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Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio.

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Speaker 2: NASCAR is one of the most popular spectator sports in

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Speaker 2: the country, but unlike other major professional sports leagues, NASCAR

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Speaker 2: is owned privately by the France family, and now two

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Speaker 2: racing teams are suing the Stock Car Series and its

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Speaker 2: chairman for anti trumpt violations, saying it exploited its position

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Speaker 2: to extract monopoly profits. Leading the way is NBA legend

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Speaker 2: Michael Jordan, a co owner of one of those teams.

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Speaker 2: He told Fox Sports that it hasn't been a fair

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Speaker 2: playing field.

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Speaker 1: So the smaller teams as well. It's not just me,

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Speaker 1: I mean, obviously, I think everybody can. I have an

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Speaker 1: opportunity to be.

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Speaker 3: To chessco in any business that my voice is saying

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Speaker 3: that it hadn't been what they hadn't been happening.

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Speaker 2: Joining me is Anti Truss law expert Harry First, a

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Speaker 2: professor YU Law School. Harry tell us about this lawsuit,

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Speaker 2: NASCAR is a.

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Speaker 3: Little odd for a sports league. It's organized a little differently.

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Speaker 3: Most sports leagues are owned by sort of the participants,

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Speaker 3: like the National Football League owns the league. The people

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Speaker 3: who own the clubs the teams. The NCAA is run

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Speaker 3: by the universities, and the NBA is that's run by

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Speaker 3: the teams. The PGA about which we've talked the golfers

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Speaker 3: are supposedly running the PGA. But here NASCAR, the stock

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Speaker 3: car racing, the circuit or the league in a way,

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Speaker 3: is run by apparently one family, this France family, who

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Speaker 3: puts together the racing circuit that NASCAR team owners drive on.

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Speaker 3: And they're sort of at the mercy, or so they

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Speaker 3: say in their complaint of NASCAR of how they run

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Speaker 3: the business and critically for them, how they split the money,

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Speaker 3: because the money, of course is in the broadcast rights.

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Speaker 3: So there's been a lot of back and forth apparently

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Speaker 3: between the race car owners and the France family a

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Speaker 3: NASCAR about what the deal is going to be and renegotiations,

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Speaker 3: and recently the France family has sort of turned the

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Speaker 3: screws a little bit and made the next deal less attractive.

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Speaker 3: According to the complaint, the race car owners are barely

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Speaker 3: scraping by, hopefully not on the track scraping by, but

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Speaker 3: financially scraping by. Now Michael Jordan comes along and he

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Speaker 3: decides that he's sort of going to lead the charge

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Speaker 3: in not bowing to what the owner of NASCAR, France wants,

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Speaker 3: and instead is going to file this any trust suit

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Speaker 3: represented by a very good sports any trust lawyer. The

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Speaker 3: basic idea is they look at a number of the

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Speaker 3: contracts that NASCAR has entered into and look at its

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Speaker 3: acquisitions of the racing circuit of other tracks and say, hey, look,

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Speaker 3: you're excluding competitors, you're fencing out others. You control this

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Speaker 3: sport and you are sort of taking all the money

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Speaker 3: for yourself. The great line is the France family and

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Speaker 3: NASCAR are monopolistic, bully.

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Speaker 2: That was a good line. So there's a noncompete. The

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Speaker 2: teams have to agree not to race in any other circuits.

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Speaker 2: They have to buy their supplies and whatnot from NASCAR

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Speaker 2: approved dealers. And you mentioned the hardball tactics. NASCAR sent

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Speaker 2: a final take it or leave it charter in the

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Speaker 2: late afternoon early evening of September sixth, and the teams

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Speaker 2: were given until midnight to sign it, under the threat

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Speaker 2: that they would eliminate the charter system if a substantial

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Speaker 2: number of teams didn't sign. Several of the teams described

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Speaker 2: the signing as coerced it doesn't sound good.

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Speaker 3: That's a good way of putting it. Sounds like strong

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Speaker 3: arm tactics. The question is whether it sounds like an

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Speaker 3: anti trust case. And that's going to be the plaints

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Speaker 3: burden a little bit. And you know, bullying is bullying,

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Speaker 3: and we don't like bullies. But the anti trust laws

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Speaker 3: actually don't protect companies necessarily from bullying. What they want

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Speaker 3: is competition in the marketplace that helps consumers. So whether

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Speaker 3: NASCAR really has a monopoly is not so clear from

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Speaker 3: the complaint. They sort of skirt around it in a way.

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Speaker 3: No market share figures. What do they compete with Formula

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Speaker 3: one racing? I have no idea what these things are exactly,

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Speaker 3: but you know, what's their competitors? Do they really have

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Speaker 3: monopoly power? If they don't, the case dissolves, you know,

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Speaker 3: I mean, why don't these drivers go to some other circuit?

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Speaker 3: Why do they Why are they so stuck with NASCAR?

