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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff looks dot com. Hello everyone,

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Speaker 1: welcome to tech stuff. My name is Chris Poulette, and

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Speaker 1: I am an editor at how stuff works dot com.

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Speaker 1: Sitting across from me, as always today looks a little

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Speaker 1: withdrawn his senior writer, Jonathan Strickland. They say the best

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Speaker 1: things in life are free. You're such a card. Today

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Speaker 1: we're going funds out of the way. Early to they

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Speaker 1: were gonna talk about automated teller machines or a t

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Speaker 1: M machines. We'll also be talking about personal identification numbers

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Speaker 1: or pen numbers. Five people just paused the podcast so

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Speaker 1: that they could write us an angry email about the redundancy.

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Speaker 1: They probably also went ahead and unsubscribed. Possibly yeah, but

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Speaker 1: we in case just for you people who have those

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Speaker 1: pet peeves. And I totally understand. I'm nothing. I share

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Speaker 1: those pet peeves. I am not criticizing. You may very

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Speaker 1: well hear me say a t M machine and or

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Speaker 1: pen number at least once in this podcast as a way,

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Speaker 1: and and not not in a way to needle you

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Speaker 1: just that's it's it's stamped in my brain that way. Well,

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Speaker 1: pen number two is also a little bit more useful

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Speaker 1: than a t M machine since pen is also a pin.

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Speaker 1: Do you have your pen? Yeah? Oh right, no, the

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Speaker 1: number exactly? Do you have your personal identification numbers? So yes,

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Speaker 1: we're talking about a t M S today, and we've

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Speaker 1: had a few people ask us about how a t

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Speaker 1: m S work. We assume it was all on the

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Speaker 1: up and up, not to find out how they work

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Speaker 1: so that you can exploit them. I did find out

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Speaker 1: an article about how to hack into one. Wow. Well,

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Speaker 1: and that gets a little complicated. We'll talk about that.

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Speaker 1: Why that is the Yeah, because it really does depend.

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Speaker 1: But first let's talk about how a t m S

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Speaker 1: came to be. That's somewhat in dispute. Yes, um, there

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Speaker 1: there are multiple people who were inventing things that resemble

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Speaker 1: what a t M S are today in different parts

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Speaker 1: of the world around the same time, although the earliest

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Speaker 1: one I could find was from a Mr. Luther sim

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Speaker 1: Jean Yes, who was born in Turkey. I was a

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Speaker 1: son of Armenians who were Sadly his family was was

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Speaker 1: broken up during a genocide in the early twentieth century,

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Speaker 1: and he uh. He eventually immigrated to the United States,

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Speaker 1: and he came up with an idea that eventually he

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Speaker 1: called the bank matic Automated teller machine. So that's where

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Speaker 1: we get a t M. That's he's the one who

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Speaker 1: came up with the term. And this was around nineteen nine.

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Speaker 1: But this was doesn't resemble the way at M S

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Speaker 1: look and and act now. But it was an idea

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Speaker 1: of a of an a machine that would dispense money.

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Speaker 1: And it was run for a six month trial at

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Speaker 1: the City Bank of New York, which we now call

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Speaker 1: City Bank. Yes, uh and uh. After the six months,

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Speaker 1: the trial ended and City Bank decided not to extend

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Speaker 1: the trial, not to implement it and UM, at least

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Speaker 1: according to one source I read, the reason behind it

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Speaker 1: was that it just didn't get a lot of traction.

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Speaker 1: The people. People just didn't want to use a machine

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Speaker 1: to interact with their bank accounts. They preferred to have

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Speaker 1: a person to person interaction in a bank and UM.

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Speaker 1: Apparently the people who were using it were a bunch

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Speaker 1: of air dwells. Yeah, I read about that too. Basically,

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Speaker 1: they they the idea of being that the only people

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Speaker 1: who would not want to talk to a teller. Are

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Speaker 1: the people who would prefer that you didn't know they

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Speaker 1: were depositing or with drawing money in the first place. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so we're talking about people with ill gotten games, gamblers

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Speaker 1: for example, places where gambling was not legal, and uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, you might not want to have to answer

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Speaker 1: tricky questions like how did you come upon this sum

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Speaker 1: of money my good man? Yes, yes, exactly. So. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: that was the first recorded incidents I could find of

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Speaker 1: someone trying to create an a t M. Yes, and

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Speaker 1: again it was it was an interesting experiment that ultimately

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Speaker 1: failed at that time. Yeah. Now, a lot of what

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Speaker 1: I read about the early days of a t M

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Speaker 1: s UM, they weren't a t M s. They didn't

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Speaker 1: function like today's machines do. UM. In some cases you

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Speaker 1: needed a special card that wasn't actually tied to your

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Speaker 1: your bank account. In fact, a lot of them used

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Speaker 1: credit cards instead UM. For a long time, credit cards

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Speaker 1: were looked down upon UM. But some of muse special

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Speaker 1: vouchers or coins, yes, and the token. Yeah. And in

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Speaker 1: Britain you had to, uh, on one of the early trials,

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Speaker 1: you had to go inside and get a voucher. You

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Speaker 1: would get a ten pound voucher. So if you wanted

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Speaker 1: fifty pounds, you have to get five vouchers that would

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Speaker 1: you take outside of the machine, which raises the question

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Speaker 1: why would you not just go and withdraw the money

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Speaker 1: directly while you're there, unless, of course, you just wanted

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Speaker 1: the convenience of being able to get at ten pounds

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Speaker 1: at any given time in the future. And I guess

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Speaker 1: that's the argument you'd have to make, Like, instead of

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Speaker 1: walking out the bank with fifty pounds, which you know

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Speaker 1: you may or may not need at that time, you

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Speaker 1: could have uh, five ten pound vouchers, and then as

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Speaker 1: the as you go about your business throughout the coming days,

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Speaker 1: you realize, oh, I need some more walking around money

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Speaker 1: or getting about money, as I like to say, you

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Speaker 1: would go and use one of those vouchers to get

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Speaker 1: some more money out. But it did seem to decrease

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Speaker 1: the convenience factor of the automated teller machine somewhat. But yeah,

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Speaker 1: in this case, you wouldn't need a card with stuff

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Speaker 1: and coded on it. You would just need your voucher

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Speaker 1: to put in and then it would spit money out.

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Speaker 1: It became like a money vending machine. Yeah, yeah, and uh.

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Speaker 1: In nineteen sixty eight in Britain there was a several

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Speaker 1: banks used the device UM that would use a card,

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Speaker 1: but not a card that you always carried with you.

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Speaker 1: It basically worked like the voucher. You'd stick the card

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Speaker 1: in the machine, you get your money out, and the

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Speaker 1: machine would keep your card, which is kind of a

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Speaker 1: pain in the neck. Yeah, it's kind of what happens

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Speaker 1: to you now when your machine eats your card and

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Speaker 1: uh yeah, I've had that happen too. That's not a

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Speaker 1: good feeling, is it, um, Yeah, except this time in

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Speaker 1: this case we're talking about it doing it on purpose.

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Speaker 1: Uh yeah. So some of the other players in this space,

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Speaker 1: and that's mainly the real development of a t M

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Speaker 1: S beyond the early nineteen thirty nine example took place

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Speaker 1: in the sixties. So you had people like James Goodfellow,

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Speaker 1: who he secured a patent on an a t M

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Speaker 1: like machine in nineteen sixty six. He also came up

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Speaker 1: with the idea of storing a personal identification number on

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Speaker 1: a magnetic strip that would be printed on the back

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Speaker 1: of a card, so that would become the a t

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Speaker 1: M card eventually. Uh. They also John D. White, who

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Speaker 1: invented a free standing automated teller machine. A lot of

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Speaker 1: these other machines were built into the corner of a building.

