1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,080 --> 00:00:15,280 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to text Stuff. I'm your host 3 00:00:15,440 --> 00:00:18,360 Speaker 1: job in Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio. 4 00:00:18,440 --> 00:00:22,360 Speaker 1: And how the tech are you Today? We're going to 5 00:00:22,400 --> 00:00:28,400 Speaker 1: talk about the history and evolution and scope of digital 6 00:00:28,640 --> 00:00:33,920 Speaker 1: rights management or d r M. Recently, I was talking 7 00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 1: about n f t s, you know, non fungible tokens, 8 00:00:37,120 --> 00:00:40,280 Speaker 1: and why I find that whole concept frustrating. But I 9 00:00:40,320 --> 00:00:43,840 Speaker 1: also I made a I made a whoopsie an error 10 00:00:44,040 --> 00:00:46,680 Speaker 1: when I was doing that, and so big thanks to 11 00:00:46,840 --> 00:00:50,400 Speaker 1: Jason Stadler on Twitter for pointing this out letting me 12 00:00:50,440 --> 00:00:53,480 Speaker 1: know also did it in a really cool way, like 13 00:00:54,440 --> 00:00:56,880 Speaker 1: it could have said like you're an idiot, and didn't, 14 00:00:57,080 --> 00:01:00,560 Speaker 1: so I appreciate that a lot. But in way, the 15 00:01:00,600 --> 00:01:02,760 Speaker 1: mistake I made is that I had said, if you 16 00:01:02,760 --> 00:01:04,080 Speaker 1: look at n f t s as a way to 17 00:01:04,120 --> 00:01:08,360 Speaker 1: support artists, it's not really that effective because the artist 18 00:01:08,440 --> 00:01:11,120 Speaker 1: only gets paid once on that initial point of sale. 19 00:01:11,160 --> 00:01:14,839 Speaker 1: So let's say that I make you know a little 20 00:01:14,840 --> 00:01:19,840 Speaker 1: piece of digital music, and I create a digital token 21 00:01:19,920 --> 00:01:22,720 Speaker 1: and n f T to represent the ownership of that 22 00:01:22,760 --> 00:01:25,720 Speaker 1: piece of music, and I sell it to you for 23 00:01:26,000 --> 00:01:28,320 Speaker 1: a dollar and then you turn around and sell it 24 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:31,000 Speaker 1: for ten dollars. Then well you made money off of it, 25 00:01:31,040 --> 00:01:33,920 Speaker 1: but all I made was the dollar. Well, Stabler, include 26 00:01:33,920 --> 00:01:36,120 Speaker 1: me in that, you know, because you're talking about a 27 00:01:36,160 --> 00:01:41,920 Speaker 1: blockchain approach where every single transaction becomes part of the chain. 28 00:01:42,080 --> 00:01:44,840 Speaker 1: You can trace it from point to point and see 29 00:01:44,880 --> 00:01:48,840 Speaker 1: how many times a token changes hands. You can actually 30 00:01:48,960 --> 00:01:52,720 Speaker 1: code in essentially a royalty feature in n f t 31 00:01:52,880 --> 00:01:55,280 Speaker 1: s so that the creator of the n f T 32 00:01:55,520 --> 00:01:58,200 Speaker 1: receives a little payout every time the n f T 33 00:01:58,360 --> 00:02:01,480 Speaker 1: goes through a transaction. So in that way, n f 34 00:02:01,520 --> 00:02:04,360 Speaker 1: t s are actually superior to a physical piece of 35 00:02:04,480 --> 00:02:07,840 Speaker 1: art because an artist can only sell an original work 36 00:02:07,840 --> 00:02:11,600 Speaker 1: of art once. Uh. They could, you know, create copies 37 00:02:11,760 --> 00:02:14,959 Speaker 1: and and and sell those as well, but the original 38 00:02:15,080 --> 00:02:18,400 Speaker 1: they only sell once and then whatever happens after that, 39 00:02:18,600 --> 00:02:21,880 Speaker 1: it's out of the artist's hands literally, So in that way, 40 00:02:22,000 --> 00:02:24,520 Speaker 1: n f t s can be superior. U. I still 41 00:02:24,560 --> 00:02:30,160 Speaker 1: think that they are wasteful, uh and speculative, but that 42 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:32,760 Speaker 1: is an important thing to actually note, So thank you 43 00:02:32,800 --> 00:02:36,720 Speaker 1: against Tadler. Anyway, that got me to thinking about digital 44 00:02:36,840 --> 00:02:42,480 Speaker 1: rights management, and the whole point of DRM is ostensibly 45 00:02:43,000 --> 00:02:46,600 Speaker 1: to make certain that the party that holds the intellectual 46 00:02:46,720 --> 00:02:51,200 Speaker 1: rights to a certain digital property is able to exercise 47 00:02:51,320 --> 00:02:55,600 Speaker 1: those rights. Uh, you know, digital stuff is different from 48 00:02:55,600 --> 00:02:57,480 Speaker 1: physical stuff. I mean, that's one of the reasons that 49 00:02:57,600 --> 00:02:59,800 Speaker 1: n f t s are a thing, right, is that 50 00:03:00,880 --> 00:03:04,920 Speaker 1: you can't treat digital the same way you would, you know, 51 00:03:05,000 --> 00:03:11,600 Speaker 1: an analog physical thing, because you can copy stuff and 52 00:03:11,760 --> 00:03:16,120 Speaker 1: easily distribute it wholesale, as opposed to if if I'm 53 00:03:16,120 --> 00:03:18,960 Speaker 1: selling something physical that that takes a lot more effort 54 00:03:19,040 --> 00:03:24,320 Speaker 1: to make a copy and transfer it. So that's the idea, 55 00:03:24,440 --> 00:03:28,040 Speaker 1: but in practice it's typically used to prevent folks from 56 00:03:28,080 --> 00:03:32,920 Speaker 1: gaining unauthorized access to hardware or software, particularly in the 57 00:03:32,960 --> 00:03:35,960 Speaker 1: Internet age, though the concepts of d r M actually 58 00:03:36,040 --> 00:03:40,160 Speaker 1: predate the Internet, and often folks will use the term 59 00:03:40,200 --> 00:03:43,200 Speaker 1: as a blanket term when really they might mean something 60 00:03:43,240 --> 00:03:48,640 Speaker 1: more specific like copy protection, which is one aspect of DRM, 61 00:03:49,200 --> 00:03:52,720 Speaker 1: or they might mean technological protection measures, which I would 62 00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:56,400 Speaker 1: argue is a little more broad than DRM. But anyway, 63 00:03:56,800 --> 00:03:59,280 Speaker 1: it's meant to cut off people's ability to copy or 64 00:03:59,440 --> 00:04:03,440 Speaker 1: steal stuff, or, as is frequently the case with tech 65 00:04:03,520 --> 00:04:08,720 Speaker 1: like printers, for example, to go outside a company's ecosystem. 66 00:04:08,720 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 1: By that, I mean companies like Cannon have incorporated DRM 67 00:04:13,080 --> 00:04:16,159 Speaker 1: to prevent people from using just any kind of toner 68 00:04:16,279 --> 00:04:20,799 Speaker 1: cartridge with their Cannon printers, something that the company recently 69 00:04:20,839 --> 00:04:23,160 Speaker 1: had to walk back a bit. In fact, let's talk 70 00:04:23,160 --> 00:04:27,920 Speaker 1: about that for a moment. So Cannon was using toner 71 00:04:27,960 --> 00:04:31,919 Speaker 1: cartridges that had a little chip in them, and the 72 00:04:32,160 --> 00:04:35,640 Speaker 1: Cannon printer would scan and look for that chip to 73 00:04:35,839 --> 00:04:40,320 Speaker 1: verify that the toner you just put into the uh, 74 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:42,919 Speaker 1: the toner cartridge that you just put into the printer 75 00:04:43,480 --> 00:04:47,200 Speaker 1: was in fact an official Cannon toner cartridge. And this 76 00:04:47,279 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 1: is kind of a DRM. If it didn't detect the chip, 77 00:04:50,279 --> 00:04:52,760 Speaker 1: then you wouldn't be able to use the toner because 78 00:04:52,800 --> 00:04:55,200 Speaker 1: the printers like, no, no, no, you should only be 79 00:04:55,279 --> 00:05:00,240 Speaker 1: using Cannon toner. Uh. We all know that printers the 80 00:05:00,240 --> 00:05:02,400 Speaker 1: the where the money is in that toner, right, Like 81 00:05:02,760 --> 00:05:07,159 Speaker 1: you can buy a printer for an amazingly cheap price 82 00:05:07,960 --> 00:05:10,480 Speaker 1: as the toner that's gonna cost you, like just just 83 00:05:10,600 --> 00:05:12,440 Speaker 1: after a year or two, you're gonna spend way more 84 00:05:12,480 --> 00:05:15,080 Speaker 1: on toner than you ever did on the printer. So 85 00:05:15,240 --> 00:05:17,600 Speaker 1: the only way that works, obviously is if you can 86 00:05:17,680 --> 00:05:20,880 Speaker 1: lock people into that ecosystem, because if they have an 87 00:05:20,880 --> 00:05:23,800 Speaker 1: option to go somewhere else to get the toner where 88 00:05:23,839 --> 00:05:26,800 Speaker 1: they can get it more, you know, cheap than the 89 00:05:26,880 --> 00:05:30,280 Speaker 1: official source, that's what they're gonna do. So the way 90 00:05:30,320 --> 00:05:32,799 Speaker 1: Cannon was trying to get around that was by using 91 00:05:33,160 --> 00:05:38,800 Speaker 1: little chips embedded in the toner cartridges so that users 92 00:05:38,839 --> 00:05:41,320 Speaker 1: would be forced to get those cartridges to use with 93 00:05:41,360 --> 00:05:45,680 Speaker 1: their Cannon printers. But now we're in a semiconductor shortage 94 00:05:45,920 --> 00:05:49,240 Speaker 1: and Cannon can't actually get hold of the materials to 95 00:05:49,279 --> 00:05:53,560 Speaker 1: make the chips to embed in their toner cartridges, which 96 00:05:53,600 --> 00:05:56,240 Speaker 1: means that Cannon's had to produce toner cartridges that don't 97 00:05:56,240 --> 00:05:59,080 Speaker 1: have the chip, And it also means that Cannon has 98 00:05:59,080 --> 00:06:03,719 Speaker 1: had to instruct users on how to use those those 99 00:06:03,760 --> 00:06:08,360 Speaker 1: cartridges and bypass the d r M systems that are 100 00:06:08,400 --> 00:06:11,800 Speaker 1: otherwise in place. Typical technically, what that means is Cannon's 101 00:06:11,839 --> 00:06:15,360 Speaker 1: teaching people how they can get a work around on 102 00:06:15,520 --> 00:06:17,960 Speaker 1: the system that is supposed to lock you into the 103 00:06:18,000 --> 00:06:21,480 Speaker 1: Cannon ecosystem, where you know, theoretically you can go outside 104 00:06:21,520 --> 00:06:23,760 Speaker 1: of it now because Cannon's just told you how it works. 