1 00:00:05,000 --> 00:00:08,239 Speaker 1: Welcome to it could happen here the only podcast where 2 00:00:08,240 --> 00:00:12,040 Speaker 1: the hosts asks all listeners and guests to provide their 3 00:00:12,080 --> 00:00:17,760 Speaker 1: Social Security number and bank account number, routing number, all 4 00:00:17,800 --> 00:00:21,599 Speaker 1: that good stuff. UM. This is a podcast about how 5 00:00:21,680 --> 00:00:24,279 Speaker 1: things aren't always great, uh and maybe are kind of 6 00:00:24,280 --> 00:00:27,480 Speaker 1: falling apart a little bit. And and it has also 7 00:00:27,600 --> 00:00:32,000 Speaker 1: not been, for the most part, a podcast about the 8 00:00:32,080 --> 00:00:35,879 Speaker 1: expanded war in Ukraine. UM. For a variety of reasons. 9 00:00:36,200 --> 00:00:38,839 Speaker 1: We have done some coverage of that, uh, but we've 10 00:00:38,880 --> 00:00:43,320 Speaker 1: focused specifically on stories of individual people and and that's 11 00:00:43,360 --> 00:00:46,800 Speaker 1: generally where I feel like our strength is as a program. 12 00:00:46,840 --> 00:00:49,360 Speaker 1: But people have been repeatedly requesting we do a little 13 00:00:49,360 --> 00:00:51,600 Speaker 1: bit of a bigger picture look at what's gone on 14 00:00:51,720 --> 00:00:54,760 Speaker 1: in that conflict, and so I have brought Aram Chambanian 15 00:00:55,280 --> 00:00:58,640 Speaker 1: into the studio. Aram, how are you doing, buddy? Oh? 16 00:00:58,720 --> 00:01:01,320 Speaker 1: Not a bad man? How you doing today? Finding dandy 17 00:01:01,400 --> 00:01:05,080 Speaker 1: like sour candy? Now, would you describe kind of your 18 00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:08,800 Speaker 1: your who you are and what you do and why 19 00:01:09,200 --> 00:01:12,319 Speaker 1: why you're You're someone people should listen to when we're 20 00:01:12,319 --> 00:01:15,399 Speaker 1: talking about a conflict like this, because you are one 21 00:01:15,440 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 1: of the people who when everyone was like, there's no 22 00:01:18,120 --> 00:01:22,280 Speaker 1: way Russia will invade was was saying, well, maybe it 23 00:01:22,360 --> 00:01:26,400 Speaker 1: might happen. Yeah, I mean, um, well, I think one 24 00:01:26,440 --> 00:01:28,399 Speaker 1: of the things that that sets me aside from a 25 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:30,320 Speaker 1: lot of other analysts out there is that I never 26 00:01:30,360 --> 00:01:32,480 Speaker 1: thought I would become an analyst, and I never thought 27 00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:35,280 Speaker 1: that I would do this. Um. I it wasn't set 28 00:01:35,280 --> 00:01:37,240 Speaker 1: in stone from me from the beginning. I thought I 29 00:01:37,280 --> 00:01:39,080 Speaker 1: was gonna be like a high school history teacher. And 30 00:01:39,160 --> 00:01:42,240 Speaker 1: so I've always studied the world in terms of reading 31 00:01:42,240 --> 00:01:44,720 Speaker 1: books on different conflicts around the world, and and I've 32 00:01:44,760 --> 00:01:48,680 Speaker 1: tried to keep appraised on where these books have led to. Right, 33 00:01:48,760 --> 00:01:51,320 Speaker 1: So if I read a book about the Second Congo War, 34 00:01:51,680 --> 00:01:54,320 Speaker 1: it makes sense to then follow current events that are 35 00:01:54,320 --> 00:01:57,600 Speaker 1: related to what happened after the Second Congo War. As 36 00:01:57,600 --> 00:02:00,560 Speaker 1: a result, I followed things going on in Ukraine starting 37 00:02:00,560 --> 00:02:03,880 Speaker 1: in with you am I done, um, and elsewhere in 38 00:02:03,880 --> 00:02:05,760 Speaker 1: the world. But but Ukraine has been one that I've 39 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:09,480 Speaker 1: focused on pretty heavily because, um, there's been a lot 40 00:02:09,560 --> 00:02:12,639 Speaker 1: of information about Ukraine ever since because of how late 41 00:02:12,680 --> 00:02:15,840 Speaker 1: the war happened in terms of human history and in 42 00:02:16,080 --> 00:02:20,560 Speaker 1: terms of recent conflicts. Feen, isn't that long ago? Um? 43 00:02:20,600 --> 00:02:24,160 Speaker 1: And so uh, I started following it back then, and 44 00:02:24,240 --> 00:02:28,360 Speaker 1: I think that if you combine modern open source tools, 45 00:02:28,600 --> 00:02:32,200 Speaker 1: modern technology, some of the stuff that organizations like Belling 46 00:02:32,240 --> 00:02:35,960 Speaker 1: Cat can do with traditional research and and and knowledge 47 00:02:36,040 --> 00:02:38,320 Speaker 1: some of the stuff that I've done in school, you 48 00:02:38,400 --> 00:02:42,880 Speaker 1: have a really powerful tool to combat disinformation UM. And 49 00:02:42,919 --> 00:02:44,120 Speaker 1: I think that's one of the best tools we have 50 00:02:44,160 --> 00:02:48,280 Speaker 1: to combat disinformation is wedding oh sent with traditional research UM. 51 00:02:48,680 --> 00:02:53,040 Speaker 1: And Yeah, when it comes to open source intelligence, UM, 52 00:02:53,720 --> 00:02:55,560 Speaker 1: the Ukrainian War is actually kind of one of the 53 00:02:55,680 --> 00:02:58,320 Speaker 1: It's not the conflict where that really started to become 54 00:02:58,320 --> 00:03:00,200 Speaker 1: a thing. That would probably be the Libyan Civil War 55 00:03:00,360 --> 00:03:04,280 Speaker 1: when when that UM began to be something people were 56 00:03:04,320 --> 00:03:07,600 Speaker 1: talking about in a big way. But the Ukrainian the 57 00:03:07,639 --> 00:03:11,880 Speaker 1: invasion of Ukraine by Russia in particular in two thousand fourteen, 58 00:03:12,600 --> 00:03:15,960 Speaker 1: UM is really where open source intelligence kind of came 59 00:03:16,080 --> 00:03:19,560 Speaker 1: into its own in a really widely known way. That's 60 00:03:19,560 --> 00:03:23,400 Speaker 1: when Belling Cats reporting on the downing of MH On 61 00:03:23,840 --> 00:03:25,640 Speaker 1: seven like went out and that was kind of like 62 00:03:25,680 --> 00:03:31,320 Speaker 1: the first first really huge international story involving like open 63 00:03:31,360 --> 00:03:36,120 Speaker 1: source intelligent cracking a case UM. And now since the 64 00:03:36,240 --> 00:03:40,360 Speaker 1: expanded invasion of Russia back in February, we've kind of 65 00:03:40,520 --> 00:03:43,800 Speaker 1: entered and again this isn't really where this period started, 66 00:03:43,840 --> 00:03:46,760 Speaker 1: but this has been kind of we've seen an explosion 67 00:03:46,880 --> 00:03:49,040 Speaker 1: of what I think would be fair to call open 68 00:03:49,080 --> 00:03:55,600 Speaker 1: source intelligence disinformation. Um. Yeah, you want to talk a 69 00:03:55,640 --> 00:03:57,800 Speaker 1: little bit about kind of some of the stuff that 70 00:03:57,840 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 1: you've seen, because there's there's a number of accounts claiming 71 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:03,840 Speaker 1: to be doing ocean on the Ukrainian war. Um, and 72 00:04:04,120 --> 00:04:07,280 Speaker 1: boy howdy, they are not all giving out good information. 73 00:04:07,360 --> 00:04:10,280 Speaker 1: And it can be difficult for people to tell what 74 00:04:10,320 --> 00:04:12,720 Speaker 1: they should trust because if you're if you're kind of 75 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:16,320 Speaker 1: just scanning over it, bad ocean or even outright fake 76 00:04:16,320 --> 00:04:19,880 Speaker 1: ocean can look very similar to good ocean, right and 77 00:04:19,880 --> 00:04:22,120 Speaker 1: and so I would put a lot of the ocean 78 00:04:22,200 --> 00:04:27,840 Speaker 1: community into four rough categories. Uh there's uh osan analysts, 79 00:04:27,839 --> 00:04:30,479 Speaker 1: and those are pretty rare. Those are the kind of 80 00:04:30,520 --> 00:04:33,240 Speaker 1: people who combine what they're seeing in real time on 81 00:04:33,320 --> 00:04:36,599 Speaker 1: social media with a background of knowledge in the area. 82 00:04:36,680 --> 00:04:40,160 Speaker 1: So like a Ukraine regional expert combining that with what 83 00:04:40,160 --> 00:04:43,400 Speaker 1: they're seeing happen in Ukraine, that's an ocean analyst. There's 84 00:04:43,440 --> 00:04:46,880 Speaker 1: some Twitter accounts that are more ocean aggregators. They don't 85 00:04:46,920 --> 00:04:49,279 Speaker 1: really have much analysis that put into what they're what 86 00:04:49,279 --> 00:04:52,200 Speaker 1: they're producing, but they spit out a lot of information 87 00:04:52,360 --> 00:04:54,680 Speaker 1: in real time, and so if you follow the right 88 00:04:54,720 --> 00:04:57,640 Speaker 1: ones that use the right sources, you can get some 89 00:04:57,720 --> 00:05:00,760 Speaker 1: pretty decent information from them. Then there's more of the 90 00:05:00,839 --> 00:05:03,839 Speaker 1: misinformation aggregators, which are accounts that just kind of spread 91 00:05:03,839 --> 00:05:06,520 Speaker 1: whatever they see without regards to whether it's true or not. 92 00:05:07,080 --> 00:05:12,599 Speaker 1: Um they'll sensationalized stories. You know, if there's the uh 93 00:05:12,680 --> 00:05:15,320 Speaker 1: A rare command and control plane takes off somewhere in 94 00:05:15,360 --> 00:05:18,560 Speaker 1: America that's known as the doomsday plane during the Cold War, 95 00:05:18,839 --> 00:05:20,800 Speaker 1: they'll tweet out the doomsday plane is in the air. 96 00:05:20,920 --> 00:05:24,160 Speaker 1: Doesn't mean the clear war right, And they're not doing 97 00:05:24,200 --> 00:05:26,400 Speaker 1: it to be hurtful, they're doing it for likes. And 98 00:05:26,440 --> 00:05:30,080 Speaker 1: then there's disinformation aggregators who are deliberately out there trying 99 00:05:30,080 --> 00:05:33,440 Speaker 1: to sow discord and so problems. And those are four 100 00:05:33,480 --> 00:05:35,520 Speaker 1: categories that I've seen all of them develop in their 101 00:05:35,560 --> 00:05:39,080 Speaker 1: own ways in the last ten years. UM. I think 102 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:43,040 Speaker 1: the best best example of that final category there's an 103 00:05:43,040 --> 00:05:46,520 Speaker 1: account on Twitter called s MM Syria, and if you 104 00:05:46,560 --> 00:05:49,359 Speaker 1: look at the account, it looks almost identical to the 105 00:05:49,400 --> 00:05:53,640 Speaker 1: OS ces Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. It takes the 106 00:05:53,720 --> 00:05:55,600 Speaker 1: same kind of graphics and it has the same kind 107 00:05:55,640 --> 00:06:00,120 Speaker 1: of terminology, but it's an astaddist disinformation outlet and so 108 00:06:00,320 --> 00:06:03,080 Speaker 1: but they've woven their way into if you just took 109 00:06:03,080 --> 00:06:05,440 Speaker 1: a casual glance at the war in Syria, you might 110 00:06:05,520 --> 00:06:08,880 Speaker 1: believe that it's a valid source. And that's the kind 111 00:06:08,920 --> 00:06:11,800 Speaker 1: of more malicious disinformation that I'm talking about, where like 112 00:06:12,120 --> 00:06:14,799 Speaker 1: they know what they're doing and they're trying to confuse people, 113 00:06:15,480 --> 00:06:18,160 Speaker 1: and it's there's you know, I think one of the 114 00:06:18,240 --> 00:06:23,080 Speaker 1: best examples of something that really struck me recently as 115 00:06:23,160 --> 00:06:25,599 Speaker 1: problematic in in the war in Ukraine, as you've got 116 00:06:25,640 --> 00:06:29,520 Speaker 1: a video going around um of that purports to show 117 00:06:29,800 --> 00:06:35,200 Speaker 1: Ukrainian soldiers shooting captured Russian soldiers um, which is a 118 00:06:35,240 --> 00:06:38,480 Speaker 1: war