WEBVTT - The Highly Valued But Unprofitable Tech Unicorns

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio,

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<v Speaker 1>and I love all things tech. And one thing that

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<v Speaker 1>consistently floors me in the tech world, specifically in the

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<v Speaker 1>tech startup world, is that a company doesn't have to

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<v Speaker 1>be profitable to seem valuable. And to me, this sounds

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<v Speaker 1>like a contradiction. You know, I mean, if a company

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<v Speaker 1>is not making a profit, it is either breaking even

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<v Speaker 1>so you know, things are just staying afloat, or it's

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<v Speaker 1>losing money. So you would think that a company that

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<v Speaker 1>was not making a profit couldn't be valuable. It would

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<v Speaker 1>at best be neutral, and worst, it would be an

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<v Speaker 1>ever growing cost to operate and require you know, consistent

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<v Speaker 1>investment to just keep going. And yet in the tech world,

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<v Speaker 1>we have plenty of examples of companies that are not

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<v Speaker 1>profitable and yet consistently reach crazy valuations and the billions

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<v Speaker 1>of dollars. So we're going to talk about a few

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<v Speaker 1>of those today, some of which I have covered in

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<v Speaker 1>other episodes, And I thought we would start off with

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<v Speaker 1>a company that actually has become profitable but only relatively recently,

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<v Speaker 1>and that is Twitter for those of you who are

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<v Speaker 1>blissfully unaware. Twitter is a social network platform upon which

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<v Speaker 1>people can post short messages called tweets to followers, and

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<v Speaker 1>originally Twitter limited these two characters in length because the

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<v Speaker 1>service was largely reliant on SMS, or Short Messaging Service

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<v Speaker 1>a k a. Old Ashen text messaging, and because SMS

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<v Speaker 1>has a limit to the number of characters it can support,

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<v Speaker 1>which is a hundred sixty characters. Twitter also had a

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<v Speaker 1>limit had a little buffer built in there so that

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<v Speaker 1>your user name could fit in. For example, in two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand seventeen, Twitter would actually increase that character limit to

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<v Speaker 1>two eight characters, so suddenly you could be twice as wordy,

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<v Speaker 1>and for people like me, that was glorious. But here's

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<v Speaker 1>the thing. While Twitter launched in two thousand six and

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<v Speaker 1>eleven years later expanded that character limit throughout that entire time,

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<v Speaker 1>it had never had a profitable year. So let's take

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<v Speaker 1>a quick look at the trajectory of Twitter. Back in

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand six, a company called Odeo created Twitter as

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<v Speaker 1>kind of a side project. Some folks at Odeo kind

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<v Speaker 1>of got together to make it, but by the following year,

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<v Speaker 1>it was ready to kind of stand as its own thing,

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<v Speaker 1>particularly after having a big debut to the world at

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<v Speaker 1>large at south By Southwest in two thousand seven. South

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<v Speaker 1>By as you know, cool people call it. I just

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<v Speaker 1>call it south By Southwest because I am aware I

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<v Speaker 1>am not cool anyway. It's a big event in Austin, Texas,

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<v Speaker 1>and it includes multiple tracks of content programming. So there's

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<v Speaker 1>a music track in which hundreds of bands come to

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<v Speaker 1>Austin and they play live gigs around the city. There's

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<v Speaker 1>a film track in which the theaters around town will

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<v Speaker 1>exhibit films from both new and unknown artists and famous filmmakers,

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<v Speaker 1>and whole discussions and things like that as well. And

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<v Speaker 1>then there's the interactive track, which includes all the computers

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<v Speaker 1>and apps and text stuff. Folks at the event adopted

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<v Speaker 1>Twitter pretty quickly, and that buzz really helped propel the

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<v Speaker 1>app and gave it a reputation as being this cool,

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<v Speaker 1>hip way to stay touch with friends, and later on

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<v Speaker 1>it became kind of seen as this tool in order

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<v Speaker 1>to send communications out too large numbers of people. So

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<v Speaker 1>it was relatively cool and hip. I mean, I would

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<v Speaker 1>say it was part of the interactive track. That gives

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<v Speaker 1>a cap on how cool and hip it can be,

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<v Speaker 1>because I would argue that the tech track still wishes

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<v Speaker 1>it was as cool as the music and film tracks are,

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<v Speaker 1>and I say that as a tech guy anyway. Over

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<v Speaker 1>the past few years, Twitter would hold various rounds of

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<v Speaker 1>funding in order to attract investors to supporting the platform,

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<v Speaker 1>and the general thought was, let's grow this thing as

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<v Speaker 1>much as we can and then we'll figure out how

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<v Speaker 1>to monetize it later, which, honestly, I mean that might

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<v Speaker 1>sound crazy, but it's probably the only route that you

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<v Speaker 1>can take with some of these tech companies. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>if you're launching a new app, it's hard to convince

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<v Speaker 1>people to jump on an untested, unproven app unless it

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<v Speaker 1>is free to use. Most folks are not super eager

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<v Speaker 1>to spend money on something that hasn't had a proven

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<v Speaker 1>use case, and so finding a way to scale up

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<v Speaker 1>and then monetize, you know, your large user base was

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<v Speaker 1>probably the most logical approach. Twitter co founder Jack Dorsey

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<v Speaker 1>led the company for a few years before handing the

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<v Speaker 1>control as CEO over to Evan Williams Now. In this

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<v Speaker 1>phase of Twitter's growth, which would be around two thousand eight,

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand ten, the company began exploring ways to use

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<v Speaker 1>promoted tweets as a type of advertising, so advertisers could

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<v Speaker 1>pay to promote a specific message a tweet so that

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<v Speaker 1>it would show up in the timelines of folks, even

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<v Speaker 1>if those folks weren't following that particular account. So I guess,

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<v Speaker 1>for you know, those who don't use Twitter, I should clarify.

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<v Speaker 1>The way it generally works is that you make an account,

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<v Speaker 1>assuming that you're making an account that can post publicly.

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<v Speaker 1>You can make a private account and then you can

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<v Speaker 1>dictate which people can actually see your tweets, but most

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<v Speaker 1>people have a public account. Then you end up following

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<v Speaker 1>accounts you want to follow. So maybe there's some notable people,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe there's some brands, maybe they're friends of yours that

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<v Speaker 1>are on Twitter. You go and you follow those and

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<v Speaker 1>you click a little button to follow them, and now

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<v Speaker 1>whenever someone posting on those accounts posts a public tweet,

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<v Speaker 1>that tweet shows up in your little Twitter feed and

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<v Speaker 1>you can read them. So let's take an example of Sally,

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<v Speaker 1>June and Bob. So Sally follows June, but she doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>follow Bob. So whenever June sends out a public tweet,

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<v Speaker 1>Sally sees it. Now, June follows Bob, so June can

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<v Speaker 1>see all of Bob's public tweets. If June were to

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<v Speaker 1>start a tweet with at Bob, so sending a Twitter

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<v Speaker 1>message to Bob, not a direct message, but at reply message,

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<v Speaker 1>Sally would not see that tweet automatically because Sally is

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<v Speaker 1>not following Bob. Now Twitter didn't always work like this,

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<v Speaker 1>but over the years the service institute these rules where

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<v Speaker 1>you have to follow both parties in order to see

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<v Speaker 1>these at replies on the face of them. Now, if again,

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<v Speaker 1>if Sally had followed both Bob and June, she would

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<v Speaker 1>see June's at at Bob. But now, let's say that

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<v Speaker 1>Bob is running a business and he wants to promote

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<v Speaker 1>his business. So he goes and he purchases a promoted

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<v Speaker 1>tweet on Twitter, and he crafts a short message urging

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<v Speaker 1>people to you know, follow a link to his business,

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<v Speaker 1>and he pays Twitter and the message posts. Now Sally

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<v Speaker 1>logs in, she looks at her Twitter feed, and now

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<v Speaker 1>she sees at the top of that Twitter feed or

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<v Speaker 1>near the top, Bob's message, even though she does not

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<v Speaker 1>follow Bob. Because that tweet has been promoted into her timeline. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>as you might imagine, a lot of Twitter users were

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<v Speaker 1>not super keen on promoted tweets, as they were often

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<v Speaker 1>left wondering why am I seeing this? Mean? I don't

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<v Speaker 1>even follow this account? But it was one of the

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<v Speaker 1>ways that Twitter could make money, and it did make money.

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<v Speaker 1>It just wasn't making enough money to offset the cost

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<v Speaker 1>of operating the company, so it remained operating at a loss.

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<v Speaker 1>In two thousand thirteen, Twitter announced it was going to

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<v Speaker 1>go public. It was going to become a publicly traded

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<v Speaker 1>company and hold an I p O or initial public offering,

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<v Speaker 1>so that would mean that Twitter stock would be publicly

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<v Speaker 1>traded on stock exchanges. Now, keep in mind that this

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<v Speaker 1>was still several years from Twitter actually having a profitable year,

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<v Speaker 1>but this also meant the company could get a fresh

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<v Speaker 1>injection of investment money, as folks would buy up shares

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<v Speaker 1>of stock. So everyone recognized that Twitter was providing a

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<v Speaker 1>valuable service, even if the company itself hadn't found a

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<v Speaker 1>way to leverage that to make the company profitable. Heck,

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<v Speaker 1>back in two thousand eleven, Twitter had a valuation of

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<v Speaker 1>eight billion dollars, but it was still seven years away

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<v Speaker 1>from a profitable year. In it launched a targeted advertising campaign,

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<v Speaker 1>a more focused approach to promoted tweets, and the following year,

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<v Speaker 1>the company held a round of layoffs, eliminating around nine

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<v Speaker 1>percent of its workforce. In the last quarter of Twitter

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<v Speaker 1>posted a quarterly profit of ninety one million dollars. The

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<v Speaker 1>company had been in operations since two thousand and six,

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<v Speaker 1>and this was the first profitable quarter for the company.

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<v Speaker 1>So three months Twitter followed that up with a string

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<v Speaker 1>of profitable quarters, and so two thousand eighteen became the

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<v Speaker 1>first profitable year in the company's history. Now, to be clear,

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<v Speaker 1>the company still had about one point five billion dollars

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<v Speaker 1>in debt at that point. Two thousand nineteen was another

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<v Speaker 1>good year for Twitter, but then saw a step back.

