1 00:00:00,480 --> 00:00:04,120 Speaker 1: Hello Seattle, Hello, Portland's We're coming out to see you 2 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:09,640 Speaker 1: this January. Love. That's right, one of the dates, my friend, January. 3 00:00:10,119 --> 00:00:11,879 Speaker 1: We're going to be at the More Theater in Seattle 4 00:00:12,080 --> 00:00:14,760 Speaker 1: on January six. We're gonna be a revolution Hall again 5 00:00:14,800 --> 00:00:17,759 Speaker 1: in Portland. That's right. Tickets are being snapped up fast everyone, 6 00:00:17,800 --> 00:00:19,800 Speaker 1: because you love us out there and we love you 7 00:00:19,880 --> 00:00:22,000 Speaker 1: right back. So just go to s y s K 8 00:00:22,200 --> 00:00:25,239 Speaker 1: live dot com for all ticket details. We can't wait 9 00:00:25,280 --> 00:00:29,800 Speaker 1: to see you. Welcome to Stuff you Should Know from 10 00:00:29,800 --> 00:00:38,479 Speaker 1: how Stuff Works dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. 11 00:00:38,560 --> 00:00:41,120 Speaker 1: I'm Josh Clark, There's Charles W. Chuck Bryant, and there's 12 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:45,040 Speaker 1: Jerry Rowland and it's us Stuff you should Know, the 13 00:00:45,200 --> 00:00:50,800 Speaker 1: Nuclear Investigators. I thought this was really neat. I did too, 14 00:00:51,640 --> 00:00:53,560 Speaker 1: and I did. I had a silly title. I thought, 15 00:00:54,040 --> 00:00:56,640 Speaker 1: how good is this gonna be? But then you and 16 00:00:56,840 --> 00:00:58,560 Speaker 1: our article was good enough, But then you found that 17 00:00:58,600 --> 00:01:03,520 Speaker 1: great article from econom Economists. Yeah, man, that was good. Yes, yeah, 18 00:01:03,520 --> 00:01:05,959 Speaker 1: our article was written by Robert william and it was great. 19 00:01:06,080 --> 00:01:10,280 Speaker 1: But it gets even better. Yeah, like people should I 20 00:01:10,280 --> 00:01:12,760 Speaker 1: think this is one of those like take twenty minutes 21 00:01:12,760 --> 00:01:16,640 Speaker 1: out of your day and read the new detectives from 22 00:01:16,680 --> 00:01:19,480 Speaker 1: the Economist just good like and we'll give you a 23 00:01:19,480 --> 00:01:22,200 Speaker 1: good over here. But it just gets knowledge to have, 24 00:01:22,400 --> 00:01:25,520 Speaker 1: you know, yeah, because you don't really think about this. 25 00:01:25,600 --> 00:01:32,039 Speaker 1: But there is, in my opinion, thankfully, a an international 26 00:01:32,520 --> 00:01:38,840 Speaker 1: network of people who are dedicated to preventing people from 27 00:01:38,880 --> 00:01:43,720 Speaker 1: getting nukes. Who should who who who shouldn't have it? 28 00:01:44,080 --> 00:01:46,839 Speaker 1: Depending on who you are, right, Like, there's a there's 29 00:01:46,840 --> 00:01:51,120 Speaker 1: a whole um. I looked up at this question like 30 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:54,280 Speaker 1: like is it the right of any sovereign nation to 31 00:01:54,400 --> 00:01:58,880 Speaker 1: have whatever nuclear technology it wants? And I saw, um, 32 00:01:58,920 --> 00:02:01,000 Speaker 1: that's actually apparently the like you know those sites like 33 00:02:01,040 --> 00:02:04,360 Speaker 1: debate dot org and like debate prep sites or something, 34 00:02:04,400 --> 00:02:08,000 Speaker 1: they'll have like a bunch of different brain teasers. Yeah, 35 00:02:08,080 --> 00:02:11,400 Speaker 1: something like that. Um. And that seems to be mostly 36 00:02:11,400 --> 00:02:13,200 Speaker 1: where it lives. But I found this one guy on 37 00:02:13,280 --> 00:02:16,880 Speaker 1: Forbes who argued that is not the case that if 38 00:02:16,919 --> 00:02:21,520 Speaker 1: you have not demonstrated a um uh like an allegiance 39 00:02:21,600 --> 00:02:28,079 Speaker 1: to liberal democratic principles and freedom uh and that you're 40 00:02:28,120 --> 00:02:29,840 Speaker 1: just looking out for your people at your role as 41 00:02:29,840 --> 00:02:32,320 Speaker 1: the government. That is to say, like, if you're an 42 00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:37,600 Speaker 1: autocratic government, you haven't you don't have enough sovereign cred 43 00:02:38,320 --> 00:02:41,720 Speaker 1: two to enjoy the right to new because this is 44 00:02:41,760 --> 00:02:44,440 Speaker 1: how this guy was arguing against, like North Korea having 45 00:02:44,960 --> 00:02:48,800 Speaker 1: the right to a nuclear program, right, But my thing is, 46 00:02:49,040 --> 00:02:51,440 Speaker 1: I think it goes even further than that. I think 47 00:02:51,480 --> 00:02:53,720 Speaker 1: that that assumes because he was also saying at the 48 00:02:53,760 --> 00:02:57,840 Speaker 1: same time, if you are a friendly nation and you 49 00:02:57,960 --> 00:03:02,480 Speaker 1: are liberal democracy, um, you kind of should have the 50 00:03:02,600 --> 00:03:09,320 Speaker 1: right to a military nuclear program. But like liberal democracies 51 00:03:09,320 --> 00:03:12,600 Speaker 1: can change over time, the nukes are going to remain. 52 00:03:12,720 --> 00:03:15,400 Speaker 1: So what was once a friendly nation may not be 53 00:03:15,880 --> 00:03:18,280 Speaker 1: thirty or fifty years from now, but they're still going 54 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:21,960 Speaker 1: to have a nuclear stockpile. Or some governments dissolved. Look 55 00:03:21,960 --> 00:03:27,320 Speaker 1: at the USSR, they had one of the the world's 56 00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:31,079 Speaker 1: largest nuclear arsenals, still do, but then the government just 57 00:03:31,160 --> 00:03:36,119 Speaker 1: disintegrated and it turned into the Russian Federation, which has 58 00:03:36,240 --> 00:03:40,280 Speaker 1: arguably much looser control over the nuclear stockpile. And we 59 00:03:40,360 --> 00:03:42,400 Speaker 1: talked about this, then how easy is it to steal 60 00:03:42,400 --> 00:03:44,840 Speaker 1: a nuclear bomb that episode we did. Yeah, I think 61 00:03:44,880 --> 00:03:50,200 Speaker 1: after after the Soviet Union dissolved, that was that was 62 00:03:50,240 --> 00:03:53,160 Speaker 1: a really scary time and continues we continue to see 63 00:03:53,200 --> 00:03:56,040 Speaker 1: the ball out from that as far as the black 64 00:03:56,120 --> 00:04:04,040 Speaker 1: market trade on nuclear either weapons or the technology or 65 00:04:04,080 --> 00:04:09,360 Speaker 1: the information or the pieces parts the mouth parts right, 66 00:04:09,480 --> 00:04:12,800 Speaker 1: as we like to say around here. And luckily, like 67 00:04:12,840 --> 00:04:17,440 Speaker 1: you said, there's a field called nuclear forensics. And as 68 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:20,920 Speaker 1: Robert astutely points out, they have sort of a three 69 00:04:20,960 --> 00:04:25,880 Speaker 1: track uh challenge on their hands, which is a what 70 00:04:25,920 --> 00:04:32,120 Speaker 1: they do is a monitor places and countries, um and organizations. Uh, 71 00:04:32,320 --> 00:04:36,680 Speaker 1: so they can basically stop them from developing nuclear arms 72 00:04:36,720 --> 00:04:39,359 Speaker 1: if they're not supposed to be people on the on 73 00:04:39,440 --> 00:04:44,279 Speaker 1: the no no list. Then they track extremist groups and 74 00:04:44,320 --> 00:04:47,560 Speaker 1: smugglers and try to find out where these You know, 75 00:04:47,560 --> 00:04:48,960 Speaker 1: there's a lot of we'll get to it later, but 76 00:04:49,080 --> 00:04:52,320 Speaker 1: a lot of stuff goes missing, which is super scary. Yeah. 77 00:04:52,440 --> 00:04:54,520 Speaker 1: Can I just interject here for a second. In two 78 00:04:54,440 --> 00:04:58,279 Speaker 1: thou eleven, the US the United States announced that it 79 00:04:58,360 --> 00:05:04,120 Speaker 1: could not account for fifty pounds of weapons usable nuclear 80 00:05:04,160 --> 00:05:06,919 Speaker 1: material that it had previously shipped around in the world 81 00:05:07,640 --> 00:05:10,359 Speaker 1: and that's just gone. They said it was enough for 82 00:05:10,560 --> 00:05:15,360 Speaker 1: dozens of nuclear warheads. And then finally, the third thing 83 00:05:15,360 --> 00:05:17,640 Speaker 1: that you will do as a nuclear detective or in 84 00:05:17,680 --> 00:05:21,159 Speaker 1: the field of nuclear forensics is if something does happen, 85 00:05:21,640 --> 00:05:24,200 Speaker 1: if there is a radiological attack or a nuclear bomb 86 00:05:24,600 --> 00:05:27,760 Speaker 1: that goes off or is launched. They are the ones 87 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:31,039 Speaker 1: who will investigate the scene just like you would any 88 00:05:31,040 --> 00:05:34,640 Speaker 1: crime scene exactly. Yeah, So that's the those are like 89 00:05:34,760 --> 00:05:37,680 Speaker 1: kind of the three things that in a nuclear forensic 90 00:05:38,320 --> 00:05:41,040 Speaker 1: detective I guess, if is the best way to put it, 91 00:05:41,600 --> 00:05:44,120 Speaker 1: UM would be involved in doing. And there's a lot 92 00:05:44,200 --> 00:05:46,839 Speaker 1: of other signs around it and research around it too, 93 00:05:47,680 --> 00:05:50,320 Speaker 1: which is why you're you very rarely find somebody who 94 00:05:50,440 --> 00:05:52,359 Speaker 1: is a full time at least in the u S 95 00:05:52,400 --> 00:05:57,000 Speaker 1: I should say, is a full time nuclear forensics expert. 