crime. And uh, I think credible people within the 119 00:06:38,520 --> 00:06:41,839 Speaker 1: Ocean community have said this is something that desperately needs 120 00:06:41,880 --> 00:06:45,520 Speaker 1: to be investigated more seriously. This this like is very 121 00:06:45,960 --> 00:06:48,240 Speaker 1: has a very good chance of being legitimate and people 122 00:06:48,240 --> 00:06:51,279 Speaker 1: should be looking into this. Whereas you've also seen folks 123 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:56,160 Speaker 1: who kind of reflectively jumped to defend Ukraine against these allegations, 124 00:06:56,240 --> 00:06:59,960 Speaker 1: putting out what I think is fairly shoddy ocean claiming 125 00:07:00,080 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 1: to show like issues with the video and stuff, and 126 00:07:02,520 --> 00:07:05,720 Speaker 1: it's like people circling blurry sections of the video and 127 00:07:05,880 --> 00:07:07,800 Speaker 1: saying like this is you know, looks like it could 128 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:10,040 Speaker 1: be edited, or this doesn't look credible, and it is 129 00:07:10,120 --> 00:07:12,800 Speaker 1: the kind of thing. I think. One reason people can 130 00:07:12,840 --> 00:07:15,400 Speaker 1: get tripped up by that is prior to the invasion 131 00:07:15,440 --> 00:07:18,080 Speaker 1: of Ukraine, there were some Russian false flag events that 132 00:07:18,200 --> 00:07:21,720 Speaker 1: involved like cadavers, bodies that had been autopsy and stuff, 133 00:07:21,720 --> 00:07:24,000 Speaker 1: which was broken down by people like Elliot Higgins at 134 00:07:24,040 --> 00:07:26,520 Speaker 1: Belling cat Um and one of the things that again 135 00:07:26,640 --> 00:07:28,720 Speaker 1: if you're just kind of looking at the surface level, 136 00:07:29,000 --> 00:07:31,560 Speaker 1: you can see like, oh well that those were videos 137 00:07:31,640 --> 00:07:34,360 Speaker 1: that were faked, and so these like the o cent 138 00:07:34,480 --> 00:07:36,960 Speaker 1: around this people like pointing out different sections of the 139 00:07:37,040 --> 00:07:40,920 Speaker 1: video looks the same. Some of the differences are, for example, Um, 140 00:07:41,240 --> 00:07:44,480 Speaker 1: when they were analyzing the bodies and those those false 141 00:07:44,520 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 1: flag footage, they brought in actual you know, corpse cutter ruppers, morticians, yes, 142 00:07:50,760 --> 00:07:53,400 Speaker 1: to analyze like the cuts in the in the skulls 143 00:07:53,480 --> 00:07:56,040 Speaker 1: and whatnot, as opposed to again just kind of a 144 00:07:56,080 --> 00:07:58,400 Speaker 1: guy circling aspects of a video and being like this 145 00:07:58,520 --> 00:08:01,200 Speaker 1: doesn't seem right and it's like, um, but you can 146 00:08:01,280 --> 00:08:03,320 Speaker 1: I can see why people get tripped up by it, 147 00:08:03,440 --> 00:08:05,840 Speaker 1: and it it is important not to get tripped up 148 00:08:05,880 --> 00:08:09,080 Speaker 1: by that kind of stuff because um, war crimes are bad, 149 00:08:09,480 --> 00:08:11,760 Speaker 1: I think is a general attitude that we we both 150 00:08:11,840 --> 00:08:15,560 Speaker 1: share um and and should be investigated regardless of like 151 00:08:15,720 --> 00:08:18,880 Speaker 1: whether or not they're being done by the side who's 152 00:08:18,880 --> 00:08:21,600 Speaker 1: also towing Russian tanks away with tractors. That you're you're 153 00:08:21,640 --> 00:08:23,880 Speaker 1: on the side of right, like right, And I think 154 00:08:23,920 --> 00:08:27,080 Speaker 1: that that's that's exactly an important distinction to because like, 155 00:08:27,680 --> 00:08:29,920 Speaker 1: there are certain claims that have come out from the 156 00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:32,839 Speaker 1: Ukrainian side, certain statements that have come out that as 157 00:08:32,920 --> 00:08:36,360 Speaker 1: an osan analyst, I could probably look into more and 158 00:08:36,559 --> 00:08:39,160 Speaker 1: maybe poke holes and stuff like the number of kills 159 00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:43,520 Speaker 1: that the ghost of keys, right, Okay, maybe it's not 160 00:08:43,760 --> 00:08:45,640 Speaker 1: thirty kills or whatever it is that people are saying. 161 00:08:45,760 --> 00:08:50,640 Speaker 1: Maybe he's not really, but that's not harmful as much 162 00:08:50,800 --> 00:08:53,960 Speaker 1: as did these guys shoot people in the legs? Right? Right? 163 00:08:54,040 --> 00:08:57,360 Speaker 1: So one of those bears examination just because of the 164 00:08:57,480 --> 00:08:59,800 Speaker 1: nature of the claim. The other one, maybe we can 165 00:09:00,040 --> 00:09:02,240 Speaker 1: xamined it after the war when it's not a It 166 00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:05,920 Speaker 1: doesn't really matter if there is a Ukrainian ace fighter 167 00:09:06,000 --> 00:09:08,520 Speaker 1: pilot who's dropped a bunch of a crazy number like 168 00:09:08,559 --> 00:09:11,200 Speaker 1: obviously in a military sense of Russian jets are being 169 00:09:11,280 --> 00:09:13,880 Speaker 1: down to that doesn't matter. But like from the perspective 170 00:09:13,920 --> 00:09:17,800 Speaker 1: of people just kind of observing this war as as 171 00:09:17,880 --> 00:09:20,920 Speaker 1: news consumers, it doesn't really matter, whereas whether or not 172 00:09:21,040 --> 00:09:24,400 Speaker 1: a country gets away with a war crime absolutely matters, 173 00:09:24,760 --> 00:09:27,320 Speaker 1: and people are treating it with the same reflective handwave 174 00:09:27,400 --> 00:09:30,080 Speaker 1: as they do when they accept these ghost of Kiev. 175 00:09:30,520 --> 00:09:32,679 Speaker 1: Yes Smiths, right, they're saying like, well, no, but I 176 00:09:32,760 --> 00:09:35,160 Speaker 1: want the Ukrainian side to win this war, so we 177 00:09:35,280 --> 00:09:37,679 Speaker 1: can't even look into any claims of war crimes. And 178 00:09:37,720 --> 00:09:40,120 Speaker 1: that's just not how it's supposed to be. Like you 179 00:09:40,240 --> 00:09:43,760 Speaker 1: condemn the crimes up front, and you investigate and you 180 00:09:43,880 --> 00:09:46,319 Speaker 1: try to move forward, and that's how we prove that 181 00:09:46,400 --> 00:09:49,800 Speaker 1: we're better than the opposing sides. Like that's that's been 182 00:09:49,840 --> 00:09:51,920 Speaker 1: the rule in this war, and it's been the rule 183 00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:54,360 Speaker 1: in war's past. You know, you you prove that you're 184 00:09:54,400 --> 00:09:58,280 Speaker 1: better than your opponents by being more decent. Yeah, and 185 00:09:58,400 --> 00:10:01,760 Speaker 1: it's it's I have seen some really unsettling logic from 186 00:10:01,840 --> 00:10:04,880 Speaker 1: some people along the lines of like, well, these were 187 00:10:05,120 --> 00:10:08,000 Speaker 1: artillerymen who have been you know, shelling civilian areas, so 188 00:10:08,120 --> 00:10:10,400 Speaker 1: why shouldn't they be be shot in the leg? And 189 00:10:10,440 --> 00:10:13,040 Speaker 1: the answer is because, like, that's number one, it is 190 00:10:13,080 --> 00:10:16,160 Speaker 1: a war crime to shoot captured prisoners. Likely that that 191 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:18,920 Speaker 1: is a thing that we as a as a species 192 00:10:19,000 --> 00:10:22,920 Speaker 1: have attempted to make illegal, um and problem and ought 193 00:10:23,000 --> 00:10:24,599 Speaker 1: to be. It is a thing that like should not 194 00:10:24,760 --> 00:10:26,439 Speaker 1: be done. And there's actually of a wide variety of 195 00:10:26,480 --> 00:10:29,680 Speaker 1: like tactical reasons why it's bad for Ukraine. If Russian 196 00:10:29,760 --> 00:10:32,719 Speaker 1: soldiers believe they will be shot after being captured, it makes, 197 00:10:33,040 --> 00:10:35,199 Speaker 1: among other things, that makes soldiers less likely to turn 198 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:38,839 Speaker 1: themselves in. UM. One of the wiser decisions that the 199 00:10:38,960 --> 00:10:41,760 Speaker 1: Ukrainian government has made in this war has been really 200 00:10:41,920 --> 00:10:46,120 Speaker 1: deliberately pushing um the idea that like, hey, Russians, if 201 00:10:46,160 --> 00:10:49,720 Speaker 1: you surrender, will pay you, you can get Ukrainian citizenship, 202 00:10:49,880 --> 00:10:52,280 Speaker 1: Like bring in your tanks, you know, land your planes 203 00:10:52,360 --> 00:10:54,600 Speaker 1: or whatever, like well, you know, will make it worth 204 00:10:54,640 --> 00:10:58,920 Speaker 1: your while. Um, which is a lot which is potentially 205 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:02,360 Speaker 1: a force multiplier, right, Um, If Russian soldiers think when 206 00:11:02,360 --> 00:11:04,600 Speaker 1: I get captured, they will shoot me, then they will 207 00:11:04,640 --> 00:11:07,000 Speaker 1: fight to the death and Ukraine will lose more people 208 00:11:07,520 --> 00:11:10,440 Speaker 1: in that fight, as opposed to if Russian soldiers think, well, ship, 209 00:11:10,520 --> 00:11:13,000 Speaker 1: I could actually have a pretty decent life if I 210 00:11:13,120 --> 00:11:15,280 Speaker 1: just turned myself into these guys and refused to fight. 211 00:11:15,720 --> 00:11:18,800 Speaker 1: That means less people you have to fight. Um. So 212 00:11:18,920 --> 00:11:21,920 Speaker 1: it it does. It does really matter whether or not 213 00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:26,319 Speaker 1: this is happening. Um. And it's also just like on 214 00:11:26,400 --> 00:11:28,520 Speaker 1: a moral level, you you shouldn't accept it. And I 215 00:11:28,600 --> 00:11:30,640 Speaker 1: see some really I think one of the things that 216 00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:34,520 Speaker 1: I find so unsettling about that logic like these are uh, 217 00:11:34,920 --> 00:11:38,080 Speaker 1: these are you know, artillerymen who have been targeting civilian areas. 218 00:11:38,120 --> 00:11:40,920 Speaker 1: Why shouldn't they be shot? Um, It's not that much 219 00:11:40,960 --> 00:11:43,120 Speaker 1: of a leap to like some other ship we saw 220 00:11:43,200 --> 00:11:46,520 Speaker 1: people saying in Vietnam, you know, these villages are harboring insurgents. 221 00:11:46,559 --> 00:11:48,760 Speaker 1: Why shouldn't we treat them like the enemy? You know, 222 00:11:48,960 --> 00:11:52,040 Speaker 1: like all of this logic leads to people getting murdered 223 00:11:52,040 --> 00:11:56,000 Speaker 1: who don't deserve to get murdered, and that is bad. Right, 224 00:11:56,120 --> 00:11:58,520 Speaker 1: there's the snowball effect, the slippery slope effect with the 225 00:11:58,600 --> 00:12:00,040 Speaker 1: moral side of it. And then like you're saying a 226 00:12:00,120 --> 00:12:02,120 Speaker 1: tactical side of it. I mean, if you look at 227 00:12:02,920 --> 00:12:05,520 Speaker 1: part of the reason members of ISIS fought so hard 228 00:12:05,600 --> 00:12:09,400 Speaker 1: in places like most of which because once you're in 229 00:12:09,480 --> 00:12:12,040 Speaker 1: that organization, your options are a bullet or like a 230 00:12:12,200 --> 00:12:15,280 Speaker 1: desert cell. If you're lucky, they're not going to treat 231 00:12:15,320 --> 00:12:17,920 Speaker 1: you well and reintegrate you into society. Come on, like, no, 232 00:12:18,240 --> 00:12:20,280 Speaker 1: that's not how it works, so you fight like hell, 233 00:12:21,120 --> 00:12:23,679 Speaker 1: you know that's that's a very basic rule that is 234 00:12:23,679 --> 00:12:27,280 Speaker 1: pretty easy to understand, I would think. So that's why 235 00:12:27,360 --> 00:12:29,800 Speaker 1: this needs to be looked into. And if it's proven false, 236 00:12:31,080 --> 00:12:33,440 Speaker 1: if it's proven it to not be a correct true video, 237 00:12:33,960 --> 00:12:35,880 Speaker 1: that just strengthens the Ukrainian side. But if it is 238 00:12:35,920 --> 00:12:38,000 Speaker 1: proven to be true, it's something that needs to be investigated. 