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Speaker 3: It's not so clear. It's not so clear to me

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Speaker 3: why the race car owners are allowed to negotiate together

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Speaker 3: against the owner of the circuit, because, in a sense,

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Speaker 3: they are selling their services. Normally, we don't allow firms

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Speaker 3: that are selling their services to negotiate together. They're forming

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Speaker 3: a league, of course, so there are anti trust complexities

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Speaker 3: that have yet to be surmounted. There's not a lot

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Speaker 3: of detail about who the other competitors might be, so

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Speaker 3: maybe there aren't, but they're still going to have to

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Speaker 3: prove things, and you know, there needs to be a

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Speaker 3: little more fleshed out about what the competition is exactly.

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Speaker 3: But if they are monopoly, some of the things that

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Speaker 3: they've allegedly done do sound like the things that courts

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Speaker 3: have been condemning recently from monopoly firms, like exclusionary contracts, exclusives,

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Speaker 3: you can only deal with me, not with others, And

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Speaker 3: this is a problem in the golfing case as well.

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Speaker 3: So you know, that could be a problem for NASCAR

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Speaker 3: in the litigation.

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Speaker 2: As far as a preliminary injunction where the standards are

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Speaker 2: pretty high, do you think that they'll be able to

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Speaker 2: get a preliminary injunction?

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Speaker 3: Well, so we haven't seen the answer to the complaint yet,

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Speaker 3: so you know, I don't know. It has to be

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Speaker 3: in the public interest. My instinct is something's going to

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Speaker 3: be worked out with the parties. You know, they're not

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Speaker 3: going to throw everyone out of NASCAR. Something will get

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Speaker 3: worked out in some way so that the case can

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Speaker 3: move on and the business can move on, because that's

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Speaker 3: in everyone's interest. They've interestingly sued the head of NASCAR

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Speaker 3: as well personally, so I don't know, you know, they

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Speaker 3: have to prove a likelihood of success and they have

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Speaker 3: to prove that, you know, an injunction is in the

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Speaker 3: public interest, So hard to say exactly whether they're really

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Speaker 3: going to be able to succeed with that at this point.

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Speaker 2: Can they get discovery before emotion to dismiss.

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Speaker 3: So judges don't have a bit of discretion on this.

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Speaker 3: The complaint will survive emotion to dismiss, and the motion

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Speaker 3: to dismiss is just on the face of the complaint,

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Speaker 3: so in some sense they don't need discovery to get

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Speaker 3: past that hurdle. Of course, it's sometimes put off the

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Speaker 3: emotion to dismiss and allow some degree of discovery, or

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Speaker 3: allow full discovery. There's a lot of sort of play

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Speaker 3: in the system. My guess is they'll survive emotion dismissed,

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Speaker 3: but in part depends on how NASCAR wants to respond

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Speaker 3: to this, and they may say they have no standing

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Speaker 3: to sue for damages because the injury is the competition,

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Speaker 3: not competitors, And they're just complaining that, you know, they

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Speaker 3: want a different cut of the monopoly profits, not that

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Speaker 3: they really want competition in Stockhart racing. Maybe they're going

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Speaker 3: to you know, ring that bell to try to stop

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Speaker 3: obligation because you.

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Speaker 2: Never know what you find in discovery. Well, you never

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Speaker 2: know about that email that shouldn't have been sent.

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Speaker 3: No, you do know you'll find something. You'll find the

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Speaker 3: email that looks bad. It's lurking somewhere in all those

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Speaker 3: gigabytes or terabytes of data that everyone has. So yes,

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Speaker 3: discovery is something that's expensive and defenders would rather not

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Speaker 3: have happened because at this point they might not know

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Speaker 3: what's in their own file.

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Speaker 2: NASCAR has faced two anti trust actions over the last

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Speaker 2: twenty five years, but those came from race tracks that

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Speaker 2: wanted cup races. NASCAR one one and settled the other.

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Speaker 3: Well, I mean, usually the owner of a circuit has

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Speaker 3: a lot of discretion in deciding how it's going to

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Speaker 3: allocate games and so forth. The NFL has been through

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Speaker 3: this a lot as well. And you know, if you're

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Speaker 3: going to run a circuit, run a league, any of

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Speaker 3: these things, you're balancing the number of races against you know,

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Speaker 3: too much, too few, and that's generally in the circuit's

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Speaker 3: interest and they need to figure that out. So there's

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Speaker 3: usual a lot of discretion with that, and unless they're

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Speaker 3: trying to exclude where it gets touchiers, if they're trying

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Speaker 3: to exclud some potential competitor, and that's what this case

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Speaker 3: seems to have over those other cases where the argument

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Speaker 3: is that they acquired a circuit much like Facebook acquired

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Speaker 3: WhatsApp or Instagram to suppress the competitor. So that's a

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Speaker 3: different competition story.

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Speaker 2: Let's move from race cars to handbags. This is an

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Speaker 2: area I do have some expertise in. Is this, I

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Speaker 2: guess the first foray of the FTC into fashion. It's

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Speaker 2: suing to stop the eight point five billion dollar deal

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Speaker 2: to marry the Coach and Kate Spade brands with Versace

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Speaker 2: and Michael Core's, and the battle is over whether the

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Speaker 2: deal would suppress competition in the category of accessible luxury handbags.