105 00:06:24,680 --> 00:06:27,240 Speaker 1: But yeah, that's that's one of the downfalls of d 106 00:06:27,400 --> 00:06:30,599 Speaker 1: r M. Now, the folks who hold intellectual property rights 107 00:06:31,040 --> 00:06:34,640 Speaker 1: saw DRM as a necessity in order to actually, you know, 108 00:06:34,760 --> 00:06:38,680 Speaker 1: profit off of the i P that they owned. So 109 00:06:39,240 --> 00:06:41,720 Speaker 1: you can think of it kind of like a lock 110 00:06:42,080 --> 00:06:46,040 Speaker 1: that's on some piece of technology, and only legit customers 111 00:06:46,080 --> 00:06:48,599 Speaker 1: are given a key to use it and only under 112 00:06:48,640 --> 00:06:53,520 Speaker 1: specific circumstances, or as the Free Software Foundation puts it, 113 00:06:53,839 --> 00:06:58,440 Speaker 1: DRM isn't really about protecting copyright or i P, but 114 00:06:58,600 --> 00:07:03,240 Speaker 1: rather controlling the use of i P, as is clearly 115 00:07:03,240 --> 00:07:08,080 Speaker 1: the case with the cannon printers. Also, DRM really describes 116 00:07:08,120 --> 00:07:12,200 Speaker 1: an overall philosophy and strategy, not a specific implementation. There 117 00:07:12,200 --> 00:07:15,880 Speaker 1: are a few really popular implementations of d r M 118 00:07:16,760 --> 00:07:21,240 Speaker 1: and a couple of flavors of that, but it's it's 119 00:07:21,280 --> 00:07:24,320 Speaker 1: more of a this is what this technology does, as 120 00:07:24,360 --> 00:07:28,480 Speaker 1: opposed to this is a very specific tech, uh, and 121 00:07:28,760 --> 00:07:33,640 Speaker 1: some people use totally different DRM methodologies than others, so 122 00:07:33,680 --> 00:07:36,720 Speaker 1: it's not a singular technology or anything like that. There 123 00:07:36,720 --> 00:07:39,880 Speaker 1: have been so many bad DRM implementations that I think 124 00:07:39,920 --> 00:07:42,760 Speaker 1: a lot of folks in the text space immediately associate 125 00:07:42,880 --> 00:07:48,920 Speaker 1: DRM with frustration and anger and betrayal. A bad DRM 126 00:07:49,000 --> 00:07:51,600 Speaker 1: solution can become a real pain in the patookas for 127 00:07:51,760 --> 00:07:56,160 Speaker 1: legit users of tech. For example, there are video games 128 00:07:56,200 --> 00:07:59,200 Speaker 1: that have DRM protections in it where it's been shown 129 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:02,840 Speaker 1: that the d r M actually negatively impacts the performance 130 00:08:02,960 --> 00:08:06,240 Speaker 1: of the game on gamers machines, So you might have 131 00:08:06,320 --> 00:08:09,200 Speaker 1: things like dropped frames, or you might not be able 132 00:08:09,200 --> 00:08:11,320 Speaker 1: to set the graphics settings as high as you think 133 00:08:11,360 --> 00:08:16,840 Speaker 1: you should based upon your hardware, because the the involvement 134 00:08:16,960 --> 00:08:21,560 Speaker 1: of DRM is actually impacting the quality of your experience. 135 00:08:22,000 --> 00:08:25,600 Speaker 1: And perhaps the most exasperating thing is that in many 136 00:08:25,640 --> 00:08:30,680 Speaker 1: cases it doesn't actually solve the problem it's meant to tackle. 137 00:08:31,360 --> 00:08:34,200 Speaker 1: So in our lock analogy, imagine you've got a gate 138 00:08:34,240 --> 00:08:36,280 Speaker 1: with a lock on it, and you've got a key 139 00:08:36,320 --> 00:08:40,760 Speaker 1: for that lock. But sometimes the lock sticks right, Sometimes 140 00:08:40,840 --> 00:08:42,840 Speaker 1: the key gets stuck in the lock and you can't 141 00:08:42,840 --> 00:08:45,120 Speaker 1: even turn it or pull it back out, and it's 142 00:08:45,160 --> 00:08:48,560 Speaker 1: just a pain to operate. Meanwhile, you look over and 143 00:08:48,559 --> 00:08:50,760 Speaker 1: you see a bunch of folks casually standing nearby with 144 00:08:50,800 --> 00:08:54,120 Speaker 1: a big old pair of bolt cutters, and you realize, well, 145 00:08:54,280 --> 00:08:56,080 Speaker 1: they just have to get the lock off once and 146 00:08:56,080 --> 00:08:57,560 Speaker 1: then they can actually go in and out of the 147 00:08:57,559 --> 00:09:01,200 Speaker 1: gate as much as they like and you know, that 148 00:09:01,360 --> 00:09:04,600 Speaker 1: seems to be the preference. That's that's the better way 149 00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:08,000 Speaker 1: of doing things. So d r M, a lot of 150 00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:10,800 Speaker 1: people argue, not only does it not solve the problem 151 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:15,640 Speaker 1: of say piracy uh or or having ownership over i P, 152 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:21,760 Speaker 1: it also hurts the legit users or customers who are 153 00:09:21,600 --> 00:09:24,920 Speaker 1: are purchasing this stuff. But let's not get too far 154 00:09:25,080 --> 00:09:28,480 Speaker 1: ahead of ourselves. Let's well, we're gonna start by talking 155 00:09:28,520 --> 00:09:31,520 Speaker 1: about the history of d r M and the various 156 00:09:31,600 --> 00:09:34,680 Speaker 1: laws that have made an imperfect solution even more of 157 00:09:34,720 --> 00:09:37,599 Speaker 1: a problem, because y' all, this starts to get absurd 158 00:09:37,960 --> 00:09:42,680 Speaker 1: when you start really thinking about it. Now, many decades ago, 159 00:09:43,480 --> 00:09:46,360 Speaker 1: even before the era of personal computers, we're talking like 160 00:09:46,920 --> 00:09:51,680 Speaker 1: nineteen fifties nineteen sixties, you typically encountered computer systems in 161 00:09:51,800 --> 00:09:56,679 Speaker 1: just a few environments. One might be academia like universities, 162 00:09:56,720 --> 00:09:59,240 Speaker 1: you know, like Stanford and m I. T. They were 163 00:09:59,280 --> 00:10:02,840 Speaker 1: working on uter systems and furthering the discipline of computer science. 164 00:10:03,880 --> 00:10:06,560 Speaker 1: Another was in certain think tanks. They might have had 165 00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:09,880 Speaker 1: access to computers, and a few businesses were starting to 166 00:10:09,920 --> 00:10:12,480 Speaker 1: adopt them. So by the nineteen sixties you had a 167 00:10:12,520 --> 00:10:17,719 Speaker 1: few big companies purchasing massive computer systems to run processes 168 00:10:17,720 --> 00:10:20,960 Speaker 1: in the background. All right, this was not yet the 169 00:10:21,000 --> 00:10:24,520 Speaker 1: era of desktop computers. That would take another decade and 170 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:29,280 Speaker 1: some change. Really, uh, you, we're really looking at massive 171 00:10:29,360 --> 00:10:32,640 Speaker 1: main frames for the most part. Now, in the early days, 172 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:38,880 Speaker 1: computers and their software were tightly coupled. You had proprietary 173 00:10:38,960 --> 00:10:43,960 Speaker 1: computer systems running proprietary software and it was only through 174 00:10:44,000 --> 00:10:48,440 Speaker 1: that pairing with specific hardware and specific software that everything worked. 