WEBVTT - TechStuff Classic: TechStuff Investigates Operation Ghost Click

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios

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<v Speaker 1>How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with

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<v Speaker 1>How Stuff Works and iHeart Radio and I love all

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<v Speaker 1>things tech, and it is time for another tech Stuff

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<v Speaker 1>classic episode. This episode originally published on May two thousand twelve,

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<v Speaker 1>and my former co host and editor Chris Pallette and

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<v Speaker 1>I sat down to talk about operation ghost Click and

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<v Speaker 1>domain name servers and this issue that was going on

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<v Speaker 1>at the time, and I think it's pretty fascinating. It

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<v Speaker 1>also gives you an idea of how d n S works.

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<v Speaker 1>So I hope you enjoy this classic episode. To get there,

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<v Speaker 1>you follow Highway fifty eight going northeast out of the city,

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<v Speaker 1>and it is a good highway and new all right,

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<v Speaker 1>we're talking about numbers today, yes we are. We're talking

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<v Speaker 1>about getting to where you're going and getting diverted along

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<v Speaker 1>the way. So, as of the recording of this podcast,

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<v Speaker 1>which is in April, there is a story that's actually

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<v Speaker 1>not a news story necessarily. It first started to kind

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<v Speaker 1>of make the news way back in November of but

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<v Speaker 1>it's kind of sort of bubbled up and It's an

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<v Speaker 1>operation that the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, has

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<v Speaker 1>headed up, and it all involves hacking into the Internet

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<v Speaker 1>and uh and and messing around with Internet traffic. It's

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<v Speaker 1>called Operation Ghost Click. That's a nice name. I always

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<v Speaker 1>love hearing the operation names. It is a wacky doctors game. So, um,

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<v Speaker 1>I think first, before we get into too much detail,

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<v Speaker 1>we should probably talk about how internet traffic works. We've

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<v Speaker 1>mentioned that on the podcast on a handful of occasions.

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<v Speaker 1>I think when in fact we got into the domain

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<v Speaker 1>name system DNS system or sorry that was redundant, the

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<v Speaker 1>d N s uh no servers um well are both

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<v Speaker 1>because DNS can can mean both, but right, right, right,

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<v Speaker 1>So yeah, we talked about it before. And basically every

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<v Speaker 1>website has a is um as an address, a physical address,

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<v Speaker 1>well physical address on on a hard drive, a physical

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<v Speaker 1>hard drive somewhere, and these numbers, there are are four

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<v Speaker 1>sets of numbers separated by periods, and that address is

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<v Speaker 1>unique to that UM space on that physical hard drive somewhere.

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<v Speaker 1>And so if you typed in UM h T T

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<v Speaker 1>P colon slash slash and these this number, you will

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<v Speaker 1>get to a website. Of course, that's very inconvenient because

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<v Speaker 1>then you neither have to write down these numbers or

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<v Speaker 1>bookmark them, or you know, you have to have some

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<v Speaker 1>sort of weird total recall thing going on where you

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<v Speaker 1>can just easily remember any series of numbers, which would

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<v Speaker 1>would would make you incredibly useful, but it would also

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<v Speaker 1>make you very rare. Most of us, most of us

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<v Speaker 1>are just not It's not something humans are particularly good

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<v Speaker 1>at doing on average. So that is what kind of

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<v Speaker 1>gave rise to the idea of having this domain name system. Yes, now,

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<v Speaker 1>domain name system, what it does is it allows you

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<v Speaker 1>to create a domain name as in words that correspond

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<v Speaker 1>to whatever your site is, and then that itself is

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<v Speaker 1>mapped to this series of numbers, this i P address right,

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<v Speaker 1>the i P being Internet protocols UM, which is the

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<v Speaker 1>the language that gets uh, you know, you from one

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<v Speaker 1>place to another on the Internet, regardless of whether you're

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<v Speaker 1>using a Windows machine, Mac or Linux or mobile thing.

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<v Speaker 1>It gets you to the same place. And what allows

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<v Speaker 1>you to type in how stuff works dot com and

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<v Speaker 1>get to our website. Yes, so if you were to

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<v Speaker 1>type how stuff works dot com, what have is that request?

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<v Speaker 1>You know, you know, what you're essentially doing is you're

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<v Speaker 1>telling your browser, I want access to this particular website.

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<v Speaker 1>Your browser sends this message along up a chain of command,

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<v Speaker 1>and uh, you know, it has to go out to

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<v Speaker 1>the right computer that has the website living on it

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<v Speaker 1>and retrieve that so that you get an instance of

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<v Speaker 1>it back at your machine. In order to do that,

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<v Speaker 1>it has to first map that one needs to have

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<v Speaker 1>is the name that you're typing. It has to be

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<v Speaker 1>mapped to that physical machine, that physical drive. Uh, and

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<v Speaker 1>it does this by going through domain name servers. A

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<v Speaker 1>domain name server is essentially like think of it kind

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<v Speaker 1>of like a phone book. Yeah, so that all the

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<v Speaker 1>different u r l s you could type in are

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<v Speaker 1>indexed against these number numerical addresses. And then that way,

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<v Speaker 1>once you type in the u r L, it looks

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<v Speaker 1>for the corresponding numeric address, owls information from that that

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<v Speaker 1>particular source, and then serves it back to you so

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<v Speaker 1>that you get what you asked for. Well that you

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<v Speaker 1>asked for it, you got it anyway. So, um, the

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<v Speaker 1>whole deal here is that you are going to get

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<v Speaker 1>the right information. Yeah, assuming that everything's working correctly, and

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<v Speaker 1>occasionally stuff messes up. There might be uh, the computer

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<v Speaker 1>that hosts, the site might be down, in which case

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<v Speaker 1>you're going to get something like a four or four

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<v Speaker 1>error because the Internet is not going to be able

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<v Speaker 1>to find the file that you've requested. We're very sorry.

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<v Speaker 1>The Internet is broken. The elders of the Internet called

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<v Speaker 1>and they said, no more Internet for you. But most

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<v Speaker 1>of the time it's gonna work just fine. However, what

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<v Speaker 1>happened in the case of Operation ghost Click is that, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>the FBI discovered there were some people who had created

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<v Speaker 1>some rogue DNS servers. So, in other words, these get

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<v Speaker 1>these folks, six Estonian nationals, according to the FBI, um

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<v Speaker 1>got together and created these servers that acted just as

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<v Speaker 1>a domain named server would. So in other words, it

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<v Speaker 1>had a collection of u r l s and index

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<v Speaker 1>of u r l s and an index of addresses

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<v Speaker 1>numeric addresses. So it was like a fake phone book,

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<v Speaker 1>right Exactly. Some of the entries in this fake phone

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<v Speaker 1>book went to different phone numbers, so instead literally yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>but we're we're sticking with the analogy, sticking with that analogy,

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<v Speaker 1>just making so instead of the official phone number for

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<v Speaker 1>a particular website, you would get a fake one, and

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<v Speaker 1>it would in other words, that you would go to

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<v Speaker 1>a fake numeric address for a real site. So you

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<v Speaker 1>might type in the address perfect in your u r

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<v Speaker 1>L bar. Right, So let's take a random example. Let's

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<v Speaker 1>just say Yahoo. So you do www dot Yahoo dot com.