96 00:05:57,600 --> 00:06:00,560 Speaker 1: Most of the time they're doing the sign ants that's 97 00:06:00,600 --> 00:06:05,599 Speaker 1: helping the field, right. So, like there's there's a project 98 00:06:05,640 --> 00:06:11,120 Speaker 1: that UM Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to identify the the 99 00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:18,520 Speaker 1: um elemental signature of the uranium that comes from all 100 00:06:18,680 --> 00:06:21,640 Speaker 1: one hundred and fifty uranium minds that have ever existed 101 00:06:21,680 --> 00:06:24,400 Speaker 1: on planet Earth. Right, So if you come across the 102 00:06:24,440 --> 00:06:29,000 Speaker 1: sample of uranium um, you can you can trace it 103 00:06:29,000 --> 00:06:32,200 Speaker 1: back to its point of origin. That's something that you 104 00:06:32,200 --> 00:06:35,520 Speaker 1: would do if you were a nuclear forensics expert. When 105 00:06:35,520 --> 00:06:39,400 Speaker 1: you're not actually like say investigating a case or UM 106 00:06:39,440 --> 00:06:43,599 Speaker 1: carrying out a routine inspection of a non military nuclear state. 107 00:06:44,200 --> 00:06:47,480 Speaker 1: That kind of thing. Yeah, they're like football referees kind 108 00:06:47,520 --> 00:06:51,680 Speaker 1: of right. And it's pretty cool that these guys even exist, right, 109 00:06:51,760 --> 00:06:53,600 Speaker 1: that the idea that there are people out there who 110 00:06:53,640 --> 00:06:58,920 Speaker 1: are inspecting states, um and by states of men countries. Obviously, 111 00:06:58,960 --> 00:07:03,599 Speaker 1: I'm using it in like the the security kind of way, right, Um, 112 00:07:03,920 --> 00:07:07,400 Speaker 1: people out there whose job it is is to say, um, 113 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:10,320 Speaker 1: you are not holding up to international standards. We think 114 00:07:10,360 --> 00:07:13,120 Speaker 1: that you are going down the road toward a military 115 00:07:13,200 --> 00:07:17,360 Speaker 1: nuclear program that's not allowed. We're going to tell yeah. 116 00:07:17,400 --> 00:07:20,960 Speaker 1: And Robert has a neat little way to put We 117 00:07:21,040 --> 00:07:24,960 Speaker 1: talked about mutually assured destruction many years ago, I think 118 00:07:25,400 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 1: in a show and in nations signed the Treaty on 119 00:07:30,320 --> 00:07:33,600 Speaker 1: the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons a k A MPT. 120 00:07:34,840 --> 00:07:37,760 Speaker 1: Is that confusing a K A MPT. I think that's 121 00:07:37,800 --> 00:07:43,000 Speaker 1: like the the acronyms, the abbreviation of the Non Proliferation Treaty. 122 00:07:43,040 --> 00:07:46,880 Speaker 1: That's right, I think. But he talks about mutually assured 123 00:07:46,880 --> 00:07:51,840 Speaker 1: destruction like this like a movie standoff where and I 124 00:07:51,880 --> 00:07:54,920 Speaker 1: always equate this with reservoir dogs, like two people and 125 00:07:55,160 --> 00:07:58,760 Speaker 1: a gun or three people aiming a gun at one another. Um, 126 00:07:58,800 --> 00:08:01,040 Speaker 1: if you are all three aiming the gun at one another, 127 00:08:01,120 --> 00:08:04,280 Speaker 1: then there is a likelihood that no one will fire 128 00:08:04,720 --> 00:08:07,000 Speaker 1: because you could all die, and maybe you will just 129 00:08:07,080 --> 00:08:09,520 Speaker 1: lower your guns. And that's sort of the idea with 130 00:08:10,160 --> 00:08:13,160 Speaker 1: mutually assured destruction if we all have not all, but 131 00:08:13,600 --> 00:08:16,640 Speaker 1: if these nations have nuclear weapons, they know that just 132 00:08:16,800 --> 00:08:20,840 Speaker 1: exchanging nuke fire. Everyone's seen war games. Uh, you can't win, 133 00:08:21,560 --> 00:08:25,119 Speaker 1: so I can't win. The trick comes in when someone 134 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:28,160 Speaker 1: else comes into that room, like in Reservoir Dogs, when 135 00:08:28,240 --> 00:08:31,080 Speaker 1: Lawrence Tierney comes in at the very end and they're 136 00:08:31,080 --> 00:08:33,520 Speaker 1: already pointing their guns, and then you've got a new 137 00:08:33,520 --> 00:08:36,920 Speaker 1: gun on the scene, and that's when everybody dies, right, 138 00:08:37,120 --> 00:08:42,080 Speaker 1: or I guess probably an even better analogy is that 139 00:08:42,160 --> 00:08:47,680 Speaker 1: with the Non Proliferation Treaty, if somebody came in, if 140 00:08:47,720 --> 00:08:50,600 Speaker 1: if say Barber strikes in came into the standoff and 141 00:08:50,640 --> 00:08:54,160 Speaker 1: Reservoir Dogs and a complete surprise twist in the director's 142 00:08:54,160 --> 00:08:58,080 Speaker 1: cut of the movie and said, everybody, everybody calmed down, 143 00:08:58,240 --> 00:09:01,240 Speaker 1: lower your guns. Here's a little her from Yental, right, 144 00:09:01,559 --> 00:09:03,720 Speaker 1: and she does her little number, and it just charms 145 00:09:03,760 --> 00:09:06,559 Speaker 1: everybody into forgetting their troubles and they put their guns up. 146 00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:11,120 Speaker 1: And that's that. That's the aim of the Nuclear Non 147 00:09:11,120 --> 00:09:15,200 Speaker 1: Proliferation Treaty. It goes even further than that. Imagine if 148 00:09:15,240 --> 00:09:18,400 Speaker 1: Babs as she was walking around doing her number from 149 00:09:18,520 --> 00:09:22,199 Speaker 1: yental Um, she was like taking everybody's guns up too, 150 00:09:22,640 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 1: and then maybe disassembling them quickly with a little jazzy 151 00:09:25,960 --> 00:09:29,600 Speaker 1: number going. And um, that was that. So not only 152 00:09:29,720 --> 00:09:35,080 Speaker 1: is there the non Proliferation Treaty, it was it was saying, everybody, 153 00:09:35,120 --> 00:09:37,960 Speaker 1: calm down. That's mutual is sure destruction. I guess the 154 00:09:38,000 --> 00:09:40,640 Speaker 1: Non Proliferation Treaty comes in and says, not only are 155 00:09:40,679 --> 00:09:42,679 Speaker 1: you gonna calm down, let's get rid of some of 156 00:09:42,720 --> 00:09:46,360 Speaker 1: these nuclear weapons to us disassemble them, right, But when 157 00:09:46,400 --> 00:09:48,840 Speaker 1: Lawrence Tyrney or Barber Stress and walk in with a 158 00:09:48,880 --> 00:09:54,360 Speaker 1: gun a k A m P T a k A 159 00:09:54,480 --> 00:09:58,080 Speaker 1: having another another nuclear player, all of a sudden, that 160 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:04,000 Speaker 1: disrupts the weird balance that is mutually assure destruction. It does, 161 00:10:04,200 --> 00:10:06,640 Speaker 1: for sure. But that which is why a lot I 162 00:10:06,640 --> 00:10:11,160 Speaker 1: think a hundred and ninety nations ratified the Nuclear nonp 163 00:10:11,360 --> 00:10:16,000 Speaker 1: non Proliferation Treaty UM, which says, yes, all of you guys, 164 00:10:16,040 --> 00:10:18,600 Speaker 1: with all of your big nukes and everything. Get rid 165 00:10:18,640 --> 00:10:20,439 Speaker 1: of some of those. We don't like them being here 166 00:10:20,480 --> 00:10:23,720 Speaker 1: on planet Earth. And the problem with that is is 167 00:10:23,760 --> 00:10:28,000 Speaker 1: that the the organization that was created to oversee this, 168 00:10:28,200 --> 00:10:34,520 Speaker 1: the International Atomic Energy Agency. I think they're basically they 169 00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:40,680 Speaker 1: amount to nuclear accountants, right. Their whole jam is that 170 00:10:40,720 --> 00:10:44,720 Speaker 1: they are UM. They go in and they say, the 171 00:10:44,760 --> 00:10:51,720 Speaker 1: international community says that you can have this UM. You 172 00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:56,160 Speaker 1: can have nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes, for the power 173 00:10:56,200 --> 00:10:59,640 Speaker 1: generation or for your hospitals or whatever, but you can't 174 00:11:00,160 --> 00:11:03,120 Speaker 1: have it. You can't have a military program. And and 175 00:11:03,200 --> 00:11:07,880 Speaker 1: there you it's not hard once you have one to 176 00:11:07,880 --> 00:11:11,400 Speaker 1: to have the other. Right, once you have a peaceful 177 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:14,600 Speaker 1: program down, it would not be very hard to translate 178 00:11:14,679 --> 00:11:17,440 Speaker 1: that into a military program. The i a e A 179 00:11:18,160 --> 00:11:22,200 Speaker 1: Is tasked with coming to your country, coming behind your 180 00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:26,640 Speaker 1: borders and looking at your your program and making sure 181 00:11:26,720 --> 00:11:30,360 Speaker 1: that it's non military. And if everything checks off, they 182 00:11:30,360 --> 00:11:32,680 Speaker 1: can turn around and say to the rest of the world, 183 00:11:32,679 --> 00:11:35,960 Speaker 1: this country is keeping their promise and all they have 184 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:40,120 Speaker 1: is a peaceful program. Everybody can be friends with this guy. 185 00:11:40,280 --> 00:11:42,360 Speaker 1: Or if they find that there is evidence of a 186 00:11:42,360 --> 00:11:46,760 Speaker 1: military program, they say, guys, um, you're gonna want to 187 00:11:46,760 --> 00:11:50,400 Speaker 1: hear about this. North Korea over here is secretly working 188 00:11:50,440 --> 00:11:54,240 Speaker 1: on a nuclear program and we've done our jobs. Now 189 00:11:54,240 --> 00:11:56,400 Speaker 1: it's up to the international community to figure out what 190 00:11:56,440 --> 00:11:59,320 Speaker 1: to do about it. Right. But here's the thing is, 191 00:12:00,120 --> 00:12:04,160 Speaker 1: you know there a U N organization, So these are 192 00:12:04,200 --> 00:12:07,040 Speaker 1: the above board. Let me come and knock on your 193 00:12:07,040 --> 00:12:09,400 Speaker 1: door and get an invitation to come in and inspect 194 00:12:09,400 --> 00:12:12,079 Speaker 1: your stuff. I got all my machines, all my gear. 195 00:12:12,559 --> 00:12:17,000 Speaker 1: They can sniff out radiation, and you you allow me 196 00:12:17,080 --> 00:12:19,599 Speaker 1: in or you don't allow me in. This isn't the 197 00:12:19,600 --> 00:12:25,559 Speaker 1: the clandestine uh FBI and and spy agencies that very 198 00:12:25,640 --> 00:12:28,960 Speaker 1: much also do the same thing from satellites and you know, 199 00:12:28,960 --> 00:12:31,080 Speaker 1: in all kinds of other ways on the ground. But 200 00:12:31,440 --> 00:12:34,560 Speaker 1: the I A e A. It really depends on these 201 00:12:34,760 --> 00:12:39,760 Speaker 1: UN mandates and cooperation from the country. So, for instance, 202 00:12:39,800 --> 00:12:43,959 Speaker 1: and two thousand two and two thousand seven, North Korea said, um, 203 00:12:44,200 --> 00:12:48,360 Speaker 1: kindly leave our country, and they had to do so. Yes, 204 00:12:48,520 --> 00:12:50,120 Speaker 1: you know, it's not like they draw a gun then 205 00:12:50,160 --> 00:12:52,840 Speaker 1: and say no, we're here to inspect your stuff, don't 206 00:12:52,880 --> 00:12:55,960 Speaker 1: you get it, right? But what they do is basically 207 00:12:56,000 --> 00:12:59,199 Speaker 1: go tell the people with the guns. Right, So that's 208 00:12:59,240 --> 00:13:02,760 Speaker 1: that's like a real red flag to not let the 209 00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:06,280 Speaker 1: I a e A access to you look everywhere but 210 00:13:06,640 --> 00:13:10,280 Speaker 1: in this room, rights, oh yeah, or to kick them 211 00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:12,760 Speaker 1: out like that. That really raises red flags and it 212 00:13:12,800 --> 00:13:16,240 Speaker 1: did in that in those instances to right. So, yes, 213 00:13:16,320 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 1: they are toothless. I mean it is after all a 214 00:13:18,360 --> 00:13:22,560 Speaker 1: U N body, but they are backed up by the 215 00:13:22,720 --> 00:13:30,120 Speaker 1: collective might of the nuclear military Nations UM, who say, basically, 216 00:13:30,160 --> 00:13:31,960 Speaker 1: this is the state the sat is quote of the world. 217 00:13:32,320 --> 00:13:35,560 Speaker 1: There's eight countries that have a nuclear program. Most of 218 00:13:35,600 --> 00:13:41,000 Speaker 1: them are allies UM, and they are tasked. Those allies 219 00:13:41,040 --> 00:13:44,400 Speaker 1: have taken it upon themselves to say, no one else 220 00:13:44,440 --> 00:13:46,920 Speaker 1: can have a nuclear program. You're not supposed to have 221 00:13:46,920 --> 00:13:49,559 Speaker 1: a nuclear program. You're not supposed to be building nukes. 222 00:13:49,679 --> 00:13:52,559 Speaker 1: We say, if you can have a military nuclear program, 223 00:13:52,720 --> 00:13:55,200 Speaker 1: and we say no. And every once in a while 224 00:13:55,600 --> 00:13:59,040 Speaker 1: a state that is not part of that group comes 225 00:13:59,120 --> 00:14:03,640 Speaker 1: up on their own with their own military nuclear program. 226 00:14:03,720 --> 00:14:06,680 Speaker 1: And when they do, the other countries have to decide 227 00:14:06,679 --> 00:14:08,800 Speaker 1: what to do about it. Yeah, and they you know, 228 00:14:08,840 --> 00:14:11,680 Speaker 1: the I a e A does very good work. Uh, 229 00:14:11,720 --> 00:14:13,959 Speaker 1: it works to a certain degree. Like in two thousand 230 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:17,280 Speaker 1: three when they said, hey Libya, hey Iran, we have 231 00:14:17,360 --> 00:14:21,520 Speaker 1: evidence now that you have a military program going. And 232 00:14:21,560 --> 00:14:23,680 Speaker 1: so Libya said, all right, I'm gonna give that up. 233 00:14:23,920 --> 00:14:27,640 Speaker 1: Iran at least gave up their suppliers in Pakistan, yeah, 234 00:14:27,680 --> 00:14:30,920 Speaker 1: a Q Khan, Yeah, and they do good work. They 235 00:14:30,920 --> 00:14:33,680 Speaker 1: want a Nobel Peace Prize in two thousand five. However, 236 00:14:33,760 --> 00:14:38,000 Speaker 1: depending on who you ask, um, like the United States 237 00:14:38,080 --> 00:14:40,960 Speaker 1: may say you guys are being too nice and too lenient. Uh. 238 00:14:41,080 --> 00:14:44,000 Speaker 1: Countries that are getting inspected say, well, I think you're 239 00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:47,280 Speaker 1: actually being a little bit too nosy. So it's definitely 240 00:14:47,280 --> 00:14:51,040 Speaker 1: the above board approach you in style to getting this 241 00:14:51,360 --> 00:14:55,880 Speaker 1: curved right there. Um, there are a lot of other 242 00:14:55,960 --> 00:14:59,800 Speaker 1: ways to like look into whether or not somebody has 243 00:14:59,840 --> 00:15:02,280 Speaker 1: an military program. We'll take a little break and we'll 244 00:15:02,280 --> 00:15:28,160 Speaker 1: talk about those. How about that, So, Chuckers, we were 245 00:15:28,200 --> 00:15:31,640 Speaker 1: talking about the above boards way where the UN politely 246 00:15:31,720 --> 00:15:35,040 Speaker 1: knocks on your door and does some inspections. And there's 247 00:15:35,040 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 1: some cool stuff that they have going on, right, Like 248 00:15:37,000 --> 00:15:42,240 Speaker 1: they install digital cameras in the facilities and they they're 249 00:15:42,280 --> 00:15:48,040 Speaker 1: like set and program to take pictures if there's movement 250 00:15:48,200 --> 00:15:53,160 Speaker 1: near likes uh A a piece of equipment that could 251 00:15:53,200 --> 00:15:58,360 Speaker 1: turn this peaceful nuclear program into a military program, and 252 00:15:58,400 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 1: then they're all time stamped and data and ordered sequentially, 253 00:16:01,440 --> 00:16:04,000 Speaker 1: so if there's any missing, some software will catch the 254 00:16:04,040 --> 00:16:07,800 Speaker 1: fact that a picture has been deleted, and now all 255 00:16:07,840 --> 00:16:11,400 Speaker 1: of a sudden, you've got an international incident. Right um. 256 00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:16,600 Speaker 1: They also use laser surveying equipment to survey the layout 257 00:16:16,960 --> 00:16:21,360 Speaker 1: of the um uh the what do they call the 258 00:16:21,560 --> 00:16:25,800 Speaker 1: the centrifuges, the piping of the centrifuge, Because so you 259 00:16:25,840 --> 00:16:30,000 Speaker 1: have to have a centrifuge to have a peaceful nuclear program. 260 00:16:30,240 --> 00:16:34,680 Speaker 1: Right like you take um uranium and uranium has like 261 00:16:34,800 --> 00:16:38,880 Speaker 1: points seven percent uranium in a uranium or I should 262 00:16:38,880 --> 00:16:41,200 Speaker 1: say the stuff that you find in nature. Now to 263 00:16:41,320 --> 00:16:45,880 Speaker 1: have like to create nuclear fuel for a nuclear power plant, 264 00:16:46,320 --> 00:16:50,120 Speaker 1: you've gotta you've got to isolate that the uranium two 265 00:16:50,120 --> 00:16:52,920 Speaker 1: thirty five isotope, and you do that by spinning it 266 00:16:53,320 --> 00:16:56,840 Speaker 1: in gas in a vacuum so fast that you're hitting 267 00:16:56,880 --> 00:17:01,640 Speaker 1: like seventy thousand rpm s and it separates the isotopes. 268 00:17:02,000 --> 00:17:04,240 Speaker 1: And then those things are connected. All those all those 269 00:17:04,240 --> 00:17:07,520 Speaker 1: centrifuges are connected by tubes of gas so that the 270 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:10,480 Speaker 1: isotopes you want all kind of mingle and migrate to 271 00:17:10,920 --> 00:17:13,520 Speaker 1: the place you want them to to where you collect them, 272 00:17:13,920 --> 00:17:16,600 Speaker 1: and then all of a sudden, you have three percent 273 00:17:16,680 --> 00:17:20,800 Speaker 1: concentration of uranium. Now you have UM nuclear fuel that 274 00:17:20,840 --> 00:17:23,280 Speaker 1: you can use for peaceful purposes if you keep it going, 275 00:17:23,600 --> 00:17:26,880 Speaker 1: if you make some upgrades to your whole composition UM 276 00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:29,280 Speaker 1: and rearrange the pipes a little bit here there, and 277 00:17:29,320 --> 00:17:32,919 Speaker 1: you can get that stuff up to UM concentration of 278 00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:37,159 Speaker 1: uranium two thirty five. Now you have weapons grade uranium. 279 00:17:37,560 --> 00:17:40,320 Speaker 1: Now you can build nuclear warheads with that. What the 280 00:17:40,440 --> 00:17:43,400 Speaker 1: i a e A Does with their laser surveys of 281 00:17:43,440 --> 00:17:48,600 Speaker 1: these centrifuge gas pipes is they they survey them, digitize 282 00:17:48,640 --> 00:17:52,280 Speaker 1: that and then do it again when they come a 283 00:17:52,359 --> 00:17:55,199 Speaker 1: year or two years later and see if there's been 284 00:17:55,240 --> 00:17:58,800 Speaker 1: any alterations or modifications to that pipe that it would 285 00:17:58,800 --> 00:18:03,119 Speaker 1: indicate that they're trying to make that uranium uh even 286 00:18:03,160 --> 00:18:06,840 Speaker 1: more enriched. Yeah. So this is this is the i 287 00:18:07,000 --> 00:18:09,879 Speaker 1: a e a s good work that they're doing. Uh. 288 00:18:09,920 --> 00:18:12,000 Speaker 1: And this is when they, you know, like we said, 289 00:18:12,040 --> 00:18:15,520 Speaker 1: go to countries that say come on in. Then there's 290 00:18:15,640 --> 00:18:21,200 Speaker 1: a whole other problem that is UM terrorists and drug 291 00:18:21,200 --> 00:18:25,919 Speaker 1: cartels and basically the black market, uh nuclear black market 292 00:18:26,960 --> 00:18:28,840 Speaker 1: and that's a whole different deal. You can't go knocking 293 00:18:28,920 --> 00:18:31,159 Speaker 1: on their door and they're not gonna say come on in. 294 00:18:31,280 --> 00:18:33,920 Speaker 1: You probably don't even know where their door is, which 295 00:18:33,920 --> 00:18:36,320 Speaker 1: is the whole point. So if you're wondering, like is 296 00:18:36,400 --> 00:18:38,320 Speaker 1: how big of an issue is this? How much should 297 00:18:38,320 --> 00:18:42,040 Speaker 1: we worry? Uh, just go read a little document