175 00:10:48,600 --> 00:10:52,280 Speaker 1: Like you couldn't port the software over to a different 176 00:10:52,400 --> 00:10:57,800 Speaker 1: computer system because it wasn't compatible. In fact, in some 177 00:10:57,920 --> 00:11:00,680 Speaker 1: cases you were working with a hard wire system, a 178 00:11:00,720 --> 00:11:05,400 Speaker 1: hard coded system, where the computer system could perform certain 179 00:11:05,720 --> 00:11:11,679 Speaker 1: processes because it was hardwired to do that, and you 180 00:11:11,720 --> 00:11:16,160 Speaker 1: couldn't separate software from hardware. It was effectively firmware. So 181 00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:18,880 Speaker 1: the program would just live on a single computer and 182 00:11:18,880 --> 00:11:22,360 Speaker 1: that was that. But towards the end of the nineteen sixties, 183 00:11:22,760 --> 00:11:26,319 Speaker 1: things were starting to change and IBM saw that its 184 00:11:26,360 --> 00:11:29,440 Speaker 1: customers needed more flexibility. There was a need to be 185 00:11:29,480 --> 00:11:32,800 Speaker 1: able to move programs between machines, or to make backup 186 00:11:32,840 --> 00:11:35,560 Speaker 1: copies of software so that you would have a backup 187 00:11:35,559 --> 00:11:39,600 Speaker 1: available should something happen to your primary copy. But creating 188 00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:43,360 Speaker 1: that kind of capability would also mean that customers would 189 00:11:43,360 --> 00:11:47,400 Speaker 1: more easily be able to make illegal copies of software. 190 00:11:47,679 --> 00:11:51,160 Speaker 1: What if someone were to give away copies of that 191 00:11:51,240 --> 00:11:55,160 Speaker 1: software to colleagues, maybe even people in other companies, you know, 192 00:11:55,200 --> 00:11:59,719 Speaker 1: companies that had not purchased the software, IBM would then 193 00:11:59,760 --> 00:12:02,320 Speaker 1: be out of a customer. So we'll talk about what 194 00:12:02,360 --> 00:12:06,080 Speaker 1: IBM did in just a moment, but first let's take 195 00:12:06,440 --> 00:12:17,880 Speaker 1: a quick break. Okay, So IBM is looking at ways 196 00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:22,880 Speaker 1: to allow customers more flexibility with their software, but also 197 00:12:23,160 --> 00:12:28,800 Speaker 1: preventing the wholesale copying of software, so that IBM doesn't 198 00:12:28,840 --> 00:12:31,400 Speaker 1: just sell one copy and then that's it, right, Then 199 00:12:31,440 --> 00:12:34,520 Speaker 1: it just goes viral as people start copying. And of 200 00:12:34,520 --> 00:12:36,840 Speaker 1: course these are this is the old days, is pre Internet, 201 00:12:37,320 --> 00:12:40,280 Speaker 1: or at least pre Internet in any meaningful way, and 202 00:12:40,440 --> 00:12:43,760 Speaker 1: so you know, we're talking about physical copies at this point, 203 00:12:44,400 --> 00:12:46,080 Speaker 1: and one of the things they were looking at was 204 00:12:46,080 --> 00:12:49,120 Speaker 1: a cryptographic approach. This would be like the lock and 205 00:12:49,200 --> 00:12:52,160 Speaker 1: key technique I was talking about before the break, where 206 00:12:52,280 --> 00:12:55,240 Speaker 1: only entities that have a legit key would be able 207 00:12:55,280 --> 00:12:59,280 Speaker 1: to use that software. But IBM saw that this was 208 00:12:59,320 --> 00:13:01,959 Speaker 1: a poor swan because it would make the software harder 209 00:13:02,000 --> 00:13:06,280 Speaker 1: to use, and perhaps most important, it would be expensive 210 00:13:06,480 --> 00:13:09,959 Speaker 1: for IBM to implement. And also there was a concern 211 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:13,200 Speaker 1: that if you were to update your system, the method 212 00:13:13,200 --> 00:13:17,000 Speaker 1: of encryption may no longer be valid, that you would 213 00:13:17,040 --> 00:13:21,320 Speaker 1: have to consistently update the DRM as well as whatever 214 00:13:21,360 --> 00:13:24,000 Speaker 1: the operating system was. It was just it was becoming 215 00:13:24,000 --> 00:13:27,960 Speaker 1: a nightmare. And so what s Humphrey, who worked at 216 00:13:27,960 --> 00:13:30,959 Speaker 1: IBM in the nineteen sixties would end up saying, quote, 217 00:13:31,240 --> 00:13:35,080 Speaker 1: because we could not devise practical physical security measures, we 218 00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:38,280 Speaker 1: had to rely on the inherent honesty of our customers. 219 00:13:38,559 --> 00:13:41,720 Speaker 1: Our hope was that legal protection and criminal prosecution would 220 00:13:41,760 --> 00:13:44,640 Speaker 1: limit the piracy problem end quote. So in other words, 221 00:13:45,000 --> 00:13:51,640 Speaker 1: IBM came to the conclusion that forcing any kind of DRM, 222 00:13:51,679 --> 00:13:55,440 Speaker 1: although it wasn't called it that yet uh would end 223 00:13:55,520 --> 00:13:58,480 Speaker 1: up causing more harm than good. So IBM decided not 224 00:13:58,520 --> 00:14:00,600 Speaker 1: to go down that route that we would later call 225 00:14:00,679 --> 00:14:03,679 Speaker 1: DRM because the downsides were greater than the positives. At 226 00:14:03,760 --> 00:14:06,040 Speaker 1: least that's the conclusion the company came to in the 227 00:14:06,080 --> 00:14:10,040 Speaker 1: nineteen sixties. If you flash forward three decades, the company 228 00:14:10,080 --> 00:14:12,440 Speaker 1: who had a very different point of view, and we'll 229 00:14:12,440 --> 00:14:16,439 Speaker 1: get there now. In the late nineteen seventies, Apple executives 230 00:14:16,440 --> 00:14:19,160 Speaker 1: and managers were deep in a conversation about creating a 231 00:14:19,200 --> 00:14:22,840 Speaker 1: solution to protect Apple software and prevent folks from being 232 00:14:22,880 --> 00:14:26,120 Speaker 1: able to make copies of it. So this is the 233 00:14:26,240 --> 00:14:30,080 Speaker 1: early age of personal computers, where you frequently would purchase 234 00:14:30,160 --> 00:14:33,160 Speaker 1: programs on a floppy disk, and you would insert that 235 00:14:33,160 --> 00:14:37,200 Speaker 1: floppy disk into a floppy disk drive attached to a computer, 236 00:14:37,640 --> 00:14:40,760 Speaker 1: and then you would run a program off the disk. Well, 237 00:14:40,840 --> 00:14:43,840 Speaker 1: with the ability to copy the contents of one disk 238 00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:47,480 Speaker 1: onto a blank disc, that meant there was a risk 239 00:14:47,600 --> 00:14:50,240 Speaker 1: that you would sell one copy, the customer would then 240 00:14:50,240 --> 00:14:52,800 Speaker 1: produce a ton of copies on their own and then 241 00:14:52,840 --> 00:14:56,480 Speaker 1: either undercut you or worse yet, distribute them for free 242 00:14:56,520 --> 00:15:00,680 Speaker 1: to other people. I think of the children. So folks 243 00:15:00,720 --> 00:15:06,560 Speaker 1: like Randy Wingington and Apple's co founder Steve Wozniak debated 244 00:15:06,680 --> 00:15:10,400 Speaker 1: on solutions that could cut back on or outright prevent 245 00:15:10,920 --> 00:15:15,440 Speaker 1: software piracy. They outlined different levels of DRM. Again, it 246 00:15:15,480 --> 00:15:18,120 Speaker 1: wasn't called DRM. It was really was more like levels 247 00:15:18,160 --> 00:15:22,840 Speaker 1: of copy protection. So if a copy protection were perfect, 248 00:15:23,160 --> 00:15:25,120 Speaker 1: they would describe it as level one. It would be 249 00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:28,960 Speaker 1: the most restrictive and it would prevent attempts to copy 250 00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:32,480 Speaker 1: the software illegally. Uh, and it went all the way 251 00:15:32,560 --> 00:15:35,120 Speaker 1: down to level five. This would be the least secure 252 00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:38,760 Speaker 1: at eight percent effectiveness. So there's still some copy protection 253 00:15:38,800 --> 00:15:41,760 Speaker 1: there um. And essentially what they were saying is we 254 00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:44,160 Speaker 1: you know this, this level of copy protection. Eight out 255 00:15:44,200 --> 00:15:47,640 Speaker 1: of ten computer users would not bother to try and 256 00:15:47,680 --> 00:15:51,000 Speaker 1: work around it. But if you were determined, you could 257 00:15:51,000 --> 00:15:55,320 Speaker 1: find your way around that copy protection. And again, this 258 00:15:55,400 --> 00:15:59,520 Speaker 1: was just a way of classifying potential solutions. And we 259 00:15:59,680 --> 00:16:02,760 Speaker 1: know about all of this because a person who goes 260 00:16:02,880 --> 00:16:07,400 Speaker 1: by the handle of vader Mere on Reddit happened to 261 00:16:07,520 --> 00:16:11,800 Speaker 1: come across a bundle of Apple internal memos, like the 262 00:16:11,840 --> 00:16:15,920 Speaker 1: physical paper and ink kind of memos. They found the 263 00:16:15,960 --> 00:16:19,040 Speaker 1: bundle of documents in a goodwill store, and those documents 264 00:16:19,080 --> 00:16:21,960 Speaker 1: detailed the back and forth between various engineers and Apple 265 00:16:22,520 --> 00:16:27,720 Speaker 1: about potential copy protection solutions, and nearly every proposal was 266 00:16:27,760 --> 00:16:31,080 Speaker 1: dismissed as either being too easy to get around or 267 00:16:31,160 --> 00:16:35,000 Speaker 1: too difficult to implement, or too expensive to consider, or 268 00:16:35,000 --> 00:16:39,080 Speaker 1: too inconvenient for the end user, or some combination thereof. 