: or did go disastrously wrong. And even today, there's stuff

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Speaker 1: the US does not want you to know when it

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Speaker 1: comes to nuclear power.

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Speaker 2: And there's certainly stuff they don't want you to know

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Speaker 2: when it's turned from generating nuclear power to detonating nuclear

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Speaker 2: weapons within the United States. What could go wrong if

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Speaker 2: we did that.

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Speaker 1: We'll find out after a word from our sponsor. Here's

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Speaker 1: where it gets crazy. So here's the issue with nuclear technology.

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Speaker 1: One of the many issues nuclear technology is dual use.

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Speaker 1: We've talked about this before. It's one of the great

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Speaker 1: dilemmas in geopolitics. Please don't fall asleep just because we

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Speaker 1: said cheopology. Essentially, the same stuff you have to do

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Speaker 1: to create nuclear power is the same stuff you have

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Speaker 1: to do to make nuclear weapons. Not very many efficient

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Speaker 1: ways to tell the difference between a country's aim here,

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Speaker 1: because there's not really a difference in what you need

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Speaker 1: to do and what you need to have.

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Speaker 2: It's just how long you keep those centrifuges running, right, Really,

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Speaker 2: what it is, That's what it amounts to right.

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Speaker 1: It's a matter of iteration. That's that's really the only difference.

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Speaker 1: Like imagine if you were this might be a little

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Speaker 1: bit too off the grid for some of us, but

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Speaker 1: imagine if you were churning butter and after you know,

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Speaker 1: x amount of churns or x amount of time spent churning,

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Speaker 1: you had butter. But if you kept going, you had

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Speaker 1: a bomb. That's basically the problem with nuclear energy and

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Speaker 1: nuclear enrichment. And so this left the US and many

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Speaker 1: other countries in a pickle because this meant that in theory,

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Speaker 1: any country with the ability to domestically create nuclear energy

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Speaker 1: would also domestically have the ability to make nuclear weapons,

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Speaker 1: and no one could stop them short of try short

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Speaker 1: of trusting them or like you know, doing a Reagan trust,

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Speaker 1: but verify watching how many times the centrifuge is spin.

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Speaker 1: It's a very messy situation. So they got into this

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Speaker 1: idea of monitoring testing. Testing nuclear weapons is one one

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Speaker 1: great way to tell right what a country's true aims are.

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Speaker 1: It's like building a battleship. You can't test a nuclear

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Speaker 1: weapon and say you're doing anything other than that. You

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Speaker 1: can't build a battleship and say you're doing anything other

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Speaker 1: than attempting to build a Blue Force navy and dominate

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Speaker 1: part of the ocean. So the US said, we need

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Speaker 1: to figure out how these other countries are testing, and

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Speaker 1: just for our own pr we're gonna say that we're

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Speaker 1: doing this. Think this is dual use. We're going to

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Speaker 1: say we're doing this just to make sure we know

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Speaker 1: what other countries are up to. It's defensive. Other countries

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Speaker 1: was widely suspected we're testing nuclear weapons underground, so that

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Speaker 1: you wouldn't from a satellite, for instance, you wouldn't see

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Speaker 1: a lot of atmospheric you know, atmospheric anomalies. You wouldn't

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Speaker 1: have people on the ground noting, you know, like a

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Speaker 1: mushroom cloud miles away or something. So they said, okay,

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Speaker 1: we're going to assume people are doing this underground because

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Speaker 1: that's what we would do well exactly.

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Speaker 2: And just to jump back in time slightly, we're talking

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Speaker 2: about the sixties and seventies here, but let's just jump

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Speaker 2: back in time to nineteen fifty four in March to

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Speaker 2: something called Castle Bravo. And just the reason why the

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Speaker 2: United States took on this. We're going to police the

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Speaker 2: nuclear testing or possible nuclear testing across the globe because

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Speaker 2: we conducted a test in the United States in a

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Speaker 2: place called the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. And

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Speaker 2: like I said in marsh First nineteen fifty four, it

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Speaker 2: was a massive explosion. I believe it was fifteen megatons

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Speaker 2: that was the yield essentially, And there was a lot

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Speaker 2: of fallout because of this nuclear test, like literally, and

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Speaker 2: I guess prly because it caused a lot of damage

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Speaker 2: and there was a lot of radiation that spread further

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Speaker 2: and in ways that we perhaps didn't expect. And it

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Speaker 2: was decided globally, at least between the powers of the

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Speaker 2: United States and the Soviet Union and several other places

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Speaker 2: that we would no longer test nuclear weapons, like we

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Speaker 2: were going to stop. That's why the US took on this.

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Speaker 1: Role, right right, they said, we are the we're the

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Speaker 1: perfect people to you know, keep everyone honest here. In

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Speaker 1: nineteen fifty four, also the same year that Edward Burnees

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Speaker 1: helped persuade the US to invade invade Guatemala and launch

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Speaker 1: a coup on behalf of private agricultural sector businesses. It

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Speaker 1: was a business coup, So shout out to you Brenees.

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Speaker 1: You monster. I'm still so impressed with the guy. Though

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Speaker 1: you have to be. You got to respect the hustle.

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Speaker 1: But anyhow, you're right. You're absolutely right, Matt. There's a

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Speaker 1: lot of precedents going into this, but unfortunately the US

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Speaker 1: was maybe not the best police officer. Maybe it was

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Speaker 1: just the least worst, you know, like that's what people

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Speaker 1: say about democracy, it's the least worst system humans have

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Speaker 1: come up with. But the US, like many other countries,

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Speaker 1: blurred the line between testing for nuclear power peaceful pursuits

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Speaker 1: and testing for nuclear weaponry. And that's why you'll notice

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Speaker 1: that we caveated some of our earlier statements by adding

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Speaker 1: the O word. Officially, it's because we have to. You see,

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Speaker 1: the US, aside from Bikinia Toll, it turns out the

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Speaker 1: US conducted multiple nuclear tests back in the day, some

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Speaker 1: of which are still probably secret. But weird Wes and

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Speaker 1: Wyoming hipped us to several tests that occurred in good

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Speaker 1: old Mississippi. And at the time, what's weird about this,

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Speaker 1: These tests were not even secret. The New York Times

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Speaker 1: ran an announcement about it that kind of aged like milk,

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Speaker 1: because it's very it's very like whoa, hey, look at this.

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Speaker 1: We're you know, nuclear power is not what could go

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Speaker 1: wrong and you can you can read the article in

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Speaker 1: full online. But this project. One of the first things

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Speaker 1: I noticed about this project met was that it had

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Speaker 1: just a terrible name.

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Speaker 2: Were talking about Project Dribble. I'm just drooling a little

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Speaker 2: bit thinking about it. But yeah, this was This was

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Speaker 2: one of several tests that fell under this thing called

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Speaker 2: the VELA Uniform. This was a mission that was essentially

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Speaker 2: attempting to detect nuclear blasts. It ran from nineteen sixty

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Speaker 2: three to nineteen seventy one, and it was Yeah, the

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Speaker 2: VELA mission really was to detect blasts that occurred in air,

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Speaker 2: blasts that occurred on land, like above the ground, underwater,

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Speaker 2: blasts that occurred even under the land, like in a

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Speaker 2: cave or something. It was trying to figure out any

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Speaker 2: of the ways that the United States Forces military in

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Speaker 2: this case, could detect whether or not a nuclear blast

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Speaker 2: had gone off anywhere in the world at any altitude.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and this is similar to weather balloon detection programs,

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Speaker 1: you know, where we could maybe put something high enough

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Speaker 1: in the atmosphere that it would detect certain changes indicative

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Speaker 1: of a nuclear explosion, but figuring out what was going

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Speaker 1: on under our feet was almost more important because that's

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Speaker 1: where the really sneaky stuff can occur. Vella Uniform was

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Speaker 1: overall seven different tests that we know about, and not

