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Speaker 1: Ah beat Force. If it doesn't work, you're just not

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Speaker 1: using enough. You're listening to Software Radio Special Operations, Military

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Speaker 1: news and straight talk with the guys and the community.

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Speaker 1: Software Radio on Time on Target. If you're watching on YouTube,

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Speaker 1: which we've been doing, you see Thomas up Cora in

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Speaker 1: the right frame of the screen. Really excited to have

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Speaker 1: you on. UM. For those who don't know, we were

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Speaker 1: referred to you by our friend del com Stock, who's

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Speaker 1: a mutual friend. Uh. Thomas is a twenty four year

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Speaker 1: c I, a security officer involved in Mogadishu, the resurgence

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Speaker 1: of Abu Saif in the Philippines, and also the hunt

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Speaker 1: for Osan bin Wad in Post nine eleven. He is

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Speaker 1: a book coming out which we'll get into, and we're

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Speaker 1: really excited more than anything just to have you on

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Speaker 1: and have this introduction to you. It's an amazing career

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Speaker 1: you've had. Thank you. We're really happy to be here. Absolutely.

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Speaker 1: So the book is coming out on May seven, so

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Speaker 1: it's uh, it's a while away, but the pre order

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Speaker 1: is up now on Amazon dot com. It's called Guardian

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Speaker 1: Life in the Crosshairs of the CIA's War on Terror.

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Speaker 1: You wrote it with John Land and Lindsay Preston. UM.

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Speaker 1: So I think it would be great to just get

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Speaker 1: started on, you know, your career from the inception. How

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Speaker 1: did you get involved in the in the CIA and

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Speaker 1: where did it all begin? Well, it started with an

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Speaker 1: ad in the newspaper and the Milwaukee Journal. Wow. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it almost sounds like you're joking. I that's surprising. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's it's how it happened. I was I finished grad school,

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Speaker 1: I was coaching wrestling. I was trying to figure out

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Speaker 1: what I wanted to do with my life. I always

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Speaker 1: had an interest in federal service, UH, but I wasn't

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Speaker 1: quite sure. So I Andrew nad got an interview next you. No,

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Speaker 1: I was driving my A T two Toyota to sell

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Speaker 1: out to Washington, d C. Started a career and uh

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Speaker 1: had no real background in security UM, but that's what

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Speaker 1: they put me into UM and was definitely a good fit.

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Speaker 1: And from there things got interesting. I was first posted

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Speaker 1: to a field office doing background investigations, which UM is

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Speaker 1: pretty boring work, quite frankly, but it's a good way

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Speaker 1: to test your metal. UM find out if you can

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Speaker 1: work independently, if you you know, tested integrity because you're

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Speaker 1: on your own doing backgrounds, checking neighborhoods, doing things with

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Speaker 1: very little supervision. But an opportunity came my way. That

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Speaker 1: was a life rope. Uh. From that boring existence, I UH,

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Speaker 1: there was an opportunity to UH go to a training course,

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Speaker 1: a brand new training course called the SPOCK which is

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Speaker 1: a special Protective Operations course. And it was a course

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Speaker 1: developed to provide protective operations training for people who are

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Speaker 1: going to protect our agency personnel overseas. And it was

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Speaker 1: in response to a couple of different incidents, one of

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Speaker 1: which was the the death of Colonel Row. It was

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Speaker 1: it was killed by by Harris in the Philippines and

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Speaker 1: then a threat against some of our people in Manila.

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Speaker 1: Fast forward about a year two this new course. I

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Speaker 1: was one of the first group to go through the

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Speaker 1: training course, the first official training UH running and it

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Speaker 1: was exciting. We had some very really good instructors from

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Speaker 1: a variety of different backgrounds UH special operations. We were

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Speaker 1: using UM theory and techniques from d A, you know,

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Speaker 1: law enforcement, because this was very much undercover. This was

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Speaker 1: going to be low profile protection, UH, something kind of new.

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Speaker 1: We're gonna be working in a foreign environment where we

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Speaker 1: cannot be flagged as protection. Um, and we need to

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Speaker 1: still provide eye level of h of security for our

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Speaker 1: people working. So I went through the training course um,

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Speaker 1: and then I was signed back into washing d C.

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Speaker 1: And this security Duty office, which was basically our nine

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Speaker 1: one one center. We answer all all the strange calls

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Speaker 1: from people who want to talk to the CIA, especially

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Speaker 1: when they have weird things that they want to talk about,

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Speaker 1: a lot of conspiracy theorists. Oh, every every day and

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Speaker 1: every night. Um and Uh. I was during that time

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Speaker 1: that I really was exposed to terrorism. Uh. We had

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Speaker 1: a shooting at the CIA headquarters in the turn lane

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Speaker 1: on January and I was on duty. I just finished

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Speaker 1: my first cup of coffee and our security Protective Service

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Speaker 1: that's our uniform division opened the back door, looked at

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Speaker 1: us and said shots fired main Gate at least two down.

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Speaker 1: That's his unprecedented type of communications. So I sat there

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Speaker 1: and thought for a second, this guy must be kidding,

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Speaker 1: and then I'm like, oh, no, he's not. So at

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Speaker 1: that moment, I hit the drop line to Fairfax County

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Speaker 1: Police started notifying them, and then the news started coming

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Speaker 1: in from our our ford deployed security personnel at the

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Speaker 1: gate and It turned out that several people were killed

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Speaker 1: and several people were wounded. And at first, uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: jumping forward, and we thought it was an active shooter,

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Speaker 1: a workplace violence issue. So we were scouring, started scouring

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Speaker 1: our records for disgruntled employees and all that. It later

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Speaker 1: turned out that that it was a Pakistani terrorists who

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Speaker 1: decided to attack CIA personnel and entering the building in

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Speaker 1: the morning and he um, and he's quite effective. He

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Speaker 1: was wearing a bullistic vest. He parked his car to

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Speaker 1: block the vehicles that were in and then he walked

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Speaker 1: backwards shooting the vehicles. And so that was a baptism

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Speaker 1: and fire for me in terms of terrorism, and uh,

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Speaker 1: it was a precursor to basically the rest of my career,

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Speaker 1: which was woven tightly around terrorism and responding to terrorism

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Speaker 1: all the way until I left. I think I remember

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Speaker 1: that incident. After that, they did a lot of things

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Speaker 1: to harden the CIA headquarters. Then at Langley, didn't they

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Speaker 1: as far as laps, making them go through checkpoints before

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Speaker 1: they even got that far. Um, different measures were taken.

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Speaker 1: As I recall, absolutely, it was a wake up call

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Speaker 1: for us. We had been relying on the Terrence and

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Speaker 1: UM maybe mystique a bit um. Now we had we

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Speaker 1: had good security, but it was alway inside are are

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Speaker 1: basically a compound, and we had nothing for those individuals

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Speaker 1: who were just sitting in that turn lane. And now

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Speaker 1: we have all kinds of different security measures there. So,

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Speaker 1: but that was a that was a wake up call

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Speaker 1: because we have a Pakistani terrorist and he disappeared into

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Speaker 1: Pakistan and between the Agency and the U and the FBI,

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Speaker 1: they were to track him down, lure him to a meeting,

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Speaker 1: captured and brought him back to the the United States who

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Speaker 1: was tried, convicted, and executed. Wow, there's uh. I was

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Speaker 1: wondering if you could talk a little bit more about

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Speaker 1: UM running security for the agency. I think it's really

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Speaker 1: interesting how this developed, and it sounds like you were

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Speaker 1: kind of at the beginning of it as far as

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Speaker 1: the mobile security aspect for the case officers and operations

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Speaker 1: officers UM way in the past. You know, back when

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Speaker 1: we had OSS and and Jedburg teams, we pretty much

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Speaker 1: sent these guys out completely by themselves, um parachuting them

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Speaker 1: in occupied territory and it occupied France and things like this,

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Speaker 1: and some of those guys a lot of those guys died.

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Speaker 1: I mean we had entire teams went out. I mean

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Speaker 1: it's important, important to mention that. Um. But then, as

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Speaker 1: you said, there's the incident with Colonel Rowe being killed

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Speaker 1: in the Philippines, um by I believe it was by

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Speaker 1: the n p A. I've actually been at the traffic

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Speaker 1: circle where that happened. Um and um. And you're saying

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Speaker 1: after that, they really came to believe that, you know,

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Speaker 1: our agency personnel need to start having some sort of

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Speaker 1: close protection detail and I guess high risk environments. Correct. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it was. It was a new philosophy and UM we

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Speaker 1: embraced it, uh because of a couple of those incidents.

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Speaker 1: But the on the protective theory side, Um, they were

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Speaker 1: coming to this conclusion that what they called the iron

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Speaker 1: box does not work anymore. That's armored cars, lots of

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Speaker 1: guys with guns and just show a force. And the

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Speaker 1: real wake up call was the Harehousing assassination. And that's

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Speaker 1: where Alfred Herrhausen, who was the head of the Deutsche Bank,

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Speaker 1: was targeted by the Red Army fact with y I D.

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Speaker 1: And it was it was, uh, a futuristic version of

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Speaker 1: the I D in terms of at that time, nobody

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Speaker 1: had ever really done that. It was. It was a

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Speaker 1: platter charge on the back of a bike that was

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Speaker 1: placed along his route, and he had he had former

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Speaker 1: what what MO would consider delta force for us there

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Speaker 1: there German delta force was around him. He had a

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Speaker 1: fifty man detail, He had the best armored car Mercedes

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Speaker 1: Benz ever made, and that platter charge went through that

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Speaker 1: armored car like a hot night thruit butter and and

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Speaker 1: killed him and did not just minorly would the driver.

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Speaker 1: At that point, there were people in the really studying

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Speaker 1: protective operations said, m you know, uh, if these guys

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Speaker 1: are going to tear through our armor like this, the

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Speaker 1: amount of guys we have, the amount of guns we have,

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Speaker 1: it isn't gonna matter. So what is it that we

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Speaker 1: really need to be focusing on? And so they they

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Speaker 1: looked into counter surveillance and surveillance detection and that became

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Speaker 1: a big, big, um turning point in terms of protective operations.

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Speaker 1: When you combine that those those theories with a lower

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Speaker 1: profile protection detail, which makes it much harder for the

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Speaker 1: bad guy to spot you, you you've increased your security dramatically,

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Speaker 1: and that if you if you emerge those two. That's

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Speaker 1: kind of what the theory we went on at the agency,

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Speaker 1: and in fact, at one point I was on the

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Speaker 1: counter surveillance team for the director, the deputy director, and

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Speaker 1: the former director. At that time we had three, we

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Speaker 1: had gates, and so we were actually actively UM working

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Speaker 1: this UH, this process, this this new procedure. But on

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Speaker 1: the on the protection side, you're you're correct. In the

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Speaker 1: old days, UH, there were a lot of military people

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Speaker 1: in OSS. But in the CIA in early nineties we

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Speaker 1: were now h mostly college type people and with very

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Speaker 1: little experience, and the military are with weapons, and the

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Speaker 1: threat was changing. We were now dealing not what the

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Speaker 1: Cold War where maybe they'll they'll knock your teeth out

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Speaker 1: or throw you in the engine until we can do

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Speaker 1: a spy exchange. When you're dealing with terrorism and narco

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Speaker 1: traffic skers UM, which was another area we were kind

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Speaker 1: of dabbling in. UM, there's no negotiating. They don't care

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Speaker 1: about what government you work for. They're just going to

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Speaker 1: get rid of you. So when you face that, you've

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Speaker 1: got to up your security posture so that the creation

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Speaker 1: of the spock actually the spot is the course that

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Speaker 1: the actual UM and this is the first time I

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Speaker 1: know of that we were allowed to actually say this.

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Speaker 1: But the name of the unit was called the Park

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Speaker 1: and that stands for Protective Operations Cadre. And they used

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Speaker 1: the word cadre specifically because it wasn't a full time position.

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Speaker 1: What it was was, UM a group of individuals and

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Speaker 1: security but all staff we're training. UH. They go to

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Speaker 1: the spot course and then they would uh they would

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Speaker 1: wait in their normal jobs and when an deployment was

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Speaker 1: was initiated, they would UM asked to go and depending

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Speaker 1: on their manager you could free up that space, they

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Speaker 1: would go and they would deploy and UM. So we

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Speaker 1: were a cadre of part timers and that had that

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Speaker 1: worked until basically at nine eleven, we it was just

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Speaker 1: too much work and so we had to bring in contractors.

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Speaker 1: And that's where UM now in fast forwarding all the

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Speaker 1: way to the protective operations world that we know of

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Speaker 1: UM with veng Ghazi and all that, where you have

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Speaker 1: a staff, offers and a number of contractors. Uh. And

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Speaker 1: that that came about in the late nineties early two thousands.

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Speaker 1: I don't know if you're allowed to say it or not,

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Speaker 1: but I mean we know today is that the g

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Speaker 1: RS program. The guys who do global security for the

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Speaker 1: agency today, as you mentioned, are mostly contractors through a

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Speaker 1: separate company oftentimes. UM and uh, you know, I know

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Speaker 1: a lot of those guys, you know, former Rangers, former Marines,

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Speaker 1: former part para rescue guys who have gone on to

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Speaker 1: work for g RS. UM, what was that shift? Like,

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Speaker 1: I mean, if you could take us a little bit

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Speaker 1: through nine eleven, and I mean the military and the

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Speaker 1: agency and obviously your corner of the agency where you

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Speaker 1: worked as well, I mean, I imagine it must have

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Speaker 1: been like drastic changes going from as you say, a small,

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Speaker 1: little part time mom and pop shop doing security for

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Speaker 1: the agency and now it's like industrial scale. You know,

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Speaker 1: you have case officers going into the wild lands of Pakistan,

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Speaker 1: the federally administrated areas and all kinds of crazy places.

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Speaker 1: I can imagine. Well, that's that's an interesting part. UM.

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Speaker 1: We were operating in those wild wally places in the nineties.

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Speaker 1: Nobody knew about us. We were completely clandestine in the

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Speaker 1: sense that, UM, with one exception an individual in Pakistan,

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Speaker 1: Ray David. Other than that, we really never came up

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Speaker 1: on the scope and which I mean, I'm going to

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Speaker 1: take a moment to brag a little bit, but the

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Speaker 1: members can back this up. When we are doing our mission,

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Speaker 1: which is mobile protective operations. The pock slash the other

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Speaker 1: acronym when i'm which I'm not allowed to mentioned the

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Speaker 1: one you did, ah, the that element has never lost

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Speaker 1: the protecting we had and we've only lost one actual

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Speaker 1: member during our primary mission. We have lost people during

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Speaker 1: a secondary stationary base protective mode, and that would be

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Speaker 1: Coast and that would be Benghazi. But in terms of

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Speaker 1: our primary in all those years and then we were

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Speaker 1: all you named the hotspots, we were there. Um we

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Speaker 1: are low profile. Operation techniques kept us out of the

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Speaker 1: crossers and so so the after nine eleven when we

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Speaker 1: started picking up a lot more work because we had

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Speaker 1: a lot more people going into the war zones, You're right,

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Speaker 1: it was. It was a massive influx and we had

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Speaker 1: to learn how to um uh incorporate non staff officers

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Speaker 1: into it. Now, mind you, they were bringing some incredible

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Speaker 1: skill sets in. I mean we were staffers before, back

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Speaker 1: when I was doing that kind of work. GPS for

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Speaker 1: three letters in the alphabet, and there was no qr

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Speaker 1: F or any of the other accordates. Quick reaction force

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Speaker 1: if UM. If you got into something, you either got

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Speaker 1: out of it or that was it UM. So it

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Speaker 1: was it was definitely a good thing to bring in UM.

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Speaker 1: This exceptional talent that we had. We had to deal

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Speaker 1: with some of the contractual issues that go with other companies.