269 00:16:39,760 --> 00:16:44,160 Speaker 1: So again, these were very smart people all debating the 270 00:16:44,240 --> 00:16:48,600 Speaker 1: possibility of creating various copy protection strategies and realizing the 271 00:16:48,680 --> 00:16:52,760 Speaker 1: downsides might be greater than any kind of benefit they 272 00:16:52,840 --> 00:16:56,960 Speaker 1: might grant. I actually remember computer games in the nineteen 273 00:16:57,000 --> 00:17:00,000 Speaker 1: eighties that would have their own takes on copy protection, 274 00:17:00,040 --> 00:17:04,240 Speaker 1: and these wouldn't necessarily count as DRN, but there is 275 00:17:04,280 --> 00:17:07,600 Speaker 1: some overlap with DRM there. For example, I remember I 276 00:17:07,640 --> 00:17:09,840 Speaker 1: had a game that would prompt you to provide an 277 00:17:09,840 --> 00:17:12,720 Speaker 1: answer to a question early on in the game. Like 278 00:17:12,760 --> 00:17:15,560 Speaker 1: you could start the game, you could start playing, but 279 00:17:15,640 --> 00:17:18,639 Speaker 1: before very long you would get a question posed to 280 00:17:18,640 --> 00:17:21,840 Speaker 1: you and the answer would be found in the game's manual. 281 00:17:22,240 --> 00:17:25,720 Speaker 1: Like back then, games came with physical manuals that you 282 00:17:25,720 --> 00:17:29,320 Speaker 1: would have. Uh. Some of those manuals would be printed 283 00:17:29,400 --> 00:17:33,399 Speaker 1: on dark paper, dark ink on dark paper, because the 284 00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:37,359 Speaker 1: game companies figured that folks weren't just copying video games 285 00:17:37,359 --> 00:17:40,119 Speaker 1: onto blank discs, they were also going to the local 286 00:17:40,200 --> 00:17:44,560 Speaker 1: photocopier and copying the manuals too, and getting around this 287 00:17:44,640 --> 00:17:48,560 Speaker 1: kind of rudimentary copy protection strategy. So the dark paper 288 00:17:48,560 --> 00:17:51,159 Speaker 1: with dark ink would foil most copiers. They would just 289 00:17:51,240 --> 00:17:53,800 Speaker 1: produce black pages. I want to say one of the 290 00:17:53,840 --> 00:17:57,199 Speaker 1: Wizardry games did that, but I could be wrong, But 291 00:17:57,280 --> 00:18:00,040 Speaker 1: playing those games was kind of a hassle because you 292 00:18:00,080 --> 00:18:02,400 Speaker 1: have to have the manual handy and flip through it 293 00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:04,879 Speaker 1: while all you really wanted to do was just play 294 00:18:04,920 --> 00:18:06,800 Speaker 1: the darn game. Let's say that you know, you went 295 00:18:06,840 --> 00:18:09,240 Speaker 1: out there and bought the game with your hard earned money, 296 00:18:09,400 --> 00:18:13,320 Speaker 1: like for me from cutting the lawn over and over again, 297 00:18:13,480 --> 00:18:15,480 Speaker 1: even if it didn't need it. Gosh darn it, because 298 00:18:15,480 --> 00:18:19,680 Speaker 1: I needs those games. And I end up handing over 299 00:18:19,760 --> 00:18:22,160 Speaker 1: my allowance money or the law and more money, whatever 300 00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:23,879 Speaker 1: it was, And and I get a game, and I 301 00:18:23,920 --> 00:18:26,720 Speaker 1: come home and now it's just a pain in the 302 00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:29,200 Speaker 1: butt to play because there's this copy protection I have 303 00:18:29,280 --> 00:18:32,320 Speaker 1: to get around. Uh. That plays into the issue with 304 00:18:32,400 --> 00:18:36,960 Speaker 1: DR and potentially being inconvenient for legit users. In fact, 305 00:18:37,440 --> 00:18:39,240 Speaker 1: it would start to tell you that maybe I just 306 00:18:39,280 --> 00:18:41,400 Speaker 1: want a cracked version of this game so I don't 307 00:18:41,480 --> 00:18:43,760 Speaker 1: have to deal with that. It's not because I want 308 00:18:43,760 --> 00:18:46,920 Speaker 1: to steal the game, but just because this is a 309 00:18:46,960 --> 00:18:51,120 Speaker 1: barrier between me and experiencing the thing I want to experience. 310 00:18:52,040 --> 00:18:55,520 Speaker 1: But we really shifted into high gear with DRM in 311 00:18:55,560 --> 00:18:58,399 Speaker 1: the nineteen nineties. This is also when we saw the 312 00:18:58,440 --> 00:19:01,200 Speaker 1: birth of the World Wide Web, which for many people 313 00:19:01,480 --> 00:19:04,760 Speaker 1: was their first exposure to the Internet. And again, the 314 00:19:04,800 --> 00:19:07,359 Speaker 1: Internet had actually been around for a while before the 315 00:19:07,400 --> 00:19:10,560 Speaker 1: Worldwide Web came along, but really only a fraction of 316 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,480 Speaker 1: the general public were even aware that it was a thing. 317 00:19:14,240 --> 00:19:18,360 Speaker 1: Most people didn't know. Unless you were, you know, actively 318 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:21,159 Speaker 1: working on our bonnet, or you were a college student 319 00:19:21,200 --> 00:19:23,760 Speaker 1: at the time in in one of the computer labs, 320 00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:27,160 Speaker 1: you probably didn't even know the Internet existed. The Web 321 00:19:27,240 --> 00:19:30,520 Speaker 1: represented a new way to access information, and that included 322 00:19:30,600 --> 00:19:34,640 Speaker 1: information that could be under copyright protection. And you know, well, 323 00:19:34,680 --> 00:19:38,679 Speaker 1: folks say information wants to be free, the parties that 324 00:19:38,760 --> 00:19:42,760 Speaker 1: hold copyrights might not always feel the same way. Now, 325 00:19:42,840 --> 00:19:47,399 Speaker 1: I should add this is understandable if you were to 326 00:19:47,440 --> 00:19:51,600 Speaker 1: pour your time and effort and talent into creating something 327 00:19:52,400 --> 00:19:55,280 Speaker 1: like let's say it's a novel, and you wanted to 328 00:19:55,359 --> 00:19:58,000 Speaker 1: earn money off your work. If you thought this is 329 00:19:58,080 --> 00:20:02,560 Speaker 1: something worth paying for, I want to become a professional novelist, 330 00:20:03,359 --> 00:20:06,399 Speaker 1: you would be concerned about folks skirting around the whole 331 00:20:07,040 --> 00:20:11,280 Speaker 1: paying for your work thing. They'd get to experience your work, 332 00:20:11,760 --> 00:20:14,800 Speaker 1: but you'd make no profit from it. Now, I say 333 00:20:14,840 --> 00:20:18,439 Speaker 1: this because I know I tend to come down pretty 334 00:20:18,480 --> 00:20:24,080 Speaker 1: hard against corporations and stuff and for lots of good reasons. 335 00:20:24,280 --> 00:20:28,480 Speaker 1: Corporations often make bone headed decisions. But I also want 336 00:20:28,480 --> 00:20:31,160 Speaker 1: to make it clear that I do see the need 337 00:20:31,280 --> 00:20:35,760 Speaker 1: and value of copyright, like I see the reason for it. 338 00:20:36,119 --> 00:20:39,000 Speaker 1: I don't think it needs to be nearly as extensive 339 00:20:39,040 --> 00:20:42,480 Speaker 1: as what we have here in America, but I digress. Also, 340 00:20:42,520 --> 00:20:45,680 Speaker 1: by the way, I say that as the son of 341 00:20:46,080 --> 00:20:50,520 Speaker 1: two authors who have published numerous books, the way copyright 342 00:20:50,600 --> 00:20:53,640 Speaker 1: law is right now, assuming that my parents were too 343 00:20:54,240 --> 00:20:59,080 Speaker 1: uh to grant the ongoing rights to either me or, say, 344 00:20:59,200 --> 00:21:04,040 Speaker 1: my sister, uh, we would be able to collect royalties 345 00:21:04,119 --> 00:21:07,880 Speaker 1: on works for the rest of our lives. Uh. But 346 00:21:08,240 --> 00:21:10,840 Speaker 1: you know, I don't care about that so much. I 347 00:21:10,840 --> 00:21:14,679 Speaker 1: think it needs to be less expansive than it is. 348 00:21:15,240 --> 00:21:19,159 Speaker 1: But I digress. So the ninety nineties hit and the 349 00:21:19,200 --> 00:21:23,359 Speaker 1: web provided a new way to distribute information and files, 350 00:21:23,359 --> 00:21:25,760 Speaker 1: so there was a need for some sort of mechanism 351 00:21:25,880 --> 00:21:30,600 Speaker 1: to make sure folks couldn't just steal stuff. Like if 352 00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:34,560 Speaker 1: you wanted to sell digital files on your website, you 353 00:21:34,600 --> 00:21:38,080 Speaker 1: would probably want a method to keep folks from copying 354 00:21:38,119 --> 00:21:43,600 Speaker 1: your products without limitations. But have no fear. A man 355 00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:47,560 Speaker 1: with a degree in sociology will soon be here as 356 00:21:47,600 --> 00:21:58,160 Speaker 1: soon as we take this quick break. Okay, before the break, 357 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:03,200 Speaker 1: I teased the entrance of Victor Shear, so in nine 358 00:22:04,400 --> 00:22:09,159 Speaker 1: uh he founded a company called Electronic Publishing Resources, but 359 00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:14,479 Speaker 1: soon they renamed this company inter Trust. Sheer had an 360 00:22:14,520 --> 00:22:18,880 Speaker 1: amazingly prescient vision of what the Internet would allow. In fact, 361 00:22:18,920 --> 00:22:22,200 Speaker 1: this is before Tim berners Lee had established the first 362 00:22:22,240 --> 00:22:26,480 Speaker 1: web server. In fact, this is before the National Science Foundation, 363 00:22:26,840 --> 00:22:30,160 Speaker 1: which had dominion over the Internet back in those days, 364 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:33,600 Speaker 1: had even lifted the restrictions on the commercial use of 365 00:22:33,640 --> 00:22:38,080 Speaker 1: the Internet. The NSF wouldn't do that till and Sheer 366 00:22:38,160 --> 00:22:43,360 Speaker 1: founded Electronic Publishing Resources the year before. So uh, he 367 00:22:43,400 --> 00:22:46,920 Speaker 1: really saw where where the path was leading. He saw 368 00:22:46,960 --> 00:22:49,160 Speaker 1: that the Internet was going to become the marketplace where 369 00:22:49,160 --> 00:22:53,600 Speaker 1: people would buy and sell digital goods. But how do 370 00:22:53,640 --> 00:22:56,560 Speaker 1: you make that work? How do you make a stable 371 00:22:56,720 --> 00:23:01,679 Speaker 1: marketplace for the the per just sing and selling and 372 00:23:01,760 --> 00:23:05,160 Speaker 1: transferring of digital goods so that it doesn't just become 373 00:23:05,200 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 1: a chaotic mess. How can you assure that the rights 374 00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:12,200 Speaker 1: holder to say, a certain song, will not see their 375 00:23:12,240 --> 00:23:15,919 Speaker 1: song just copied and distributed across the entire Internet. What 376 00:23:16,119 --> 00:23:19,399 Speaker 1: was needed was a method to wrap files up into 377 00:23:19,440 --> 00:23:22,719 Speaker 1: a container of some sort, and the container would have 378 00:23:22,920 --> 00:23:26,600 Speaker 1: special rules associated with it, rules that the container would 379 00:23:26,640 --> 00:23:29,959 Speaker 1: only uh, you know, allow users to do so, Like 380 00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:32,240 Speaker 1: if it was within the rule set, it was fine. 381 00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:34,760 Speaker 1: If it was outside, it wouldn't allow access to the 382 00:23:34,840 --> 00:23:39,119 Speaker 1: file inside the container. Rules like how many times the 383 00:23:39,160 --> 00:23:42,840 Speaker 1: file might be accessed. It could be something like a 384 00:23:42,840 --> 00:23:48,000 Speaker 1: a subscription service where you would have to continuously pay 385 00:23:48,000 --> 00:23:52,359 Speaker 1: a subscription fee in order to have continued use of 386 00:23:52,359 --> 00:23:55,320 Speaker 1: a specific file. Uh. Maybe it would be on how 387 00:23:55,359 --> 00:23:58,800 Speaker 1: many machines you can install the file. We saw this 388 00:23:58,880 --> 00:24:02,679 Speaker 1: a lot with music file else where companies were creating 389 00:24:02,760 --> 00:24:06,359 Speaker 1: limitations on how many machines you could install a particular 390 00:24:07,320 --> 00:24:10,520 Speaker 1: album before you would get a message saying sorry, you've 391 00:24:10,760 --> 00:24:14,119 Speaker 1: you've put this on the max number of machines you 392 00:24:14,160 --> 00:24:16,760 Speaker 1: can have it on. Same with video games like that. 393 00:24:16,760 --> 00:24:18,879 Speaker 1: That was a big thing with video games too, where 394 00:24:19,240 --> 00:24:22,439 Speaker 1: you could purchase a game and you might get a 395 00:24:22,440 --> 00:24:25,280 Speaker 1: message saying, no, you've already got this installed on another machine, 396 00:24:25,280 --> 00:24:27,760 Speaker 1: so you can't install it on this computer, which is 397 00:24:27,760 --> 00:24:29,240 Speaker 1: a real pain in the butt if you're doing things 398 00:24:29,320 --> 00:24:32,800 Speaker 1: like upgrading your computer system, or you happen to have 399 00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:34,960 Speaker 1: multiple computers and you just want to be able to 400 00:24:34,960 --> 00:24:39,200 Speaker 1: port the experience from one machine to another. DRM would 401 00:24:39,280 --> 00:24:43,840 Speaker 1: sometimes interfere with that, but anyway, Uh, those were the 402 00:24:43,840 --> 00:24:46,240 Speaker 1: sort of rules that would be associated with these containers. 403 00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:49,040 Speaker 1: That was Sheer's vision. Again, not bad for a fellow 404 00:24:49,080 --> 00:24:53,120 Speaker 1: who had a sociology degree, and he would file several 405 00:24:53,160 --> 00:24:57,520 Speaker 1: patents around this idea. And it was Sheer who called 406 00:24:57,560 --> 00:25:01,040 Speaker 1: it a digital rights Management strate to g so that's 407 00:25:01,040 --> 00:25:04,119 Speaker 1: where dr M comes from. The patents would end up 408 00:25:04,160 --> 00:25:07,560 Speaker 1: making headlines later on when Intertrust, a company that at 409 00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:11,520 Speaker 1: the time had fewer than forty employees, filed a massive 410 00:25:11,600 --> 00:25:16,960 Speaker 1: lawsuit against Microsoft claiming infringement, saying that Microsoft was making 411 00:25:17,040 --> 00:25:22,399 Speaker 1: use of DRM technology without actually paying Intertrust for for 412 00:25:22,480 --> 00:25:25,159 Speaker 1: using it. The battle would last a few years, but 413 00:25:25,280 --> 00:25:28,879 Speaker 1: Microsoft ultimately would settle out of court and pay Intertrust 414 00:25:29,040 --> 00:25:33,080 Speaker 1: hundreds of millions of dollars in the process. Something similar 415 00:25:33,119 --> 00:25:38,040 Speaker 1: happened between Intertrust and Apple almost a decade later. But 416 00:25:38,400 --> 00:25:42,320 Speaker 1: around that same time, work out of Xerox's famous park 417 00:25:42,600 --> 00:25:45,359 Speaker 1: department that's p a r C. It stands for Palo 418 00:25:45,400 --> 00:25:49,520 Speaker 1: Alto Research Center, they would develop a different approach to 419 00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:51,719 Speaker 1: d r M, one that took into account not just 420 00:25:51,840 --> 00:25:56,640 Speaker 1: copy protection, but the transference of files. That project would 421 00:25:56,720 --> 00:26:00,080 Speaker 1: evolve into a product called content Guard. So yeah, the 422 00:26:00,359 --> 00:26:05,399 Speaker 1: digibox from Intertrust and content Guard originally from Xerox, and 423 00:26:05,440 --> 00:26:09,760 Speaker 1: then IBM. You remember them, the company that said that 424 00:26:09,960 --> 00:26:13,440 Speaker 1: you know, a DRM approach would be bad for business. Well, 425 00:26:13,480 --> 00:26:18,679 Speaker 1: they developed a cryptographic envelope methodology to send files inside 426 00:26:18,760 --> 00:26:22,440 Speaker 1: as a type of DRM. They called it cryptolope, which 427 00:26:22,480 --> 00:26:24,960 Speaker 1: sounds like something too young vampires in love would do 428 00:26:25,080 --> 00:26:30,240 Speaker 1: if their parents didn't approve of their relationship. Cryptolope, You're 429 00:26:30,280 --> 00:26:34,320 Speaker 1: welcome anyway. By now, we were into the late nineties 430 00:26:34,480 --> 00:26:36,879 Speaker 1: and in the United States, Congress was hashing out a 431 00:26:36,920 --> 00:26:40,439 Speaker 1: new law to address copyright issues in the digital age. 432 00:26:41,480 --> 00:26:46,320 Speaker 1: In fact, this was the infamous Digital Millennium Copyright Act 433 00:26:46,520 --> 00:26:48,720 Speaker 1: or d m c A. Like when you hear about 434 00:26:48,720 --> 00:26:51,760 Speaker 1: someone getting a d m c A strike, it relates 435 00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:56,000 Speaker 1: back to this law, which became a law. Now. A 436 00:26:56,040 --> 00:26:58,000 Speaker 1: big reason for the d m c A was that 437 00:26:58,040 --> 00:27:00,639 Speaker 1: folks were now able to make digital copis of stuff 438 00:27:01,000 --> 00:27:03,640 Speaker 1: and make them available over the Internet, and a big 439 00:27:03,640 --> 00:27:06,600 Speaker 1: part of this was digital music. This was before the 440 00:27:06,640 --> 00:27:10,199 Speaker 1: iTunes music store that wouldn't launch until two thousand three. 