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Speaker 2: What is that? I mean, it seems made up.

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Speaker 3: My innits reaction is, of course it's made up. Market

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Speaker 3: definitions are often made up in a sense, you know,

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Speaker 3: luxury fountain pens, premium ice, cream cases abound with those

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Speaker 3: kind of market definitions. I do want to back you

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Speaker 3: up for one second. Of very famous anti trust case

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Speaker 3: from the thirties was brought by the Federal Trade Commission

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Speaker 3: against the Fashion Originator's Guild of America, which was suppressing

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Speaker 3: knockoffs on Seventh Avenue by you know, companies that would

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Speaker 3: get the high fashion stuff and quickly turn out knockoffs

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Speaker 3: that looked alike. So the fashion industry wanted to stop that,

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Speaker 3: and the Federal Trade Commission stopped them from doing it.

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Speaker 3: So not the first time, Just to give a little history,

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Speaker 3: It's not often perhaps, but this is an eight and

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Speaker 3: a half billion dollar acquisition, so there are a few

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Speaker 3: zeros attached to it. Now, your question is does this

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Speaker 3: make sense as a market And you know, key to

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Speaker 3: all of this and mentioned this with you know, stock

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Speaker 3: car racing is assessing what the universe competitors might be,

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Speaker 3: or as you know, we call it market definition. So

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Speaker 3: that's the start of every anti trust case. Not necessarily

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Speaker 3: the finish. Current law gives some latitudes. Even though you know,

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Speaker 3: a handbag's a handbag and a lot of things can

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Speaker 3: serve the same function. Current law gives the plaintiffs a

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Speaker 3: chance to look at how consumers actually behave patterns of trade,

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Speaker 3: the way things are recognized. The Wall Street Journal actually

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Speaker 3: ran a story sort of as the Commission is considering

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Speaker 3: this case, where they use this category of accessible luxury.

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Speaker 3: So the industry seems to recognize this. That's the first thing. Yes,

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Speaker 3: it seems a little cooked, and that's always a danger

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Speaker 3: in anti trust cases, but it may be backed up

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Speaker 3: with how the parties themselves the market, and more importantly

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Speaker 3: in this case, I think who the parties themselves saw

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Speaker 3: as their close competitors, because that's really the key to

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Speaker 3: the theory of what's going on, and that corps saw

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Speaker 3: Coach and Kate Spade and vice versa as close competitors

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Speaker 3: and looked at pricing data based on those and paid

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Speaker 3: a lot of attention to that to those as competitors. Obviously,

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Speaker 3: there are lots of handbags and you know, lots of sellers.

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Speaker 3: But if they paid close attention to those, and it's

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Speaker 3: backed up by data that consumers see them as pretty

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Speaker 3: close by, or you know, they consider one or the other,

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Speaker 3: that will probably be enough for the Federal Trade Commission's case.

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Speaker 3: You know, the first leg of showing that the effect

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Speaker 3: of the merger may be the less competition.

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Speaker 2: All right, coming up next, I'll continue this conversation with

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Speaker 2: NYU Law professor Harry First and we'll talk more about

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Speaker 2: this handbag deal. You're listening to Bloomberg. I've been talking

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Speaker 2: to anti trust law professor Harry First of NYU Law

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Speaker 2: School about the FTC trying to block tapestries eight point

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Speaker 2: five billion dollar acquisition of Capri Holdings, saying the deal

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Speaker 2: would eliminate head to head competition between the fashion companies

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Speaker 2: brands like Coach and Michael Core's in the so called

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Speaker 2: affordable luxury handbag market. It seems like there's a lot

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Speaker 2: of competition in the handbag market, and it's a market

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Speaker 2: that's easy to enter.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, And in that Wall Street Journal article, they said

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Speaker 3: a search of Macy's website for bags price from one

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Speaker 3: hundred to five hundred dollars yields results for more than

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Speaker 3: seventy brands. So that sounds like a lot of competition.

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Speaker 3: And you're right that this is going to be the argument.

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Speaker 3: On the other hand, I'll put it back to you.

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Speaker 3: Apparently the defend economic experts testify that people who buy

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Speaker 3: Coach would consider Prada and Burbery. Now is that true?

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Speaker 3: Isn't it true? I don't know personally, But the question

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Speaker 3: again in the end is, you know not is there

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Speaker 3: a whole universe? But if Cores raises its price by

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Speaker 3: a little, what brand will consumers switch to? And if

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Speaker 3: a lot of consumers switch to either Coach or Kate Spade,

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Speaker 3: this means I think the FDC is going to argue,

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Speaker 3: this means that by having all three brands, they could

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Speaker 3: raise the corese price a bit and what they used

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Speaker 3: to lose because these were separate companies in terms of business,

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Speaker 3: they'll retain because people will now switch to Coach or

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Speaker 3: Kate Spade. So this would give them the ability to

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Speaker 3: raise price on these bags in a way that they

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Speaker 3: couldn't before. And I think that's going to be a

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Speaker 3: key to the government's complaint, is that by putting the

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Speaker 3: brands together, they'll do things that they couldn't do if

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Speaker 3: the brands were competing.