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Speaker 1: We we set up UM very strong vetting processes and

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Speaker 1: that's why we had, you know, I think we had

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Speaker 1: some of the best guys in the business on the

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Speaker 1: contract side, and I think they don't get enough credit

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Speaker 1: UM for for being there out out there putting their

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Speaker 1: lives on the line and getting really known recognition UM.

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Speaker 1: But if you don't vet correctly and you don't supervise correctly,

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Speaker 1: you can have some pretty catastrophic events. And if you

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Speaker 1: look at some of the other elements. I don't want

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Speaker 1: to put any puny fingers, but there's some other UM

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Speaker 1: or government or going zations that have had contractors working

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Speaker 1: for him that it didn't work out as well. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean today they have what is it like a

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Speaker 1: three or four week or three or four week vetting

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Speaker 1: process if you want to go on the mobile contract,

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Speaker 1: and then there's one for the security guys or the

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Speaker 1: static security guys also, right they have. They have a

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Speaker 1: very strong vetting process. And also if if you know,

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Speaker 1: if you if something goes wrong and you do something,

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Speaker 1: then you shouldn't. You're you're not going to be invited back.

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Speaker 1: And I'll tell you, uh, you you want to be

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Speaker 1: on the A team. And we pretty much were the

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Speaker 1: A teams in terms of housing, transportation, UM, armor uh,

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Speaker 1: cutting edge armor. We're talking about the money spent on

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Speaker 1: armored cars. Uh. They spared no expense. Well did you

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Speaker 1: see things change from what you were saying when you

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Speaker 1: were with the POCK to today's uh, you know agency

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Speaker 1: security where you know, you guys more clandestine, will profile

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Speaker 1: and I don't want to say the guys today or

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Speaker 1: high profile rolling around Iraq in Afghanistan, but I mean

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Speaker 1: it's a different ballgame. Correct. What what happened was, Um,

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm kind of an unusual security officer. Uh. To

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Speaker 1: give you a quick snippet of what CIA security really is, UM,

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Speaker 1: it's it's a we use the term baked in, not

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Speaker 1: bolted on. Our security operatus came into the into the CIA.

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Speaker 1: So we were int a girl to the entire growth

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Speaker 1: of the organization, but well we kind of edged more

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Speaker 1: into personnel security UM. As time went on, and the

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Speaker 1: counter intelligence when you say that the agency security apparatus

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Speaker 1: started in you know, the fifties, and it was that

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Speaker 1: more originally more of a counter intelligence UM capacity that

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Speaker 1: they were looking at a combination of the two. Yeah,

301
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Speaker 1: it was the security support, counter intelligence and vetting. Interesting,

302
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Speaker 1: but now we're very much heavy on personnel security. In fact,

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Speaker 1: that's that's really the main thrust. And then you've got

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Speaker 1: some of these side elements that are in technical security, UM,

305
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Speaker 1: you know, the people who are in locks and alarms,

306
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Speaker 1: and then you have ah, those of us gunslinger types.

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Speaker 1: The protective operations side really was only the director's protection

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Speaker 1: staff prior to UH and UM, and that was you know,

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Speaker 1: that's more of suits and going to nice places, not

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Speaker 1: not where we went UM. So it was it was

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Speaker 1: a dramatic change, and I'll be honest, the agency management

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Speaker 1: really wasn't really thrilled with it. They always thought we

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Speaker 1: were temporary. UM. The if you look at the way

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Speaker 1: you mentioned something earlier about the Cold War UM. Cold

315
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Speaker 1: War warrior type ci A officers did not carry weapons

316
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Speaker 1: and they believed that they relied on their wits. Now,

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Speaker 1: the threat level change, the threat dynamic changed, so UM,

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Speaker 1: we had to change with it. But a lot of

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Speaker 1: those guys who cut their teeth in the cocktail circuit

320
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Speaker 1: of Europe, they're senior managers now and they're not really

321
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Speaker 1: understanding this guy, you know, guns and running around and

322
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Speaker 1: so there's always been a rub. And UM, we barely

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Speaker 1: stayed in existence during that period up until and there

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Speaker 1: was a name change. And I won't go into the

325
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Speaker 1: name change. But when I was a senior team letter

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Speaker 1: along with another gentleman, and that's when we started, our

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Speaker 1: numbers jumped. And because we were being worn out, we

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Speaker 1: were actually guys weren't getting enough training. They were basically

329
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Speaker 1: deploying all the time. Um. But there's a lot of

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Speaker 1: pride in the unit. Did you guys get any resistance

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Speaker 1: from the case officers as been throughout the nineties and

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Speaker 1: even after nine eleven, who are like, I don't I

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Speaker 1: don't want these these ex army guys following me around places? What? What?

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Speaker 1: What is this? Absolutely? Actually early on, UM, as I said,

335
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Speaker 1: I had an unusual security career. I jumped in and

336
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Speaker 1: out of security over over the twenty four years. I

337
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Speaker 1: actually was operational. UM. I worked in the CTC for

338
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Speaker 1: a number of years doing different jobs, one of which

339
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Speaker 1: was in the counter terrorism unit, and that is an

340
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Speaker 1: operational unit that was targeting terrorists and specifically doing a

341
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Speaker 1: variety of different things. But one of the things that

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Speaker 1: I was involved in because of my security background was

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Speaker 1: looking for terrorists signature looking. So when I went to Khartoum,

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Speaker 1: we were tracking terrorists. Now cartoon is the club med

345
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Speaker 1: of terrorism. Uh. When I went there, everybody was there,

346
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Speaker 1: including Osama bin Lad but he wasn't as big of

347
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Speaker 1: a fish back then. But then it was a Bunidao

348
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Speaker 1: and Carlos the Jackal, and I got to Sudan and

349
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Speaker 1: got to work with a guy who basically got Carlos

350
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Speaker 1: a legend and special Forces, a guy named Billy Walk.

351
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Speaker 1: So I arrived in just after after Billy scored on

352
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Speaker 1: that and his book Hunting the Jackal talks about It's

353
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Speaker 1: the only book besides mine that actually talks about that unit.

354
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Speaker 1: And to give you a corollary, the British have a

355
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Speaker 1: unit similar fourteen Intelligence Debt, and and I've I've looked

356
00:23:36,240 --> 00:23:38,880
Speaker 1: at their literature on them. It's it's almost identical, doing

357
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Speaker 1: the same thing they would do. Color Surmanson surveillance, detection

358
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Speaker 1: and surveillance on I ra A bad guys for the

359
00:23:46,800 --> 00:23:50,520
Speaker 1: s A S SO. UM. So that's what I was doing.

360
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Speaker 1: So when I came back from that, I went back

361
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Speaker 1: into the to the park. I brought that UH information

362
00:23:58,640 --> 00:24:00,760
Speaker 1: and that training to the to the pock and we

363
00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:06,000
Speaker 1: started doing teaching our park officers how to be more clandestine.

364
00:24:06,560 --> 00:24:09,159
Speaker 1: And the first step is understand who your client is.

365
00:24:09,560 --> 00:24:14,000
Speaker 1: Your client is a clandestine officer. Their job is to

366
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Speaker 1: meet UH and recruit assets, um, and they use specific

367
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Speaker 1: tradecraft to do that. And if we don't we the

368
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Speaker 1: protectors don't understand that tradecraft. UM, we're not very effective

369
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Speaker 1: and they're not gonna like us much. You do you

370
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Speaker 1: have any stories about I mean, I know you couldn't

371
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Speaker 1: get into specifics about the one and the wear maybe,

372
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Speaker 1: but particularly Harry source meets or you know, any any

373
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Speaker 1: weird things like that that may have gone down. UM. Yeah,

374
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Speaker 1: there was. There was a situation in the country. I

375
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Speaker 1: had a very good working relationship with this was this

376
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Speaker 1: was when I was doing the counter terrorism unit stuff. UM.

377
00:24:57,560 --> 00:25:02,359
Speaker 1: We had and an asset was captured and killed actually

378
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Speaker 1: didn't he wasn't killed at that point, but he was

379
00:25:04,560 --> 00:25:08,000
Speaker 1: he was captured and um, we were going to try

380
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Speaker 1: to get some funds to his widow. And uh we

381
00:25:14,040 --> 00:25:19,199
Speaker 1: knew that the opposition was probably staking out her location.

382
00:25:20,080 --> 00:25:23,960
Speaker 1: So we had to get into position to provide counter

383
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Speaker 1: servants support for the case officer. Who um who got

384
00:25:30,600 --> 00:25:34,320
Speaker 1: completely dressed up. He was he looked like he was

385
00:25:34,359 --> 00:25:37,200
Speaker 1: covered head and toe. He looked like a woman and

386
00:25:37,400 --> 00:25:41,800
Speaker 1: uh and he hobbled down the street and picking up

387
00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:44,200
Speaker 1: trash and putting in a bag and then he ended

388
00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:47,480
Speaker 1: up throwing what he looked like an old crumpled can

389
00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:51,040
Speaker 1: over the wall into this residence and it was the

390
00:25:51,119 --> 00:25:56,200
Speaker 1: crumpled can full of cash for for this widow. So

391
00:25:56,760 --> 00:26:01,680
Speaker 1: that was a pretty scary night because we we knew

392
00:26:01,760 --> 00:26:03,720
Speaker 1: that there was a real good chance that they were

393
00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:06,320
Speaker 1: in the neighborhood watching for some type of activity. And

394
00:26:06,320 --> 00:26:14,000
Speaker 1: I think we completely bamboos with them on the protection side. Uh,

395
00:26:14,080 --> 00:26:15,879
Speaker 1: there was a lot. There was a lot of hairy

396
00:26:15,880 --> 00:26:18,600
Speaker 1: stuff we did. Um stuff that we came out of

397
00:26:18,600 --> 00:26:21,960
Speaker 1: and we're like whoa um and talked about in the book.

398
00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:24,679
Speaker 1: I talked about one mission where we was the longest

399
00:26:24,760 --> 00:26:27,800
Speaker 1: drive in that country that we've ever done, um than

400
00:26:28,119 --> 00:26:33,280
Speaker 1: anything at dark was extremely dangerous UM. And we made

401
00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:36,320
Speaker 1: the run um to this other city and around the

402
00:26:36,600 --> 00:26:38,800
Speaker 1: route back. It took us longer because of traffic, and

403
00:26:38,840 --> 00:26:43,000
Speaker 1: we ended up in the dark and with all we

404
00:26:43,240 --> 00:26:45,000
Speaker 1: all of a sudden we came up on him on

405
00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:50,440
Speaker 1: two armored personnel carriers bristling with guns and these guys

406
00:26:50,480 --> 00:26:54,480
Speaker 1: are hunting terrorists and they're looking for anything and everything

407
00:26:54,600 --> 00:26:56,679
Speaker 1: on the road and we come up on him and

408
00:26:58,760 --> 00:27:00,439
Speaker 1: it was one of those moments where are they going

409
00:27:00,480 --> 00:27:03,680
Speaker 1: to fire or not? And luckily they didn't, and and

410
00:27:04,160 --> 00:27:06,800
Speaker 1: it wasn't eventful, but it could have been not really

411
00:27:06,840 --> 00:27:10,240
Speaker 1: bad because you're working in a clandestine manner. You can't

412
00:27:10,280 --> 00:27:15,359
Speaker 1: necessarily tell the government you're in. You can't deconflict necessarily,

413
00:27:15,359 --> 00:27:17,359
Speaker 1: like hey, we're going to meet with our secret source

414
00:27:17,480 --> 00:27:22,320
Speaker 1: over in this place. You know absolutely not a lot

415
00:27:22,320 --> 00:27:24,920
Speaker 1: of these places they had no idea we were operating

416
00:27:24,920 --> 00:27:28,680
Speaker 1: in their in their midst none and um. So that

417
00:27:28,800 --> 00:27:32,120
Speaker 1: was a lot of work trying to get logistics in

418
00:27:32,280 --> 00:27:35,520
Speaker 1: and and and cover our tracks, especially when you're there

419
00:27:35,520 --> 00:27:38,439
Speaker 1: a lot. So there was a lot of of different

420
00:27:38,520 --> 00:27:40,919
Speaker 1: rules as we used to get in country and do

421
00:27:40,960 --> 00:27:43,399
Speaker 1: what we did, and we and we hid in a

422
00:27:43,400 --> 00:27:46,679
Speaker 1: lot of different other elements, you know. Um, we had

423
00:27:46,720 --> 00:27:49,560
Speaker 1: a lot of help from from our other government and

424
00:27:49,640 --> 00:27:52,639
Speaker 1: military sources. Yeah, it sounds like bringing things in and

425
00:27:52,680 --> 00:27:55,359
Speaker 1: diplomatic pouches, like out of a spy movie or something

426
00:27:55,400 --> 00:27:59,199
Speaker 1: like that. It's cool, Um. I want to ask you

427
00:27:59,240 --> 00:28:01,400
Speaker 1: because I mean the other highlights here from your book

428
00:28:01,440 --> 00:28:03,560
Speaker 1: you talk about and you mentioned it briefly, So why

429
00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:09,040
Speaker 1: don't we start there um in Khartoum looking for Ben Laden. Yes,

430
00:28:09,520 --> 00:28:11,600
Speaker 1: and you said you you rolled in just as Billy

431
00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:17,080
Speaker 1: wahb was rolling out. Yeah. The it's it's funny, um

432
00:28:16,840 --> 00:28:19,920
Speaker 1: my writers basically laughing. They say I'm the Forrest Gump

433
00:28:20,760 --> 00:28:26,720
Speaker 1: of security because I was around for so many things. Um.

434
00:28:27,160 --> 00:28:31,040
Speaker 1: Bin Laden and I uh rolled around the same mud often.

435
00:28:31,720 --> 00:28:34,560
Speaker 1: And for example, I was in Somalia and he sent

436
00:28:34,680 --> 00:28:39,360
Speaker 1: his his goons in and they we didn't know it

437
00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:41,360
Speaker 1: was him at the time. We just knew that an

438
00:28:41,360 --> 00:28:43,520
Speaker 1: element was going to come in and they were going

439
00:28:43,600 --> 00:28:45,880
Speaker 1: to up the anty and they did. They started out

440
00:28:45,880 --> 00:28:50,800
Speaker 1: by being active at night and pinpoint accurate with their

441
00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:56,840
Speaker 1: mortar fire. They gave the the the special Rangers that

442
00:28:57,000 --> 00:29:01,520
Speaker 1: arrived in Mogadishu, the black Hawk down group. They they

443
00:29:01,560 --> 00:29:03,640
Speaker 1: gave him a welcome their their second night in with

444
00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:06,840
Speaker 1: a pinpoint mortar, a brag right into their little birds

445
00:29:07,560 --> 00:29:11,200
Speaker 1: hangar area. And if you go back through our podcasts,

446
00:29:11,360 --> 00:29:15,760
Speaker 1: you'll hear George hand arrived in Mangad issue like the

447
00:29:16,160 --> 00:29:19,200
Speaker 1: day after or the day of that that happened. So,

448
00:29:19,320 --> 00:29:22,960
Speaker 1: I mean, yeah, it's interesting how these stories intersect. And

449
00:29:23,000 --> 00:29:24,800
Speaker 1: we didn't know till later that it was it was

450
00:29:24,920 --> 00:29:28,000
Speaker 1: bin Laden's guys. And then later on when I uh

451
00:29:28,240 --> 00:29:31,840
Speaker 1: when I was in cartoon, he was there operating UM

452
00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:36,720
Speaker 1: and uh so and and some of his prime UM

453
00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:41,640
Speaker 1: cohorts were involved in the Asian terrorists activities, and a

454
00:29:41,640 --> 00:29:44,240
Speaker 1: lot of people around the world don't understand because it

455
00:29:44,280 --> 00:29:48,800
Speaker 1: was never really highlighted how critical those operations were to

456
00:29:48,880 --> 00:29:52,280
Speaker 1: the worldwide threat. It was huge. Yeah. Yeah, I mean,

457
00:29:52,720 --> 00:29:55,320
Speaker 1: the the idea behind find planes and the things came

458
00:29:55,400 --> 00:29:59,520
Speaker 1: from Ramsay Useth who was working on that plan in

459
00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:03,840
Speaker 1: Minertle when he got discovered and disappeared. I mean, so

460
00:30:03,920 --> 00:30:06,320
Speaker 1: much of what was happening in the Philippines was at

461
00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:10,760
Speaker 1: that time was uh you know, the saudiast We're financing

462
00:30:10,800 --> 00:30:13,800
Speaker 1: a series of madrassas as I recall over there that

463
00:30:13,800 --> 00:30:17,480
Speaker 1: they were using the finance terrorist activity and UM, you know,

464
00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:20,120
Speaker 1: through through what you guys were doing in the agency

465
00:30:20,320 --> 00:30:23,760
Speaker 1: and through um a lot of hard work from the Filipinos. Um,

466
00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:27,040
Speaker 1: a lot of that stuff has been neutralized absolutely. Uh.