441 00:27:10,320 --> 00:27:12,840 Speaker 1: But there was another way to get digital music. So 442 00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:15,800 Speaker 1: some of y'all might be too young to remember this, 443 00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:18,520 Speaker 1: but back in the day, the way you would get 444 00:27:18,520 --> 00:27:21,160 Speaker 1: digital music onto a device, you know, like an MP 445 00:27:21,320 --> 00:27:24,000 Speaker 1: three player, that's what we called him back then, before 446 00:27:24,040 --> 00:27:27,600 Speaker 1: we had smartphones. Well, you would take your music collection 447 00:27:28,040 --> 00:27:30,920 Speaker 1: from c d s and you would use a CD 448 00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:34,400 Speaker 1: ROM drive connected to a computer, and then you would 449 00:27:34,480 --> 00:27:37,440 Speaker 1: use a program to rip the music from those c 450 00:27:37,640 --> 00:27:40,800 Speaker 1: ds and convert them into music files, and then you 451 00:27:40,800 --> 00:27:44,400 Speaker 1: would transfer those files via a cable to the MP 452 00:27:44,480 --> 00:27:47,040 Speaker 1: three player. There was no wireless MP three's back in 453 00:27:47,119 --> 00:27:51,240 Speaker 1: those days, but this meant that you'd have musical files 454 00:27:51,520 --> 00:27:56,000 Speaker 1: on your computer. You could potentially send those files to 455 00:27:56,040 --> 00:27:59,040 Speaker 1: someone else or save them to some other disc and 456 00:27:59,160 --> 00:28:01,520 Speaker 1: you could listen to music without actually paying for it. 457 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:05,760 Speaker 1: The horror. And then we had the rise of peer 458 00:28:05,800 --> 00:28:08,840 Speaker 1: to peer networks, and those made it way easier to 459 00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:12,800 Speaker 1: distribute files like music files across a large group of computers. 460 00:28:12,840 --> 00:28:15,120 Speaker 1: You know, I had Napster and Kazan and those kind 461 00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:17,840 Speaker 1: of of peer to peer networks, So you had a 462 00:28:17,880 --> 00:28:21,280 Speaker 1: subset of folks who were uploading and downloading music files 463 00:28:21,320 --> 00:28:25,439 Speaker 1: like crazy anyway, DRM was one method to try and 464 00:28:25,520 --> 00:28:29,560 Speaker 1: prevent folks from just copying music wholesale, and one of 465 00:28:29,560 --> 00:28:32,080 Speaker 1: the things that the d m c A did was 466 00:28:32,119 --> 00:28:35,040 Speaker 1: to make it a crime to try and circumvent the 467 00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:38,720 Speaker 1: DRM protections on files. Now here's where we get into 468 00:28:38,800 --> 00:28:42,520 Speaker 1: a weird paradox that still makes my brain melt. All right, 469 00:28:43,240 --> 00:28:46,240 Speaker 1: let's quickly talk about making a copy for the purposes 470 00:28:46,360 --> 00:28:50,680 Speaker 1: of a backup here. Generally speaking, the US government has 471 00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:53,960 Speaker 1: ruled that it's okay to make a copy of stuff 472 00:28:54,000 --> 00:28:57,400 Speaker 1: you own for the purposes of a backup. So, for example, 473 00:28:58,120 --> 00:29:01,400 Speaker 1: I have a small collection of Vinyl records. I might 474 00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:04,360 Speaker 1: want to make a digital backup of those Vinyl records 475 00:29:04,440 --> 00:29:07,720 Speaker 1: so that should anything happen to my physical collection, I 476 00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:10,479 Speaker 1: still have the music. Now, granted, a lot of this 477 00:29:10,520 --> 00:29:12,680 Speaker 1: example kind of doesn't work in the era of on 478 00:29:12,800 --> 00:29:15,960 Speaker 1: demand streaming music, but just stick with me here. The 479 00:29:16,040 --> 00:29:20,120 Speaker 1: point is if I made a copy of that Vinyl 480 00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:24,520 Speaker 1: record album collection just as a backup for myself and 481 00:29:24,560 --> 00:29:27,120 Speaker 1: that was it, I'd pretty much be in the clear. 482 00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:29,880 Speaker 1: I mean, that is considered acceptable. It kind of falls 483 00:29:29,880 --> 00:29:33,160 Speaker 1: in line with fair use. Fair use is a collection 484 00:29:33,200 --> 00:29:37,160 Speaker 1: of legal exceptions that allow folks to copy or otherwise 485 00:29:37,160 --> 00:29:40,200 Speaker 1: make use of material that they don't own. The copyright 486 00:29:40,320 --> 00:29:45,840 Speaker 1: for um fair use, though, is a tricky subject anyway. 487 00:29:45,920 --> 00:29:49,400 Speaker 1: In the era of DRN, making backup copies is way 488 00:29:49,440 --> 00:29:53,560 Speaker 1: more complicated and infuriating. A lot of d r M 489 00:29:53,720 --> 00:29:58,680 Speaker 1: just outright prevents customers from making a copy, including backup copies. 490 00:29:59,320 --> 00:30:03,680 Speaker 1: So it's legal to make backups of your stuff, now, 491 00:30:03,720 --> 00:30:07,160 Speaker 1: that's what the courts have said repeatedly. What the d 492 00:30:07,280 --> 00:30:11,160 Speaker 1: M c A does however, as it says, well, yeah, 493 00:30:11,240 --> 00:30:12,920 Speaker 1: it's okay for you to make a copy of your 494 00:30:12,920 --> 00:30:16,880 Speaker 1: stuff for the purposes of backup, but it's not okay 495 00:30:17,000 --> 00:30:21,000 Speaker 1: to get around the DRM protections that prevent you from 496 00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:25,120 Speaker 1: making a copy. So this is a classic catch twenty two. 497 00:30:25,560 --> 00:30:28,520 Speaker 1: You could make a legal backup copy if you could 498 00:30:28,560 --> 00:30:30,880 Speaker 1: get around the d r M, but getting around the 499 00:30:30,960 --> 00:30:36,720 Speaker 1: DRM is illegal. Other countries adopted similar legislation, which meant 500 00:30:36,760 --> 00:30:44,600 Speaker 1: now that DRM has legal protection and people don't. Yikes. Uh, 501 00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:46,560 Speaker 1: this kind of leads to lots of problems. I mean, 502 00:30:46,600 --> 00:30:49,600 Speaker 1: we've got the issue with the individual users. That's a 503 00:30:49,640 --> 00:30:52,120 Speaker 1: problem right there. Like if you aren't allowed to make 504 00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:56,840 Speaker 1: a backup copy because of that protection. That's really frustrating. 505 00:30:57,360 --> 00:31:01,880 Speaker 1: But another big one is archival and president vation of works. See, 506 00:31:02,720 --> 00:31:06,040 Speaker 1: the way we store stuff evolves over time, and that 507 00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:09,280 Speaker 1: also means that the older methods we were relying upon 508 00:31:09,520 --> 00:31:13,960 Speaker 1: in decades past gradually become obsolete. Like let's go back 509 00:31:13,960 --> 00:31:16,440 Speaker 1: to floppy drives. I'm sure some of you out there 510 00:31:16,440 --> 00:31:19,640 Speaker 1: listening you might have a working floppy drive hanging around, 511 00:31:20,280 --> 00:31:22,440 Speaker 1: but for the most part, I would say we could 512 00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:26,160 Speaker 1: call them extinct, like the dinosaurs. So let's say that 513 00:31:26,240 --> 00:31:30,440 Speaker 1: a company released a particular piece of software on floppy disks, 514 00:31:31,120 --> 00:31:35,040 Speaker 1: and the disks contained a form of copy protection on them, 515 00:31:35,080 --> 00:31:39,720 Speaker 1: and then decades later, someone needs to access that program, 516 00:31:39,760 --> 00:31:43,640 Speaker 1: except now that company doesn't exist anymore, so you can't 517 00:31:43,640 --> 00:31:46,240 Speaker 1: go to them. There's no one to go to the 518 00:31:47,000 --> 00:31:50,640 Speaker 1: No one has floppy drives. So even if you had 519 00:31:50,680 --> 00:31:53,840 Speaker 1: a copy of the disk in your hand, you wouldn't 520 00:31:53,960 --> 00:31:56,440 Speaker 1: be able to make a copy of the old file 521 00:31:57,080 --> 00:32:00,640 Speaker 1: because the way it was protected and the way it saved. 