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<v Speaker 1>You hit enter. Now, normally, in a regular DNS server,

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<v Speaker 1>it would look up that you are L, look to

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<v Speaker 1>see what the numeric address is for that you are L,

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<v Speaker 1>send that information out, retrieve the website, and serve it

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<v Speaker 1>up to you. A rogue DNS server would look up

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<v Speaker 1>that u r L, look at the numeric address that

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<v Speaker 1>was created for that u r L, But it isn't

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<v Speaker 1>actually the address for Yahoo. It's an address for something else,

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<v Speaker 1>and it serves that up to you. Now, why would

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<v Speaker 1>anyone do this? There are a couple of different reasons. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>in the case of the Estonians, and they were doing

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<v Speaker 1>something I think that was kind of uh deviously clever.

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<v Speaker 1>They were doing this in order to reroute traffic to

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<v Speaker 1>break in advertising money. So in other words, what they

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<v Speaker 1>wanted to do was the way advertising on the Internet

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<v Speaker 1>works in general is that you get paid for a

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<v Speaker 1>certain number of views of the ad. It's called impressions.

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<v Speaker 1>The number of impressions and ad gets that translates to money.

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<v Speaker 1>And if you get lots and lots and lots of impressions,

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<v Speaker 1>you get lots of money. Um. Then in general a

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<v Speaker 1>single impression is worth a fraction of assent. Yeah, but

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<v Speaker 1>if you can say, hey, you know, I can promise

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<v Speaker 1>you that five million people are going to say your ad,

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<v Speaker 1>then you can command a good price for your services. Right, So,

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<v Speaker 1>very popular websites can tend to charge more than sites

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<v Speaker 1>that don't get a lot of traffic. Makes makes sense. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's say that you have a billboard next to a

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<v Speaker 1>busy highway. The price for that billboard to to to

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<v Speaker 1>put it out on that billboard's probably gonna be higher

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<v Speaker 1>than a billboard that's next to a rural road that

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't get a lot of traffic. So anyway, the same

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<v Speaker 1>sort of logic applies on on the web. So what

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<v Speaker 1>these guys were doing, I say guys, what these Estonians

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<v Speaker 1>were doing because I don't know their gender, Uh, they

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<v Speaker 1>were they were using these rogue DNS servers to reroute

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<v Speaker 1>traffic to go to different websites and that had specific

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<v Speaker 1>ads on them that the Estonians were administering, and then

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<v Speaker 1>they were pulling in the money. So they were redirecting traffic.

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<v Speaker 1>It's like putting in a detour in your route. And

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<v Speaker 1>so you're going down your normal route to get to

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<v Speaker 1>wherever you're going, and you see a sign that says, oh, nope,

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<v Speaker 1>the road is out. Up ahead, take a right instead

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<v Speaker 1>of going straight, and you will go through a different route.

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<v Speaker 1>And along that route you decided to stop and eat.

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<v Speaker 1>And normally you would stop and eat at your favorite restaurant,

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<v Speaker 1>but you can't get to that one because it's on

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<v Speaker 1>the road that's been closed. So you go to this

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<v Speaker 1>other restaurant and it all turns out that it was

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<v Speaker 1>employed by the other restaurant in the first place. They

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<v Speaker 1>put that detour sign up because they wanted to get

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<v Speaker 1>some more foot traffic or some more some more diners

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<v Speaker 1>to come in. That was the general plan. Now, the

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<v Speaker 1>question is how do you get that rogue DNS server

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<v Speaker 1>to get in the line of traffic so that people

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<v Speaker 1>will visit it in the first place. Yeah, because if

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<v Speaker 1>you're typing in an address that you already know, say

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<v Speaker 1>Discovery dot com, you should theoretically be routed to the

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<v Speaker 1>right place. As long as your computer is configured correctly

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<v Speaker 1>and the Internet is working. The way it's supposed to.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, what are they gonna do. Are they gonna

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<v Speaker 1>go in and kick out the legitimate DNS machine and

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<v Speaker 1>replace it. No, it was very clever. They created a

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<v Speaker 1>kind of malware and the malware is essentially called d

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<v Speaker 1>n s changer, and so DNS changer would change the

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<v Speaker 1>DNS settings on your computer or other device or even router,

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<v Speaker 1>which was particularly nasty because if it changed on the router,

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<v Speaker 1>then any device that connects through that router would be affected. Also,

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<v Speaker 1>it's unlikely that you're going to have anti virus software

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<v Speaker 1>on your router, although you might on your computer now.

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<v Speaker 1>The way that they did this with the router was

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<v Speaker 1>the easiest way, and it's the easiest way for someone

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<v Speaker 1>to prevent it from happening to them. The way that

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<v Speaker 1>worked on the router was that they just ended up

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<v Speaker 1>using a list of generic user and names and passwords

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<v Speaker 1>that are that tend to be um UH administered over

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<v Speaker 1>various routers. So you pick pick a router, like whatever

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<v Speaker 1>router you you happen to use, that router tends to

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<v Speaker 1>have a standard user name and standard password that you

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<v Speaker 1>are supposed to change once you install it into your

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<v Speaker 1>home network. But a lot of people never get around

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<v Speaker 1>to doing that. They install the the the router and

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<v Speaker 1>then they don't bother changing the user name and password,

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<v Speaker 1>which means that anyone who knows what the standard user

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<v Speaker 1>name and password is for that brand of router could

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<v Speaker 1>get access to that network. That's what they were doing

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<v Speaker 1>in this case. But in order to change the computers themselves,

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<v Speaker 1>not the router, what they had to do was convince

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<v Speaker 1>people to download some malware and execute that. Now, social engineering, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>lots of different ways of doing that. You know. There's

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<v Speaker 1>the very standard way where they include some uh they

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<v Speaker 1>put on on a website that you might encounter, or

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<v Speaker 1>a little pop up that says, hey, your antivirus software

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<v Speaker 1>is out of date. Install this and we will scan

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<v Speaker 1>your computer for viruses and free, yeah, for free. And

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<v Speaker 1>in fact it really is a virus itself that installs