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Speaker 1: It was actually part of a larger structure. UM. This

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Speaker 1: was more of a free standing um A machine. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And then there's John Shepherd Baron, who I think, I

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Speaker 1: think most sources I saw credited him as the true

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Speaker 1: father of the a t M. Yeah, John Shepherd Baron,

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Speaker 1: because he was the guy who created the first real

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Speaker 1: fully electronic automated teller machine and uh, and the very

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Speaker 1: first one was installed in Barclays Bank in London in

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Speaker 1: nineteen sixty seven. But you also had Don Wetzel. Now

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Speaker 1: he was working in America and his machine started coming

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Speaker 1: out around nineteen eight, and he was known to have

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Speaker 1: worked at least in part on Shepherd Baron's work as well.

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Speaker 1: He kind of took Shepherd Baron's work and then uh

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Speaker 1: change things like enhanced things and drop some things and

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Speaker 1: included other things. So uh sort of used as a

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Speaker 1: launching point for his own work. So you get a

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Speaker 1: lot of conflicting information about who is really the inventor

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Speaker 1: of the A t M. I think part of it

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Speaker 1: depends on where you're from. If you're from England, then

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Speaker 1: it's John Shepherd Baron. Yeah, and uh. Um the National

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Speaker 1: Museum of American History, the Smithsonian recognized wetzel Um and

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Speaker 1: his company Docutel, which was a baggage handling company UM,

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Speaker 1: as the people who created the A t M. So

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Speaker 1: it's yeah, I guess. And like I said, it all

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Speaker 1: depends on who you ask, sort of like television or radio. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: they're like many other inventors. There's uh the story, the

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Speaker 1: real story is far more complicated than just a factoid

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Speaker 1: that you'll find in a history book. Yeah. Now, I

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Speaker 1: was gonna say. Now, even though in the sixties, UM

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Speaker 1: A t M s became a lot more common, banks

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Speaker 1: started as uh including them as part of their services. UM.

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Speaker 1: As a matter of fact, Uh, the Fortune article I

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Speaker 1: read by Ellen Florian Um and uh Doris Burke and

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Speaker 1: Jenny Merrow basically was saying that they quoted a chemical

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Speaker 1: bank advertisement and said, UM, on September two, our bank

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Speaker 1: will open at nine o'clock and we'll never close again.

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Speaker 1: And that was the Rockville Center branch at ten North

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Speaker 1: Village Avenue on Long Island. Yeah. The idea being that,

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Speaker 1: of course, you could access your account at any time

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Speaker 1: and make withdrawals or transfers or whatever without having to

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Speaker 1: go into the bank. Because of course, the reason why

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Speaker 1: people were coming up with this in the first place

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Speaker 1: was for convenience, because bank hours are notoriously um short. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that will people talk about bankers hours, where you know,

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Speaker 1: in order to actually go and visit the bank, you

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Speaker 1: might have to take time out of your work day

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Speaker 1: in order to you know, and then you have to

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Speaker 1: go inside a bank and stand in line. See, for

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Speaker 1: some of our listeners, this is going to sound completely

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Speaker 1: foreign to them because apart from maybe opening up a

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Speaker 1: bank account or perhaps going in for a loan or

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Speaker 1: something like that, you just don't have to do that anymore. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean, if you want to do the day to

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Speaker 1: day stuff, depositing a check, finding out how much money

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Speaker 1: you have in the bank, making withdrawal, maybe even transferring

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Speaker 1: money between accounts, you can do all that in an

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Speaker 1: a t M. Yeah. In some cases, you can do

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Speaker 1: some of that through online banking as well. So we've

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Speaker 1: we've almost completely eliminated the need to go into a

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Speaker 1: physical space. But back in the day, it used to

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Speaker 1: be that if you wanted to do anything to do

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Speaker 1: with your money. You had to go and stand in

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Speaker 1: line and wait to talk to a teller, and then

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Speaker 1: they pull up your records and do you do all

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Speaker 1: that in person, face to face. And actually in the sixties,

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Speaker 1: back when, uh, back when these were launching again, the

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Speaker 1: people weren't flocking to them immediately. There were In fact,

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Speaker 1: some banks were a little skeptical that people would ever

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Speaker 1: want to interact with a machine as opposed to a human.

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Speaker 1: They thought that the human interaction was a key component

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Speaker 1: of the banking process. And it really wasn't until the

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Speaker 1: eighties that A t M s started to truly take off. Well,

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Speaker 1: the Fortune article actually has a particular event that they

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Speaker 1: credit with the takeoff of the A t M And

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Speaker 1: what might that be. Well, as it turns out, it

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Speaker 1: took Mother Nature's involvement to spur people to use the

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Speaker 1: A t M. According to them, it's not nice to

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Speaker 1: fool Mother Nature. No, we know what side of the

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Speaker 1: bread your butter? Never mind, all right, go ahead anyway.

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Speaker 1: In January in New York they got seventeen inches of snow,

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Speaker 1: which slowed business to a crawl because a lot of

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Speaker 1: places couldn't open. And they said, um, again, this is

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Speaker 1: citing the Fortune article. Um, there was a commercial that

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Speaker 1: City Bank released saying, UM, you know, hey, you can

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Speaker 1: use these machines anytime, whether the bank's open or not. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And they had a new tagline, the City Never sleeps

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Speaker 1: um and it said, um, there the machines used increased

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Speaker 1: during the storm, and uh. City banks market share in

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Speaker 1: New York City deposits had doubled, and so the rest

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Speaker 1: of the banks moved to catch up. And that basically

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Speaker 1: started a revolution, at least in New York. Um. Of

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Speaker 1: course that's a lot of people, so that that can

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Speaker 1: affect things. And people go in there and see how

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Speaker 1: people are using the A t M s and they

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Speaker 1: go back home. Yep. Yeah, And like I said, in

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Speaker 1: the eighties that really started to take off. So I

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Speaker 1: guess now we can finally start getting into what makes

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Speaker 1: up an A t M and how they how they

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Speaker 1: actually work. Uh. Now, part of this involves the way

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Speaker 1: that we access the A t M s uh. And

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Speaker 1: and not just with the key the keypad or the

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Speaker 1: touch screen depending upon the model that you're using, but

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Speaker 1: the card you have, your A t M card, whatever

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Speaker 1: you're using to access the A t M. And there

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Speaker 1: are variations on this, but all of them have a

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Speaker 1: magnetic stripe or mag stripe on them. And uh, you

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Speaker 1: might say, well, what the heck is a magnetic stripe, Well,

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Speaker 1: it's kind of what sounds like it's a uh, it's

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Speaker 1: it's a plastic like film. It's on the back of

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Speaker 1: your card that has lots and lots and lots of

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Speaker 1: tiny iron based magnetic particles. Yes, as a matter of fact,

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Speaker 1: it's very similar, if not nearly identical to the material

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Speaker 1: that they used to use in recording tape cassette tape

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Speaker 1: cassette tapes, real to real tapes, eight track tapes, also

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Speaker 1: floppy disks. The material inside there, I mean, that's even

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Speaker 1: most of them are even the same brownish color. Right.

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Speaker 1: And the way you right to this strip is that

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Speaker 1: you you magnetize these little particles. Each of the particles

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Speaker 1: acts like its own bar magnet, right, and you magnetize

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Speaker 1: them to either have a north or south pole direction

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Speaker 1: on each particle, and so that's like bits, zeros and ones.

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Speaker 1: So by creating them in either a north or south

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Speaker 1: pole direction, and then you you've got thousands of these, right,

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Speaker 1: and in one strip you can encode information that way,

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Speaker 1: and that information is going to have things like the

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Speaker 1: the account number on it, so that it has you know,

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Speaker 1: it's able to say this card belongs to this account. Uh.

