1 00:00:10,160 --> 00:00:13,520 Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. 2 00:00:13,600 --> 00:00:16,640 Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wi isn't they so? Joe? 3 00:00:17,120 --> 00:00:20,360 Speaker 1: You know, one of the most famous maxims in markets 4 00:00:20,520 --> 00:00:22,640 Speaker 1: has to be that I think it's that warrant. It's 5 00:00:22,680 --> 00:00:25,800 Speaker 1: Warren Buffett, isn't it the quote about when the tide 6 00:00:25,800 --> 00:00:28,479 Speaker 1: goes out, you get to see who's swimming naked. It's 7 00:00:29,160 --> 00:00:31,840 Speaker 1: it's a cliche. We are in a big time tide 8 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:35,120 Speaker 1: goes out the environment. I mean the number of CEOs 9 00:00:35,600 --> 00:00:39,040 Speaker 1: of various companies who have written some version of like 10 00:00:39,360 --> 00:00:43,640 Speaker 1: I screwed up, this was all my fault, I misjudged, etcetera. 11 00:00:44,200 --> 00:00:46,320 Speaker 1: Every day it feels like there's another one. And it 12 00:00:46,440 --> 00:00:48,200 Speaker 1: is true. When there is a bear market, when there's 13 00:00:48,200 --> 00:00:52,599 Speaker 1: a downturn, you discover both frauds, and you discover insolvencies, 14 00:00:52,640 --> 00:00:55,600 Speaker 1: and you discover unsustainable structures. It all comes out right. 15 00:00:55,720 --> 00:00:58,160 Speaker 1: It is a popular saying for a reason, which is 16 00:00:58,200 --> 00:01:01,120 Speaker 1: that it tends to be true. Is kind of amazing 17 00:01:01,160 --> 00:01:04,240 Speaker 1: me about this particular cycle, is I guess just the 18 00:01:05,160 --> 00:01:08,120 Speaker 1: speed at which all of this seems to be happening, 19 00:01:08,280 --> 00:01:10,880 Speaker 1: So you know, it was only a few months ago 20 00:01:11,240 --> 00:01:15,280 Speaker 1: that we had Jim Chainos, the fame short seller, on 21 00:01:15,319 --> 00:01:19,240 Speaker 1: the podcast talking about how he thought that there was 22 00:01:19,240 --> 00:01:21,640 Speaker 1: going to be more pain ahead for a lot of 23 00:01:21,680 --> 00:01:25,600 Speaker 1: different froth spots in the market, and how interest rates 24 00:01:25,640 --> 00:01:28,160 Speaker 1: going up basically meant that a bunch of frauds were 25 00:01:28,160 --> 00:01:32,080 Speaker 1: going to be exposed. Yeah, and so basically the market 26 00:01:31,920 --> 00:01:34,360 Speaker 1: at particularly a lot of the tech stocks and a 27 00:01:34,360 --> 00:01:37,959 Speaker 1: lot of the gig economy, is sharing economy, the arc economy, 28 00:01:38,040 --> 00:01:41,319 Speaker 1: all these things really have gotten hit pretty hard since 29 00:01:41,319 --> 00:01:44,200 Speaker 1: we talked to Jim earlier in the summer, and it's 30 00:01:44,240 --> 00:01:46,040 Speaker 1: still a mess. And so I guess part of the 31 00:01:46,120 --> 00:01:48,760 Speaker 1: question is, well, what does it look like at the bottom, 32 00:01:48,760 --> 00:01:50,920 Speaker 1: What have we learned, what are we seeing with the 33 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:54,480 Speaker 1: tide going out? And are we any closer to you know, 34 00:01:54,560 --> 00:01:57,440 Speaker 1: something that could resemble like a bottom for this market? Right? 35 00:01:57,520 --> 00:01:59,800 Speaker 1: And then also I guess my question is do fra 36 00:02:00,240 --> 00:02:03,040 Speaker 1: pick up in this environment or do they get exposed 37 00:02:03,080 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 1: and more difficult to perpetrate. So we're going to be 38 00:02:06,400 --> 00:02:09,440 Speaker 1: talking about all those things with Jim Chainos. This is 39 00:02:09,480 --> 00:02:13,119 Speaker 1: an episode that we recorded live at the Berkeley Forum 40 00:02:13,240 --> 00:02:17,480 Speaker 1: for Corporate Governance in San Francisco. Jim is of course, 41 00:02:17,520 --> 00:02:20,040 Speaker 1: the co founder of Chainos and Co. Which used to 42 00:02:20,040 --> 00:02:26,760 Speaker 1: be called Kinnicos. Here's our conversation. Hi Ji, Hi guys now, Jim, 43 00:02:26,800 --> 00:02:28,920 Speaker 1: the last time we spoke to you, I think was 44 00:02:28,960 --> 00:02:32,040 Speaker 1: in June of this year. Fast forward a few months. 45 00:02:32,120 --> 00:02:36,600 Speaker 1: You are completely correct, froth was blown off the top 46 00:02:36,639 --> 00:02:39,280 Speaker 1: of the frothy stocks in the market. I don't even 47 00:02:39,280 --> 00:02:41,800 Speaker 1: have a question. I think I'm just gonna ask you, like, 48 00:02:41,960 --> 00:02:44,600 Speaker 1: tell us what's going to happen now. Look, we're getting 49 00:02:44,600 --> 00:02:48,840 Speaker 1: a situation where the various parts of speculation are getting 50 00:02:48,919 --> 00:02:51,680 Speaker 1: rung out of this market one by one. We talked 51 00:02:51,680 --> 00:02:54,760 Speaker 1: a little about them back in June. I think we've 52 00:02:54,800 --> 00:02:56,920 Speaker 1: waited right in the middle of kind of our second 53 00:02:56,919 --> 00:03:01,000 Speaker 1: crypto crisis over these past few days. On top of it, 54 00:03:01,080 --> 00:03:05,400 Speaker 1: you've got the tech complex melting down, and a lot 55 00:03:05,440 --> 00:03:07,679 Speaker 1: of this is just the byproduct as we discussed of 56 00:03:08,200 --> 00:03:11,360 Speaker 1: perhaps the most speculative market that I've seen in my 57 00:03:11,440 --> 00:03:16,040 Speaker 1: lifetime forty years on the street, which was and one 58 00:03:16,120 --> 00:03:19,120 Speaker 1: by one, whether it's crypto, whether it's n f t S, 59 00:03:19,440 --> 00:03:24,040 Speaker 1: whether it's SPACs, the poster children for that speculation are 60 00:03:24,080 --> 00:03:27,160 Speaker 1: basically being taken out to the woodshed. And disposed of, 61 00:03:27,480 --> 00:03:31,800 Speaker 1: and the question will be does it spread to something 62 00:03:31,919 --> 00:03:35,240 Speaker 1: in the markets anyway that's much broader than that, and 63 00:03:35,520 --> 00:03:38,400 Speaker 1: that remains to be seen again kind of like Tracy, 64 00:03:38,480 --> 00:03:40,840 Speaker 1: I don't even have a question exactly, but f t 65 00:03:41,120 --> 00:03:43,760 Speaker 1: X give us, give us the Jim Chaino's take. Well, 66 00:03:43,800 --> 00:03:46,320 Speaker 1: I mean, I think Joe, you basically are probably better 67 00:03:46,360 --> 00:03:50,360 Speaker 1: prepared than me to talk about that, because the quintessential 68 00:03:50,520 --> 00:03:54,520 Speaker 1: moment for me in the whole crypto saga was the 69 00:03:54,560 --> 00:03:58,160 Speaker 1: interview that you and Matt Levin had with SPF. I 70 00:03:58,160 --> 00:04:01,640 Speaker 1: think back in April, where I pointed out he kept 71 00:04:01,640 --> 00:04:05,320 Speaker 1: saying the quiet parts out loud about how business models 72 00:04:05,360 --> 00:04:08,800 Speaker 1: were in effect Ponzi schemes. And I think we're gonna 73 00:04:08,840 --> 00:04:12,840 