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Speaker 2: The FDC says that working in middle class women will

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Speaker 2: suffer harm if the acquisition goes through. I mean, is

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Speaker 2: it really harm if you don't get to buy one

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Speaker 2: handbag as opposed to the other. I mean, it's not

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Speaker 2: like groceries.

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Speaker 3: Well, yeah, I wish I could parry that by saying,

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Speaker 3: excuse me, this bag is important. Well, the harm that

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Speaker 3: they're saying is is not that they won't be able

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Speaker 3: to buy the bag. So one of the stories is

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Speaker 3: that Cores has been suffering because they've had to discount

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Speaker 3: some suffering. Cores may be suffering, but consumers are, like

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Speaker 3: Corps bags, presumably are pleased with this. Now is the

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Speaker 3: merger supposed to end that suffering by how by allowing

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Speaker 3: Cores to raise its price? So what will buyers of

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Speaker 3: Cores bags then do? Will they be harmed? Well, maybe

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Speaker 3: some of them just won't buy handbag. I guess not.

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Speaker 3: But maybe some of them will pay the higher price,

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Speaker 3: or maybe some of them will say, now step up

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Speaker 3: to that Kate Spade that I wouldn't have before. So

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Speaker 3: they're now spending more So from the point of view

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Speaker 3: of the company, they keep the sale, and consumers now

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Speaker 3: instead of being able to pay a lower price for

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Speaker 3: the Cores one have to pay either pay a higher

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Speaker 3: price or switch to something they would not have bought before. So,

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Speaker 3: you know, are they harmed in a way that we

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Speaker 3: think of for consumer welfare? The answer would be yes,

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Speaker 3: you know, they would be better off with competition between

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Speaker 3: the brands, and in fact, that's what the Supreme Court

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Speaker 3: has emphasized. Inter brand competition is supposed to be a

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Speaker 3: key thing, and you know, now Tapestry says, well.

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Speaker 1: Not so much.

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Speaker 2: The trial's over. The judge is going to rule, we

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Speaker 2: expect soon. Would a victory here for the FTC in

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Speaker 2: any way expand what the FTC is doing or is

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Speaker 2: it just another in a line of cases?

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Speaker 3: Well, it's not high tech. It's actually not an unusual

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Speaker 3: theory to me. It's it's within what we might call

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Speaker 3: conventional analysis in the sense that most merge enforcement has

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Speaker 3: been done against horizontal mergers, mergers between competitors. That's what

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Speaker 3: this is. I mean, if they win, that's what the

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Speaker 3: court's saying, that they were really direct competitors. It uses,

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Speaker 3: in a sense, familiar theories the government has been using

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Speaker 3: for a decade. Really, you know, nothing new here that

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Speaker 3: questions does it apply to these facts? So I don't

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Speaker 3: think this is breaking new ground. It's confirming the ground

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Speaker 3: that courts have been going on now really consistently with

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Speaker 3: the government's cases, which is being willing to look at

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Speaker 3: the patterns of trade, look at how people operate, not

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Speaker 3: be super reliant on you know, economists and economic models.

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Speaker 3: So I think it's that sort of case, not not

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Speaker 3: a oh my god, this is something really new.

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Speaker 2: I want to turn for a moment to the Google

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Speaker 2: anti trust case, which was the biggest anti trust case

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Speaker 2: of the summer, perhaps of the year. And the question

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Speaker 2: now is what remedies the government is going to ask for.

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Speaker 3: I have to say, I don't know what the government's

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Speaker 3: going to ask for, and the government is still being

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Speaker 3: maybe koi is the word shy. I don't know exactly.

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Speaker 3: All the government has filed has been this framework for remedies.

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Speaker 3: You know, their shows they're thinking about it, which is

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Speaker 3: very nice. They've been litigating this case for four years.

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Speaker 3: It's nice that they're now thinking about now that they've

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Speaker 3: caught the bus, what do they want to do with it.

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Speaker 3: I hope they really have an idea in mind and

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Speaker 3: they're not just now trying to figure this out. So

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Speaker 3: one of the things that people have been talking about

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Speaker 3: is to you know, restructure Google in a way that

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Speaker 3: would force them to sell some of their assets, maybe

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Speaker 3: get rid of their interests, their their own brand of Android,

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Speaker 3: maybe to vest chrome. Maybe there are other things, so

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Speaker 3: that is a possibility. The government sort of tea that

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Speaker 3: in its papers said it could include these things. Maybe

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Speaker 3: Google plays also at the app store, So possible, But

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Speaker 3: I don't know whether they'll ask it, and I don't

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Speaker 3: know whether the judge would order it even if I asked.