467
00:30:27,520 --> 00:30:31,200
Speaker 1: There were some when I was in the Philippines, we

468
00:30:31,200 --> 00:30:36,640
Speaker 1: found out that Humbali was the mastermind behind the failed

469
00:30:36,680 --> 00:30:41,560
Speaker 1: Singapore attack had actually been targeting Minil embassy. That was

470
00:30:41,600 --> 00:30:45,480
Speaker 1: his backup plan. And we caught that guy, a famous

471
00:30:45,720 --> 00:30:50,800
Speaker 1: bomber named Father Gozi, and he was a prolific bomber. Uh,

472
00:30:51,160 --> 00:30:53,280
Speaker 1: I mean he was an expert. He's the guy who

473
00:30:53,320 --> 00:30:57,200
Speaker 1: blew up the movie theater in Manila. He set up

474
00:30:57,240 --> 00:31:00,000
Speaker 1: five bombs in Manila one day. They recalled the Result

475
00:31:00,120 --> 00:31:06,760
Speaker 1: Day bombings December twenty two thousand and I actually have again.

476
00:31:06,840 --> 00:31:09,120
Speaker 1: I was in Manila at the time doing a die

477
00:31:09,240 --> 00:31:13,440
Speaker 1: print with my brothers and we had to divert around

478
00:31:13,440 --> 00:31:19,440
Speaker 1: Manila because it was being blown up. And h when

479
00:31:19,440 --> 00:31:21,360
Speaker 1: he was caught, he was able to actually rig a

480
00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:25,000
Speaker 1: cell phone and back then that was that was new technology.

481
00:31:25,960 --> 00:31:29,840
Speaker 1: So very interesting guy. Uh. And he was he was

482
00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:32,320
Speaker 1: getting prepared to do the Manilea embassy when he was

483
00:31:32,400 --> 00:31:35,920
Speaker 1: quiet with a thousand pounds of commercial great explosive and

484
00:31:36,560 --> 00:31:40,480
Speaker 1: six pools of dead chord. And so there's all this, uh,

485
00:31:40,840 --> 00:31:44,720
Speaker 1: it's all kind of interwoven. I mean going back to

486
00:31:45,080 --> 00:31:47,600
Speaker 1: um do you want to go back then to Somalia? Then? Um,

487
00:31:47,920 --> 00:31:50,800
Speaker 1: and and flesh that out a little bit because there's

488
00:31:50,840 --> 00:31:52,880
Speaker 1: actually I wanted to ask you too, now that it's

489
00:31:52,880 --> 00:31:55,960
Speaker 1: starting to jog my memory. There was a an agency

490
00:31:56,040 --> 00:31:59,560
Speaker 1: team or maybe well I'll let you elaborate if you can,

491
00:31:59,640 --> 00:32:02,920
Speaker 1: but there's a team of Americans that went over a

492
00:32:03,000 --> 00:32:06,120
Speaker 1: land mine back in I think before the black Hawk

493
00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:11,120
Speaker 1: down incident, the Battle of the Black Sea happened. UM

494
00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:15,320
Speaker 1: Delta Force a former Delta Force UM individuals killed Larry

495
00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:21,080
Speaker 1: Larry Friedman. Yeah, he had an interesting nickname, but uh

496
00:32:21,160 --> 00:32:27,000
Speaker 1: and uh Larry was part of a group of ground

497
00:32:27,000 --> 00:32:33,120
Speaker 1: Branch uh Special Activity Division personnel that we're doing route

498
00:32:33,280 --> 00:32:39,440
Speaker 1: reconnaissance in advance of the military and um when his

499
00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:42,600
Speaker 1: vehicle went over a landmine and he was instantly killed

500
00:32:42,640 --> 00:32:46,440
Speaker 1: and there were some wounded. The first Park Team provided

501
00:32:46,480 --> 00:32:53,960
Speaker 1: security for the evac. Okay, interesting yeah, and um uh

502
00:32:54,760 --> 00:32:58,680
Speaker 1: how how he Wassden wrote a book called Seal Team six,

503
00:32:59,440 --> 00:33:02,479
Speaker 1: and in it talks about his adventures in Mogadishu, um,

504
00:33:02,840 --> 00:33:07,200
Speaker 1: some of which were with us, and and he actually mentions,

505
00:33:08,320 --> 00:33:12,600
Speaker 1: UM my team and one of the one the incidents

506
00:33:12,600 --> 00:33:15,440
Speaker 1: that happened, uh, you know during my tour there after

507
00:33:15,480 --> 00:33:18,080
Speaker 1: that incident happened was that when you got you came

508
00:33:18,080 --> 00:33:20,600
Speaker 1: in with the team and began. I came in later.

509
00:33:20,960 --> 00:33:23,720
Speaker 1: I came in just before black Hawk down and I

510
00:33:23,840 --> 00:33:26,360
Speaker 1: was there for a couple of things that changed. The

511
00:33:26,680 --> 00:33:34,240
Speaker 1: environment changed dramatically. Um ah A Deed was a former asset,

512
00:33:35,000 --> 00:33:36,840
Speaker 1: so he kind of knew how we operated. And then

513
00:33:36,840 --> 00:33:38,840
Speaker 1: he got on the bad side of everybody. Yeah that's

514
00:33:38,880 --> 00:33:41,440
Speaker 1: not good. And then he decided he wanted to He

515
00:33:41,480 --> 00:33:44,000
Speaker 1: knew who his enemies were, so he put out a

516
00:33:44,040 --> 00:33:47,840
Speaker 1: reward for all of our heads, the park team. Holy shit.

517
00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:52,640
Speaker 1: Yeah and uh and so it was pretty hairy times

518
00:33:52,840 --> 00:33:55,600
Speaker 1: and and we were the only ones on the road

519
00:33:55,640 --> 00:33:59,000
Speaker 1: at one point in fact, Time Magazine had a little

520
00:33:59,000 --> 00:34:05,720
Speaker 1: burpabotis uh dusty SUVs running the pothole streaks of moby

521
00:34:05,760 --> 00:34:08,799
Speaker 1: t shoot. Yeah, we were the only ones out there

522
00:34:08,800 --> 00:34:12,960
Speaker 1: at the time. Um, everybody else was was laying low

523
00:34:13,400 --> 00:34:15,879
Speaker 1: or if they weren't they were like the CNN people

524
00:34:15,880 --> 00:34:19,280
Speaker 1: who were getting killed. UM. So it was what happened

525
00:34:19,360 --> 00:34:23,920
Speaker 1: was the deed was turning the people against the UN forces.

526
00:34:24,200 --> 00:34:26,799
Speaker 1: He was holding rallies and we could just see day

527
00:34:26,840 --> 00:34:31,520
Speaker 1: by day the population was turning against us, and he

528
00:34:31,560 --> 00:34:33,319
Speaker 1: knew he had to get rid of us, you know,

529
00:34:33,400 --> 00:34:37,160
Speaker 1: the whole U N peacekeeping force. And what what's interesting

530
00:34:37,200 --> 00:34:40,400
Speaker 1: about that that was a major watershed event for peacekeeping.

531
00:34:41,080 --> 00:34:43,880
Speaker 1: The U. S military got a little bit of a

532
00:34:43,920 --> 00:34:50,279
Speaker 1: black eye on that, UM and UH that shaped how

533
00:34:50,400 --> 00:34:57,840
Speaker 1: we dealt with force protection in Bosnia where I was involved. UM.

534
00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:03,080
Speaker 1: I was General Nash specifically asked for UM the counter

535
00:35:03,120 --> 00:35:06,720
Speaker 1: terrorism unity that was to come in and protect basically

536
00:35:06,760 --> 00:35:10,200
Speaker 1: look look after his troops in Tuzla because of the

537
00:35:10,280 --> 00:35:15,200
Speaker 1: threats that they had UM seen in Somalia. So UM

538
00:35:15,239 --> 00:35:17,560
Speaker 1: and not to get political, but there was a there

539
00:35:17,600 --> 00:35:21,839
Speaker 1: was an event that happened after Somalia where Um the

540
00:35:21,880 --> 00:35:26,080
Speaker 1: sect Deaf was fired and that was Aspen and he

541
00:35:26,239 --> 00:35:28,680
Speaker 1: was because the troops on the ground asked for tanks,

542
00:35:29,239 --> 00:35:33,319
Speaker 1: armor and he said, no, we don't want to have

543
00:35:33,440 --> 00:35:36,040
Speaker 1: that image. And then later on when people were killed,

544
00:35:36,080 --> 00:35:39,960
Speaker 1: he was fired. So he fight forward to beg Ghazi.

545
00:35:40,120 --> 00:35:43,200
Speaker 1: You can there's there's a corrollary with a different ending.

546
00:35:44,239 --> 00:35:46,400
Speaker 1: There's a you know, a number of different things and

547
00:35:46,480 --> 00:35:51,160
Speaker 1: a number of UM I think, different evolutions that were

548
00:35:51,200 --> 00:35:54,399
Speaker 1: taking place at the time. For instance, around that same

549
00:35:54,400 --> 00:35:58,200
Speaker 1: time in Mangadishu, we're also hunting down Pablo Escobar in Colombia,

550
00:35:58,760 --> 00:36:03,120
Speaker 1: and there's a number of UM botched operations UM and

551
00:36:03,160 --> 00:36:06,319
Speaker 1: the I mean, I shouldn't say botched, but failed operations

552
00:36:06,360 --> 00:36:10,840
Speaker 1: because we came to realize we were telegraphing our moves

553
00:36:10,880 --> 00:36:13,120
Speaker 1: that people could see, we're moving all these logistics in

554
00:36:13,120 --> 00:36:16,279
Speaker 1: the theater, etcetera, etcetera. And that became the criticism in

555
00:36:16,360 --> 00:36:18,560
Speaker 1: Mangadishu as well. It's like, how many times are you

556
00:36:18,600 --> 00:36:22,319
Speaker 1: gonna air assault these targets? UM. But then of course

557
00:36:22,320 --> 00:36:24,319
Speaker 1: there's only so many ways you're going to get there, right,

558
00:36:24,360 --> 00:36:27,400
Speaker 1: You're gonna fly in, you're going to um take jeeps in,

559
00:36:28,239 --> 00:36:31,280
Speaker 1: and you guys operated in a in a clandestine manner,

560
00:36:31,320 --> 00:36:33,160
Speaker 1: which is I guess that's maybe the third option, is

561
00:36:33,200 --> 00:36:35,520
Speaker 1: to use some sort of subterfuge to get to your target.

562
00:36:36,920 --> 00:36:38,960
Speaker 1: But it was it was real. Mogi issue was really

563
00:36:39,000 --> 00:36:44,839
Speaker 1: a tough environment because um uh in Mark Bowen's book

564
00:36:45,280 --> 00:36:48,480
Speaker 1: Black Hawk Down, he talks about the Italians. The Italians

565
00:36:48,760 --> 00:36:55,439
Speaker 1: were incredibly complicit with odeed checkpoint. Pasta was yeah, um yeah,

566
00:36:55,560 --> 00:36:59,360
Speaker 1: and and that that figures into this. We we noticed

567
00:36:59,400 --> 00:37:02,919
Speaker 1: that and Delta would start to rev up and fly out,

568
00:37:03,320 --> 00:37:05,360
Speaker 1: a little red light would start to flash out of

569
00:37:05,400 --> 00:37:11,200
Speaker 1: the out of the Italian camp at the airport, and uh,

570
00:37:11,440 --> 00:37:15,760
Speaker 1: this was this was This was reported to the head

571
00:37:16,080 --> 00:37:19,279
Speaker 1: of the u N contingency at the airport, which was

572
00:37:19,480 --> 00:37:22,160
Speaker 1: an Egyptian general, I think, and he went and he

573
00:37:22,200 --> 00:37:25,040
Speaker 1: confronted the Italians and basically said, we're not going to

574
00:37:25,120 --> 00:37:28,759
Speaker 1: see any more red lights. And this is part of

575
00:37:28,760 --> 00:37:31,680
Speaker 1: their They were the previous tenants you could say, of

576
00:37:32,440 --> 00:37:36,920
Speaker 1: Somalia and they wanted it back. And we know from

577
00:37:37,239 --> 00:37:41,640
Speaker 1: intelligence reporting, et cetera, that the Italians were incou it's

578
00:37:41,760 --> 00:37:45,440
Speaker 1: with a deed and to the to give you an

579
00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:47,840
Speaker 1: idea at the level and the and the lethality of this,

580
00:37:48,760 --> 00:37:53,160
Speaker 1: the Chess checkpoint passed up nearby. There was was a

581
00:37:53,200 --> 00:37:57,560
Speaker 1: post that the Italians gave up to the Nigerians. They

582
00:37:57,560 --> 00:37:59,520
Speaker 1: never told the Nigerians that they were paying off the

583
00:37:59,520 --> 00:38:02,120
Speaker 1: Smalley to leave them alone. So the Nigerians came in

584
00:38:02,719 --> 00:38:05,040
Speaker 1: and they were slaughtered. I mean we're talking to a

585
00:38:05,080 --> 00:38:07,279
Speaker 1: couple of them are skin to lives. Their bodies were

586
00:38:07,320 --> 00:38:09,680
Speaker 1: dragged through the streets. This part was put on sne

587
00:38:09,680 --> 00:38:12,760
Speaker 1: and they had to shielded, you know, down to their skivvies.

588
00:38:14,080 --> 00:38:20,239
Speaker 1: We ran into the edge of that ambush. Um and

589
00:38:20,400 --> 00:38:24,120
Speaker 1: that and which kind of explains why when we we're

590
00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:27,239
Speaker 1: running back out of there, trying to get to a

591
00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:32,920
Speaker 1: hospital to save the life of our protect thee UM,

592
00:38:33,040 --> 00:38:37,160
Speaker 1: we weren't getting any any response from the checkpoint pasta

593
00:38:37,560 --> 00:38:41,359
Speaker 1: Italian military. They did not react to the shooting. They

594
00:38:41,360 --> 00:38:43,880
Speaker 1: did not react to our driving up. So we just

595
00:38:44,560 --> 00:38:47,719
Speaker 1: carried on back to the un compound and we were

596
00:38:47,800 --> 00:38:49,239
Speaker 1: lucky enough to get him back in time to save

597
00:38:49,280 --> 00:38:53,160
Speaker 1: his life. It was a case officer that had been shot. Yes,

598
00:38:53,239 --> 00:38:58,480
Speaker 1: the deputy. Yeah, at the time we were we didn't remember.