Speaker 1: look back at that as a watershed moment because the 74 00:04:12,960 --> 00:04:17,360 Speaker 1: crises in liquidity and the revelations on the stable coins 75 00:04:17,680 --> 00:04:22,080 Speaker 1: all immediately followed that interview and it was one of 76 00:04:22,080 --> 00:04:25,360 Speaker 1: those moments, and kudos to you all. It was one 77 00:04:25,400 --> 00:04:28,240 Speaker 1: of those moments in the markets that not only went 78 00:04:28,360 --> 00:04:32,400 Speaker 1: viral on social media, but but went viral amongst professionals 79 00:04:32,440 --> 00:04:35,160 Speaker 1: and others. Have you seen this interview? Did you see 80 00:04:35,200 --> 00:04:38,520 Speaker 1: what was said here? And it's very rare you get 81 00:04:38,520 --> 00:04:41,280 Speaker 1: that aha moment like that crystallized, But that was one 82 00:04:41,320 --> 00:04:44,440 Speaker 1: of them, and the whole idea, and I've called it 83 00:04:44,480 --> 00:04:48,360 Speaker 1: a predatory junkyard. As you know, the whole crypto structure, 84 00:04:48,520 --> 00:04:52,880 Speaker 1: in my view, was designed to extract fees from really 85 00:04:52,960 --> 00:04:56,479 Speaker 1: unsuspecting investors and investors that were kind of sold a 86 00:04:56,520 --> 00:04:59,120 Speaker 1: bill of goods where the bill of goods kept changing. 87 00:04:59,800 --> 00:05:02,320 Speaker 1: You know, we remember all the use cases for crypto 88 00:05:02,440 --> 00:05:04,760 Speaker 1: as they kept changing over the past handful of years. 89 00:05:05,120 --> 00:05:07,039 Speaker 1: It was going to be an alternative currency, it was 90 00:05:07,040 --> 00:05:08,440 Speaker 1: gonna be a store of value, it was going to 91 00:05:08,480 --> 00:05:11,040 Speaker 1: be inflation hedge, and at the end of the day, 92 00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:14,640 Speaker 1: it was really just a speculative asset and speculative asset 93 00:05:14,680 --> 00:05:19,160 Speaker 1: class and with an immense cost structure built around it. 94 00:05:19,560 --> 00:05:23,680 Speaker 1: So the idea really was for the crypto you know community, 95 00:05:24,279 --> 00:05:27,160 Speaker 1: was how can we extract the most amount of fees 96 00:05:27,600 --> 00:05:32,280 Speaker 1: from unsuspecting investors. And that's my view and I still 97 00:05:32,320 --> 00:05:35,600 Speaker 1: hold to it. What happens now for crypto is there 98 00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:39,000 Speaker 1: a recovery here or is this so bad? I mean 99 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:42,240 Speaker 1: f t X, Sam Bankman freed, and you know, I 100 00:05:42,320 --> 00:05:45,160 Speaker 1: was there at that Odd Lots interview as well, and 101 00:05:45,200 --> 00:05:48,480 Speaker 1: we were all sat in the room quite shocked by 102 00:05:48,560 --> 00:05:51,480 Speaker 1: what SPF had just said. For those who haven't listened 103 00:05:51,520 --> 00:05:54,599 Speaker 1: to it, we asked him to describe how yield farming works, 104 00:05:54,640 --> 00:05:56,320 Speaker 1: and he basically says, well, you put money in a 105 00:05:56,360 --> 00:05:59,120 Speaker 1: box and more money comes out of the box, and 106 00:05:59,160 --> 00:06:02,160 Speaker 1: you worry about the use case later. All right, So 107 00:06:02,320 --> 00:06:05,880 Speaker 1: fast forward to today, it's all falling apart. Can crypto 108 00:06:06,080 --> 00:06:09,200 Speaker 1: emerge from this and potentially find, you know, a new 109 00:06:09,279 --> 00:06:14,039 Speaker 1: narrative to sell a new potential use case. Yeah, I'll 110 00:06:14,080 --> 00:06:17,159 Speaker 1: just add the ultimate irony in the last couple of 111 00:06:17,200 --> 00:06:21,240 Speaker 1: days is the crypto community talking and sort of begging 112 00:06:21,240 --> 00:06:24,320 Speaker 1: and asking where are the regulators? Is really truly the 113 00:06:24,400 --> 00:06:29,400 Speaker 1: ultimate irony since the crypto ethos was about, you know, 114 00:06:29,440 --> 00:06:33,120 Speaker 1: really being outside of the regulatory environment and being a 115 00:06:33,200 --> 00:06:37,680 Speaker 1: separate and independent system um, and now it's begging for 116 00:06:37,680 --> 00:06:40,920 Speaker 1: for the same sorts of things. And you know, as 117 00:06:40,960 --> 00:06:44,280 Speaker 1: I pointed out for a few years, the real problem 118 00:06:44,320 --> 00:06:49,719 Speaker 1: with anti fiat structures is exactly when you need fiat 119 00:06:50,000 --> 00:06:53,520 Speaker 1: is the time when people are most afraid and when 120 00:06:53,600 --> 00:06:58,680 Speaker 1: fear stalks the markets, because governments, through their various different 121 00:06:58,880 --> 00:07:03,200 Speaker 1: means can not only enforce contracts and adjudicate fraud, but 122 00:07:03,279 --> 00:07:06,200 Speaker 1: in effect connect as lenders of last resort and or 123 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:10,080 Speaker 1: established deposit insurance, which is exactly what everyone looks for 124 00:07:10,200 --> 00:07:12,440 Speaker 1: when when people are worried about getting the money back. 125 00:07:13,160 --> 00:07:16,360 Speaker 1: And it's why alternative currency schemes and by the way, 126 00:07:16,400 --> 00:07:18,960 Speaker 1: crypto isn't the first. I mean, they've been all kinds 127 00:07:19,000 --> 00:07:23,360 Speaker 1: of alternative currency schemes to FIAT for centuries now, and 128 00:07:23,640 --> 00:07:27,560 Speaker 1: they always flourish in bull markets when people's sense of 129 00:07:27,600 --> 00:07:30,920 Speaker 1: disbelief is suspended and people begin to believe things that 130 00:07:30,960 --> 00:07:33,800 Speaker 1: are too good to be true. And crypto and all 131 00:07:33,840 --> 00:07:36,320 Speaker 1: the other ancillary aspects of crypto, whether it's n f 132 00:07:36,360 --> 00:07:39,720 Speaker 1: T s or what have you, really were the latest 133 00:07:39,800 --> 00:07:42,120 Speaker 1: iteration of that. The last time we talked to you 134 00:07:42,120 --> 00:07:44,760 Speaker 1: said that as well. What's an example of an alternative 135 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:48,040 Speaker 1: currency that thrived in a bull market? What's a historical 136 00:07:48,080 --> 00:07:50,400 Speaker 1: parallel to so, I mean you had you had the 137 00:07:50,480 --> 00:07:54,840 Speaker 1: various different banking systems that that thrived in the early 138 00:07:54,920 --> 00:07:58,840 Speaker 1: nineteenth century in the US. That's certainly probably one that 139 00:07:58,840 --> 00:08:02,600 Speaker 1: that economic history orients would point to. And we can 140 00:08:02,640 --> 00:08:06,280 Speaker 1: go back further. I mean the various different currencies that 141 00:08:06,280 --> 00:08:09,840 Speaker 1: that the father of FIAT, John Law, who I teach 142 00:08:09,880 --> 00:08:12,920 Speaker 1: in my fraud course, brought forth in the early seventeen 143 00:08:12,960 --> 00:08:15,760 Speaker 1: hundreds in France. But there have been a number of them. 144 00:08:15,800 --> 00:08:20,800 Speaker 1: And the problem again is is they rely on a 145 00:08:20,840 --> 00:08:24,440 Speaker 1: system of trust, whereby the systems that FIAT has developed 146 00:08:24,440 --> 00:08:28,520 Speaker 1: in the past three hundred years have really been designed 147 00:08:29,200 --> 00:08:32,240 Speaker 1: to engender trust. It's the offset, of course, to the 148 00:08:32,280 --> 00:08:35,480 Speaker 1: downside of FIAT, which is debasement. And so the crypto 149 00:08:35,640 --> 00:08:39,840 Speaker 1: community pointed out the risks of debasement and UH and 150 00:08:39,880 --> 00:08:43,400 Speaker 1: all the other risks of sovereign governments getting involved in 151 00:08:43,400 --> 00:08:46,800 Speaker 1: your currency, but they forgot the good parts and and 152 00:08:46,880 --> 00:08:49,160 Speaker 1: that's I think the lesson that we have to learn. 