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Speaker 2: Why is the government playing coy? What's the point a

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Speaker 2: surprise attack?

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Speaker 3: I don't know for sure. Sometimes, I mean, one strategy

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Speaker 3: is to play close to the vest so that you

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Speaker 3: don't really you wait until the last minute to tell

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Speaker 3: your opponent exactly what you want. Another thing is the

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Speaker 3: government might not want to royal the markets unduly, and

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Speaker 3: you know, by indicating it's going to ask for X

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Speaker 3: and then maybe not get it, and it affects, you know, markets,

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Speaker 3: These are market events, so the governments can be a

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Speaker 3: little cautious about that. I have no idea whether you know,

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Speaker 3: someone in the Justice Department is thinking about the election

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Speaker 3: says let's not put anything crazy out here until after

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Speaker 3: the election. I have no idea. So it could be

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Speaker 3: any of those things, And it could be that they

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Speaker 3: don't know for sure because they're still talking to people

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Speaker 3: in the industry and to experts about what might work

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Speaker 3: and thinking about what legally they can ask for, So

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Speaker 3: all those are possible. I don't have any way really

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Speaker 3: of choosing what it might be.

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Speaker 2: The Google case was a Justice Department case. The FTC

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Speaker 2: and the Justice Department do they divvy up these cases

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Speaker 2: where you'll take this, I'll take that. I mean, how

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Speaker 2: does it work out in.

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Speaker 3: These tech cases. Apparently what they did, and this was

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Speaker 3: in the Trump administration, is they did divide them up

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Speaker 3: two industries for each, So the FTC got Amazon and

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Speaker 3: Facebook and the Justice Department got Google and Apple. They

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Speaker 3: don't know how that was done, you know, presumably some

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Speaker 3: agreement between maybe the Attorney General, the head of any

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Speaker 3: trust division, and the then chair of the Federal Trade Commission.

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Speaker 3: So I think that was sort of an ad hoc

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Speaker 3: thing that usually the cases go to the agency that

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Speaker 3: has had some prior experience with the industry, and these

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Speaker 3: fights are generally held in merger cases where notification has

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Speaker 3: to be given to both the Justice Department and the

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Speaker 3: Federal Trade Commission, and then the two agencies have a

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Speaker 3: liaison procedure to decide who gets what, and sometimes they

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Speaker 3: get pretty contentious, actually, but these monopolization cases were more

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Speaker 3: unusual because the government hadn't really filed a major case

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Speaker 3: since Microsoft twenty years before.

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Speaker 2: Always a pleasure to have you on Harry. That's NYU

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Speaker 2: law professor Harry First. The Supreme Court seems unlikely to

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Speaker 2: side with an American citizen challenging the revocation of her

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Speaker 2: spouse is visa a visa which was revoked because of

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Speaker 2: a sham marriage. Join me is immigration law expert Leon Fresco,

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Speaker 2: a partner Holiday Night. Leon tell us what this case

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Speaker 2: is about.

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Speaker 1: So let's start with the simple facts of the case.

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Speaker 1: You have a US citizen here whose name is Amina Buarfa,

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Speaker 1: and what she's trying to do is she's trying to

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Speaker 1: do what many people, almost a million people a year do,

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Speaker 1: and that is to take a foreign national and convert

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Speaker 1: their status from either undocumented or some other visa status

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Speaker 1: to the status of a lawful permanent resident on the

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Speaker 1: basis of a marriage to US citizens. And so this

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Speaker 1: person Buarfa marries her husband. That petition is approved. But

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Speaker 1: then what happens is as the petition starts to go

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Speaker 1: toward the final step of what's called the background check

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Speaker 1: approval process, it actually gets revoke because they say that

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Speaker 1: the foreign national who is marrying the US citizen here

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Speaker 1: had entered into a previous marriage solely to evade the

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Speaker 1: immigration laws. So the point was they couldn't be approved

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Speaker 1: because then this marriage was not deemed to be a

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Speaker 1: valid marriage. Had that been an original decision denying the application,

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Speaker 1: that decision could have been reviewed by a federal court.

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Speaker 1: But because it was a revocation of an approved decision,

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Speaker 1: the question is is that review barred because the ability

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Speaker 1: to revoke such a petition is discretionary, and because of that,

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Speaker 1: there's all these statutes in the Immigration Code that say

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Speaker 1: there's no judicial review of discretionary immigration decisions, which is

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Speaker 1: something the Supreme Court over the last two three years

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Speaker 1: has really been focusing on and eliminating as much judicial

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Speaker 1: review as possible on all of these questions where they're

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Speaker 1: starting to dean these things discretionary. And so the incongruency

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Speaker 1: year is does Supreme Court want to create this perverse

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Speaker 1: incentive where it gives, basically, in difficult cases, the immigration

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Speaker 1: authority the ability to avoid review by saying, look, why

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Speaker 1: don't we just grant it and then revoke it a

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Speaker 1: few days later, and then that way it can't be

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Speaker 1: reviewed as opposed to just denying it, and then this

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Speaker 1: can get judicial review. And so that's the debate here.