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Speaker 1: all of those tests were nuclear, but not one, but

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Speaker 1: two of the nuclear detonations occurred just north of a

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Speaker 1: very small town in Lamar County, Mississippi, called Baxterville. Baxterville

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Speaker 1: is tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny, you know, it's kind of

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Speaker 1: like that. Around the time this occurred, Baxterville is what

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Speaker 1: Garth Brooks would have called a one stoplight town or

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Speaker 1: something like that. I'm forgetting my Garth Brooks, but you

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Speaker 1: know what I'm referencing right anyway, Anyway, friends in low

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Speaker 1: places aside, Baxterville was about twenty eight miles and is

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Speaker 1: twenty eight miles southwest of Hattiesburg, which is probably the

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Speaker 1: most recognizable town in the area. So the Powers that

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Speaker 1: Beach chose to detonate nuclear weapons in nearby Baxterville, where

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Speaker 1: again people did live, because there was a distinctive geological

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Speaker 1: feature there called the Tatum Salt Dome. I have to mention,

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Speaker 1: I don't know if it's because I was hungry when

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Speaker 1: I was listening to your voicemail initially, West, but I

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Speaker 1: could have sworn. I could have sworn you said potato

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Speaker 1: salt dome, and I just like started imagining all the

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Speaker 1: cool things you can do with potatoes. But no, this

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Speaker 1: is way less cool. This nuclear energy.

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Speaker 2: No joke, man. I googled. The first thing I googled

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Speaker 2: was potato salt dome, and I didn't know. I'm not joking.

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Speaker 2: I thought that's what it was too. And that's nothing

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Speaker 2: against us, is I just I was maybe having a

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Speaker 2: hard time understanding it when I was listening on my

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Speaker 2: phone or something, and perhaps that was also a bit ravenous.

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Speaker 1: We're a very carb oriented podcast, and know just like

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Speaker 1: as a crew, you.

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Speaker 2: Know for sure, I really quickly, I just want to

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Speaker 2: go back. So we're talking about the Tatum salt Dome.

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Speaker 2: We're going to get into that, but I want to

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Speaker 2: backtrack just for a moment to make sure people understand

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Speaker 2: that these seven tests that were talking about with Vala

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Speaker 2: Uniform were to test the sensor equipment that the Veala

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Speaker 2: project essentially was going to use to detect explosions elsewhere.

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Speaker 2: So in order to know that you can successfully detect

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Speaker 2: an underground nuclear explosion. Let's say, somewhere in the USS

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Speaker 2: are you need to first manufacture your own explosion to

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Speaker 2: see Hey, if they do one like this, can we

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Speaker 2: see it? Yep? Okay, So that was the point of this.

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Speaker 2: I am not sure if I explained that well enough

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Speaker 2: prior to saying it here.

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Speaker 1: I think you ye. I think it's important to like

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Speaker 1: highlight that because it's another instance of dual use, isn't it.

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Speaker 1: It would be naive to assume that there would not

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Speaker 1: be other data, right, other results that were monitored and

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Speaker 1: pulled from again, these detonations of nuclear weapons. You're right,

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Speaker 1: And they spend a lot of time thinking about this.

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Speaker 1: As a matter of fact, they spend a lot of

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Speaker 1: time thinking about how to set it up. But they

433
00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:51,480
Speaker 1: did not spend a lot of time on three big things,

434
00:28:51,840 --> 00:28:54,760
Speaker 1: and that's what this episode is about. First, they obviously

435
00:28:55,680 --> 00:28:59,120
Speaker 1: didn't spend a lot of time thinking through what would

436
00:28:59,200 --> 00:29:04,520
Speaker 1: actually happen when you detonated nuclear they called a nuclear device,

437
00:29:04,600 --> 00:29:08,360
Speaker 1: but when you detonate a nuclear bomb underground in an

438
00:29:08,400 --> 00:29:11,520
Speaker 1: occupied area. Second, they didn't think about the long term

439
00:29:11,560 --> 00:29:17,920
Speaker 1: consequences aftermath or effects. And third, they really phoned in

440
00:29:18,040 --> 00:29:22,800
Speaker 1: the names. I can't I can't emphasize that enough. Project Dribble.

441
00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:28,360
Speaker 1: The first test is called the Salmon Events, which sounds

442
00:29:28,400 --> 00:29:32,600
Speaker 1: like something your local park ranger gets excited about once

443
00:29:32,640 --> 00:29:33,720
Speaker 1: a year, you know what I mean.

444
00:29:34,240 --> 00:29:35,560
Speaker 2: Yeah, I think they were hungry too.

445
00:29:35,600 --> 00:29:35,800
Speaker 4: Man.

446
00:29:39,680 --> 00:29:42,640
Speaker 2: Well, we mentioned the Tail salt dome wide is important.

447
00:29:42,680 --> 00:29:45,080
Speaker 2: I just gonna put this out here quickly. One of

448
00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:48,680
Speaker 2: the major reasons when they're you know, they're imagining what

449
00:29:48,760 --> 00:29:51,400
Speaker 2: another country might do. When they were going to try

450
00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:54,760
Speaker 2: and test underground, they thought, well, if there was some

451
00:29:54,880 --> 00:30:01,160
Speaker 2: kind of salt dome or an underground assault deposit somewhere

452
00:30:01,200 --> 00:30:04,640
Speaker 2: on land, the authorities could put a bunch of water

453
00:30:04,800 --> 00:30:09,520
Speaker 2: into that salt deposit, essentially, you know, turn that solid

454
00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:15,040
Speaker 2: sodium into salt water, and create a cavity underground where

455
00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:18,360
Speaker 2: they could then place a bomb, explode it and do

456
00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:21,520
Speaker 2: some testing. Right. That was one of the major reasons

457
00:30:21,560 --> 00:30:24,640
Speaker 2: they chose this Tatum Salt mine or Tatum Salt dome.

458
00:30:24,960 --> 00:30:28,160
Speaker 1: Right, yeah, yeah, yeah. It wasn't just because it was cool,

459
00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:34,720
Speaker 1: but it was because of the actual physical makeup of

460
00:30:34,840 --> 00:30:38,720
Speaker 1: the dome. So they announced this to their credit, unlike

461
00:30:38,800 --> 00:30:44,520
Speaker 1: some other US test on domestic populations. And here's what

462
00:30:44,560 --> 00:30:49,280
Speaker 1: they decided to do. On October twenty second, after warning

463
00:30:49,840 --> 00:30:54,520
Speaker 1: some residents in the area. About ten am nineteen sixty four,

464
00:30:55,160 --> 00:30:59,480
Speaker 1: the authorities detonated a five point three kiloton device eight

465
00:30:59,560 --> 00:31:05,560
Speaker 1: hundred twenty meters or twenty seven hundred feet underground. Real quick,

466
00:31:05,920 --> 00:31:08,760
Speaker 1: because I know we've thrown some words around here. Kill

467
00:31:08,800 --> 00:31:12,080
Speaker 1: A ton is one thousand tons, so this is like

468
00:31:12,480 --> 00:31:18,400
Speaker 1: thousand five thousand tons, and change a megaton, like Matt,

469
00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:22,000
Speaker 1: you had mentioned with Bikini A toll is one million tons,

470
00:31:22,200 --> 00:31:25,240
Speaker 1: so this is smaller than Bikini A toll. But again

471
00:31:25,440 --> 00:31:30,040
Speaker 1: it is in a It's an area where people were

472
00:31:30,040 --> 00:31:35,040
Speaker 1: not expecting to encounter radiation and nuclear disaster. So the

473
00:31:35,080 --> 00:31:38,160
Speaker 1: first thing that goes wrong when they detonate this at

474
00:31:38,160 --> 00:31:41,440
Speaker 1: ten a m Is that the explosion is much much

475
00:31:41,560 --> 00:31:45,560
Speaker 1: stronger than the residents had been told it would be.