153 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:53,560 Speaker 1: Do you worry about crypto drama, what's going on in 154 00:08:53,559 --> 00:08:58,040 Speaker 1: that industry having a contagious effect on either the rest 155 00:08:58,080 --> 00:09:01,840 Speaker 1: of Silicon Valley or the wider market, given that they're 156 00:09:01,880 --> 00:09:05,240 Speaker 1: do seem to be these interlinkages between for instance, crypto 157 00:09:05,240 --> 00:09:09,760 Speaker 1: players and venture capital firms. Yeah, I mean, to me, 158 00:09:09,840 --> 00:09:13,280 Speaker 1: this looks this looks a lot more as we discuss 159 00:09:13,400 --> 00:09:15,360 Speaker 1: this looks a lot more to me like the dot 160 00:09:15,400 --> 00:09:18,880 Speaker 1: com era on steroids rather than sort of the prelude 161 00:09:18,920 --> 00:09:22,240 Speaker 1: to the global financial crisis because of the nature of 162 00:09:22,240 --> 00:09:26,480 Speaker 1: of the banking system and payments. I don't think this 163 00:09:26,600 --> 00:09:29,480 Speaker 1: is a contagion effect. I do think it's it's a 164 00:09:29,480 --> 00:09:33,400 Speaker 1: pretty bad mark to market effect for equity type investors, 165 00:09:33,640 --> 00:09:36,160 Speaker 1: much like the dot com era. But I don't think 166 00:09:36,240 --> 00:09:39,360 Speaker 1: it is contagion through the credit markets. I mean, I think, 167 00:09:39,400 --> 00:09:42,600 Speaker 1: why I saw something this morning that it might even 168 00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:44,440 Speaker 1: be lower now as we speak. But I think the 169 00:09:44,520 --> 00:09:47,760 Speaker 1: crypto mark to market for the all the coins out 170 00:09:47,760 --> 00:09:50,840 Speaker 1: there is something now below one trillion, somewhere on eight 171 00:09:50,880 --> 00:09:54,080 Speaker 1: hundred billion dollars. And uh, you know, eight hundred billion 172 00:09:54,080 --> 00:09:56,600 Speaker 1: dollars is a lot of money. But I'll remind you 173 00:09:56,679 --> 00:09:59,480 Speaker 1: that until about a week ago, you know, Tesla's market 174 00:09:59,520 --> 00:10:01,920 Speaker 1: cap was a hundred billion dollars. That's just one stock. 175 00:10:02,520 --> 00:10:06,280 Speaker 1: So I think the contagion effects are probably going to 176 00:10:06,320 --> 00:10:22,679 Speaker 1: be dimnimus to the to the payments and credit system. 177 00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:25,079 Speaker 1: I definitely want to get to like tech stocks and 178 00:10:25,240 --> 00:10:27,400 Speaker 1: Tesla and all that in one second, but one last question. 179 00:10:27,440 --> 00:10:30,040 Speaker 1: You know, it's this, as you pointed out, the crash happens, 180 00:10:30,040 --> 00:10:32,880 Speaker 1: people say we're are the regulators. This is again, I 181 00:10:32,880 --> 00:10:35,319 Speaker 1: think a classic part of the cycle that the regulators 182 00:10:35,559 --> 00:10:38,679 Speaker 1: seem to come in late. What does history say about 183 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:42,120 Speaker 1: how far they go? Would you expect to see, for example, 184 00:10:42,360 --> 00:10:46,319 Speaker 1: criminal charges people in jail as a result of this 185 00:10:46,640 --> 00:10:49,840 Speaker 1: dot com trading on steroids in crypto. Yeah. So one 186 00:10:49,880 --> 00:10:51,600 Speaker 1: of the things, one of the things I teach is 187 00:10:51,640 --> 00:10:55,800 Speaker 1: that not only are are the regulators archaeologists not detectives, 188 00:10:56,360 --> 00:11:00,079 Speaker 1: but that that asset prices are both the staunch a 189 00:11:00,320 --> 00:11:05,520 Speaker 1: defense attorney and the harshest prosecutor for financial fraud. That 190 00:11:05,640 --> 00:11:08,640 Speaker 1: nobody's out looking to bring the bad guys in when 191 00:11:08,640 --> 00:11:12,800 Speaker 1: everybody's making money. It's only when people start losing money 192 00:11:12,840 --> 00:11:15,760 Speaker 1: that you begin to get a public outcry of of, 193 00:11:15,880 --> 00:11:18,240 Speaker 1: you know, throw the rascals in jail. You know, if 194 00:11:18,280 --> 00:11:20,880 Speaker 1: we go back again to the dot com era, people 195 00:11:20,920 --> 00:11:23,120 Speaker 1: were losing money and dot com for a better part 196 00:11:23,120 --> 00:11:26,040 Speaker 1: of a year. But it wasn't until the Enron and 197 00:11:26,080 --> 00:11:30,319 Speaker 1: World Com scandals hit that the federal government really geared 198 00:11:30,400 --> 00:11:33,520 Speaker 1: up its efforts to uh to look at corporate wrongdoing 199 00:11:33,600 --> 00:11:36,200 Speaker 1: and and bring on Sarbanes Oxley. So this is gonna 200 00:11:36,200 --> 00:11:38,200 Speaker 1: be the same thing. I mean, people have lost a 201 00:11:38,240 --> 00:11:41,079 Speaker 1: lot of money in crypto, a lot of new investors, 202 00:11:41,120 --> 00:11:43,440 Speaker 1: a lot of young investors, so you're gonna get a 203 00:11:43,440 --> 00:11:47,600 Speaker 1: political outcry nowdo to to regulate this system and and 204 00:11:47,679 --> 00:11:52,040 Speaker 1: bring bad guys to justice. Now. I've also pointed out 205 00:11:52,120 --> 00:11:54,000 Speaker 1: that it seems to me that there might be a 206 00:11:54,000 --> 00:11:57,160 Speaker 1: reason why a lot of these crypto entrepreneurs live in 207 00:11:57,200 --> 00:12:00,840 Speaker 1: places like the Bahamas in Dubai and not New York City, 208 00:12:00,920 --> 00:12:03,640 Speaker 1: So you know, it might be. And I think there 209 00:12:03,679 --> 00:12:06,839 Speaker 1: are one or two actually that are technically fugitists from 210 00:12:06,840 --> 00:12:10,640 Speaker 1: justice already. So it's gonna be interesting to see see 211 00:12:10,679 --> 00:12:14,320 Speaker 1: what we see from a prosecutorial as opposed to a 212 00:12:14,360 --> 00:12:18,760 Speaker 1: regulatory initiative against this, and what kind of wrongdoing that 213 00:12:18,840 --> 00:12:22,640 Speaker 1: gets exposed if it turns out that there was actual 214 00:12:23,000 --> 00:12:26,520 Speaker 1: misrepresentations or assets that were claimed to be there, we're 215 00:12:26,559 --> 00:12:29,240 Speaker 1: not there. On the other hand, it just seems, I mean, 216 00:12:29,520 --> 00:12:31,840 Speaker 1: people have been warning about this for for now a 217 00:12:31,840 --> 00:12:35,120 Speaker 1: few years. It's not like the warning signs weren't there 218 00:12:35,640 --> 00:12:38,760 Speaker 1: for people to notice. Yeah, there's at least one crypto 219 00:12:38,920 --> 00:12:44,319 Speaker 1: entrepreneur that has effectively purchased diplomatic community as well preemptively. 