599
00:38:58,520 --> 00:39:01,000
Speaker 1: I was saying about how we had right armor. That

600
00:39:01,160 --> 00:39:05,720
Speaker 1: was much later. We were not driving in armored cars

601
00:39:05,800 --> 00:39:09,200
Speaker 1: really and uh in Mogidishu at that time. UM we

602
00:39:09,239 --> 00:39:11,440
Speaker 1: had at one point we had two. Then we were

603
00:39:11,480 --> 00:39:16,680
Speaker 1: down to one and the one was so conspicuous that

604
00:39:16,719 --> 00:39:18,879
Speaker 1: we just couldn't use it. It was a big white

605
00:39:18,880 --> 00:39:21,320
Speaker 1: suburban and it was like the only suburban and country

606
00:39:21,840 --> 00:39:25,640
Speaker 1: and the Somalis knew it and they and they were

607
00:39:25,640 --> 00:39:27,640
Speaker 1: looking for it, and they called it the white whale,

608
00:39:29,200 --> 00:39:34,080
Speaker 1: So we weren't going to use that. So yeah, it was.

609
00:39:34,200 --> 00:39:38,520
Speaker 1: It was a pretty pretty ugly moment. Since you mentioned

610
00:39:38,560 --> 00:39:42,320
Speaker 1: it earlier. UM, and you're you know, uniquely qualified to

611
00:39:42,400 --> 00:39:45,239
Speaker 1: comment on this matter, and we've covered it a lot.

612
00:39:45,320 --> 00:39:49,840
Speaker 1: Here is Benghazi, Uh what do you think happened there?

613
00:39:49,880 --> 00:39:52,160
Speaker 1: I mean there's been a tons and tons of debate

614
00:39:52,239 --> 00:39:57,560
Speaker 1: about um, the personnel station, they're requesting additional security, Um,

615
00:39:57,560 --> 00:40:01,759
Speaker 1: should they have gotten it, Should the temper emissions facility

616
00:40:01,880 --> 00:40:05,040
Speaker 1: been upgraded? Etcetera, etcetera. UM, but I was wondering what

617
00:40:05,080 --> 00:40:11,239
Speaker 1: your thoughts are on how all of that played out. UM. Uh, yeah,

618
00:40:11,320 --> 00:40:13,200
Speaker 1: I have. I have a lot of opinions on it,

619
00:40:13,239 --> 00:40:15,319
Speaker 1: and I'm going to start out with caveating this is

620
00:40:15,400 --> 00:40:18,279
Speaker 1: this is my opinion based on but but based on

621
00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:22,160
Speaker 1: my knowledge. I've worked m in a lot of places overseas,

622
00:40:22,719 --> 00:40:27,520
Speaker 1: and uh, the State Department RSL staff are are there.

623
00:40:27,560 --> 00:40:31,200
Speaker 1: They're total troopers. They are they're they're given a really

624
00:40:31,280 --> 00:40:34,640
Speaker 1: rough job and they're really not that supported. And in

625
00:40:34,640 --> 00:40:39,480
Speaker 1: this case, they knew they were understaffed, they asked for

626
00:40:39,760 --> 00:40:44,560
Speaker 1: um additional resources, they didn't get them. But I will

627
00:40:44,600 --> 00:40:49,359
Speaker 1: tell you the State Department has a record of error

628
00:40:49,520 --> 00:40:53,840
Speaker 1: on the side of not caution. Um. There I have.

629
00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:56,880
Speaker 1: I have witnessed situations where they have made policy and

630
00:40:56,960 --> 00:41:02,280
Speaker 1: procedure based on expediency and convenient it's over real protection.

631
00:41:02,400 --> 00:41:04,879
Speaker 1: Now my John biased, I'm you know, but I've also

632
00:41:04,960 --> 00:41:07,680
Speaker 1: worked in these environments and I know when you roll

633
00:41:07,760 --> 00:41:10,799
Speaker 1: the dice like this, there's people's lives at stake, and

634
00:41:11,200 --> 00:41:12,759
Speaker 1: they have a tendency to roll the dice in the

635
00:41:12,760 --> 00:41:15,719
Speaker 1: wrong direction. Um. And this this is one of those

636
00:41:15,719 --> 00:41:18,800
Speaker 1: ones where they roll the dice and they lost. Um.

637
00:41:18,840 --> 00:41:21,359
Speaker 1: So that that was that was a clear cut In

638
00:41:21,400 --> 00:41:25,840
Speaker 1: my book, there's no doubt that the State Department management

639
00:41:25,880 --> 00:41:30,000
Speaker 1: is complicit and it should have been held accountable when

640
00:41:30,080 --> 00:41:34,399
Speaker 1: we just like the set death in Somalia, when when

641
00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:38,439
Speaker 1: we had Evan Barlow on the podcast, I mean he

642
00:41:38,680 --> 00:41:41,719
Speaker 1: his view and based on his experience, was that they

643
00:41:41,719 --> 00:41:44,080
Speaker 1: were forewarned that the ambassador was going to be killed,

644
00:41:44,080 --> 00:41:46,040
Speaker 1: and he was pretty vocal about that on the show,

645
00:41:46,680 --> 00:41:49,359
Speaker 1: and that you know, nothing was done. Remember that During

646
00:41:49,400 --> 00:41:51,799
Speaker 1: that I remember him saying he was trying to warn

647
00:41:51,840 --> 00:41:56,640
Speaker 1: the State Department. They essentially brushed him off. Um. But

648
00:41:56,640 --> 00:42:00,360
Speaker 1: but then, what did you think about the respons that

649
00:42:00,560 --> 00:42:04,480
Speaker 1: night from the agency security contractors who it sounds like

650
00:42:04,520 --> 00:42:07,560
Speaker 1: they really manned up um in a in a pretty

651
00:42:07,719 --> 00:42:14,239
Speaker 1: crappy situation. Yeah, let's start off with the responsibility. Just

652
00:42:14,719 --> 00:42:18,799
Speaker 1: clear the water. Um. Our people are not responsible for

653
00:42:18,800 --> 00:42:21,920
Speaker 1: State Department, right right. It was an informal agreement between

654
00:42:21,960 --> 00:42:28,319
Speaker 1: the annex and the consulate, and that agreement is It's

655
00:42:28,360 --> 00:42:32,600
Speaker 1: tough when you make informal agreements because you know that's

656
00:42:32,640 --> 00:42:36,080
Speaker 1: not the way to do business. But I fully understand

657
00:42:36,800 --> 00:42:40,440
Speaker 1: because when you are in those environments, it is US

658
00:42:40,960 --> 00:42:42,880
Speaker 1: that means them, and you know the State Department of

659
00:42:42,960 --> 00:42:47,200
Speaker 1: US being the US people against them, meaning that the threats.

660
00:42:47,920 --> 00:42:54,120
Speaker 1: So I totally understand. Um, you know why they were

661
00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:59,480
Speaker 1: compelled to respond, um, And I uh, I think it

662
00:42:59,520 --> 00:43:01,480
Speaker 1: was her role what they what in terms of what

663
00:43:01,520 --> 00:43:04,200
Speaker 1: they did and the fact that they for sure they

664
00:43:04,200 --> 00:43:07,520
Speaker 1: saved lives. Unfortunately they were there's no way they were

665
00:43:07,520 --> 00:43:09,480
Speaker 1: going to be able to prevent the death of the

666
00:43:09,520 --> 00:43:14,640
Speaker 1: ambassador just timing wise. Looking at the timeline okay UM

667
00:43:14,719 --> 00:43:17,239
Speaker 1: where I may differ a little bit because I have

668
00:43:17,360 --> 00:43:21,640
Speaker 1: the perspective of not only being an operator, not only

669
00:43:21,680 --> 00:43:27,120
Speaker 1: being a team leader, but also managing UM taketive operations

670
00:43:27,280 --> 00:43:29,760
Speaker 1: in the war zones in a variety of different places

671
00:43:29,760 --> 00:43:34,879
Speaker 1: where they worked for me the whole everybody, every pock

672
00:43:35,000 --> 00:43:38,600
Speaker 1: person in Iraq worked for me when I was there,

673
00:43:39,480 --> 00:43:43,319
Speaker 1: When I was in Southeast Asia or South Asia, they

674
00:43:43,320 --> 00:43:48,800
Speaker 1: worked for me. So there's a decision making process UM.

675
00:43:48,840 --> 00:43:51,120
Speaker 1: So I have to say, with a little bit of

676
00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:55,719
Speaker 1: a caveat that just jumping out and running to go

677
00:43:55,840 --> 00:44:00,960
Speaker 1: save those guys is a very dangerous procedure because if

678
00:44:00,960 --> 00:44:05,600
Speaker 1: you don't know what you're running into ah and you're

679
00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:10,200
Speaker 1: and you're also your responsibility is the annex. So if

680
00:44:10,200 --> 00:44:12,680
Speaker 1: you leave the annex unprotected and something happens in the

681
00:44:12,680 --> 00:44:18,399
Speaker 1: annex while you're gone, these are huge factors UM, which

682
00:44:18,440 --> 00:44:22,120
Speaker 1: is loaded with classified information and other things that shouldn't

683
00:44:22,120 --> 00:44:27,040
Speaker 1: fall into animil. It's your job, you're you're basically demanding

684
00:44:27,160 --> 00:44:30,440
Speaker 1: your job for another job that you're really not formally

685
00:44:30,800 --> 00:44:35,400
Speaker 1: engaged in. UM. The other part of it is what

686
00:44:35,520 --> 00:44:39,600
Speaker 1: a lot of people don't understand with foreign consulates and embassies.

687
00:44:39,800 --> 00:44:42,720
Speaker 1: It is the host government's responsibility to protect those sites,

688
00:44:42,960 --> 00:44:48,239
Speaker 1: not the US. Our security at embassies is miniscule. We

689
00:44:48,320 --> 00:44:54,279
Speaker 1: rely on So if the situation becomes so dire that

690
00:44:54,400 --> 00:44:58,120
Speaker 1: the local security cannot handle the threat, we need to

691
00:44:58,120 --> 00:44:59,960
Speaker 1: be out of there. So we should have been gone anyway.

692
00:45:00,640 --> 00:45:06,040
Speaker 1: But there is local security, and the base chief, according

693
00:45:06,080 --> 00:45:09,600
Speaker 1: to reports, was trying to get that local security elements

694
00:45:09,600 --> 00:45:11,799
Speaker 1: to come in. So, now if you think it's a

695
00:45:12,239 --> 00:45:17,640
Speaker 1: dark of night and you have multiple converging armed groups, yeah,

696
00:45:17,800 --> 00:45:22,200
Speaker 1: very dangerous. The chances there's no deconfliction capable because there's

697
00:45:22,239 --> 00:45:29,560
Speaker 1: no real communications. So it was a real scary situation. Um,

698
00:45:29,600 --> 00:45:32,799
Speaker 1: and it turned out, you know, it was heroically and

699
00:45:33,080 --> 00:45:35,920
Speaker 1: um and you know, we saved they saved lives, and

700
00:45:36,440 --> 00:45:40,680
Speaker 1: but I can understand why the chief of base was

701
00:45:40,800 --> 00:45:44,240
Speaker 1: hesitant to jump into that situation without all the facts

702
00:45:44,320 --> 00:45:48,440
Speaker 1: that he could possibly muster. So yeah, no, that's a

703
00:45:48,560 --> 00:45:52,000
Speaker 1: that's an interesting perspective, especially because if you watch the

704
00:45:52,040 --> 00:45:54,239
Speaker 1: film that was made of it, you know, he's the

705
00:45:54,480 --> 00:45:56,400
Speaker 1: chief of base is really portrayed. Is it just a

706
00:45:56,480 --> 00:46:03,399
Speaker 1: huge asshole? Yeah, yeah, I think that. Well, I'll tell

707
00:46:03,400 --> 00:46:06,719
Speaker 1: you now that I'm in the literary game. Um. The

708
00:46:06,760 --> 00:46:12,360
Speaker 1: publishers and even some of the writers they want more drama, yes,

709
00:46:13,040 --> 00:46:15,480
Speaker 1: and they wanted me to to to spice things up.

710
00:46:15,480 --> 00:46:17,920
Speaker 1: And I'm like, no, this is my book is not

711
00:46:18,000 --> 00:46:24,959
Speaker 1: a tell all. It's uh, it's it's about um contributions

712
00:46:25,000 --> 00:46:30,240
Speaker 1: that have been made by a group. Um and UM.

713
00:46:30,280 --> 00:46:34,000
Speaker 1: There's no matter what bureaucracy work for you as always

714
00:46:34,000 --> 00:46:37,760
Speaker 1: things you can complain about. And I decided to focus

715
00:46:37,760 --> 00:46:39,440
Speaker 1: on the positives. I mean, I could tell you a

716
00:46:39,480 --> 00:46:44,080
Speaker 1: bunch of horror stories that's not Thomas. Before we were recording,

717
00:46:44,120 --> 00:46:46,759
Speaker 1: you said to me, you know, I never set out

718
00:46:46,800 --> 00:46:49,600
Speaker 1: to write a book, and you know it's a long career.

719
00:46:49,760 --> 00:46:52,480
Speaker 1: Obviously there's a ton of stuff you could write about.

720
00:46:52,880 --> 00:46:56,600
Speaker 1: What what was was there one like points or one

721
00:46:56,680 --> 00:46:58,520
Speaker 1: catalyst that made you say, you know what, I'm gonna

722
00:46:58,560 --> 00:47:02,080
Speaker 1: do this. I'm gonna write this book. Actually, as a

723
00:47:02,160 --> 00:47:06,160
Speaker 1: as an excellent question, Um, the Thirteen Hours book and

724
00:47:06,239 --> 00:47:12,880
Speaker 1: movie made me realize that the contractors, the guys that

725
00:47:12,960 --> 00:47:16,680
Speaker 1: were in that situation, they actually believe that the that

726
00:47:16,840 --> 00:47:19,719
Speaker 1: the protective operations in the agency started at nine love it.

727
00:47:21,080 --> 00:47:23,239
Speaker 1: They have no idea. That's what I call this the preak.

728
00:47:23,600 --> 00:47:28,040
Speaker 1: This is the origin story I'll protective operations in the Agency.

729
00:47:28,200 --> 00:47:31,680
Speaker 1: My book is the prequel to the Thirteen Hours. And

730
00:47:31,760 --> 00:47:35,520
Speaker 1: they don't know it. And in fact, I was the

731
00:47:35,560 --> 00:47:40,120
Speaker 1: unofficial historian for the unit for for years because I'm

732
00:47:40,160 --> 00:47:45,640
Speaker 1: a pack rat, which is which was massive cold turkey

733
00:47:45,680 --> 00:47:48,200
Speaker 1: when I left the agency because I couldn't keep my files.

734
00:47:48,719 --> 00:47:51,640
Speaker 1: But uh, I mean I had cable traffic, I had

735
00:47:51,680 --> 00:47:56,560
Speaker 1: everything I could find on our origins because I'm a

736
00:47:56,560 --> 00:48:00,279
Speaker 1: big believer in the history and I was involved jump

737
00:48:00,360 --> 00:48:02,760
Speaker 1: in and out of the of the park over the years.

738
00:48:03,040 --> 00:48:05,000
Speaker 1: And some of these guys don't even know who I was,

739
00:48:05,400 --> 00:48:08,239
Speaker 1: and they say it was this old dude because at

740
00:48:08,280 --> 00:48:09,640
Speaker 1: one point I was one of the older guys in

741
00:48:09,680 --> 00:48:15,080
Speaker 1: the unit. Um and uh, they didn't know the history.