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<v Speaker 1>to your computer. You know, you think you are trying

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<v Speaker 1>to head off some sort of malware and in fact

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<v Speaker 1>you're actually installing malware to your computer at the time,

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<v Speaker 1>or it can be through email attachments, you know, all

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<v Speaker 1>the standard ways that malware propagates across the web. Any

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<v Speaker 1>of that would work to get this this particular kind

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<v Speaker 1>of malware onto your machine. Once you installed it, whether

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<v Speaker 1>it was through a trojan program or whatever, it would

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<v Speaker 1>go and reset the DNS settings on your computer, and

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<v Speaker 1>it would direct your computer to go to these rogue

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<v Speaker 1>DNS servers as opposed to your Internet Service providers DNS servers,

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<v Speaker 1>because h I SP has its own right that passes

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<v Speaker 1>the information up along the chain of command, so you

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<v Speaker 1>would bypass your I s P S servers. You would

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<v Speaker 1>go to these rogue servers, and then you would be

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<v Speaker 1>directed to whatever website they wanted to direct YouTube for

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<v Speaker 1>any particular u r L. For some u r l s,

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<v Speaker 1>you might just get the regular website you you're sent

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<v Speaker 1>along and nothing bad happens. For other u r l s,

0:13:17.760 --> 0:13:20.319
<v Speaker 1>you might be directed to a site that looks very

0:13:20.360 --> 0:13:23.480
<v Speaker 1>similar to the one you wanted, but something isn't quite right,

0:13:23.600 --> 0:13:25.640
<v Speaker 1>and it tends that again, they were just doing it

0:13:25.679 --> 0:13:28.200
<v Speaker 1>for the advertising money. The scary thing is they could

0:13:28.240 --> 0:13:31.120
<v Speaker 1>have done this for any other reason and actually tried

0:13:31.160 --> 0:13:35.360
<v Speaker 1>to steal stuff directly from the user. Now in this case,

0:13:35.559 --> 0:13:37.560
<v Speaker 1>that doesn't seem to be what they were up to.

0:13:37.679 --> 0:13:41.240
<v Speaker 1>They were up to just redirecting that traffic. So you

0:13:41.320 --> 0:13:43.680
<v Speaker 1>might think, well, that's annoying. I mean, I'm not going

0:13:43.760 --> 0:13:45.200
<v Speaker 1>to get to the website I want to go to

0:13:45.320 --> 0:13:49.680
<v Speaker 1>unless I type in the actual uh numeric address physically,

0:13:49.920 --> 0:13:52.679
<v Speaker 1>then I would go to it. But Uh, while it's

0:13:52.679 --> 0:13:54.200
<v Speaker 1>annoying that I wouldn't go to the site that I

0:13:54.200 --> 0:13:56.200
<v Speaker 1>wanted to go to, at least they're not stealing from me.

0:13:56.880 --> 0:13:59.400
<v Speaker 1>But they could have. They could have directed things so

0:13:59.440 --> 0:14:02.480
<v Speaker 1>that you would go to dummy websites that look similar

0:14:02.520 --> 0:14:06.320
<v Speaker 1>to official ones and put in a system where you

0:14:06.360 --> 0:14:08.640
<v Speaker 1>type in your user name and password and they would

0:14:08.720 --> 0:14:11.480
<v Speaker 1>log it. They could have logged it, they didn't. They

0:14:11.520 --> 0:14:14.960
<v Speaker 1>could have logged that information, thus getting access to various

0:14:15.000 --> 0:14:17.360
<v Speaker 1>accounts across the Internet. They could have gotten access to

0:14:17.400 --> 0:14:21.400
<v Speaker 1>email accounts, bank accounts, you know, any other sort of

0:14:22.080 --> 0:14:26.360
<v Speaker 1>anything that would require authorization. They could have done that. Uh,

0:14:26.800 --> 0:14:28.760
<v Speaker 1>And what would probably have happened is that you would

0:14:28.800 --> 0:14:30.320
<v Speaker 1>have logged in. Let's say that you try to go

0:14:30.400 --> 0:14:34.560
<v Speaker 1>to your banks online banking site and you might get

0:14:34.760 --> 0:14:37.960
<v Speaker 1>a site that looks very much like your banks site.

0:14:38.000 --> 0:14:40.960
<v Speaker 1>In fact, it might even look almost identical. Um, the

0:14:41.000 --> 0:14:43.520
<v Speaker 1>address might look a little hinky, but if you were

0:14:43.560 --> 0:14:45.400
<v Speaker 1>the type of you use the name and password. Likely

0:14:45.440 --> 0:14:48.840
<v Speaker 1>you would get a response saying, oh, sites down for maintenance.

0:14:49.800 --> 0:14:52.480
<v Speaker 1>But what's really happened is that that information has been

0:14:52.520 --> 0:14:56.000
<v Speaker 1>logged by hackers. That could have happened, or they could

0:14:56.000 --> 0:14:58.760
<v Speaker 1>have directed you to a site where you would have

0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:02.960
<v Speaker 1>been encouraged to download even more malware, perhaps a back

0:15:03.000 --> 0:15:06.480
<v Speaker 1>door access programs that you are your computer would become

0:15:06.480 --> 0:15:10.120
<v Speaker 1>part of a bot net or any other kind of

0:15:10.120 --> 0:15:14.440
<v Speaker 1>of hacking tool. It's it's really the options are pretty

0:15:14.520 --> 0:15:16.400
<v Speaker 1>much unlimited. Now. In this case, again it was just

0:15:16.480 --> 0:15:21.320
<v Speaker 1>to redirect traffic. However, there were some other problems that

0:15:21.600 --> 0:15:24.160
<v Speaker 1>would happen if you were affected by this virus. You

0:15:24.240 --> 0:15:27.640
<v Speaker 1>might not you know, you might not have anyone stealing

0:15:27.720 --> 0:15:30.400
<v Speaker 1>from your bank account or anything. But one of the

0:15:30.440 --> 0:15:33.040
<v Speaker 1>things the virus does, which is pretty much standard operating

0:15:33.040 --> 0:15:37.880
<v Speaker 1>procedure for viruses, is it turned off the features on

0:15:37.920 --> 0:15:41.840
<v Speaker 1>your operating system and your anti virus from updating so

0:15:41.880 --> 0:15:45.400
<v Speaker 1>that you wouldn't be able to get the latest security

0:15:45.440 --> 0:15:49.640
<v Speaker 1>patches that would prevent this this UH program from working.

0:15:50.320 --> 0:15:53.880
<v Speaker 1>So first step pretty much of any malware is let's

0:15:53.920 --> 0:15:58.360
<v Speaker 1>disable the stuff that can turn this off. So anything

0:15:58.360 --> 0:16:02.239
<v Speaker 1>that would automatically turn the the malware off was disabled.