220 00:12:44,679 --> 00:12:46,520 Speaker 1: Nothing has happened to him yet, but he has it. 221 00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:50,760 Speaker 1: Let's talk about frauds more generally, and you mentioned en Ron, 222 00:12:50,840 --> 00:12:55,240 Speaker 1: and you've obviously been a player throughout different boom and 223 00:12:55,280 --> 00:13:00,360 Speaker 1: bust cycles. What generally happens to frauds in a down turn? 224 00:13:00,440 --> 00:13:03,600 Speaker 1: I'm assuming many of them get exposed, but there must 225 00:13:03,600 --> 00:13:06,960 Speaker 1: also be incentive there to maybe start new ones and 226 00:13:07,000 --> 00:13:11,880 Speaker 1: try to bury some of your problems as they get worse. Well, 227 00:13:11,960 --> 00:13:14,520 Speaker 1: that is a problem in that that as it becomes 228 00:13:14,520 --> 00:13:18,160 Speaker 1: more and more difficult to to meet expectations, often the 229 00:13:18,160 --> 00:13:23,080 Speaker 1: frauds get exponentially worse as they go on. But what 230 00:13:23,280 --> 00:13:25,920 Speaker 1: I would point out is that the fraud cycle follows 231 00:13:25,960 --> 00:13:30,880 Speaker 1: the financial cycle with a lag. So typically broad thrives 232 00:13:30,960 --> 00:13:33,600 Speaker 1: in a in a in a bull market, and the 233 00:13:33,679 --> 00:13:37,560 Speaker 1: longer the bull market and the longer the the business expansion, 234 00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:42,000 Speaker 1: typically the worst the waves of fraud that are subsequently discovered. 235 00:13:42,360 --> 00:13:45,720 Speaker 1: And then when when markets turned down and people become 236 00:13:46,000 --> 00:13:50,120 Speaker 1: a little bit more leary, since most frauds require new 237 00:13:50,160 --> 00:13:53,679 Speaker 1: capital to keep going, they tend to get exposed after 238 00:13:53,720 --> 00:13:56,360 Speaker 1: the markets turned down and made off in December of 239 00:13:56,400 --> 00:13:59,120 Speaker 1: oh eight's a good example. Um, And of course what 240 00:13:59,240 --> 00:14:02,080 Speaker 1: we mentioned and on in world common tycho and that 241 00:14:02,200 --> 00:14:06,080 Speaker 1: class in this cycle, I think it's going to be. 242 00:14:06,679 --> 00:14:10,160 Speaker 1: I think crypto is probably gonna be right up there. Uh, 243 00:14:10,160 --> 00:14:13,240 Speaker 1: and that has started clearly, But I think the fraud 244 00:14:13,280 --> 00:14:17,520 Speaker 1: that's occurring is much more subtle, and I think it's 245 00:14:17,559 --> 00:14:22,280 Speaker 1: going to be even harder to prosecute. And and that's 246 00:14:22,320 --> 00:14:27,680 Speaker 1: the abuse of metrics, self described and self generated metrics 247 00:14:27,720 --> 00:14:30,960 Speaker 1: that now investors have just gotten so used to, which 248 00:14:31,000 --> 00:14:34,480 Speaker 1: are really, in my opinion, you know, mask over business 249 00:14:34,520 --> 00:14:38,600 Speaker 1: plans that probably will never be profitable, and and the 250 00:14:38,600 --> 00:14:43,760 Speaker 1: amount of adjusted adjusted profitability and adjusted EBITDA. There was 251 00:14:44,000 --> 00:14:47,000 Speaker 1: one of our shorts reported last night and they said 252 00:14:47,040 --> 00:14:50,840 Speaker 1: that they expected to be profitable by the end of 253 00:14:51,920 --> 00:14:58,520 Speaker 1: three on an adjusted basis adjusted for other operating costs. 254 00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:01,480 Speaker 1: I have no idea what that mean, but you know, 255 00:15:01,960 --> 00:15:05,560 Speaker 1: analysts dutifully this morning said they expect to be profitable 256 00:15:05,560 --> 00:15:09,280 Speaker 1: at the end of three UM. And so the investors 257 00:15:09,240 --> 00:15:14,280 Speaker 1: have gotten so used to, particularly Silicon Valley, describing profitability 258 00:15:14,400 --> 00:15:17,120 Speaker 1: as they would like it and not as it really exists, 259 00:15:17,480 --> 00:15:20,080 Speaker 1: that you kind of wonder will the SEC cracked down 260 00:15:20,120 --> 00:15:23,080 Speaker 1: on that, Will will Congress crack down on that and 261 00:15:23,080 --> 00:15:25,600 Speaker 1: and get us back to kind of generally accepted accounting 262 00:15:25,600 --> 00:15:29,600 Speaker 1: principles as opposed to accounting principles or whatever I want 263 00:15:29,600 --> 00:15:32,800 Speaker 1: them to be. Well, as you say, the fraud cycle 264 00:15:33,120 --> 00:15:36,600 Speaker 1: follows the financial cycle. And of course one way that 265 00:15:37,280 --> 00:15:40,720 Speaker 1: Silicon Valley companies in particular, all companies, but Silicon Valley 266 00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:45,320 Speaker 1: in particular, flatters their financials makes profitability look better is 267 00:15:45,800 --> 00:15:50,240 Speaker 1: you know, substantial share based compensation and you know it's 268 00:15:50,240 --> 00:15:53,000 Speaker 1: not really a cash expense, but of course still investors 269 00:15:53,040 --> 00:15:57,640 Speaker 1: are paying it. What happens to this place, Silicon Valley? 270 00:15:57,800 --> 00:16:01,000 Speaker 1: What happens to share based compensation in an era in 271 00:16:01,040 --> 00:16:04,760 Speaker 1: which shares go down? I imagine for employees they're not 272 00:16:04,800 --> 00:16:07,000 Speaker 1: as excited about getting stocked as they might have been 273 00:16:07,040 --> 00:16:08,840 Speaker 1: a year ago or two years ago as part of 274 00:16:08,840 --> 00:16:12,600 Speaker 1: their camp. So talk to us about like how that unfolds, 275 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:15,160 Speaker 1: and like what the down cycle of an industry that's 276 00:16:15,200 --> 00:16:18,440 Speaker 1: so driven by equity issuance two employees? What happens in 277 00:16:18,440 --> 00:16:22,080 Speaker 1: a down cycle? Well, it was a big issue Joe 278 00:16:22,360 --> 00:16:25,480 Speaker 1: in posted dot com era, and back then it was 279 00:16:25,520 --> 00:16:29,560 Speaker 1: stock option accounting that became that went under the microscope 280 00:16:29,880 --> 00:16:32,800 Speaker 1: and ultimately had to be accounted for. And now, of course, 281 00:16:32,880 --> 00:16:36,520 Speaker 1: in effect it's taken out through the use of pro 282 00:16:36,600 --> 00:16:40,680 Speaker 1: formal adjustments. But what what people found out was that 283 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:44,640 Speaker 1: it had just a tremendous pro cyclical effect on things. 