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Speaker 1: It may also have the pen on their the personal

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Speaker 1: identification number, so that you can have that as sort

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Speaker 1: of a key pass intrigue. You know, as long as

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Speaker 1: the pen that you enter into the A t M

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Speaker 1: matches the one that's on the card and in the account,

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Speaker 1: as long as all three of those are are the same,

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Speaker 1: then you'll be able to access your information. So that's

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Speaker 1: on your card, which means of course that the a

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Speaker 1: t M has to have some sort of card reader involved,

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Speaker 1: which you know it's a magnetic stripe reader that you know.

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Speaker 1: Depending on the style of the A t M, it

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Speaker 1: maybe one where you put your card in and it

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Speaker 1: sucks it into the machine and you hope when your

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Speaker 1: transactions over it will spit it back out again. Or

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Speaker 1: what I see most commonly now are the kinds where

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Speaker 1: you swipe it. You either have a vertical swipe where

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Speaker 1: you just swipe the card down the side of a

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Speaker 1: little reader or you inserted into a slot and pull

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Speaker 1: it back out again quickly, and in either case, the

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Speaker 1: what happens is those little magnets go past a detector.

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Speaker 1: Because the magnets are in motion, the detector detects the

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Speaker 1: difference of the magnetism on each of those little bars

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Speaker 1: and can read that as whatever the information is. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: So all the information that's printed on the card, um

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Speaker 1: the number that's embossed in the card in your name,

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Speaker 1: the machine is not reading or looking at any of

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Speaker 1: that stuff. It's taking everything from the magnetic stripe. Which

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Speaker 1: is why you should not put your your credit cards

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Speaker 1: or a T M S cards or anything like that

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Speaker 1: near powerful magnets, right, because that could actually realign those

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Speaker 1: little magnetic particles inside the film. And some people call

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Speaker 1: it de magnetizing, but really it's just realigning those polls

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Speaker 1: so it no longer it might spout out gibberish now

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Speaker 1: when you when you swipe it or anyway, it's not

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Speaker 1: going to correspond with your information and suddenly your card

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Speaker 1: doesn't work anymore. Yeah, you can also find the same

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Speaker 1: thing if you've used it too much, if the magnetic

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Speaker 1: stripe gets damaged in some way. Um. You know some

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00:17:04,760 --> 00:17:07,560
Speaker 1: people say that eel skin wallets. Yeah, I hear that

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Speaker 1: a lot, because you know, and there are a lot

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Speaker 1: of different theories about Actually, the theory I've heard that

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00:17:12,600 --> 00:17:14,680
Speaker 1: seems to explain it the most, or it seems to

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Speaker 1: be the most logical to me. Eel skin wallets some

300
00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:21,480
Speaker 1: people claim came from electric eels and that somehow has

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Speaker 1: some sort of electric impulse still stored in it, and

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00:17:24,440 --> 00:17:28,439
Speaker 1: that's what's screwing up the cards. Count me skeptical on

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00:17:28,440 --> 00:17:31,640
Speaker 1: that one, exactly. But a lot of these have a

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Speaker 1: magnetic clasp so that when you close it, it remains closed.

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00:17:36,800 --> 00:17:40,359
Speaker 1: And the magnetic clasp depending on how your card is,

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Speaker 1: how you're storing your card in the wallet, Uh, the

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Speaker 1: stripe might be close enough to the magnetic class that

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Speaker 1: the magnetic class is is realigning those magnetic particles in

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00:17:50,040 --> 00:17:55,280
Speaker 1: the film, So don't do that. Well yeah, so once that, uh,

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Speaker 1: you're you have the magnetic card reader. We've talked about

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Speaker 1: that and and basically the information is going into a computer. Yeah,

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00:18:05,119 --> 00:18:08,520
Speaker 1: very basic cpu inside every a t M and in

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Speaker 1: fact a lot of them run windows, yeah, which we'll

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Speaker 1: get to. The earlier A t M s were all proprietary.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, Now that was when if you had an

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Speaker 1: account with UM Bank something, you know, First National Bank,

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00:18:21,880 --> 00:18:24,320
Speaker 1: and you wanted to go to Second National Bank, you

318
00:18:24,359 --> 00:18:26,399
Speaker 1: were on your own. You have to find an a

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00:18:26,480 --> 00:18:28,719
Speaker 1: t M for with First National Bank or you are

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00:18:28,760 --> 00:18:31,240
Speaker 1: out of luck because your card wouldn't work the system

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00:18:31,560 --> 00:18:35,879
Speaker 1: wasn't compatible. However, it also meant that those A t

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Speaker 1: M s had the benefit of security through obscurity. That's

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Speaker 1: true because UH would be thief would have to focus

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Speaker 1: on a particular type of a t M and the

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00:18:49,359 --> 00:18:51,240
Speaker 1: things that might work on that a t M would

326
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Speaker 1: not necessarily work on a t M s for other banks,

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Speaker 1: So it's somewhat limited the liability and the vulnerability of

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Speaker 1: those machines. Once the machine started to move toward more

329
00:19:01,600 --> 00:19:05,800
Speaker 1: computer based operating systems like Lennox and Windows, then you

330
00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:10,000
Speaker 1: opened up new opportunities for thieves to target specific parts

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Speaker 1: of the A t M infrastructure and UH and made

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Speaker 1: it in some ways more vulnerable than the older models.

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Speaker 1: Now I say that, but the truth is you can

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00:19:19,640 --> 00:19:22,840
Speaker 1: actually find these older model a t M s on

335
00:19:23,040 --> 00:19:27,120
Speaker 1: plenty of sites like eBay, where you could buy an

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00:19:27,119 --> 00:19:29,800
Speaker 1: a t M if you wanted to, and if your

337
00:19:29,920 --> 00:19:33,119
Speaker 1: goal was to deconstruct to hack this a t M

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00:19:33,160 --> 00:19:35,760
Speaker 1: so you would learn how it works, you could potentially

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00:19:35,760 --> 00:19:39,680
Speaker 1: find vulnerabilities in that system to exploit. Don't do that,

340
00:19:39,920 --> 00:19:44,760
Speaker 1: it's illegal. You don't want to do that. But there

341
00:19:44,760 --> 00:19:46,920
Speaker 1: that That is one of the downsides to the old

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00:19:46,960 --> 00:19:50,000
Speaker 1: systems too, is that, you know, it's not like these

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00:19:50,040 --> 00:19:51,879
Speaker 1: things were. It's not like you had to have a

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Speaker 1: license to own one. You know, you just had to

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00:19:54,880 --> 00:19:57,280
Speaker 1: buy one. So you just had to find someone willing

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00:19:57,320 --> 00:19:59,560
Speaker 1: to sell one and then you could buy it. So,

347
00:20:00,600 --> 00:20:03,840
Speaker 1: but yes, you've got your CPU in there. Uh. However,

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00:20:03,880 --> 00:20:08,280
Speaker 1: the a t M is not its own standalone UM machine.

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00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:12,720
Speaker 1: Like it's not that it's it's disconnected from the outside world. No,

350
00:20:13,080 --> 00:20:14,880
Speaker 1: but if you if you think about it, it's it's

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Speaker 1: very much like the computer that sits on your desktop

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00:20:18,400 --> 00:20:22,680
Speaker 1: or laptop. So you've got a screen for customer uh

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00:20:22,800 --> 00:20:25,840
Speaker 1: for basically an output device. You've got a printer that

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00:20:25,920 --> 00:20:29,320
Speaker 1: prints out. You've got an input device or maybe two.