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<v Speaker 1>The company made larger expenditures in and despite bringing in

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<v Speaker 1>three point seven to billion dollars in revenue, it ended

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<v Speaker 1>the year with an operating loss of one point one

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<v Speaker 1>four billion dollars. Still, Twitter is a company that has

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<v Speaker 1>gone from start up to one that actually generated enough

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<v Speaker 1>revenue to at least sometimes cover all the costs of

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<v Speaker 1>operation and then some. But let's move on to a

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<v Speaker 1>slightly younger company. One that's perhaps on the cusp of

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<v Speaker 1>having its first profitable year by the end of That

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<v Speaker 1>company is snap Incorporated, which of course is known for

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<v Speaker 1>its popular video social platform Snapchat. I should say video

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<v Speaker 1>and photo platform Snapchat. Snapchat launched back in two thousand eleven,

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<v Speaker 1>meaning this company is actually a decade old, which feels

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<v Speaker 1>weird to say. Uh and uh, And in my mind

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<v Speaker 1>it's always like that thing that just came out a

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<v Speaker 1>couple of years ago, like I have such a bad

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<v Speaker 1>way of placing wind tech things launched to me, like

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<v Speaker 1>anything pre Twitter was only around a few years. But anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>three Stanford University students named Reggie Brown, Evan Spiegel, and

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<v Speaker 1>Bobby Murphy created the app way back in the day. Now.

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<v Speaker 1>The story goes that Brown had come up with this

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<v Speaker 1>idea of a platform that would allow users to post

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<v Speaker 1>photos and videos that would have a limited shelf life,

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<v Speaker 1>so after a given amount of time, the content would disappear,

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<v Speaker 1>meaning you had to be actively engaged with the app

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<v Speaker 1>frequently or you'd end up missing out on stuff. Also,

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<v Speaker 1>I should add that at least some of the stories

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<v Speaker 1>of the early days of this idea, In fact, a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of the stories I should argue really revolved around

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<v Speaker 1>the very things that concerned critics have raised about Snapchat,

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<v Speaker 1>that being that the fact that you're you're talking about

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<v Speaker 1>video and photos that only stay active for a certain

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<v Speaker 1>amount of time and then they go away forever or

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<v Speaker 1>apparently forever, meant that folks would take photos and videos of, say,

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<v Speaker 1>less socially acceptable subjects. So, in other words, at least

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<v Speaker 1>in one recounting of this idea, the primary use case

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<v Speaker 1>for the disappearing photos was that it might encourage people

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<v Speaker 1>to send racy pictures and videos to one another. Reading

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<v Speaker 1>some of the accounts about this is pretty disturbing in

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<v Speaker 1>some cases, like it. It feels gross. Not that people

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<v Speaker 1>shouldn't send whatever they want to whomever they want. I

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<v Speaker 1>don't mean that if they are consenting adults and and

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<v Speaker 1>it is welcomed. I have no issues with what people

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<v Speaker 1>send to one another, but rather that it was a

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<v Speaker 1>means of encouraging this behavior from people who might otherwise

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<v Speaker 1>resist it. You start getting into some territory that I

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<v Speaker 1>find pretty ski vy. However, there are lots of other

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<v Speaker 1>ways of using the app that don't involve, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>skivie related topics and worlds are turned on such thoughts

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<v Speaker 1>I suppose now, Honestly, if I dived into the background

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<v Speaker 1>of the founders and some of the emails that they

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<v Speaker 1>were sending to one another, back with them each other

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<v Speaker 1>and with their fraternity mates, I would quickly need to

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<v Speaker 1>slap an explicit tag on this episode. It is not

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<v Speaker 1>a good luck, is all I'm gonna say, or rather

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<v Speaker 1>like some of it is like really reprehensible, but let's

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<v Speaker 1>just move on. I've been soap boxing long enough. So

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<v Speaker 1>this was an app that was partly built on the

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<v Speaker 1>premise of fomo, you know, the fear of missing out,

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<v Speaker 1>which was kind of brilliant because that kind of design

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<v Speaker 1>encourages ongoing and increased engagement, and that is something that

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<v Speaker 1>can be monetized if it's treated properly. It's the thing

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<v Speaker 1>that every platform is out for. It's why the Facebook

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<v Speaker 1>algorithm works the way it does. It's why the YouTube

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<v Speaker 1>algorithm works the way it does. It's designed to encourage

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<v Speaker 1>you to stay there for as long as possible. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>just to backtrack a little bit, while Twitter turned a

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<v Speaker 1>profit in two thousand and eighteen, the company also saw

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<v Speaker 1>a drop in active users. In fact, that drop of

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<v Speaker 1>active users was bad enough that Twitter essentially said it

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't going to report on the number of active users

0:14:21.440 --> 0:14:26.600
<v Speaker 1>anymore and instead focus on profitability as a metric, possibly

0:14:26.640 --> 0:14:29.840
<v Speaker 1>because the company was also kind of saying that it's

0:14:29.960 --> 0:14:33.480
<v Speaker 1>long term profitability strategy hinged on building out a larger

0:14:33.520 --> 0:14:37.080
<v Speaker 1>community of active users, and it could be pretty upsetting

0:14:37.080 --> 0:14:41.200
<v Speaker 1>to investors to hear that the long term success of

0:14:41.240 --> 0:14:46.600
<v Speaker 1>a company is dependent upon something that is currently in decline. Anyway,

0:14:46.760 --> 0:14:51.560
<v Speaker 1>the story of snapchat then gets really rough. Originally the

0:14:51.600 --> 0:14:55.080
<v Speaker 1>idea was for a website, but the trio soon learned

0:14:55.240 --> 0:14:58.560
<v Speaker 1>that a mobile app would be far more useful and popular,

0:14:59.080 --> 0:15:02.120
<v Speaker 1>and the app that the you originally created with Bobby

0:15:02.200 --> 0:15:05.760
<v Speaker 1>Murphy actually doing the coding was called Peka boo p

0:15:06.040 --> 0:15:09.680
<v Speaker 1>I c A b o O. And then well, a

0:15:09.760 --> 0:15:13.720
<v Speaker 1>decision was reached, and that decision was to exercise Reggie

0:15:13.760 --> 0:15:16.640
<v Speaker 1>Brown from the group to kick him out. So out

0:15:16.640 --> 0:15:21.120
<v Speaker 1>of the three, Brown had apparently made the fewest contributions

0:15:21.160 --> 0:15:25.560
<v Speaker 1>to actually building the product, though according to you know

0:15:25.800 --> 0:15:30.520
<v Speaker 1>the original story, it was his actual idea to make

0:15:30.560 --> 0:15:33.240
<v Speaker 1>this thing. He didn't do a whole lot of work

0:15:33.480 --> 0:15:37.000
<v Speaker 1>to build it. He did do some work with filing patents,

0:15:37.640 --> 0:15:40.640
<v Speaker 1>but even by his own admission, he said he didn't

0:15:40.680 --> 0:15:44.320
<v Speaker 1>do quite as much as as a Spiegel or Um

0:15:44.440 --> 0:15:49.640
<v Speaker 1>or Murphy had done. So he later would sue Snapchat,

0:15:50.240 --> 0:15:54.560
<v Speaker 1>which was essentially not even acknowledging his existence, and the

0:15:54.600 --> 0:15:58.040
<v Speaker 1>company would ultimately reach a one fifty seven point five

0:15:58.240 --> 0:16:03.240
<v Speaker 1>million dollar settlement with him, which is, you know, not

0:16:03.640 --> 0:16:06.640
<v Speaker 1>that's not a bad amount of cash to take with

0:16:06.720 --> 0:16:08.960
<v Speaker 1>you to say, like, yeah, I came up with the idea,

0:16:09.120 --> 0:16:11.320
<v Speaker 1>and then you could go and do whatever you wanted

0:16:11.400 --> 0:16:13.920
<v Speaker 1>with it. By the way, these guys were not like

0:16:14.960 --> 0:16:17.960
<v Speaker 1>struggling college students either, I just want to point that

0:16:18.000 --> 0:16:21.200
<v Speaker 1>out anyway. Brown and Spiegel then founded a company on

0:16:21.280 --> 0:16:25.560
<v Speaker 1>September six, two thousand eleven that would be Snapchat, which

0:16:26.120 --> 0:16:29.840
<v Speaker 1>was essentially a relaunch of Peekaboo, but with some you know,

0:16:29.960 --> 0:16:34.360
<v Speaker 1>changes to the look of it. The company Snap Incorporated

0:16:34.720 --> 0:16:37.360
<v Speaker 1>would follow a few years later as a sort of

0:16:37.440 --> 0:16:41.480
<v Speaker 1>parent company for the purposes you like organizing and handling

0:16:41.520 --> 0:16:44.440
<v Speaker 1>finance and things like that. The app, at first was

0:16:44.520 --> 0:16:47.480
<v Speaker 1>an iOS exclusive. It came to Android a year later

0:16:47.520 --> 0:16:52.120
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand twelve. In ten, Mark Zuckerberg reportedly made

0:16:52.120 --> 0:16:56.880
<v Speaker 1>an offer that the Snapchat founders actually could refuse, but

0:16:57.040 --> 0:17:00.920
<v Speaker 1>that offer was allegedly for three billion dollars and they

0:17:00.920 --> 0:17:05.199
<v Speaker 1>turned it down. Wowser's In two thousand seventeen, the company

0:17:05.240 --> 0:17:08.280
<v Speaker 1>held an I p O and got a massive cash

0:17:08.320 --> 0:17:13.120
<v Speaker 1>injection and that created a company valuation of twenty four

0:17:13.720 --> 0:17:19.520
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars and had introduced advertising, So it was generating revenue.

0:17:20.040 --> 0:17:22.679
<v Speaker 1>It was making cash, It just wasn't making enough to

0:17:22.720 --> 0:17:25.680
<v Speaker 1>cover all the costs in order to turn a profit.

0:17:26.080 --> 0:17:28.960
<v Speaker 1>But the app appeared to be on a rocket ship

0:17:29.000 --> 0:17:31.080
<v Speaker 1>to the moon. But then a couple of things ended

0:17:31.160 --> 0:17:34.520
<v Speaker 1>up causing the company some grief. One was that a

0:17:34.600 --> 0:17:37.560
<v Speaker 1>spurned Mark Zuckerberg decided he would build out his own

0:17:37.600 --> 0:17:43.320
<v Speaker 1>Snapchat by having the Facebook owned business of Instagram introduced

0:17:43.320 --> 0:17:48.920
<v Speaker 1>features that were let's just call it directly lifted off

0:17:48.960 --> 0:17:53.320
<v Speaker 1>of Snapchats feature list and so calling it something that

0:17:53.400 --> 0:17:59.840
<v Speaker 1>resembled Snapchats features as being kind Snapchats. Growth trailed off

0:18:00.000 --> 0:18:04.440
<v Speaker 1>weekly it dropped by so the company was actually still growing,

0:18:04.480 --> 0:18:06.760
<v Speaker 1>it was just growing at a much slower rate than

0:18:06.840 --> 0:18:13.160
<v Speaker 1>it had been. Then there was the ultimate betrayal. Snapchat

0:18:13.240 --> 0:18:17.160
<v Speaker 1>redesigned its user interface, and then Kylie Jenner sent out

0:18:17.160 --> 0:18:20.800
<v Speaker 1>a tweet saying she didn't even use it anymore, and

0:18:20.960 --> 0:18:25.840
<v Speaker 1>that was the unkindest cut of all. Honestly, I'm still

0:18:25.880 --> 0:18:30.159
<v Speaker 1>goggling at a billion dollar company that is unable to

0:18:30.160 --> 0:18:33.720
<v Speaker 1>turn a profit. I really just you know, business is

0:18:33.760 --> 0:18:39.480
<v Speaker 1>beyond me. Obviously, I am not any sort of business genius. Anyway,

0:18:39.640 --> 0:18:43.040
<v Speaker 1>snap was going through some internal turmoil. The company lost

0:18:43.080 --> 0:18:45.680
<v Speaker 1>to chief financial officers and the head of its human

0:18:45.720 --> 0:18:50.000
<v Speaker 1>resources department in short succession, and Instagram was eating into

0:18:50.080 --> 0:18:54.480
<v Speaker 1>Snapchat's growth, and then the double whammy of TikTok's emergence

0:18:54.920 --> 0:18:57.240
<v Speaker 1>began to be an issue, and then the pandemic of

0:18:58.480 --> 0:19:02.040
<v Speaker 1>really threw wrenches into the various works. The company wasn't

0:19:02.080 --> 0:19:05.720
<v Speaker 1>falling apart, not by any means, but things were pretty tense.

