WEBVTT - What the Fed's Big Balance Sheet Unwind Means for Markets

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Allawitt and I'm Joe. Joe. What was the

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<v Speaker 1>biggest thing that happened in markets in recent months over

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<v Speaker 1>the summer. It's like a test. I think it's like

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<v Speaker 1>a test of, you know, what people are looking at

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<v Speaker 1>the moment, what they find interesting. I mean, the FED tightening. Obviously, yes,

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<v Speaker 1>this is the correct answer. Okay, I'll stop there. I

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<v Speaker 1>got it right, So I'm just gonna stop there and

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<v Speaker 1>you can go on. Okay, So the FED started quantitative tightening.

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<v Speaker 1>We're recording this in late June, and weirdly, it kind

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<v Speaker 1>of went by without that much fanfare, Like there were

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<v Speaker 1>a few news articles about the FED firing the starting

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<v Speaker 1>gun on quantitative tightening and the unwind of its very

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<v Speaker 1>very large balance sheet, but there was so much going

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<v Speaker 1>on at the same time, you know, there was that

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<v Speaker 1>surprise seventy five basis point interest rate hike, and then

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<v Speaker 1>lots of talk about inflation and things like that that

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<v Speaker 1>it feels like it didn't get as much attention as

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<v Speaker 1>it probably should have. Most of the attention is paid

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<v Speaker 1>to the rate obviously, you know, queue when it was

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<v Speaker 1>first unveiled or when Ben Berneki did QUI two, which

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<v Speaker 1>was the real QUEI during the Great financial crazies, I

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<v Speaker 1>got so much attention, but there still seems to be

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of ambiguity about a how it works, what

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<v Speaker 1>it does, what it accomplishes, and then in terms of

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<v Speaker 1>like the degree to which unwinding the balance sheet is

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<v Speaker 1>or is not an additional form of policy, tightening is

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<v Speaker 1>something that I just feel like is at best, like

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<v Speaker 1>still deeply misunderstood. It is kind of crazy that even

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<v Speaker 1>after years and years of quantitative easing, there's still a

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<v Speaker 1>discussion about what the impact is and how it actually works.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, I remember people still arguing about whether or

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<v Speaker 1>not it pushes up asset prices and things like that.

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<v Speaker 1>And there are people out there right now who are

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<v Speaker 1>arguing that the reason markets have fallen might not actually

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<v Speaker 1>have to do that much with inflation concerns and worries

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<v Speaker 1>over a looming recession, but could just be because liquidity

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<v Speaker 1>is starting to exit the system. No, No, I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>it's totally it's totally valid. You know, it's worth noting

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<v Speaker 1>that we have had, you know, markets boomed even though

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<v Speaker 1>there was no longer a further expansion of the balance sheet.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, we started to rally in early nineteen again

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<v Speaker 1>even as the balance sheet shrank for a while, going

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<v Speaker 1>into some of the tensions, but it really is wild,

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<v Speaker 1>as you say, like how little we know and how

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<v Speaker 1>little even I mean, I think even the FED knows

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<v Speaker 1>about like quanted measuring the effects of changes to the

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<v Speaker 1>size of the balance sheet. Well, there is also an

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<v Speaker 1>argument to be made that the QUEI that we seen

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<v Speaker 1>over the past couple of years is stylistically and quantitatively

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<v Speaker 1>different than the ones we've seen prior, and so the

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<v Speaker 1>exit is going to be different too. So we are

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<v Speaker 1>going to dig into all of these um very big

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<v Speaker 1>and technical questions and I'm happy to say we really

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<v Speaker 1>do have the perfect person to discuss this. We're going

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<v Speaker 1>to be speaking with someone who's been on the podcast before, Joe,

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<v Speaker 1>but I think you were actually away for that effort. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so I'm thrilled to have him back. We're going to

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<v Speaker 1>be speaking with Joseph Wang. He used to work at

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<v Speaker 1>the New York Fed on the Open Markets desk, conducting

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<v Speaker 1>repo operations, basically being deep in the weeds of money markets,

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<v Speaker 1>and now he runs a blog called fed Guy, which

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<v Speaker 1>is really a must read if you're interested in monetary

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<v Speaker 1>policy and in all of these big questions about how

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<v Speaker 1>it actually works. So, Joseph, thank you so much for