476
00:31:46,120 --> 00:31:51,760
Speaker 1: The ground shook, A gigantic cloud of dust rises, the

477
00:31:51,840 --> 00:31:55,520
Speaker 1: thing you were hoping to avoid. Windows break, walls crack

478
00:31:55,680 --> 00:32:00,880
Speaker 1: fourteen miles away, Wells go bad, run dry, They clawed.

479
00:32:00,880 --> 00:32:03,520
Speaker 1: This favorite story, I know you probably have some two, Matt.

480
00:32:03,560 --> 00:32:06,080
Speaker 1: One of my favorite stories is there's a local fisherman

481
00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:09,239
Speaker 1: who watches in amazement as all the fish in this

482
00:32:09,360 --> 00:32:11,480
Speaker 1: pond jump out of the water at once.

483
00:32:12,960 --> 00:32:18,360
Speaker 2: Wow. Yeah, I can't imagine seeing that. Wow. Well, you

484
00:32:18,400 --> 00:32:21,840
Speaker 2: know another thing that I can't imagine is the way

485
00:32:21,880 --> 00:32:24,880
Speaker 2: a lot of the local residents described what they saw,

486
00:32:24,920 --> 00:32:28,600
Speaker 2: even when they were miles away from ground zero. They

487
00:32:28,920 --> 00:32:32,000
Speaker 2: this is I'm just gonna paraphrase this, and you can

488
00:32:32,040 --> 00:32:35,360
Speaker 2: go online and read a lot of first hand accounts

489
00:32:35,560 --> 00:32:42,120
Speaker 2: of this test. Salmon in particular, they noted that there

490
00:32:42,200 --> 00:32:47,640
Speaker 2: were ground ripples, like waves of the ground where it's

491
00:32:47,760 --> 00:32:49,680
Speaker 2: estimates now at this point, because a lot of this

492
00:32:49,800 --> 00:32:53,520
Speaker 2: was looking back, you know, twenty thirty forty fifty years

493
00:32:53,560 --> 00:32:56,960
Speaker 2: after the incident, but a lot of it they described

494
00:32:57,040 --> 00:33:02,000
Speaker 2: as you know, maybe three feet of let's say, now

495
00:33:02,040 --> 00:33:06,320
Speaker 2: imagine five inches of wave of that ground that you

496
00:33:06,320 --> 00:33:10,880
Speaker 2: can see moving essentially in a semicircular path towards you,

497
00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:15,440
Speaker 2: and actually moving the ground and rippling it. There were

498
00:33:15,440 --> 00:33:18,400
Speaker 2: some people who said they were standing on concrete, and

499
00:33:18,520 --> 00:33:21,680
Speaker 2: on the concrete you could feel a wave of earth

500
00:33:22,080 --> 00:33:25,280
Speaker 2: travel under your feet, and then they would They described

501
00:33:25,360 --> 00:33:31,240
Speaker 2: about ten to fifteen seconds of just quiet and nothing,

502
00:33:31,320 --> 00:33:34,520
Speaker 2: and then another ripple, and then another eleven seconds or so,

503
00:33:34,640 --> 00:33:37,040
Speaker 2: and then a third ripple of the ground that you

504
00:33:37,040 --> 00:33:41,920
Speaker 2: could actually watch like that sounds otherworldly to me.

505
00:33:43,480 --> 00:33:47,520
Speaker 1: Have you ever I remember we talked about this. Have

506
00:33:47,560 --> 00:33:51,400
Speaker 1: you ever been in an earthquake or experienced one?

507
00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:56,400
Speaker 2: There have been several low, very very low level earthquakes

508
00:33:56,560 --> 00:33:58,960
Speaker 2: in Georgia that I have felt, and I didn't know

509
00:33:59,040 --> 00:34:00,760
Speaker 2: I was feeling it until I woke up the next

510
00:34:00,800 --> 00:34:03,120
Speaker 2: day and read that there was a low level earthquake.

511
00:34:03,600 --> 00:34:05,600
Speaker 2: But you know, I've been to California a few times

512
00:34:05,640 --> 00:34:08,040
Speaker 2: now in my life, and I've never experienced anything big

513
00:34:08,120 --> 00:34:09,240
Speaker 2: or in any other place.

514
00:34:09,920 --> 00:34:15,960
Speaker 1: M Yeah, it's it's a it's an incredibly disorienting feeling,

515
00:34:16,440 --> 00:34:19,279
Speaker 1: and it's one of those things where all of a

516
00:34:19,320 --> 00:34:23,360
Speaker 1: sudden you recognize how powerless we as individuals can be.

517
00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:28,080
Speaker 1: When I was when I was living in Central America,

518
00:34:28,280 --> 00:34:31,080
Speaker 1: I looked like honestly, man, I looked like a woos

519
00:34:31,440 --> 00:34:33,960
Speaker 1: the first couple of times, you know, I was at

520
00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:38,960
Speaker 1: this family's this family's residence where you know, we're drinking

521
00:34:39,040 --> 00:34:43,280
Speaker 1: instant coffee. It's like eight thirty in the morning or something,

522
00:34:43,680 --> 00:34:47,120
Speaker 1: and then all of a sudden, the kitchen just moves,

523
00:34:47,920 --> 00:34:51,640
Speaker 1: and then it moves back, and some stuff I'm trying

524
00:34:51,719 --> 00:34:54,360
Speaker 1: not to curse here, but some stuff just falls off

525
00:34:54,480 --> 00:35:00,560
Speaker 1: the shelves, and the lady who's house it was, she

526
00:35:00,760 --> 00:35:03,920
Speaker 1: is She's like, I'm just gonna put up this spoon again,

527
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:07,400
Speaker 1: and blah blah blah. And I think maybe I've done

528
00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:10,279
Speaker 1: some sort of drug that I can't remember, you know,

529
00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:14,280
Speaker 1: and that reality is just glitching. But I say that because,

530
00:35:14,480 --> 00:35:18,319
Speaker 1: you know, it is difficult to explain what an earthquake

531
00:35:18,400 --> 00:35:22,960
Speaker 1: feels like unless you experience it. There is no anchor,

532
00:35:23,160 --> 00:35:26,600
Speaker 1: there is nothing that you can hold because the world

533
00:35:27,040 --> 00:35:30,640
Speaker 1: is quaking, and this is what these people experience, right,

534
00:35:31,360 --> 00:35:35,560
Speaker 1: So of course they're scared, especially because they thought they

535
00:35:35,560 --> 00:35:40,960
Speaker 1: had done everything right. They had complied with the orders

536
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:45,239
Speaker 1: of the federal government. They had evacuated if they were

537
00:35:45,239 --> 00:35:49,280
Speaker 1: told to evacuate, and they still, as we would say today,

538
00:35:49,840 --> 00:35:56,240
Speaker 1: got their stuff rocked, you know. And the thing is that, Okay,

539
00:35:56,719 --> 00:36:01,319
Speaker 1: this is crazy, right, No one dies immediately, and thank

540
00:36:01,360 --> 00:36:05,320
Speaker 1: your lucky stars for that, right, Federal agents residents alike.

541
00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:11,040
Speaker 1: Several weeks after the blast, the government has hired workers

542
00:36:11,160 --> 00:36:14,960
Speaker 1: to drill back into the hole in the ground left by.

543
00:36:14,840 --> 00:36:18,200
Speaker 2: This explosion in the Tatum saltom in the.

544
00:36:18,160 --> 00:36:22,640
Speaker 1: Tatum salt them to release radioactive gas that's trapped inside. Now,

545
00:36:22,680 --> 00:36:26,000
Speaker 1: the officials were using what we would describe as cutting

546
00:36:26,080 --> 00:36:29,920
Speaker 1: edge technology for the time. They had scrubbers that were

547
00:36:29,960 --> 00:36:36,160
Speaker 1: set up, and a scrubber basically would decontaminate the radioactive gas.