0:19:06.200 --> 0:19:09.720
<v Speaker 1>In The Financial Times declared that Snapchat had about three

0:19:09.800 --> 0:19:12.960
<v Speaker 1>years to reach a cash flow neutral status or else

0:19:12.960 --> 0:19:14.720
<v Speaker 1>it would need to find a new way to raise

0:19:14.800 --> 0:19:17.480
<v Speaker 1>money in order to stay in business. Its losses in

0:19:17.520 --> 0:19:22.720
<v Speaker 1>twenty eight amounted to one point three billion dollars. Now,

0:19:22.720 --> 0:19:25.200
<v Speaker 1>the good news for snap is that while the company

0:19:25.280 --> 0:19:29.720
<v Speaker 1>lost money in the years since, it was losing less

0:19:29.760 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 1>money per year in losses amounted to around nine hut

0:19:35.200 --> 0:19:39.679
<v Speaker 1>five million dollars. That's not great, I get it. The

0:19:39.720 --> 0:19:43.600
<v Speaker 1>Motley Fool reported in January of one that Snap might

0:19:43.640 --> 0:19:46.959
<v Speaker 1>actually turn a profit this year, though I glanced at

0:19:46.960 --> 0:19:50.199
<v Speaker 1>the company's quarterly earnings reports, which the company has to

0:19:50.240 --> 0:19:54.000
<v Speaker 1>file publicly because it's a publicly traded company, and it

0:19:54.040 --> 0:19:56.520
<v Speaker 1>continues to operate at a net loss this year. The

0:19:56.560 --> 0:19:59.920
<v Speaker 1>company continues to add revenue streams frequently in the four

0:20:00.119 --> 0:20:04.359
<v Speaker 1>of serving more ads per experience. But yeah, no profitable

0:20:04.480 --> 0:20:07.520
<v Speaker 1>year yet. When we come back, we'll talk about some

0:20:07.600 --> 0:20:10.720
<v Speaker 1>other famous companies that have yet to turn a profit,

0:20:10.760 --> 0:20:13.760
<v Speaker 1>at least on an annual basis. But first, well, I

0:20:13.800 --> 0:20:23.800
<v Speaker 1>gotta have some profit. Let's take a quick break before

0:20:23.840 --> 0:20:26.080
<v Speaker 1>we get into our next company. Let me hit you

0:20:26.119 --> 0:20:28.520
<v Speaker 1>with a little fun tidbit that I came across while

0:20:28.560 --> 0:20:32.680
<v Speaker 1>researching this episode. Business Insider has a two thousand nineteen

0:20:32.800 --> 0:20:36.879
<v Speaker 1>article that served as some of the inspiration for this episode.

0:20:36.920 --> 0:20:39.720
<v Speaker 1>Although a lot of the things in that list are

0:20:40.480 --> 0:20:43.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, have turned a profit since then. But in

0:20:43.160 --> 0:20:46.520
<v Speaker 1>that article they cite a report from pitch Book, and

0:20:46.600 --> 0:20:49.239
<v Speaker 1>that report says that out of one startups that had

0:20:49.280 --> 0:20:52.240
<v Speaker 1>a valuation of at least one billion dollars, that is

0:20:52.320 --> 0:20:58.400
<v Speaker 1>the Unicorn valuation only uh less than had become profitable.

0:20:58.400 --> 0:21:03.960
<v Speaker 1>In fact, sixty were unprofitable more than half. And the

0:21:04.080 --> 0:21:07.880
<v Speaker 1>article also cites a stat from Recode that says unprofitable

0:21:07.920 --> 0:21:12.920
<v Speaker 1>companies that went public actually performed better than profitable companies did.

0:21:13.440 --> 0:21:16.199
<v Speaker 1>The market loves a highly valued underdog. I guess I

0:21:16.200 --> 0:21:19.400
<v Speaker 1>mean I still don't understand business honestly. But let's move on.

0:21:19.840 --> 0:21:22.560
<v Speaker 1>Let's talk about a company that's not actually a tech

0:21:22.680 --> 0:21:26.520
<v Speaker 1>company but was treated like one. And of course I'm

0:21:26.560 --> 0:21:30.160
<v Speaker 1>talking about we Work, a company that had the business

0:21:30.200 --> 0:21:34.200
<v Speaker 1>model of securing office space in various markets and then

0:21:34.320 --> 0:21:38.840
<v Speaker 1>essentially sub letting that space out to customers. And those

0:21:38.840 --> 0:21:42.159
<v Speaker 1>were typically smaller companies or sometimes companies that wanted to

0:21:42.160 --> 0:21:45.400
<v Speaker 1>open up, say a small branch office in the city

0:21:45.440 --> 0:21:49.119
<v Speaker 1>where they did not already have a presence. We Work

0:21:49.480 --> 0:21:53.920
<v Speaker 1>has had a phenomenal journey, complete with drama and theatrics,

0:21:54.160 --> 0:21:57.200
<v Speaker 1>and one of the strangest attempted I p O s

0:21:57.320 --> 0:22:02.439
<v Speaker 1>I have ever researched. Like Its bonkers, y'all. Now. The

0:22:02.480 --> 0:22:06.720
<v Speaker 1>founder of the company was Adam Newman, and Israeli born

0:22:06.880 --> 0:22:09.760
<v Speaker 1>entrepreneur who moved to the United States in two thousand

0:22:09.880 --> 0:22:12.960
<v Speaker 1>one and got his start running a company called Crawlers

0:22:13.000 --> 0:22:16.680
<v Speaker 1>with a K and that specialized in clothing for babies.

0:22:17.359 --> 0:22:20.440
<v Speaker 1>In two thousand eight, he created a new startup called

0:22:20.560 --> 0:22:23.280
<v Speaker 1>Green Desk, which was sort of a predecessor to we Work,

0:22:23.480 --> 0:22:26.479
<v Speaker 1>and the idea was to create office space that folks

0:22:26.520 --> 0:22:30.000
<v Speaker 1>like freelancers could rent out. So maybe you're a freelancing

0:22:30.080 --> 0:22:32.640
<v Speaker 1>writer and you need a dedicated workspace, so you could

0:22:32.720 --> 0:22:36.920
<v Speaker 1>rent out like a desk in a shared coworking environment

0:22:36.960 --> 0:22:39.399
<v Speaker 1>with lots of other people. So that was the idea,

0:22:39.600 --> 0:22:41.600
<v Speaker 1>and it was called Green Desk because the focus was

0:22:41.640 --> 0:22:46.959
<v Speaker 1>on sustainability, So the office space had recycled furniture in it,

0:22:47.119 --> 0:22:48.960
<v Speaker 1>and the idea was that the electricity was going to

0:22:49.040 --> 0:22:52.239
<v Speaker 1>come from wind power, that kind of thing. Newman and

0:22:52.400 --> 0:22:56.159
<v Speaker 1>his Green Desk co founder Miguel mcklvey sold off the

0:22:56.200 --> 0:22:59.760
<v Speaker 1>company for a few million dollars and around twenty or

0:23:00.000 --> 0:23:04.520
<v Speaker 1>an eleven because accounts very they launched a new company

0:23:04.640 --> 0:23:07.399
<v Speaker 1>based around the idea of shared workspaces, and this was

0:23:07.560 --> 0:23:10.919
<v Speaker 1>we Work. And again, despite the fact that you know,

0:23:11.000 --> 0:23:14.000
<v Speaker 1>it was really a real estate company, the media was

0:23:14.080 --> 0:23:17.399
<v Speaker 1>treating it like it was a tech startup, and it

0:23:17.440 --> 0:23:19.840
<v Speaker 1>was operating a lot like a tech startup, so I

0:23:19.880 --> 0:23:22.919
<v Speaker 1>guess that was the reason for the media coverage. We

0:23:23.040 --> 0:23:27.000
<v Speaker 1>Work expanded rapidly, securing office space in various cities around

0:23:27.040 --> 0:23:30.040
<v Speaker 1>the world and then renting it out to their customers.

0:23:30.320 --> 0:23:33.639
<v Speaker 1>And this meant we Work was signing these really expensive

0:23:33.720 --> 0:23:37.240
<v Speaker 1>long term leases with lots of different office buildings, and

0:23:37.320 --> 0:23:42.280
<v Speaker 1>that made some investors nervous because this was a guaranteed expense. Right,

0:23:42.359 --> 0:23:45.520
<v Speaker 1>You're doing a long term lease, that's a guaranteed cost

0:23:45.560 --> 0:23:48.960
<v Speaker 1>to your company, and we Works business of renting out

0:23:49.000 --> 0:23:53.159
<v Speaker 1>space to customers was not necessarily going to follow the

0:23:53.240 --> 0:23:56.560
<v Speaker 1>demand that would match the supply. In other words, there

0:23:56.640 --> 0:24:00.800
<v Speaker 1>might be years where fewer customers actually need that shared

0:24:00.840 --> 0:24:03.240
<v Speaker 1>office space, and yet you would still be saddled with

0:24:03.320 --> 0:24:07.920
<v Speaker 1>this long term lease agreement. The company grew very quickly.

0:24:08.080 --> 0:24:10.560
<v Speaker 1>The Newman developed a reputation for having a bit of

0:24:10.560 --> 0:24:15.119
<v Speaker 1>a lavish and some might say hedonistic lifestyle. He also

0:24:15.280 --> 0:24:17.000
<v Speaker 1>made some choices that made him a bit of a

0:24:17.000 --> 0:24:20.240
<v Speaker 1>target in the business space. Now, I would argue that

0:24:20.480 --> 0:24:26.080
<v Speaker 1>targeting Newman based on those choices was sometimes unfair and disingenuous,

0:24:26.119 --> 0:24:32.000
<v Speaker 1>like you know, placing weird kind of moral uh decisions

0:24:32.040 --> 0:24:34.960
<v Speaker 1>based upon some of his behavior, but he was also

0:24:35.080 --> 0:24:37.879
<v Speaker 1>known for spending a lot of money, both in the

0:24:37.960 --> 0:24:41.359
<v Speaker 1>company and outside of it, so it was kind of

0:24:41.400 --> 0:24:45.760
<v Speaker 1>hard to to not criticize his behaviors in some cases.