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00:20:29,320 --> 00:20:30,720
Speaker 1: You might have a touch screen. You might have a

356
00:20:30,800 --> 00:20:34,880
Speaker 1: key pad uh to type in members or both UM

357
00:20:34,960 --> 00:20:39,040
Speaker 1: and hopefully both for those of people who have vision impairments,

358
00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:43,159
Speaker 1: right right. And then you also have uh, basically an

359
00:20:43,160 --> 00:20:46,919
Speaker 1: internet connection. It may be on a private network, it

360
00:20:46,960 --> 00:20:49,200
Speaker 1: might be some kind yeah, very it might be a

361
00:20:49,880 --> 00:20:55,119
Speaker 1: closed off, private connection, but it goes to a whatever

362
00:20:55,240 --> 00:20:59,480
Speaker 1: bank is behind that particular a t M. Yeah, it'll

363
00:20:59,520 --> 00:21:02,439
Speaker 1: have a network connection of some type to communicate with

364
00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:05,800
Speaker 1: a a server somewhere that has account information on it.

365
00:21:06,359 --> 00:21:08,800
Speaker 1: So if you have three in your account you want

366
00:21:08,800 --> 00:21:13,040
Speaker 1: to withdraw twenty dollars, it will say, okay, well Jonathan's

367
00:21:13,080 --> 00:21:16,920
Speaker 1: got three, so I can give him twenty dollars and

368
00:21:17,080 --> 00:21:19,960
Speaker 1: he's withdrawn twenty dollars. So it makes a note of

369
00:21:19,960 --> 00:21:21,399
Speaker 1: that in the account, so it says, now he has

370
00:21:21,400 --> 00:21:24,320
Speaker 1: two left. Yeah. The way this works is that so

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00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:27,200
Speaker 1: you can think of the especially the older a t

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00:21:27,400 --> 00:21:30,160
Speaker 1: M s Um, we're really thin clients. Yeah they were,

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00:21:30,280 --> 00:21:33,320
Speaker 1: they were. You know. The the had essentially enough power

374
00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:38,359
Speaker 1: for it to read the strip to uh uh to two,

375
00:21:38,800 --> 00:21:43,080
Speaker 1: allow you to input your pen and to display the information.

376
00:21:43,480 --> 00:21:46,159
Speaker 1: But then what it would do is the terminal that

377
00:21:46,200 --> 00:21:49,639
Speaker 1: you're using would connect to a host processor. Now this

378
00:21:49,680 --> 00:21:54,359
Speaker 1: would be a computer that belongs to whatever financial institution

379
00:21:54,600 --> 00:21:58,840
Speaker 1: again is owns that a t M. Now, if that's

380
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Speaker 1: your bank, then that's a much where this ends. It goes.

381
00:22:01,520 --> 00:22:04,919
Speaker 1: It refers to your account. Make it confirms that you

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00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:06,760
Speaker 1: that you are who you say you are and that

383
00:22:07,000 --> 00:22:09,800
Speaker 1: at least according to your pen and that you have

384
00:22:09,880 --> 00:22:12,520
Speaker 1: the funds that you require in order for you to

385
00:22:12,560 --> 00:22:14,399
Speaker 1: get whatever it is you're asking. So again like in

386
00:22:14,440 --> 00:22:16,679
Speaker 1: your example, that that you have at least twenty dollars

387
00:22:16,680 --> 00:22:20,199
Speaker 1: you can withdraw um and then it will send the

388
00:22:20,240 --> 00:22:24,280
Speaker 1: information back to the machine that you're at and either

389
00:22:24,400 --> 00:22:27,280
Speaker 1: confirmed that it can dispense the cash or deny it,

390
00:22:28,000 --> 00:22:31,680
Speaker 1: and then the machine does whatever it's supposed to do. Uh.

391
00:22:31,720 --> 00:22:34,879
Speaker 1: If your bank is a different bank, then what happens

392
00:22:34,960 --> 00:22:36,879
Speaker 1: is the it will go to the host processor. The

393
00:22:36,880 --> 00:22:41,200
Speaker 1: host processor will then route that request to the specific

394
00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:46,080
Speaker 1: financial institution that you belong to and get the permission there,

395
00:22:46,480 --> 00:22:51,600
Speaker 1: and then your bank essentially will wirelessly transfer funds to

396
00:22:52,040 --> 00:22:55,800
Speaker 1: the financial institution and charge of that a t M.

397
00:22:55,840 --> 00:22:59,480
Speaker 1: And then that financial institution will allow the a t

398
00:22:59,640 --> 00:23:02,800
Speaker 1: M to dispense cash because the money has been you know,

399
00:23:02,840 --> 00:23:05,640
Speaker 1: it's not losing money, it's had the wireless transfer from

400
00:23:05,680 --> 00:23:09,359
Speaker 1: your bank. This is also why you'll find a lot

401
00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:13,440
Speaker 1: of a t M s have those fees on them, yes,

402
00:23:13,600 --> 00:23:17,960
Speaker 1: the usage fees, because otherwise, you know, it's just an

403
00:23:17,960 --> 00:23:20,359
Speaker 1: access thing that you know, banks are doing out of

404
00:23:20,359 --> 00:23:23,359
Speaker 1: the goodness of their hearts. But these are bankers. We

405
00:23:23,440 --> 00:23:27,280
Speaker 1: know they don't have that, right bankers and lawyers right,

406
00:23:28,280 --> 00:23:31,600
Speaker 1: so um hey, I wrote, I watched the documentary at Christmas, Caroll,

407
00:23:31,760 --> 00:23:35,800
Speaker 1: I know how this works. So so in order to

408
00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:37,840
Speaker 1: make money off of these transactions, that's why you have

409
00:23:37,880 --> 00:23:40,840
Speaker 1: that usage fee, because you know it's going to charge

410
00:23:40,840 --> 00:23:44,000
Speaker 1: you for the whole process of having the money transferred

411
00:23:44,000 --> 00:23:47,760
Speaker 1: from your financial institution to the bank, and depending upon

412
00:23:47,840 --> 00:23:51,400
Speaker 1: the way that the different financial institutions operate, you might

413
00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:55,880
Speaker 1: actually have multiple fees on one transaction, which is really irritating. Yeah,

414
00:23:55,920 --> 00:23:58,719
Speaker 1: that's when you get the fee from the second national

415
00:23:58,720 --> 00:24:00,800
Speaker 1: bank from using it's a t M, and then the

416
00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:03,639
Speaker 1: fee from the first national bank for wirelessly transferring the

417
00:24:03,640 --> 00:24:06,639
Speaker 1: money to second national bank. You should have used our

418
00:24:06,680 --> 00:24:09,879
Speaker 1: a t M. Yeah, that's uh, that's terrible. However, one

419
00:24:09,920 --> 00:24:11,680
Speaker 1: of the bright sides of using a t M S

420
00:24:11,760 --> 00:24:13,960
Speaker 1: is that if you're in a foreign country and you're

421
00:24:14,040 --> 00:24:18,040
Speaker 1: using your card, it's automatically making the change exchange, and

422
00:24:18,080 --> 00:24:21,160
Speaker 1: it usually makes that exchange at a like you know, normally,

423
00:24:21,160 --> 00:24:23,600
Speaker 1: if you go into a financial institution to exchange currency

424
00:24:23,640 --> 00:24:26,520
Speaker 1: from one format to another, there's a fee placed on

425
00:24:26,600 --> 00:24:29,520
Speaker 1: top of that. So yes, so you're not going to

426
00:24:29,600 --> 00:24:33,200
Speaker 1: get a a perfect exchange from whatever currency you're using

427
00:24:33,240 --> 00:24:35,639
Speaker 1: to whatever you need. You're gonna have some of that

428
00:24:35,640 --> 00:24:38,000
Speaker 1: money taken out. But usually if you're using an A

429
00:24:38,080 --> 00:24:40,320
Speaker 1: t M in a foreign country, you you tend to

430
00:24:40,320 --> 00:24:43,920
Speaker 1: get one of the You normally get a really favorable rate.