0:16:02.560 --> 0:16:04.800
<v Speaker 1>So that's a problem because it means that even if

0:16:04.880 --> 0:16:12.160
<v Speaker 1>you aren't being actively preyed upon by these particular hackers, uh,

0:16:12.440 --> 0:16:15.080
<v Speaker 1>future attacks could hit you much more easily because you

0:16:15.080 --> 0:16:19.000
<v Speaker 1>are no longer protected, which is pretty bad. That's what

0:16:19.080 --> 0:16:22.200
<v Speaker 1>we call a bad thing and Internet security. And there

0:16:22.240 --> 0:16:24.800
<v Speaker 1>were about what four million people around the world and

0:16:25.320 --> 0:16:28.240
<v Speaker 1>about a hundred countries that were affected by this, and

0:16:28.240 --> 0:16:31.880
<v Speaker 1>then thousand in the United States. And it wasn't just uh,

0:16:31.920 --> 0:16:36.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, citizen users, it was also businesses, government, government computers. UM.

0:16:36.480 --> 0:16:38.440
<v Speaker 1>I think there were even like a couple of computers

0:16:38.440 --> 0:16:41.880
<v Speaker 1>over at NASA that were affected to this. And uh.

0:16:42.080 --> 0:16:45.080
<v Speaker 1>And the good news that we have is that the

0:16:45.160 --> 0:16:49.960
<v Speaker 1>FBI arrested these six Estonian nationals that were identified as

0:16:49.960 --> 0:16:53.200
<v Speaker 1>being part of this running actually running this ring. Yeah,

0:16:53.200 --> 0:16:54.880
<v Speaker 1>they were going to try to have them extraditedto the

0:16:54.920 --> 0:16:59.160
<v Speaker 1>United States. Yeah. And they've also taken over the rogue

0:16:59.240 --> 0:17:01.960
<v Speaker 1>DNS servers they have identified as being part of this,

0:17:02.640 --> 0:17:06.480
<v Speaker 1>and those rogue DNS servers are now acting like legitimate

0:17:06.600 --> 0:17:09.879
<v Speaker 1>DNS servers, which is great. That means that as a user,

0:17:10.160 --> 0:17:12.320
<v Speaker 1>when you try to visit a website, you should get

0:17:12.359 --> 0:17:16.240
<v Speaker 1>what you're supposed to get. However, there's a problem because

0:17:16.600 --> 0:17:20.439
<v Speaker 1>your computers still have if you're affected, your computer still

0:17:20.520 --> 0:17:23.560
<v Speaker 1>is directing you to the wrong set of servers. You're

0:17:23.560 --> 0:17:26.480
<v Speaker 1>still getting the right result, but you're going and you're

0:17:26.480 --> 0:17:29.000
<v Speaker 1>not going to the regular chain of command that you

0:17:29.040 --> 0:17:31.439
<v Speaker 1>should go to. And the FBI is not going to

0:17:31.480 --> 0:17:35.399
<v Speaker 1>be running these servers forever, and in fact, in in July,

0:17:36.320 --> 0:17:40.280
<v Speaker 1>they're going to turn them off. And once those turn off,

0:17:40.320 --> 0:17:43.000
<v Speaker 1>if your computer is being directed to those DNS servers,

0:17:43.040 --> 0:17:46.920
<v Speaker 1>you may not have any more Web access, at least

0:17:46.920 --> 0:17:49.800
<v Speaker 1>not through typing in a normal U r L, because

0:17:49.840 --> 0:17:51.679
<v Speaker 1>your computer is going to try and go through a

0:17:51.720 --> 0:17:54.480
<v Speaker 1>pathway that doesn't exist anymore. Chris and I have more

0:17:54.520 --> 0:17:57.760
<v Speaker 1>to say about Operation Ghost Click, but before we get there,

0:17:57.840 --> 0:18:08.399
<v Speaker 1>let's take a quick break to thank our spawn, sir. So,

0:18:08.840 --> 0:18:11.520
<v Speaker 1>the important thing to do is to determine whether or

0:18:11.560 --> 0:18:16.240
<v Speaker 1>not your computer has this infection, and if it does

0:18:16.280 --> 0:18:19.960
<v Speaker 1>have the infection, to clear it up. And uh, it's

0:18:20.160 --> 0:18:22.720
<v Speaker 1>the first one is easier than the second one. The

0:18:22.760 --> 0:18:26.840
<v Speaker 1>FBI actually set up a website designed to help you

0:18:26.920 --> 0:18:30.520
<v Speaker 1>identify whether or not you have been affected. Yes, um,

0:18:30.600 --> 0:18:33.520
<v Speaker 1>you can go to the FBI's website and follow the

0:18:33.560 --> 0:18:38.680
<v Speaker 1>links to find out about whether or not your computer

0:18:39.440 --> 0:18:42.760
<v Speaker 1>has this problem. And there's actually a couple different ways

0:18:42.760 --> 0:18:44.720
<v Speaker 1>of doing it. There's they've they've set up a u

0:18:44.800 --> 0:18:47.240
<v Speaker 1>r L where what it does is it pings a

0:18:47.359 --> 0:18:49.760
<v Speaker 1>server and if it gets a positive result saying that

0:18:49.920 --> 0:18:52.639
<v Speaker 1>you're fine, uh, you get a screen that has this

0:18:52.680 --> 0:18:55.760
<v Speaker 1>big green icon on it and says you're good. Um.

0:18:55.800 --> 0:18:58.280
<v Speaker 1>If you're not fine, you get a big red icon

0:18:58.359 --> 0:19:00.720
<v Speaker 1>which says this is saying that you're you know, it's

0:19:00.760 --> 0:19:04.240
<v Speaker 1>going through one of the rogue DNS servers. They've also

0:19:04.280 --> 0:19:09.800
<v Speaker 1>identified a range of the IP addresses that you know.

0:19:09.840 --> 0:19:12.280
<v Speaker 1>You can check your DNS settings on your computer yourself.

0:19:12.320 --> 0:19:14.960
<v Speaker 1>If you're using a Windows machine, you go to a

0:19:15.040 --> 0:19:18.760
<v Speaker 1>run command and you type an IP configured slash all uh,

0:19:18.800 --> 0:19:22.040
<v Speaker 1>and then that'll pull up your DNS settings and you

0:19:22.080 --> 0:19:26.080
<v Speaker 1>can see what the what the numeric address is for

0:19:26.119 --> 0:19:28.600
<v Speaker 1>the server that you go to, and if it falls

0:19:28.600 --> 0:19:31.399
<v Speaker 1>within the range that's been identified by the FBI, you

0:19:31.520 --> 0:19:35.320
<v Speaker 1>know that your DNS settings are wrong. Clearing this up

0:19:35.680 --> 0:19:38.440
<v Speaker 1>and getting rid of the malware is a little tricky. Uh.