548
00:36:36,600 --> 00:36:40,880
Speaker 1: But soon they realized that wasn't the real problem. They

549
00:36:40,880 --> 00:36:44,720
Speaker 1: would have to do something about the radioactive liquid waste

550
00:36:44,960 --> 00:36:47,759
Speaker 1: from all the drilling operations. Just like in Lord of

551
00:36:47,800 --> 00:36:51,879
Speaker 1: the Rings, they delved too deep and their bow rog

552
00:36:52,600 --> 00:36:56,920
Speaker 1: was very dangerous waste radiation. So they said, Okay, you

553
00:36:56,960 --> 00:36:59,400
Speaker 1: know what we're going to do. We're going to dig

554
00:36:59,640 --> 00:37:03,600
Speaker 1: a We're gonna dig a hole. We're just we're gonna

555
00:37:03,640 --> 00:37:05,960
Speaker 1: dig some more holes, and we're gonna dig one really

556
00:37:06,040 --> 00:37:10,680
Speaker 1: deep hole two four hundred feet into the earth right

557
00:37:10,719 --> 00:37:15,239
Speaker 1: by the salt dome. And then someone in the room

558
00:37:15,360 --> 00:37:20,200
Speaker 1: is like, hey, isn't there a groundwater aquifer there? And

559
00:37:20,200 --> 00:37:23,280
Speaker 1: they're like, come, Craig, I need you to be a team player.

560
00:37:24,200 --> 00:37:27,640
Speaker 2: It's fine. It's also who cares if it's an aqua

561
00:37:27,719 --> 00:37:31,080
Speaker 2: for everything will be fine. There's no problem with irradiating

562
00:37:31,239 --> 00:37:39,759
Speaker 2: ground water. Yeah, so we're still in nineteen sixty five

563
00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:43,439
Speaker 2: here remember, and between March and July of that year,

564
00:37:45,320 --> 00:37:49,920
Speaker 2: there was a ton of radioactive liquid waste that was

565
00:37:49,960 --> 00:37:53,880
Speaker 2: disposed of into this well where an underground aquifer was.

566
00:37:54,480 --> 00:37:58,800
Speaker 2: We're talking about three hundred and thirty eight thousand gallons

567
00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:04,359
Speaker 2: of radioactive waste that was just see you later, down

568
00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:08,240
Speaker 2: into the well, into the water. And that wasn't it either.

569
00:38:08,400 --> 00:38:11,160
Speaker 2: That's not where the story stops. It wasn't just one

570
00:38:11,520 --> 00:38:18,279
Speaker 2: nuclear test underground at this location. The government went right

571
00:38:18,320 --> 00:38:21,960
Speaker 2: back through and dropped another bomb into that hole that

572
00:38:22,000 --> 00:38:24,400
Speaker 2: they created with the first test. And we'll tell you

573
00:38:24,520 --> 00:38:26,960
Speaker 2: all about that when we returned from a word from

574
00:38:26,960 --> 00:38:27,520
Speaker 2: our sponsor.

575
00:38:34,040 --> 00:38:37,480
Speaker 1: That's right. They must have had a different person writing

576
00:38:37,520 --> 00:38:41,040
Speaker 1: the names by this point. A few years later, they

577
00:38:41,880 --> 00:38:44,319
Speaker 1: conduct a second test, as you said, Matt, during what

578
00:38:44,520 --> 00:38:47,960
Speaker 1: was called the Sterling Events. This happened on December third,

579
00:38:48,160 --> 00:38:53,640
Speaker 1: nineteen sixty six. Basically, they said, hey, we got this

580
00:38:53,719 --> 00:38:57,719
Speaker 1: great hole from earlier, let's keep using it. This was

581
00:38:57,760 --> 00:39:03,759
Speaker 1: a very like pro hole in the ground kind of institution.

582
00:39:04,760 --> 00:39:06,480
Speaker 1: And it made sense. I don't mean to bust their

583
00:39:06,520 --> 00:39:09,400
Speaker 1: chops too hard, it made sense. So they dropped a

584
00:39:09,480 --> 00:39:13,040
Speaker 1: three hundred and eighty ton device into the cavity that

585
00:39:13,120 --> 00:39:16,160
Speaker 1: was left behind by the previous explosion. In the Salmon event,

586
00:39:17,000 --> 00:39:22,719
Speaker 1: the Department of Defense and associated agencies required residents for

587
00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:26,200
Speaker 1: these tests within one and a half miles of the

588
00:39:26,239 --> 00:39:30,600
Speaker 1: explosion point to leave their homes while the events were occurring.

589
00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:37,879
Speaker 1: They also said, hey, you know, these detonations might mess

590
00:39:37,960 --> 00:39:40,440
Speaker 1: up your house a little bit. They might damage some

591
00:39:40,520 --> 00:39:44,000
Speaker 1: buildings and stuff. And it did, and it definitely did.

592
00:39:46,040 --> 00:39:50,120
Speaker 1: They also proactively said, you know, we are going to

593
00:39:51,600 --> 00:39:53,600
Speaker 1: we're going to get in front of this, as they

594
00:39:53,640 --> 00:39:56,200
Speaker 1: say in corporate America or in the realm of politics,

595
00:39:56,520 --> 00:39:58,160
Speaker 1: and we're going to go ahead and just let you

596
00:39:58,280 --> 00:40:01,960
Speaker 1: know whatever happens, We're going to give you a five grand.

597
00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:05,760
Speaker 1: Just tell us what happened. We'll give you five grand.

598
00:40:05,880 --> 00:40:11,759
Speaker 1: Everybody's happy. It didn't stop there. Later, they would go

599
00:40:11,840 --> 00:40:16,800
Speaker 1: on to conduct more experiments with non nuclear explosives during

600
00:40:16,800 --> 00:40:20,520
Speaker 1: a project called Miracle Play, which sounds like something for

601
00:40:20,960 --> 00:40:22,680
Speaker 1: you know, your Nintendo switch.

602
00:40:23,560 --> 00:40:28,800
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, it does. Ben Really quickly, let's get into

603
00:40:29,040 --> 00:40:34,640
Speaker 2: the reason why they tested secondary much much smaller device

604
00:40:34,880 --> 00:40:37,640
Speaker 2: in that same place where they caused the first explosion.

605
00:40:38,200 --> 00:40:41,799
Speaker 2: Just quickly, just go over this. So the first time

606
00:40:41,840 --> 00:40:44,920
Speaker 2: they detonated a nuke in the Tatum Salt Dome. It

607
00:40:45,080 --> 00:40:52,880
Speaker 2: essentially created a massive, let's say, spherical hole in the ground,

608
00:40:53,200 --> 00:40:56,000
Speaker 2: not necessarily holding and get into like a cavern, like

609
00:40:56,000 --> 00:41:00,759
Speaker 2: a cave basically underneath the ground. And when once they

610
00:41:00,880 --> 00:41:03,359
Speaker 2: had created that with the first explosion, the first test

611
00:41:03,480 --> 00:41:06,440
Speaker 2: during Salmon, they like I said, like we said, they

612
00:41:07,200 --> 00:41:10,959
Speaker 2: drilled a hole into this cavity. They dropped a much

613
00:41:11,000 --> 00:41:15,439
Speaker 2: smaller bomb and what did we say, It was three

614
00:41:15,480 --> 00:41:19,879
Speaker 2: hundred and eighty ton, Yeah, three hundred and eighty ton device,

615
00:41:19,960 --> 00:41:22,880
Speaker 2: much smaller, and they dropped that down there and it

616
00:41:22,960 --> 00:41:26,680
Speaker 2: exploded it to test whether or not there would be

617
00:41:26,719 --> 00:41:31,759
Speaker 2: this dampening effect that the you know, the scientists and

618
00:41:32,000 --> 00:41:35,239
Speaker 2: personnel that were testing with the veal val uniform. They

619
00:41:35,280 --> 00:41:37,359
Speaker 2: wanted to see if a country could do that could

620
00:41:37,480 --> 00:41:42,719
Speaker 2: dampen the essentially shock waves of a nuclear explosion by

621
00:41:42,760 --> 00:41:46,560
Speaker 2: having a hole in the ground, a large cavernous hole

622
00:41:46,800 --> 00:41:49,600
Speaker 2: in the ground, rather than just dipping it into the

623
00:41:49,600 --> 00:41:51,520
Speaker 2: ground and exploding it. Mm hmm.