284 00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:47,600 Speaker 1: That is, when your stock price was going up, you 285 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:51,120 Speaker 1: didn't have to issue as many shares for a given 286 00:16:51,120 --> 00:16:55,200 Speaker 1: dollar level of compensation. And now that the stock is down, 287 00:16:55,600 --> 00:16:58,560 Speaker 1: if your stock is down eight or you have to 288 00:16:58,640 --> 00:17:02,160 Speaker 1: just issue massive amount of stock, So you're issuing more 289 00:17:02,240 --> 00:17:05,040 Speaker 1: stock as it goes down, You're diluting people. So it 290 00:17:05,080 --> 00:17:09,400 Speaker 1: becomes procyclical to the downside as well, and the numbers 291 00:17:09,400 --> 00:17:12,560 Speaker 1: are now becoming meaningful. The company I mentioned just a 292 00:17:12,560 --> 00:17:15,960 Speaker 1: few minutes ago that reported last night it's got run 293 00:17:16,080 --> 00:17:18,720 Speaker 1: rate share based comp of almost a half a billion 294 00:17:18,760 --> 00:17:22,600 Speaker 1: dollars and based on their current share count, that means 295 00:17:22,680 --> 00:17:25,040 Speaker 1: that that the shares outstanding are going to be going 296 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:27,560 Speaker 1: up something like seven to ten percent a year just 297 00:17:27,680 --> 00:17:30,680 Speaker 1: on the back of share based comp. The other problem 298 00:17:30,760 --> 00:17:33,960 Speaker 1: is we've seen a number of companies, beginning in the 299 00:17:34,000 --> 00:17:38,240 Speaker 1: second quarter UH companies like door Dash and Salesforce, dot 300 00:17:38,280 --> 00:17:43,600 Speaker 1: Com and Zoom announced large share buyback programs to offset 301 00:17:43,640 --> 00:17:46,399 Speaker 1: the dilution of the share base comp. So you have 302 00:17:46,560 --> 00:17:49,879 Speaker 1: the you have the silliness of the share based compy 303 00:17:50,040 --> 00:17:53,879 Speaker 1: excluded from the adjusted profit figures and actually being a 304 00:17:53,920 --> 00:17:56,760 Speaker 1: positive for operating cash flow and the cash flow statement. 305 00:17:57,240 --> 00:18:01,119 Speaker 1: But yet now the substantial share buy back cost is 306 00:18:01,160 --> 00:18:04,800 Speaker 1: below the line in the cash flow statement under financing. 307 00:18:05,520 --> 00:18:09,359 Speaker 1: So it's skewed incentived in so many different ways. But 308 00:18:09,480 --> 00:18:12,000 Speaker 1: I don't it's getting worse. The amount of share based 309 00:18:12,000 --> 00:18:15,120 Speaker 1: camp for some of these companies is actually going up 310 00:18:15,160 --> 00:18:19,240 Speaker 1: faster than revenues. So they're on the treadmill, if you will, 311 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:21,000 Speaker 1: and I don't know how they're going to get off it. 312 00:18:21,880 --> 00:18:25,120 Speaker 1: Why do you think investors have been willing to accept 313 00:18:25,480 --> 00:18:28,520 Speaker 1: these types of pro forma adjustments in the past, because, 314 00:18:28,560 --> 00:18:31,320 Speaker 1: I mean, this has been a known issue. I think 315 00:18:31,359 --> 00:18:33,520 Speaker 1: we had someone from the SEC recently. I think it 316 00:18:33,640 --> 00:18:35,239 Speaker 1: was an article in the Wall Street Journal. They were 317 00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:38,240 Speaker 1: talking about this. We used to make fun of, you know, 318 00:18:38,320 --> 00:18:42,080 Speaker 1: community adjusted ebit DAW and stuff like that. People knew 319 00:18:42,119 --> 00:18:45,040 Speaker 1: that this was happening, and yet it didn't seem to 320 00:18:45,080 --> 00:18:47,760 Speaker 1: have that much impact on either the company's share price 321 00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:51,720 Speaker 1: or its ability to raise funding. Yeah, until it did, right, 322 00:18:51,920 --> 00:18:55,560 Speaker 1: And again that that's my view on the pro cyclicality 323 00:18:55,600 --> 00:18:59,359 Speaker 1: of all these kinds of developments. They make things look 324 00:18:59,600 --> 00:19:01,399 Speaker 1: much better than they are on the way up, and 325 00:19:01,440 --> 00:19:04,080 Speaker 1: they really hitch it pretty hard on the way down, 326 00:19:04,760 --> 00:19:08,159 Speaker 1: and so it just increases the amount of votility in 327 00:19:08,320 --> 00:19:11,680 Speaker 1: given corporate assets. There's one other aspect I will mention 328 00:19:11,960 --> 00:19:15,400 Speaker 1: that your audience might not appreciate, and and we saw 329 00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:18,440 Speaker 1: it in the dot com bust, and that is if 330 00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:23,439 Speaker 1: you have a lavish equity issuance culture, and you have 331 00:19:23,520 --> 00:19:27,640 Speaker 1: a compliant board that basically will agree to almost any 332 00:19:27,720 --> 00:19:34,639 Speaker 1: management equity issuance plan, then when you issue stock options 333 00:19:34,960 --> 00:19:39,280 Speaker 1: and various different equity instruments to your management and your employees, 334 00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:44,439 Speaker 1: if the boards rubber stamp things, well, they will rubber 335 00:19:44,520 --> 00:19:49,439 Speaker 1: stamp repricing those equity awards if the stock goes lower, 336 00:19:49,920 --> 00:19:53,800 Speaker 1: or granting more if the stock goes lower to keep 337 00:19:53,840 --> 00:19:58,160 Speaker 1: employees happy. And what that means is is that boards 338 00:19:58,160 --> 00:20:02,360 Speaker 1: are acquiescing to not only call options, but they're granting 339 00:20:02,400 --> 00:20:06,960 Speaker 1: put options to the employees and management. And that's a 340 00:20:07,080 --> 00:20:12,040 Speaker 1: frightening alternative because number one, the black Shoals model is 341 00:20:12,040 --> 00:20:15,360 Speaker 1: only picking up the cost of the call options, and 342 00:20:15,440 --> 00:20:18,600 Speaker 1: b you don't really want a management team that has 343 00:20:18,640 --> 00:20:21,439 Speaker 1: a bunch of puts in their stock as well as calls. 