0:24:46.280 --> 0:24:49.280
<v Speaker 1>In two thousand nineteen, things came to a head. The

0:24:49.320 --> 0:24:52.720
<v Speaker 1>company was planning a public offering to go on to

0:24:52.840 --> 0:24:57.760
<v Speaker 1>the stock market. It had recently rebranded and became the

0:24:57.880 --> 0:25:02.439
<v Speaker 1>Wee Company. This is something that's since been essentially abandoned,

0:25:02.440 --> 0:25:04.359
<v Speaker 1>but the idea was that it would have three divisions.

0:25:04.640 --> 0:25:07.119
<v Speaker 1>There was the we Work division, that's the one with

0:25:07.200 --> 0:25:10.760
<v Speaker 1>the office space. There was we Grow, which was going

0:25:10.800 --> 0:25:13.439
<v Speaker 1>to or which was running an elementary school in New

0:25:13.480 --> 0:25:16.399
<v Speaker 1>York City. And there was we Live, which operated a

0:25:16.400 --> 0:25:19.520
<v Speaker 1>couple of apartment buildings. Now in the i p O filing,

0:25:19.520 --> 0:25:22.800
<v Speaker 1>the company revealed it had lost two point nine billion

0:25:23.040 --> 0:25:26.080
<v Speaker 1>dollars over the course of three years leading up to

0:25:26.160 --> 0:25:30.320
<v Speaker 1>the i p O, so nearly three billion dollars lost.

0:25:31.119 --> 0:25:33.919
<v Speaker 1>At one point, the company was seeking evaluation of around

0:25:33.960 --> 0:25:38.720
<v Speaker 1>forty seven billion dollars. That would drop down to around

0:25:38.760 --> 0:25:42.280
<v Speaker 1>ten billion as they were still attempting to hold an IPO.

0:25:42.680 --> 0:25:45.960
<v Speaker 1>By September of two thousand nineteen. We Work had delayed

0:25:46.000 --> 0:25:49.480
<v Speaker 1>the I p O T October, and an executive named

0:25:49.520 --> 0:25:53.320
<v Speaker 1>Wendy Silverstein, who was part of the real estate investment

0:25:53.400 --> 0:25:56.879
<v Speaker 1>leadership team quit like she was an high ranking executive

0:25:56.880 --> 0:26:00.119
<v Speaker 1>who walks out, and the board of directors was staring

0:26:00.200 --> 0:26:03.880
<v Speaker 1>to have actual discussions about the possibility of removing Newman

0:26:04.359 --> 0:26:07.320
<v Speaker 1>as the CEO of the company, seeing him as something

0:26:07.400 --> 0:26:11.160
<v Speaker 1>of a liability. Newman and his wife both had gained

0:26:11.160 --> 0:26:15.239
<v Speaker 1>notoriety for unconventional behavior that is unconventional for, you know,

0:26:15.320 --> 0:26:19.320
<v Speaker 1>leaders of a business valuing itself in the billions of dollars.

0:26:19.359 --> 0:26:23.280
<v Speaker 1>Some things were kind of skiezy, like he trademarked the

0:26:23.400 --> 0:26:27.600
<v Speaker 1>term WE for WE Work just w E and then

0:26:27.640 --> 0:26:30.639
<v Speaker 1>pushed the company to purchase the trademark from him for

0:26:30.720 --> 0:26:33.280
<v Speaker 1>five point nine million dollars, which kind of looks like,

0:26:33.640 --> 0:26:36.239
<v Speaker 1>you know, using the company you run to fund your

0:26:36.280 --> 0:26:40.840
<v Speaker 1>personal life directly. It's not a good look. Another issue

0:26:41.000 --> 0:26:44.840
<v Speaker 1>is that Newman apparently purchased properties and then would lease

0:26:44.960 --> 0:26:48.360
<v Speaker 1>them back to WE Work, turning his purchases into revenue

0:26:48.359 --> 0:26:52.240
<v Speaker 1>generators with the company he was running. This was, to

0:26:52.320 --> 0:26:55.840
<v Speaker 1>put it mildly, a conflict of interests and something that

0:26:55.880 --> 0:26:58.840
<v Speaker 1>would not fly for a publicly traded company, so that

0:26:58.920 --> 0:27:02.720
<v Speaker 1>presented a potential problem for the I p O. Now,

0:27:02.760 --> 0:27:05.919
<v Speaker 1>this IBO struggle meant that we works largest investor, the

0:27:05.960 --> 0:27:09.680
<v Speaker 1>mega corporation, soft Bank, would end up stepping into kind

0:27:09.680 --> 0:27:13.480
<v Speaker 1>of acquire the company. This would largely be abandoned a

0:27:13.480 --> 0:27:17.080
<v Speaker 1>few months later, and part of that process involved extending

0:27:17.119 --> 0:27:22.119
<v Speaker 1>a one point seven billion dollar golden parachute deal to

0:27:22.280 --> 0:27:27.640
<v Speaker 1>Newman to vacate his position. So imagine being paid more

0:27:27.680 --> 0:27:32.920
<v Speaker 1>than a billion and a half dollars not to work somewhere.

0:27:34.440 --> 0:27:38.920
<v Speaker 1>Please pay me not to work for you. I will

0:27:38.960 --> 0:27:41.880
<v Speaker 1>cut you a much better deal than one point five

0:27:41.920 --> 0:27:45.639
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars to not work for you. Under the ownership

0:27:45.720 --> 0:27:49.680
<v Speaker 1>of soft Bank, we work downsized, laying off some two thousand,

0:27:49.720 --> 0:27:53.120
<v Speaker 1>four hundred employees initially with more to follow. But then

0:27:53.160 --> 0:27:56.600
<v Speaker 1>we get to twenty twenty and the other shoe drops

0:27:56.680 --> 0:28:00.280
<v Speaker 1>super hard. So we work was already kind of in

0:28:00.320 --> 0:28:04.920
<v Speaker 1>our choppy sees going into twenty right like, things were

0:28:04.920 --> 0:28:08.000
<v Speaker 1>not looking good for the company. The pandemic hits, and

0:28:08.040 --> 0:28:12.160
<v Speaker 1>that necessitates many cities to initiate stay at home orders,

0:28:12.160 --> 0:28:15.119
<v Speaker 1>so work from home policies go into effect, and for

0:28:15.160 --> 0:28:18.760
<v Speaker 1>a company that focuses on subletting office space. It was

0:28:18.800 --> 0:28:22.720
<v Speaker 1>a true catastrophe. According to the Guardian, the company saw

0:28:22.720 --> 0:28:25.920
<v Speaker 1>a thirty percent decline in customers and losses of two

0:28:25.960 --> 0:28:31.440
<v Speaker 1>point one billion dollars in the first quarter of one.

0:28:31.680 --> 0:28:34.959
<v Speaker 1>It's losses in the first quarter of twenty or fifty

0:28:35.040 --> 0:28:39.080
<v Speaker 1>six million, so when the pandemic starts, they lose a

0:28:39.160 --> 0:28:42.360
<v Speaker 1>little more than half a billion dollars in the first

0:28:42.400 --> 0:28:46.360
<v Speaker 1>quarter this year, first quarter losses of two point one

0:28:46.520 --> 0:28:50.560
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars. Now, the company still has plans to go public,

0:28:50.640 --> 0:28:53.200
<v Speaker 1>but not through an I p O. Rather, the plan

0:28:53.400 --> 0:28:55.680
<v Speaker 1>was to use a spack s p a C. That's

0:28:55.720 --> 0:28:58.959
<v Speaker 1>a special purpose acquisition company, also known as a blank

0:28:59.160 --> 0:29:03.120
<v Speaker 1>check company. So these are companies that don't actually do anything.

0:29:03.600 --> 0:29:05.960
<v Speaker 1>They just go public. So you get a bunch of

0:29:05.960 --> 0:29:09.239
<v Speaker 1>investors to pour a whole bunch of money into a

0:29:09.320 --> 0:29:13.520
<v Speaker 1>company which just kind of exists in name and on paper,

0:29:14.240 --> 0:29:16.880
<v Speaker 1>and you then take this company that just kind of

0:29:16.920 --> 0:29:21.320
<v Speaker 1>exists on paper to go public. There's nothing wrong about that.

0:29:21.800 --> 0:29:24.600
<v Speaker 1>And then once you go public, you use this company

0:29:24.640 --> 0:29:28.560
<v Speaker 1>to acquire some other private company and then through the

0:29:28.680 --> 0:29:33.840
<v Speaker 1>transitive property of acquisition, that private company becomes a publicly

0:29:33.840 --> 0:29:37.920
<v Speaker 1>traded company, so it is a way to sidestep the

0:29:37.960 --> 0:29:40.440
<v Speaker 1>I p O process. So if it's a company like

0:29:40.480 --> 0:29:45.560
<v Speaker 1>we Work, which has lost all confidence in in the

0:29:45.600 --> 0:29:48.360
<v Speaker 1>market as far as you know, holding an I p

0:29:48.520 --> 0:29:50.880
<v Speaker 1>O is concerned, it would be a way to become

0:29:50.920 --> 0:29:53.120
<v Speaker 1>a publicly traded company without having to go through the

0:29:53.160 --> 0:29:57.680
<v Speaker 1>I p OH. It sounds shady, but it's Tod's legal. Meanwhile,

0:29:57.960 --> 0:30:01.440
<v Speaker 1>the new executive team that we Work has both reined

0:30:01.480 --> 0:30:04.840
<v Speaker 1>in the cash burn practices of the past as well

0:30:04.880 --> 0:30:08.360
<v Speaker 1>as cut back on operating expenses. So there is a

0:30:08.400 --> 0:30:11.800
<v Speaker 1>possibility that the company will have a profitable fourth quarter

0:30:11.880 --> 0:30:16.160
<v Speaker 1>this year, assuming occupancy rates improve. But then we're also

0:30:16.240 --> 0:30:18.680
<v Speaker 1>in a stage of the pandemic that has become kind

0:30:18.760 --> 0:30:22.000
<v Speaker 1>of unpredictable and questionable again with the rise of the

0:30:22.040 --> 0:30:25.400
<v Speaker 1>delta variant UH, it has a lot of people concerned,

0:30:25.520 --> 0:30:29.000
<v Speaker 1>so we'll have to see how that plays apart, even

0:30:29.040 --> 0:30:32.280
<v Speaker 1>with a profitable fourth quarter is going to end in

0:30:32.360 --> 0:30:35.280
<v Speaker 1>a loss for we Work, But if the company can

0:30:35.400 --> 0:30:39.320
<v Speaker 1>build momentum, it might see an operating profit by the

0:30:39.480 --> 0:30:44.680
<v Speaker 1>end of two which it can put toward its considerable debt.