239 00:12:38,040 --> 00:12:40,160 Speaker 1: It can't be overlooked. It can't be swept under the 240 00:12:40,240 --> 00:12:42,680 Speaker 1: under the rug. Just because we we want one side 241 00:12:42,720 --> 00:12:44,880 Speaker 1: of this war to come out on top doesn't mean 242 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:48,719 Speaker 1: that we have to ignore you're committing like one, A 243 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:51,880 Speaker 1: good rule of thumb to approach a war from when 244 00:12:51,880 --> 00:12:55,200 Speaker 1: you're trying to analyze it is that there there has 245 00:12:55,280 --> 00:12:57,559 Speaker 1: never been a side in a war who have not 246 00:12:57,720 --> 00:13:01,559 Speaker 1: committed war crimes. Um. So that should always be on 247 00:13:01,640 --> 00:13:03,640 Speaker 1: your mind when you're trying to evaluate the reality of 248 00:13:03,640 --> 00:13:05,040 Speaker 1: a war crime. It doesn't mean every claim of a 249 00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:07,520 Speaker 1: war crime is true. That would be a very silly 250 00:13:07,600 --> 00:13:09,439 Speaker 1: way to translate that. But it does mean that when 251 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:12,040 Speaker 1: there is a claim that the side you support has 252 00:13:12,080 --> 00:13:14,679 Speaker 1: been responsible for a war crime, your default should be 253 00:13:15,040 --> 00:13:18,079 Speaker 1: this is not impossible, and I should I should proceed 254 00:13:18,160 --> 00:13:20,199 Speaker 1: from the area that this could have happened, and and 255 00:13:20,320 --> 00:13:24,040 Speaker 1: it should be analyzed without reflectively dismissing it, and also 256 00:13:24,120 --> 00:13:26,640 Speaker 1: without saying that like war crimes committed by a group 257 00:13:26,720 --> 00:13:29,079 Speaker 1: of soldiers in a single part of a theater necessarily 258 00:13:29,160 --> 00:13:32,800 Speaker 1: mean that the the war itself is being prosecuted in 259 00:13:32,840 --> 00:13:36,080 Speaker 1: a criminal level by that government. Um because for example, well, 260 00:13:36,080 --> 00:13:39,360 Speaker 1: I mean, I was about to say U. S. Soldiers 261 00:13:39,360 --> 00:13:41,880 Speaker 1: committed war crimes in World War Two, but actually the 262 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:43,920 Speaker 1: prosecution of that war was criminal in a lot of 263 00:13:43,960 --> 00:13:50,959 Speaker 1: fundamental ways. But it doesn't. That doesn't mean that like 264 00:13:51,160 --> 00:13:54,520 Speaker 1: your granddad committed war crimes because other U. S. Soldiers 265 00:13:54,559 --> 00:13:59,800 Speaker 1: who were in the field executed captured German POWs, you know, um, Yeah, 266 00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:02,000 Speaker 1: which I think is something people have an easier time 267 00:14:02,080 --> 00:14:04,880 Speaker 1: understanding when it's not a war, they feel the need 268 00:14:04,960 --> 00:14:08,600 Speaker 1: to have a series of two character or less takes 269 00:14:08,679 --> 00:14:12,520 Speaker 1: on in Twitter. Yeah, it's That's the weirdest thing about 270 00:14:12,559 --> 00:14:15,680 Speaker 1: about the social media age and and kind of sent 271 00:14:16,320 --> 00:14:19,520 Speaker 1: in general, is that while it does make it very 272 00:14:19,600 --> 00:14:23,080 Speaker 1: accessible and easy for anybody to get involved in investigating 273 00:14:23,360 --> 00:14:27,520 Speaker 1: these crimes and these events, it also means that everybody 274 00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:29,880 Speaker 1: thinks they have an opinion that matters on it, and 275 00:14:30,200 --> 00:14:33,280 Speaker 1: uh and and in that sense, they muddy the waters. 276 00:14:33,360 --> 00:14:36,800 Speaker 1: They they a lot of people can can imitate the 277 00:14:36,880 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 1: ocent look pretty well. They can circle things in pictures 278 00:14:40,280 --> 00:14:42,560 Speaker 1: that look similar, or as we saw in Syria, a 279 00:14:42,640 --> 00:14:46,200 Speaker 1: lot they'd take two pictures of two totally different dudes 280 00:14:46,560 --> 00:14:48,520 Speaker 1: and say these are the same guy, they're both members 281 00:14:48,560 --> 00:14:51,920 Speaker 1: of Al Nustra are something like that, and they would 282 00:14:51,960 --> 00:14:54,080 Speaker 1: compare the eyes and compare the chins and stuff, and 283 00:14:54,080 --> 00:14:56,440 Speaker 1: it's kind of like a belling cat image. But it 284 00:14:56,640 --> 00:15:00,560 Speaker 1: wasn't right. It is. That's the anger here is that 285 00:15:00,680 --> 00:15:04,920 Speaker 1: like everybody can can help, but everybody can hurt now too. Yeah. Yeah, 286 00:15:04,960 --> 00:15:08,920 Speaker 1: And it's one of those things. Every every aspect of 287 00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:11,160 Speaker 1: this cuts both ways, because like the thing people started 288 00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:15,240 Speaker 1: saying rightfully so after the invasion, or the expanded invasion 289 00:15:15,280 --> 00:15:18,000 Speaker 1: I should say of Ukraine by Russia. Is like, well, 290 00:15:18,040 --> 00:15:20,520 Speaker 1: now all of these people who were experts in whatever 291 00:15:20,600 --> 00:15:22,800 Speaker 1: the last big story was are going to become experts 292 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:25,440 Speaker 1: on the Ukrainian conflict, right, which is absolutely a thing 293 00:15:25,480 --> 00:15:27,080 Speaker 1: that happened. You get all of these people who I 294 00:15:27,120 --> 00:15:31,160 Speaker 1: think are pretty bad journalists and reporters who suddenly like 295 00:15:31,320 --> 00:15:33,640 Speaker 1: rushed to to have their commentary on this thing that 296 00:15:33,720 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 1: they have ignored for the last eight years. Um. But 297 00:15:37,120 --> 00:15:39,760 Speaker 1: at the same time, it's to talk about Belling Cat. 298 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:42,160 Speaker 1: The founder of Belling Cat, my old boss, Elliott Higgins, 299 00:15:42,760 --> 00:15:45,640 Speaker 1: was like literally an unemployed dude sitting on his couch 300 00:15:45,960 --> 00:15:48,880 Speaker 1: and when he started analyzing war footage um and is 301 00:15:48,960 --> 00:15:53,600 Speaker 1: now one of the most respected conflict analysts in the world. UM. 302 00:15:53,760 --> 00:15:56,480 Speaker 1: And that is a thing the Internet has made possible. UM. 303 00:15:56,560 --> 00:15:59,880 Speaker 1: I think a great example would be the Caliber Obscura Twitter, 304 00:16:00,000 --> 00:16:02,480 Speaker 1: which is just like a dude in the UK who 305 00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:07,760 Speaker 1: has an almost impossible ability to recognize firearms and pieces 306 00:16:07,800 --> 00:16:11,960 Speaker 1: of firearms and so just analyzes people send him footage 307 00:16:12,000 --> 00:16:13,880 Speaker 1: from all over the planet and he'll say, like, these 308 00:16:13,880 --> 00:16:15,480 Speaker 1: are these guns, and this is where they came from, 309 00:16:15,560 --> 00:16:17,800 Speaker 1: and this is uh, this one is like looks like 310 00:16:17,880 --> 00:16:21,280 Speaker 1: this kind of gun, but it's actually, um, a fake 311 00:16:21,360 --> 00:16:23,640 Speaker 1: one that's being made locally in this country, and it 312 00:16:23,760 --> 00:16:25,120 Speaker 1: is supposed to look like this. And you can tell 313 00:16:25,160 --> 00:16:28,760 Speaker 1: because like, um, that's not a person who Caliber did 314 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:32,000 Speaker 1: not like go to some sort of fancy gun school. 315 00:16:32,080 --> 00:16:35,200 Speaker 1: They just are uh. I mean, it's definitely not right 316 00:16:35,200 --> 00:16:37,240 Speaker 1: to call them an amateur because quite frankly, I don't 317 00:16:37,280 --> 00:16:40,320 Speaker 1: know any people who are working at institutes and better 318 00:16:40,400 --> 00:16:43,560 Speaker 1: at the thing that Caliber does than calibers, right um. 319 00:16:43,600 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 1: But they did just start as a person on Twitter. 320 00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:48,560 Speaker 1: You know, that's the thing about this, this is that 321 00:16:49,480 --> 00:16:52,080 Speaker 1: you get people who were not kind of born with 322 00:16:52,160 --> 00:16:54,360 Speaker 1: an idea that they were going to become analysts and 323 00:16:54,400 --> 00:16:57,120 Speaker 1: this in this field. And so you have people like 324 00:16:57,400 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: both of both of the people you mentioned, whom I 325 00:16:59,800 --> 00:17:02,080 Speaker 1: I know personal I don't know Elliott personally, but I 326 00:17:02,160 --> 00:17:05,240 Speaker 1: remember him from our days are shared days on a 327 00:17:05,359 --> 00:17:09,800 Speaker 1: comedy website together. It's the website that show remained nameless, 328 00:17:11,600 --> 00:17:16,119 Speaker 1: right um. And then and then you know, uh, Caliber 329 00:17:16,160 --> 00:17:18,240 Speaker 1: and I have talked on Twitter a bunch and you know, 330 00:17:18,320 --> 00:17:20,080 Speaker 1: we're friends there and it's just interesting to see that, 331 00:17:20,119 --> 00:17:23,399 Speaker 1: like both of them are very real people behind like 332 00:17:23,560 --> 00:17:27,800 Speaker 1: their professional personality and their their expertise. They're also down 333 00:17:27,880 --> 00:17:30,680 Speaker 1: to earth, real people, which is rare in this field 334 00:17:30,720 --> 00:17:33,480 Speaker 1: because a lot of people are kind of elitist um 335 00:17:33,680 --> 00:17:37,359 Speaker 1: and and and yeah Gatekeeper E And neither of them 336 00:17:37,400 --> 00:17:39,840 Speaker 1: are about that. They're both all about like getting as 337 00:17:39,880 --> 00:17:43,320 Speaker 1: many people doing this as possible because more eyes are better, Like, yeah, 338 00:17:43,920 --> 00:17:46,040 Speaker 1: Elliott is is Uh. I mean, the whole reason my 339 00:17:46,160 --> 00:17:48,920 Speaker 1: career with Belling Cat existed is because, like I emailed 340 00:17:48,960 --> 00:17:50,479 Speaker 1: him out of the blue one day and said, hey, 341 00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:53,359 Speaker 1: I've been noticing this weird thing in videos of fascists 342 00:17:53,960 --> 00:17:55,960 Speaker 1: talking to cops. Can I write a thing for you? 343 00:17:56,200 --> 00:17:58,639 Speaker 1: And he was just like okay, and and that was 344 00:17:58,880 --> 00:18:00,960 Speaker 1: I mean, like that was how that started. Um and 345 00:18:01,080 --> 00:18:03,720 Speaker 1: he's I've met him since a couple of times, and yeah, 346 00:18:03,720 --> 00:18:06,200 Speaker 1: it is a very I think it is very informed. 