called 298 00:18:42,040 --> 00:18:46,200 Speaker 1: the i a e. A Illicit Trafficking Database. Um, it's 299 00:18:46,200 --> 00:18:49,199 Speaker 1: a little frightening. So what they will do is they'll 300 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:51,400 Speaker 1: it's it's not very long. They have like a two 301 00:18:51,440 --> 00:18:54,119 Speaker 1: or three page report, and I think the most recent 302 00:18:54,119 --> 00:18:59,040 Speaker 1: one I saw was numbers where they will basically say 303 00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:05,600 Speaker 1: how many incidents of unauthorized um acquisition, possession, used, transfer, 304 00:19:05,760 --> 00:19:10,679 Speaker 1: or disposal of nuclear or radioactive materials were there? And 305 00:19:10,720 --> 00:19:13,520 Speaker 1: there was the good news is it's gone down. There 306 00:19:13,560 --> 00:19:17,000 Speaker 1: was some huge spike in two thousand six. When you 307 00:19:17,000 --> 00:19:19,000 Speaker 1: look at these charts, I have no idea what happened 308 00:19:19,320 --> 00:19:22,919 Speaker 1: in two thousand six, but it's sort of level, and 309 00:19:22,960 --> 00:19:26,080 Speaker 1: then two thousand six it just like ramps up. Like 310 00:19:26,960 --> 00:19:29,280 Speaker 1: I think there were a hundred and thirty something cases 311 00:19:29,800 --> 00:19:33,000 Speaker 1: in two thousand six compared to just over forty and 312 00:19:33,000 --> 00:19:36,880 Speaker 1: two thousand fifteen. Yeah, that's a pretty big spike. It's 313 00:19:36,880 --> 00:19:39,080 Speaker 1: a big spike. And then like the graphs really really 314 00:19:39,080 --> 00:19:40,720 Speaker 1: stand out. So I don't know what's going on then, 315 00:19:41,200 --> 00:19:44,360 Speaker 1: but it's still a little scary to see just how 316 00:19:44,400 --> 00:19:48,879 Speaker 1: many cases there are where things go missing, or things 317 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:53,480 Speaker 1: are not disposed of, right, or things are are acquired 318 00:19:53,600 --> 00:19:55,960 Speaker 1: or sold on the black market. And this is just 319 00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:58,600 Speaker 1: the stuff they know about. Yeah, this is these are 320 00:19:58,640 --> 00:20:01,760 Speaker 1: just the ones that got caught, right um. And you know, 321 00:20:01,960 --> 00:20:05,720 Speaker 1: that whole non proliferation um is a it's a double 322 00:20:05,800 --> 00:20:07,960 Speaker 1: edged sword as well as far as the nuclear black 323 00:20:08,000 --> 00:20:11,880 Speaker 1: market goes, because yes, you're disassembling nuclear warheads, but then 324 00:20:11,920 --> 00:20:17,920 Speaker 1: that means that nuclear grade plutonium or uranium is now 325 00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:22,360 Speaker 1: being transported somewhere for storage or something like that. Right, 326 00:20:22,400 --> 00:20:25,720 Speaker 1: so it's back in play. I guess. Whereas before you'd 327 00:20:25,720 --> 00:20:28,199 Speaker 1: have to steal the whole nuclear warhead, now you just 328 00:20:28,280 --> 00:20:31,200 Speaker 1: have a big lump of weapons grade uranium that's being 329 00:20:31,200 --> 00:20:35,080 Speaker 1: transported across the Atlantic, you know, So that that represents 330 00:20:35,280 --> 00:20:38,879 Speaker 1: a security um, a change in security too. I wonder 331 00:20:38,920 --> 00:20:42,000 Speaker 1: if there were a bunch of nuclear warheads that were 332 00:20:42,040 --> 00:20:45,320 Speaker 1: disassembled that year, I don't know. I bet someone knows 333 00:20:45,320 --> 00:20:49,720 Speaker 1: the answer though, so like you were saying, like there 334 00:20:49,800 --> 00:20:53,040 Speaker 1: is the whole black market UM that that represents an 335 00:20:53,160 --> 00:20:57,240 Speaker 1: an entirely different UM side to this. And there are 336 00:20:57,240 --> 00:21:00,840 Speaker 1: plenty of UM terrorists, organizations and just what you would 337 00:21:00,840 --> 00:21:04,440 Speaker 1: call bad actors, which is hilarious, but it's also pretty 338 00:21:04,480 --> 00:21:06,520 Speaker 1: sinister if you think about it. Who would just like 339 00:21:06,600 --> 00:21:09,000 Speaker 1: to get their hands on this kind of stuff. Some 340 00:21:09,080 --> 00:21:12,320 Speaker 1: of the people that they're selling it to our representatives 341 00:21:12,320 --> 00:21:16,160 Speaker 1: of countries that want to have their own military program UM, 342 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:21,040 Speaker 1: like North Korea or Iraq, Um, I should say Soda 343 00:21:21,160 --> 00:21:25,399 Speaker 1: Hussein erra Iraq, which we're both successful in creating nuclear 344 00:21:25,440 --> 00:21:30,720 Speaker 1: programs right under the noses of the international intelligence community. Yeah, 345 00:21:30,800 --> 00:21:32,600 Speaker 1: and you know, well we'll get to that a little 346 00:21:32,600 --> 00:21:34,359 Speaker 1: bit later. Like how some of the ways that they 347 00:21:34,359 --> 00:21:38,800 Speaker 1: can skirt this stuff. But but the good news is 348 00:21:38,800 --> 00:21:43,840 Speaker 1: is that it is Uh. You can't just get uranium 349 00:21:43,840 --> 00:21:46,320 Speaker 1: at the corner store, right, you can only mind for 350 00:21:46,359 --> 00:21:49,480 Speaker 1: it in certain places. You can't. You can't just get 351 00:21:49,520 --> 00:21:53,000 Speaker 1: that uranium and throw it into a hand grenade casing 352 00:21:53,760 --> 00:21:56,240 Speaker 1: and then you have a little tiny nuclear bomb. Well 353 00:21:56,280 --> 00:21:58,679 Speaker 1: that's a dirty bomb at least. Well, yeah, there are 354 00:21:58,680 --> 00:22:03,040 Speaker 1: such things as dirty bombs. But it's it's like nuclear warheads. Um. 355 00:22:03,160 --> 00:22:05,280 Speaker 1: They they have to be made in very special ways 356 00:22:05,280 --> 00:22:10,080 Speaker 1: with very special materials. And it's the good news is 357 00:22:10,160 --> 00:22:14,159 Speaker 1: that is that I won't say it's easy, but it is. 358 00:22:14,280 --> 00:22:18,520 Speaker 1: It is all pretty trackable to a certain degree. On 359 00:22:19,320 --> 00:22:22,240 Speaker 1: like these nuclear forensics teams, they can generally find out 360 00:22:22,280 --> 00:22:26,960 Speaker 1: even by examining, uh, examining the uranium, like where it 361 00:22:27,000 --> 00:22:32,320 Speaker 1: actually came from or where where did this casing come from? 362 00:22:32,440 --> 00:22:36,160 Speaker 1: It can be tracked pretty readily at this point. Yeah, 363 00:22:36,200 --> 00:22:39,280 Speaker 1: and that's where the UM like the where the nuclear 364 00:22:39,320 --> 00:22:42,520 Speaker 1: forensic scientists are also doing, like the day to day 365 00:22:42,560 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 1: science to create a database like the signatures of uranium 366 00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:49,680 Speaker 1: from the hundred and fifty minds around the around the world. Right, 367 00:22:49,720 --> 00:22:51,840 Speaker 1: that's where that stuff kind of comes into place. When 368 00:22:51,840 --> 00:22:55,879 Speaker 1: you find something, you know, the dude who's smuggling it, 369 00:22:56,800 --> 00:22:58,840 Speaker 1: he may give up whoever he knows, but that doesn't 370 00:22:58,880 --> 00:23:02,960 Speaker 1: mean it's going to lead anywhere. UM. Actually studying the 371 00:23:03,000 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 1: material that he was smuggling is UM, it can frequently 372 00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:12,240 Speaker 1: give up more information than that person even knows, you know, 373 00:23:12,400 --> 00:23:14,720 Speaker 1: yeah for sure. But to do that you have to 374 00:23:14,800 --> 00:23:18,240 Speaker 1: catch the material. UM when it's say coming through your 375 00:23:18,240 --> 00:23:23,280 Speaker 1: border or your port and there are um, well, there's 376 00:23:23,359 --> 00:23:26,080 Speaker 1: there's a number of ways to do this, right yeah. 377 00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:27,399 Speaker 1: I mean you know you can do a lot with 378 00:23:27,440 --> 00:23:30,679 Speaker 1: satellite imagery of course, um, but you can only do 379 00:23:30,760 --> 00:23:34,000 Speaker 1: so much with satellite imagery, like to really to really 380 00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:36,080 Speaker 1: find this stuff. I mean, the good news is radiation 381 00:23:36,119 --> 00:23:40,520 Speaker 1: gives off radiation, so are these these uh uranium and 382 00:23:40,520 --> 00:23:43,919 Speaker 1: stuff like that gives off radiation, But you need to 383 00:23:43,920 --> 00:23:45,960 Speaker 1: be on like ideally you need to be on the 384 00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:49,520 Speaker 1: ground and fairly close to it to read it. Yeah, 385 00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:53,719 Speaker 1: the detectors have gotten way better. Supposedly they need like, um, 386 00:23:53,760 --> 00:23:56,000 Speaker 1: just a fifth of the mass that it used to 387 00:23:56,000 --> 00:23:59,639 Speaker 1: take to set off a reading. Um. But yeah, you 388 00:23:59,680 --> 00:24:02,840 Speaker 1: still have to be I think that the next generation 389 00:24:02,960 --> 00:24:06,000 Speaker 1: will be basically a football field, an American football field 390 00:24:06,000 --> 00:24:10,359 Speaker 1: link yards, yeah, hundred yards roughly a hundred meters um. 391 00:24:10,440 --> 00:24:13,919 Speaker 1: But that means that you have to have a person 392 00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:18,919 Speaker 1: in a hostile nation, you know, walking around with a 393 00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:22,960 Speaker 1: detector within a football field of a nuclear facility. That's 394 00:24:23,119 --> 00:24:26,240 Speaker 1: that's a lot of um. That's