344 00:20:22,160 --> 00:20:24,439 Speaker 1: And it's something that I don't think a lot of 345 00:20:24,440 --> 00:20:27,240 Speaker 1: people pay enough attention to on the governance side that 346 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:45,560 Speaker 1: I think I think your your audience might appreciate. I 347 00:20:45,640 --> 00:20:48,640 Speaker 1: have a really short question. Are you gonna make us 348 00:20:48,880 --> 00:20:51,679 Speaker 1: look at the look at which companies reported earnings on 349 00:20:51,760 --> 00:20:54,400 Speaker 1: November eighth and have a half a billion dollar share 350 00:20:54,440 --> 00:20:56,560 Speaker 1: based compensation run Rader? You're gonna just tell us the 351 00:20:56,640 --> 00:21:00,600 Speaker 1: name of the company. It's a fintech company, that it's 352 00:21:00,640 --> 00:21:03,320 Speaker 1: based out where you guys are right now. And uh, 353 00:21:03,560 --> 00:21:06,560 Speaker 1: and let's say let's say, uh, let's say it's involved 354 00:21:06,560 --> 00:21:09,240 Speaker 1: in a sector of fintech. Uh that a lot of 355 00:21:09,240 --> 00:21:13,240 Speaker 1: people have questioned by now pay later. I think that 356 00:21:13,240 --> 00:21:17,280 Speaker 1: that that'll narrow down that that should narrow it down. Well, okay, 357 00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:19,840 Speaker 1: this kind of leads into a process question. But in 358 00:21:19,880 --> 00:21:24,680 Speaker 1: an environment like this, do you find identifying potential shorts 359 00:21:24,840 --> 00:21:30,200 Speaker 1: easier than during the bull market? Identifying them wasn't the problem, Tracy. 360 00:21:30,440 --> 00:21:33,399 Speaker 1: It was where they where the stocks went, that was 361 00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:36,560 Speaker 1: the issue. Um. You know, some of these business models, 362 00:21:36,760 --> 00:21:41,040 Speaker 1: I mean to us and others have been questionable from 363 00:21:41,119 --> 00:21:44,000 Speaker 1: the get go. Um, you know, take a look at 364 00:21:44,040 --> 00:21:47,640 Speaker 1: at ride hailing or or food delivery, something we're all 365 00:21:47,720 --> 00:21:51,080 Speaker 1: familiar with. These companies been around for ten and fifteen years. 366 00:21:51,359 --> 00:21:54,120 Speaker 1: They haven't found a way to make make profit. Door 367 00:21:54,240 --> 00:21:59,360 Speaker 1: Dash to single out, one company actually has higher losses 368 00:21:59,400 --> 00:22:03,520 Speaker 1: per order now then a few years ago, and so 369 00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:08,399 Speaker 1: they're not scaling. And and that is for companies that 370 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:12,120 Speaker 1: are based on digitization and having a platform and using 371 00:22:12,160 --> 00:22:16,320 Speaker 1: the internet, you had better scale. That's the whole concept. 372 00:22:16,920 --> 00:22:21,159 Speaker 1: And you know, so many business models are showing increasing 373 00:22:21,240 --> 00:22:25,600 Speaker 1: losses as they age, and I just sort of wonder, 374 00:22:25,840 --> 00:22:28,879 Speaker 1: at what point do do people just say okay enough. 375 00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:31,280 Speaker 1: And I've been shocked at it. It went on as 376 00:22:31,359 --> 00:22:33,480 Speaker 1: long as it did for a lot of these business models, 377 00:22:33,560 --> 00:22:39,440 Speaker 1: so identifying them was not the issue. Having other investors 378 00:22:39,520 --> 00:22:42,920 Speaker 1: care about that is really the issue. So I've always 379 00:22:42,960 --> 00:22:45,400 Speaker 1: found this point that you make to be very compelling 380 00:22:45,440 --> 00:22:48,720 Speaker 1: that it's like, Okay, if these right hailing, sharing economy 381 00:22:48,800 --> 00:22:52,520 Speaker 1: whatever companies couldn't make money during the boom, during the 382 00:22:52,600 --> 00:22:54,879 Speaker 1: good times, then when were they ever going to make money? 383 00:22:55,040 --> 00:22:58,159 Speaker 1: The counter that we've heard and we didn't interview not 384 00:22:58,280 --> 00:23:00,159 Speaker 1: long after the last time we talked to you with 385 00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:03,439 Speaker 1: the VC Jason Kelly canvas. He's like, yes, that's a 386 00:23:03,440 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 1: good point. On the flip side, investors were encouraging all 387 00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:10,600 Speaker 1: these companies to grow at any cost, and they were 388 00:23:10,640 --> 00:23:13,560 Speaker 1: not being rewarded for profitability. They were rewarding for growth. 389 00:23:13,920 --> 00:23:16,400 Speaker 1: And so it's not fair to say they can't make 390 00:23:16,440 --> 00:23:19,520 Speaker 1: money because they just weren't incentivized to. There was no 391 00:23:19,760 --> 00:23:21,840 Speaker 1: reason why they would have when the games were all 392 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:25,040 Speaker 1: too growth. When you look at these models, why can't 393 00:23:25,160 --> 00:23:27,560 Speaker 1: in your view, they turned the dial? Because that is 394 00:23:27,560 --> 00:23:30,240 Speaker 1: the big question, right, can they cut costs now? Can 395 00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:33,960 Speaker 1: they sort of like finally like right size and make money. 396 00:23:34,080 --> 00:23:36,360 Speaker 1: We've seen these big stock price to clients. In many 397 00:23:36,400 --> 00:23:41,600 Speaker 1: cases we see management going into cost cutting, layoff profitability mode. 398 00:23:41,880 --> 00:23:43,760 Speaker 1: Why don't you think that they can now turn the 399 00:23:43,840 --> 00:23:47,880 Speaker 1: dials and get to positive cash flow? We'll see and 400 00:23:47,880 --> 00:23:51,960 Speaker 1: and so far they haven't and and so uh, maybe 401 00:23:51,960 --> 00:23:54,280 Speaker 1: they're not losing as much money, but if you look 402 00:23:54,320 --> 00:23:57,159 Speaker 1: at the operating metrics, a lot of them are still 403 00:23:57,200 --> 00:24:01,879 Speaker 1: inherently unprofitable at suitably high up in the income statement, 404 00:24:01,880 --> 00:24:04,920 Speaker 1: whether it's operating income or gross profits. But what we're 405 00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:08,000 Speaker 1: really looking for as short sellers and looking at these 406 00:24:08,040 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 1: business models is for the companies that have stopped growing 407 00:24:11,480 --> 00:24:14,800 Speaker 1: and are still losing money, Because if they've stopped growing 408 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:19,280 Speaker 1: and the losses are still considerable, then the whole idea. 409 00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:23,080 Speaker 1: While we were investing for growth through investing for future capacity, 410 00:24:23,520 --> 00:24:26,160 Speaker 1: investors you know, didn't care as long as our top 411 00:24:26,200 --> 00:24:29,439 Speaker 1: line was growing. But if you're structurally unprofitable as you 412 00:24:29,520 --> 00:24:33,240 Speaker 1: slow down or stopped growing, then you have a problem. 