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Speaker 2: If someone's accused of a prior sham marriage, would they

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Speaker 2: ever be allowed to stay here as a permanent residence.

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Speaker 1: Well, so one of the questions was is this really

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Speaker 1: a discretionary decision or not? Because but the justices were

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Speaker 1: trying to figure out was is if the US Citizenship

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Speaker 1: and Immigration Services sometimes let the occasional sham marriage through

404
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Speaker 1: on discretionary factors, then this is clearly a discretionary thing,

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Speaker 1: and so hence it's not reviewable. But the odd sort

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Speaker 1: of argument that the plaintiff were making here is they

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Speaker 1: never let the sham marriages through, which is a point

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Speaker 1: that the government attorney didn't really have all her facts

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Speaker 1: straight here. Odd are there any such cases where the

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Speaker 1: government would let them slide? And I doubt she would

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Speaker 1: want to make such a pronouncement because it would make

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Speaker 1: the government look bad if there were such cases that

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Speaker 1: the government let slide. So the case sort of has

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Speaker 1: this assumption in it that if the government knows there

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Speaker 1: is a sham marriage, it would revoke the petition, hence

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Speaker 1: making it a little bit more difficult to say that

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Speaker 1: this is a discretionary revocation as opposed to one that

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Speaker 1: would be done in every single case.

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Speaker 2: Chief Justice Roberts told the attorney for the visa applicant,

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Speaker 2: this is an easy case. Just file another visa application

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Speaker 2: and you'll get judicial review if it's denied.

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Speaker 3: I mean, I get the government's position, as far as

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Speaker 3: I can tell, is that you just won't take yes

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Speaker 3: for an answer. You want there to be review rather

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Speaker 3: than review after revocation. And they're saying you can get

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Speaker 3: that kind of just apply again and you'll get exactly

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Speaker 3: what you would have you think you're entitled to, which

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Speaker 3: is judicial review of the decision. What more can what more.

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Speaker 2: Do you want?

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Speaker 1: Well, this is a complicated argument in the following sense.

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Speaker 1: So number one, what the Chief Justice was saying is

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Speaker 1: after this revocation occurs, there is nothing because this person

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Speaker 1: is in the United States right now preventing them from

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Speaker 1: filing a new application, which they assume would just be denied,

435
00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:45,159
Speaker 1: and they could just get judicial review of this new application.

436
00:26:45,840 --> 00:26:48,240
Speaker 1: And they did, yes, already get review in the Board

437
00:26:48,240 --> 00:26:51,560
Speaker 1: of Immigration Appeals, but they didn't get review in the

438
00:26:51,600 --> 00:26:54,120
Speaker 1: federal court. But they could get review in the federal

439
00:26:54,160 --> 00:26:57,280
Speaker 1: court if they just filed a new application, So which

440
00:26:57,359 --> 00:27:00,520
Speaker 1: point the plantiff said, yeah, but now we're delayed several years,

441
00:27:00,840 --> 00:27:03,160
Speaker 1: and so why is that fair? And the court seem

442
00:27:03,200 --> 00:27:06,199
Speaker 1: to have no simpathy for that. But where this is

443
00:27:06,320 --> 00:27:11,199
Speaker 1: actually quite a compelling argument is this many times in

444
00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:15,240
Speaker 1: other contexts where there are green card petitions, not in

445
00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:19,040
Speaker 1: this sham marriage context, but for instance, someone argues that

446
00:27:19,320 --> 00:27:23,320
Speaker 1: they are an expert in a particular job, and so

447
00:27:23,920 --> 00:27:26,200
Speaker 1: the government agrees with that, and then one year later

448
00:27:26,280 --> 00:27:29,320
Speaker 1: revokes it say no, actually, you're not an expert at

449
00:27:29,320 --> 00:27:32,640
Speaker 1: a particular job. A lot of times in those cases,

450
00:27:33,280 --> 00:27:36,720
Speaker 1: two problems exist. Number one is that there is this

451
00:27:36,880 --> 00:27:40,719
Speaker 1: sort of statute of limitations whereby the person had to

452
00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:44,800
Speaker 1: file their application before a certain date that they would

453
00:27:44,800 --> 00:27:48,760
Speaker 1: have lost their status on a non immigrant visa. And

454
00:27:49,119 --> 00:27:54,159
Speaker 1: the whole success of that green card application is because

455
00:27:54,200 --> 00:27:57,000
Speaker 1: they filed it before a certain date. So if you

456
00:27:57,040 --> 00:27:59,320
Speaker 1: were to revoke that one and just say well, you

457
00:27:59,320 --> 00:28:02,600
Speaker 1: can always file again, no, in those cases you couldn't.