that's that's a that's 395 00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:30,040 Speaker 1: a tall order in a lot of cases, right, Um, 396 00:24:30,080 --> 00:24:34,000 Speaker 1: there are detectors that are attached to satellites that can 397 00:24:34,040 --> 00:24:39,400 Speaker 1: detect um radiation into the atmosphere. Yeah, and apparently they've 398 00:24:39,440 --> 00:24:42,080 Speaker 1: gotten a lot better too. But the problem is is 399 00:24:42,119 --> 00:24:46,840 Speaker 1: that radiation there's a couple of things with actual radiation UM. 400 00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:51,080 Speaker 1: It can be shielded relatively easily with a thick layer 401 00:24:51,080 --> 00:24:56,280 Speaker 1: of concrete um or lead um, and the stuff that 402 00:24:56,320 --> 00:24:59,760 Speaker 1: does escape can get absorbed into the atmosphere. So I 403 00:24:59,760 --> 00:25:03,560 Speaker 1: think the detectors, like satellite detectors, are getting much better 404 00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:06,280 Speaker 1: than they were before. And probably the stuff that we 405 00:25:06,359 --> 00:25:10,200 Speaker 1: know about here in this article as probably ten years old. 406 00:25:10,880 --> 00:25:14,120 Speaker 1: I'm sure we're far more advanced than this article would 407 00:25:14,200 --> 00:25:17,440 Speaker 1: would say as far as something like a a radiation 408 00:25:17,480 --> 00:25:20,320 Speaker 1: detector attached to a satellite goes like even the two 409 00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:23,800 Speaker 1: year old article you think is behind Yeah, I think, 410 00:25:23,880 --> 00:25:28,119 Speaker 1: I think so, I think, yeah, yeah, I get what 411 00:25:28,119 --> 00:25:31,880 Speaker 1: you're laying down. So so I think that it's probably 412 00:25:32,119 --> 00:25:36,880 Speaker 1: much better. But again, UM radiation can be it can 413 00:25:36,920 --> 00:25:41,600 Speaker 1: be shielded. One thing that they that nuclear detectives have 414 00:25:41,680 --> 00:25:44,639 Speaker 1: figured out though, is that there's a part of a 415 00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:48,200 Speaker 1: nuclear reactor, uh, not a part of it, but something 416 00:25:48,240 --> 00:25:52,800 Speaker 1: that's created in nuclear reactors um neutrinos that you can't 417 00:25:52,840 --> 00:25:55,320 Speaker 1: do anything about. They're going to escape because they pass 418 00:25:55,720 --> 00:25:59,359 Speaker 1: so easily through matter that they will actually travel through 419 00:25:59,440 --> 00:26:06,440 Speaker 1: solid Earth unfazed by anything that comes in contact with UM. 420 00:26:06,480 --> 00:26:09,360 Speaker 1: And they've created this. Do you do you see Cosmos 421 00:26:09,440 --> 00:26:13,639 Speaker 1: the reboot with nil deGrasse Tyson? Did you see the 422 00:26:13,640 --> 00:26:15,640 Speaker 1: one where he was like in a boat in like 423 00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:21,080 Speaker 1: a new trino cave underground. So it's really neat, Like 424 00:26:21,160 --> 00:26:23,000 Speaker 1: he was standing up in a boat in this really 425 00:26:23,160 --> 00:26:26,480 Speaker 1: dark cave that had like little lights or something kind 426 00:26:26,520 --> 00:26:30,520 Speaker 1: of starlight. It was a romantic scene. And what where 427 00:26:30,560 --> 00:26:34,160 Speaker 1: he was was, um this cave underground. I think it's 428 00:26:34,200 --> 00:26:38,520 Speaker 1: the one in Ohio where it's underground in an old 429 00:26:38,520 --> 00:26:42,159 Speaker 1: salt mine and it's filled with water and it's underground 430 00:26:42,160 --> 00:26:44,400 Speaker 1: to protect it from cosmic rays that could give off 431 00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:48,359 Speaker 1: false readings. But it's meant to pick up new trinos 432 00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:53,680 Speaker 1: that are traveling through the Earth from UH nuclear reactors, right. 433 00:26:54,280 --> 00:26:56,360 Speaker 1: And the way that does that is since new trinos 434 00:26:56,520 --> 00:26:58,960 Speaker 1: interact like almost not at all with matter, which is 435 00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:02,840 Speaker 1: why they can pass un affected through solid earth. UM. 436 00:27:02,880 --> 00:27:07,000 Speaker 1: When it comes in contact with a certain atom in water, 437 00:27:07,760 --> 00:27:11,520 Speaker 1: it gives up the faintest flash of light and if 438 00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:14,639 Speaker 1: you have enough water, this is actually a pretty rare 439 00:27:14,800 --> 00:27:17,440 Speaker 1: occurrence when it happens. But if you have enough water, 440 00:27:17,800 --> 00:27:19,840 Speaker 1: it's going to happen eventually, and you're going to be 441 00:27:19,920 --> 00:27:23,679 Speaker 1: able to detect it with underwater photo sensors. Right, So 442 00:27:23,760 --> 00:27:27,119 Speaker 1: what they've done is fill this old salt mine with 443 00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:29,840 Speaker 1: a huge like supposedly it will take like a million 444 00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:33,919 Speaker 1: tons of water to detract to detect neutrinos from a 445 00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:38,840 Speaker 1: hundred a thousand kilometers away. Um, But when a hostile 446 00:27:38,920 --> 00:27:41,639 Speaker 1: nation or a nation that's not supposed to have a 447 00:27:41,760 --> 00:27:46,040 Speaker 1: nuclear program runs an on off cycle of their nuclear 448 00:27:46,760 --> 00:27:52,520 Speaker 1: enrichment reactor there enriching their nuclear material, you will be 449 00:27:52,600 --> 00:27:57,119 Speaker 1: able to detect that through neutrinos in your underground cave 450 00:27:57,640 --> 00:28:03,400 Speaker 1: neutrino detector. Isn't that insane? Yeah? Think about how much 451 00:28:03,480 --> 00:28:07,720 Speaker 1: trouble it is, but that it actually works, it's amazing. 452 00:28:08,040 --> 00:28:12,480 Speaker 1: I think it's amazing too. And and Neil deGrasse Tyson 453 00:28:12,560 --> 00:28:14,320 Speaker 1: is the man. Can we just say that again? Oh? Yeah, 454 00:28:14,400 --> 00:28:17,320 Speaker 1: for sure? All right. Should we take it a break here? 455 00:28:17,400 --> 00:28:19,120 Speaker 1: All right, we'll come back and we'll talk a little 456 00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:22,359 Speaker 1: bit more about sort of the latest and greatest technology 457 00:28:22,400 --> 00:28:24,639 Speaker 1: we have going as well as some other sneaky ways 458 00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:50,080 Speaker 1: to hide this kind of activity right after this, all right, 459 00:28:50,240 --> 00:28:54,600 Speaker 1: so I can't stress enough. That's uh. This great Economist 460 00:28:54,680 --> 00:28:58,200 Speaker 1: article called the New Detectives. UH really learned a lot 461 00:28:58,200 --> 00:29:00,640 Speaker 1: from it. And there's this UM kind of starts out 462 00:29:00,640 --> 00:29:04,600 Speaker 1: by talking about UM and this is if you have 463 00:29:05,000 --> 00:29:10,320 Speaker 1: not prevented someone from getting uh nuclear materials and they 464 00:29:10,320 --> 00:29:13,719 Speaker 1: are actually doing nuclear tests, which ideally you have stopped 465 00:29:13,760 --> 00:29:18,560 Speaker 1: the process before that. But let's be honest, sometimes things 466 00:29:18,560 --> 00:29:21,160 Speaker 1: slip through the cracks. People get their hands, or countries 467 00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:24,360 Speaker 1: get their hands or rogue nations and terrorists get their 468 00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:27,280 Speaker 1: hands on these materials and they want to test out 469 00:29:28,040 --> 00:29:32,200 Speaker 1: UM bombs and things. They are now using some amazing 470 00:29:33,160 --> 00:29:37,920 Speaker 1: UH equipment, seismic seismographic equipment. Would that be the way 471 00:29:37,960 --> 00:29:40,800 Speaker 1: it is? It? Yeah, to detect this stuff to the 472 00:29:40,840 --> 00:29:44,520 Speaker 1: point now there's a there's a group called the Preparatory 473 00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:49,320 Speaker 1: Commission for the Comprehensive Tests Band Treaty Organization. UH. And 474 00:29:49,360 --> 00:29:52,360 Speaker 1: that's a fancy way of saying. They listen around the 475 00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:57,680 Speaker 1: world with these seismograph machines to the point where doctor Zerbo, 476 00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:00,720 Speaker 1: which is the greatest name ever actually for like a 477 00:30:00,840 --> 00:30:05,240 Speaker 1: nuclear international nuclear scientists. Doctor Zerbo says, now it is 478 00:30:05,280 --> 00:30:09,400 Speaker 1: impossible to test with thus smallest nuclear weapon anywhere on 479 00:30:09,480 --> 00:30:13,960 Speaker 1: Earth in secret. They will hear it. Yep, it's amazing. Yeah. 480 00:30:14,040 --> 00:30:20,280 Speaker 1: The the ctbt O, the the Comprehensive Test Band Treaty Organization, Right, 481 00:30:21,320 --> 00:30:25,280 Speaker 1: is that correct? Correct? They have so I saw it 482 00:30:25,280 --> 00:30:28,320 Speaker 1: listed somewhere, but this this article kind of lays it out. 483 00:30:28,680 --> 00:30:32,680 Speaker 1: They have a hundred and seventy seismic stations worldwide, eleven 484 00:30:32,760 --> 00:30:36,880 Speaker 1: underwater hydroacoustic centers so you can detect the sound waves 485 00:30:36,920 --> 00:30:43,400 Speaker 1: in the ocean, sixty atmospheric infrasound listening stations. They're off 486 00:30:43,400 --> 00:30:47,840 Speaker 1: at that point, right, and then nineties six radio new 487 00:30:48,040 --> 00:30:53,520 Speaker 1: radio NUCLEIIED NUCLEAD sampling facilities. I think that's the ones 488 00:30:53,560 --> 00:30:56,640 Speaker 1: that like like those satellites that can detect radiation leaks. 