347 00:18:07,000 --> 00:18:09,280 Speaker 1: Because of the fact that he did not come from 348 00:18:09,400 --> 00:18:12,639 Speaker 1: sort of this big institutional background. UM has has a 349 00:18:12,760 --> 00:18:17,119 Speaker 1: humility with which he approaches his investigations that, uh, I 350 00:18:17,240 --> 00:18:20,200 Speaker 1: think is one of the things you should look for 351 00:18:20,440 --> 00:18:23,800 Speaker 1: in trying to decide whether or not open source intelligence 352 00:18:23,840 --> 00:18:26,440 Speaker 1: that you're seeing on Twitter whatever is credible is how 353 00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:31,080 Speaker 1: how how conclusive are they stating their claims? Are? How 354 00:18:31,119 --> 00:18:33,639 Speaker 1: many times do they offer only a single possibility for 355 00:18:33,760 --> 00:18:36,880 Speaker 1: what something is like? Um, you know, there's a number 356 00:18:36,880 --> 00:18:48,400 Speaker 1: of things you can do. I think at this point 357 00:18:48,480 --> 00:18:51,600 Speaker 1: we should probably move to a separate area of discussion, 358 00:18:51,680 --> 00:18:59,040 Speaker 1: which is how's the how's this working? Who? Who's who's winning? What? Um? Well, so, 359 00:18:59,240 --> 00:19:03,280 Speaker 1: I I made a statement on my Facebook page, my 360 00:19:03,400 --> 00:19:06,160 Speaker 1: personal Facebook page, three weeks ago, and I still feel 361 00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:09,280 Speaker 1: confident in that statement, and that is that well, Ukraine 362 00:19:09,359 --> 00:19:13,080 Speaker 1: has yet to win this war. Russia has already lost. 363 00:19:13,280 --> 00:19:16,639 Speaker 1: They've already lost their objectives, They've already lost what they 364 00:19:16,800 --> 00:19:18,480 Speaker 1: what their goals were. And at this point it's a 365 00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:21,639 Speaker 1: face saving venture on the Russian part. But a rum um. 366 00:19:22,480 --> 00:19:26,520 Speaker 1: Russia carried out a cutting faint action to distract while 367 00:19:26,560 --> 00:19:29,320 Speaker 1: they while they took the East by burning a fifth 368 00:19:29,359 --> 00:19:32,240 Speaker 1: of their general staff and all of their armored vehicles. 369 00:19:32,920 --> 00:19:35,639 Speaker 1: It was a cunning fat Yeah. I saw someone on 370 00:19:35,760 --> 00:19:41,280 Speaker 1: Twitter positive was actually uh a move to use up 371 00:19:41,320 --> 00:19:46,600 Speaker 1: all of Ukraine's ammunition. Brilliant, Yeah, just very very zab 372 00:19:46,680 --> 00:19:53,120 Speaker 1: Brannigan logic. Half of Vladimir Putin. Ukrainians have a preset 373 00:19:53,200 --> 00:19:55,960 Speaker 1: kill limit and once they hit ten generals, the army 374 00:19:56,000 --> 00:20:00,159 Speaker 1: will shut down. But no, the war is not well 375 00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:02,959 Speaker 1: for Russia. Um. And that's not to say that it's 376 00:20:03,000 --> 00:20:06,600 Speaker 1: going great for Ukraine either, but no one needs to 377 00:20:06,720 --> 00:20:12,840 Speaker 1: do less well to succeed here. Yes, it's uh, I 378 00:20:12,920 --> 00:20:15,159 Speaker 1: mean because one of the things that is a black box, right. 379 00:20:15,280 --> 00:20:18,040 Speaker 1: I do think because there was a lot of discussion 380 00:20:18,119 --> 00:20:20,280 Speaker 1: earlier in the ward, particularly like how credible are these 381 00:20:20,359 --> 00:20:23,159 Speaker 1: numbers that the Ukrainian government is putting out for for 382 00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:26,760 Speaker 1: dead and for destroyed vehicles? And I think the oceans 383 00:20:27,200 --> 00:20:30,399 Speaker 1: out there, like the verified vehicle casualties and stuff that 384 00:20:30,400 --> 00:20:33,280 Speaker 1: we can verify, means that like obviously the Ukrainian government 385 00:20:33,400 --> 00:20:36,360 Speaker 1: is patting their numbers, but not by as much as 386 00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:39,159 Speaker 1: a lot of people might have, like it's not wildly 387 00:20:39,280 --> 00:20:43,320 Speaker 1: off saw their first casualty account. I think first casual account. 388 00:20:43,320 --> 00:20:46,920 Speaker 1: I think it was okays, like day two or three, 389 00:20:48,119 --> 00:20:50,320 Speaker 1: and then like all of the western and help me, yeah, 390 00:20:50,760 --> 00:20:56,600 Speaker 1: actually yeah, it's probably about oh my god. Wow. Yeah 391 00:20:57,200 --> 00:20:59,560 Speaker 1: in perspective for some people who may not that number 392 00:20:59,600 --> 00:21:02,879 Speaker 1: may not jump out to them. We lost, you know, 393 00:21:03,400 --> 00:21:07,240 Speaker 1: just shy of three thousand soldiers killed during the Iraq Wars. So, yeah, 394 00:21:07,560 --> 00:21:10,360 Speaker 1: two thousand in a couple of days is an extraordinary 395 00:21:10,440 --> 00:21:13,359 Speaker 1: number of losses. Yeah. And of course the black box 396 00:21:13,400 --> 00:21:15,359 Speaker 1: here we don't have nearly as good an information on 397 00:21:15,640 --> 00:21:18,439 Speaker 1: is what kind of casualties is the Ukrainian military suffered 398 00:21:18,440 --> 00:21:21,119 Speaker 1: and what kind of civilian casualties have been suffered? And um, 399 00:21:21,560 --> 00:21:26,360 Speaker 1: Obviously civilian casualties nearly always take much longer to get, 400 00:21:26,640 --> 00:21:28,920 Speaker 1: um to the extent that it's ever. I think we 401 00:21:29,000 --> 00:21:32,720 Speaker 1: have a better chance of getting objective civilian casualties for 402 00:21:32,800 --> 00:21:35,320 Speaker 1: this because, unlike a lot of other conflicts, these civilians 403 00:21:35,359 --> 00:21:40,080 Speaker 1: being killed, our civilians under the ages of a government 404 00:21:40,119 --> 00:21:43,320 Speaker 1: that is a functional state, as opposed to Syria, for example, 405 00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:47,080 Speaker 1: where the there's basically the only people with an interest 406 00:21:47,160 --> 00:21:49,399 Speaker 1: in accurately reporting the death count are a number of 407 00:21:49,480 --> 00:21:55,080 Speaker 1: different non governmental organizations. Um, because the people being are 408 00:21:55,160 --> 00:21:57,360 Speaker 1: being killed by one government or the other, right including 409 00:21:57,440 --> 00:21:59,760 Speaker 1: like this is this was the same thing like in 410 00:21:59,800 --> 00:22:02,560 Speaker 1: a rack. The civilians who died in Mosel were technically 411 00:22:02,960 --> 00:22:06,920 Speaker 1: under the Iraqi government's you know whatever protection. Seems like 412 00:22:06,920 --> 00:22:08,920 Speaker 1: the wrong word to say, but I can tell you 413 00:22:09,000 --> 00:22:12,280 Speaker 1: from my experience there there was no We still do 414 00:22:12,400 --> 00:22:15,120 Speaker 1: not have anything that approaches a credible civilian death count 415 00:22:15,200 --> 00:22:18,840 Speaker 1: for for that conflict, um and probably never will right 416 00:22:18,960 --> 00:22:21,920 Speaker 1: and and on that note, on the civilian casualties note, 417 00:22:22,760 --> 00:22:26,800 Speaker 1: we were talking earlier about what how you can identify 418 00:22:26,880 --> 00:22:29,080 Speaker 1: a credible ostan account versus a one that you probably 419 00:22:29,080 --> 00:22:31,159 Speaker 1: shouldn't give too much credence to. And one of the 420 00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:34,480 Speaker 1: best ways to do that, honestly is is, ah, look 421 00:22:34,520 --> 00:22:38,200 Speaker 1: at their their morals. I guess if they're ever posting 422 00:22:38,320 --> 00:22:42,000 Speaker 1: and celebrating the death of civilians anywhere, you should probably 423 00:22:42,119 --> 00:22:45,800 Speaker 1: disregard them. Like, yeah, I'll never see Elliott Higgins being like, yeah, 424 00:22:45,920 --> 00:22:48,520 Speaker 1: suck at people of belowgrad like you got hit with 425 00:22:48,560 --> 00:22:50,760 Speaker 1: a missile, Like it's not it's you know, it's not 426 00:22:50,760 --> 00:22:53,440 Speaker 1: gonna happen. Yeah, it's not. It's the same thing as like, 427 00:22:54,440 --> 00:23:00,560 Speaker 1: I get why people celebrate, uh, you know, battlefield victory. Obviously, 428 00:23:00,640 --> 00:23:03,680 Speaker 1: I don't think, especially if you're literally a Ukrainian living, 429 00:23:04,080 --> 00:23:06,160 Speaker 1: you know, in the area affected, I don't think there's 430 00:23:06,160 --> 00:23:11,960 Speaker 1: anything morally wrong with celebrating opposing soldiers being defeated. But 431 00:23:12,280 --> 00:23:15,080 Speaker 1: I I am I continue to be deeply unsettled by 432 00:23:15,320 --> 00:23:20,119 Speaker 1: footage celebrating things like the destruction of armored personnel carriers 433 00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:23,840 Speaker 1: full of nineteen year old kids, um, even though a 434 00:23:23,960 --> 00:23:26,840 Speaker 1: non insignificant number of those nineteen year old kids are 435 00:23:27,200 --> 00:23:30,520 Speaker 1: accessories to war crimes. Right, Like, it doesn't mean like 436 00:23:30,680 --> 00:23:33,520 Speaker 1: I'm broadly okay with it. I do. I do feel 437 00:23:33,520 --> 00:23:37,160 Speaker 1: a lot better about celebrating losses of special forces units 438 00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:40,399 Speaker 1: like the vdv UM that have been heavily involved in 439 00:23:40,440 --> 00:23:42,800 Speaker 1: war crimes around the world, like that I have less 440 00:23:42,880 --> 00:23:46,760 Speaker 1: kind of an issue with. But and I felt that personally. 441 00:23:46,880 --> 00:23:50,080 Speaker 1: You know, I'm Armenian and during the Carback War, it 442 00:23:50,200 --> 00:23:53,000 Speaker 1: was just day, every day I would wake up to 443 00:23:53,560 --> 00:23:57,040 Speaker 1: dozens of videos of Armenian conscripts and soldiers being blown 444 00:23:57,160 --> 00:24:00,119 Speaker 1: up and hunted from the air, and people on when 445 00:24:00,240 --> 00:24:02,240 Speaker 1: or cheering for it because they were, for one reason 446 00:24:02,359 --> 00:24:04,840 Speaker 1: or another, on the ZERI side. And like, I get it, 447 00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:06,440 Speaker 1: you know, like you were saying you want to cheer 448 00:24:06,480 --> 00:24:10,560 Speaker 1: your battlefield victories, and I understand that from people who 449 00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:14,040 Speaker 1: live on the battlefield and live near the battlefield, I 450 00:24:14,160 --> 00:24:17,560 Speaker 1: get it. It's happening to you, to people thousands of 451 00:24:17,640 --> 00:24:20,600 Speaker 1: miles away cheerleading on the internet. What the hell is 452 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:23,880 Speaker 1: wrong with you. Yeah, maybe don't do that. Maybe don't 453 00:24:23,920 --> 00:24:26,119 Speaker 1: do that, like you what the hell? Like you know, 454 00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:28,760 Speaker 1: those are real people in that video that never did 455 00:24:28,800 --> 00:24:31,439 Speaker 1: anything to you. And this is not like a sporting 456 00:24:31,480 --> 00:24:32,840 Speaker 1: event where like they go home at the end of 457 00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:35,440 Speaker 1: the day and they've just lost, like they're dead even 458 00:24:35,520 --> 00:24:38,600 Speaker 1: when they do. Like, I've spent a huge amount of 459 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:42,399 Speaker 1: my career talking directly face to face with victims of ISIS, Right, 460 00:24:42,440 --> 00:24:46,439 Speaker 1: I have been to like eight or nine refugee camps 461 00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:50,119 Speaker 1: in two countries at this point, specifically for that were. 462 00:24:50,160 --> 00:24:53,600 Speaker 1: In addition, Todays spent on the refugee trail in between 463 00:24:53,680 --> 00:24:57,680 Speaker 1: Hungary and Serbia, talking to two Syrians and talking to 464 00:24:57,920 --> 00:25:01,600 Speaker 1: um um, people who would like led the region. Uh. 465 00:25:01,960 --> 00:25:04,920 Speaker 1: But at the same time, I can't help but like, 466 00:25:05,240 --> 00:25:07,560 Speaker 1: like I've literally been under fire by ISIS and then 467 00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:10,199 Speaker 1: had those ISIS guys gotten killed, and I have celebrated 468 00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:13,320 Speaker 1: and cheered when that's happened. Um, And I'll never forget 469 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:15,359 Speaker 1: we were embedded with this mortar team and we were 470 00:25:15,440 --> 00:25:19,159 Speaker 1: under fire from this sniper and the mortar team. I forget. 