742
00:48:15,280 --> 00:48:19,040
Speaker 1: And it's too bad because it's it's a rich uh

743
00:48:19,719 --> 00:48:25,239
Speaker 1: very powerful yes, and and talk about successful. But if

744
00:48:25,239 --> 00:48:28,000
Speaker 1: you don't know that we've been operating since ninety since

745
00:48:28,080 --> 00:48:33,799
Speaker 1: not basically you're missing out on a whole lot of

746
00:48:33,800 --> 00:48:38,520
Speaker 1: of interesting stuff. So so that was the reason why

747
00:48:38,560 --> 00:48:41,200
Speaker 1: I actually wrote the book. What do you think about

748
00:48:42,120 --> 00:48:46,560
Speaker 1: where the agency security operations are at today? I mean,

749
00:48:46,640 --> 00:48:48,920
Speaker 1: do you think they've kind of veered in the wrong direction,

750
00:48:49,200 --> 00:48:53,560
Speaker 1: um and perhaps becoming too big, too fast. Um, are

751
00:48:53,560 --> 00:48:56,520
Speaker 1: they too visible? I'm just curious what your thoughts are

752
00:48:56,560 --> 00:49:01,000
Speaker 1: about that three letter acronym grew today and where they're

753
00:49:01,000 --> 00:49:02,600
Speaker 1: a I mean, I mean, I'm sure there's a lot

754
00:49:02,640 --> 00:49:04,560
Speaker 1: to be proud of, but are there also areas that

755
00:49:04,600 --> 00:49:09,680
Speaker 1: you think could be better? Yeah, I'll be honest with you,

756
00:49:10,000 --> 00:49:13,239
Speaker 1: and this is stuff that that you can see when

757
00:49:13,239 --> 00:49:18,120
Speaker 1: you get specialized units, they have a tendency to um

758
00:49:20,000 --> 00:49:23,440
Speaker 1: to get almost incestuous. And what I mean by that

759
00:49:23,560 --> 00:49:26,960
Speaker 1: is they want to control everything. And if you don't

760
00:49:27,000 --> 00:49:30,719
Speaker 1: have enough oversight, uh. And what I mean by that

761
00:49:30,880 --> 00:49:35,040
Speaker 1: is um enlightened oversight, experience oversight, not just somebody they

762
00:49:35,080 --> 00:49:37,880
Speaker 1: put in as a manager, but somebody who understands that

763
00:49:38,440 --> 00:49:44,399
Speaker 1: you get into trouble. Um. There's some legal proceedings going

764
00:49:44,440 --> 00:49:49,960
Speaker 1: on against a specific naval units right now, Okay, a

765
00:49:50,080 --> 00:49:53,719
Speaker 1: number of them, uh, that you could probably trace right

766
00:49:53,760 --> 00:49:59,319
Speaker 1: back to this this particular characteristic. UM. Would I think

767
00:49:59,360 --> 00:50:02,319
Speaker 1: there's some that there's a there's a risk with that

768
00:50:02,480 --> 00:50:07,279
Speaker 1: within my my old unit, if you don't have people

769
00:50:07,280 --> 00:50:10,840
Speaker 1: who are strong enough to resist the natural urge of

770
00:50:10,960 --> 00:50:15,160
Speaker 1: type A personalities in a type confined area of chemistry

771
00:50:15,280 --> 00:50:19,879
Speaker 1: is strong coming off the rails. Yeah. Um. The other

772
00:50:19,880 --> 00:50:21,959
Speaker 1: part of it is you you mentioned something earlier about

773
00:50:22,120 --> 00:50:26,919
Speaker 1: the old days the low profile. Um. That is an art,

774
00:50:28,000 --> 00:50:31,800
Speaker 1: but it's and a skill. So you've got to find people.

775
00:50:32,000 --> 00:50:34,920
Speaker 1: Not everybody that can do the high profile can be

776
00:50:34,960 --> 00:50:37,719
Speaker 1: that can do the low profile. Six ft six guys

777
00:50:37,800 --> 00:50:44,600
Speaker 1: just don't blend um. But that's a specific training, UM

778
00:50:44,800 --> 00:50:50,759
Speaker 1: activity that needs to be re reinvigorated because, um, the

779
00:50:51,239 --> 00:50:53,239
Speaker 1: areas there is in the world where you cannot go

780
00:50:53,960 --> 00:50:59,960
Speaker 1: um you know, fifteen magazines m for you know, ballistic

781
00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:01,400
Speaker 1: best all that you just can't do it in that

782
00:51:01,480 --> 00:51:05,360
Speaker 1: and operating the environment. So and we need people protection

783
00:51:05,440 --> 00:51:07,960
Speaker 1: for our case officers in areas where it's not the

784
00:51:08,000 --> 00:51:10,960
Speaker 1: war zone, and we don't want to be relegated to

785
00:51:11,120 --> 00:51:15,000
Speaker 1: only the war zone. The last thing I'm personally wondering

786
00:51:15,080 --> 00:51:17,759
Speaker 1: unless Jack has anything else, and then I really appreciate

787
00:51:17,760 --> 00:51:20,200
Speaker 1: you going the full hour with us. Um. You know,

788
00:51:20,360 --> 00:51:22,839
Speaker 1: as I said earlier, del Comstock was how we were

789
00:51:22,920 --> 00:51:26,839
Speaker 1: referred to. UH with you, what's your relation with Dale

790
00:51:26,840 --> 00:51:28,759
Speaker 1: because he's a great guy. We've known for a long time.

791
00:51:28,880 --> 00:51:31,040
Speaker 1: Jack's known for a certainly a long time, and I've

792
00:51:31,080 --> 00:51:34,200
Speaker 1: probably known for about five years at this point. It's

793
00:51:34,239 --> 00:51:36,920
Speaker 1: a really strange little world we live in, those of

794
00:51:37,000 --> 00:51:39,160
Speaker 1: us who have kind of worked in these areas. I

795
00:51:39,280 --> 00:51:43,840
Speaker 1: know a friend of his, I've known him for many years. UM.

796
00:51:44,120 --> 00:51:49,080
Speaker 1: His name is a Roue, Well, that's his nickname, and

797
00:51:49,120 --> 00:51:51,600
Speaker 1: he's UM. He's one of the I think it was

798
00:51:51,600 --> 00:51:55,759
Speaker 1: the first command Sergeant Major Delta, and he is good

799
00:51:55,760 --> 00:52:00,120
Speaker 1: friends with Dale. And so I met that. I was

800
00:52:00,120 --> 00:52:03,319
Speaker 1: having coffee with Ru in the Philippines and I met

801
00:52:03,400 --> 00:52:07,439
Speaker 1: Dale just this year. So and then we started talking

802
00:52:07,480 --> 00:52:10,040
Speaker 1: to found out that Dale was in logan issue at

803
00:52:10,040 --> 00:52:12,040
Speaker 1: the same time. I was, yeah, he he must have

804
00:52:12,080 --> 00:52:14,560
Speaker 1: been on the same like plane, even as with George

805
00:52:14,600 --> 00:52:17,439
Speaker 1: Hand because I believe it was a squadron that came

806
00:52:17,520 --> 00:52:20,359
Speaker 1: in after the Battle of the Black Sea UM as

807
00:52:20,400 --> 00:52:23,760
Speaker 1: reinforcements like my my company. I was in third Ranger

808
00:52:23,760 --> 00:52:28,480
Speaker 1: Battalion UM way after the event, but Bravo Company three

809
00:52:28,560 --> 00:52:31,480
Speaker 1: seven five got into that firefight in Manga diissue and

810
00:52:31,480 --> 00:52:34,920
Speaker 1: then my company Alpha Company came in afterwards UM to

811
00:52:34,920 --> 00:52:37,960
Speaker 1: to reinforce and help out UM but they didn't I

812
00:52:38,000 --> 00:52:43,600
Speaker 1: don't think they saw any action. Mhm. But yeah, that's Um,

813
00:52:43,640 --> 00:52:46,040
Speaker 1: thanks so much for doing this today. I mean, this

814
00:52:46,080 --> 00:52:49,319
Speaker 1: has been like a super enlightening interview for me, um

815
00:52:49,360 --> 00:52:51,160
Speaker 1: because like you said, I think a lot of us

816
00:52:51,160 --> 00:52:54,960
Speaker 1: have heard um, either through the grape vine, through our

817
00:52:55,000 --> 00:52:57,719
Speaker 1: friends and so forth, or from the wider public is

818
00:52:57,760 --> 00:53:00,400
Speaker 1: aware of thirteen Hours and all of that, of course,

819
00:53:00,640 --> 00:53:04,000
Speaker 1: but like you said, I mean, there's not much knowledge

820
00:53:04,000 --> 00:53:07,720
Speaker 1: about what this organization really is, or where it came from,

821
00:53:07,920 --> 00:53:10,960
Speaker 1: or all these these colorful incidents that they've been involved

822
00:53:10,960 --> 00:53:14,200
Speaker 1: in over the decades. So you've sold me. I'm super

823
00:53:14,239 --> 00:53:19,520
Speaker 1: stoked to read this book. Now you guys having me. Yeah,

824
00:53:19,600 --> 00:53:22,399
Speaker 1: So the final uh you know, plug for the book here,

825
00:53:22,400 --> 00:53:23,759
Speaker 1: I'm sure a lot of you guys are gonna want

826
00:53:23,760 --> 00:53:26,960
Speaker 1: to pick it up. Guardian Life in the Crosshairs of

827
00:53:26,960 --> 00:53:30,080
Speaker 1: the CIA's War on Terror. It is a little bit

828
00:53:30,160 --> 00:53:32,120
Speaker 1: until it comes out. It comes out May seven, but

829
00:53:32,200 --> 00:53:34,959
Speaker 1: it is up for pre order on Amazon dot com.

830
00:53:35,000 --> 00:53:37,839
Speaker 1: And as uh, I know you've probably said in here,

831
00:53:37,840 --> 00:53:40,520
Speaker 1: I know Brandon said many times that you know pre

832
00:53:40,680 --> 00:53:44,600
Speaker 1: orders really matter, So you know, pre order it and

833
00:53:44,880 --> 00:53:47,640
Speaker 1: May seventh, you know it'll it'll approach sooner than you think.

834
00:53:47,719 --> 00:53:50,320
Speaker 1: And I think that this is gonna open up, uh

835
00:53:50,520 --> 00:53:53,080
Speaker 1: some light into a lot of stuff that people don't

836
00:53:53,120 --> 00:53:55,400
Speaker 1: know about. As you said, Um, you know, and I

837
00:53:55,480 --> 00:53:58,040
Speaker 1: think especially anyone who's read Thirteen Hours is gonna want

838
00:53:58,040 --> 00:54:00,839
Speaker 1: to read this book now. Absolutely. It's a it's it's

839
00:54:00,840 --> 00:54:03,480
Speaker 1: a good origin story and I'm good. I'm doing the

840
00:54:03,520 --> 00:54:06,600
Speaker 1: sneak peeks into the book every two weeks on the

841
00:54:06,640 --> 00:54:13,759
Speaker 1: Guardian Facebook page and on LinkedIn. Where can people find that?

842
00:54:13,760 --> 00:54:16,600
Speaker 1: If people want to check that on LinkedIn, just go

843
00:54:16,680 --> 00:54:21,920
Speaker 1: to my my LinkedIn page under Thomas Pecora and Guardian

844
00:54:22,239 --> 00:54:26,360
Speaker 1: is if you just put Guardian on Facebook, Um, it

845
00:54:26,400 --> 00:54:31,040
Speaker 1: should come up. It's a separate web page. And uh

846
00:54:31,080 --> 00:54:34,200
Speaker 1: the book is also out on Barnes and Noble. Cool.

847
00:54:34,320 --> 00:54:36,960
Speaker 1: So I'm down. Well, we'll have you back on as

848
00:54:36,960 --> 00:54:39,520
Speaker 1: we get closer to the release date. Um, if that

849
00:54:39,600 --> 00:54:41,480
Speaker 1: works for you, and we can go and we'll go

850
00:54:41,520 --> 00:54:43,239
Speaker 1: in a little bit more in depth with it. Yeah,

851
00:54:43,280 --> 00:54:45,200
Speaker 1: maybe you can read the book and then and then

852
00:54:45,239 --> 00:54:47,839
Speaker 1: do a part two. Yes, that'd be awesome and it's

853
00:54:47,840 --> 00:54:50,080
Speaker 1: a well way, so we'll do it for sure. Um.

854
00:54:50,160 --> 00:54:53,080
Speaker 1: So I'm gonna wrap up this show with Jack Thomas,

855
00:54:53,080 --> 00:54:54,440
Speaker 1: but I was gonna tell you I'll have this up

856
00:54:54,480 --> 00:54:57,600
Speaker 1: tomorrow night. It's a really packed schedule this week with

857
00:54:57,680 --> 00:55:00,000
Speaker 1: Hurricane Group, as we have all these meetings and stuff,

858
00:55:00,080 --> 00:55:01,920
Speaker 1: so I would normally get it up a little earlier,

859
00:55:01,960 --> 00:55:03,600
Speaker 1: so you don't see it up tomorrow during the day.

860
00:55:03,840 --> 00:55:06,200
Speaker 1: We'll be up tomorrow night. I'll send it over to you.

861
00:55:06,520 --> 00:55:09,040
Speaker 1: And this was excellent, man, I really once a gonna

862
00:55:09,040 --> 00:55:13,040
Speaker 1: appreciate you going the full hour with us. Oh my pleasure. Yeah,

863
00:55:13,040 --> 00:55:19,160
Speaker 1: thank you here, guys, awesome, thanks Thomas. By right, that

864
00:55:19,239 --> 00:55:22,360
Speaker 1: was awesome, man, I mean I knew that was going

865
00:55:22,400 --> 00:55:26,000
Speaker 1: to be interesting. Yeah. And and when Dale shot you know,

866
00:55:26,040 --> 00:55:28,200
Speaker 1: the name of Hover, we were like, that's that's a

867
00:55:28,200 --> 00:55:31,680
Speaker 1: good one. And we saw his background, so that's gonna

868
00:55:31,719 --> 00:55:34,320
Speaker 1: be a great book. Pick it up. May seventh, Guardian

869
00:55:34,520 --> 00:55:38,240
Speaker 1: Life in the cross Hairs of the CIA's War on Terror. Um,

870
00:55:38,280 --> 00:55:40,600
Speaker 1: before we get into a bunch of stuff which I'd

871
00:55:40,600 --> 00:55:43,440
Speaker 1: like to be sure to check out, Create Club, the

872
00:55:43,520 --> 00:55:47,719
Speaker 1: long anticipated collaboration watch we did with NFW Watches. That's

873
00:55:47,719 --> 00:55:50,640
Speaker 1: in the way. This's premium create Uh. To my left,

874
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Speaker 1: I am looking at just a plethora of boxes here

875
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Speaker 1: of all different new Create Club stuff and it's a

876
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Speaker 1: lot of custom gear, really cool stuff between the web

877
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Speaker 1: uponized pen that we have and the sunglass cases and uh,

878
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Speaker 1: I see the spear fishing tool. All different types are

879
00:56:07,920 --> 00:56:10,480
Speaker 1: really cool ships. So Scott Wittner from the load out

880
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Speaker 1: room and all those guys, uh and Brand and of

881
00:56:13,000 --> 00:56:17,719
Speaker 1: course are currently working on bringing you custom products like

882
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Speaker 1: that in um everything I mentioned really and a lot

883
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Speaker 1: of new stuff that I wasn't aware of that's on

884
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Speaker 1: the horizon. It's a club fore men buy men and

885
00:56:28,200 --> 00:56:31,200
Speaker 1: you can check that all out at Create Club dot us.

886
00:56:31,239 --> 00:56:34,920
Speaker 1: That's Create Club dot us. Hey, if you're a dog owner,

887
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Speaker 1: many of you now know that we have a partnership

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Speaker 1: with Kuna. Kuna has a team of trained canine handlers

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Speaker 1: picking out a box sery dog each month of healthy

890
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Speaker 1: treats and training aids. It's custom built through your dogs

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Speaker 1: size and age as well. The products are US sourced,

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893
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Speaker 1: we're talking to pitbull or chihuahua, anytime up a dog,

895
00:57:00,760 --> 00:57:03,319
Speaker 1: they're gonna have something that they're gonna love and you're

896
00:57:03,320 --> 00:57:05,000
Speaker 1: gonna love so you can see all of that at

897
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Speaker 1: kuned dot dog. That's cuned dot dog. It's efficient for you.