489 00:30:57,240 --> 00:30:59,680 Speaker 1: I think that's that's like that. So yeah, like around 490 00:30:59,680 --> 00:31:01,840 Speaker 1: the world, they've got it locked down. You cannot set 491 00:31:01,880 --> 00:31:04,239 Speaker 1: off a nuclear weapon in them not know about it. 492 00:31:04,760 --> 00:31:07,840 Speaker 1: That is correct. Another big thing that they're doing now 493 00:31:08,040 --> 00:31:14,240 Speaker 1: is uh software, network analysis software. After nine eleven, America 494 00:31:14,320 --> 00:31:19,400 Speaker 1: really started ramping up. As everyone knows, there listening skills 495 00:31:20,120 --> 00:31:24,120 Speaker 1: um and not in like a polite my friend has 496 00:31:24,160 --> 00:31:26,600 Speaker 1: some issues they need to talk through way right, you 497 00:31:26,600 --> 00:31:30,719 Speaker 1: know what I mean. Uh, So they now have all 498 00:31:30,760 --> 00:31:35,360 Speaker 1: the software that can It's sort of I think the 499 00:31:35,400 --> 00:31:37,600 Speaker 1: feeling I get is what this software now does. It's 500 00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:41,000 Speaker 1: able to just draw from all these different areas, whether 501 00:31:41,040 --> 00:31:45,800 Speaker 1: it's email for social media, or phone calls or receipts 502 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:49,640 Speaker 1: and credit card transactions like prism. Yeah, and it will 503 00:31:49,680 --> 00:31:52,680 Speaker 1: just it'll feed it all into these the the software 504 00:31:52,680 --> 00:31:56,880 Speaker 1: programs now that will eventually narrow it down to, Hey, 505 00:31:56,920 --> 00:32:00,720 Speaker 1: this person might be a batty because they have ticked 506 00:32:00,720 --> 00:32:04,520 Speaker 1: off uh not as an angered but they have checked 507 00:32:04,600 --> 00:32:09,160 Speaker 1: so many boxes in our software system of activities that 508 00:32:09,160 --> 00:32:11,720 Speaker 1: they're undertaking that you might want to go take a 509 00:32:11,720 --> 00:32:14,360 Speaker 1: look at them. Yeah, and the things that this did. 510 00:32:14,360 --> 00:32:19,240 Speaker 1: You say the name Aura, So Aura is a good 511 00:32:19,240 --> 00:32:22,360 Speaker 1: example of this kind of software. It's from Carnegie Melon 512 00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:28,800 Speaker 1: and basically it it has been adapted to not just 513 00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:32,720 Speaker 1: track terrorists, but to track nuclear scientists. Now I think 514 00:32:32,760 --> 00:32:35,640 Speaker 1: like thirty thousand of them around the world. So if 515 00:32:35,680 --> 00:32:37,640 Speaker 1: you're a nuclear scientist and you're in the prime of 516 00:32:37,680 --> 00:32:42,080 Speaker 1: your career and you publish an article every eighteen to 517 00:32:42,360 --> 00:32:45,000 Speaker 1: thirty six weeks on average, according to the computer, and 518 00:32:45,000 --> 00:32:48,040 Speaker 1: all of a sudden you just stop. You're going to 519 00:32:48,080 --> 00:32:50,320 Speaker 1: set off a red flag. They're going to wonder why 520 00:32:50,360 --> 00:32:53,560 Speaker 1: you stopped publishing at the height of your career, and 521 00:32:53,600 --> 00:32:55,920 Speaker 1: they're going to say, you know, it's entirely possible that 522 00:32:55,920 --> 00:33:00,320 Speaker 1: they got drafted into a nuclear military program where would 523 00:33:00,320 --> 00:33:03,000 Speaker 1: not be allowed to publish, so that might set off 524 00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:06,120 Speaker 1: a red flag. And then there's another computer, um I 525 00:33:06,160 --> 00:33:09,560 Speaker 1: think the Pentagon is set up called Constellation the Whopper, 526 00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:12,560 Speaker 1: which again is probably yeah, it's probably twenty years out 527 00:33:12,600 --> 00:33:14,800 Speaker 1: of date by now if it's in this article. But 528 00:33:14,920 --> 00:33:19,160 Speaker 1: this Constellation is a computer that takes the information from 529 00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:23,280 Speaker 1: all these other computer all these other softwares and put 530 00:33:23,360 --> 00:33:25,920 Speaker 1: them together and says, oh, well, not only did that 531 00:33:25,960 --> 00:33:28,960 Speaker 1: guy stop publishing at the height of his nuclear science career, 532 00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:34,560 Speaker 1: he also just moved within commuting distance of a um 533 00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:38,920 Speaker 1: a facility that is suspected by Army intelligence of possibly 534 00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:44,720 Speaker 1: being holding nuclear centrifuges that that aren't registered anywhere. Yeah, 535 00:33:44,760 --> 00:33:47,640 Speaker 1: and there uh, there are other programs. There's one software 536 00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:51,680 Speaker 1: program that uses what's called combinatorial mathematics, and what they 537 00:33:51,720 --> 00:33:55,360 Speaker 1: do is they analyze data to end up with a 538 00:33:55,400 --> 00:33:59,920 Speaker 1: set of criteria called centrality between this and degree, since 539 00:34:00,040 --> 00:34:04,200 Speaker 1: Radley centrality being how important someone is in the system. 540 00:34:04,440 --> 00:34:06,520 Speaker 1: Between this is their access to other people and the 541 00:34:06,600 --> 00:34:10,120 Speaker 1: degree there's a number of people they interact with and 542 00:34:10,239 --> 00:34:13,879 Speaker 1: the idea there is what they're looking for. Generally, our 543 00:34:13,920 --> 00:34:18,160 Speaker 1: network members that have high between this and low degree, 544 00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:22,719 Speaker 1: So those are probably like Osama bin Laden is a 545 00:34:22,719 --> 00:34:25,520 Speaker 1: good example. Like towards the end, he has access to 546 00:34:25,520 --> 00:34:28,080 Speaker 1: a lot of people, but he's not interacting with a 547 00:34:28,080 --> 00:34:30,239 Speaker 1: lot of people. Well, he's like a high up. A 548 00:34:30,320 --> 00:34:32,480 Speaker 1: higher up, I think is what It indicates somebody of 549 00:34:32,520 --> 00:34:37,000 Speaker 1: importance in the network. Right yeah, and um, that's this 550 00:34:37,120 --> 00:34:39,920 Speaker 1: is all extremely g whiz. But then you hear about, oh, 551 00:34:39,960 --> 00:34:42,880 Speaker 1: it's actually being applied in real life. Um back and 552 00:34:42,920 --> 00:34:46,000 Speaker 1: I think two thousand and ten eleven twelve, at least 553 00:34:46,080 --> 00:34:51,200 Speaker 1: five nuclear scientists working on Iran's nuclear program were murdered. Um. 554 00:34:51,600 --> 00:34:53,880 Speaker 1: One of them was like picking his child up or 555 00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:57,200 Speaker 1: dropping his child off at daycare, like just gunned down 556 00:34:57,239 --> 00:35:00,600 Speaker 1: by guys in the street or um carbon or something 557 00:35:00,640 --> 00:35:02,759 Speaker 1: like that. And the one thing that they had in 558 00:35:02,800 --> 00:35:07,840 Speaker 1: common was that they were all working on Iran's nuclear program. UM. 559 00:35:08,360 --> 00:35:12,920 Speaker 1: And they think that the Mossade used intelligence that was 560 00:35:13,040 --> 00:35:17,600 Speaker 1: gathered by these this type of software program to figure 561 00:35:17,640 --> 00:35:21,280 Speaker 1: out if you kill these people, it will really screw 562 00:35:21,400 --> 00:35:25,200 Speaker 1: up the program because they're important figures in this program. 563 00:35:25,280 --> 00:35:27,160 Speaker 1: Even though we don't know them. We know their names 564 00:35:27,160 --> 00:35:29,359 Speaker 1: and that's it. We don't know anything about them. Just 565 00:35:29,440 --> 00:35:32,440 Speaker 1: based on this metadata that that these programs put together, 566 00:35:32,680 --> 00:35:34,680 Speaker 1: we can tell you that if if they weren't around 567 00:35:34,719 --> 00:35:37,400 Speaker 1: any longer, it would set the whole program back. And 568 00:35:37,440 --> 00:35:40,720 Speaker 1: they did. Yeah, and uh, like I'll say in earlier, 569 00:35:40,719 --> 00:35:42,960 Speaker 1: the good news is is if you want to build 570 00:35:43,560 --> 00:35:45,839 Speaker 1: and again we're not talking about dirty bombs and stuff, 571 00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:49,160 Speaker 1: but if you want to build a nuclear warhead, there 572 00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:53,920 Speaker 1: are very specialized parts that you have to buy UM 573 00:35:53,960 --> 00:35:57,480 Speaker 1: in order to do so. So they have software that 574 00:35:57,560 --> 00:36:00,800 Speaker 1: monitors this stuff around the world, and what this article 575 00:36:00,920 --> 00:36:06,040 Speaker 1: calls UM they reveal choke points basically that they can monitor, 576 00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:10,120 Speaker 1: like the ceramic composites for the centerfuges that you have 577 00:36:10,239 --> 00:36:12,919 Speaker 1: to have in order to pull this off. There's only 578 00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:16,840 Speaker 1: so many companies that do that in the world. So UM, 579 00:36:17,080 --> 00:36:18,839 Speaker 1: I mean, that's the good news. You can't run out 580 00:36:18,840 --> 00:36:23,600 Speaker 1: to Walmart and buy the stuff to make this happen. So, uh, 581 00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:26,160 Speaker 1: it makes a little bit easier to monitor what's going 582 00:36:26,200 --> 00:36:30,840 Speaker 1: on to a certain degree. Um. That's gotta be a 583 00:36:30,920 --> 00:36:34,839 Speaker 1: huge help man having that. Oh yeah, especially together with 584 00:36:34,920 --> 00:36:38,720 Speaker 1: human intelligence, which apparently is still one of the best 585 00:36:38,719 --> 00:36:42,279 Speaker 1: ways to find out about a nuclear program. Um. There 586 00:36:42,320 --> 00:36:44,759 Speaker 1: was this one I think Syria was working on their 587 00:36:44,840 --> 00:36:49,760 Speaker 1: nuclear program and they had, with the assistance of North Korea, 588 00:36:50,080 --> 00:36:54,800 Speaker 1: they had built a facility where they lowered the floor, yes, 589 00:36:55,160 --> 00:36:59,120 Speaker 1: so that they could start their military nuclear program in 590 00:36:59,239 --> 00:37:02,840 Speaker 1: secret and um, rather than a cooling tower, they connected 591 00:37:02,880 --> 00:37:06,359 Speaker 1: to a nearby reservoir with underground pipes. Um. And they 592 00:37:06,400 --> 00:37:08,879 Speaker 1: had this whole thing set up. And if you were 593 00:37:08,920 --> 00:37:12,000 Speaker 1: looking at it, and you were a military analyst looking 594 00:37:12,040 --> 00:37:14,759 Speaker 1: for evidence of a nuclear facility being built, you would 595 00:37:14,760 --> 00:37:18,279 Speaker 1: immediately check that building off the list because it was 596 00:37:18,400 --> 00:37:21,560 Speaker 1: too low, too close to the ground, like the it 597 00:37:21,600 --> 00:37:26,080 Speaker 1: wasn't tall enough to house a nuclear facility. And they 598 00:37:26,120 --> 00:37:28,200 Speaker 1: did I'm sure over and over. I'm sure they saw 599 00:37:28,200 --> 00:37:32,080 Speaker 1: this building plenty of times. And it wasn't until um, 600 00:37:32,080 --> 00:37:35,600 Speaker 1: some human intelligence gave it up that it became clear 601 00:37:35,640 --> 00:37:38,360 Speaker 1: that no, actually this is this is a nuclear facility, 602 00:37:39,200 --> 00:37:44,400 Speaker 1: so it can you can fool the international even the 603 00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:47,760 Speaker 1: nuclear detectives can be fooled, is I guess what I'm saying, 604 00:37:48,080 --> 00:37:50,120 Speaker 1: which is kind of surprising. But one of the ways 605 00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:53,239 Speaker 1: that you do that is you you figure out how 606 00:37:53,280 --> 00:37:57,359 Speaker 1: to build your nuclear program in house. You get detected 607 00:37:57,640 --> 00:37:59,960 Speaker 1: when you start to spread out through the black mark 608 00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:03,520 Speaker 1: market or to that company that makes the composites needed 609 00:38:03,560 --> 00:38:07,080 Speaker 1: for centrifuges. Yeah, like Iran, for example, they used in 610 00:38:07,120 --> 00:38:09,400 Speaker 1: the in that same article. They can mind the uranium 611 00:38:09,440 --> 00:38:12,600 Speaker 1: themselves in the country, which is a little scary. And 612 00:38:12,600 --> 00:38:14,880 Speaker 1: then they can also or they at least had been 613 00:38:14,960 --> 00:38:20,000 Speaker 1: working on producing those center few droaters instead with carbon 614 00:38:20,040 --> 00:38:23,520 Speaker 1: fiber instead of the special steel that they need to outsource. 615 00:38:24,080 --> 00:38:25,960 Speaker 1: So all of a sudden, you're not on that list. 616 00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:28,719 Speaker 1: You're doing an in house and it I mean, it 617 00:38:28,719 --> 00:38:31,560 Speaker 1: seems like from reading this, like the good news is 618 00:38:31,600 --> 00:38:34,600 Speaker 1: are getting more and more specialized equipment that you can 619 00:38:34,719 --> 00:38:38,560 Speaker 1: detect stuff from further away, and our capabilities and the 620 00:38:38,600 --> 00:38:42,200 Speaker 1: software is getting better and better. But these places are 621 00:38:42,239 --> 00:38:45,040 Speaker 1: also finding more and more ways to side step traditional 622 00:38:45,120 --> 00:38:48,759 Speaker 1: manufacturing means, which is kind of scary at the same time. Yeah, 623 00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:53,000 Speaker 1: apparently Um Saddam Hussein had a nuclear program that he 624 00:38:53,080 --> 00:38:55,640 Speaker 1: was working on that he was able to come up 625 00:38:55,680 --> 00:38:59,839 Speaker 1: with I was mentioning it earlier, where UM he did 626 00:38:59,840 --> 00:39:03,359 Speaker 1: it by basically going retro. He used the process of 627 00:39:03,480 --> 00:39:09,959 Speaker 1: UM separating uranium isotopes through electro magnetism rather than centrifuges, 628 00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:14,399 Speaker 1: so he didn't need centrifuges. And apparently it's so low 629 00:39:14,440 --> 00:39:19,279 Speaker 1: tech and UM so out of use that no analysts 630 00:39:19,320 --> 00:39:21,880 Speaker 1: were looking for evidence of that, so they just totally 631 00:39:21,920 --> 00:39:23,600 Speaker 1: missed it. But he was still able to come up 632 00:39:23,600 --> 00:39:27,400 Speaker 1: with the nuclear program using that old, outdated technology purposefully 633 00:39:27,520 --> 00:39:32,080 Speaker 1: from what I understand. Wow. Yeah. And then of course 634 00:39:32,200 --> 00:39:35,640 Speaker 1: nuclear North Korea's nuclear program was just a total surprise 635 00:39:35,640 --> 00:39:39,200 Speaker 1: to everybody. I mean, people suspected it and we're very 636 00:39:39,239 --> 00:39:42,000 Speaker 1: concerned that it was going on, but it wasn't until 637 00:39:42,440 --> 00:39:47,279 Speaker 1: Kim Jong n or ill I can't remember which one 638 00:39:47,320 --> 00:39:48,800 Speaker 1: it would have been, but back in two thousand and 639 00:39:48,840 --> 00:39:52,279 Speaker 1: ten they invited as Stanford professor out and showed it 640 00:39:52,280 --> 00:39:55,160 Speaker 1: to him so he could go tell the world shocked 641 00:39:55,200 --> 00:39:58,080 Speaker 1: everybody done. Yeah, why in the world did they let 642 00:39:58,120 --> 00:40:01,960 Speaker 1: that happen? Yeah, I mean I don't I don't know 643 00:40:02,000 --> 00:40:04,000 Speaker 1: how it happened. I think it happened because of that 644 00:40:04,000 --> 00:40:07,359 Speaker 1: guy we mentioned earlier, a Q Khan from Pakistan who 645 00:40:07,400 --> 00:40:11,959 Speaker 1: was the father of Pakistan's military nuclear program UM, who 646 00:40:12,120 --> 00:40:16,839 Speaker 1: was educated in Europe and stole some blueprints for making 647 00:40:16,920 --> 00:40:21,759 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons and went about building Pakistan one right. And 648 00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:25,520 Speaker 1: then they started turning the countries like Libya, Iran, North 649 00:40:25,600 --> 00:40:31,480 Speaker 1: Korea and UM offering basically turn key military nuclear programs 650 00:40:31,520 --> 00:40:34,480 Speaker 1: based on Pakistan's designs for like a hundred million dollars. 651 00:40:35,400 --> 00:40:37,520 Speaker 1: And then he got He ended up as a scapegoat 652 00:40:37,560 --> 00:40:40,800 Speaker 1: for his nation and was placed under house arrest. Luxurious 653 00:40:40,800 --> 00:40:42,839 Speaker 1: house arrest, but still from what I understand, the guy 654 00:40:42,880 --> 00:40:44,640 Speaker 1: was very upset about this because he went from being 655 00:40:44,640 --> 00:40:47,560 Speaker 1: a treated like a god to being treated like, you know, 656 00:40:48,719 --> 00:40:52,040 Speaker 1: it's his fault that there's nuclear periliferation among Rugue states 657 00:40:52,840 --> 00:40:56,680 Speaker 1: UM and was finally released a few years I think 658 00:40:56,719 --> 00:40:59,880 Speaker 1: five years later, And I mean that guy, he deserves 659 00:40:59,880 --> 00:41:02,840 Speaker 1: his own episode. He was fascinating. I think still is. 660 00:41:02,840 --> 00:41:05,320 Speaker 1: I believe he's still around too. What's his name, a 661 00:41:05,480 --> 00:41:07,759 Speaker 1: Q Khan? Can we call it the wrath of con 662 00:41:08,280 --> 00:41:11,120 Speaker 1: That's what they did in the Atlantic. They I couldn't 663 00:41:11,160 --> 00:41:15,600 Speaker 1: believe it. Uh, so the big question is and the economists, 664 00:41:15,760 --> 00:41:20,560 Speaker 1: um thankfully asked that could you build a nuclear weapon 665 00:41:20,600 --> 00:41:24,000 Speaker 1: in secret? And uh, there's a couple of opinions there. 666 00:41:24,040 --> 00:41:28,600 Speaker 1: They asked the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, former Foreign Secretary 667 00:41:29,000 --> 00:41:32,600 Speaker 1: Rhyas Mohammed Khan. He said, Nope, I can't do that 668 00:41:32,640 --> 00:41:36,920 Speaker 1: in secret anymore. But uh, there was an anonymous American 669 00:41:36,960 --> 00:41:41,759 Speaker 1: State Department counter proliferation official who said it's not impossible, 670 00:41:41,880 --> 00:41:45,680 Speaker 1: so you know, don't don't be fooled. Yeah, it's a 671 00:41:45,680 --> 00:41:51,360 Speaker 1: little little, little worsome. Yeah, I mean you you really 672 00:41:51,400 --> 00:41:53,759 Speaker 1: like to think that nobody could do this anymore. But 673 00:41:53,840 --> 00:41:57,240 Speaker 1: apparently it is getting easier and easier. But like you said, 674 00:41:57,440 --> 00:42:00,799 Speaker 1: it's also making it easier and easier to detect. It's 675 00:42:00,800 --> 00:42:03,640 Speaker 1: like any illegal operations. Um, it's like a game of 676 00:42:03,680 --> 00:42:07,839 Speaker 1: cat and mouse with on the development side of developing. 