522 00:32:01,480 --> 00:32:06,560 Speaker 1: So in the in the efforts to preserve important stuff, 523 00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:09,560 Speaker 1: and it's kind of hard to think of certain things 524 00:32:09,600 --> 00:32:12,680 Speaker 1: like like computer games as being important. But in order 525 00:32:12,720 --> 00:32:16,360 Speaker 1: to preserve that for historical record. The copy of protection 526 00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:18,640 Speaker 1: stands as a huge barrier to that, and so that's 527 00:32:18,680 --> 00:32:21,000 Speaker 1: one of the reasons why people who are critics of 528 00:32:21,080 --> 00:32:27,000 Speaker 1: DRM really hammer this home, saying DRM really makes it 529 00:32:27,040 --> 00:32:30,600 Speaker 1: difficult for us to do important work. There's also the 530 00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:33,600 Speaker 1: issue of if you want to do scholarly work, if 531 00:32:33,640 --> 00:32:39,680 Speaker 1: you want to examine a computer program to look for vulnerabilities, 532 00:32:39,720 --> 00:32:44,040 Speaker 1: for example, like you're doing some security research, DRM can 533 00:32:44,080 --> 00:32:46,400 Speaker 1: stand in the way of that and to disable the 534 00:32:46,480 --> 00:32:49,600 Speaker 1: DRM would be breaking the law. So there are people 535 00:32:49,640 --> 00:32:53,680 Speaker 1: who really have legit criticisms for the way we treat 536 00:32:53,840 --> 00:32:57,760 Speaker 1: DRM these days. And this means that over time we 537 00:32:57,880 --> 00:33:01,440 Speaker 1: lose knowledge, right, we can't act says that anymore, the 538 00:33:01,480 --> 00:33:05,959 Speaker 1: information literally becomes inaccessible. So again one of the biggest 539 00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:10,040 Speaker 1: arguments leveled against DRM. That prevents the legal archival of information, 540 00:33:10,200 --> 00:33:12,640 Speaker 1: and it means that those files and the stuff built 541 00:33:12,680 --> 00:33:16,560 Speaker 1: from those files end up living on borrowed time. Then 542 00:33:16,600 --> 00:33:19,239 Speaker 1: there's also the back end of DRM. So a lot 543 00:33:19,280 --> 00:33:22,360 Speaker 1: of these methodologies rely upon a service running in the 544 00:33:22,400 --> 00:33:26,720 Speaker 1: background where a file is checking in with the mothership 545 00:33:26,800 --> 00:33:30,920 Speaker 1: back home. Right, So DRM is not just something that 546 00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:34,800 Speaker 1: just lives on a file itself. It's part of a 547 00:33:34,920 --> 00:33:38,920 Speaker 1: larger interconnected service. So what happens if the company in 548 00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:43,040 Speaker 1: charge of that service goes out of business or gets acquired, 549 00:33:43,320 --> 00:33:47,120 Speaker 1: will you still have access through the equipment or file? 550 00:33:47,200 --> 00:33:50,800 Speaker 1: I mean, you purchased it, but if you lose it, 551 00:33:51,000 --> 00:33:53,800 Speaker 1: like if the thing goes away, what happens to the 552 00:33:53,800 --> 00:33:56,920 Speaker 1: stuff you bought. Here's a great example of this. I 553 00:33:57,520 --> 00:34:03,920 Speaker 1: have purchased digital copies of certain television shows. The Mighty 554 00:34:03,960 --> 00:34:06,800 Speaker 1: Bush is one of them. I did that on Xbox. 555 00:34:07,320 --> 00:34:11,480 Speaker 1: I purchased the full seasons of The Mighty Bush, and 556 00:34:11,520 --> 00:34:14,239 Speaker 1: I have it available in Xbox to watch whenever I want. 557 00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:18,239 Speaker 1: Let's say something weird happens at Microsoft and the entire 558 00:34:18,360 --> 00:34:21,480 Speaker 1: Xbox division goes defunct and I no longer have access 559 00:34:21,520 --> 00:34:25,839 Speaker 1: to that. I paid for that that stuff, and I 560 00:34:25,880 --> 00:34:27,839 Speaker 1: would have otherwise had access to it if they had 561 00:34:27,840 --> 00:34:30,759 Speaker 1: sent me, say a physical copy of the DVDs, which 562 00:34:30,800 --> 00:34:33,080 Speaker 1: by the way, I went ahead and purchased because of 563 00:34:33,120 --> 00:34:35,799 Speaker 1: just this very reason. But I would no longer have 564 00:34:35,840 --> 00:34:38,319 Speaker 1: access to that material. It's It's one of the big 565 00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:42,400 Speaker 1: arguments against streaming services is the idea that should the 566 00:34:42,400 --> 00:34:45,239 Speaker 1: streaming service go out of business, you lose access to 567 00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:48,960 Speaker 1: all of that stuff. Or what about when a company 568 00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:53,560 Speaker 1: that sells a DRM protected file decides to recall that file. Now, 569 00:34:53,600 --> 00:34:56,279 Speaker 1: this happened with Amazon in two thousand nine, and in 570 00:34:56,320 --> 00:35:00,239 Speaker 1: a fitting twist, the files were e books, and they 571 00:35:00,239 --> 00:35:05,680 Speaker 1: were ebook versions of two George Orwell titles, Animal Farm 572 00:35:05,719 --> 00:35:12,719 Speaker 1: and Nine. Now, considering the novel features an invasive government 573 00:35:12,800 --> 00:35:17,480 Speaker 1: exerting control over virtually every aspect of people's lives, largely 574 00:35:17,880 --> 00:35:21,920 Speaker 1: through the control of information, this hit pretty darn close 575 00:35:22,000 --> 00:35:27,800 Speaker 1: to home. It felt like like like reality was mirroring fiction. 576 00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:31,840 Speaker 1: So what actually happened? While according to Amazon, the company 577 00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:35,320 Speaker 1: that had added these two titles to the Kindle Store 578 00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:40,600 Speaker 1: didn't actually have the publishing rights for those books, which 579 00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:43,720 Speaker 1: meant it would be illegal to sell those books because 580 00:35:44,320 --> 00:35:46,840 Speaker 1: the company that was selling them didn't actually have the 581 00:35:46,920 --> 00:35:50,359 Speaker 1: rights to them. So Amazon stopped the sale. But some 582 00:35:50,440 --> 00:35:54,400 Speaker 1: customers had actually already purchased those titles they had added 583 00:35:54,400 --> 00:35:58,480 Speaker 1: them to their digital libraries. So Amazon then recalled the 584 00:35:58,520 --> 00:36:01,800 Speaker 1: titles from the customers who bought them and then issued 585 00:36:01,840 --> 00:36:04,920 Speaker 1: a refund. But that meant that people who had purchased 586 00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:09,120 Speaker 1: either of those books suddenly saw them just vanish from 587 00:36:09,160 --> 00:36:12,680 Speaker 1: their kindle libraries. So let's think of that as if 588 00:36:12,719 --> 00:36:14,960 Speaker 1: it were a physical book. Let's say you went to 589 00:36:15,000 --> 00:36:18,600 Speaker 1: a brick and mortar bookstore and you purchased a physical 590 00:36:18,680 --> 00:36:22,920 Speaker 1: copy of George Orwell, and you take your physical copy 591 00:36:22,920 --> 00:36:24,920 Speaker 1: of the book home with you and you put it 592 00:36:25,000 --> 00:36:27,920 Speaker 1: up on your shelf, and that night, someone from the 593 00:36:27,960 --> 00:36:31,160 Speaker 1: bookstore breaks into your house takes the book off your 594 00:36:31,160 --> 00:36:34,160 Speaker 1: shelf and leaves the purchase price for the book behind 595 00:36:34,320 --> 00:36:39,279 Speaker 1: before leaving. That would be quite the invasion. And that 596 00:36:39,480 --> 00:36:43,560 Speaker 1: is kind of what happened digitally speaking with Amazon, and 597 00:36:43,600 --> 00:36:47,600 Speaker 1: it was made possible through DRM tools, which of course 598 00:36:47,719 --> 00:36:51,800 Speaker 1: raises troubling issues. If DRM allows a company to recall 599 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:55,400 Speaker 1: a product after you've already purchased it, well, it's definitely 600 00:36:55,400 --> 00:37:01,160 Speaker 1: not yours, is it? Like you, you just have access 601 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:03,640 Speaker 1: to it for as long as the company allows you 602 00:37:03,680 --> 00:37:06,960 Speaker 1: to have access to it. So there are a ton 603 00:37:07,080 --> 00:37:11,719 Speaker 1: of issues around DRM, and most of them poorly affect 604 00:37:12,040 --> 00:37:15,439 Speaker 1: the end user. Uh. It often feels like you're being 605 00:37:15,480 --> 00:37:19,160 Speaker 1: punished for having gone through the proper channels to purchase 606 00:37:19,239 --> 00:37:22,600 Speaker 1: whatever the digital good is, whereas if you had just 607 00:37:22,920 --> 00:37:26,200 Speaker 1: you know, pirated it, if someone had already cracked the 608 00:37:26,280 --> 00:37:28,680 Speaker 1: d r M off of it, and you've got access 609 00:37:28,719 --> 00:37:32,120 Speaker 1: to the pirated copy. You wouldn't have these concerns because 610 00:37:32,120 --> 00:37:35,240 Speaker 1: it would all have been stripped away. Not a great message. 611 00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:37,280 Speaker 1: I haven't even really touched on some of the methods 612 00:37:37,320 --> 00:37:40,360 Speaker 1: of copy protection that have led to massive problems, like 613 00:37:40,440 --> 00:37:44,879 Speaker 1: Sony's infamous copy protection methodology that was in the mid 614 00:37:44,920 --> 00:37:48,440 Speaker 1: two thousand's. It would install a root kit on your computer. 