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<v Speaker 1>coming back on ad thoughts. Tracy, Hey, Joe, thanks so

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<v Speaker 1>much for your biding. Yet it's a pleasure to be here. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>So maybe just to begin with, could you give us

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<v Speaker 1>the bra outline of how quantitative tightening or the QUEI

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<v Speaker 1>that we've seen over the past couple of years. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>as I alluded to, it's different to the QUI that

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<v Speaker 1>we've seen in the past. So I guess the question

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<v Speaker 1>is how different is it this time? Like? What makes

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<v Speaker 1>this particular exit different to previous periods of quantitative tightening

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<v Speaker 1>that we've seen. Sure, so I think this time QUT

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<v Speaker 1>is a different first and the level, and I think

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<v Speaker 1>there's changes in the financial in the structure of the

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<v Speaker 1>financial system that make a bit more difficult. So this

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<v Speaker 1>time around, QUI looks like it's going to ramp up

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<v Speaker 1>to about nine billion dollars a month now. In contrast,

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<v Speaker 1>the last time around when we did this, the maximum

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<v Speaker 1>that we ever did was fifty billion dollars a month.

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<v Speaker 1>So in terms of pace, it's a much much more

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<v Speaker 1>aggress pace. We're doing nine billion a month, can kind

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<v Speaker 1>of contrast last time the maximum we did was fifty

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<v Speaker 1>billion a month. So the way that this works through

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<v Speaker 1>the system, I think Bradley speaking, I think of QT

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<v Speaker 1>as having two mechanisms. One is that it increases the

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<v Speaker 1>supply of treasuries into the market. That's one, and that's

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<v Speaker 1>kind of how the FET thinks of it. It. By

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<v Speaker 1>increasing or increasing the supply of treasuries, you are pushing

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<v Speaker 1>the term premium higher, so it puts upward pressure on

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<v Speaker 1>interest rates. And the second mechanism has to do with

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<v Speaker 1>draining liquidity out of the system. So these two mechanisms

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<v Speaker 1>are related but also operate in separate ways, And they

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<v Speaker 1>also have a lot of moving parts into how they

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<v Speaker 1>actually can play out. And these moving parts aren't completely

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<v Speaker 1>within the FET's control. So because of this, QT can

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<v Speaker 1>play out in a range of outcomes. You can have

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<v Speaker 1>very benign QT, where it really is just washing paint

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<v Speaker 1>dry as Railie and what mentioned before, or you can

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<v Speaker 1>have QT that's more aggressive and very disruptive. Now, based

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<v Speaker 1>on what I see in the current configuration of the

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<v Speaker 1>financial system, considers so many moving parts, it seems what's

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<v Speaker 1>happening right now is compared to last time, QT, this

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<v Speaker 1>time is going to be a lot more disruptive. I

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<v Speaker 1>guess I can talk about why from the So I'll

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<v Speaker 1>go by the first mechanism, the increase in trgury supply,

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<v Speaker 1>and then I'll talk about why draining liquidy this time

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<v Speaker 1>will also be more disruptive. So when QT increases the

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<v Speaker 1>supply of treasuries into the private sector, the Fed doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>actually get to decide what tenors that reach the market.

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<v Speaker 1>That's a decision by the U S. Tresury techne. Overall,

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<v Speaker 1>what happens is that um when the feed is doing QT,

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<v Speaker 1>it's it's receiving repayments for the tresury that it owes

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<v Speaker 1>that that it owns. So the U S Trsury issues

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<v Speaker 1>new debt and takes that money and repays the ft.

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<v Speaker 1>That's what happens. So it's the U S. Treasury that

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<v Speaker 1>gets decide what are the new what are the tenors

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<v Speaker 1>of the new treasuries that the market absorbs. Now, you

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<v Speaker 1>can do this in a way that's very market neutral.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's say the U S. Tregury issues a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of short data debt, Treasury builds now, the market can

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<v Speaker 1>absorb these treasury bills very easily. If you think back

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<v Speaker 1>to the first quarter of the tresury issued two trillion

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<v Speaker 1>dollars in bills in the market just lapped that up easily.

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<v Speaker 1>So in a sense, it's because bills are so cash like,

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<v Speaker 1>it's they don't really have any interest rate impact. But

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<v Speaker 1>what the U. S. Treasury is doing this time around,

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<v Speaker 1>it's actually cutting bill issuance, so because it had received

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of tax payments in April above its expectations.