431
00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:47,120
Speaker 1: You know, it won't be as dramatic as it would

432
00:24:47,119 --> 00:24:48,719
Speaker 1: be if you were to go into some money changing

433
00:24:48,720 --> 00:24:54,840
Speaker 1: place anyway, getting off topic here, So, uh, that's the

434
00:24:54,880 --> 00:24:57,240
Speaker 1: process going on behind the scenes. Now, when the money

435
00:24:57,359 --> 00:25:00,560
Speaker 1: is actually coming out, how does the A t M

436
00:25:00,640 --> 00:25:04,720
Speaker 1: know that it's giving you the right amount of money? Well,

437
00:25:05,880 --> 00:25:08,240
Speaker 1: it has to. Basically, it has cassettes in there with

438
00:25:08,320 --> 00:25:12,320
Speaker 1: the different bills. So assuming that things are lined up correctly,

439
00:25:12,520 --> 00:25:14,480
Speaker 1: assuming that the person who's loaded the A t M

440
00:25:14,520 --> 00:25:17,400
Speaker 1: has done so in the proper way, then it should

441
00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:20,400
Speaker 1: be dispensing the right number of bills. Now, it also

442
00:25:20,480 --> 00:25:23,359
Speaker 1: goes by thickness, so it should be able to tell

443
00:25:24,160 --> 00:25:28,320
Speaker 1: um if you are getting say two bills out, let's

444
00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:31,720
Speaker 1: say two twenties you want um, then it should be

445
00:25:31,760 --> 00:25:34,560
Speaker 1: able to go, okay, there are two, because I can

446
00:25:34,600 --> 00:25:37,840
Speaker 1: tell by the thickness of these bills. Um. So yeah,

447
00:25:37,880 --> 00:25:40,280
Speaker 1: you've got you've got a couple of different types of

448
00:25:40,320 --> 00:25:43,080
Speaker 1: sensors inside the A t M. There's usually an electrical

449
00:25:43,320 --> 00:25:46,679
Speaker 1: eye sensor, some sort of optical sensor that is optically

450
00:25:46,840 --> 00:25:51,320
Speaker 1: verifying that the the denominations that are being dispensed match

451
00:25:51,400 --> 00:25:54,880
Speaker 1: what you asked for. Yes. And then there's also the

452
00:25:54,880 --> 00:25:58,159
Speaker 1: thickness sensor, so that if uh, if it's supposed to

453
00:25:58,200 --> 00:26:00,239
Speaker 1: be doing it one bill at a time, and the

454
00:26:00,240 --> 00:26:02,520
Speaker 1: thickness sensor says, wait a minute, that's too thick for

455
00:26:02,560 --> 00:26:06,920
Speaker 1: it to be one bill, it will send that particular bill,

456
00:26:07,080 --> 00:26:09,240
Speaker 1: or a pair of bills, or whatever it happens to

457
00:26:09,240 --> 00:26:13,159
Speaker 1: be to a reject been inside the A t M.

458
00:26:13,200 --> 00:26:15,560
Speaker 1: So the A t M has has a bend that

459
00:26:15,600 --> 00:26:18,600
Speaker 1: collects rejects, and this can also be bills that are

460
00:26:18,840 --> 00:26:22,320
Speaker 1: worn or torn. If if it detects that, then it's

461
00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:25,800
Speaker 1: gonna send it to the reject ben. Uh. And so

462
00:26:25,880 --> 00:26:28,800
Speaker 1: the ben is just gonna keep collecting bills that get

463
00:26:28,800 --> 00:26:32,320
Speaker 1: rejected through this process. And it's all taking just a

464
00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:35,840
Speaker 1: few seconds. So you know, you might be waiting a

465
00:26:35,880 --> 00:26:39,320
Speaker 1: little bit but thinking like whatever, what. Meanwhile, the machine

466
00:26:39,359 --> 00:26:41,840
Speaker 1: is making sure that it's dispensing the right number and

467
00:26:42,000 --> 00:26:45,840
Speaker 1: denomination of bills to you. Um. There's also an electronic

468
00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:48,679
Speaker 1: journal that's part of an a t M, so that

469
00:26:48,880 --> 00:26:53,600
Speaker 1: it's recording every transaction that's happening with that machine, and

470
00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:56,439
Speaker 1: it also records whenever any bill gets sent to the

471
00:26:56,480 --> 00:27:00,479
Speaker 1: reject ben And that way, when someone comes into service

472
00:27:00,520 --> 00:27:02,679
Speaker 1: the machine, either to refill it or to fix it

473
00:27:02,760 --> 00:27:04,959
Speaker 1: or whatever, they can take a look at the journal

474
00:27:05,320 --> 00:27:09,359
Speaker 1: and see, uh, you know, how frequently are is the

475
00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:12,200
Speaker 1: reject been getting a bill sent to it, and it's

476
00:27:12,200 --> 00:27:15,800
Speaker 1: happening a lot. That might mean that either the sensors

477
00:27:15,880 --> 00:27:19,440
Speaker 1: need to be adjusted, or that the feeding mechanism needs

478
00:27:19,440 --> 00:27:21,560
Speaker 1: to be adjusted so that it's no longer pulling more

479
00:27:21,600 --> 00:27:24,840
Speaker 1: than one bill at a time, Or it might mean

480
00:27:24,920 --> 00:27:27,879
Speaker 1: that the actual bills that are being put into the

481
00:27:27,920 --> 00:27:33,040
Speaker 1: machine are of to they're not they're not fresh enough

482
00:27:33,560 --> 00:27:36,200
Speaker 1: that you know that something needs to change. This one's

483
00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:39,119
Speaker 1: a little stale, Yeah, exactly, because too many of them

484
00:27:39,160 --> 00:27:42,680
Speaker 1: are going into the reject been. So so it's got

485
00:27:42,680 --> 00:27:45,560
Speaker 1: built built in error correction if you will. Yeah, it's

486
00:27:45,720 --> 00:27:48,520
Speaker 1: and and some of that again is mechanical, and some

487
00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:52,040
Speaker 1: of it's just saying, hey, stop putting crappy money in

488
00:27:52,080 --> 00:27:55,720
Speaker 1: me because I can't give it to anyone, and the

489
00:27:55,720 --> 00:27:59,680
Speaker 1: bank's like, but we don't want to give money to anyone, Yes,

490
00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:02,480
Speaker 1: And then they twirl their mustaches and leap into a

491
00:28:02,560 --> 00:28:06,800
Speaker 1: giant vault full of gold coins, which, by the way hurts.

492
00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:09,600
Speaker 1: I don't know how Scrooge McDuck did it, no, man,

493
00:28:09,680 --> 00:28:12,000
Speaker 1: I I scratched that one off my bucket list, and

494
00:28:12,040 --> 00:28:15,679
Speaker 1: then I also broke an arm, so not. I do

495
00:28:15,760 --> 00:28:21,680
Speaker 1: not recommend it. However, if you invest tuppens anyway, um

496
00:28:21,720 --> 00:28:26,840
Speaker 1: so yeah, that birds um so yeah. I mean it

497
00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:32,520
Speaker 1: is basically, um a computer with a couple's special sophisticated

498
00:28:32,920 --> 00:28:36,359
Speaker 1: UM ways to handle error correction. Oh and I also

499
00:28:36,760 --> 00:28:38,800
Speaker 1: wanted to mention that the journal. The journal sort of

500
00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:41,560
Speaker 1: serves two purposes. One, it helps keep track of what's

501
00:28:41,560 --> 00:28:43,200
Speaker 1: going on with a machine, so that can you you

502
00:28:43,200 --> 00:28:46,400
Speaker 1: could see the machines working correctly. Also provides an accounting

503
00:28:46,840 --> 00:28:50,200
Speaker 1: uh in case there's ever any dispute about what the

504
00:28:50,520 --> 00:28:53,360
Speaker 1: machine was dispensing or whether there was a question about

505
00:28:53,840 --> 00:28:56,480
Speaker 1: um how the machine was used. Out of course, now

506
00:28:56,600 --> 00:28:59,240
Speaker 1: um A t m s also usually have some kind