0:30:46.000 --> 0:30:49.280
<v Speaker 1>We've got some more companies to talk about. But before

0:30:49.320 --> 0:31:00.920
<v Speaker 1>I get into those, let's take another quick break. Oh okay, y'all.

0:31:00.920 --> 0:31:03.920
<v Speaker 1>For this next one, I have to give you all

0:31:03.960 --> 0:31:08.240
<v Speaker 1>a disclaimer. See I work for I Heart Radio, say

0:31:08.240 --> 0:31:11.280
<v Speaker 1>it at the beginning of every single episode, and one

0:31:11.600 --> 0:31:15.920
<v Speaker 1>of our competitors in the digital space at least is Spotify.

0:31:16.120 --> 0:31:20.120
<v Speaker 1>Now I'm gonna talk about Spotify and the fact that

0:31:20.200 --> 0:31:24.600
<v Speaker 1>it has never posted an annual profit, but I'm gonna

0:31:24.720 --> 0:31:28.640
<v Speaker 1>try to do my best to remove myself from comparing

0:31:28.680 --> 0:31:30.800
<v Speaker 1>it to the company I work for, because that would

0:31:30.840 --> 0:31:35.360
<v Speaker 1>just be tacky and biased, and it's not apples to apples, right.

0:31:35.440 --> 0:31:40.080
<v Speaker 1>I Heart Radio is a huge company that includes hundreds

0:31:40.160 --> 0:31:43.800
<v Speaker 1>of radio stations across the United States terrestrial radio stations.

0:31:44.120 --> 0:31:46.560
<v Speaker 1>The digital part of I Heart Radio is just one

0:31:46.800 --> 0:31:50.520
<v Speaker 1>part of a much larger company, so you can't really

0:31:50.560 --> 0:31:54.520
<v Speaker 1>compare apples to apples here. Spotify is a different beast. Plus,

0:31:54.920 --> 0:31:57.000
<v Speaker 1>I should acknowledge right out of the gate that while

0:31:57.080 --> 0:32:01.280
<v Speaker 1>Spotify has never posted an annual profit, the company has

0:32:01.360 --> 0:32:07.040
<v Speaker 1>had profitable quarters and trust me, that ain't nothing, it's something.

0:32:07.120 --> 0:32:12.040
<v Speaker 1>In other words, here's the super summarized story. Because I

0:32:12.080 --> 0:32:15.600
<v Speaker 1>have actually done episodes about Spotify in the past, But

0:32:15.840 --> 0:32:18.680
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand and six a pair of developers named

0:32:18.800 --> 0:32:22.480
<v Speaker 1>Daniel Elk and Martin Lawrenson came up with this idea

0:32:22.560 --> 0:32:26.200
<v Speaker 1>for Spotify, and the idea was to create a streaming

0:32:26.440 --> 0:32:30.320
<v Speaker 1>music platform, a service that would give music companies away

0:32:30.360 --> 0:32:34.840
<v Speaker 1>to reach listeners a customers, and make it so easy

0:32:34.920 --> 0:32:38.200
<v Speaker 1>to listen to their music that people would stop pirating

0:32:38.280 --> 0:32:41.440
<v Speaker 1>all the ding bang music. Because this was in the

0:32:41.440 --> 0:32:46.440
<v Speaker 1>wake of really a big era of digital piracy. You

0:32:46.520 --> 0:32:50.840
<v Speaker 1>had the giant peer to peer networks like Napster and Kazam,

0:32:50.880 --> 0:32:54.520
<v Speaker 1>which were largely used to pirate music, and you also

0:32:54.560 --> 0:32:58.640
<v Speaker 1>had the rise of the torrent index site, the pirate Bay,

0:32:58.960 --> 0:33:02.640
<v Speaker 1>and like the Pirate Bay, Spotify also calls Sweden Home.

0:33:03.000 --> 0:33:05.959
<v Speaker 1>So you know, piracy was something that was really on

0:33:06.000 --> 0:33:10.280
<v Speaker 1>the minds of people in Sweden who who were connected

0:33:10.320 --> 0:33:13.080
<v Speaker 1>to either you know, the entertainment industry or the tech

0:33:13.120 --> 0:33:17.640
<v Speaker 1>world that would facilitate this sort of stuff. So the

0:33:17.680 --> 0:33:21.000
<v Speaker 1>concept actually had a really good use case, a platform

0:33:21.200 --> 0:33:25.640
<v Speaker 1>where music companies could generate revenue from digital music rather

0:33:25.680 --> 0:33:31.760
<v Speaker 1>than see rampant piracy. Now people might end up listening

0:33:31.800 --> 0:33:35.920
<v Speaker 1>to streaming music even if they weren't the type to download,

0:33:36.040 --> 0:33:37.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, to pay for a download of the song,

0:33:38.240 --> 0:33:40.880
<v Speaker 1>and the landscape at that point was really fragmented. In

0:33:40.920 --> 0:33:44.680
<v Speaker 1>the mid two thousand's, there was Apple with the iTunes store,

0:33:44.760 --> 0:33:48.440
<v Speaker 1>which launched in two thousand one. But you purchased songs

0:33:48.520 --> 0:33:52.600
<v Speaker 1>on iTunes, right, You weren't streaming from iTunes back then.

0:33:53.080 --> 0:33:56.080
<v Speaker 1>You would just make a purchase, download it to your device,

0:33:56.200 --> 0:33:58.920
<v Speaker 1>and you would have it. And then you would have

0:33:58.960 --> 0:34:01.880
<v Speaker 1>a bunch of proprietary approaches from the various music labels

0:34:01.880 --> 0:34:04.400
<v Speaker 1>that were trying to operate their own digital store fronts.

0:34:04.400 --> 0:34:08.000
<v Speaker 1>But again, it just meant that it was a fractured

0:34:08.040 --> 0:34:12.600
<v Speaker 1>experience for users and not very satisfying. Spotify would launch

0:34:12.600 --> 0:34:15.879
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand eight, two years after they first came

0:34:15.960 --> 0:34:19.080
<v Speaker 1>up with the idea, and users could either opt for

0:34:19.239 --> 0:34:23.279
<v Speaker 1>a free account that would include advertising between a certain

0:34:23.360 --> 0:34:26.320
<v Speaker 1>number of songs and that would generate revenue right it

0:34:26.400 --> 0:34:30.600
<v Speaker 1>was just your their classic ads supported revenue generation, or

0:34:30.920 --> 0:34:34.399
<v Speaker 1>users could opt to go with an ad free experience

0:34:34.840 --> 0:34:39.160
<v Speaker 1>in return for a monthly subscription fee. Other streaming platforms

0:34:39.160 --> 0:34:42.759
<v Speaker 1>would follow competing with Spotify, and some markets like the

0:34:42.840 --> 0:34:45.400
<v Speaker 1>United States, would not get access to Spotify for a

0:34:45.400 --> 0:34:49.160
<v Speaker 1>few years. The US finally got Spotify in July two

0:34:49.200 --> 0:34:51.600
<v Speaker 1>thou eleven, so we had been hearing about it for,

0:34:52.200 --> 0:34:54.400
<v Speaker 1>you know, nearly three years by the time we finally

0:34:54.440 --> 0:34:58.920
<v Speaker 1>got access to it. The company mostly operated at a loss,

0:34:59.080 --> 0:35:03.279
<v Speaker 1>except for the asional profitable quarter over the years. In

0:35:04.480 --> 0:35:08.720
<v Speaker 1>Music Business World reported that Spotify's losses over its decade

0:35:08.719 --> 0:35:12.080
<v Speaker 1>of existence at that point amounted to about two point

0:35:12.160 --> 0:35:16.959
<v Speaker 1>eight billion dollars. The company has spent a great deal

0:35:17.000 --> 0:35:20.560
<v Speaker 1>of money on scaling and on purchasing content, including landing

0:35:20.600 --> 0:35:25.960
<v Speaker 1>exclusive deals with some podcasters. People interested in those shows

0:35:26.000 --> 0:35:29.319
<v Speaker 1>can only get them through Spotify. It's kind of the

0:35:29.360 --> 0:35:33.719
<v Speaker 1>opposite of how we do things. So for example, the

0:35:33.800 --> 0:35:36.960
<v Speaker 1>video game discussion show The Besties, which by the way,

0:35:37.440 --> 0:35:41.279
<v Speaker 1>it's not one of our shows. I genuinely really love

0:35:41.360 --> 0:35:44.920
<v Speaker 1>the Besties, so shout out to those guys. They do

0:35:45.000 --> 0:35:48.719
<v Speaker 1>a great show about video games. Anyway, for about for

0:35:48.760 --> 0:35:52.600
<v Speaker 1>a year, the Bestie's was a Spotify exclusive, uh, and

0:35:52.719 --> 0:35:56.359
<v Speaker 1>that agreement eventually expired, but for a year, in order

0:35:56.360 --> 0:36:00.560
<v Speaker 1>to get new episodes you needed a Spotify account, and

0:36:00.640 --> 0:36:03.960
<v Speaker 1>those episodes are now available on other platforms because that

0:36:04.040 --> 0:36:09.320
<v Speaker 1>exclusivity deal expired. Spotify did not renew it um, so

0:36:09.800 --> 0:36:12.520
<v Speaker 1>it's a different story now. But at a time you

0:36:12.520 --> 0:36:15.120
<v Speaker 1>can only get them through Spotify. There are some that

0:36:15.160 --> 0:36:19.680
<v Speaker 1>are Spotify exclusives and they are pay for podcasts. You

0:36:19.680 --> 0:36:23.880
<v Speaker 1>have to pay a subscription fee in order to get them. Um.

0:36:24.000 --> 0:36:26.799
<v Speaker 1>I don't know the success rate of that, because in

0:36:26.880 --> 0:36:31.440
<v Speaker 1>my experience, the paid for model is one that's really

0:36:31.600 --> 0:36:34.480
<v Speaker 1>shaky for podcasts. But I'm curious. I'll have to look

0:36:34.480 --> 0:36:36.800
<v Speaker 1>into that. Maybe I'll do an episode about it. Anyway,

0:36:37.160 --> 0:36:41.160
<v Speaker 1>Spotify spent more than half a billion dollars acquiring podcast

0:36:41.200 --> 0:36:46.680
<v Speaker 1>related companies like Anchor FM, gimblet Media, Podcast and more.