471 00:25:19,240 --> 00:25:20,879 Speaker 1: You can in the article I wrote on it, I 472 00:25:21,000 --> 00:25:22,520 Speaker 1: list the exact number of rounds fired but it was 473 00:25:22,520 --> 00:25:25,080 Speaker 1: like nine or ten something like that, where they're gradually 474 00:25:25,160 --> 00:25:28,639 Speaker 1: walking in mortars until they get this guy um. And 475 00:25:29,040 --> 00:25:31,440 Speaker 1: obviously we like cheered when they fucking killed this dude 476 00:25:31,480 --> 00:25:33,440 Speaker 1: because he was shooting at us. And I remember, like 477 00:25:33,560 --> 00:25:36,320 Speaker 1: kind of on our way out away from the front, 478 00:25:36,520 --> 00:25:40,760 Speaker 1: my fixer Sangar was like, how many rounds did they 479 00:25:40,840 --> 00:25:42,320 Speaker 1: drop before they got him? And I was like, I 480 00:25:42,320 --> 00:25:43,439 Speaker 1: don't know. I think it was like nine or ten. 481 00:25:43,480 --> 00:25:45,200 Speaker 1: I've got the footage somewhere and he was like, I 482 00:25:45,280 --> 00:25:50,159 Speaker 1: wonder what else they hit and and sing sangarsa uh 483 00:25:51,080 --> 00:25:53,440 Speaker 1: like was born and raised in mosle Um, And it 484 00:25:53,560 --> 00:25:55,760 Speaker 1: was one of those things we spent the very next day. 485 00:25:55,800 --> 00:25:58,720 Speaker 1: We were like talking to people fleeing their homes and stuff. 486 00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:01,600 Speaker 1: And not only did we like see some of those 487 00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:04,560 Speaker 1: people who lost family members to miss his Um, both 488 00:26:04,640 --> 00:26:08,200 Speaker 1: by Iraqi forces and by coalition aircraft and stuff, but 489 00:26:08,280 --> 00:26:10,800 Speaker 1: like we came upon this dead iis fighter in a 490 00:26:10,840 --> 00:26:13,520 Speaker 1: fighting position where you could see he had been in 491 00:26:13,600 --> 00:26:15,879 Speaker 1: there with his wife for days and he had been 492 00:26:15,920 --> 00:26:18,760 Speaker 1: wounded two or three days before he got killed, and 493 00:26:18,840 --> 00:26:21,240 Speaker 1: you could see the evidence of the first aide she 494 00:26:21,359 --> 00:26:22,960 Speaker 1: had done on him, and it was one of those things. 495 00:26:23,040 --> 00:26:25,000 Speaker 1: I guess I could try to make the case that like, well, 496 00:26:25,040 --> 00:26:27,560 Speaker 1: maybe she was a captive and didn't want to do it, 497 00:26:27,680 --> 00:26:30,359 Speaker 1: but quite frankly, everything I saw in there makes me 498 00:26:30,480 --> 00:26:33,440 Speaker 1: believe like she cared deeply for him and stayed with 499 00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:36,200 Speaker 1: him until the bitter end, trying to keep him alive 500 00:26:36,280 --> 00:26:38,920 Speaker 1: and fighting. Um. And that doesn't mean he's not like 501 00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:40,879 Speaker 1: a monster, and it doesn't mean he shouldn't have been 502 00:26:41,000 --> 00:26:43,359 Speaker 1: killed because he's a fucking dashi who was in the 503 00:26:43,440 --> 00:26:46,960 Speaker 1: middle of doing enabling a series of terrible things. But 504 00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:50,520 Speaker 1: he's also like, you can't you can't ignore the humanity 505 00:26:51,240 --> 00:26:54,520 Speaker 1: of of somebody when you have seen that element of 506 00:26:54,640 --> 00:26:58,040 Speaker 1: what what happens in the conflict, and that has stayed 507 00:26:58,080 --> 00:27:01,520 Speaker 1: with me quite a bit ever since. Yeah, and it's 508 00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:06,160 Speaker 1: it's one of those things. And you gotta you gotta 509 00:27:06,200 --> 00:27:09,399 Speaker 1: remember that the majority of of young men of fighting 510 00:27:09,480 --> 00:27:11,959 Speaker 1: age around the world who joined a military or an 511 00:27:12,359 --> 00:27:14,760 Speaker 1: armed organization or an insurgent group, whatever it may be, 512 00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:18,200 Speaker 1: they do so typically because it's whomever is in charge 513 00:27:18,240 --> 00:27:21,080 Speaker 1: of the area they're growing up in. Right, you don't 514 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:23,600 Speaker 1: join the Russian Army because you wait all the options 515 00:27:23,640 --> 00:27:25,879 Speaker 1: and the Brazilian Army offer some good aid, you know, 516 00:27:26,000 --> 00:27:28,880 Speaker 1: some good healthcare packages. And I looked at the Italian Army, 517 00:27:28,920 --> 00:27:30,320 Speaker 1: but really I want to go with the Russian. No, 518 00:27:30,440 --> 00:27:33,560 Speaker 1: you go with wherever you were born, yeah, whether and 519 00:27:33,960 --> 00:27:35,680 Speaker 1: you know, and I was talking to my roommate about 520 00:27:35,680 --> 00:27:38,200 Speaker 1: this last night. We were watching this footage from the 521 00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:40,200 Speaker 1: flood of ninety six here in Oregon, you know, And 522 00:27:40,240 --> 00:27:43,439 Speaker 1: it's this National Guard a helicopter where they're pushing bales 523 00:27:43,520 --> 00:27:45,400 Speaker 1: of hay out of the back of the helicopter down 524 00:27:45,480 --> 00:27:48,919 Speaker 1: to cows stranded out in your tillamook. And so depending 525 00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:51,000 Speaker 1: on when you join the National Guard, you either fed 526 00:27:51,160 --> 00:27:55,800 Speaker 1: cows hey from a helicopter or deployed to Irock. That's 527 00:27:55,840 --> 00:27:58,600 Speaker 1: the luck of the draw, right, That's not fair. No, 528 00:27:59,520 --> 00:28:00,919 Speaker 1: they don't just or have to die any more than 529 00:28:00,960 --> 00:28:03,560 Speaker 1: the guys dropping the hay out of the helicopter did, right. 530 00:28:04,640 --> 00:28:07,960 Speaker 1: But people get Yeah, they get carried away with like 531 00:28:08,200 --> 00:28:10,560 Speaker 1: turning it into a sport almost, and they forget that 532 00:28:10,600 --> 00:28:12,040 Speaker 1: there's people on the other end, and that like, while 533 00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:14,720 Speaker 1: some of them are threats and they may need to 534 00:28:14,760 --> 00:28:18,840 Speaker 1: be dealt with, it's like you know, a bear comes 535 00:28:18,880 --> 00:28:21,120 Speaker 1: at you in the woods, you shoot it, you don't, 536 00:28:21,280 --> 00:28:23,720 Speaker 1: you don't skin it and make fun of it, like yeah, 537 00:28:24,200 --> 00:28:28,120 Speaker 1: you know, I go kill its kids. You know, that's 538 00:28:28,160 --> 00:28:31,360 Speaker 1: not that's not how it works, you know, So like yeah, yeah, 539 00:28:31,480 --> 00:28:33,159 Speaker 1: don't don't be don't be a piece of ship, Like 540 00:28:33,240 --> 00:28:38,200 Speaker 1: don't don't don't don't lose your humanity, m because I mean, 541 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:39,520 Speaker 1: one of the things that makes it easy to lose 542 00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:42,920 Speaker 1: your humanity is that like videos of ship getting blown 543 00:28:43,000 --> 00:28:45,520 Speaker 1: up looks dope, right like it it does. It looks 544 00:28:45,560 --> 00:28:47,680 Speaker 1: cool to watch things get blown up. That's in fact, 545 00:28:47,760 --> 00:28:50,480 Speaker 1: I suspect how a lot of people who become very 546 00:28:50,560 --> 00:28:52,800 Speaker 1: good oh since investigators part of what draws them in. 547 00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:54,240 Speaker 1: It's just like I'm sure that was a part of 548 00:28:54,280 --> 00:28:57,400 Speaker 1: why Caliber started obsessively researching guns. Is like their neat 549 00:28:57,520 --> 00:29:00,520 Speaker 1: guns are neat. You know, weapons are interesting. People are 550 00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:05,760 Speaker 1: inherently interested in in weaponry. Um, which is not a 551 00:29:05,880 --> 00:29:07,840 Speaker 1: good thing. It's just the thing, you know. It's not 552 00:29:07,920 --> 00:29:09,880 Speaker 1: a bad thing either. It's just like a thing human 553 00:29:09,960 --> 00:29:13,360 Speaker 1: beings will always be interested in because warfare is as 554 00:29:13,440 --> 00:29:17,280 Speaker 1: natural to us as eating and fucking um. Well, you're 555 00:29:17,280 --> 00:29:19,520 Speaker 1: talking about the mortars, right, the mortars walking in and 556 00:29:19,560 --> 00:29:22,600 Speaker 1: there's this video on YouTube of made by an American 557 00:29:22,760 --> 00:29:26,960 Speaker 1: Navy attack squadron Um of them dropping bomb after bomb 558 00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:30,600 Speaker 1: on targets and muzzle and and and rocca places like that, 559 00:29:31,200 --> 00:29:33,920 Speaker 1: and it's set to the Devil's going to cut You down, 560 00:29:34,000 --> 00:29:35,960 Speaker 1: and every time there's a beat and in the music 561 00:29:36,040 --> 00:29:38,160 Speaker 1: and you see a bomb drop, and some of these 562 00:29:38,200 --> 00:29:40,600 Speaker 1: bombs it's like four bombs dropping at a time, dropping 563 00:29:40,640 --> 00:29:42,920 Speaker 1: an eight story building. And so I'm sure there was 564 00:29:42,960 --> 00:29:45,080 Speaker 1: a guy inside there with a woman, but like you 565 00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:47,040 Speaker 1: want to tell me there wasn't anybody else in that 566 00:29:47,120 --> 00:29:50,160 Speaker 1: eighth story building, And like, okay, yeah, you're celebrating the 567 00:29:50,200 --> 00:29:52,160 Speaker 1: death of the combatant there, but like also all those 568 00:29:52,200 --> 00:29:55,360 Speaker 1: other people are being celebrated indirectly, and so like you 569 00:29:55,440 --> 00:29:58,200 Speaker 1: gotta remember that, like these bombs explode and they take 570 00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:00,080 Speaker 1: out a large area, and these fights are happening in 571 00:30:00,240 --> 00:30:03,120 Speaker 1: cities a lot of the time. Yeah, the weaponry that 572 00:30:03,160 --> 00:30:07,480 Speaker 1: the United States uses is more precise than something like 573 00:30:07,600 --> 00:30:10,840 Speaker 1: a barrel bomb, but not by as many orders of 574 00:30:10,920 --> 00:30:15,240 Speaker 1: magnitude as you would hope um And and precision doesn't 575 00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:20,160 Speaker 1: precision matters. Yes, it's not a non important things an 576 00:30:20,320 --> 00:30:23,400 Speaker 1: important thing, but ultimately It doesn't matter if your missile 577 00:30:23,480 --> 00:30:25,840 Speaker 1: went right into that living room full of civilians and 578 00:30:25,880 --> 00:30:27,920 Speaker 1: blew them all up, or if you leveled the block 579 00:30:28,040 --> 00:30:31,080 Speaker 1: and maybe you know, killed them indirectly. Like you gotta 580 00:30:31,120 --> 00:30:33,560 Speaker 1: know what you're hitting. The target is what really matters, right, 581 00:30:33,840 --> 00:30:35,280 Speaker 1: So it doesn't matter if you can hit the target, 582 00:30:35,280 --> 00:30:37,200 Speaker 1: you gotta make sure it's the right target. And that's 583 00:30:37,280 --> 00:30:39,240 Speaker 1: where we're starting to have issues now, is like we 584 00:30:39,320 --> 00:30:42,120 Speaker 1: can hit targets really well, we just aren't always sure 585 00:30:42,160 --> 00:30:44,960 Speaker 1: that it's the right yes, as opposed I mean, and 586 00:30:45,120 --> 00:30:47,800 Speaker 1: and you are seeing. So let's let's talk about we 587 00:30:47,920 --> 00:30:52,560 Speaker 1: we started this chatting about Ukrainian potential Ukrainian war crime. Um, 588 00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:56,280 Speaker 1: what we have absolute documentation. It is a tremendous amount 589 00:30:56,320 --> 00:30:59,480 Speaker 1: of war crimes on behalf of the Russian UH invaders, 590 00:30:59,840 --> 00:31:02,680 Speaker 1: including a thing that they have done repeatedly in Syria, 591 00:31:02,760 --> 00:31:06,840 Speaker 1: which is the targeting of hospitals and medical facilities, um 592 00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:10,360 Speaker 1: with with terrible civilian casualties as a as a result. 