624
00:41:52,360 --> 00:41:55,600
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, there's there is valuable science here, you

625
00:41:55,640 --> 00:41:58,160
Speaker 1: know what I mean. I think that's one of the

626
00:41:58,160 --> 00:42:02,960
Speaker 1: biggest points about this. But the problem is everything we've described.

627
00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:07,840
Speaker 1: Even with the safety measures that they took, it's still

628
00:42:08,239 --> 00:42:14,000
Speaker 1: incredibly dangerous. People were living in the area, right, And

629
00:42:14,840 --> 00:42:19,640
Speaker 1: you'll be happy slash roll your eyes and groaning to

630
00:42:21,000 --> 00:42:26,400
Speaker 1: learn that Uncle Sam did compensate the residents of Baxterville

631
00:42:26,440 --> 00:42:31,040
Speaker 1: and Hattiesburg. Even they gave adults ten dollars and they

632
00:42:31,040 --> 00:42:35,760
Speaker 1: gave children five bucks. The shockwave of this explosion literally

633
00:42:35,920 --> 00:42:40,120
Speaker 1: lifted the ground four inches. A lot of buildings only

634
00:42:40,200 --> 00:42:43,799
Speaker 1: have minimal damage. That's frankly amazing. But what is not

635
00:42:43,920 --> 00:42:48,880
Speaker 1: amazing and what is you know, perhaps the most disappointing

636
00:42:49,440 --> 00:42:53,799
Speaker 1: and strange part of this story be the effects and

637
00:42:53,840 --> 00:42:57,000
Speaker 1: the aftermath, which they clearly did not plan for.

638
00:42:57,560 --> 00:43:01,640
Speaker 2: Agreed, I would say, we're talking nineteen sixty four dollars,

639
00:43:01,719 --> 00:43:05,719
Speaker 2: so ten bucks, five bucks not too shabby.

640
00:43:06,280 --> 00:43:07,279
Speaker 1: That's very fair of you.

641
00:43:07,440 --> 00:43:10,520
Speaker 2: Yes, I'd be facetious here. No, you're right, though, Ben,

642
00:43:10,760 --> 00:43:13,480
Speaker 2: the aftermath and effects of these tests is not something

643
00:43:13,560 --> 00:43:15,880
Speaker 2: laugh at. I apologize again. We're in one of those

644
00:43:15,920 --> 00:43:18,880
Speaker 2: situations where you're trying to be a little light just

645
00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:23,759
Speaker 2: because this stuff is. It's tough on individual people and families.

646
00:43:24,360 --> 00:43:28,600
Speaker 2: So you know, the big thing here is that the

647
00:43:28,680 --> 00:43:31,840
Speaker 2: United States government appears to not have been fully aware

648
00:43:32,280 --> 00:43:36,120
Speaker 2: of the risks that were posed by contaminating with radiation

649
00:43:36,280 --> 00:43:39,800
Speaker 2: things like groundwater and just you know, a general area

650
00:43:39,840 --> 00:43:42,520
Speaker 2: where flora and fauna are going to be affected by

651
00:43:42,520 --> 00:43:48,040
Speaker 2: this radiation. They were, however, fully aware of the horrific

652
00:43:48,040 --> 00:43:51,240
Speaker 2: consequences of dropping the bomb on let's say, a city

653
00:43:51,760 --> 00:43:55,640
Speaker 2: and suburban area when you're looking at the attacks on

654
00:43:55,719 --> 00:44:00,760
Speaker 2: Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In this case, the lodge at least

655
00:44:00,960 --> 00:44:04,040
Speaker 2: was that this would this would not have much of

656
00:44:04,080 --> 00:44:08,520
Speaker 2: an effect because you know, you're exploding this thing underground,

657
00:44:08,640 --> 00:44:11,960
Speaker 2: because the radioactive material is going to be stuck under there.

658
00:44:12,000 --> 00:44:14,040
Speaker 2: It's not going to be able to escape and get

659
00:44:14,040 --> 00:44:17,560
Speaker 2: into the air and affect things in the way that

660
00:44:17,600 --> 00:44:20,840
Speaker 2: we you know, generally had been testing nukes in the past,

661
00:44:22,200 --> 00:44:25,080
Speaker 2: and it would you know, over time, if you didn't

662
00:44:25,120 --> 00:44:29,080
Speaker 2: disturb the area, and especially like essentially the cave that

663
00:44:29,160 --> 00:44:31,799
Speaker 2: was created because of this explosion, if you didn't disturb that,

664
00:44:32,000 --> 00:44:36,360
Speaker 2: then the stuff would decay naturally, slowly, but naturally, and

665
00:44:36,400 --> 00:44:37,640
Speaker 2: you wouldn't have to worry too.

666
00:44:37,600 --> 00:44:44,200
Speaker 1: Much, right, This was not the case. Follow up drilling

667
00:44:44,440 --> 00:44:48,920
Speaker 1: operations that allowed scientists to collect more information about this

668
00:44:49,120 --> 00:44:54,480
Speaker 1: and to dispose of the devices actually ended up contaminating

669
00:44:54,520 --> 00:44:58,760
Speaker 1: the site. So it wasn't so much the initial testing

670
00:44:59,120 --> 00:45:03,600
Speaker 1: as it was the later attempts to leverage info from

671
00:45:03,600 --> 00:45:07,120
Speaker 1: the testing or to get a hold of these devices

672
00:45:07,320 --> 00:45:12,279
Speaker 1: created hazardous radioactive waste. You know, all like imagine that

673
00:45:12,480 --> 00:45:15,160
Speaker 1: green gunk you see in episodes of The Simpsons or

674
00:45:15,200 --> 00:45:18,399
Speaker 1: Captain Planet. It made that stuff, and that stuff is very,

675
00:45:18,480 --> 00:45:21,040
Speaker 1: very bad. Humans are not built to be around it.

676
00:45:21,440 --> 00:45:24,640
Speaker 1: Decades after the first test, the Department of Energy is

677
00:45:24,719 --> 00:45:28,920
Speaker 1: still picking up radiation in the ground and surprise in

678
00:45:29,000 --> 00:45:32,440
Speaker 1: the aquifers, and that is due to the problem with

679
00:45:32,480 --> 00:45:35,680
Speaker 1: the cleanup. Employees who worked on these clean up missions

680
00:45:35,719 --> 00:45:41,480
Speaker 1: said that it was lax at best. Some a couple

681
00:45:41,480 --> 00:45:45,200
Speaker 1: of poison particular, maintained that they were allied to when

682
00:45:45,239 --> 00:45:50,280
Speaker 1: they asked medical professionals to explain things like strange burns

683
00:45:50,320 --> 00:45:56,080
Speaker 1: they found or differing medical conditions. The Department of Energy

684
00:45:56,280 --> 00:45:59,600
Speaker 1: maintained that the radiation levels they did find, even the

685
00:45:59,680 --> 00:46:03,200
Speaker 1: ones that persisted for decades, were no threat to the

686
00:46:03,239 --> 00:46:07,160
Speaker 1: health of residents. And to be fair, we know that

687
00:46:08,600 --> 00:46:12,040
Speaker 1: the modern human being, especially in the West, is exposed

688
00:46:12,040 --> 00:46:17,440
Speaker 1: to low levels of radiation from every including everything from

689
00:46:17,640 --> 00:46:21,480
Speaker 1: like maybe an X ray scan to I kid you

690
00:46:21,560 --> 00:46:26,799
Speaker 1: not bananas. Bananas have low level radiation. So they were

691
00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:30,879
Speaker 1: still oh yeah, I'm flying in a plane. Oh man,

692
00:46:31,200 --> 00:46:32,879
Speaker 1: remember when we used to do that. I would still

693
00:46:32,920 --> 00:46:34,760
Speaker 1: trade it all. I was supposed to go to Easter

694
00:46:34,800 --> 00:46:37,960
Speaker 1: Island this summer. Did I tell you that? No, it

695
00:46:38,000 --> 00:46:39,680
Speaker 1: was a secret plan. I didn't want to tell you

696
00:46:39,680 --> 00:46:43,480
Speaker 1: guys until I could text you a picture. But uh yeah.