458
00:28:02,880 --> 00:28:06,760
Speaker 1: That person would be in illegal status and they couldn't

459
00:28:06,800 --> 00:28:10,160
Speaker 1: file a new green card application, and so that would

460
00:28:10,160 --> 00:28:13,119
Speaker 1: be a huge problem, and it was not raised unfortunately

461
00:28:13,600 --> 00:28:16,879
Speaker 1: by the attorney. The other one that the plane of

462
00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:20,520
Speaker 1: slawyer did mention was this concept of if your petition

463
00:28:20,640 --> 00:28:23,720
Speaker 1: gets revoked, then you have to apply again. You start

464
00:28:23,760 --> 00:28:27,520
Speaker 1: with a new date in line, which means that where

465
00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:30,399
Speaker 1: there is a line for green cards, which exists in

466
00:28:30,440 --> 00:28:32,960
Speaker 1: a lot of the categories, you move from the front

467
00:28:32,960 --> 00:28:34,359
Speaker 1: of the line all the way to the back of

468
00:28:34,359 --> 00:28:37,880
Speaker 1: the line, which could mean ten, twenty, thirty, forty years

469
00:28:38,120 --> 00:28:41,120
Speaker 1: of additional ways. And I think the court understood that

470
00:28:41,160 --> 00:28:43,800
Speaker 1: but basically said those people can bring that case later,

471
00:28:44,240 --> 00:28:46,600
Speaker 1: which I don't think would actually be true, because I

472
00:28:46,640 --> 00:28:50,440
Speaker 1: think this authority either exists or won't exist to revote

473
00:28:50,480 --> 00:28:53,480
Speaker 1: these petitions. But nevertheless, the court appeared did not have

474
00:28:53,560 --> 00:28:54,800
Speaker 1: sympathy for.

475
00:28:54,720 --> 00:28:58,280
Speaker 2: This argument, because the Chief Justice at one point said, Okay,

476
00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:01,320
Speaker 2: the government made a mistake, and you know you're set

477
00:29:01,400 --> 00:29:04,080
Speaker 2: back two years or whatever, but you know we are

478
00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:07,640
Speaker 2: where we are. Was any justice sympathetic to this argument.

479
00:29:08,240 --> 00:29:11,080
Speaker 1: I didn't see a lot of sympathy to that argument.

480
00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:14,760
Speaker 1: I actually thought, just as Thomas, interestingly enough, showed a

481
00:29:14,760 --> 00:29:17,280
Speaker 1: little bit of sympathy to the fact that at the

482
00:29:17,360 --> 00:29:21,040
Speaker 1: end of the day, if you were revoking for any

483
00:29:21,120 --> 00:29:24,320
Speaker 1: other reason that might make sense. But if you're revoking

484
00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:26,560
Speaker 1: for the exact same reason that was the reason that

485
00:29:26,720 --> 00:29:30,920
Speaker 1: was approved, that maybe this didn't make sense and this

486
00:29:30,960 --> 00:29:36,040
Speaker 1: wouldn't be considered a discretionary determination. But I ultimately don't

487
00:29:36,080 --> 00:29:39,640
Speaker 1: see any of the justices want to rule in favor

488
00:29:39,640 --> 00:29:42,760
Speaker 1: of the plaintive year and so it seems very difficult

489
00:29:42,800 --> 00:29:45,200
Speaker 1: to see that there'd be any sympathy for this argument.

490
00:29:46,040 --> 00:29:48,960
Speaker 2: I mean, you have a sham marriage here, so it

491
00:29:49,000 --> 00:29:52,320
Speaker 2: doesn't really evoke much sympathy someone trying to get around

492
00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:53,080
Speaker 2: the rules.

493
00:29:53,400 --> 00:29:55,840
Speaker 1: Yes, I mean, this is another problem of bad fact

494
00:29:55,960 --> 00:29:59,479
Speaker 1: make bad law. And there certainly could have been a

495
00:29:59,480 --> 00:30:02,560
Speaker 1: different where the government would have brought the case in

496
00:30:02,640 --> 00:30:05,200
Speaker 1: a flip side of the circuit split where it was

497
00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:08,000
Speaker 1: the ninth Circuit. And I actually had a case like

498
00:30:08,080 --> 00:30:12,120
Speaker 1: this where the ninth Circuit was there was a revocation

499
00:30:12,680 --> 00:30:16,600
Speaker 1: of someone's employment based visa on this exact thing where

500
00:30:16,920 --> 00:30:19,920
Speaker 1: the government had said this person was an expert. And

501
00:30:19,960 --> 00:30:22,960
Speaker 1: then basically what happened was the government didn't like that

502
00:30:23,000 --> 00:30:26,120
Speaker 1: this person was not cooperating with the government to give

503
00:30:26,160 --> 00:30:28,840
Speaker 1: all sorts of secrets from their own country, which this

504
00:30:28,920 --> 00:30:31,760
Speaker 1: person didn't have to do after the law. So they

505
00:30:31,800 --> 00:30:35,000
Speaker 1: basically made up that the person was no longer an

506
00:30:35,040 --> 00:30:38,440
Speaker 1: expert and revoked their position. And if it had been

507
00:30:38,480 --> 00:30:40,360
Speaker 1: that kind of case, I think the Supreme Court would