413 00:24:33,359 --> 00:24:36,040 Speaker 1: And that that's why the things like the door dash 414 00:24:36,080 --> 00:24:38,760 Speaker 1: metric I mentioned to you, you know, the loss is 415 00:24:38,840 --> 00:24:43,119 Speaker 1: per order become important to judge whether or not what 416 00:24:43,240 --> 00:24:46,000 Speaker 1: your guests said is true or not. We've made it 417 00:24:46,119 --> 00:24:50,119 Speaker 1: twenty five minutes without actually mentioning Elon Musk, although we 418 00:24:50,160 --> 00:24:53,399 Speaker 1: did mention Tesla, so I don't again, this is one 419 00:24:53,400 --> 00:24:55,360 Speaker 1: of those things. I don't even have a question, but 420 00:24:55,640 --> 00:25:03,639 Speaker 1: Tesla Elon Musk, Twitter, Jim go. Look, you know the 421 00:25:03,720 --> 00:25:07,399 Speaker 1: Twitter saga is one for the ages, and I'm an 422 00:25:07,440 --> 00:25:11,679 Speaker 1: interested observer like everybody else. We're focused on on Tesla 423 00:25:11,800 --> 00:25:14,720 Speaker 1: the car company, and I would just keep pointing out 424 00:25:14,760 --> 00:25:18,640 Speaker 1: to people that Tesla the car company is not only 425 00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:21,880 Speaker 1: the most profitable car company, which certainly we didn't never 426 00:25:21,920 --> 00:25:24,920 Speaker 1: thought it would be, but is also you know, going 427 00:25:24,960 --> 00:25:29,720 Speaker 1: away still with the stock down almost is still the 428 00:25:29,760 --> 00:25:33,639 Speaker 1: most expensive automobile o EM in the world by a lot. 429 00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:36,840 Speaker 1: And uh, I think we're looking at a company that 430 00:25:36,920 --> 00:25:40,800 Speaker 1: that's training now right around thirty times gross profits thirty 431 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:44,440 Speaker 1: times gross profits is is you know, their software is 432 00:25:44,480 --> 00:25:47,639 Speaker 1: a service stocks that would kill for that and basically 433 00:25:47,720 --> 00:25:51,679 Speaker 1: sells luxury cars, right he sells fifty and sixty and 434 00:25:51,720 --> 00:25:56,919 Speaker 1: seventy thousand dollar cars that you know have immense gross 435 00:25:56,920 --> 00:26:00,720 Speaker 1: profit margins where the rest of the industry is lucky 436 00:26:00,760 --> 00:26:04,879 Speaker 1: to get fifteen or we don't think that's sustainable. Um, 437 00:26:05,040 --> 00:26:07,080 Speaker 1: we think that the number one the luxury car market 438 00:26:07,119 --> 00:26:10,159 Speaker 1: is a much smaller than people think. And number two, 439 00:26:10,560 --> 00:26:12,240 Speaker 1: even though the o E other o E m s 440 00:26:12,280 --> 00:26:15,840 Speaker 1: have been slow on the uptake, they are coming and 441 00:26:15,960 --> 00:26:18,840 Speaker 1: competition will increase and most cars will be e v 442 00:26:19,040 --> 00:26:22,680 Speaker 1: s by the next five to ten years. And it's 443 00:26:22,720 --> 00:26:26,280 Speaker 1: a tough business. It's a low return on capital business. 444 00:26:26,560 --> 00:26:29,560 Speaker 1: It always has been. He caught the sweet spot to 445 00:26:29,760 --> 00:26:33,920 Speaker 1: his and his shareholders benefit and to the short sellers detriment. 446 00:26:34,640 --> 00:26:37,400 Speaker 1: But now he's got to maintain it. And I think 447 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:42,840 Speaker 1: that's increasingly difficult because his investors are still looking for 448 00:26:42,840 --> 00:26:48,640 Speaker 1: forty growth for the next you know, decade, and that 449 00:26:48,680 --> 00:26:50,520 Speaker 1: means that pretty much he's going to be the entire 450 00:26:50,560 --> 00:26:53,440 Speaker 1: car industry, you know, by by the early twenty thirties. 451 00:26:53,840 --> 00:26:55,800 Speaker 1: And we just don't think that's going to happen. Are 452 00:26:55,840 --> 00:26:59,240 Speaker 1: you short Tesla right now? We are because I wasn't 453 00:26:59,240 --> 00:27:03,840 Speaker 1: sure because I where you're so obviously the stock has 454 00:27:03,880 --> 00:27:06,199 Speaker 1: come down a lot has gotten hammered over the for 455 00:27:06,240 --> 00:27:08,800 Speaker 1: a while now. But you're just even at the current 456 00:27:08,880 --> 00:27:12,239 Speaker 1: levels unsustainable. Yeah, And I would be remissed if I 457 00:27:12,280 --> 00:27:15,240 Speaker 1: didn't point out that people have now lost more money 458 00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:18,000 Speaker 1: in Tesla than they've made. It's like crypto, I believe. 459 00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:21,560 Speaker 1: Think about that, Yeah, yeah, exactly. And when do you 460 00:27:21,560 --> 00:27:27,920 Speaker 1: think about Twitter? Does that distract from Musk's role at Tesla? Well, 461 00:27:27,920 --> 00:27:31,119 Speaker 1: remember he's also the CEO of a couple of other companies, 462 00:27:31,520 --> 00:27:37,399 Speaker 1: not just Twitter and Tesla. So you know, it's I 463 00:27:37,480 --> 00:27:40,320 Speaker 1: don't understand the value age, I don't understand the price 464 00:27:40,359 --> 00:27:44,520 Speaker 1: he paid, um and and it's to do with what 465 00:27:44,560 --> 00:27:48,960 Speaker 1: he wants. And I believe in private property and free enterprise, 466 00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:51,600 Speaker 1: and you know, I'm kind of scratching my head at 467 00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:55,439 Speaker 1: some of the initiatives, But um, we'll see how it 468 00:27:55,480 --> 00:27:59,480 Speaker 1: plays out. I don't think it was worth four billion dollars. 469 00:28:00,040 --> 00:28:02,520 Speaker 1: I think he thinks it probably wasn't worth forty four 470 00:28:02,520 --> 00:28:05,400 Speaker 1: billion dollars, And it'll be interesting to see how how 471 00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:08,720 Speaker 1: that plays out. But I think it's probably gonna take 472 00:28:08,760 --> 00:28:12,040 Speaker 1: a disproportionate amount of his attention over the near term. 473 00:28:12,080 --> 00:28:14,080 Speaker 1: So we just have about a minute and a half. 474 00:28:14,200 --> 00:28:17,119 Speaker 1: So just like really simple, you know, like when you've 475 00:28:17,240 --> 00:28:20,919 Speaker 1: seen the end sides of many bubbles in your career, 476 00:28:21,320 --> 00:28:23,880 Speaker 1: does it look like we're close to the bottom here? 477 00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:26,639 Speaker 1: And also what do you what would be the signs 478 00:28:26,680 --> 00:28:29,000 Speaker 1: that we are close to something that you would call 479 00:28:29,040 --> 00:28:34,520 Speaker 1: a bottom. Again, market timing is not my forte but um, 480 00:28:34,560 --> 00:28:37,040 Speaker 1: if it was a bottom, it would be the most 481 00:28:37,080 --> 00:28:41,800 Speaker 1: expensive bottom probably in modern financial history. I mean, most 482 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:46,480 Speaker 1: bear market bottoms have basically bottomed out somewhere between nine 483 00:28:46,520 --> 00:28:52,480 Speaker 