697
00:46:43,560 --> 00:46:46,960
Speaker 1: But being a US resident traveling internationally is going to

698
00:46:47,040 --> 00:46:50,440
Speaker 1: be harry for a while. Even if even if you

699
00:46:50,520 --> 00:46:53,120
Speaker 1: live in the US and you have the ability to

700
00:46:53,280 --> 00:46:56,440
Speaker 1: go somewhere, the other country might not necessarily want to

701
00:46:56,520 --> 00:47:00,600
Speaker 1: let you in now more than ever, But we'll anyway.

702
00:47:00,640 --> 00:47:03,400
Speaker 1: That doesn't matter. The point that matters here is that

703
00:47:03,440 --> 00:47:05,160
Speaker 1: there are a lot of things that expose you to

704
00:47:05,200 --> 00:47:08,640
Speaker 1: low level radiation. You run into it all the time,

705
00:47:09,080 --> 00:47:11,960
Speaker 1: and the Department of Energy was saying, well, this is

706
00:47:12,040 --> 00:47:14,440
Speaker 1: kind of the same thing. It's not going to be dangerous.

707
00:47:14,880 --> 00:47:19,920
Speaker 1: But in the nineteen nineties, residents of the area Baxterville, Hattiesburg,

708
00:47:20,960 --> 00:47:27,200
Speaker 1: and workers from Project Dribble, they started to say, you know,

709
00:47:29,239 --> 00:47:33,120
Speaker 1: a lot of our friends, coworkers and loved ones from

710
00:47:33,160 --> 00:47:37,640
Speaker 1: this time period are dying, and they're dying of cancer.

711
00:47:38,200 --> 00:47:42,719
Speaker 2: Yeah, about twenty five thirty years later, that's when I

712
00:47:42,760 --> 00:47:46,720
Speaker 2: guess you begin to notice that that radiation, those rads

713
00:47:46,760 --> 00:47:48,640
Speaker 2: you took back in the day are starting to show

714
00:47:48,680 --> 00:47:53,680
Speaker 2: themselves because there are long term effects there. And you know,

715
00:47:53,719 --> 00:47:56,520
Speaker 2: the local residents ended up creating a list of I

716
00:47:56,560 --> 00:48:00,680
Speaker 2: believe it was forty four people who had either died

717
00:48:00,680 --> 00:48:02,760
Speaker 2: of cancer or who had developed cancer.

718
00:48:03,360 --> 00:48:04,839
Speaker 4: And you know.

719
00:48:04,840 --> 00:48:09,160
Speaker 2: That's in the large scheme of things, that's a relatively

720
00:48:09,400 --> 00:48:12,960
Speaker 2: low number, but in a small town, forty four people

721
00:48:13,040 --> 00:48:17,080
Speaker 2: in an immediate area who had you know, gotten cancer

722
00:48:17,200 --> 00:48:20,280
Speaker 2: or died of cancer is a lot. And they demanded

723
00:48:20,280 --> 00:48:23,160
Speaker 2: that the state and federal government figure out if any

724
00:48:23,160 --> 00:48:26,160
Speaker 2: of these conditions were in any way linked to the

725
00:48:26,200 --> 00:48:28,960
Speaker 2: salt dome tests that were done back in the sixties.

726
00:48:29,719 --> 00:48:33,800
Speaker 2: And you know, we're talking in nineteen nineties. It moved

727
00:48:34,000 --> 00:48:37,600
Speaker 2: slowly trying to get any kind of movement within the

728
00:48:37,680 --> 00:48:41,600
Speaker 2: legal system, within you know, the people who could actually

729
00:48:41,640 --> 00:48:45,439
Speaker 2: run the testing, because there was, by the way, there

730
00:48:45,560 --> 00:48:48,280
Speaker 2: was a lot of long term testing of the flora

731
00:48:48,280 --> 00:48:51,319
Speaker 2: and fauna in the immediate area that was going on.

732
00:48:51,880 --> 00:48:56,319
Speaker 2: But you know who's to I couldn't find much on

733
00:48:56,640 --> 00:48:59,799
Speaker 2: the actual testing of the residents that was going on

734
00:49:00,080 --> 00:49:02,680
Speaker 2: up until they started raising a flag and saying, hey,

735
00:49:03,680 --> 00:49:06,759
Speaker 2: we're we're fauna too, right.

736
00:49:08,239 --> 00:49:10,960
Speaker 1: I mean, that's a very very salient point.

737
00:49:12,200 --> 00:49:15,239
Speaker 2: By the way, I forgot to mention this, the a

738
00:49:15,280 --> 00:49:19,480
Speaker 2: lot of residents in this area used wells that they had,

739
00:49:19,560 --> 00:49:21,640
Speaker 2: you know, doug or had been there existing on their

740
00:49:21,680 --> 00:49:26,960
Speaker 2: properties prior to these events. Almost all, if not everyone,

741
00:49:27,120 --> 00:49:30,880
Speaker 2: of the wells in the surrounding area were producing undrinkable

742
00:49:30,920 --> 00:49:33,640
Speaker 2: water or no water at all, water that was not

743
00:49:33,760 --> 00:49:36,319
Speaker 2: potable for them to drink, so they had to find

744
00:49:36,320 --> 00:49:39,120
Speaker 2: alternative means to get water. There. You can read a

745
00:49:39,120 --> 00:49:42,000
Speaker 2: lot more about this in a couple of places online.

746
00:49:42,080 --> 00:49:46,120
Speaker 2: I would recommend the Atomic Heritage site atomic heritage dot org.

747
00:49:46,440 --> 00:49:50,640
Speaker 2: And there's also a bunch of local reporting that's happened

748
00:49:50,640 --> 00:49:54,399
Speaker 2: over the you know, let's say, from about twenty ten

749
00:49:54,440 --> 00:49:59,279
Speaker 2: and onward. There have been several stories about this. Sorry,

750
00:49:59,320 --> 00:50:00,359
Speaker 2: I just want to put that there.

751
00:50:00,840 --> 00:50:04,880
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, yeah, I would recommend and I was reading

752
00:50:05,040 --> 00:50:09,920
Speaker 1: into work by NOLA dot com, by the Sun Herald.