677 00:42:08,040 --> 00:42:11,200 Speaker 1: Good guys developing stuff, bad guys developing stuff. Yeah, it's 678 00:42:11,200 --> 00:42:14,319 Speaker 1: really interesting. But in this case, this game of cat 679 00:42:14,360 --> 00:42:17,080 Speaker 1: and mouse, you have some of the smartest human beings 680 00:42:17,640 --> 00:42:20,640 Speaker 1: on the planet who are who have banded together to 681 00:42:20,680 --> 00:42:26,040 Speaker 1: say no, no, we're not gonna let this happen. Okay, Well, 682 00:42:26,080 --> 00:42:28,680 Speaker 1: if you want to know more about nuclear detectives or 683 00:42:28,719 --> 00:42:32,120 Speaker 1: nuclear forensics, start digging because there's plenty out there. And 684 00:42:32,239 --> 00:42:36,480 Speaker 1: man is it fascinating. Um, since I said it's fascinating, 685 00:42:36,640 --> 00:42:42,520 Speaker 1: it's time for listener mail. So before we do listener mail, buddy, 686 00:42:42,560 --> 00:42:45,640 Speaker 1: can we talk a little bit about our old friends 687 00:42:45,800 --> 00:42:50,359 Speaker 1: at the Cooperative for Education. Oh yes, let's chuck co Ed. Yeah. 688 00:42:50,400 --> 00:42:52,840 Speaker 1: The quick download with co ED is we went to 689 00:42:52,840 --> 00:42:55,280 Speaker 1: Guatemala quite a few years ago with them. They invited 690 00:42:55,400 --> 00:42:58,319 Speaker 1: to come down you, me and Jerry and I went down. 691 00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:01,440 Speaker 1: We saw the great work they do, like real on 692 00:43:01,480 --> 00:43:06,080 Speaker 1: the ground hard work helping children of Guatemala pulled themselves 693 00:43:06,080 --> 00:43:08,600 Speaker 1: out of poverty through education. Yeah. Yeah, it's in our 694 00:43:08,880 --> 00:43:11,759 Speaker 1: two part Guatemala special that everybody can go listen to 695 00:43:11,800 --> 00:43:14,359 Speaker 1: if you haven't heard it and get this, Chuck, So, 696 00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:17,840 Speaker 1: COED has another drive going on and they're making it 697 00:43:17,880 --> 00:43:21,239 Speaker 1: their mission to keep a thousand girls in Guatemala from 698 00:43:21,320 --> 00:43:25,480 Speaker 1: dropping out of school. By that's amazing, dude. It takes 699 00:43:25,520 --> 00:43:28,640 Speaker 1: twelve years of education to break the cyclopoverty in Guatemala, 700 00:43:29,280 --> 00:43:31,600 Speaker 1: but a poor rural Guatemalan has only one and twenty 701 00:43:31,680 --> 00:43:35,200 Speaker 1: chance of reaching that milestone. So they are literally identifying 702 00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:39,640 Speaker 1: young women to literally keep them in school. Like it's 703 00:43:39,680 --> 00:43:42,759 Speaker 1: not some nebulous campaign and you're not sure where your 704 00:43:42,760 --> 00:43:45,400 Speaker 1: money is going. You are helping a young woman in 705 00:43:45,440 --> 00:43:48,480 Speaker 1: Guatemala stay in school and get educated. Yep. So you 706 00:43:48,520 --> 00:43:51,640 Speaker 1: can sponsor one of those girls for seventy dollars a 707 00:43:51,680 --> 00:43:53,160 Speaker 1: month or if you want to do half of that, 708 00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:56,600 Speaker 1: thirty five dollars a month. COED will match you with 709 00:43:56,640 --> 00:43:59,480 Speaker 1: another sponsor to make sure that there is a student 710 00:43:59,560 --> 00:44:03,040 Speaker 1: who is able to continue her education and therefore eventually 711 00:44:03,040 --> 00:44:05,520 Speaker 1: break her family out of the cycle of poverty that 712 00:44:05,640 --> 00:44:09,200 Speaker 1: dropping out of school perpetuates. Yeah, it's really great. They're 713 00:44:09,200 --> 00:44:12,759 Speaker 1: awesome people. So if you weren't a good person this 714 00:44:12,840 --> 00:44:14,439 Speaker 1: year and you want to make up for it here 715 00:44:14,480 --> 00:44:16,840 Speaker 1: before the end of the year, or if you want 716 00:44:16,920 --> 00:44:21,040 Speaker 1: to start off in the right way, go to thousand 717 00:44:21,040 --> 00:44:24,799 Speaker 1: Girls Initiative dot org and that is all spelled out, 718 00:44:24,840 --> 00:44:28,359 Speaker 1: not the number one, thousand thousand Girls Initiative dot org 719 00:44:28,920 --> 00:44:31,359 Speaker 1: and you can actually pick out the student you want 720 00:44:31,360 --> 00:44:34,439 Speaker 1: to sponsor. Is just the best. Co ED is great 721 00:44:34,480 --> 00:44:36,839 Speaker 1: and we're really happy that we're still working with them. Yep. 722 00:44:36,920 --> 00:44:38,960 Speaker 1: So keep up the good work co ed and you 723 00:44:39,000 --> 00:44:42,200 Speaker 1: guys please please go help these guys out, all right? 724 00:44:42,440 --> 00:44:45,359 Speaker 1: Uh now on the listener mail, Yes, I'm gonna call 725 00:44:45,440 --> 00:44:49,960 Speaker 1: this UM restaurant health inspection from a manager's perspective. Okay, 726 00:44:50,320 --> 00:44:52,640 Speaker 1: do have permission to read this? I love listening to 727 00:44:52,719 --> 00:44:54,560 Speaker 1: the show on health inspections. Guys. Want to throw in 728 00:44:54,600 --> 00:44:57,360 Speaker 1: a couple of tidbits from my point of view. First, 729 00:44:57,440 --> 00:45:00,200 Speaker 1: you were spot on just about everything with your re arch, 730 00:45:00,200 --> 00:45:03,840 Speaker 1: including how some employees take no exception to sanitary practice. 731 00:45:04,440 --> 00:45:06,680 Speaker 1: Those employees tend to not have a very long career. 732 00:45:07,000 --> 00:45:09,080 Speaker 1: When the health inspector shows up and you see the 733 00:45:09,120 --> 00:45:11,880 Speaker 1: staff start to scramble in the business, we call that 734 00:45:11,960 --> 00:45:13,839 Speaker 1: the two minute drill. And that is not to say 735 00:45:13,840 --> 00:45:15,879 Speaker 1: that we don't keep our restaurant up to standards, because 736 00:45:15,920 --> 00:45:18,880 Speaker 1: we do, but we want it to be perfect. Typically, 737 00:45:18,920 --> 00:45:20,520 Speaker 1: the this made me feel a lot better by the 738 00:45:20,560 --> 00:45:24,640 Speaker 1: way reading this. Uh. Typically the hd H comes to 739 00:45:24,680 --> 00:45:27,680 Speaker 1: the restaurant at the most inopportune times, right in the 740 00:45:27,680 --> 00:45:29,840 Speaker 1: middle of a busy lunch service. At that point, the 741 00:45:29,880 --> 00:45:33,000 Speaker 1: kitchen is cooking one dishes at the same time servers 742 00:45:33,040 --> 00:45:36,040 Speaker 1: are running drinks and taking orders. Dirty dishes are stacking 743 00:45:36,080 --> 00:45:38,280 Speaker 1: up a bit in the back. With the Health Inspection 744 00:45:38,320 --> 00:45:41,799 Speaker 1: past fail scale being so specific, the slightest thing can 745 00:45:41,840 --> 00:45:43,879 Speaker 1: fail you anything from an ice scoop in the ice 746 00:45:43,840 --> 00:45:47,680 Speaker 1: spin to a fruit fly or a steak resting at 747 00:45:47,719 --> 00:45:52,080 Speaker 1: temperature that is off by two degrees. We as managers 748 00:45:52,080 --> 00:45:54,720 Speaker 1: like to continue to train our staff keep things tidy, 749 00:45:54,760 --> 00:45:57,160 Speaker 1: but also I have a few quick fixes in order 750 00:45:57,200 --> 00:45:59,839 Speaker 1: to maintain that a rating. Washing hands is a must 751 00:46:00,000 --> 00:46:02,960 Speaker 1: anytime food is handled, especially when the inspectors are on site. 752 00:46:03,160 --> 00:46:05,759 Speaker 1: As you know, it's a very nerve wracking time while 753 00:46:05,760 --> 00:46:08,200 Speaker 1: they're checking every nook and cranny. That is why we 754 00:46:08,920 --> 00:46:12,960 Speaker 1: managers are required by law to get health certified to 755 00:46:13,160 --> 00:46:16,880 Speaker 1: ensure we are training out staff properly and not allowing 756 00:46:16,920 --> 00:46:21,000 Speaker 1: any boots in the Brunswick stew he said, Broad worst 757 00:46:21,000 --> 00:46:23,840 Speaker 1: stew so I saw that I think he might be insane. 758 00:46:25,880 --> 00:46:28,719 Speaker 1: As always, thanks for an incredible podcast and providing us 759 00:46:28,760 --> 00:46:31,920 Speaker 1: with information on things we may not usually have knowledge 760 00:46:31,920 --> 00:46:35,040 Speaker 1: to prior all the best, Derek, he said, ps. We 761 00:46:35,040 --> 00:46:36,880 Speaker 1: have a remarkable cuisine at my place, so if you 762 00:46:36,880 --> 00:46:39,200 Speaker 1: ever are in the area, come on buy and we'll 763 00:46:39,200 --> 00:46:41,439 Speaker 1: treat you to some great food. We have the best 764 00:46:41,480 --> 00:46:43,799 Speaker 1: Broad worst stew in the region. Well, he didn't say 765 00:46:43,800 --> 00:46:47,720 Speaker 1: what restaurant he worked at. Oh, actually it's in his email. 766 00:46:48,360 --> 00:46:50,040 Speaker 1: I'm not gonna read that, but they're in Boston, so 767 00:46:50,200 --> 00:46:52,960 Speaker 1: maybe okay, and we go back to the wilbur We 768 00:46:52,960 --> 00:46:55,680 Speaker 1: can go get some Boston cream pie cake and then 769 00:46:55,719 --> 00:46:59,040 Speaker 1: some Broad Worst Delicious. Yeah cool, Thanks a lot. What 770 00:46:59,080 --> 00:47:01,880 Speaker 1: is the guy's name, Derek? Thanks a lot, Derek. That 771 00:47:01,960 --> 00:47:03,640 Speaker 1: was a great email, and yes, in need, it did 772 00:47:03,719 --> 00:47:05,600 Speaker 1: make It made me feel a lot better to Chuck. 773 00:47:06,400 --> 00:47:08,120 Speaker 1: If you want to make me and Chuck feel better, 774 00:47:08,239 --> 00:47:11,200 Speaker 1: well just send us an email. First. You can tweet 775 00:47:11,200 --> 00:47:13,520 Speaker 1: to us. I'm at josh On Clark and s Y 776 00:47:13,640 --> 00:47:16,520 Speaker 1: s K podcast, Chuck's Man in the Facebook pages at 777 00:47:16,600 --> 00:47:19,440 Speaker 1: Charles W. Chuck Bryant and that Stuff you Should Know. 778 00:47:20,000 --> 00:47:22,120 Speaker 1: You can send us an email to Stuff podcast at 779 00:47:22,160 --> 00:47:24,360 Speaker 1: how stuff Works dot com. Is always joined us at 780 00:47:24,360 --> 00:47:31,320 Speaker 1: our home on the web, Stuff you Should Know dot com. 781 00:47:31,320 --> 00:47:33,759 Speaker 1: For more on this and thousands of other topics, is 782 00:47:33,800 --> 00:47:45,520 Speaker 1: it how Stuff Works dot com.