898
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Speaker 1: Your dog is gonna love it as well as I said,

899
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Speaker 1: and check that all out CEU n A dot d

900
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Speaker 1: o G. And last, I wanted to mention the spec

901
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Speaker 1: Ops Channel. That's our channel that offers the most exclusive shows, interviews,

902
00:57:22,400 --> 00:57:27,000
Speaker 1: documentaries covering the most exciting military content today. Also, all

903
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Speaker 1: those episodes we did of training sell that's all available.

904
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Speaker 1: So if you're into that action packed stuff like shooting

905
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Speaker 1: school's defensive driving jungle and winter warfare, climbing and all

906
00:57:38,840 --> 00:57:40,920
Speaker 1: sorts of cool stuff, you can check that out at

907
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Speaker 1: spec ops channel dot com. That's spec Ops channel dot com.

908
00:57:45,600 --> 00:57:47,200
Speaker 1: And I don't know what you're waiting for, because you

909
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Speaker 1: can get all of that great content for only four

910
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Speaker 1: a month. Check out our app, Software Radio, because I

911
00:57:53,320 --> 00:57:56,040
Speaker 1: still have people tweeting me that are like, where are

912
00:57:56,040 --> 00:57:58,959
Speaker 1: the new episodes? Because they're using the old software ap app,

913
00:57:59,200 --> 00:58:01,600
Speaker 1: which is kind of slete at this point. So use

914
00:58:01,680 --> 00:58:03,920
Speaker 1: the software up radio app. Just like news Rap has

915
00:58:03,920 --> 00:58:06,439
Speaker 1: its own app, now, software radio has its own app.

916
00:58:06,520 --> 00:58:09,760
Speaker 1: Everything kind of has its own thing. Um with that,

917
00:58:10,240 --> 00:58:13,880
Speaker 1: I was extremely excited as Nick Coughmen pointed out last

918
00:58:13,960 --> 00:58:16,800
Speaker 1: night to see that Alex Hollongs did this great article

919
00:58:16,920 --> 00:58:20,680
Speaker 1: about Russia's space program and some of the weird stuff

920
00:58:20,720 --> 00:58:23,600
Speaker 1: going on, and that is up on Drudge Report. And

921
00:58:23,640 --> 00:58:25,760
Speaker 1: there's probably only been a handful of times that a

922
00:58:25,800 --> 00:58:29,360
Speaker 1: news rapper softwrep article has been on Drudge Report. I

923
00:58:29,400 --> 00:58:32,160
Speaker 1: remember your article on the disappearance of bin Lad's body

924
00:58:32,200 --> 00:58:34,320
Speaker 1: and the reasons behind it that was on Drudge Report.

925
00:58:34,680 --> 00:58:37,160
Speaker 1: This is probably the first time I've seen an article

926
00:58:37,240 --> 00:58:40,160
Speaker 1: from our guys on Drudge Report in years, and it's

927
00:58:40,560 --> 00:58:43,800
Speaker 1: it's a big deal, millions of hits daily. Yeah, it's

928
00:58:43,880 --> 00:58:45,959
Speaker 1: nice of Drudge to, you know, link to us. Most

929
00:58:45,960 --> 00:58:48,640
Speaker 1: outlets just kind of like steal the stuff we published

930
00:58:48,680 --> 00:58:50,560
Speaker 1: and write it as their own and then say we

931
00:58:50,640 --> 00:58:53,000
Speaker 1: came up with this all on our own, and like, well,

932
00:58:53,160 --> 00:58:56,720
Speaker 1: I mean Drudge Drudge is really like an aggregate, but

933
00:58:57,080 --> 00:58:59,800
Speaker 1: that's that's what it is. Yeah, and they knew that

934
00:58:59,840 --> 00:59:04,320
Speaker 1: it was our story, so you know, yeah, it's cool. Yeah,

935
00:59:04,360 --> 00:59:08,640
Speaker 1: I'm excited for Alex. So check out that article. Um

936
00:59:08,680 --> 00:59:12,040
Speaker 1: I saw this piece of news today which is uh

937
00:59:12,480 --> 00:59:16,520
Speaker 1: really disappointing. Um a ji wad veteran which I believe

938
00:59:16,680 --> 00:59:19,400
Speaker 1: Duncan Hunter Jr. You guys might remember in the Republican

939
00:59:19,440 --> 00:59:24,360
Speaker 1: primary in two thousand eight, Duncan Hunter's father, Duncan Hunter Senior,

940
00:59:24,800 --> 00:59:27,240
Speaker 1: ran for President UM. He got knocked out in the

941
00:59:27,280 --> 00:59:30,480
Speaker 1: Republican primary pretty early on. But while he was campaigning,

942
00:59:30,800 --> 00:59:34,120
Speaker 1: his son was in I Raq, And I believe Afghanistan

943
00:59:34,240 --> 00:59:37,880
Speaker 1: as a Marine Corps um fighter, you know, now veteran.

944
00:59:38,560 --> 00:59:42,800
Speaker 1: And it turns out and I was reading, you know,

945
00:59:42,920 --> 00:59:44,640
Speaker 1: I might be wrong in this said after double check,

946
00:59:44,680 --> 00:59:47,560
Speaker 1: I think he might have been the first uh GIE

947
00:59:47,600 --> 00:59:51,200
Speaker 1: WAD veteran to serve in Congress. But he is now

948
00:59:51,600 --> 00:59:55,680
Speaker 1: facing charges in September over misusing two d fifty thou

949
00:59:55,880 --> 00:59:59,120
Speaker 1: dollars in campaign funds. So more than anything, I think

950
00:59:59,120 --> 01:00:01,480
Speaker 1: a giant disp appointment. You know, Jack and I were

951
01:00:01,480 --> 01:00:07,560
Speaker 1: talking prior about how it's exciting to see uh veterans

952
01:00:07,560 --> 01:00:11,040
Speaker 1: of this era elected to Congress, and it sucks when

953
01:00:11,080 --> 01:00:13,680
Speaker 1: you see an article like this because it it paints

954
01:00:13,720 --> 01:00:16,000
Speaker 1: them all in a bad light, which it shouldn't. You know,

955
01:00:16,080 --> 01:00:20,240
Speaker 1: this is no reflection on a guy like Dan Crunshaw

956
01:00:20,320 --> 01:00:23,480
Speaker 1: for example. You know, yeah, well, I mean I think

957
01:00:23,520 --> 01:00:25,160
Speaker 1: you what you were pointing out Ian is like you

958
01:00:25,160 --> 01:00:27,560
Speaker 1: have to look at the person. Like just because a

959
01:00:27,600 --> 01:00:32,480
Speaker 1: person is a veteran, it's like big whoop. Okay, I

960
01:00:32,480 --> 01:00:34,920
Speaker 1: mean cool, that's cool, But like what else, Like what

961
01:00:34,960 --> 01:00:38,680
Speaker 1: else have you been doing? What kind of person are you? Um?

962
01:00:38,800 --> 01:00:40,880
Speaker 1: You know, just because you served in the military doesn't

963
01:00:40,880 --> 01:00:43,960
Speaker 1: mean you're a great guy. Um. You know, we have

964
01:00:44,600 --> 01:00:46,720
Speaker 1: a place called Leavenworth where there are a bunch of

965
01:00:46,720 --> 01:00:49,160
Speaker 1: people who served in the military, and they're not great guys.

966
01:00:50,920 --> 01:00:53,800
Speaker 1: You have to pay attention to this, and and and

967
01:00:53,800 --> 01:00:56,560
Speaker 1: and I guess saw a point many of them because

968
01:00:56,600 --> 01:00:58,560
Speaker 1: I mean some of them are kind of victims of

969
01:00:58,640 --> 01:01:03,560
Speaker 1: these really ridiculous um what's the word I'm looking for?

970
01:01:03,680 --> 01:01:09,560
Speaker 1: Um uh, engagement? What I'm having a break forward here?

971
01:01:09,720 --> 01:01:12,320
Speaker 1: Rules of engagement? Rules of engagement, you know a few

972
01:01:12,400 --> 01:01:14,240
Speaker 1: of them. I don't know how many people are sitting

973
01:01:14,240 --> 01:01:17,200
Speaker 1: in Leavenworth because of rules of engagement. I mean, I

974
01:01:17,280 --> 01:01:19,960
Speaker 1: just think of it's really difficult to prosecute. I think

975
01:01:20,000 --> 01:01:22,520
Speaker 1: of Michael Behannah, you know, and and those type of things.

976
01:01:22,520 --> 01:01:24,520
Speaker 1: I'm sure he's not the only one who had And

977
01:01:24,880 --> 01:01:28,360
Speaker 1: there's there's that SF guy who when he was on

978
01:01:28,400 --> 01:01:30,480
Speaker 1: the polygraph for a job for the c I A

979
01:01:31,120 --> 01:01:35,160
Speaker 1: he uh confessed alleged. I mean, as we're as it's

980
01:01:35,160 --> 01:01:37,280
Speaker 1: been reported the news, he was on the polygraph he said,

981
01:01:37,320 --> 01:01:40,720
Speaker 1: oh yeah, actually I did murder this Afghan alleged bombmaker,

982
01:01:41,440 --> 01:01:44,680
Speaker 1: and uh, there there's a big ship show. The CIA

983
01:01:44,840 --> 01:01:47,480
Speaker 1: had to report it and say this guy confessed a

984
01:01:47,560 --> 01:01:50,840
Speaker 1: murder on a polygraph and um, and then the issue

985
01:01:50,880 --> 01:01:53,800
Speaker 1: kind of dropped and then the dude uh in question

986
01:01:53,920 --> 01:01:56,320
Speaker 1: he brought the whole thing up on during like a

987
01:01:56,400 --> 01:02:00,400
Speaker 1: CNN interview like a few years later, and then it's

988
01:02:00,440 --> 01:02:04,200
Speaker 1: like the army decide they wanted to start prosecuting um.

989
01:02:04,240 --> 01:02:06,160
Speaker 1: And I think that ship show is still going on

990
01:02:06,200 --> 01:02:08,960
Speaker 1: to this day. But I don't know. I mean, I

991
01:02:09,240 --> 01:02:12,520
Speaker 1: I can go on a whole rant about polygraphs, Um, like,

992
01:02:12,600 --> 01:02:15,480
Speaker 1: how dumb is this guy that he it's not a

993
01:02:15,600 --> 01:02:19,080
Speaker 1: polygraph and he's like the silly machine the pseudo science

994
01:02:19,080 --> 01:02:21,160
Speaker 1: can actually tell if I'm telling the truth or not.

995
01:02:21,480 --> 01:02:23,680
Speaker 1: And he confess to a murder on it, Like, dude,

996
01:02:23,720 --> 01:02:25,800
Speaker 1: if that's yeah, I mean, there's a reason it's not

997
01:02:25,840 --> 01:02:31,000
Speaker 1: admissible in court. Oh my god. But then again, there's

998
01:02:31,040 --> 01:02:33,760
Speaker 1: been people who have admitted to stuff that they that

999
01:02:33,840 --> 01:02:36,840
Speaker 1: they didn't do due to like long interrogations. There's been

1000
01:02:36,920 --> 01:02:41,800
Speaker 1: you know, it's not related to that. Well, UM, well,

1001
01:02:41,920 --> 01:02:44,320
Speaker 1: the with the polygraph, the whole point of it is

1002
01:02:44,360 --> 01:02:47,720
Speaker 1: everyone knows it's it's it's junk science. But they bring

1003
01:02:47,800 --> 01:02:50,120
Speaker 1: people in there just for that reason because it rattles

1004
01:02:50,120 --> 01:02:52,480
Speaker 1: people and it makes them nervous and they'll start confessing

1005
01:02:52,520 --> 01:02:55,520
Speaker 1: this stuff. Um. It's not that it works, is that

1006
01:02:55,560 --> 01:02:58,480
Speaker 1: you think it works. UM. And then uh, well with

1007
01:02:58,600 --> 01:03:00,960
Speaker 1: the interrogation thing that I mean, I think a lot

1008
01:03:00,960 --> 01:03:05,400
Speaker 1: of that was highlighted by UM that making a Murderer

1009
01:03:05,720 --> 01:03:10,200
Speaker 1: documentary on Netflix. UM, and they talked specifically about the

1010
01:03:10,200 --> 01:03:13,040
Speaker 1: read interrogation method. And I was trained in the read

1011
01:03:13,080 --> 01:03:16,960
Speaker 1: interrogation method myself, as was UM a whole generation of

1012
01:03:17,000 --> 01:03:22,120
Speaker 1: Special Forces soldiers UM, and the the read interrogation method. UM.

1013
01:03:22,240 --> 01:03:25,640
Speaker 1: What it teaches you is, UM, don't get it, don't

1014
01:03:25,640 --> 01:03:27,920
Speaker 1: get in the suspect's face. You don't threaten them with

1015
01:03:27,960 --> 01:03:30,640
Speaker 1: the death penalty. You know, confess to me or else.

1016
01:03:30,920 --> 01:03:32,400
Speaker 1: What it teaches you to do is to try to

1017
01:03:32,480 --> 01:03:36,040
Speaker 1: empathize with the person and build a theme. And so

1018
01:03:36,080 --> 01:03:38,080
Speaker 1: what you do is you empathize with them, make them

1019
01:03:38,280 --> 01:03:40,520
Speaker 1: think that you're a nice person, that you're a good person,

1020
01:03:41,080 --> 01:03:44,480
Speaker 1: and then you provide them with an out, so it's

1021
01:03:44,520 --> 01:03:48,720
Speaker 1: like a moral out. So you say, um, listen, you're

1022
01:03:48,720 --> 01:03:51,640
Speaker 1: a good guy, you're a good person. Ian. Um, you

1023
01:03:51,680 --> 01:03:54,400
Speaker 1: know you just did something out of character. You were

1024
01:03:54,480 --> 01:03:57,720
Speaker 1: in a room with a little boy, no one was looking.

1025
01:03:58,120 --> 01:04:00,800
Speaker 1: You never would have done anything like please don't take

1026
01:04:00,840 --> 01:04:05,760
Speaker 1: this audio out of but you will build a theme

1027
01:04:05,840 --> 01:04:09,680
Speaker 1: like that, um, and keep rating the person and pushing

1028
01:04:09,720 --> 01:04:12,439
Speaker 1: them in that direction until they'll they'll just like you'll

1029
01:04:12,480 --> 01:04:15,720
Speaker 1: even see read interrogation videos where the person being interrogated

1030
01:04:15,800 --> 01:04:20,320
Speaker 1: eventually they start nodding like yep, yep, stuff that went

1031
01:04:20,360 --> 01:04:23,960
Speaker 1: down and the making of a murderer documentary. The problem

1032
01:04:24,040 --> 01:04:28,120
Speaker 1: is they were interrogating a kid, I believe. Yeah, he

1033
01:04:28,200 --> 01:04:29,760
Speaker 1: was still a minor at the time. He was like

1034
01:04:29,840 --> 01:04:33,960
Speaker 1: seventeen and um, let's be real, low low i Q

1035
01:04:34,640 --> 01:04:39,760
Speaker 1: not not a very smart intellectual person. Um. And the

1036
01:04:39,880 --> 01:04:43,200
Speaker 1: read interrogation people, they'll tell you we have never gotten

1037
01:04:43,280 --> 01:04:47,920
Speaker 1: a false confession. There has never been a false confession.

1038
01:04:48,480 --> 01:04:54,320
Speaker 1: I mean, come on, it's fucking bullshit. Everyone knows it's bullshit. Um.