753
00:50:11,440 --> 00:50:14,520
Speaker 1: There's actually there's a really good Atlas Obscura article on

754
00:50:14,520 --> 00:50:18,680
Speaker 1: this that gives a nice overview, but you're right without

755
00:50:18,840 --> 00:50:25,080
Speaker 1: admitting liability for some stuff. Around two thousand, the government

756
00:50:25,160 --> 00:50:28,880
Speaker 1: built a water pipeline to help residents of the Tatum

757
00:50:28,920 --> 00:50:32,800
Speaker 1: Salt Dome get drinking water that came from an area

758
00:50:32,840 --> 00:50:36,759
Speaker 1: other than the test site. And their idea was, you know,

759
00:50:37,160 --> 00:50:41,920
Speaker 1: we're not officially saying that we really screwed the pooch

760
00:50:42,040 --> 00:50:45,720
Speaker 1: on this, but we want you guys to feel better,

761
00:50:46,160 --> 00:50:50,280
Speaker 1: So this is sort of this is for you. Fast

762
00:50:50,320 --> 00:50:53,720
Speaker 1: forward twenty fifteen, the Department of Labor has paid nearly

763
00:50:53,880 --> 00:50:57,919
Speaker 1: five point five million dollars US two people who are

764
00:50:57,960 --> 00:51:03,040
Speaker 1: suffering medical problems after working at the Salmon nuclear explosion

765
00:51:03,120 --> 00:51:07,000
Speaker 1: site against southwest of Hattiesburg, about twenty eight miles. So

766
00:51:07,120 --> 00:51:09,520
Speaker 1: if you combine that with the money that was paid

767
00:51:09,560 --> 00:51:14,160
Speaker 1: to workers who lived in Mississippi but didn't necessarily work

768
00:51:14,320 --> 00:51:18,439
Speaker 1: on the site, the total bill is sixteen point eight

769
00:51:18,480 --> 00:51:22,880
Speaker 1: million dollars. Oddly enough, that's the price tag for a

770
00:51:22,920 --> 00:51:27,400
Speaker 1: total of fifty six claims. Odd coincidence, there's that number

771
00:51:27,520 --> 00:51:31,600
Speaker 1: again For the numerologists in the crowd. Those fifty six

772
00:51:31,640 --> 00:51:35,240
Speaker 1: claims came from the Salmon site, which today we usually

773
00:51:35,280 --> 00:51:38,680
Speaker 1: call the Tatum Salt Dome, and today as we record

774
00:51:38,719 --> 00:51:42,799
Speaker 1: this officially, Tatum Salt Dome is the location of the

775
00:51:42,840 --> 00:51:48,279
Speaker 1: only known nuclear weapons test aka detonation to ever be

776
00:51:48,480 --> 00:51:50,960
Speaker 1: performed in the eastern United States.

777
00:51:51,480 --> 00:51:56,160
Speaker 2: That's right. A lot of it was done out in Nevada, Nevada, however,

778
00:51:56,200 --> 00:51:59,160
Speaker 2: you want to say it at the test sites out there,

779
00:51:59,200 --> 00:52:01,440
Speaker 2: and a couple of other places, or just you know,

780
00:52:01,800 --> 00:52:05,800
Speaker 2: outside of the United States, on atolls and other places

781
00:52:05,920 --> 00:52:09,320
Speaker 2: underneath the water and in the air, in various places.

782
00:52:09,760 --> 00:52:12,040
Speaker 2: It's pretty weird to think about. And it's so odd

783
00:52:12,080 --> 00:52:14,560
Speaker 2: again that Ben and I were unaware of this until

784
00:52:14,640 --> 00:52:18,000
Speaker 2: Weird West came along and was like, hey, guys, look

785
00:52:18,000 --> 00:52:25,359
Speaker 2: at this and then left. It's really it's really frustrating

786
00:52:26,560 --> 00:52:28,920
Speaker 2: to know that the government did pay out that money

787
00:52:28,920 --> 00:52:34,640
Speaker 2: to fifty six people, when to my mind, you think

788
00:52:34,680 --> 00:52:37,160
Speaker 2: about the residents that have been living there, the families

789
00:52:37,160 --> 00:52:40,719
Speaker 2: that have been growing up there near this place, it

790
00:52:40,800 --> 00:52:43,640
Speaker 2: feels like there's been a larger effect maybe than just

791
00:52:43,760 --> 00:52:46,560
Speaker 2: the workers who were there on site who got dosed

792
00:52:47,600 --> 00:52:50,400
Speaker 2: or radiation, because you know it's highly likely that they didn't.

793
00:52:50,400 --> 00:52:53,080
Speaker 2: That's probably one of the major reasons that the money

794
00:52:53,160 --> 00:52:56,719
Speaker 2: was actually paid out. But just thinking about the number

795
00:52:56,760 --> 00:53:01,160
Speaker 2: of people that ended up drinking water, children that ended

796
00:53:01,239 --> 00:53:06,320
Speaker 2: up drinking water around there, it feels like it feels

797
00:53:06,360 --> 00:53:09,959
Speaker 2: like there would be more casualties. But maybe I'm wrong.

798
00:53:10,360 --> 00:53:12,040
Speaker 2: I would say there are a couple of places online

799
00:53:12,080 --> 00:53:15,040
Speaker 2: where you can read first hand accounts of people who

800
00:53:15,040 --> 00:53:19,840
Speaker 2: were there, and there's one gentleman who refers a couple

801
00:53:19,840 --> 00:53:22,680
Speaker 2: of times to the number of people with cancer, and

802
00:53:22,960 --> 00:53:25,440
Speaker 2: he says, I believe the quote is something along the

803
00:53:25,480 --> 00:53:29,640
Speaker 2: lines of if you look north essentially of the Tatum

804
00:53:29,640 --> 00:53:32,280
Speaker 2: Salt Dome, that's where there are a ton of people

805
00:53:32,400 --> 00:53:35,920
Speaker 2: getting cancer. And that was a I believe it was

806
00:53:35,920 --> 00:53:40,200
Speaker 2: a twenty fourteen interview with this gentleman, but he was

807
00:53:40,239 --> 00:53:44,080
Speaker 2: specifically saying, look to the north of where these explosions occurred,

808
00:53:44,080 --> 00:53:46,480
Speaker 2: and that's where you'll find the people who were really affected.

809
00:53:47,000 --> 00:53:52,799
Speaker 1: And this situation has not been solved. You know, more

810
00:53:52,880 --> 00:53:57,400
Speaker 1: than what you know decades and decades later, this situation

811
00:53:57,760 --> 00:54:05,520
Speaker 1: remains unsolved. The one important thing to note here is

812
00:54:06,200 --> 00:54:08,799
Speaker 1: we are harping a lot on the activities of the

813
00:54:08,880 --> 00:54:13,360
Speaker 1: US government, but made no mistake. The USSR was conducting

814
00:54:13,560 --> 00:54:22,000
Speaker 1: similarly dangerous and devious nuclear experiments, and many other modern

815
00:54:22,239 --> 00:54:26,720
Speaker 1: nuclear powers have done the same thing. This was how

816
00:54:26,800 --> 00:54:31,640
Speaker 1: the radioactive sausage was made. Today, most of the residents

817
00:54:31,640 --> 00:54:36,520
Speaker 1: of Lamar County have, you know, maybe a passing understanding

818
00:54:37,200 --> 00:54:41,319
Speaker 1: of these two nuclear explosions, right at least from what

819
00:54:41,360 --> 00:54:46,879
Speaker 1: we understand, and younger citizens in Mississippi typically like if

820
00:54:47,200 --> 00:54:51,680
Speaker 1: you drove there today and you asked someone, say, I

821
00:54:51,680 --> 00:54:55,040
Speaker 1: don't know under eighteen about this stuff, they probably haven't

822
00:54:55,080 --> 00:54:59,080
Speaker 1: heard of Project Dribble. To your point, Matt, about the

823
00:54:59,160 --> 00:55:06,279
Speaker 1: distribution of cancer and cancer rates. Statistics now show that

824
00:55:06,440 --> 00:55:10,960
Speaker 1: cancer and heart disease the rates in Baxterville are comparable

825
00:55:11,040 --> 00:55:14,360
Speaker 1: to the rest of the state of Mississippi, which sadly

826
00:55:14,440 --> 00:55:18,400
Speaker 1: means that they are noticeably higher than the national average.

827
00:55:19,360 --> 00:55:23,719
Speaker 1: Some residents who are familiar with this story maintain that

828
00:55:23,840 --> 00:55:27,560
Speaker 1: the US government is still hiding some part of the truth,

829
00:55:28,040 --> 00:55:31,760
Speaker 1: whether that's the full extent of the radiation, the consequences

830
00:55:31,760 --> 00:55:38,600
Speaker 1: of the test, or the distribution of contamination associated medical conditions.