593 00:31:10,400 --> 00:31:12,480 Speaker 1: And this is something that the New York Times actually 594 00:31:12,560 --> 00:31:15,560 Speaker 1: published an incredible article based on a mix of O 595 00:31:15,720 --> 00:31:18,719 Speaker 1: cent and like I'm not entirely sure how they got them, 596 00:31:18,800 --> 00:31:22,280 Speaker 1: but combat flight recorders, like the audio that these these 597 00:31:22,360 --> 00:31:25,600 Speaker 1: Russian fighter pilots were sending back and forth to command 598 00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:28,840 Speaker 1: as they attacked hospitals in Syria. Um, so we actually 599 00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:31,360 Speaker 1: have a tremendous amount of detail about like what it 600 00:31:31,560 --> 00:31:34,840 Speaker 1: looks like inside the cockpit and in like the control 601 00:31:34,920 --> 00:31:37,840 Speaker 1: room and whatnot, as air strikes are being ordered on 602 00:31:38,000 --> 00:31:41,040 Speaker 1: medical facilities. I really recommend people check that article out. 603 00:31:41,760 --> 00:31:45,360 Speaker 1: Um it's it's pretty harrowing shit. But um, yeah, are 604 00:31:45,400 --> 00:31:47,560 Speaker 1: you are you surprised at all by kind of what 605 00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:50,040 Speaker 1: you are what you've seen so far in behalf of 606 00:31:50,080 --> 00:31:53,000 Speaker 1: the Russian forces in Ukraine? No, no, not even not 607 00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:56,000 Speaker 1: even the slightest, Because I followed the war and in 608 00:31:56,240 --> 00:31:59,240 Speaker 1: Syria rather closely. And uh, I mean there was a 609 00:31:59,280 --> 00:32:02,080 Speaker 1: point when they had stop marking the hospitals with hospital 610 00:32:02,120 --> 00:32:05,160 Speaker 1: marketings because the Russians would target them so consistently. The 611 00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:07,800 Speaker 1: United Nations had to stop giving the Russians the coordinates 612 00:32:07,880 --> 00:32:11,200 Speaker 1: of the hospitals and in Aleppo because they kept getting targeted. Um, 613 00:32:11,680 --> 00:32:14,880 Speaker 1: there was an aid convoy that was struck, I believe 614 00:32:14,960 --> 00:32:17,760 Speaker 1: by Syrian aircraft, but it was the targeting was given 615 00:32:17,800 --> 00:32:20,200 Speaker 1: to them by Russian aircraft. Um, it was just an 616 00:32:20,200 --> 00:32:23,240 Speaker 1: AID convoy coming into Aleppo, a United Nations and Aid convoy, 617 00:32:23,280 --> 00:32:25,520 Speaker 1: and it was bombed and strafe repeatedly for you know, 618 00:32:25,640 --> 00:32:29,760 Speaker 1: several hours. Um. Things like that that happened so regularly 619 00:32:29,840 --> 00:32:32,960 Speaker 1: in Syria to the relative silence of the rest of 620 00:32:33,000 --> 00:32:36,200 Speaker 1: the world. Um, that led me to believe that when 621 00:32:36,240 --> 00:32:39,600 Speaker 1: they go into Ukraine, they're not going to be any gentler. Um. 622 00:32:40,480 --> 00:32:42,680 Speaker 1: A lot of people suspected early on that, like, well, 623 00:32:43,280 --> 00:32:46,280 Speaker 1: they it's harder to demonize people who look like you, 624 00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:49,440 Speaker 1: so they're not going to have as much of an 625 00:32:49,480 --> 00:32:53,080 Speaker 1: easy time demonizing Ukrainians. And I think there has been 626 00:32:53,160 --> 00:32:55,720 Speaker 1: some degree of difficulty with that, at least in terms 627 00:32:55,760 --> 00:32:58,040 Speaker 1: of some of the conscripts on the Russian side. But 628 00:32:58,160 --> 00:32:59,560 Speaker 1: the other thing we're seeing is that, like a lot 629 00:32:59,640 --> 00:33:02,680 Speaker 1: of these, a lot of people seem to genuinely believe 630 00:33:02,760 --> 00:33:07,120 Speaker 1: the mission of denazifying Ukraine. And so if that's what 631 00:33:07,240 --> 00:33:12,920 Speaker 1: you believe you're doing, then the bombing doesn't surprise. It 632 00:33:13,000 --> 00:33:15,560 Speaker 1: doesn't become a surprise. Right If you think that you're 633 00:33:15,560 --> 00:33:18,320 Speaker 1: going into Ukraine to suppress it and occupy it, then 634 00:33:18,400 --> 00:33:21,480 Speaker 1: bombing city city is full of Russians, Russians and Russian speakers. 635 00:33:21,640 --> 00:33:24,040 Speaker 1: Seems like a bad idea, but if you believe that 636 00:33:24,120 --> 00:33:28,040 Speaker 1: they're all Nazis, then it makes sense that you might 637 00:33:28,240 --> 00:33:30,240 Speaker 1: just blow them up because they're all the enemy. I'm 638 00:33:30,280 --> 00:33:32,080 Speaker 1: not saying I'm not condoning it. I'm saying no, But 639 00:33:32,160 --> 00:33:34,280 Speaker 1: I mean that is literally what the US government in 640 00:33:34,360 --> 00:33:38,240 Speaker 1: the British government did in World War Two. You know exactly. 641 00:33:48,440 --> 00:33:52,960 Speaker 1: There have been claims made that what Russia is doing 642 00:33:53,080 --> 00:33:57,920 Speaker 1: in places like Maryo Pol announced to an active genocide. UM. 643 00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:02,160 Speaker 1: What is your opinion on that? Genocide is a big word. 644 00:34:05,160 --> 00:34:08,040 Speaker 1: It's yeah, but you know it has a lot of 645 00:34:08,120 --> 00:34:10,600 Speaker 1: meaning behind it, in the sense that like, just because 646 00:34:10,680 --> 00:34:12,880 Speaker 1: somebody is killing large numbers of people and doing so 647 00:34:13,000 --> 00:34:15,080 Speaker 1: in heinous ways does not make it a genocide. You 648 00:34:15,160 --> 00:34:18,040 Speaker 1: have to pro an attempt to destroy culture and destroy 649 00:34:18,160 --> 00:34:22,040 Speaker 1: heritage and things of that nature. Um. As it stands, 650 00:34:22,239 --> 00:34:25,200 Speaker 1: I would say that it looks likely that there are 651 00:34:25,320 --> 00:34:29,240 Speaker 1: signs of potential genocide in Mariable. I am not confident 652 00:34:29,320 --> 00:34:31,400 Speaker 1: enough to come out and say that I conclusively think 653 00:34:31,400 --> 00:34:34,160 Speaker 1: it's happening, but the way that it looks like the 654 00:34:34,800 --> 00:34:38,440 Speaker 1: the city is being deliberately targeted to either force the 655 00:34:38,680 --> 00:34:43,200 Speaker 1: entire population to flee or to radicalize them one way 656 00:34:43,320 --> 00:34:47,320 Speaker 1: or the other. Is it goes beyond military uh targeting. 657 00:34:47,880 --> 00:34:50,360 Speaker 1: You know. I think the thing that were that I 658 00:34:50,600 --> 00:34:55,799 Speaker 1: that is the most like troubling potential sign of an 659 00:34:55,840 --> 00:35:00,000 Speaker 1: intention of genocide is the reports that the Russian government 660 00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:03,200 Speaker 1: and has been evacuating civilians that they have in parts 661 00:35:03,239 --> 00:35:06,719 Speaker 1: of Mariopold. They have captured two places in Russia, which 662 00:35:06,800 --> 00:35:08,920 Speaker 1: is this is a misconception. You don't have to just 663 00:35:09,160 --> 00:35:11,279 Speaker 1: be killing people, as you stated, it's an attempt to 664 00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:13,480 Speaker 1: destroy a culture, which you can do by killing, but 665 00:35:13,560 --> 00:35:17,479 Speaker 1: you can also do by things like separating people, moving people, 666 00:35:17,600 --> 00:35:21,640 Speaker 1: like forced migration and whatnot. Like there's aspects of that. Again, 667 00:35:21,719 --> 00:35:23,680 Speaker 1: look at like the genocide of the Native Americans in 668 00:35:23,719 --> 00:35:26,080 Speaker 1: the United States. It was not all straight up killing. 669 00:35:26,120 --> 00:35:29,360 Speaker 1: A lot of it was forced migration, um, which is 670 00:35:29,400 --> 00:35:31,840 Speaker 1: an act of genocide as well. Um. And that's the 671 00:35:31,960 --> 00:35:34,239 Speaker 1: kind of thing where I'm I'm kind of waiting for 672 00:35:34,400 --> 00:35:37,760 Speaker 1: more reporting on that to the to see here exactly 673 00:35:37,840 --> 00:35:39,719 Speaker 1: what's happening in the extent to what's happening, But that 674 00:35:39,840 --> 00:35:43,600 Speaker 1: really troubles me in terms of potential signs of a genocide. Yeah, 675 00:35:43,719 --> 00:35:46,000 Speaker 1: and when they when they coined the term genocide after 676 00:35:46,080 --> 00:35:49,600 Speaker 1: World War Two, it was it was with reference to 677 00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:52,279 Speaker 1: the Holocaust. But but what they had in mind was 678 00:35:52,360 --> 00:35:56,520 Speaker 1: the Armenian genocide. Yeah, when it when they when they 679 00:35:56,600 --> 00:36:00,319 Speaker 1: drafted these words, and because it was beyond just sheer 680 00:36:00,480 --> 00:36:02,480 Speaker 1: number of people killed, if we're talking a sheer number 681 00:36:02,520 --> 00:36:06,000 Speaker 1: of people killed, the Nazis also killed six million other 682 00:36:06,120 --> 00:36:08,879 Speaker 1: people in addition to the six million Jews they killed. 683 00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:12,040 Speaker 1: The reason we talked about the Jews is one, six 684 00:36:12,120 --> 00:36:14,320 Speaker 1: million is a lot of people. And two, it was 685 00:36:14,400 --> 00:36:18,640 Speaker 1: a deliberate attempt to destroy their entire culture, to make 686 00:36:18,719 --> 00:36:22,600 Speaker 1: them have never existed. And that's very different and very scary. 