0:36:47.360 --> 0:36:49.960
<v Speaker 1>Elkas said that the company is still focused largely on

0:36:50.040 --> 0:36:53.640
<v Speaker 1>growth and will switch to a profit based strategy at

0:36:53.680 --> 0:36:57.279
<v Speaker 1>some point, presumably when the company has grown enough. And

0:36:57.320 --> 0:36:59.480
<v Speaker 1>this gets back to that thing I was saying earlier

0:36:59.520 --> 0:37:04.600
<v Speaker 1>that sometimes concentrating on growth is the most important strategy,

0:37:04.719 --> 0:37:08.680
<v Speaker 1>because if you try and monetize too early, not only

0:37:08.719 --> 0:37:11.239
<v Speaker 1>will you not make enough money to cover costs, but

0:37:11.360 --> 0:37:15.560
<v Speaker 1>you might inhibit the growth of your company. And in

0:37:17.200 --> 0:37:21.759
<v Speaker 1>the company posted a profitable first quarter. Now, according to Spotify,

0:37:21.880 --> 0:37:26.120
<v Speaker 1>it posted a fourteen million euro profit for quarter one

0:37:26.280 --> 0:37:30.240
<v Speaker 1>of one. That's about sixteen point six million dollars US,

0:37:30.600 --> 0:37:34.480
<v Speaker 1>and recently the company posted a twelve million euro operating

0:37:34.520 --> 0:37:37.719
<v Speaker 1>profit for the second quarter. That's about fourteen point to

0:37:37.960 --> 0:37:40.560
<v Speaker 1>five million dollars US. So if the rest of the

0:37:40.640 --> 0:37:44.520
<v Speaker 1>year follows, Spotify could actually see its first annual profit

0:37:44.840 --> 0:37:48.360
<v Speaker 1>by the end of twenty one, though of course it

0:37:48.440 --> 0:37:51.600
<v Speaker 1>still has a mountain of debt that it has to address.

0:37:51.640 --> 0:37:54.279
<v Speaker 1>It's not like it's completely out of the woods, but

0:37:54.320 --> 0:37:57.239
<v Speaker 1>it could be that's turned a very important corner by

0:37:57.239 --> 0:38:01.279
<v Speaker 1>the end of this year. And and next I think

0:38:01.440 --> 0:38:05.440
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna talk about a company that posted its first

0:38:05.440 --> 0:38:08.680
<v Speaker 1>annual profit in twenty twenty, but only if you put

0:38:08.680 --> 0:38:12.600
<v Speaker 1>a big old asterisk next to that. And this company

0:38:12.880 --> 0:38:16.439
<v Speaker 1>is Tesla. Now. The co founders of Tesla and yes

0:38:16.560 --> 0:38:20.040
<v Speaker 1>Elon Musk is one of them, launched the company in

0:38:20.080 --> 0:38:24.320
<v Speaker 1>two thousand three. And a startup automobile company is obviously

0:38:24.360 --> 0:38:27.920
<v Speaker 1>a huge undertaking. As you might imagine, the startup costs

0:38:28.040 --> 0:38:32.440
<v Speaker 1>are considerable. So think of like a company that just

0:38:32.560 --> 0:38:35.279
<v Speaker 1>you know, is not like a manufacturing company. You have

0:38:35.960 --> 0:38:38.880
<v Speaker 1>all your basic expenses, right, you have to have a

0:38:38.880 --> 0:38:42.120
<v Speaker 1>corporate headquarters, and you've got all the different departments that

0:38:42.160 --> 0:38:45.279
<v Speaker 1>you would expect to have, like sales and marketing, and

0:38:45.320 --> 0:38:49.280
<v Speaker 1>so you have operating costs associated with them. But with Tesla,

0:38:49.400 --> 0:38:52.640
<v Speaker 1>you also have an auto manufacturing side of the business

0:38:53.600 --> 0:38:57.520
<v Speaker 1>that's enormously expensive to build out, and so the company

0:38:57.600 --> 0:39:01.120
<v Speaker 1>was making huge investments in itself year after year, which

0:39:01.160 --> 0:39:04.800
<v Speaker 1>meant that despite the high cost of the company's frequently

0:39:04.920 --> 0:39:08.600
<v Speaker 1>highly desired cars, the company as a whole was operating

0:39:08.680 --> 0:39:11.960
<v Speaker 1>at a loss. And for some people like me, I'm

0:39:12.000 --> 0:39:15.279
<v Speaker 1>counting myself in here, it can be confusing, right, because

0:39:15.320 --> 0:39:19.040
<v Speaker 1>you think cars are expensive. Clearly, if you're selling enough cars,

0:39:19.040 --> 0:39:22.520
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna be making tons of money. But making cars

0:39:22.640 --> 0:39:26.719
<v Speaker 1>is also expensive, especially when you're building out the manufacturing

0:39:26.719 --> 0:39:29.560
<v Speaker 1>capabilities of your company. So for a lot of you,

0:39:29.600 --> 0:39:31.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure that's not a big surprise, right, And a

0:39:31.960 --> 0:39:34.920
<v Speaker 1>Tesla vehicle does cost a lot. So, for example, the

0:39:35.040 --> 0:39:39.520
<v Speaker 1>least expensive Tesla model is the Model three, which has

0:39:39.560 --> 0:39:45.719
<v Speaker 1>a base standard price of forty one one dollars, with

0:39:45.800 --> 0:39:49.040
<v Speaker 1>one two hundred of that being a destination fee to

0:39:49.160 --> 0:39:54.280
<v Speaker 1>get the car to wherever you are buying it. But hey, actually,

0:39:55.200 --> 0:39:58.799
<v Speaker 1>right now, because of the crazy, screwed up world we

0:39:58.880 --> 0:40:03.239
<v Speaker 1>live in, because of the pandemic, because of the semiconductor shortage,

0:40:03.239 --> 0:40:06.759
<v Speaker 1>and thus because of a car shortage, that actually is

0:40:06.800 --> 0:40:10.080
<v Speaker 1>not that much more expensive than the average car price

0:40:10.160 --> 0:40:14.040
<v Speaker 1>in the United States. As of June one, the average

0:40:14.080 --> 0:40:18.000
<v Speaker 1>car price here in the US was forty two hundred

0:40:18.080 --> 0:40:22.680
<v Speaker 1>six dollars. So because of those issues, Tesla's prices, at

0:40:22.760 --> 0:40:26.320
<v Speaker 1>least for its you know, most inexpensive car are actually

0:40:26.360 --> 0:40:30.320
<v Speaker 1>pretty competitive compared to the average price in the United States.

0:40:30.360 --> 0:40:31.960
<v Speaker 1>So I guess I have to eat my words on

0:40:32.000 --> 0:40:34.879
<v Speaker 1>that one, although to be fair, the other Tesla models

0:40:34.920 --> 0:40:38.600
<v Speaker 1>are much more expensive. Now usually we do think of

0:40:38.600 --> 0:40:41.319
<v Speaker 1>Tesla's cars as being on the price e side. And

0:40:41.360 --> 0:40:44.759
<v Speaker 1>even so, that wasn't enough to push the company into profitability.

0:40:44.960 --> 0:40:47.840
<v Speaker 1>And again it's no wonder because the company was building

0:40:47.840 --> 0:40:50.520
<v Speaker 1>out new factories and all that kind of thing. But

0:40:50.600 --> 0:40:54.160
<v Speaker 1>then there's the other source of revenue that Tesla enjoys,

0:40:54.200 --> 0:40:57.200
<v Speaker 1>and it's a big one. In fact, it's a bigger

0:40:57.280 --> 0:41:01.359
<v Speaker 1>revenue source than what it generates from our sales, and

0:41:01.400 --> 0:41:06.440
<v Speaker 1>that revenue comes from regulatory credits. See some states here

0:41:06.480 --> 0:41:09.239
<v Speaker 1>in the United States, eleven of them, in fact, have

0:41:09.400 --> 0:41:13.480
<v Speaker 1>regulations that require automakers to sell a certain percentage of

0:41:13.520 --> 0:41:18.600
<v Speaker 1>their cars as zero emission vehicles by so, in other words,

0:41:18.800 --> 0:41:21.000
<v Speaker 1>if you want to sell a car in one of

0:41:21.040 --> 0:41:24.120
<v Speaker 1>those states, a certain percentage of the cars you make

0:41:24.320 --> 0:41:27.200
<v Speaker 1>have to be zero emission vehicles. And I say certain

0:41:27.200 --> 0:41:30.600
<v Speaker 1>percentage because it differs from state to state. And if

0:41:30.600 --> 0:41:33.239
<v Speaker 1>the automakers are not going to be able to make

0:41:33.280 --> 0:41:36.360
<v Speaker 1>that percentage number, you know, if they're not able to

0:41:36.440 --> 0:41:40.560
<v Speaker 1>produce enough zero emission vehicles to make up that percentage

0:41:40.600 --> 0:41:42.560
<v Speaker 1>of the cars they want to sell in those states,

0:41:42.960 --> 0:41:47.239
<v Speaker 1>they have to offset that by buying up regulatory credits

0:41:47.280 --> 0:41:52.280
<v Speaker 1>from some other automaker that does meet those requirements. Well,

0:41:52.960 --> 0:41:56.319
<v Speaker 1>all Tesla vehicles are electric, and so Tesla has a

0:41:56.520 --> 0:41:59.759
<v Speaker 1>big old heap in handful of regulatory credits that it

0:41:59.800 --> 0:42:05.120
<v Speaker 1>can sell to other manufacturers, and it does so. More

0:42:05.160 --> 0:42:09.439
<v Speaker 1>than half of Tesla's revenue in twenty twenty came not

0:42:09.640 --> 0:42:14.240
<v Speaker 1>from selling cars, but from taking money from other automakers

0:42:14.320 --> 0:42:17.440
<v Speaker 1>that will not be able to meet those regulatory requirements

0:42:17.440 --> 0:42:22.360
<v Speaker 1>by twenty five. Just pretty wild, right anyway. Twenty twenty

0:42:22.520 --> 0:42:26.000
<v Speaker 1>was the first profitable year for Tesla, but the company

0:42:26.000 --> 0:42:28.640
<v Speaker 1>would have operated at a loss if it had not

0:42:28.800 --> 0:42:33.080
<v Speaker 1>been for those regulatory credits, and those credits are not

0:42:33.160 --> 0:42:37.000
<v Speaker 1>gonna stick around forever. In a few years, other automakers

0:42:37.000 --> 0:42:40.680
<v Speaker 1>will have caught up with those regulatory requirements because we're

0:42:40.680 --> 0:42:43.239
<v Speaker 1>going to see more states passing them. We might see

0:42:43.239 --> 0:42:46.160
<v Speaker 1>federal level. Other parts of the world are following suit.

0:42:46.520 --> 0:42:49.480
<v Speaker 1>So that means that eventually all the car companies are

0:42:49.480 --> 0:42:51.000
<v Speaker 1>going to be on the same page, and those that

0:42:51.080 --> 0:42:54.760
<v Speaker 1>credit market will not even exist. It will go away.