831
00:55:38,880 --> 00:55:44,239
Speaker 1: And you can't blame people for being distrustful in these

832
00:55:44,280 --> 00:55:49,160
Speaker 1: situations in general. But you know, thank you to weird

833
00:55:49,239 --> 00:55:52,160
Speaker 1: West Wyoming. Wish we have more of a happy ending

834
00:55:52,640 --> 00:55:54,719
Speaker 1: to this story. But the best thing we can say

835
00:55:54,760 --> 00:55:56,280
Speaker 1: is the story's not over yet.

836
00:55:56,920 --> 00:55:59,640
Speaker 2: That's right, the story is not over. Thank yous. I

837
00:55:59,680 --> 00:56:02,200
Speaker 2: will get give you just a quick thing from the

838
00:56:02,200 --> 00:56:07,279
Speaker 2: Sun Herald. So back about ten years ago, little little

839
00:56:07,360 --> 00:56:11,120
Speaker 2: less than ten years ago, back in twenty ten, the

840
00:56:11,840 --> 00:56:14,640
Speaker 2: good old us of A government declared that this site,

841
00:56:14,719 --> 00:56:18,000
Speaker 2: the Tatum Salt Dome in this area was safe and

842
00:56:18,080 --> 00:56:23,279
Speaker 2: they transferred I believe it was about fifteen hundred, yeah,

843
00:56:23,320 --> 00:56:27,440
Speaker 2: one thy five hundred acres to the state, back to Mississippi,

844
00:56:28,120 --> 00:56:31,720
Speaker 2: and they were talking about, how, you know, the wood

845
00:56:31,760 --> 00:56:34,440
Speaker 2: out here, the trees, the timber, this is all really

846
00:56:34,560 --> 00:56:37,520
Speaker 2: good stuff we can use. It's about two million dollars

847
00:56:37,560 --> 00:56:41,760
Speaker 2: worth of twenty ten dollars of this stuff. And also

848
00:56:42,560 --> 00:56:45,879
Speaker 2: we could build recreational sites here. Let's do it. Hey,

849
00:56:45,920 --> 00:56:48,680
Speaker 2: we got all this land, let's make it happen. Everything's safe.

850
00:56:49,200 --> 00:56:54,760
Speaker 2: And the state Health Department in Mississippi in twenty thirteen,

851
00:56:55,560 --> 00:56:57,799
Speaker 2: they were still, you know, up until twenty thirteen, they

852
00:56:57,800 --> 00:57:00,479
Speaker 2: were still monitoring the whole site, looking at the water,

853
00:57:00,640 --> 00:57:05,360
Speaker 2: specifically for tritium, which is according to the Sun Herald

854
00:57:05,400 --> 00:57:09,080
Speaker 2: which is also, according to science, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen.

855
00:57:09,760 --> 00:57:12,440
Speaker 2: And you know, they were saying, you know what, We're okay,

856
00:57:12,920 --> 00:57:15,520
Speaker 2: We're still going to monitor the groundwater. We're gonna look

857
00:57:15,520 --> 00:57:18,920
Speaker 2: at the surface water. But everything seems fine. Let's get

858
00:57:18,960 --> 00:57:21,880
Speaker 2: back to it out here in the old Tatum salt dome.

859
00:57:23,840 --> 00:57:26,560
Speaker 2: Here's another thing, just a quick note that they make

860
00:57:26,600 --> 00:57:28,800
Speaker 2: at the end of this article, which by the way,

861
00:57:28,920 --> 00:57:32,400
Speaker 2: is called nuclear tests in South Mississippi cost government millions

862
00:57:32,400 --> 00:57:39,280
Speaker 2: and claims. They note that several times the concept of

863
00:57:39,520 --> 00:57:42,960
Speaker 2: using a salt mine or a salt dome in this

864
00:57:43,040 --> 00:57:47,880
Speaker 2: way as a safe place to store nuclear waste, even

865
00:57:47,920 --> 00:57:52,480
Speaker 2: though we learned from this test that is not necessarily

866
00:57:52,880 --> 00:57:57,280
Speaker 2: a safe place to store nuclear waste because of the aquifers.

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00:57:57,640 --> 00:58:01,320
Speaker 2: That is, I think one of the big takeaways nuclear

868
00:58:01,360 --> 00:58:06,000
Speaker 2: waste and ground aquifers are it's a very dangerous combination.

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00:58:06,800 --> 00:58:09,720
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's true. And at this point we passed the

870
00:58:09,760 --> 00:58:12,840
Speaker 1: torch to you. What do you think about this? Do

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00:58:12,920 --> 00:58:16,920
Speaker 1: you think that people are maybe being alarmist about the

872
00:58:17,000 --> 00:58:22,480
Speaker 1: connection between these older nuclear detonations and rates of cancer

873
00:58:22,640 --> 00:58:25,600
Speaker 1: or certain medical conditions in the area. And now do

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00:58:25,720 --> 00:58:28,400
Speaker 1: you think that there's not enough attention put on this.

875
00:58:28,880 --> 00:58:32,840
Speaker 1: What do you think about other similar tests in the

876
00:58:32,880 --> 00:58:35,560
Speaker 1: world and are there any that you are aware of

877
00:58:35,720 --> 00:58:38,440
Speaker 1: in your neck of the global woods. We'd love to

878
00:58:38,480 --> 00:58:40,800
Speaker 1: hear from you. Let us know. You can find us

879
00:58:40,800 --> 00:58:43,920
Speaker 1: on the Internet. We're all over it. The Internet is

880
00:58:44,000 --> 00:58:47,280
Speaker 1: just like lousy with our presence, despite the fact that

881
00:58:47,320 --> 00:58:52,200
Speaker 1: we have seemingly angered the Tulpa god of Internet search.

882
00:58:52,960 --> 00:58:55,200
Speaker 1: You can find us on Facebook. You can find us

883
00:58:55,240 --> 00:58:59,520
Speaker 1: on Twitter, you can find us on Instagram. We especially

884
00:58:59,560 --> 00:59:04,240
Speaker 1: like to wreck commends our Facebook community page. Here's where

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00:59:04,240 --> 00:59:05,040
Speaker 1: it gets crazy.

886
00:59:05,520 --> 00:59:08,680
Speaker 2: Yes, you can hang out there with your fellow conspiracy realist,

887
00:59:08,760 --> 00:59:12,360
Speaker 2: talk about this episode, suggest others, post memes, whatever you

888
00:59:12,360 --> 00:59:14,520
Speaker 2: want to do. You can hang out with some of

889
00:59:14,720 --> 00:59:19,440
Speaker 2: the awesomest mods that exist on that old Facebook platform.

890
00:59:19,640 --> 00:59:21,360
Speaker 2: If you don't want to do that stuff, you can

891
00:59:21,400 --> 00:59:23,680
Speaker 2: always pick up your phone and give us a call.

892
00:59:23,800 --> 00:59:29,360
Speaker 2: Our number is one eight three three std WYTK. If

893
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Speaker 2: you leave a message, you can be certain that Ben

894
00:59:31,880 --> 00:59:34,320
Speaker 2: and I will both hear it, and Noel will will

895
00:59:34,360 --> 00:59:37,320
Speaker 2: hear of it if we deem it to be good

896
00:59:37,440 --> 00:59:40,240
Speaker 2: enough or elicit to it. No, I'm just choking Noel's

897
00:59:40,240 --> 00:59:43,720
Speaker 2: can listen to. If you don't want to do that stuff,

898
00:59:43,800 --> 00:59:46,160
Speaker 2: but you still want to reach out, you can always

899
00:59:46,200 --> 00:59:48,360
Speaker 2: reach us at our good old fashioned email.

900
00:59:48,680 --> 01:00:10,800
Speaker 5: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

901
01:00:10,960 --> 01:00:13,040
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

902
01:00:13,120 --> 01:00:17,680
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903
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