1039
01:04:54,360 --> 01:04:56,520
Speaker 1: So yeah, I mean, some of these things that. I mean,

1040
01:04:56,560 --> 01:05:00,200
Speaker 1: this is like a whole separate discussion, um, then what

1041
01:05:00,240 --> 01:05:03,480
Speaker 1: we originally started talking about. But but it's it is

1042
01:05:03,520 --> 01:05:06,640
Speaker 1: an interesting topic. And I think some of the things

1043
01:05:06,640 --> 01:05:11,000
Speaker 1: that we take as accepted science, um, that we take

1044
01:05:11,120 --> 01:05:15,320
Speaker 1: as you know, um, factual, tested protocols that never yield

1045
01:05:15,360 --> 01:05:20,600
Speaker 1: false results. Um, can you know, use a second look

1046
01:05:20,840 --> 01:05:24,480
Speaker 1: in many cases. It was also General Maddie who said, um,

1047
01:05:24,800 --> 01:05:27,200
Speaker 1: when he was asked about water boarding prior to being

1048
01:05:27,200 --> 01:05:30,120
Speaker 1: a part of the administration. Uh, he said, and I

1049
01:05:30,120 --> 01:05:32,360
Speaker 1: don't remember the exact quote, but some of the effective

1050
01:05:32,360 --> 01:05:33,720
Speaker 1: I could do a lot more with a pack of

1051
01:05:33,720 --> 01:05:37,480
Speaker 1: cigarettes than water boarding someone if we have a terrorist. Yeah,

1052
01:05:37,520 --> 01:05:42,680
Speaker 1: that's true. Um. And uh, well, I mean some people

1053
01:05:42,720 --> 01:05:44,080
Speaker 1: are going to be kind of pissed about it. But

1054
01:05:44,200 --> 01:05:47,640
Speaker 1: I wrote about this in my book, um about the

1055
01:05:47,800 --> 01:05:52,120
Speaker 1: tension facility, And I mean they there, they used a

1056
01:05:52,200 --> 01:05:55,800
Speaker 1: carrot and stick approach. I mean, the the detainees would

1057
01:05:55,800 --> 01:05:59,000
Speaker 1: be offered the pack of cigarettes, um and just dime

1058
01:05:59,040 --> 01:06:01,240
Speaker 1: out your friends, will you go? You know that kind

1059
01:06:01,280 --> 01:06:03,920
Speaker 1: of thing. Um. The stick was you know, if you

1060
01:06:03,920 --> 01:06:05,440
Speaker 1: don't tell us what we want to know, we're not

1061
01:06:05,440 --> 01:06:08,560
Speaker 1: gonna let you sleep. You're gonna we're not gonna let

1062
01:06:08,560 --> 01:06:13,240
Speaker 1: you even sit down. You know, they do things like that. Um,

1063
01:06:13,240 --> 01:06:15,040
Speaker 1: but that that was the method that they were using

1064
01:06:15,280 --> 01:06:19,160
Speaker 1: at that time in Iraq. Yeah, and then the other

1065
01:06:19,280 --> 01:06:22,360
Speaker 1: stories we wanted to get into. There was a there's

1066
01:06:22,400 --> 01:06:25,360
Speaker 1: Brandon walking by if you're watching on YouTube. There was

1067
01:06:25,560 --> 01:06:29,320
Speaker 1: a admiral who had there was a suicide that even

1068
01:06:29,400 --> 01:06:33,000
Speaker 1: in bah Haraein pretty crazy story. Was the admiral of

1069
01:06:33,040 --> 01:06:37,240
Speaker 1: the fifth Fleet. Yeah, so this is um Scott Stearney.

1070
01:06:37,440 --> 01:06:40,440
Speaker 1: This one's from New York Post. A decorated US admiral

1071
01:06:40,560 --> 01:06:42,480
Speaker 1: was found dead over the weekend in the Middle East,

1072
01:06:42,760 --> 01:06:46,120
Speaker 1: the victim of an apparent suicide. According to a report,

1073
01:06:46,520 --> 01:06:49,720
Speaker 1: Vice Admiral Scott Steerney, commander of the Navy's fifth Fleet,

1074
01:06:49,800 --> 01:06:53,520
Speaker 1: was discovered inside his home in bah Haraein. Military officials

1075
01:06:53,520 --> 01:06:56,680
Speaker 1: said in a statement Saturday that no foul play was suspected,

1076
01:06:56,960 --> 01:06:59,520
Speaker 1: but they wouldn't confirm if Steerney took his own life

1077
01:06:59,720 --> 01:07:03,080
Speaker 1: see Yes News. However, quoted officials seeing his death was

1078
01:07:03,120 --> 01:07:08,680
Speaker 1: an apparent suicide, so really unfortunate story and suspicious circumstances

1079
01:07:08,720 --> 01:07:11,400
Speaker 1: on some level. Well, yeah, I mean I don't want

1080
01:07:11,400 --> 01:07:13,760
Speaker 1: to get like my tinfoil hat on and and I

1081
01:07:13,800 --> 01:07:15,880
Speaker 1: hate it when people do that, But I mean, I

1082
01:07:16,520 --> 01:07:20,800
Speaker 1: was just pointing out before that it's weird that the

1083
01:07:20,840 --> 01:07:25,520
Speaker 1: commander of the fifth Fleet in Bahrain apparently commits suicide

1084
01:07:26,000 --> 01:07:28,720
Speaker 1: the next day a carrier strike group is the point

1085
01:07:28,760 --> 01:07:32,840
Speaker 1: to the Persian Gulf. It's like, what the hell is

1086
01:07:32,880 --> 01:07:37,480
Speaker 1: going on right now? But um, yeah, it's it's a

1087
01:07:37,520 --> 01:07:43,000
Speaker 1: sad story, um for sure. And when you see even

1088
01:07:43,000 --> 01:07:47,320
Speaker 1: the senior leaders of our military are committing suicide, Like,

1089
01:07:47,440 --> 01:07:49,960
Speaker 1: at what point are we finally going to be like

1090
01:07:50,880 --> 01:07:54,440
Speaker 1: something's broken, Like ship's not working here? You know, I

1091
01:07:55,720 --> 01:07:57,760
Speaker 1: don't know. We've covered it so many times, and and

1092
01:07:57,760 --> 01:08:01,240
Speaker 1: and and other outlets have other new sources covered all

1093
01:08:01,240 --> 01:08:04,560
Speaker 1: the time about um, the suicides. What we're talking about before,

1094
01:08:04,600 --> 01:08:07,680
Speaker 1: about troops coming off the rails, things going hey wire.

1095
01:08:07,880 --> 01:08:10,840
Speaker 1: I mean there's a reason for that. Um, And maybe

1096
01:08:10,840 --> 01:08:13,439
Speaker 1: we need to start asking ourselves some hard questions. Yeah,

1097
01:08:13,640 --> 01:08:16,800
Speaker 1: we'll rest in peace. Uh. And then there's this other

1098
01:08:16,960 --> 01:08:20,600
Speaker 1: article here that's been covered by a few outlets. The

1099
01:08:20,680 --> 01:08:24,519
Speaker 1: West may be wrong about China's social credit system. Uh.

1100
01:08:24,560 --> 01:08:28,040
Speaker 1: This one is by Bing's song for the Washington Post. Well, yeah,

1101
01:08:28,120 --> 01:08:31,080
Speaker 1: it is it's by Bing Song, but if you notice

1102
01:08:31,400 --> 01:08:39,519
Speaker 1: the director, you have the in and then there's a

1103
01:08:39,560 --> 01:08:43,200
Speaker 1: little uh byeline here, a little or not a byline

1104
01:08:43,200 --> 01:08:45,599
Speaker 1: but in italics at the end of the article. This

1105
01:08:45,720 --> 01:08:48,840
Speaker 1: was produced by The World Post, a partnership of the

1106
01:08:48,880 --> 01:08:52,080
Speaker 1: Burgrun Institute in the Washington Post. So it looks like

1107
01:08:52,120 --> 01:08:55,360
Speaker 1: a normal op ed on the surface. But and what

1108
01:08:55,479 --> 01:08:59,120
Speaker 1: we'll just to get into this article real quick. What

1109
01:08:59,280 --> 01:09:02,760
Speaker 1: it's attempting to do is to try to soften the image,

1110
01:09:03,240 --> 01:09:08,360
Speaker 1: UM of the Western reporting on China's social credit system,

1111
01:09:09,040 --> 01:09:12,439
Speaker 1: which is something we've been reporting on for several years. UM.

1112
01:09:12,439 --> 01:09:15,000
Speaker 1: The story has really picked up, UM you know, some

1113
01:09:15,000 --> 01:09:19,160
Speaker 1: some mainstream coverage over about the last year. UM and China.

1114
01:09:19,439 --> 01:09:22,800
Speaker 1: What what it's essentially, What it gets at, and the

1115
01:09:22,840 --> 01:09:25,120
Speaker 1: author of this article even points it out, is that

1116
01:09:25,160 --> 01:09:27,760
Speaker 1: it's not really a social credit system. And I kind

1117
01:09:27,760 --> 01:09:30,280
Speaker 1: of agree with her here because what that does is

1118
01:09:30,280 --> 01:09:33,679
Speaker 1: it makes people think it's analogous to our credit card

1119
01:09:34,080 --> 01:09:37,759
Speaker 1: UH credit system, that you have credit UM finance credit

1120
01:09:37,960 --> 01:09:40,200
Speaker 1: UM and but that's not really what it's talking about.

1121
01:09:40,320 --> 01:09:42,760
Speaker 1: That maybe a part of it in China, that you

1122
01:09:42,840 --> 01:09:46,920
Speaker 1: have UM finance credit, but there's also judicial credit. There's

1123
01:09:47,000 --> 01:09:50,639
Speaker 1: also political credit. UM, these other different types of credit,

1124
01:09:50,680 --> 01:09:55,559
Speaker 1: and there are different systems that play into a whole UM.

1125
01:09:55,600 --> 01:09:57,920
Speaker 1: And what she points out is that you probably shouldn't

1126
01:09:57,960 --> 01:10:01,200
Speaker 1: use this term social cred at its system because it

1127
01:10:01,280 --> 01:10:04,559
Speaker 1: creates this this false image in our minds. UM. The

1128
01:10:04,640 --> 01:10:10,479
Speaker 1: more accurate trans translation would probably be a social trust system.

1129
01:10:10,520 --> 01:10:12,920
Speaker 1: Now that's nice, but I fail to see how this

1130
01:10:13,120 --> 01:10:17,759
Speaker 1: change in translation UM softens the blow of this super

1131
01:10:18,160 --> 01:10:23,880
Speaker 1: Orwellian panopticon state that the Chinese are establishing. UM. Even

1132
01:10:23,880 --> 01:10:27,280
Speaker 1: though it's a social trust system. The social trust is

1133
01:10:27,320 --> 01:10:30,479
Speaker 1: a it's a social trust score that is being assigned

1134
01:10:30,520 --> 01:10:34,040
Speaker 1: to you by the state UM and rewarding you based

1135
01:10:34,080 --> 01:10:38,040
Speaker 1: on your loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and UM

1136
01:10:38,240 --> 01:10:43,120
Speaker 1: the moor's established by that party. Uh. And she makes

1137
01:10:43,120 --> 01:10:48,480
Speaker 1: a whole number of excuses for what they're doing in here. UM.

1138
01:10:48,640 --> 01:10:52,400
Speaker 1: There's a lot of double think going on here in

1139
01:10:52,439 --> 01:10:55,320
Speaker 1: this article, basically trying to say, yes, this exists, but

1140
01:10:55,479 --> 01:10:58,000
Speaker 1: it's not that big of a deal and don't really

1141
01:10:58,000 --> 01:11:00,800
Speaker 1: worry about it. And you know, it gives a little

1142
01:11:00,880 --> 01:11:04,160
Speaker 1: like man splaining Like, well, in China, the Chinese people

1143
01:11:04,240 --> 01:11:06,679
Speaker 1: have a different view of their government and have different

1144
01:11:06,680 --> 01:11:10,040
Speaker 1: expectations of their government. What she's saying is that, you know,

1145
01:11:10,520 --> 01:11:13,240
Speaker 1: the Chinese don't get freedom, so, you know, shut the

1146
01:11:13,240 --> 01:11:16,639
Speaker 1: funk up. It is what it is. Uh. She goes

1147
01:11:16,680 --> 01:11:20,120
Speaker 1: in into one part about the Chinese belief that their

1148
01:11:20,160 --> 01:11:24,639
Speaker 1: government has a responsibility um to be a moral authority

1149
01:11:24,920 --> 01:11:28,760
Speaker 1: and to enforce moral morals on the public. It's like

1150
01:11:29,080 --> 01:11:31,799
Speaker 1: that on the surface, that doesn't make any sense, because

1151
01:11:31,960 --> 01:11:38,080
Speaker 1: every government in the world passes legislation and passes laws

1152
01:11:38,120 --> 01:11:42,519
Speaker 1: that are related to morality. Whether we we we catch

1153
01:11:42,600 --> 01:11:45,160
Speaker 1: it in those terms or not. Every state in the

1154
01:11:45,200 --> 01:11:50,759
Speaker 1: world passes these laws based on that culture's perception of morality. Um.

1155
01:11:50,800 --> 01:11:53,960
Speaker 1: You know, we we are laws against everything from um

1156
01:11:54,640 --> 01:11:58,920
Speaker 1: so called victimless crimes like prostitution, two laws against rape

1157
01:11:58,960 --> 01:12:03,200
Speaker 1: and murder. Those are all based on our conception of morality. Um,

1158
01:12:03,280 --> 01:12:07,839
Speaker 1: so that China does not have some monopoly on virtuous behavior.

1159
01:12:08,400 --> 01:12:10,200
Speaker 1: I don't know what the hell that's supposed to mean.

1160
01:12:10,880 --> 01:12:13,840
Speaker 1: But this gets more interesting. I mean, I knew this

1161
01:12:13,920 --> 01:12:16,280
Speaker 1: was fishy when I first read it, but then I

1162
01:12:16,320 --> 01:12:19,639
Speaker 1: saw this New York New York Times journalist his last

1163
01:12:19,680 --> 01:12:21,960
Speaker 1: name was Forsyth, did a little bit of a deep

1164
01:12:22,000 --> 01:12:24,559
Speaker 1: digging on it. And and I believe he speaks Chinese,

1165
01:12:24,760 --> 01:12:26,479
Speaker 1: so he was able to go more in depth on

1166
01:12:26,520 --> 01:12:29,599
Speaker 1: this than than I would be able to. UM. And

1167
01:12:30,400 --> 01:12:33,920
Speaker 1: when you find out so Bing Song as part of

1168
01:12:33,920 --> 01:12:40,240
Speaker 1: this burg ruined institute. Um, she is a Chinese national

1169
01:12:40,360 --> 01:12:44,360
Speaker 1: from the mainland. UH came to the West and on

1170
01:12:44,400 --> 01:12:47,720
Speaker 1: a merit based scholarship, which is exceedingly rare back in

1171
01:12:47,720 --> 01:12:53,400
Speaker 1: those days, went to Oxford, then went back to China. UM.

1172
01:12:53,600 --> 01:12:58,519
Speaker 1: She joined UM Goldman Sachs, became a manager for the

1173
01:12:58,960 --> 01:13:02,160
Speaker 1: Chinese division of Goldman Sachs. And she went from a

1174
01:13:02,200 --> 01:13:05,880
Speaker 1: new hire at Goldman to being a directing manager in

1175
01:13:05,920 --> 01:13:09,360
Speaker 1: two years. Yeah, that doesn't happen. Now, that doesn't happen

1176
01:13:09,400 --> 01:13:13,720
Speaker 1: by accident. UM, that's not normal. She's married to this

1177
01:13:13,800 --> 01:13:17,040
Speaker 1: dude who teaches at a at a university in Beijing,

1178
01:13:17,120 --> 01:13:20,920
Speaker 1: who's a Canadian. He's not Chinese, he's a Canadian national.