687 00:36:22,800 --> 00:36:25,840 Speaker 1: Dying is also very bad, the idea of dying and 688 00:36:25,920 --> 00:36:27,759 Speaker 1: then all of the people who were like you just 689 00:36:27,840 --> 00:36:30,440 Speaker 1: don't exist anymore, and all your books and your literature 690 00:36:30,440 --> 00:36:34,880 Speaker 1: are gone, Like that's that's monstrous. Yeah, And that's why 691 00:36:34,920 --> 00:36:38,040 Speaker 1: there's a difference between genocide and mass killing. Yeah, And 692 00:36:38,360 --> 00:36:40,480 Speaker 1: it's it's the difference that we talked about US war 693 00:36:40,560 --> 00:36:42,399 Speaker 1: crimes in World War Two, of which there were many, 694 00:36:42,480 --> 00:36:45,400 Speaker 1: including the fire bombing of Dresden. I would argue, but 695 00:36:45,520 --> 00:36:48,000 Speaker 1: it's not an act of genocide because when they fire 696 00:36:48,080 --> 00:36:52,440 Speaker 1: bombed Dresden. It was certainly um the killing of civilians 697 00:36:52,520 --> 00:36:56,440 Speaker 1: without particular regard to the direct military efficacy of the action, 698 00:36:56,520 --> 00:36:59,040 Speaker 1: But it was not an attempt to destroy German culture 699 00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:02,600 Speaker 1: or obliterate the German people. And you brought up the 700 00:37:02,719 --> 00:37:05,359 Speaker 1: Armenian genocide, Well, we'll talk about this at some point 701 00:37:05,480 --> 00:37:08,279 Speaker 1: behind the bastards. But he mentioned that that was kind 702 00:37:08,320 --> 00:37:12,040 Speaker 1: of what the people when the term genocide was invented, 703 00:37:12,680 --> 00:37:15,120 Speaker 1: that was what people were looking at, even though it 704 00:37:15,200 --> 00:37:16,960 Speaker 1: was kind of a direct response to the Holocaust. It's 705 00:37:16,960 --> 00:37:20,759 Speaker 1: also worth noting that like when the Nazis planned the Holocaust, 706 00:37:20,920 --> 00:37:24,400 Speaker 1: they used the Armenian genocide as a model. Um Hitler's 707 00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:27,759 Speaker 1: literal statement was when people when he was asked during 708 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:29,960 Speaker 1: like one of his his dinners with a bunch of 709 00:37:30,160 --> 00:37:34,440 Speaker 1: Nazi officials, like what what about kind of the international 710 00:37:34,560 --> 00:37:37,120 Speaker 1: reaction to what we're planning to do? He was like, well, 711 00:37:37,120 --> 00:37:39,800 Speaker 1: who remembers the Armenians? You know? Like that was his 712 00:37:40,040 --> 00:37:41,480 Speaker 1: That was his attitude, is like, we'll get away with 713 00:37:41,560 --> 00:37:44,680 Speaker 1: it because nobody did anything during this genocide, right and 714 00:37:44,840 --> 00:37:48,439 Speaker 1: and and I think while I would hesitate to call 715 00:37:48,600 --> 00:37:52,440 Speaker 1: the entire war in Ukrainian genocide. Yes, as of yet, 716 00:37:52,960 --> 00:37:55,080 Speaker 1: I would say that there's a similarity between the Armenian 717 00:37:55,160 --> 00:37:59,359 Speaker 1: genocide and and how that led to the Holocaust. There's 718 00:37:59,360 --> 00:38:01,600 Speaker 1: a similarity be between the Russian war crimes committed in 719 00:38:01,680 --> 00:38:03,839 Speaker 1: Syria and how that led to the war crimes being 720 00:38:04,440 --> 00:38:06,839 Speaker 1: committed in Ukraine, in the sense that if the world 721 00:38:06,920 --> 00:38:11,040 Speaker 1: had stood up earlier, we would not be seeing this now. Yeah. 722 00:38:12,040 --> 00:38:14,680 Speaker 1: The problem is the world looked the other way when 723 00:38:14,719 --> 00:38:19,160 Speaker 1: the Russians bombed hospitals in Syria, when they repeatedly bombed hospitals. 724 00:38:19,200 --> 00:38:22,560 Speaker 1: In fact, the world didn't just look away. A lot 725 00:38:22,640 --> 00:38:25,560 Speaker 1: of people in the West mocked it. I'm sure you've 726 00:38:25,600 --> 00:38:27,480 Speaker 1: heard it as often as I have. The last hospital 727 00:38:27,560 --> 00:38:30,319 Speaker 1: and Aleppo joke right where, oh they're bombing the lost 728 00:38:30,360 --> 00:38:32,759 Speaker 1: the last hospital and Aleppo again. Well, the reason that 729 00:38:32,840 --> 00:38:34,919 Speaker 1: happened is because when you bomb the hospital, they build 730 00:38:34,960 --> 00:38:37,040 Speaker 1: a new one and then it gets bombed again three 731 00:38:37,080 --> 00:38:39,279 Speaker 1: days later, so they've bombed the last one again. So 732 00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:41,239 Speaker 1: it wasn't a joke. It was just a tragedy that 733 00:38:41,320 --> 00:38:45,160 Speaker 1: kept playing out that people couldn't really fathom, so they mocked, right, 734 00:38:45,239 --> 00:38:47,200 Speaker 1: And so when that's the attitude of a lot of 735 00:38:47,239 --> 00:38:49,640 Speaker 1: the world, it's no surprise that what's what's happened in 736 00:38:49,760 --> 00:38:53,640 Speaker 1: Ukraine as as run out of control? M hm, Where 737 00:38:53,640 --> 00:38:55,279 Speaker 1: do you think we go from here? What are you 738 00:38:55,360 --> 00:38:58,080 Speaker 1: what are you expecting to kind of see next within 739 00:38:58,200 --> 00:39:01,000 Speaker 1: this conflict? You know, the most recent kind of reporting 740 00:39:01,080 --> 00:39:03,880 Speaker 1: is that Russia's pulling. Russia's framing it as they're pulling 741 00:39:03,920 --> 00:39:07,319 Speaker 1: back from Kiev to to focus on other fronts. Uh. 742 00:39:07,440 --> 00:39:09,920 Speaker 1: The Ukrainian side is saying like, well, they've been defeated 743 00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:11,879 Speaker 1: around Kiev and they're pulling back. What do you think 744 00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:14,200 Speaker 1: kind of we're seeing next? What what is your opinion 745 00:39:14,239 --> 00:39:16,920 Speaker 1: on kind of the next stages here? So I think 746 00:39:16,960 --> 00:39:21,239 Speaker 1: it really depends on Vladimir Putin's power and how long 747 00:39:21,360 --> 00:39:24,640 Speaker 1: he remains in a position of unchecked power. I'm not 748 00:39:24,800 --> 00:39:27,360 Speaker 1: saying necessarily he will fall from power. I'm saying that 749 00:39:28,080 --> 00:39:30,439 Speaker 1: how long can he go as the only guy calling 750 00:39:30,480 --> 00:39:33,640 Speaker 1: the shots? Because as it stands right now, it doesn't 751 00:39:33,760 --> 00:39:36,239 Speaker 1: look like he's the same Vladimir Putin that we were 752 00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:38,120 Speaker 1: used to dealing with. It seems like something may have 753 00:39:38,280 --> 00:39:42,000 Speaker 1: changed with him. And that's a wild card because if 754 00:39:43,000 --> 00:39:45,400 Speaker 1: if Vladimir Putin wants to continue to escalate here. He 755 00:39:45,400 --> 00:39:47,719 Speaker 1: can continue to do so because he may not be 756 00:39:47,760 --> 00:39:49,880 Speaker 1: getting the same reporting that we are about the condition 757 00:39:49,920 --> 00:39:52,160 Speaker 1: of his army. He may think his army is doing 758 00:39:52,239 --> 00:39:54,759 Speaker 1: better than they're doing and that they actually are just repositioning. 759 00:39:55,120 --> 00:39:56,920 Speaker 1: So if that's the case, there's a chance to he'll 760 00:39:57,000 --> 00:40:00,600 Speaker 1: escalate against potentially in NATO country. I find that unlikely, 761 00:40:01,120 --> 00:40:03,160 Speaker 1: but there's still a chance for it. I think what's 762 00:40:03,160 --> 00:40:04,800 Speaker 1: more likely is that we're going to see the Russian 763 00:40:04,840 --> 00:40:09,160 Speaker 1: military refocused efforts in the east, in in donetskan Hansk 764 00:40:09,640 --> 00:40:11,880 Speaker 1: with an attempts to create a land bridge to Crimea 765 00:40:12,000 --> 00:40:16,000 Speaker 1: through the area through Mariopola Melitopa area UM and I 766 00:40:16,040 --> 00:40:17,680 Speaker 1: think they're going to try to rusify the area as 767 00:40:17,760 --> 00:40:20,600 Speaker 1: much as possible and remove as many of the Ukrainians 768 00:40:20,640 --> 00:40:24,120 Speaker 1: as possible UM one way or the other. And I 769 00:40:24,120 --> 00:40:25,719 Speaker 1: don't know if they'll be successful in that, but I 770 00:40:25,760 --> 00:40:27,680 Speaker 1: think simultaneously while they do that, they're going to try 771 00:40:27,719 --> 00:40:29,680 Speaker 1: to tie down and destroy as much of the Ukrainian 772 00:40:29,719 --> 00:40:32,920 Speaker 1: military as possible UM, which will be difficult because the 773 00:40:33,040 --> 00:40:35,680 Speaker 1: units in the east are Ukraine's best to equip units. 774 00:40:36,040 --> 00:40:39,040 Speaker 1: So I don't know how this ends. I don't see 775 00:40:39,239 --> 00:40:42,600 Speaker 1: a reasonable end to this insight, but that's just because 776 00:40:42,600 --> 00:40:45,640 Speaker 1: there's too many variables at the moment. I do think 777 00:40:45,719 --> 00:40:48,120 Speaker 1: one thing that's kind of worth looking at this war 778 00:40:48,239 --> 00:40:52,120 Speaker 1: in in historical context. A number of comparisons have been 779 00:40:52,160 --> 00:40:54,680 Speaker 1: made to both of the world wars here, Um, I 780 00:40:54,800 --> 00:40:57,279 Speaker 1: think the thing that it most reminds me of is 781 00:40:57,440 --> 00:41:01,000 Speaker 1: World War One, not in that it's a conflagration on 782 00:41:01,120 --> 00:41:03,839 Speaker 1: that scale or in that um it's a similar war 783 00:41:03,880 --> 00:41:06,560 Speaker 1: in terms of the combat, but it is an example 784 00:41:06,719 --> 00:41:10,320 Speaker 1: of the first big war that utilizes a variety of 785 00:41:10,400 --> 00:41:13,840 Speaker 1: weapons and tactics that have been battlefield tested in a 786 00:41:13,920 --> 00:41:17,440 Speaker 1: series of smaller wars, right, um, And I think we 787 00:41:17,560 --> 00:41:21,280 Speaker 1: are seeing in Ukraine for the first time the actual 788 00:41:22,360 --> 00:41:24,720 Speaker 1: I think one thing that we have seen is that drones. 789 00:41:24,840 --> 00:41:26,840 Speaker 1: And I'm not talking about the big ones here. You know, 790 00:41:26,920 --> 00:41:28,200 Speaker 1: they get a lot of the bay rock tar and 791 00:41:28,239 --> 00:41:30,680 Speaker 1: stuff like get that gets a lot of attention, but 792 00:41:30,840 --> 00:41:34,239 Speaker 1: like small the kind of drones anyone listening to this 793 00:41:34,320 --> 00:41:37,719 Speaker 1: could pick up and buy today, right Those drones I 794 00:41:37,840 --> 00:41:40,640 Speaker 1: think are proving to be a game changer on a 795 00:41:40,760 --> 00:41:43,600 Speaker 1: tactical level, in a similar manner to the machine gun 796 00:41:43,920 --> 00:41:47,320 Speaker 1: in in the turn of the last century, before the 797 00:41:47,440 --> 00:41:50,320 Speaker 1: last century. Yeah, Well, with the drones, I've often machine 798 00:41:50,360 --> 00:41:53,080 Speaker 1: guns are good, good comparison. I've often thought of it 799 00:41:53,360 --> 00:41:56,200 Speaker 1: as like the airplane, and we had airplanes, and we 800 00:41:56,239 --> 00:41:58,879 Speaker 1: haven't had combat airplanes. Before World War One, we didn't 801 00:41:58,880 --> 00:42:00,680 Speaker 1: have very many of them because no he really realized 802 00:42:00,680 --> 00:42:03,080 Speaker 1: the utility of them in war. And then as the 803 00:42:03,160 --> 00:42:05,720 Speaker 1: war got closer, and then the war started, countries started 804 00:42:05,760 --> 00:42:08,279 Speaker 1: to slowly build up these small fleets of aircraft, and 805 00:42:08,320 --> 00:42:10,759 Speaker 1: then by the end of the war, everybody had an 806 00:42:10,760 --> 00:42:12,360 Speaker 1: air force. I think we see the same thing with 807 00:42:12,440 --> 00:42:14,920 Speaker 1: these small consumer drones, is that like, by the end 808 00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:18,360 Speaker 1: of this war or whatever conflagrations are coming after it, 809 00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:21,279 Speaker 1: every military in the world is going to have little 810 00:42:21,680 --> 00:42:24,600 Speaker 1: little you know, phantom phantom threes or whatever, basically for 811 00:42:24,640 --> 00:42:28,240 Speaker 1: every infantry squad. One of the things that's so wild 812 00:42:28,760 --> 00:42:31,600 Speaker 1: is that if if you again, if you sitting here 813 00:42:31,719 --> 00:42:35,080 Speaker 1: right now, have not an insignificant amount of money, let's 814 00:42:35,080 --> 00:42:39,400 Speaker 1: save three to four thousand dollars and the enough mechanical 815 00:42:40,680 --> 00:42:44,719 Speaker 1: like competence to carry out modest repairs on your own car, 816 00:42:45,640 --> 00:42:50,120 Speaker 1: you could, with things entirely available over the shelf, build 817 00:42:50,160 --> 00:42:53,760 Speaker 1: a weapon system capable of disabling a variety of armored 818 00:42:53,840 --> 00:42:56,800 Speaker 1: vehicles at night. You know, like you that that is 819 00:42:56,840 --> 00:42:59,719 Speaker 1: a thing that individual people you could do that and 820 00:42:59,800 --> 00:43:01,279 Speaker 1: you and have it up and running in a matter 821 00:43:01,360 --> 00:43:06,879 Speaker 1: of days. Just I'm imagining the next protest in unnamed city. Yeah, 822 00:43:07,719 --> 00:43:10,759 Speaker 1: and a consumer drone flies over the police line and 823 00:43:10,880 --> 00:43:15,440 Speaker 1: drops a little thing on him. This is bang, yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. 