615 00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:51,480 Speaker 1: So you go out, you buy an album published by 616 00:37:51,640 --> 00:37:54,840 Speaker 1: Sony b MG. You would come back and you put 617 00:37:54,880 --> 00:37:59,239 Speaker 1: the CD on your computer, and maybe you want to 618 00:37:59,719 --> 00:38:02,040 Speaker 1: rip the music to put onto your brand new iPod, 619 00:38:02,239 --> 00:38:04,400 Speaker 1: or maybe you just want to listen on your computer, 620 00:38:04,719 --> 00:38:08,560 Speaker 1: and boom, your computer installs files that create vulnerabilities on 621 00:38:08,640 --> 00:38:12,920 Speaker 1: your computer system, vulnerabilities that hackers later were able to 622 00:38:12,960 --> 00:38:16,520 Speaker 1: take advantage of and infect systems with malware. Uh. It 623 00:38:16,640 --> 00:38:19,960 Speaker 1: was like installing a back door to your computer system. 624 00:38:20,160 --> 00:38:23,840 Speaker 1: Something that's never a good idea. Now, the really crazy 625 00:38:23,880 --> 00:38:27,520 Speaker 1: thing about all of this is that DRM doesn't work, 626 00:38:27,760 --> 00:38:30,520 Speaker 1: at least not for the purpose for which it was invented, 627 00:38:30,600 --> 00:38:33,880 Speaker 1: which was the whole idea of giving the rights owners 628 00:38:34,440 --> 00:38:38,040 Speaker 1: the peace of mind that you know they're not going 629 00:38:38,040 --> 00:38:41,480 Speaker 1: to be completely exploited by everybody else. There are folks 630 00:38:41,520 --> 00:38:44,960 Speaker 1: who specialize in cracking DRM on files, and as long 631 00:38:45,000 --> 00:38:47,640 Speaker 1: as they're not caught, the result is that the new 632 00:38:47,719 --> 00:38:51,160 Speaker 1: files are DRM free and are preferable to the d 633 00:38:51,320 --> 00:38:54,800 Speaker 1: r M versions, even for legit customers, and the entertainment 634 00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:59,279 Speaker 1: industry has not faded away because of this. It's not 635 00:38:59,360 --> 00:39:04,680 Speaker 1: like piracy has destroyed companies. The arguments for DRM typically 636 00:39:04,800 --> 00:39:07,759 Speaker 1: end up not holding very much water, because, as it 637 00:39:07,800 --> 00:39:11,319 Speaker 1: turns out, the problem with piracy doesn't actually seem to 638 00:39:11,400 --> 00:39:13,960 Speaker 1: hit the bottom line, at least not nearly to the 639 00:39:14,000 --> 00:39:18,239 Speaker 1: extent that companies would have us believe. Now. DRM is 640 00:39:18,280 --> 00:39:22,520 Speaker 1: still a thing today, but the landscape has changed dramatically. 641 00:39:23,160 --> 00:39:26,520 Speaker 1: For one thing, the proliferation of streaming services has created 642 00:39:26,600 --> 00:39:30,320 Speaker 1: a new way to distribute stuff like music, movies, and television. 643 00:39:30,600 --> 00:39:34,080 Speaker 1: To access the entertainment, you need a subscription to those 644 00:39:34,160 --> 00:39:38,000 Speaker 1: various services, or you have to have a free version 645 00:39:38,040 --> 00:39:40,880 Speaker 1: that's supported by ads or whatever. Whatever. The revenue generation 646 00:39:40,920 --> 00:39:44,280 Speaker 1: model is not that this is the only way people 647 00:39:44,360 --> 00:39:47,239 Speaker 1: access entertainment, but it's become so popular that a lot 648 00:39:47,239 --> 00:39:50,840 Speaker 1: of DRM strategies are just moot because the entertainment gets 649 00:39:50,920 --> 00:39:55,759 Speaker 1: locked inside a specific ecosystem, or you've got stuff like 650 00:39:55,800 --> 00:39:58,640 Speaker 1: computer games or console games that require the player to 651 00:39:58,680 --> 00:40:02,360 Speaker 1: have a persistent connect to the Internet. The purpose of 652 00:40:02,360 --> 00:40:05,440 Speaker 1: that connection is to verify that the player in question 653 00:40:05,640 --> 00:40:08,400 Speaker 1: is using a legitimate copy of the game, namely that 654 00:40:08,760 --> 00:40:12,160 Speaker 1: the person playing the game purchased the game, and the 655 00:40:12,239 --> 00:40:15,279 Speaker 1: connection Internet connection is a connection to a server that's 656 00:40:15,400 --> 00:40:19,759 Speaker 1: verifying that. This is also an irritation because even if 657 00:40:19,760 --> 00:40:23,279 Speaker 1: the game is a single player experience, you still have 658 00:40:23,320 --> 00:40:25,200 Speaker 1: to be connected to the Internet to run the game. 659 00:40:25,280 --> 00:40:27,600 Speaker 1: You're not playing against other people, you're just trying to 660 00:40:27,640 --> 00:40:30,879 Speaker 1: play the game, and yet you need that connection time 661 00:40:30,880 --> 00:40:34,160 Speaker 1: and again we've seen people resist that and to complain 662 00:40:34,200 --> 00:40:37,520 Speaker 1: about it. So, yeah, DRM is still a thing because 663 00:40:37,520 --> 00:40:40,640 Speaker 1: there's still this massive fear that the whole system would 664 00:40:40,640 --> 00:40:43,560 Speaker 1: fall apart, or at the very least companies would make 665 00:40:43,640 --> 00:40:48,200 Speaker 1: less money than they feel they should should DRM go away. 666 00:40:48,239 --> 00:40:51,680 Speaker 1: But I've seen a lot of legit arguments that say 667 00:40:51,760 --> 00:40:55,840 Speaker 1: DRM really just causes more problems than it and it 668 00:40:55,880 --> 00:40:58,120 Speaker 1: doesn't really solve the problem it was meant to solve. 669 00:40:59,000 --> 00:41:02,600 Speaker 1: So I'm also an advocate of just getting rid of DRM. 670 00:41:03,680 --> 00:41:06,680 Speaker 1: I don't know that we can rely upon the honesty 671 00:41:06,719 --> 00:41:10,200 Speaker 1: of the average person on the Internet. But I am 672 00:41:10,239 --> 00:41:13,440 Speaker 1: pretty certain that DRM is kind of a broken solution 673 00:41:13,719 --> 00:41:18,920 Speaker 1: to a problem that actually hasn't been well defined in 674 00:41:19,040 --> 00:41:22,080 Speaker 1: terms of impact. I mean, the Government Accountability Office in 675 00:41:22,120 --> 00:41:26,440 Speaker 1: the United States famously issued a report that said it 676 00:41:26,560 --> 00:41:31,200 Speaker 1: is impossible to determine to what extent piracy actually affects 677 00:41:31,200 --> 00:41:36,600 Speaker 1: the bottom line, and that the numbers that that content companies, 678 00:41:36,640 --> 00:41:40,480 Speaker 1: that things like music companies and movie studios, the numbers 679 00:41:40,520 --> 00:41:44,799 Speaker 1: that they cite saying we lost X billion amount of 680 00:41:44,840 --> 00:41:48,799 Speaker 1: dollars because of piracy, those are unsupportable. Uh. The big 681 00:41:48,840 --> 00:41:51,839 Speaker 1: reason behind that is that you can never actually say 682 00:41:51,880 --> 00:41:54,960 Speaker 1: that someone who pirated something would have otherwise purchased it. 683 00:41:55,480 --> 00:41:58,040 Speaker 1: So a pirated copy is not the same thing as 684 00:41:58,040 --> 00:42:01,160 Speaker 1: a lost sale. Right If I pired a copy of 685 00:42:01,160 --> 00:42:04,760 Speaker 1: an Adam Sandler movie, it might be that I'm morbidly curious, 686 00:42:04,760 --> 00:42:07,000 Speaker 1: but not to the point where I would actually purchase 687 00:42:07,080 --> 00:42:10,880 Speaker 1: the film. And maybe if I weren't, uh, you know, 688 00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:13,719 Speaker 1: willing to pirate it, I would just never I just 689 00:42:13,760 --> 00:42:16,759 Speaker 1: never bother watching it. I have never priorate it an 690 00:42:16,840 --> 00:42:20,400 Speaker 1: Adam Sandler film because I don't I don't need to, 691 00:42:20,920 --> 00:42:25,920 Speaker 1: I don't need to indulge in that. I'm okay, I'm good. Anyway, 692 00:42:26,280 --> 00:42:28,239 Speaker 1: I thought that this would be an interesting thing to 693 00:42:28,280 --> 00:42:31,000 Speaker 1: go down, and really it was the Cannon printer story 694 00:42:31,080 --> 00:42:35,200 Speaker 1: that really drew my attention. That's what sparked this whole 695 00:42:35,640 --> 00:42:39,000 Speaker 1: episode idea. This morning, I saw that that news item 696 00:42:39,040 --> 00:42:42,319 Speaker 1: and thought I should do an episode about DRM, what 697 00:42:42,520 --> 00:42:46,400 Speaker 1: it's for and how it often falls short of what 698 00:42:46,600 --> 00:42:50,960 Speaker 1: the goals are. Uh yeah, I hope you enjoyed this. 699 00:42:51,120 --> 00:42:53,920 Speaker 1: If you have suggestions on topics I should cover in 700 00:42:53,960 --> 00:42:56,760 Speaker 1: future episodes of tech Stuff, reach out to me on Twitter, 701 00:42:56,840 --> 00:43:00,760 Speaker 1: like Stadler did. The handle for the show is tech 702 00:43:01,040 --> 00:43:04,560 Speaker 1: Stuff H s W and I'll talk to you again 703 00:43:05,480 --> 00:43:13,360 Speaker 1: really soon. Y. Tech Stuff is an I Heart Radio production. 704 00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:16,440 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from I Heart Radio, visit the I 705 00:43:16,560 --> 00:43:19,759 Speaker 1: Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to 706 00:43:19,840 --> 00:43:20,720 Speaker 1: your favorite shows.