0:42:54.840 --> 0:42:58.640
<v Speaker 1>So while Tesla is profitable for the moment, it will

0:42:58.680 --> 0:43:01.800
<v Speaker 1>not be able to rely up on that specific source

0:43:01.840 --> 0:43:04.600
<v Speaker 1>of revenue for much longer, and it will need to

0:43:04.640 --> 0:43:09.920
<v Speaker 1>find another roadmap to profitability. I have another pair of

0:43:09.960 --> 0:43:12.839
<v Speaker 1>companies to talk about, but before I get to that,

0:43:13.360 --> 0:43:24.000
<v Speaker 1>let's take one last quick break. Okay, finally, we've got

0:43:24.040 --> 0:43:27.160
<v Speaker 1>a pair of companies to consider, and I'm putting them together.

0:43:28.239 --> 0:43:31.000
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk about them separately, but they're they're paired together

0:43:31.040 --> 0:43:34.240
<v Speaker 1>because they're both in the same business. And those companies

0:43:34.280 --> 0:43:39.439
<v Speaker 1>are Uber and Lift, the ride sharing companies. Uh. These

0:43:39.480 --> 0:43:44.040
<v Speaker 1>companies have long been seen as huge disruptors to the

0:43:44.200 --> 0:43:47.839
<v Speaker 1>legacy taxi services around the world, right, I mean, there

0:43:47.840 --> 0:43:54.000
<v Speaker 1>are famous protests that taxi unions have held in response

0:43:54.040 --> 0:43:58.040
<v Speaker 1>to companies like Lift and Uber moving into their territories.

0:43:58.600 --> 0:44:02.200
<v Speaker 1>So they are seen as these massive disruptors, and disruptors

0:44:02.320 --> 0:44:06.800
<v Speaker 1>tend to get a particularly romantic portrayal in the tech sector.

0:44:07.200 --> 0:44:10.160
<v Speaker 1>They're thought of as being these, you know, giant companies

0:44:10.160 --> 0:44:12.640
<v Speaker 1>that can just stride in and shake the way things

0:44:12.680 --> 0:44:17.520
<v Speaker 1>are done and and just be incredibly profitable. But these

0:44:17.560 --> 0:44:23.600
<v Speaker 1>particular companies have been disruptive at a considerable loss. Uh heck,

0:44:23.640 --> 0:44:25.759
<v Speaker 1>a loss so considerable that even some of the most

0:44:25.800 --> 0:44:29.040
<v Speaker 1>creative accounting on the planet can only make those losses

0:44:29.080 --> 0:44:35.160
<v Speaker 1>look less bad. Let's take Uber for example. Uber started

0:44:35.239 --> 0:44:38.040
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand nine, and originally it was sort of

0:44:38.080 --> 0:44:41.160
<v Speaker 1>a black town car service, you know, kind of a

0:44:41.719 --> 0:44:45.000
<v Speaker 1>uh an upscale way to get around. It was not

0:44:46.040 --> 0:44:49.120
<v Speaker 1>quite frame the way it is today. And the story

0:44:49.200 --> 0:44:52.120
<v Speaker 1>goes that the co founders of the company were sharing

0:44:52.239 --> 0:44:54.400
<v Speaker 1>stories about how hard it was to get a taxi

0:44:54.520 --> 0:44:57.840
<v Speaker 1>in Paris during a snowstorm, and wouldn't it be great

0:44:58.040 --> 0:45:00.880
<v Speaker 1>if someone could just create a company that could shake

0:45:01.000 --> 0:45:04.240
<v Speaker 1>up the way that car services work and that taxi

0:45:04.320 --> 0:45:07.239
<v Speaker 1>services work. And this led to this idea of a

0:45:07.360 --> 0:45:10.480
<v Speaker 1>ride sharing company, which really is more of a ride

0:45:10.640 --> 0:45:13.680
<v Speaker 1>hailing company. I think a right sharing company would be

0:45:13.719 --> 0:45:17.239
<v Speaker 1>more like something that would encourage car pools, but that's

0:45:17.280 --> 0:45:20.600
<v Speaker 1>not what Uber or Lift do. So while we often

0:45:20.640 --> 0:45:23.920
<v Speaker 1>call them ride sharing I think they're really more ride

0:45:24.080 --> 0:45:28.359
<v Speaker 1>hailing companies. And what followed was a meteoric rise in

0:45:28.440 --> 0:45:31.880
<v Speaker 1>terms of investment rounds and rolling out of services. The

0:45:31.920 --> 0:45:36.439
<v Speaker 1>company also earned itself a pretty ugly reputation. For one thing,

0:45:37.000 --> 0:45:41.560
<v Speaker 1>Uber insisted repeatedly that the people driving for Uber were

0:45:41.600 --> 0:45:46.040
<v Speaker 1>not Uber employees, but rather they should be considered independent

0:45:46.200 --> 0:45:50.279
<v Speaker 1>freelance contractors, which meant they also would not qualify for

0:45:50.320 --> 0:45:54.560
<v Speaker 1>stuff like benefits. For another, the company became famous for

0:45:54.600 --> 0:45:59.680
<v Speaker 1>having a truly toxic corporate work environment, and it was

0:45:59.760 --> 0:46:04.160
<v Speaker 1>one that protected male executives from charges of harassment from

0:46:04.280 --> 0:46:09.120
<v Speaker 1>their female coworkers. You know, harassment and worse. The stories

0:46:09.160 --> 0:46:11.919
<v Speaker 1>are are truly terrible, and it became one of those

0:46:11.920 --> 0:46:15.520
<v Speaker 1>companies that prompted folks to say human resources is not

0:46:15.640 --> 0:46:20.000
<v Speaker 1>there to protect you, it's there to protect the company. Now.

0:46:20.040 --> 0:46:22.920
<v Speaker 1>That whole story is beyond awful, and it culminated in

0:46:22.960 --> 0:46:26.080
<v Speaker 1>the board of directors forcing the co founder and CEO

0:46:26.239 --> 0:46:32.360
<v Speaker 1>of the company out. He was he was highly encouraged

0:46:32.400 --> 0:46:36.320
<v Speaker 1>to resign. Let's say what followed was a new leadership

0:46:36.400 --> 0:46:39.880
<v Speaker 1>team that claimed to be dedicated to overhauling the corporate

0:46:39.920 --> 0:46:44.919
<v Speaker 1>culture and atoning for the past and building towards profitability,

0:46:45.120 --> 0:46:49.160
<v Speaker 1>because you know, Uber wasn't profitable at all. It was

0:46:49.280 --> 0:46:52.920
<v Speaker 1>losing money every year. So while we were hearing these

0:46:52.920 --> 0:46:56.600
<v Speaker 1>stories about Uber drivers seeing much of their fairs siphoned

0:46:56.719 --> 0:46:59.920
<v Speaker 1>to the company. In other words, the people doing the driving,

0:47:00.040 --> 0:47:02.640
<v Speaker 1>we're seeing a lot of the money they were bringing

0:47:02.640 --> 0:47:05.520
<v Speaker 1>in going not to them but to the company. The

0:47:05.560 --> 0:47:09.880
<v Speaker 1>expenses of the operations were such that Uber as a

0:47:09.920 --> 0:47:12.920
<v Speaker 1>whole still wasn't turning a profit. So it's kind of

0:47:12.960 --> 0:47:15.279
<v Speaker 1>like the worst of both worlds, right. You had the

0:47:15.360 --> 0:47:18.520
<v Speaker 1>drivers saying we should be keeping more of the money

0:47:18.600 --> 0:47:22.640
<v Speaker 1>that we generate, and the company, meanwhile, even taking the

0:47:22.920 --> 0:47:27.160
<v Speaker 1>you know that percentage, was losing money. Despite all this,

0:47:27.360 --> 0:47:30.480
<v Speaker 1>Uber still held an initial public offering and became a

0:47:30.520 --> 0:47:33.240
<v Speaker 1>publicly traded company. So once again we have a company

0:47:33.719 --> 0:47:36.319
<v Speaker 1>that was not profitable. It was operating in a loss

0:47:36.400 --> 0:47:39.160
<v Speaker 1>year over year, still holding an I p O, and

0:47:39.239 --> 0:47:42.880
<v Speaker 1>still generating crazy stock market prices. So it continued to

0:47:42.920 --> 0:47:46.440
<v Speaker 1>lose money on an annual basis. Despite all this, the

0:47:46.440 --> 0:47:50.000
<v Speaker 1>company's fiscal year for twenty nineteen was bleak. It had

0:47:50.040 --> 0:47:54.759
<v Speaker 1>a loss of eight point five billion dollars and have

0:47:54.920 --> 0:47:59.560
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars loss, but in early the hope was that

0:47:59.719 --> 0:48:02.239
<v Speaker 1>by the end of that year the company would be profitable.

0:48:02.719 --> 0:48:05.880
<v Speaker 1>And then the pandemic hit in full force, and as

0:48:05.960 --> 0:48:10.000
<v Speaker 1>you might imagine, was a tough year. Oddly enough, not

0:48:10.120 --> 0:48:13.440
<v Speaker 1>as tough a year as two thousand nineteen was for Uber,

0:48:13.920 --> 0:48:18.040
<v Speaker 1>so Uber posted a six point seven seven billion dollar

0:48:18.160 --> 0:48:22.919
<v Speaker 1>loss in unless you're paying attention to Uber's finance call

0:48:23.080 --> 0:48:28.399
<v Speaker 1>when discussing, because that's when the magical accounting comes into play. Now,

0:48:28.440 --> 0:48:32.200
<v Speaker 1>you see, Uber was being kind of loosey goosey with

0:48:32.400 --> 0:48:36.680
<v Speaker 1>the concept of ebida and ebida or e B I

0:48:36.719 --> 0:48:40.160
<v Speaker 1>T d A is an acronym that stands for earnings

0:48:40.280 --> 0:48:46.360
<v Speaker 1>before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. It's kind of a

0:48:46.400 --> 0:48:49.880
<v Speaker 1>way of saying how much cash a business generates or

0:48:50.000 --> 0:48:52.719
<v Speaker 1>loses over a given amount of time, So you could

0:48:52.719 --> 0:48:58.600
<v Speaker 1>have quarterly or annual, et cetera. It's not quite profit,

0:48:59.200 --> 0:49:01.960
<v Speaker 1>or at least it's not as simple as profit as

0:49:02.000 --> 0:49:04.680
<v Speaker 1>you do have these other factors like taxes and such

0:49:05.120 --> 0:49:08.480
<v Speaker 1>that will factor into the end result, but it's generally

0:49:08.680 --> 0:49:12.680
<v Speaker 1>used as a way of judging the comparative health of

0:49:12.719 --> 0:49:16.200
<v Speaker 1>a company at a given time. Well, Uber was working

0:49:16.200 --> 0:49:21.200
<v Speaker 1>with an adjusted EBIDA that included twelve categories of exclusion,

0:49:21.760 --> 0:49:24.800
<v Speaker 1>which in itself was pretty unusual. So with that, creative

0:49:24.800 --> 0:49:28.840
<v Speaker 1>accounting essentially saying here's how much we lost as long

0:49:28.880 --> 0:49:32.880
<v Speaker 1>as you ignore these twelve other factors, that collectively means