824 00:43:16,560 --> 00:43:19,399 Speaker 1: Like there's a lot of people, even even as as 825 00:43:19,520 --> 00:43:22,720 Speaker 1: influential and meaningful as they've been on the battlefield in Ukraine, 826 00:43:22,760 --> 00:43:25,160 Speaker 1: I think people still are kind of slow to understand 827 00:43:25,200 --> 00:43:27,440 Speaker 1: the extent. Like there's one of the wildest stories that's 828 00:43:27,440 --> 00:43:30,080 Speaker 1: come out of it is that the Ukrainian military has 829 00:43:30,239 --> 00:43:35,360 Speaker 1: a an outfit of civilian drone operators using hacked and 830 00:43:35,520 --> 00:43:39,279 Speaker 1: home built drones to attack Russian forces at night UM 831 00:43:39,800 --> 00:43:42,759 Speaker 1: and they have been The documented of efficacy of their 832 00:43:42,840 --> 00:43:45,400 Speaker 1: raids has been significant, And I can I can remember 833 00:43:45,719 --> 00:43:48,680 Speaker 1: spending a brief period of time with an Iraqi military 834 00:43:48,800 --> 00:43:51,040 Speaker 1: unit that was just using d g I phantoms that 835 00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:54,600 Speaker 1: they had rigged to drop what were since essentially mortar 836 00:43:54,680 --> 00:43:57,520 Speaker 1: shells with shuttlecocks on them from a height um and 837 00:43:57,600 --> 00:44:00,239 Speaker 1: they were very effective at killing people um as isis 838 00:44:00,320 --> 00:44:03,160 Speaker 1: drones were effective at sort of spotting you know, mortars 839 00:44:03,200 --> 00:44:05,000 Speaker 1: for folks well. And one of the things I saw 840 00:44:05,080 --> 00:44:07,800 Speaker 1: i SIS use their more their drones for great effect 841 00:44:08,280 --> 00:44:11,320 Speaker 1: wasn't so much to kill large numbers of enemy soldiers. 842 00:44:11,600 --> 00:44:13,760 Speaker 1: It was to do the same thing that American predator 843 00:44:13,880 --> 00:44:16,560 Speaker 1: drones and report drones had done for for decades by 844 00:44:16,640 --> 00:44:19,040 Speaker 1: that point the terror groups, which is let them know 845 00:44:19,120 --> 00:44:21,799 Speaker 1: you can't gather in large numbers. Yeah, if you gather 846 00:44:21,880 --> 00:44:23,640 Speaker 1: in large numbers your target. And so you saw a 847 00:44:23,760 --> 00:44:25,520 Speaker 1: Rocky soldier saying no more than two or three in 848 00:44:25,560 --> 00:44:27,800 Speaker 1: a group. Any more than that will get targeted, you know, 849 00:44:27,920 --> 00:44:31,239 Speaker 1: And so they flipped the equation basically yep, and don't 850 00:44:31,320 --> 00:44:34,640 Speaker 1: I mean I one of the reasons why I I 851 00:44:34,760 --> 00:44:37,600 Speaker 1: have a general policy heavily informed by my time in 852 00:44:37,680 --> 00:44:41,160 Speaker 1: Mosle that the last place I want to be in 853 00:44:41,320 --> 00:44:44,560 Speaker 1: a anywhere near a war zone is an armored vehicle. 854 00:44:45,120 --> 00:44:49,120 Speaker 1: Um because that's really unless you are in something that's 855 00:44:49,160 --> 00:44:53,120 Speaker 1: heavily up armored, like an im wrap. Little bombs dropped 856 00:44:53,160 --> 00:44:55,400 Speaker 1: by drones can do significant damage to something like a 857 00:44:55,480 --> 00:44:58,120 Speaker 1: humpy and that's exactly what you target. You don't target 858 00:44:58,160 --> 00:45:00,800 Speaker 1: a Toyota Corolla with a drope like that, unless you 859 00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:03,560 Speaker 1: specifically know an individuals in that Corolla that you want 860 00:45:03,560 --> 00:45:07,080 Speaker 1: to kill. But you may just behind the lines see 861 00:45:07,120 --> 00:45:09,320 Speaker 1: a target of opportunity in an armor see an armored 862 00:45:09,560 --> 00:45:13,080 Speaker 1: lightly armored vehicle, and drop a immunition on it. And 863 00:45:13,120 --> 00:45:15,239 Speaker 1: that's one of the things this is done. There's a 864 00:45:15,280 --> 00:45:18,200 Speaker 1: lot of talk prior to the expanded Russian invasion about 865 00:45:18,200 --> 00:45:20,680 Speaker 1: how immediately Russia was going to get air superiority, and 866 00:45:20,719 --> 00:45:23,160 Speaker 1: that's obviously a bigger story than just drones. There's a 867 00:45:23,200 --> 00:45:27,239 Speaker 1: lot of factors and why Russia. It's probably accurate to 868 00:45:27,239 --> 00:45:29,800 Speaker 1: say they have superiority in a number of parts of 869 00:45:29,880 --> 00:45:32,160 Speaker 1: the war, but they don't have supremacy like they It's 870 00:45:32,200 --> 00:45:35,400 Speaker 1: not like an absolute matter. And part of that is because, um, 871 00:45:35,600 --> 00:45:39,040 Speaker 1: it's not really possible to at this moment. Someday, I 872 00:45:39,120 --> 00:45:42,040 Speaker 1: suspect there will be more effective ways of stopping drones 873 00:45:42,239 --> 00:45:46,320 Speaker 1: and at like a theater level. Um maybe, but it 874 00:45:46,440 --> 00:45:50,279 Speaker 1: certainly hasn't happened yet. Yeah. Yeah, And and that's the thing. 875 00:45:50,360 --> 00:45:52,279 Speaker 1: You know, there's there's the drones, and then there's also 876 00:45:52,719 --> 00:45:55,239 Speaker 1: on the Ukrainian side, they you know, I think they 877 00:45:55,360 --> 00:45:59,160 Speaker 1: recognize that air force against air force, the Russians have 878 00:45:59,200 --> 00:46:02,800 Speaker 1: a new miracles periority. So you can deny the Russians 879 00:46:02,840 --> 00:46:05,920 Speaker 1: air supremacy by shooting down their planes with man pads. 880 00:46:06,680 --> 00:46:08,359 Speaker 1: You don't have to have an air force to deny 881 00:46:08,400 --> 00:46:11,160 Speaker 1: your opponent, You just have to dye them the ability 882 00:46:11,200 --> 00:46:14,000 Speaker 1: to freely operate in your airspace. And this is one 883 00:46:14,000 --> 00:46:15,719 Speaker 1: of those things. There's been a lot of talk about 884 00:46:15,719 --> 00:46:18,279 Speaker 1: a no fly zone, um, which I tend to think 885 00:46:18,320 --> 00:46:20,440 Speaker 1: would be a bad idea in the traditional sense in 886 00:46:20,560 --> 00:46:23,520 Speaker 1: terms of like the US and NATO sending in planes 887 00:46:23,600 --> 00:46:25,719 Speaker 1: to down Russian planes over Ukraine. There's a number of 888 00:46:25,800 --> 00:46:29,239 Speaker 1: reasons why that's concerning. But you can effectively establish a 889 00:46:29,320 --> 00:46:31,560 Speaker 1: no fly zone by shipping in a funckload of man 890 00:46:31,680 --> 00:46:36,279 Speaker 1: pads exactly. Yeah, And I'm not against that. I think 891 00:46:36,320 --> 00:46:39,640 Speaker 1: in terms of what kind of what kind of armed 892 00:46:39,960 --> 00:46:44,280 Speaker 1: arms support is ethical to provide, giving people the ability 893 00:46:44,400 --> 00:46:48,200 Speaker 1: to stop planes from bombing cities is broadly speaking, one 894 00:46:48,239 --> 00:46:50,120 Speaker 1: of the most ethical things you can do in terms 895 00:46:50,160 --> 00:46:53,279 Speaker 1: of shipping munitions around the world, right, and the other 896 00:46:53,320 --> 00:46:56,080 Speaker 1: advantages that man pads. I'm sure somebody could turn it 897 00:46:56,160 --> 00:47:01,160 Speaker 1: into a lethal ground weapon, but they're pretty hard use 898 00:47:01,239 --> 00:47:05,319 Speaker 1: against ground targets, against houses, things like that, not really 899 00:47:05,360 --> 00:47:09,680 Speaker 1: what they're designed for. So it's not like just handing over, 900 00:47:09,880 --> 00:47:14,160 Speaker 1: you know, some indiscriminate weapon to the Ukrainians to use 901 00:47:14,200 --> 00:47:16,640 Speaker 1: against Russian cities. You're you're giving them a weapon that's 902 00:47:16,640 --> 00:47:20,439 Speaker 1: specifically used against military aircraft, like most man pads can't 903 00:47:20,480 --> 00:47:23,520 Speaker 1: reach the altitude that airliners are at even so yep, 904 00:47:24,000 --> 00:47:26,440 Speaker 1: so I think that's probably what we want to talk 905 00:47:26,440 --> 00:47:29,880 Speaker 1: about today. Um, you wanna plug your plug aubles. Tell 906 00:47:29,920 --> 00:47:32,440 Speaker 1: people where they can find you in your analysis out 907 00:47:32,480 --> 00:47:35,479 Speaker 1: in the wild. Yeah, so you can. You can follow 908 00:47:35,520 --> 00:47:39,040 Speaker 1: me on Twitter. My handle is at Shabanian Rum and 909 00:47:39,680 --> 00:47:43,080 Speaker 1: I work I published occasionally with the New Lines Institute. 910 00:47:43,360 --> 00:47:45,359 Speaker 1: Uh so you can see my work there as well. 911 00:47:45,719 --> 00:47:48,000 Speaker 1: And I have a website that I seldom update, the 912 00:47:48,080 --> 00:47:51,680 Speaker 1: Folded Gap dot com um hasn't been updated and probably 913 00:47:51,880 --> 00:47:55,879 Speaker 1: eight months now because I've been tired. But um, yeah, 914 00:47:55,920 --> 00:47:59,040 Speaker 1: those are the places to find me, and d ms 915 00:47:59,080 --> 00:48:01,000 Speaker 1: are open on Twitter. If you ever have questions or 916 00:48:01,000 --> 00:48:03,000 Speaker 1: anything like that, let me know. I'm happy to talk 917 00:48:03,040 --> 00:48:04,759 Speaker 1: with anybody who's got questions on these kind of things. 918 00:48:05,160 --> 00:48:09,759 Speaker 1: Hell yeah, well that's gonna be us, so you know, 919 00:48:10,160 --> 00:48:14,080 Speaker 1: enjoy this analysis of the of the war in Ukraine. 920 00:48:14,640 --> 00:48:18,120 Speaker 1: UM before we return you to your regularly scheduled multipart 921 00:48:18,200 --> 00:48:21,600 Speaker 1: series on Nazi cat girls UH, the primary focus of 922 00:48:21,640 --> 00:48:28,840 Speaker 1: this podcast, It Could Happen Here, as a production of 923 00:48:28,920 --> 00:48:31,840 Speaker 1: cool Zone Media. For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, 924 00:48:31,920 --> 00:48:34,399 Speaker 1: visit our website cool zone media dot com, or check 925 00:48:34,480 --> 00:48:36,719 Speaker 1: us out on the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, 926 00:48:36,840 --> 00:48:39,800 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can find sources 927 00:48:39,880 --> 00:48:42,399 Speaker 1: for It Could Happen Here, updated monthly at cool zone 928 00:48:42,440 --> 00:48:45,200 Speaker 1: Media dot com slash sources. Thanks for listening.