1: and fifteen times the previous peaks of earnings. And because 484 00:28:52,720 --> 00:28:54,840 Speaker 1: normally the earnings are depressed at the bottom of a 485 00:28:54,840 --> 00:28:59,720 Speaker 1: bear market. But but if we think that roughly, you know, 486 00:28:59,760 --> 00:29:02,320 Speaker 1: earn things are peaking right now, and they may or 487 00:29:02,360 --> 00:29:05,040 Speaker 1: may not be, but my guess is they're pretty close 488 00:29:05,640 --> 00:29:11,280 Speaker 1: nine to fifteen times would be eighteen hundred two three 489 00:29:11,320 --> 00:29:14,600 Speaker 1: thousand thirty one on the SMP. We're a long way 490 00:29:14,640 --> 00:29:18,880 Speaker 1: away from that, so, you know, I saw it for 491 00:29:18,920 --> 00:29:21,920 Speaker 1: the first time. Facts that was saying that SNP earning 492 00:29:22,040 --> 00:29:24,760 Speaker 1: estimates are coming down for the fourth quarter, are gonna 493 00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:27,280 Speaker 1: be down you over year, So we might be at 494 00:29:27,280 --> 00:29:30,720 Speaker 1: peak earnings right now of two hundred and five or 495 00:29:30,760 --> 00:29:33,600 Speaker 1: two d ten dollars. You know, we were where were 496 00:29:33,600 --> 00:29:36,600 Speaker 1: we the other day? So we were at nineteen and 497 00:29:36,600 --> 00:29:40,440 Speaker 1: a half times that number. That's a pretty rich number 498 00:29:40,480 --> 00:29:44,160 Speaker 1: to be a stock market bottom. All right, Well, Jim Chanos, 499 00:29:44,200 --> 00:29:46,360 Speaker 1: it was lovely seeing you again. We look forward to 500 00:29:46,400 --> 00:29:49,200 Speaker 1: maybe catching up with you in like another four months 501 00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:51,320 Speaker 1: and we'll just ask you we'll just say you were 502 00:29:51,360 --> 00:30:06,680 Speaker 1: right again. Thanks guys, I appreciate that. Well, that was 503 00:30:06,800 --> 00:30:10,520 Speaker 1: our conversation with Jim Chainos at the Berkeley Forum on 504 00:30:10,680 --> 00:30:15,959 Speaker 1: Corporate Governance. Tracy, it's always a pleasure to talk to Jim, 505 00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:18,440 Speaker 1: of course, you know, I thought it was actually interesting. 506 00:30:18,680 --> 00:30:21,719 Speaker 1: Obviously we're in this sort of like fraud exposure cycle, 507 00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:25,520 Speaker 1: but the other sort of pro cyclical element besides discovering 508 00:30:25,560 --> 00:30:28,320 Speaker 1: all this bad activity, it's just what we see about 509 00:30:28,360 --> 00:30:31,400 Speaker 1: financing and what he talked about with share based compensation 510 00:30:31,440 --> 00:30:34,240 Speaker 1: and this sort of compensation structure coming home to roost, right, 511 00:30:34,280 --> 00:30:37,360 Speaker 1: and also the idea that those sorts of share based 512 00:30:37,400 --> 00:30:40,959 Speaker 1: compensation schemes can be an amplifying force for stock prices 513 00:30:41,000 --> 00:30:43,480 Speaker 1: on the way up but also on the way down, right, 514 00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:45,760 Speaker 1: Because you know, when when it comes to uh, you know, 515 00:30:45,880 --> 00:30:49,080 Speaker 1: Silicon Valley, you know, and we think about leverage, we 516 00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:51,800 Speaker 1: we sometimes don't think of tech companies in that because 517 00:30:51,800 --> 00:30:54,400 Speaker 1: they don't have any debt per se. But when you 518 00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:58,000 Speaker 1: think about like how crucial share based compensation was, and 519 00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:00,320 Speaker 1: if you think about it in terms of almost rowing 520 00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:04,400 Speaker 1: from your own investors in order to pay employees and 521 00:31:04,440 --> 00:31:06,520 Speaker 1: so forth so that they'll keep working at the salaries 522 00:31:06,600 --> 00:31:09,720 Speaker 1: it expects, it really is like a form of financial leverage. 523 00:31:09,920 --> 00:31:13,160 Speaker 1: It's just not a credit leverage. Share based capital is 524 00:31:13,200 --> 00:31:17,320 Speaker 1: the lower tier two capital of Silicon valid I like this. 525 00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:22,480 Speaker 1: That's good. That's good. That's yeah. Shall we leave it there. 526 00:31:22,560 --> 00:31:25,280 Speaker 1: Let's leave it there. Okay. This has been another episode 527 00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:27,800 Speaker 1: of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can 528 00:31:27,800 --> 00:31:30,560 Speaker 1: follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway, and I'm Joe 529 00:31:30,560 --> 00:31:32,920 Speaker 1: Wi isn't, though. You can follow me on Twitter at 530 00:31:32,960 --> 00:31:36,160 Speaker 1: the Stalwart, follow our guest Jim Chanos He's at Wall 531 00:31:36,200 --> 00:31:40,440 Speaker 1: Street Cynic, follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand 532 00:31:40,480 --> 00:31:43,640 Speaker 1: and Dashel Bennett at Dashbot, and check out all of 533 00:31:43,640 --> 00:31:47,800 Speaker 1: our podcasts under the handle at Podcasts and I wanted 534 00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:49,840 Speaker 1: to let you know about a special event that we're 535 00:31:49,880 --> 00:31:54,000 Speaker 1: holding for listeners. My co host Tracy Alloway and I 536 00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:57,400 Speaker 1: will be speaking with past guest Josh Younger, as well 537 00:31:57,440 --> 00:32:01,680 Speaker 1: as Columbia law professor levmanand in a special live episode 538 00:32:01,800 --> 00:32:05,400 Speaker 1: of The Odd Lots podcast on November nine. We're gonna 539 00:32:05,440 --> 00:32:08,959 Speaker 1: be holding it at Bloomberg h Q, and you're welcome 540 00:32:09,040 --> 00:32:13,240 Speaker 1: to come mingo join. We're gonna have cocktails, canapas and 541 00:32:13,360 --> 00:32:16,360 Speaker 1: other stuff on that day along with the live recording. 542 00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:19,840 Speaker 1: So if you're interested in attending a live episode of 543 00:32:19,880 --> 00:32:22,560 Speaker 1: the Odd Lows podcast as well as meeting me and Tracy, 544 00:32:22,640 --> 00:32:24,720 Speaker 1: as well as meeting our guests, and as well as 545 00:32:24,760 --> 00:32:28,360 Speaker 1: meeting other Odd Lots listeners, go find the rs VP. 546 00:32:28,600 --> 00:32:31,120 Speaker 1: Both Tracy and I have tweeted about it. It's also 547 00:32:31,160 --> 00:32:34,560 Speaker 1: on Bloomberg dot com. Slash odd lots. Sign up and 548 00:32:34,680 --> 00:32:36,640 Speaker 1: join us in New York City at bloomberg Age Q 549 00:32:36,920 --> 00:32:38,080 Speaker 1: on November twenty nine,