507
00:28:59,240 --> 00:29:04,840
Speaker 1: of security camera um nearby to watch that people are

508
00:29:05,000 --> 00:29:06,800
Speaker 1: who they say they are. Yeah, so you can match

509
00:29:06,920 --> 00:29:09,960
Speaker 1: up the time on the security camera with the time

510
00:29:10,040 --> 00:29:12,880
Speaker 1: that was listed in the journal and go back and

511
00:29:12,920 --> 00:29:16,360
Speaker 1: review footage. Uh if someone has if any of you

512
00:29:16,400 --> 00:29:19,720
Speaker 1: out there have ever had your card number and and

513
00:29:19,800 --> 00:29:23,640
Speaker 1: penn stolen so that someone else has accessed your account

514
00:29:23,640 --> 00:29:25,760
Speaker 1: through an a t M, you realize, of course this

515
00:29:25,800 --> 00:29:28,640
Speaker 1: would be a really important feature. I'm one of those people,

516
00:29:28,680 --> 00:29:31,960
Speaker 1: by the way. Yeah, well that's actually that was but

517
00:29:32,080 --> 00:29:34,560
Speaker 1: my bank was very good at letting me know and

518
00:29:34,800 --> 00:29:38,520
Speaker 1: was very proactive in making sure that that got fixed.

519
00:29:38,600 --> 00:29:42,760
Speaker 1: So yeah, yeah, now that's that's true. These uh, these

520
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:48,440
Speaker 1: machines are sophisticated and and specialized, but they're also uh

521
00:29:48,480 --> 00:29:51,200
Speaker 1: in some ways not so sophisticated that they can't be

522
00:29:51,240 --> 00:29:54,960
Speaker 1: fooled or not not necessarily fooled. But um also that

523
00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:57,760
Speaker 1: other people can come along and take information by using

524
00:29:58,000 --> 00:30:01,080
Speaker 1: devices such as skimmers, which can me put over the

525
00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:05,040
Speaker 1: card reader UM. And basically it is usually a very slim,

526
00:30:05,560 --> 00:30:09,680
Speaker 1: uh compact device that can read the magnetic strip on

527
00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:12,720
Speaker 1: there on the card. So basically what happens is if

528
00:30:12,760 --> 00:30:15,640
Speaker 1: if a scammer has installed a skimmer on an A

529
00:30:15,720 --> 00:30:18,760
Speaker 1: t M. When you put your card through it, both

530
00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:20,960
Speaker 1: the skimmer and the A t M are reading the

531
00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:23,960
Speaker 1: card number. Now the pin block the UM. In the

532
00:30:24,040 --> 00:30:27,040
Speaker 1: United States, federal regulations require that the pin block, which

533
00:30:27,040 --> 00:30:32,680
Speaker 1: is the four digit pin uh information UM, must be

534
00:30:32,800 --> 00:30:36,600
Speaker 1: encrypted when it's sent along. So UH to some degree,

535
00:30:37,560 --> 00:30:40,560
Speaker 1: you would be protected if just your number was going

536
00:30:40,600 --> 00:30:42,800
Speaker 1: through the skimmer, because you would need the pin block

537
00:30:43,520 --> 00:30:46,960
Speaker 1: UH encrypted, you know, and it's encrypted on the card,

538
00:30:47,120 --> 00:30:50,360
Speaker 1: so it can't UH the machine has to decipher that.

539
00:30:50,400 --> 00:30:53,360
Speaker 1: The skimmer can't do that. So what the scammers do.

540
00:30:53,840 --> 00:30:56,520
Speaker 1: They will they will install a very tiny camera. You know,

541
00:30:56,760 --> 00:30:59,160
Speaker 1: cameras are teeny tiny these days. You know, we've got

542
00:30:59,240 --> 00:31:02,200
Speaker 1: him in our smartphone owns and other types of phones. UM,

543
00:31:02,240 --> 00:31:04,719
Speaker 1: they're sitting on top of our laptops and and and

544
00:31:04,920 --> 00:31:08,160
Speaker 1: computers because they're so small. UM, people can in smaller,

545
00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:13,520
Speaker 1: in small, install a small camera right above the area

546
00:31:13,560 --> 00:31:16,880
Speaker 1: where the you type in your number, and then they'll

547
00:31:16,920 --> 00:31:20,719
Speaker 1: they'll record your keypad punches. And then what they'll do

548
00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:23,880
Speaker 1: is they'll match the keypad punch to the information that

549
00:31:23,920 --> 00:31:27,480
Speaker 1: they've skimmed off your card, and then they've got essentially

550
00:31:27,560 --> 00:31:31,320
Speaker 1: your card number and your pen all in one place

551
00:31:31,360 --> 00:31:35,560
Speaker 1: and can then access money from your account at any

552
00:31:35,560 --> 00:31:37,960
Speaker 1: a t M. And a lot of cases too, they

553
00:31:37,960 --> 00:31:39,720
Speaker 1: don't try to take as much as they can get.

554
00:31:39,720 --> 00:31:41,800
Speaker 1: A lot of cases, UM, banks that I know of

555
00:31:41,840 --> 00:31:44,000
Speaker 1: here in the United States will give you a maximum

556
00:31:44,000 --> 00:31:48,120
Speaker 1: amount of day, usually something like three dollars per day UM.

557
00:31:48,160 --> 00:31:50,240
Speaker 1: A lot of times these scammers won't do that. They'll

558
00:31:50,280 --> 00:31:54,160
Speaker 1: take out twenty dollars, and the idea being that be

559
00:31:54,200 --> 00:31:56,840
Speaker 1: harder to detect. Yeah, well I must have. I must

560
00:31:56,880 --> 00:31:58,640
Speaker 1: have taken out I don't remember what I what that was,

561
00:31:58,680 --> 00:32:00,440
Speaker 1: but it wasn't that much. It wasn't like somebody was

562
00:32:00,480 --> 00:32:03,920
Speaker 1: scanning me. Although if you do, if you're which this,

563
00:32:04,080 --> 00:32:05,720
Speaker 1: by the way, is why it's important for you to

564
00:32:05,880 --> 00:32:09,880
Speaker 1: review your your bank statements on a regular basis, uh,

565
00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:13,040
Speaker 1: because you may notice that you're withdrawing money from places

566
00:32:13,080 --> 00:32:17,880
Speaker 1: that you are not physically at, like Los Angeles or

567
00:32:17,960 --> 00:32:19,880
Speaker 1: something when you're not in l A. If you're in

568
00:32:20,000 --> 00:32:21,400
Speaker 1: l A and you see that you with drawn from

569
00:32:21,480 --> 00:32:23,400
Speaker 1: l A, you may very well have been the person

570
00:32:23,480 --> 00:32:25,360
Speaker 1: who have done that. I don't mean to say that

571
00:32:25,400 --> 00:32:29,120
Speaker 1: any withdrawal from l A is obviously fraudulent, right people

572
00:32:29,120 --> 00:32:33,560
Speaker 1: who people everything's on it? Does this mean I have

573
00:32:33,640 --> 00:32:36,400
Speaker 1: to drive to San Jose if I want to withdraw money? Yes,

574
00:32:36,520 --> 00:32:39,320
Speaker 1: that is what I meant. Um. There are some some

575
00:32:39,360 --> 00:32:45,000
Speaker 1: people working on newer types of verification technology. I saw

576
00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:48,840
Speaker 1: one they're trying out in Poland, which is using biometrics.

577
00:32:48,840 --> 00:32:50,640
Speaker 1: They do a scan of your finger and they don't

578
00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:52,960
Speaker 1: use your fingerprint. They're looking at the veins in your

579
00:32:52,960 --> 00:32:56,960
Speaker 1: finger which is pretty smart because again fingerprints, you can

580
00:32:57,000 --> 00:33:00,880
Speaker 1: lift a fingerprint and you can fake fingerprint readers. It.