0:49:33.160 --> 0:49:36.640
<v Speaker 1>we actually lost more than this, those losses came down

0:49:36.719 --> 0:49:39.520
<v Speaker 1>from six point seven seven billion dollars to a more

0:49:39.560 --> 0:49:44.840
<v Speaker 1>modest two point five three billion dollars. Because creative accounting

0:49:44.840 --> 0:49:49.200
<v Speaker 1>can only get you so far. Now, Uber executives argue

0:49:49.400 --> 0:49:51.640
<v Speaker 1>that the company is on track to have a positive

0:49:51.760 --> 0:49:55.279
<v Speaker 1>EBIDA by the end of twenty one. But keep in

0:49:55.320 --> 0:49:59.640
<v Speaker 1>mind that's with all these exclusions in play. If we

0:49:59.680 --> 0:50:04.280
<v Speaker 1>actually include those factors rather than exclude them, we're likely

0:50:04.320 --> 0:50:07.759
<v Speaker 1>still talking about actual loss in the real world once

0:50:07.800 --> 0:50:10.719
<v Speaker 1>all the ink dries. Despite that, the shares for the

0:50:10.719 --> 0:50:13.160
<v Speaker 1>company have been on the rise since they're low of

0:50:13.239 --> 0:50:17.120
<v Speaker 1>fifteen dollars per share during an earlier time in the pandemic,

0:50:17.760 --> 0:50:21.080
<v Speaker 1>so that company could turn a quasi profit at the

0:50:21.160 --> 0:50:24.200
<v Speaker 1>end of one, but with you know, a big asterisk

0:50:24.360 --> 0:50:27.319
<v Speaker 1>behind that. If it can do that, and if it

0:50:27.320 --> 0:50:30.480
<v Speaker 1>can build upon that, then we might finally see a

0:50:30.640 --> 0:50:35.040
<v Speaker 1>ride sharing company emerge from operating at a loss despite

0:50:35.080 --> 0:50:38.359
<v Speaker 1>you know, that whole disruptive thing. But now let's talk

0:50:38.400 --> 0:50:43.120
<v Speaker 1>about Lift. Lift launched in two thousand and twelve, so

0:50:43.160 --> 0:50:46.480
<v Speaker 1>it came after Uber, and over the years has been

0:50:46.520 --> 0:50:50.120
<v Speaker 1>in a pretty nasty battle with Uber. Sometimes that battle

0:50:50.160 --> 0:50:54.560
<v Speaker 1>even included employees of one company actively trying to sabotage

0:50:54.640 --> 0:50:58.160
<v Speaker 1>the operations of the other company. It got ugly, y'all.

0:50:58.440 --> 0:51:02.680
<v Speaker 1>But that's a matter for different episode. Anyway. Like Uber,

0:51:03.040 --> 0:51:06.719
<v Speaker 1>Lift operated at a loss year after year, expanding into

0:51:06.719 --> 0:51:08.960
<v Speaker 1>new markets and holding its own I p O to

0:51:09.000 --> 0:51:12.600
<v Speaker 1>go public, but the company continued to lose money, not

0:51:12.680 --> 0:51:16.240
<v Speaker 1>turning a profit. In twenty nineteen, it lost two point

0:51:16.320 --> 0:51:20.520
<v Speaker 1>six billion dollars. In twenty the company saw revenue shrink,

0:51:21.280 --> 0:51:24.000
<v Speaker 1>so it was three point six two billion dollars in

0:51:24.000 --> 0:51:27.359
<v Speaker 1>two thousand nineteen, it shranked to two point three six

0:51:27.400 --> 0:51:31.520
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars in twenty twenty. That's revenue despital that even

0:51:31.560 --> 0:51:35.880
<v Speaker 1>though it's a less revenue, it actually also saw fewer losses.

0:51:35.920 --> 0:51:40.160
<v Speaker 1>In twenty nineteen, it came in at one point seven

0:51:40.280 --> 0:51:43.920
<v Speaker 1>five billion dollars in losses, still not great, but not

0:51:43.960 --> 0:51:47.520
<v Speaker 1>as bad as twenty nineteen. But like Uber, lift has

0:51:47.560 --> 0:51:51.400
<v Speaker 1>its own you know, accounting wizardry that it uses lifts

0:51:51.440 --> 0:51:55.319
<v Speaker 1>adjusted ebitas stated that it actually lost six hundred eighty

0:51:55.400 --> 0:51:59.279
<v Speaker 1>nine point nine million dollars in twenty nineteen, and surprisingly,

0:51:59.800 --> 0:52:03.760
<v Speaker 1>it lost seven fifty five point two million in twenty

0:52:04.040 --> 0:52:06.319
<v Speaker 1>Now I say surprisingly, I realize I'm throwing a lot

0:52:06.320 --> 0:52:09.399
<v Speaker 1>of numbers at you. It's kind of just becomes word

0:52:09.480 --> 0:52:11.919
<v Speaker 1>salad or numbers salad at a point. But the reason

0:52:12.000 --> 0:52:17.440
<v Speaker 1>I say surprisingly is because using lifts metrics, it looks

0:52:17.480 --> 0:52:20.560
<v Speaker 1>like the company lost more in than it did in

0:52:21.719 --> 0:52:24.319
<v Speaker 1>but using a different set of metrics, the opposite is true.

0:52:24.600 --> 0:52:27.640
<v Speaker 1>In both cases, It's still lost money both years, and

0:52:27.800 --> 0:52:32.240
<v Speaker 1>just the question is how much Like Uber Lifts, mathematic

0:52:32.239 --> 0:52:35.800
<v Speaker 1>wizardry suggests that the company will reach a positive EBITA

0:52:36.200 --> 0:52:39.000
<v Speaker 1>by the end of this year. But like Uber, without

0:52:39.080 --> 0:52:42.480
<v Speaker 1>that adjusted EBITA approach, the story is that the company

0:52:42.560 --> 0:52:44.840
<v Speaker 1>is going to continue to operate at a loss unless

0:52:44.920 --> 0:52:49.440
<v Speaker 1>things really change in the last quarter of one. In fact,

0:52:49.480 --> 0:52:52.000
<v Speaker 1>earlier this year, Lift announced that it had a net

0:52:52.040 --> 0:52:55.240
<v Speaker 1>loss of four d twenty seven point three million dollars

0:52:55.480 --> 0:52:58.959
<v Speaker 1>in the first quarter of one. Now I can't tell

0:52:59.000 --> 0:53:03.400
<v Speaker 1>you why their second quarter results are because I'm recording

0:53:03.400 --> 0:53:07.799
<v Speaker 1>this on the same day it publishes, August two, and

0:53:07.840 --> 0:53:10.560
<v Speaker 1>the company hasn't announced that yet because that announcement happens

0:53:10.560 --> 0:53:14.520
<v Speaker 1>tomorrow on August three, So we'll see then if things

0:53:14.560 --> 0:53:18.799
<v Speaker 1>have changed. But yeah, this is an odd thing, right,

0:53:18.960 --> 0:53:22.800
<v Speaker 1>It's weird to see these companies that get these incredible valuations.

0:53:22.800 --> 0:53:27.120
<v Speaker 1>There's this amazing amount of excitement and investment poured into

0:53:27.200 --> 0:53:30.719
<v Speaker 1>these companies, and they can go for a decade or

0:53:30.800 --> 0:53:33.719
<v Speaker 1>longer without turning a profit, and some of them might

0:53:34.000 --> 0:53:38.640
<v Speaker 1>never turn a profit. Now, the good news is that

0:53:38.719 --> 0:53:41.719
<v Speaker 1>for the ones that can stick around long enough, they

0:53:41.800 --> 0:53:45.160
<v Speaker 1>might be able to find a revenue path that does

0:53:45.239 --> 0:53:47.319
<v Speaker 1>work and that they can build on that, and so

0:53:47.440 --> 0:53:51.480
<v Speaker 1>that investment over the long term becomes a good idea.

0:53:51.960 --> 0:53:54.240
<v Speaker 1>But for a lot of people, I think they probably

0:53:54.280 --> 0:53:58.040
<v Speaker 1>feel like these companies feel like almost a Ponzi scheme

0:53:58.120 --> 0:54:01.400
<v Speaker 1>or pyramid scheme, and that you might get in early

0:54:01.480 --> 0:54:04.680
<v Speaker 1>on and invest in this company, and then you get

0:54:04.680 --> 0:54:07.239
<v Speaker 1>the sinking feeling that the company is never going to

0:54:07.280 --> 0:54:10.040
<v Speaker 1>turn a profit, But if you hype it up, then

0:54:10.080 --> 0:54:12.840
<v Speaker 1>other people are going to come in and invest, and

0:54:12.880 --> 0:54:14.719
<v Speaker 1>you might be able to get your investment back out

0:54:14.840 --> 0:54:17.080
<v Speaker 1>or even turn a profit on it. Right, Like if

0:54:17.080 --> 0:54:19.719
<v Speaker 1>you bought shares of stock when it was trading at

0:54:19.719 --> 0:54:23.520
<v Speaker 1>fifteen dollars and then it ends up trading at sixty dollars,

0:54:24.080 --> 0:54:26.839
<v Speaker 1>you can get out and make a profit on that.

0:54:27.120 --> 0:54:30.600
<v Speaker 1>Even if you deeply suspect this company is not going

0:54:30.640 --> 0:54:35.080
<v Speaker 1>to be profitable. It's crazy to me, like tech either

0:54:35.200 --> 0:54:38.920
<v Speaker 1>works or it doesn't work. Right, It's pretty simple to

0:54:39.520 --> 0:54:42.960
<v Speaker 1>describe the operations of tech when you really boil it down.

0:54:43.480 --> 0:54:46.800
<v Speaker 1>But business, you know, business just don't make no sense.

0:54:47.680 --> 0:54:49.719
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I guess it makes sense. End dollars. That's

0:54:49.719 --> 0:54:53.320
<v Speaker 1>a dad joke. I'm done. I'm sorry. Hey, this wraps

0:54:53.400 --> 0:54:56.799
<v Speaker 1>up this episode of tech Stuff. If you have a

0:54:56.800 --> 0:54:59.320
<v Speaker 1>suggestion for a topic I should cover in the future,

0:54:59.400 --> 0:55:01.680
<v Speaker 1>please each out to me. The best way to do

0:55:01.719 --> 0:55:04.920
<v Speaker 1>that is on Twitter, you know, the profitable one and

0:55:05.080 --> 0:55:09.200
<v Speaker 1>the handle there is text stuff h s W and

0:55:09.239 --> 0:55:18.120
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk to you again really soon. Y. Tech Stuff

0:55:18.200 --> 0:55:21.359
<v Speaker 1>is an I Heart radio production. For more podcasts from

0:55:21.360 --> 0:55:25.160
<v Speaker 1>my heart Radio, visit the I heart Radio app, Apple podcasts,

0:55:25.280 --> 0:55:27.240
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