0:19:38.480 --> 0:19:40.960
<v Speaker 1>The easiest way I can think of to do it

0:19:41.000 --> 0:19:43.040
<v Speaker 1>if I were doing it myself. Is going to a

0:19:43.040 --> 0:19:48.040
<v Speaker 1>computer that I know has not been affected and downloading

0:19:48.160 --> 0:19:52.480
<v Speaker 1>the latest antivirus software I can find and putting Most

0:19:52.520 --> 0:19:55.880
<v Speaker 1>of them have an option where you can put a

0:19:56.000 --> 0:19:59.880
<v Speaker 1>version of that onto a thumb drive. Do that, then

0:20:00.000 --> 0:20:03.399
<v Speaker 1>take the thumb drive over to the infective machine and

0:20:03.440 --> 0:20:06.520
<v Speaker 1>booted into safe mode, and load up the anti virus

0:20:06.560 --> 0:20:09.520
<v Speaker 1>software from the thumb drive, and that should be able.

0:20:09.600 --> 0:20:12.600
<v Speaker 1>Depending upon the anti virus software, it should be able

0:20:12.640 --> 0:20:16.159
<v Speaker 1>to scan it and remove it. Um. The FBI also

0:20:16.240 --> 0:20:20.800
<v Speaker 1>points to several web assets that can help you if

0:20:20.920 --> 0:20:23.320
<v Speaker 1>your computer does appear to be one of the ones

0:20:23.359 --> 0:20:25.840
<v Speaker 1>that infected, and those may work very well for you.

0:20:26.240 --> 0:20:28.959
<v Speaker 1>I tend to go with the anti virus approach whenever

0:20:29.000 --> 0:20:33.800
<v Speaker 1>I can. UM it just I don't know, I don't

0:20:33.800 --> 0:20:36.399
<v Speaker 1>know it is. I just have a preference for that

0:20:36.440 --> 0:20:40.920
<v Speaker 1>as opposed to going like a web based route. Yeah. Yeah, um,

0:20:40.960 --> 0:20:44.040
<v Speaker 1>but it is. It is fairly easy to uh to

0:20:44.080 --> 0:20:46.280
<v Speaker 1>get rid of the problem in this case. It's not

0:20:46.359 --> 0:20:48.960
<v Speaker 1>like some of the others where you have to UH

0:20:49.040 --> 0:20:51.439
<v Speaker 1>reformat your hard drive to get it back. Yeah. I mean,

0:20:52.080 --> 0:20:56.600
<v Speaker 1>there's there's something depending on how tech savvy you are,

0:20:57.200 --> 0:20:59.840
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty easy. If you're not terribly tech savvy, it

0:21:00.040 --> 0:21:02.199
<v Speaker 1>maybe it may be worth it to take it to

0:21:02.440 --> 0:21:05.800
<v Speaker 1>a computer professional to have them scan it and remove

0:21:05.800 --> 0:21:08.560
<v Speaker 1>it and take care of it for you, because the

0:21:08.600 --> 0:21:11.360
<v Speaker 1>more you mess with your computer settings, the more you

0:21:11.520 --> 0:21:17.560
<v Speaker 1>may inadvertently cause some problems that can turn your machine

0:21:17.640 --> 0:21:21.760
<v Speaker 1>into a nightmare. Um and and sometimes depending on the malware,

0:21:21.800 --> 0:21:23.960
<v Speaker 1>like if you've had this on your computer for a while,

0:21:24.480 --> 0:21:26.879
<v Speaker 1>that might not be the only malware that's affecting you.

0:21:27.640 --> 0:21:30.679
<v Speaker 1>You might have other problems, in which case, uh, you know,

0:21:30.720 --> 0:21:34.359
<v Speaker 1>a simple scan and remove may not be enough. In

0:21:34.400 --> 0:21:37.240
<v Speaker 1>a worst case scenario, you might have to do something

0:21:37.280 --> 0:21:40.560
<v Speaker 1>like wipe your computer and reinstall the operating system, in

0:21:40.600 --> 0:21:42.200
<v Speaker 1>which case the first thing you want to do is

0:21:42.240 --> 0:21:44.400
<v Speaker 1>back up as much of your data as you possibly

0:21:44.440 --> 0:21:48.600
<v Speaker 1>can and then you do the wipe. But that even

0:21:48.640 --> 0:21:51.360
<v Speaker 1>that is I mean, that's that's like a worst case

0:21:51.359 --> 0:21:55.640
<v Speaker 1>scenario type of thing, and hopefully none of our listeners

0:21:55.640 --> 0:21:57.080
<v Speaker 1>are in that well. First of all, hopefully none of

0:21:57.080 --> 0:21:59.840
<v Speaker 1>our listeners have been affected by this malware, but if

0:21:59.840 --> 0:22:02.600
<v Speaker 1>they have, hopefully it's not so severe. Letting they don't

0:22:02.600 --> 0:22:06.760
<v Speaker 1>have other forms of malware that they can't you know, uh,

0:22:06.880 --> 0:22:10.560
<v Speaker 1>take care of it themselves. Yeah. Um, and of course

0:22:10.600 --> 0:22:12.160
<v Speaker 1>it's always a good idea to back up your hard

0:22:12.200 --> 0:22:15.040
<v Speaker 1>drive on a regular basis anyway, just to make sure

0:22:15.040 --> 0:22:17.600
<v Speaker 1>they always back up your hard drive to h to

0:22:17.680 --> 0:22:20.400
<v Speaker 1>make sure that you have a version of your operating

0:22:20.400 --> 0:22:23.320
<v Speaker 1>system uh installed on there that you can go back

0:22:23.320 --> 0:22:27.679
<v Speaker 1>to that you know is not infected at least hopefully. Yeah.

0:22:28.160 --> 0:22:30.439
<v Speaker 1>But that's that's that's pretty impressive. I mean, the FBI

0:22:30.520 --> 0:22:33.840
<v Speaker 1>has really been promoting the fact that they they had

0:22:33.840 --> 0:22:37.040
<v Speaker 1>this success in taking down or apparent success I should say,

0:22:37.080 --> 0:22:40.520
<v Speaker 1>and taking down this uh this ring, this ring, because um,

0:22:41.280 --> 0:22:43.200
<v Speaker 1>you know this is this is pretty significant. They took

0:22:43.200 --> 0:22:48.680
<v Speaker 1>away traffic from uh legitimate websites in addition to making

0:22:48.720 --> 0:22:53.359
<v Speaker 1>money for themselves with the the alternate fake websites. Um.