581
00:33:02,080 --> 00:33:06,520
Speaker 1: The more sophisticated the detection device, the less likely someone's

582
00:33:06,520 --> 00:33:09,280
Speaker 1: going to go through all the trouble to um to

583
00:33:09,400 --> 00:33:11,880
Speaker 1: fool it, because it is a lot of I mean,

584
00:33:11,920 --> 00:33:13,560
Speaker 1: it takes a lot of investment just to get the

585
00:33:13,600 --> 00:33:16,920
Speaker 1: stuff too to be able to fool these devices. But yeah,

586
00:33:16,920 --> 00:33:19,880
Speaker 1: if you wanna, fingerprint is not full proof because you

587
00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:23,800
Speaker 1: could lift a print off of something and then create

588
00:33:23,840 --> 00:33:28,640
Speaker 1: a latex print, uh and fool some machines using that.

589
00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:32,840
Speaker 1: We've seen that happen before. Um. There's also I know

590
00:33:32,880 --> 00:33:35,880
Speaker 1: you mentioned the cameras, but we should also mention some

591
00:33:36,280 --> 00:33:40,440
Speaker 1: uh some skimmers will also use a fake keypad, which

592
00:33:41,840 --> 00:33:46,680
Speaker 1: which is essentially a key logger that's logging up pen entries.

593
00:33:46,840 --> 00:33:48,480
Speaker 1: So if you ever walk up to an A t

594
00:33:48,680 --> 00:33:51,400
Speaker 1: M and and it looks like parts of the machine

595
00:33:51,600 --> 00:33:54,680
Speaker 1: don't match up exactly like the it's just a different

596
00:33:54,680 --> 00:33:58,160
Speaker 1: coloration or made out of a different material, and it

597
00:33:58,240 --> 00:34:01,240
Speaker 1: just looks a little odd, that's a warning sign. Doesn't

598
00:34:01,280 --> 00:34:04,520
Speaker 1: necessarily mean that a skimmer has hit that machine. It

599
00:34:04,560 --> 00:34:07,080
Speaker 1: may just be that that particular machine was manufactured in

600
00:34:07,200 --> 00:34:10,759
Speaker 1: an odd way. But anything that looks a little out

601
00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:12,799
Speaker 1: of place should be a big red flag to you.

602
00:34:13,280 --> 00:34:15,480
Speaker 1: And UH, and I would highly recommend that if you

603
00:34:15,520 --> 00:34:17,319
Speaker 1: do notice something when you walk up to an A

604
00:34:17,400 --> 00:34:21,439
Speaker 1: t M, uh that's like that that you find a

605
00:34:21,480 --> 00:34:24,919
Speaker 1: different one, don't use that one. Yeah, And and keep

606
00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:27,719
Speaker 1: in mind where it is to the more isolated A

607
00:34:27,880 --> 00:34:30,240
Speaker 1: t M s are more likely to be the ones

608
00:34:30,640 --> 00:34:34,040
Speaker 1: that UH scammers are going to target because they will

609
00:34:34,080 --> 00:34:37,480
Speaker 1: be easier to modify. UM, because this stuff takes a

610
00:34:37,480 --> 00:34:39,719
Speaker 1: little bit of time and effort, and if you're doing

611
00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:42,400
Speaker 1: it in a high traffic area, someone's gonna notice. Yeah. Like,

612
00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:44,600
Speaker 1: for example, the the A t M s that you

613
00:34:44,680 --> 00:34:48,480
Speaker 1: might see in a popular gas station, UM are a

614
00:34:48,480 --> 00:34:51,920
Speaker 1: whole lot likely, a whole lot more likely to be okay,

615
00:34:52,040 --> 00:34:54,960
Speaker 1: because if a cashier is standing right across from it

616
00:34:55,040 --> 00:34:58,359
Speaker 1: all day long, it's unlikely that a scammer is going

617
00:34:58,400 --> 00:35:04,040
Speaker 1: to have the the time to install those devices without

618
00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:06,880
Speaker 1: getting caught doing what are you doing? Or something like

619
00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:10,200
Speaker 1: a busy airport where there's a lot of security already there.

620
00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:11,880
Speaker 1: I mean, it's just it's such a it would be

621
00:35:11,880 --> 00:35:14,360
Speaker 1: such a high risk endeavor that it would you know,

622
00:35:14,560 --> 00:35:17,400
Speaker 1: you look at risk versus reward from a thief standpoint,

623
00:35:17,760 --> 00:35:20,120
Speaker 1: would be less likely to be hit. That's not saying

624
00:35:20,160 --> 00:35:23,919
Speaker 1: that some enterprising thief hasn't tried it, but but it's

625
00:35:24,040 --> 00:35:26,200
Speaker 1: less likely. Yeah. Well, in fact, we've had a we

626
00:35:26,239 --> 00:35:29,720
Speaker 1: had a rash here in the Atlanta area not terribly

627
00:35:29,760 --> 00:35:33,600
Speaker 1: long ago where people were knocking over a t M

628
00:35:33,640 --> 00:35:36,680
Speaker 1: s with their cars and just taking the a forklifts

629
00:35:36,760 --> 00:35:41,040
Speaker 1: or bulldozers. Yeah, yeah, basically because it's easier to crow

630
00:35:41,080 --> 00:35:44,439
Speaker 1: bar your way into one than bother trying to Because

631
00:35:44,440 --> 00:35:46,680
Speaker 1: we didn't mention the code part of the a t

632
00:35:46,880 --> 00:35:49,479
Speaker 1: M is it's a safe. Yeah, you know, it's there's

633
00:35:49,480 --> 00:35:51,520
Speaker 1: a safe that's inside these machines. That's where all the

634
00:35:51,560 --> 00:35:53,560
Speaker 1: money is kept in a vault in a safe in

635
00:35:53,640 --> 00:35:56,520
Speaker 1: the machine. So if you were to take the whole machine,

636
00:35:56,520 --> 00:36:00,719
Speaker 1: you're taking the vault. Now before before any of you say, Hey,

637
00:36:00,800 --> 00:36:03,040
Speaker 1: I'm going to go on a life of crime and

638
00:36:03,080 --> 00:36:05,640
Speaker 1: start knocking over a t M machines, a t M

639
00:36:05,680 --> 00:36:08,080
Speaker 1: S I knew, I told you at the beginning of

640
00:36:08,080 --> 00:36:10,400
Speaker 1: the show that it was gonna happen. I caught myself

641
00:36:10,400 --> 00:36:12,960
Speaker 1: that I told you it was gonna happen. Um, A

642
00:36:13,000 --> 00:36:16,520
Speaker 1: lot of these have things inside the vault that if

643
00:36:17,239 --> 00:36:20,799
Speaker 1: if stuff goes wrong, it will ruin the money inside there.

644
00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:25,520
Speaker 1: Essentially a little little explosive charges. Usually some of them

645
00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:30,480
Speaker 1: have um explosive charges full of gas, so that if

646
00:36:30,600 --> 00:36:33,320
Speaker 1: if a thief is trying to use a gas explosion

647
00:36:33,400 --> 00:36:37,520
Speaker 1: to uh to open the vault, that it actually has

648
00:36:37,600 --> 00:36:41,919
Speaker 1: gas that counteracts the explosive gas, rendering in a inert

649
00:36:42,680 --> 00:36:45,360
Speaker 1: so and that in that case it's not necessarily destroying

650
00:36:45,360 --> 00:36:47,960
Speaker 1: the money inside, it's just trying to destroy the the

651
00:36:48,040 --> 00:36:51,040
Speaker 1: methodology that the thief is using to get the vault open.

652
00:36:51,640 --> 00:36:54,160
Speaker 1: So yeah, there's some other tech involved here that's kind

653
00:36:54,200 --> 00:36:58,960
Speaker 1: of interesting. UM. Now I use a t M S.