1179
01:13:21,600 --> 01:13:26,439
Speaker 1: UM teaches UH at this at this university in Beijing,

1180
01:13:26,880 --> 01:13:30,879
Speaker 1: where he basically offers up apologies for the Chinese Communist

1181
01:13:30,960 --> 01:13:34,479
Speaker 1: government and their authoritarian style. UM. He's written even like

1182
01:13:34,560 --> 01:13:37,000
Speaker 1: books and articles. He's like he's the darling of the

1183
01:13:37,000 --> 01:13:40,840
Speaker 1: Communist Party because he says, well, you know, they're they're

1184
01:13:40,840 --> 01:13:45,280
Speaker 1: a merit based dictatorship. They're a softer, nicer time type

1185
01:13:45,280 --> 01:13:49,320
Speaker 1: of dictatorship. You know, he's he's a typical kind of

1186
01:13:49,560 --> 01:13:52,840
Speaker 1: dude who's like, you know, I'm going to be a

1187
01:13:52,840 --> 01:13:55,439
Speaker 1: part of this elite class. And I think it's great

1188
01:13:55,479 --> 01:13:58,200
Speaker 1: that our classes in charge. Um, I think it's great

1189
01:13:58,240 --> 01:14:00,320
Speaker 1: that where the you know, he never actually as this,

1190
01:14:00,479 --> 01:14:02,160
Speaker 1: but of course, you know, you get the you get

1191
01:14:02,160 --> 01:14:05,519
Speaker 1: the sense that it's like, look, yes, the the jack

1192
01:14:05,560 --> 01:14:08,400
Speaker 1: boot is stomping on a human face forever, as George

1193
01:14:08,479 --> 01:14:11,360
Speaker 1: Orwell said, but hey, I'm wearing the jackboots, so you know,

1194
01:14:11,439 --> 01:14:14,120
Speaker 1: shut the funk up. Uh, And there's just all kind

1195
01:14:14,160 --> 01:14:16,639
Speaker 1: You go into the background of this couple, and I mean,

1196
01:14:16,720 --> 01:14:21,240
Speaker 1: it's just incredibly clear, and I can't prove, I couldn't

1197
01:14:21,320 --> 01:14:26,680
Speaker 1: prove to you factually that they are a informal or

1198
01:14:26,840 --> 01:14:31,559
Speaker 1: formal asset of the Chinese Communist Party. But if you

1199
01:14:31,560 --> 01:14:34,240
Speaker 1: start looking at them and their track record and who

1200
01:14:34,280 --> 01:14:37,679
Speaker 1: they are and try to connect the dots, what's going

1201
01:14:37,720 --> 01:14:40,120
Speaker 1: on becomes very clear. And I mean I'm not saying

1202
01:14:40,160 --> 01:14:43,960
Speaker 1: that they're like on the take and they're they're receiving. Um, well,

1203
01:14:44,000 --> 01:14:46,640
Speaker 1: maybe they are, but I'm not saying that it's a

1204
01:14:46,680 --> 01:14:49,160
Speaker 1: direct relationship, like hey, we'll pay you to write these

1205
01:14:49,160 --> 01:14:52,439
Speaker 1: bullshit op eds in the American press. But but there's

1206
01:14:52,479 --> 01:14:55,960
Speaker 1: definitely I mean he the husband teaches at at this

1207
01:14:56,080 --> 01:15:00,280
Speaker 1: Chinese university. The wife is you know, closely really aided,

1208
01:15:00,520 --> 01:15:04,920
Speaker 1: uh you know, involved in in Chinese American finance. Um,

1209
01:15:05,040 --> 01:15:08,040
Speaker 1: the quid the quid pro quo is unmistakable. I mean

1210
01:15:08,200 --> 01:15:10,680
Speaker 1: it's certainly there. And and for her to write this

1211
01:15:11,240 --> 01:15:14,000
Speaker 1: and not this close this information, I mean, she is

1212
01:15:14,040 --> 01:15:19,679
Speaker 1: far from being an unbiased source. Um. And so it's

1213
01:15:19,680 --> 01:15:21,840
Speaker 1: just andrut because most people will probably just see this

1214
01:15:21,880 --> 01:15:27,960
Speaker 1: and say, Washington Post pretty reputable. That's the ultimate irony,

1215
01:15:28,000 --> 01:15:31,080
Speaker 1: of course, is the Washington Post has their motto democracy

1216
01:15:31,200 --> 01:15:36,080
Speaker 1: dies in the darkness Jesus Christ, that sure does. Yeah,

1217
01:15:36,120 --> 01:15:38,320
Speaker 1: And you start looking at this thing, the Burger Rune

1218
01:15:38,720 --> 01:15:42,800
Speaker 1: Burger Run Institute, and I mean like their whole like

1219
01:15:43,120 --> 01:15:48,880
Speaker 1: reason for existence is basically like to to basically tell

1220
01:15:48,920 --> 01:15:53,200
Speaker 1: America why we suck. Um, and and the people who

1221
01:15:53,280 --> 01:15:55,840
Speaker 1: advise them and sit on their board, I mean, their

1222
01:15:55,880 --> 01:15:59,639
Speaker 1: whole their whole reason for existence is essentially, I mean

1223
01:15:59,640 --> 01:16:02,120
Speaker 1: I could and help, but look at this and see

1224
01:16:02,160 --> 01:16:06,679
Speaker 1: that they're very much aligned with Chinese strategists who see

1225
01:16:06,720 --> 01:16:10,120
Speaker 1: their current role of China is to be managing a

1226
01:16:10,200 --> 01:16:13,120
Speaker 1: declining power and the declining powers of the United States

1227
01:16:13,120 --> 01:16:15,559
Speaker 1: in their eyes, and that they see their roles to

1228
01:16:16,080 --> 01:16:19,720
Speaker 1: manage us UH as we become a second rate power

1229
01:16:19,960 --> 01:16:24,640
Speaker 1: and China becomes a global hedgemon UH. And this institute

1230
01:16:24,680 --> 01:16:30,719
Speaker 1: looks like they're kind of the American liaison helping helping UH,

1231
01:16:30,920 --> 01:16:34,200
Speaker 1: helping US ease US into that position. UM. But you know,

1232
01:16:34,280 --> 01:16:36,640
Speaker 1: people can go and take a look at this institute

1233
01:16:36,680 --> 01:16:38,800
Speaker 1: and look at these characters for themselves and make their

1234
01:16:38,840 --> 01:16:43,320
Speaker 1: own determinations. And it's by the way, b r G

1235
01:16:43,320 --> 01:16:45,599
Speaker 1: G r U E N if people want to look

1236
01:16:45,640 --> 01:16:48,800
Speaker 1: up at the Institute China Center. From my point of view,

1237
01:16:48,920 --> 01:16:53,760
Speaker 1: I mean, people talk all about China Russian collusion or

1238
01:16:53,880 --> 01:16:56,240
Speaker 1: or the threat about Iran. Something's got to be done

1239
01:16:56,240 --> 01:17:00,800
Speaker 1: about Iran. Bro No, No, China is a America's number

1240
01:17:00,800 --> 01:17:03,519
Speaker 1: one threat. If you want to know who the bad

1241
01:17:03,560 --> 01:17:08,639
Speaker 1: guys are, look at this. Russia. I mean they're gonna

1242
01:17:08,640 --> 01:17:12,360
Speaker 1: be you know, Russia is has a bunch of islands

1243
01:17:12,479 --> 01:17:15,360
Speaker 1: where that seagulls crap all over and you know, the

1244
01:17:15,680 --> 01:17:20,240
Speaker 1: the North Sea. I mean, there's nothing. I mean, I Russia's.

1245
01:17:20,320 --> 01:17:23,559
Speaker 1: Russia is a threat, but they're the small threat. UM.

1246
01:17:23,600 --> 01:17:28,320
Speaker 1: They're not economically or socially viable over the long term. UM,

1247
01:17:28,479 --> 01:17:31,759
Speaker 1: China is looking to supplant US as a global power,

1248
01:17:32,560 --> 01:17:35,000
Speaker 1: and this is the threat that people should be focused on.

1249
01:17:35,439 --> 01:17:38,439
Speaker 1: I saw over the past week, UM Gordon Shang, who's

1250
01:17:38,439 --> 01:17:42,040
Speaker 1: a friend of mine, expert on China, UM rights for Forbes,

1251
01:17:42,160 --> 01:17:44,840
Speaker 1: regularly on pretty much all media outlets from Foxing News

1252
01:17:44,840 --> 01:17:47,960
Speaker 1: to MSNBC. He's been pretty vocal on Twitter over the

1253
01:17:48,000 --> 01:17:52,080
Speaker 1: past week about Trump wanting to be more diplomatic with

1254
01:17:52,160 --> 01:17:55,760
Speaker 1: China and and have better relations, and Gordon has been

1255
01:17:55,800 --> 01:17:59,160
Speaker 1: saying that we shouldn't be easing into that until we

1256
01:17:59,240 --> 01:18:02,240
Speaker 1: tell Sha to do something about their human rights policy,

1257
01:18:02,400 --> 01:18:04,599
Speaker 1: it's never gonna happen China, which I think is why

1258
01:18:04,600 --> 01:18:06,599
Speaker 1: Gordon Shang wants us. You know, a guy like that

1259
01:18:06,680 --> 01:18:09,840
Speaker 1: and many experts on the subject to our anti China

1260
01:18:10,240 --> 01:18:12,880
Speaker 1: don't want us to build relations with China. Yeah. I mean,

1261
01:18:13,320 --> 01:18:15,280
Speaker 1: I'm sure that his you know, his heart is in

1262
01:18:15,280 --> 01:18:17,760
Speaker 1: the right place, but China is not going to democratize.

1263
01:18:17,760 --> 01:18:19,760
Speaker 1: That's that's a myth. No, I don't and I don't

1264
01:18:19,760 --> 01:18:21,080
Speaker 1: think he believes that in the least. I don't know

1265
01:18:21,120 --> 01:18:23,400
Speaker 1: if you're saying Trump believes that or oh, I mean,

1266
01:18:23,439 --> 01:18:25,519
Speaker 1: I don't think Trump knows what Trump believes. I mean,

1267
01:18:25,560 --> 01:18:27,960
Speaker 1: he's just kind of winging it day to day, and

1268
01:18:28,000 --> 01:18:30,559
Speaker 1: the Chinese are just laughing at him because, like I said,

1269
01:18:31,160 --> 01:18:34,639
Speaker 1: the Trump Sorry, I'm getting lost in my words there. Uh,

1270
01:18:34,720 --> 01:18:36,800
Speaker 1: you know, Trump wakes up in the morning and he

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01:18:36,840 --> 01:18:39,960
Speaker 1: has a different idea, um, you know, hour to hour

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01:18:40,400 --> 01:18:43,360
Speaker 1: about what he believes about these things. The Chinese planning

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01:18:43,400 --> 01:18:46,200
Speaker 1: like hundred years spans. So I mean they're just laughing

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01:18:46,240 --> 01:18:50,120
Speaker 1: at at Trump. They're like whatever. And also the incoming

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01:18:50,439 --> 01:18:53,800
Speaker 1: tariffs with trade that's gonna have a big impact on things.

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01:18:53,880 --> 01:18:57,439
Speaker 1: I mean I have actually a family members who own

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01:18:57,520 --> 01:19:00,360
Speaker 1: small businesses that that you know Bi mateer reels from

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01:19:00,439 --> 01:19:02,439
Speaker 1: China and they're like, yeah, my my costs are gonna

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01:19:02,439 --> 01:19:04,599
Speaker 1: go up if we end up going through with all

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01:19:04,600 --> 01:19:09,680
Speaker 1: this stuff on tariffs. So he's playing checkers, we need

1281
01:19:09,720 --> 01:19:13,240
Speaker 1: to play chess. Yeah alright, Well, I hope you guys

1282
01:19:13,400 --> 01:19:16,360
Speaker 1: enjoyed this episode. With Thomas Pakora. I thought that was

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01:19:16,400 --> 01:19:20,400
Speaker 1: really excellent. I greatly appreciate him coming on with us

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01:19:20,439 --> 01:19:23,760
Speaker 1: and taking the time, and I'm looking forward to that book,

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01:19:24,000 --> 01:19:26,360
Speaker 1: looking forward to reading yeah once again. The book is

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01:19:26,520 --> 01:19:30,439
Speaker 1: Guardian Life in the Crosshairs of the CIA's War on Terror.

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01:19:30,800 --> 01:19:34,960
Speaker 1: It's written by Thomas Or with John Land and Lindsay Preston.

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01:19:35,080 --> 01:19:38,680
Speaker 1: Available May seven, up now for pre order and Amazon, or,

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01:19:38,720 --> 01:19:42,519
Speaker 1: as Thomas said, Barnes and Noble as well. And other

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01:19:42,600 --> 01:19:45,519
Speaker 1: than that, we have an incredibly busy week here at

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01:19:45,600 --> 01:19:50,080
Speaker 1: Hurricane Media with meetings and a lot of great stuff happening.

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01:19:50,080 --> 01:19:53,040
Speaker 1: We also have our big party Friday night that's on

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01:19:53,120 --> 01:19:57,080
Speaker 1: the horizon, and uh, that's really it, man. I mean

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01:19:57,160 --> 01:19:59,479
Speaker 1: it's just it's it's gonna be packed week for us. Yeah,

1295
01:19:59,720 --> 01:20:01,840
Speaker 1: and engine to get shows up somehow though, and then

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01:20:01,960 --> 01:20:05,640
Speaker 1: next week I will not be here. So I have

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01:20:05,760 --> 01:20:08,320
Speaker 1: some best stuffs that I've already made that I've scheduled out,

1298
01:20:08,520 --> 01:20:11,120
Speaker 1: not actually not really best of this stuff from Brandon's

1299
01:20:11,120 --> 01:20:15,599
Speaker 1: Power Thought podcast, including the interview with Captain Jerry Yellen,

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01:20:16,040 --> 01:20:19,080
Speaker 1: which is just awesome. Them the man who flew the

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01:20:19,120 --> 01:20:23,080
Speaker 1: final combat mission over Japan. I'm pretty sure very likely

1302
01:20:23,120 --> 01:20:25,479
Speaker 1: the final interview of his life, because he passed away

1303
01:20:25,840 --> 01:20:28,160
Speaker 1: just a couple of months after we did that interview.

1304
01:20:28,760 --> 01:20:31,120
Speaker 1: UM and you all, and you know, what's interesting to

1305
01:20:31,160 --> 01:20:33,920
Speaker 1: me is that he was in the what we now

1306
01:20:34,000 --> 01:20:37,120
Speaker 1: call the Air Force in a very short period of

1307
01:20:37,120 --> 01:20:40,120
Speaker 1: time where the name went from the Army Air Corps

1308
01:20:40,120 --> 01:20:43,240
Speaker 1: to the Army Air Forces and then to the Air

1309
01:20:43,320 --> 01:20:45,479
Speaker 1: Forces we know now now no today. I believe for

1310
01:20:45,560 --> 01:20:48,320
Speaker 1: seven years it was called the Army Air Forces and

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01:20:48,360 --> 01:20:51,639
Speaker 1: he was in there during that time period. That was interesting.

1312
01:20:52,200 --> 01:20:55,920
Speaker 1: So alright, guys, follow us on Twitter and Instagram at

1313
01:20:55,960 --> 01:21:08,479
Speaker 1: Soft Prep Radio and we're at you've been listening to

1314
01:21:08,680 --> 01:21:13,120
Speaker 1: Self Rep Radio new episodes of every Wednesday and Friday.

1315
01:21:13,920 --> 01:21:17,360
Speaker 1: Follow the show on Instagram and Twitter at self Rep

1316
01:21:17,479 --> 01:21:17,839
Speaker 1: Radio