0:22:53.400 --> 0:22:57.040
<v Speaker 1>And it does expose the fact that most people are

0:22:57.080 --> 0:23:00.760
<v Speaker 1>are you know, still having to to think about what

0:23:00.840 --> 0:23:04.399
<v Speaker 1>they do because they they may very well be letting

0:23:04.440 --> 0:23:06.520
<v Speaker 1>somebody in. It could have been a lot worse than

0:23:06.560 --> 0:23:11.800
<v Speaker 1>it was. Yeah, exploiting the DNS system, which again I know, redundant,

0:23:11.920 --> 0:23:16.320
<v Speaker 1>a t M machine, uh, exploiting that pin number, Um,

0:23:16.400 --> 0:23:19.280
<v Speaker 1>it was pretty ingenious, you know, Essentially, it just shows

0:23:19.280 --> 0:23:23.719
<v Speaker 1>that understanding how the Internet works and building this parallel

0:23:23.880 --> 0:23:30.320
<v Speaker 1>system that exploits the way Internet works was very clever. Now,

0:23:30.440 --> 0:23:34.280
<v Speaker 1>of course, it's still depended upon user behavior to work,

0:23:34.680 --> 0:23:37.040
<v Speaker 1>because if no one had downloaded the malware, if no

0:23:37.080 --> 0:23:42.000
<v Speaker 1>one had installed the malware, it wouldn't have um nothing

0:23:42.000 --> 0:23:44.480
<v Speaker 1>would have happened. You would have had these DNS, these

0:23:44.560 --> 0:23:47.399
<v Speaker 1>rogue DNS servers that would be online and would be

0:23:47.440 --> 0:23:50.280
<v Speaker 1>ready to redirect traffic to wherever they wanted it to go.

0:23:50.800 --> 0:23:53.480
<v Speaker 1>But if no one downloaded the malware, the traffic would

0:23:53.480 --> 0:23:57.679
<v Speaker 1>never have been redirected. So really, the other lesson to

0:23:57.720 --> 0:24:02.119
<v Speaker 1>take away from this is just practice good Internet security

0:24:02.280 --> 0:24:07.240
<v Speaker 1>rules of thumb, things like don't open strange attachments from

0:24:07.280 --> 0:24:10.879
<v Speaker 1>you know, in random emails, make sure you ask people

0:24:10.960 --> 0:24:13.000
<v Speaker 1>if they've sent you an attachment, asked them like, did

0:24:13.000 --> 0:24:16.280
<v Speaker 1>you really send this to me? Because sometimes people their

0:24:16.320 --> 0:24:21.400
<v Speaker 1>email address gets compromised and they randomly start sending out

0:24:21.560 --> 0:24:28.359
<v Speaker 1>files to people, often in uncharacteristically uh worded ways, Like

0:24:28.440 --> 0:24:32.080
<v Speaker 1>you might read a message and think, either my friend

0:24:32.240 --> 0:24:37.800
<v Speaker 1>is taking a terrible fall and decided to email me

0:24:37.840 --> 0:24:43.800
<v Speaker 1>immediately afterward, or is under the influence of some powerful

0:24:44.200 --> 0:24:47.320
<v Speaker 1>alcohol or you know, it just doesn't make any sense.

0:24:47.320 --> 0:24:49.200
<v Speaker 1>Like you read it and you're like, this doesn't sound

0:24:49.240 --> 0:24:53.720
<v Speaker 1>like Chris. Chris never emails me in all caps with

0:24:53.840 --> 0:24:56.679
<v Speaker 1>lots of letters missing. Um, you know, send this to

0:24:56.760 --> 0:25:00.280
<v Speaker 1>everyone you know. Um, Bill Gates will give you twenty

0:25:00.320 --> 0:25:04.720
<v Speaker 1>five cents for every email that you've forard anyway, don't

0:25:04.760 --> 0:25:07.679
<v Speaker 1>don't open those email attachments. Yeah, and you know what

0:25:07.720 --> 0:25:11.000
<v Speaker 1>I recently realized. Um, every once in a while, I

0:25:11.160 --> 0:25:13.400
<v Speaker 1>find a story that I want to send to somebody,

0:25:13.800 --> 0:25:17.120
<v Speaker 1>and I've I've realized that I was sending it. I'd say, hey,

0:25:17.200 --> 0:25:19.359
<v Speaker 1>I just saw this, you should check it out. You

0:25:19.359 --> 0:25:21.800
<v Speaker 1>know what. That sounds just like something a spam or

0:25:21.800 --> 0:25:24.280
<v Speaker 1>would writ right, So I try to make it a

0:25:24.320 --> 0:25:27.560
<v Speaker 1>little more personally personal so that the well, for one thing,

0:25:27.560 --> 0:25:30.800
<v Speaker 1>the spam filter will on a lot of these uh

0:25:30.640 --> 0:25:32.800
<v Speaker 1>uh services will we'll pull it right out of there

0:25:32.840 --> 0:25:36.280
<v Speaker 1>if you if it's something that that minimal. So if

0:25:36.320 --> 0:25:40.000
<v Speaker 1>it fits that pattern of hey I saw this, check

0:25:40.000 --> 0:25:43.119
<v Speaker 1>it out, and then yeah, it can fall into the

0:25:43.160 --> 0:25:46.359
<v Speaker 1>spam filter pretty easily. Also, And it doesn't just go

0:25:46.440 --> 0:25:50.679
<v Speaker 1>with attachments like I mean, or links. There are links,

0:25:50.720 --> 0:25:54.280
<v Speaker 1>plenty of links are problems, but think about gosh, I've

0:25:54.320 --> 0:25:57.640
<v Speaker 1>seen this so many times on Facebook. Click jacking on Facebook.

0:25:57.720 --> 0:26:01.240
<v Speaker 1>We're in the home stretch for Operation Click. But before

0:26:01.280 --> 0:26:03.480
<v Speaker 1>we click on any more ghosts, we're gonna take a

0:26:03.560 --> 0:26:15.040
<v Speaker 1>quick break to thank our sponsor. So if you've ever gone,

0:26:15.280 --> 0:26:17.679
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure most of you have. Anyone who's had a

0:26:17.680 --> 0:26:21.080
<v Speaker 1>Facebook account long enough has seen this happen with their friends.