654
00:36:59,000 --> 00:37:01,480
Speaker 1: I mean I I try to be careful about and

655
00:37:01,480 --> 00:37:03,439
Speaker 1: I try to keep a good eye on making sure

656
00:37:03,520 --> 00:37:06,080
Speaker 1: that whatever device I'm using looks you know, totally legit

657
00:37:06,120 --> 00:37:10,320
Speaker 1: and everything. Uh it's it's us. So I'm not saying

658
00:37:10,360 --> 00:37:12,279
Speaker 1: that a t M s are so dangerous that no

659
00:37:12,320 --> 00:37:16,040
Speaker 1: one should use them, but it does bear repeating that

660
00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:18,719
Speaker 1: you should be vigilant and pay attention when you come

661
00:37:18,760 --> 00:37:20,080
Speaker 1: up to an a t M. Don't just you know,

662
00:37:20,480 --> 00:37:26,239
Speaker 1: walk up and ignore all uh all safety, especially you know,

663
00:37:26,320 --> 00:37:29,040
Speaker 1: not just the machine itself. But you know, it's always

664
00:37:29,080 --> 00:37:30,680
Speaker 1: good to take a quick look around you to make

665
00:37:30,680 --> 00:37:35,560
Speaker 1: sure you're not going to be mugged. I've never been mugged.

666
00:37:35,760 --> 00:37:38,440
Speaker 1: I don't want it to happen. I'm gonna try and

667
00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:42,080
Speaker 1: keep that street going. But yeah, that's that's one of

668
00:37:42,120 --> 00:37:44,359
Speaker 1: those things is that, you know, banks often would tell

669
00:37:44,400 --> 00:37:49,040
Speaker 1: customers to you know, certain follow certain safety guidelines and

670
00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:51,680
Speaker 1: be alert when you're using those machines, and you know,

671
00:37:51,760 --> 00:37:53,680
Speaker 1: make sure you have your card ready before you go

672
00:37:53,800 --> 00:37:57,120
Speaker 1: up to one and uh and and uh, you know,

673
00:37:57,560 --> 00:38:01,759
Speaker 1: don't don't linger, don't count your money as your until

674
00:38:01,800 --> 00:38:04,640
Speaker 1: the dealing is done, I guess, but don't catch your

675
00:38:04,680 --> 00:38:06,560
Speaker 1: money right there at the machine. You know, don't give

676
00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:10,799
Speaker 1: thieves the opportunity to pounce on you in that in

677
00:38:10,840 --> 00:38:12,919
Speaker 1: those cases. Now, of course, if you're in a nice,

678
00:38:12,920 --> 00:38:15,440
Speaker 1: busy street and there's a lot of people around, you're

679
00:38:15,440 --> 00:38:17,879
Speaker 1: probably in better shape than uh, you know. I'm talking

680
00:38:17,880 --> 00:38:20,360
Speaker 1: about in the middle of the night, after you've gone

681
00:38:20,360 --> 00:38:22,560
Speaker 1: clubbing all night long and you need that cash because

682
00:38:22,560 --> 00:38:26,360
Speaker 1: you're about to go to that all night pancake house

683
00:38:27,200 --> 00:38:31,759
Speaker 1: that only accepts cash. Just bear in mind your surroundings

684
00:38:31,760 --> 00:38:34,640
Speaker 1: in the situation and be careful. Yes, Also, it never

685
00:38:34,719 --> 00:38:37,680
Speaker 1: hurts to try to cover your hand when you're typing

686
00:38:37,719 --> 00:38:40,960
Speaker 1: in your pin, because even if you don't see the

687
00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:43,640
Speaker 1: little camera, it is possible that it may be one

688
00:38:43,760 --> 00:38:47,120
Speaker 1: somewhere around. But it's just a good habit to get into.

689
00:38:47,560 --> 00:38:49,840
Speaker 1: It makes it really hard to type in your pin correctly.

690
00:38:49,880 --> 00:38:54,520
Speaker 1: I've found plus you just gotta use one like I do.

691
00:38:54,719 --> 00:38:57,399
Speaker 1: Zero zero zero zero. It just goes right through one, two,

692
00:38:57,520 --> 00:39:01,480
Speaker 1: three four using my luggage. Yeah, the there there is

693
00:39:01,520 --> 00:39:05,839
Speaker 1: one exception. I mean, with all the the thousands of

694
00:39:05,880 --> 00:39:09,200
Speaker 1: these machines that are there are everywhere in the world, um,

695
00:39:09,560 --> 00:39:13,520
Speaker 1: and it is likely that the more remote machines are

696
00:39:13,520 --> 00:39:15,839
Speaker 1: the ones that would be targeted by scammers. However, if

697
00:39:15,840 --> 00:39:20,239
Speaker 1: you find yourself at the McMurdo station in Antarctica and

698
00:39:20,400 --> 00:39:24,000
Speaker 1: use the A t M there, it's probably not been hacked,

699
00:39:24,440 --> 00:39:28,719
Speaker 1: but I can't guarantee that it only dispenses frozen herring. No,

700
00:39:28,920 --> 00:39:32,520
Speaker 1: there actually is an A t M at McMurdo station

701
00:39:32,880 --> 00:39:37,399
Speaker 1: in an Antarctica. I don't know why, but I saw

702
00:39:37,440 --> 00:39:39,600
Speaker 1: it mentioned in several of the articles I was using

703
00:39:39,640 --> 00:39:42,320
Speaker 1: for research. I guess just because it's so weird that

704
00:39:42,360 --> 00:39:45,360
Speaker 1: there would be one there. You kind of wonder what

705
00:39:45,400 --> 00:39:47,960
Speaker 1: you need cash for in Antarctica. So so you want

706
00:39:47,960 --> 00:39:50,440
Speaker 1: to report fraud? Yes, so what what? What did he

707
00:39:50,480 --> 00:39:53,600
Speaker 1: look like? Well, he was wearing a tuxedo. He's about

708
00:39:53,600 --> 00:39:56,719
Speaker 1: two ft tall, about two ft tall, and imagine most

709
00:39:56,760 --> 00:39:59,719
Speaker 1: of the people on most of the people on this

710
00:40:00,040 --> 00:40:04,520
Speaker 1: block of eyes. All right, Well, on that note, we're

711
00:40:04,520 --> 00:40:06,920
Speaker 1: going to a not a bank note either. We're gonna

712
00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:10,560
Speaker 1: wrap this up. So, guys, if you have any questions

713
00:40:10,640 --> 00:40:13,439
Speaker 1: about types of technology you want to know more about,

714
00:40:13,600 --> 00:40:16,719
Speaker 1: or maybe a company or a person in technology you

715
00:40:16,719 --> 00:40:19,600
Speaker 1: want to know more about, send us an email our

716
00:40:19,640 --> 00:40:23,160
Speaker 1: addresses tech stuff at how stuff works dot com, or

717
00:40:23,280 --> 00:40:26,040
Speaker 1: drop us a line on Twitter or Facebook are handled,

718
00:40:26,040 --> 00:40:29,360
Speaker 1: There is tech stuff hs W and Chris and I

719
00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:34,000
Speaker 1: will talk to you again a really soon. Be sure

720
00:40:34,000 --> 00:40:36,920
Speaker 1: to check out our new video podcast, Stuff from the Future.

721
00:40:37,280 --> 00:40:39,600
Speaker 1: Join how Stuff Work staff as we explore the most

722
00:40:39,600 --> 00:40:44,439
Speaker 1: promising and perplexing possibilities of tomorrow. The House Stuff Works

723
00:40:44,440 --> 00:40:52,479
Speaker 1: iPhone app has arrived. Download it today on iTunes, brought

724
00:40:52,520 --> 00:40:55,720
Speaker 1: to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. It's ready,

725
00:40:55,880 --> 00:40:56,319
Speaker 1: are you