508
00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:43,280
Speaker 1: have viewed it a lot differently. But here the bad

509
00:30:43,360 --> 00:30:47,360
Speaker 1: facts to make bad law situation is one where yeah,

510
00:30:47,400 --> 00:30:50,720
Speaker 1: you're starting with a marriage that has a lot of

511
00:30:50,840 --> 00:30:54,600
Speaker 1: components of fraud in it. And the question is why,

512
00:30:54,680 --> 00:30:57,280
Speaker 1: if this is ultimately going to be rejected when it

513
00:30:57,360 --> 00:31:00,000
Speaker 1: all shakes out, do we need to make a Supreme

514
00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:01,000
Speaker 1: Court case out of it?

515
00:31:01,280 --> 00:31:02,880
Speaker 2: So what did they take this case?

516
00:31:03,480 --> 00:31:06,040
Speaker 1: Very odd? But I think there is this circuit split,

517
00:31:06,360 --> 00:31:08,600
Speaker 1: and I think that the circuit split is something they've

518
00:31:08,640 --> 00:31:11,480
Speaker 1: wanted to resolve and something the government wanted to resolve.

519
00:31:12,000 --> 00:31:14,600
Speaker 1: I mean, I think when the government saw this appeal

520
00:31:15,120 --> 00:31:18,200
Speaker 1: being taken, they were sort of saying, yeah, yeah, go

521
00:31:18,280 --> 00:31:21,000
Speaker 1: for it. It takes the case so that they could

522
00:31:21,000 --> 00:31:23,959
Speaker 1: finally close this circuit split up in a way that

523
00:31:24,080 --> 00:31:27,600
Speaker 1: was beneficial toward the government and against judicial review of

524
00:31:27,640 --> 00:31:28,680
Speaker 1: these kinds of cases.

525
00:31:29,160 --> 00:31:31,840
Speaker 2: And the government's attorney said there are more than nine

526
00:31:31,920 --> 00:31:36,640
Speaker 2: hundred thousand of these kinds of visa cases. Is that possible?

527
00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:40,200
Speaker 1: Correct? Believe it or not. That's a normal number because

528
00:31:40,240 --> 00:31:43,560
Speaker 1: it's not a cap category, and it's pretty much been

529
00:31:43,600 --> 00:31:48,080
Speaker 1: that way for the last twenty years. It's been somewhere

530
00:31:48,080 --> 00:31:52,400
Speaker 1: between seven hundred and nine hundred thousand per year of

531
00:31:52,600 --> 00:31:56,520
Speaker 1: US citizens marrying foreign nationals and trying to get them

532
00:31:56,560 --> 00:31:57,280
Speaker 1: green cards.

533
00:31:57,320 --> 00:32:00,640
Speaker 2: So and explain why you think this case is so

534
00:32:00,760 --> 00:32:03,040
Speaker 2: important beyond the marriage context.

535
00:32:03,400 --> 00:32:08,200
Speaker 1: The government they actually do this practice of revoking petitions

536
00:32:08,600 --> 00:32:10,719
Speaker 1: so that they don't have to get them reviewed by

537
00:32:10,720 --> 00:32:13,680
Speaker 1: the federal courts. Instead of just denying it in the

538
00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:16,280
Speaker 1: first instance, they'll approve it and then revoke it. That

539
00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:18,600
Speaker 1: people know that happens, and it doesn't happen a lot,

540
00:32:18,920 --> 00:32:21,720
Speaker 1: but it happens a handful of times this year in

541
00:32:21,800 --> 00:32:25,960
Speaker 1: some very complicated cases. And that's the kind of thing

542
00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:27,800
Speaker 1: where I think it would have been much more useful

543
00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:30,760
Speaker 1: to talk about those cases and to not provide a

544
00:32:30,840 --> 00:32:33,320
Speaker 1: path for the service to be able to do that,

545
00:32:34,040 --> 00:32:38,120
Speaker 1: whereas they just stayed focused on just this marriage issue

546
00:32:38,560 --> 00:32:43,200
Speaker 1: and how the marriage statute operates within this discretion, which

547
00:32:43,240 --> 00:32:47,240
Speaker 1: I think just everybody's eyes lies over, yeah, and didn't

548
00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:49,880
Speaker 1: allow for what the real states are here.

549
00:32:50,320 --> 00:32:53,840
Speaker 2: Thanks so much, Leon. That's Leon Fresco of Holland and Knight.

550
00:32:54,440 --> 00:32:57,080
Speaker 2: And that's it for this edition of the Bloomberg Law Podcast.

551
00:32:57,440 --> 00:32:59,720
Speaker 2: Remember you can always get the latest legal news by

552
00:33:00,000 --> 00:33:03,680
Speaker 2: subscribing and listening to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify,

553
00:33:03,960 --> 00:33:07,800
Speaker 2: and at Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast, slash Law. I'm

554
00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:10,320
Speaker 2: June Grosso and this is Bloomberg