0:26:22.160 --> 0:26:27.399
<v Speaker 1>You'll look and there'll be some video link. You know,

0:26:27.440 --> 0:26:30.000
<v Speaker 1>it'll say. It won't be an embedded video, so it's

0:26:30.040 --> 0:26:33.000
<v Speaker 1>not something that plays within Facebook, but you'll see like

0:26:33.040 --> 0:26:36.400
<v Speaker 1>a link to some incredible video and it usually has

0:26:36.440 --> 0:26:38.840
<v Speaker 1>to do with either violence or sex. Those tend to

0:26:38.840 --> 0:26:42.199
<v Speaker 1>be the two big ones. Yeah. Yeah, you go for

0:26:42.240 --> 0:26:45.680
<v Speaker 1>those base instincts that we humans have and uh and

0:26:46.080 --> 0:26:48.040
<v Speaker 1>you get a lot of results, which is kind of

0:26:48.359 --> 0:26:52.119
<v Speaker 1>a sad commentary, but that's a different podcast. Anyway, there's

0:26:52.160 --> 0:26:54.600
<v Speaker 1>a you know, you'll you'll see this link And I

0:26:54.600 --> 0:26:58.760
<v Speaker 1>saw one recently and immediately I was like, my red

0:26:58.760 --> 0:27:00.760
<v Speaker 1>flag went up as soon as I thought. First of all,

0:27:01.000 --> 0:27:02.720
<v Speaker 1>I was like, this doesn't seem like the kind of

0:27:02.760 --> 0:27:05.600
<v Speaker 1>thing this person would have shared, Like they might have

0:27:05.640 --> 0:27:07.760
<v Speaker 1>clicked on a link but it doesn't seem like something

0:27:07.800 --> 0:27:10.679
<v Speaker 1>they would have themselves shared. And it was a supposedly

0:27:10.680 --> 0:27:14.280
<v Speaker 1>a video about Justin Bieber being stabbed at a concert,

0:27:15.080 --> 0:27:18.240
<v Speaker 1>and as soon as I saw it, I thought, uh,

0:27:18.280 --> 0:27:22.680
<v Speaker 1>this has click clickjacking written all over it, And immediately

0:27:22.680 --> 0:27:25.600
<v Speaker 1>I went to one of my favorite references for this

0:27:25.640 --> 0:27:29.159
<v Speaker 1>sort of thing, snopes dot com. So Snopes is all

0:27:29.200 --> 0:27:31.919
<v Speaker 1>about urban legends, but they also look at things like

0:27:32.080 --> 0:27:35.919
<v Speaker 1>internet hoaxes and and click jacking. And I did a

0:27:35.960 --> 0:27:38.040
<v Speaker 1>quick search and sure enough, this is something that's been

0:27:38.040 --> 0:27:40.159
<v Speaker 1>around for a while, and it just it's just like

0:27:40.200 --> 0:27:42.920
<v Speaker 1>a lot of other clickjacking. It has these cycles that

0:27:43.040 --> 0:27:47.040
<v Speaker 1>goes through where you'll have an initial pop up of

0:27:47.119 --> 0:27:49.600
<v Speaker 1>this and then it dies down, and then it'll pop

0:27:49.680 --> 0:27:51.879
<v Speaker 1>up again, and I'll do that three or four times.

0:27:52.320 --> 0:27:55.080
<v Speaker 1>Current events are often yeah, and I mean it's it's

0:27:55.280 --> 0:27:57.159
<v Speaker 1>you'll find some of these that are that have lasted

0:27:57.160 --> 0:28:00.440
<v Speaker 1>for years that basically they don't necessarily you have to

0:28:00.480 --> 0:28:04.600
<v Speaker 1>be about Justin Bieber, for example, that maybe the uh

0:28:04.920 --> 0:28:08.239
<v Speaker 1>the click jack to jure, Yeah exactly, or you know,

0:28:08.760 --> 0:28:11.000
<v Speaker 1>five years ago it could have been about for example,

0:28:11.000 --> 0:28:13.119
<v Speaker 1>Britney Spear. Yeah, that would be a very popular one

0:28:13.200 --> 0:28:16.000
<v Speaker 1>and Jennifer Anniston or somebody somebody that's in the news

0:28:16.119 --> 0:28:18.240
<v Speaker 1>right that moment. Yeah, and it tends to be like

0:28:18.680 --> 0:28:22.000
<v Speaker 1>or or it'll be like this this this news anchor

0:28:22.040 --> 0:28:26.000
<v Speaker 1>had an embarrassing moment on the news. Click to find

0:28:26.080 --> 0:28:29.080
<v Speaker 1>out that sort of stuff. And what happens is if

0:28:29.119 --> 0:28:31.879
<v Speaker 1>you do click that, you'll get a message that essentially

0:28:31.920 --> 0:28:35.840
<v Speaker 1>says usually something like, uh, your your you need to

0:28:35.880 --> 0:28:39.080
<v Speaker 1>install this extension or you need to install this video

0:28:39.120 --> 0:28:41.640
<v Speaker 1>player in order to watch this video. And if you

0:28:41.800 --> 0:28:45.479
<v Speaker 1>allow it, then it gets access to things like your

0:28:45.520 --> 0:28:49.000
<v Speaker 1>Facebook feed and as well as possibly other stuff. It

0:28:49.160 --> 0:28:54.440
<v Speaker 1>may involve other, you know, kinds of malware, but in general,

0:28:54.560 --> 0:28:58.600
<v Speaker 1>you've seen see this get propagated across Facebook where someone

0:28:58.640 --> 0:29:01.280
<v Speaker 1>who has fallen from the trick agrees to it, and

0:29:01.320 --> 0:29:05.080
<v Speaker 1>then it continues to go across Facebook because it starts

0:29:05.080 --> 0:29:07.840
<v Speaker 1>to use that person's feed. So whenever I see one

0:29:07.840 --> 0:29:11.240
<v Speaker 1>of these, here's what I do, guys. I immediately, you know,

0:29:11.280 --> 0:29:13.800
<v Speaker 1>I see something that that raises a red flag like that,

0:29:14.520 --> 0:29:16.840
<v Speaker 1>first way I do is I do a search on

0:29:16.840 --> 0:29:22.480
<v Speaker 1>on Google for whatever the video supposedly shows, because nine

0:29:22.520 --> 0:29:25.160
<v Speaker 1>times out of ten, it's just completely made up, and

0:29:25.240 --> 0:29:27.960
<v Speaker 1>you can usually find up I find an article written

0:29:28.000 --> 0:29:29.800
<v Speaker 1>on it, or it'll be on Snopes or something like

0:29:29.840 --> 0:29:32.920
<v Speaker 1>that where I'll say, you know, this new Facebook scam

0:29:33.000 --> 0:29:35.600
<v Speaker 1>is going around, so watch out for it. Once I

0:29:35.600 --> 0:29:37.920
<v Speaker 1>have confirmed that it's a scam, I go back to

0:29:37.960 --> 0:29:42.160
<v Speaker 1>Facebook and I comment on the entry and I say, Hey,

0:29:42.240 --> 0:29:45.800
<v Speaker 1>it looks like this is a clickjacking attempt. You may

0:29:45.840 --> 0:29:49.040
<v Speaker 1>want to go and and change your Facebook password and

0:29:49.120 --> 0:29:52.680
<v Speaker 1>delete this post because by deleting the post, you're going

0:29:52.760 --> 0:29:56.720
<v Speaker 1>to help remove that that step for other people to

0:29:56.760 --> 0:30:00.760
<v Speaker 1>fall victim to that same problem. So I that fairly

0:30:00.800 --> 0:30:03.160
<v Speaker 1>regularly because I've got a lot of friends on Facebook,

0:30:03.600 --> 0:30:06.160
<v Speaker 1>and this sort of thing can happen to anyone. It's

0:30:06.280 --> 0:30:10.320
<v Speaker 1>uh and it's not necessarily something that's that's sort of

0:30:10.760 --> 0:30:15.560
<v Speaker 1>either appealing to violence or sex. Sometimes it's something that's

0:30:15.560 --> 0:30:18.800
<v Speaker 1>just interesting and it has nothing to do with any

0:30:18.880 --> 0:30:23.680
<v Speaker 1>of those uh uh kind of more base subject matter.

0:30:24.640 --> 0:30:27.240
<v Speaker 1>And also, I mean in general, when there's a link

0:30:27.280 --> 0:30:30.040
<v Speaker 1>in Facebook, if it's a link in Facebook, I tend

0:30:30.120 --> 0:30:32.840
<v Speaker 1>to go to Google anyway and try and get to

0:30:32.920 --> 0:30:35.600
<v Speaker 1>that link without going through Facebook, because you never know

0:30:36.040 --> 0:30:39.120
<v Speaker 1>when it's a clickjacking attempt. If it's an embedded video

0:30:39.200 --> 0:30:41.560
<v Speaker 1>within Facebook, like a YouTube video that's been embedded in

0:30:41.560 --> 0:30:44.160
<v Speaker 1>Facebook something like that, I'm all right with that. I'll

0:30:44.200 --> 0:30:47.640
<v Speaker 1>watch it that way. But for links, I tend to

0:30:47.680 --> 0:30:49.520
<v Speaker 1>go outside of Facebook to do it, just to be

0:30:49.560 --> 0:30:53.640
<v Speaker 1>on the safe side, which I'm sure Facebook hates. That's

0:30:53.640 --> 0:30:56.320
<v Speaker 1>not what Facebook wants to hear. But until they want

0:30:56.400 --> 0:30:59.240
<v Speaker 1>to track you, right, until there's better security around that

0:30:59.400 --> 0:31:02.560
<v Speaker 1>so that I'm not throwing caution to the wind and

0:31:02.600 --> 0:31:06.640
<v Speaker 1>infecting my computer, I just I can't justify it. So

0:31:07.160 --> 0:31:09.880
<v Speaker 1>that's just my own personal approach. Guys. I'm sure all

0:31:09.920 --> 0:31:11.960
<v Speaker 1>of you probably have your own sort of way of

0:31:12.000 --> 0:31:15.520
<v Speaker 1>dealing with this and avoiding problems, but it's always something

0:31:15.520 --> 0:31:18.360
<v Speaker 1>that's good to keep in mind. Uh and UM. Anyway,

0:31:18.400 --> 0:31:21.120
<v Speaker 1>So if you guys, suspect that you might have this

0:31:21.240 --> 0:31:23.640
<v Speaker 1>DNS change your malware on your computer, go to the

0:31:23.680 --> 0:31:27.680
<v Speaker 1>FBI's website. Use their tool first of all to see

0:31:27.800 --> 0:31:30.400
<v Speaker 1>if you get a result back. If you don't get

0:31:30.400 --> 0:31:35.200
<v Speaker 1>a result back, you're probably okay, not necessarily okay. You

0:31:35.240 --> 0:31:39.640
<v Speaker 1>can pull up that list of addresses that do map

0:31:39.760 --> 0:31:43.280
<v Speaker 1>to these rogue servers and go through your computer settings

0:31:43.320 --> 0:31:49.560
<v Speaker 1>and confirm it that way warning rogue servers, So just

0:31:49.800 --> 0:31:53.120
<v Speaker 1>check your computers, make sure you're you're fine, because if

0:31:53.120 --> 0:31:57.080
<v Speaker 1>you're not fine, then once the FBI turns these servers off,

0:31:57.120 --> 0:31:59.760
<v Speaker 1>you may have some problems accessing stuff over the web.

0:32:00.080 --> 0:32:02.840
<v Speaker 1>And then you're thinking, what the heck happened? And that

0:32:02.880 --> 0:32:05.400
<v Speaker 1>wraps up another classic episode of tech Stuff. Hope you

0:32:05.400 --> 0:32:07.600
<v Speaker 1>guys enjoyed. It gives you a little bit of a

0:32:07.600 --> 0:32:12.920
<v Speaker 1>glimpse into the past and this operation Ghost Click problem

0:32:13.000 --> 0:32:18.320
<v Speaker 1>that was plaguing us in the spring of If you

0:32:18.360 --> 0:32:21.640
<v Speaker 1>guys have any questions or maybe suggestions for future episodes,

0:32:21.680 --> 0:32:24.160
<v Speaker 1>you can send me an email the addresses tech Stuff

0:32:24.320 --> 0:32:27.480
<v Speaker 1>at how stuff works dot com, or pop on over

0:32:27.520 --> 0:32:30.560
<v Speaker 1>to our website that's text stuff podcast dot com. That's

0:32:30.560 --> 0:32:34.560
<v Speaker 1>where you're going to find links to all our classic episodes,

0:32:34.560 --> 0:32:38.160
<v Speaker 1>including all of our new episodes. You'll also find links

0:32:38.200 --> 0:32:42.000
<v Speaker 1>to our social media presence and a link to our

0:32:42.040 --> 0:32:45.760
<v Speaker 1>online merchandise store, and every purchase you make there and

0:32:45.760 --> 0:32:48.240
<v Speaker 1>goes to help the show, and we greatly appreciate it,

0:32:48.720 --> 0:32:56.760
<v Speaker 1>and I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff

0:32:56.800 --> 0:32:59.240
<v Speaker 1>is a production of I Heart Radio's How Stuff Works.

0:32:59.280 --> 0:33:02.000
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0:33:02.040 --> 0:33:05.320
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