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<v Speaker 1>So all the q T increase in supply over the

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<v Speaker 1>next few months is going to be in coupons, and

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<v Speaker 1>coupons are more difficult for the market to absorb, so

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<v Speaker 1>it's probably going to place more upward pressure on interest rates.

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<v Speaker 1>There are also a lot more mechanics behind this that

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<v Speaker 1>that make it the same around more disruptive. So, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>we're having a big change in who the Marshall wires

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<v Speaker 1>are in this market. Well, actually, I'll sit back a

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<v Speaker 1>bit and say, so the increases imply this time around

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<v Speaker 1>is much higher than it was last time around. I

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<v Speaker 1>think it's useful to think about treasury rates in terms

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<v Speaker 1>of supply and demand. So in terms of supply, the

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<v Speaker 1>sime around the amount. Taking into account of QT the

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<v Speaker 1>estimates for the increase in supply to the private sector,

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<v Speaker 1>it's going to be about one point five trillion dollars

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<v Speaker 1>a year, so for the next three years. Now, just

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<v Speaker 1>for context, pre COVID, the amount of supply that was

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<v Speaker 1>going into the market was about five dred billion dollars

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<v Speaker 1>a year, and so the pace of the supply is

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<v Speaker 1>just so so much higher than than it was the

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<v Speaker 1>last time we did this. And that is happening in

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<v Speaker 1>the context of from the say demand side, from the

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<v Speaker 1>buyer side, where the Marshall buyer is changing and the

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<v Speaker 1>market structure doesn't seem very strong. The Marshall buyer for

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<v Speaker 1>treasuries before COVID was actually the hedge fund the hedge funds.

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<v Speaker 1>So what the hedgemunds were doing they were buying let's say,

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<v Speaker 1>hundreds of boons haves and treasuries several hundred billions and treasuries,

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<v Speaker 1>but they were buying it as part of a basis trade,

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<v Speaker 1>so they actually didn't really care about things like growth

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<v Speaker 1>and inflation. It was really about the spread between the

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<v Speaker 1>cast treasuries in the future. So there were the marginal buyers.

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<v Speaker 1>Post COVID, it was all about the FED and the

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<v Speaker 1>commercial banks. The commercial banks, because of regulation, they have

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<v Speaker 1>to own a lot of liquid assets and they were

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<v Speaker 1>buying tremendously. So those players are not in the market anymore.

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<v Speaker 1>And there were also players who are much more agnostic

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<v Speaker 1>to things like where the interest rates were because they

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<v Speaker 1>have to buy them as part of a pair's trade

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<v Speaker 1>or for regulation. Those people are out, and you're having

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<v Speaker 1>to a situation where we're looking for the new Marshal buyer,

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<v Speaker 1>and that new Marshall buyer is probably going to be

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<v Speaker 1>more sensitive to things like inflation rates. And you know

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<v Speaker 1>as well as we see and this happening in UH inflation,

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<v Speaker 1>it's it's not clear what that is, nor what defense

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<v Speaker 1>policy rate will be going forward, So there's gonna be

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<v Speaker 1>some volatility there. M And one more thing, and you

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<v Speaker 1>can see chair Power and mentioned this again, Trojery market

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<v Speaker 1>liquidity is not pretty good. So when we have this

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<v Speaker 1>tremendous increase in supply changing demand amidst very low Tridrey

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<v Speaker 1>market liquidity. So just just for some context, so every

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<v Speaker 1>day in the trojury market, we do about six hundred

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<v Speaker 1>billion dollars in cash cash transactions, and we have about

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<v Speaker 1>a twenty three trillion dollar trojury market for the private sector.

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<v Speaker 1>So if you rewind the clock twenty years ago, we

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<v Speaker 1>had about seven trillion dollars in net market. About treasuries

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<v Speaker 1>daily volumes are about four hundred billion, So today the

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<v Speaker 1>total treasuries volumes have more than triple toe trillion, but

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<v Speaker 1>the liquidity daily liquidity is only a little bit higher,

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<v Speaker 1>from four hundred billion to six hundred billion, So you

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<v Speaker 1>can have in a sense, you can think about let's

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<v Speaker 1>say the stadium getting a lot bigger, but the doors

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<v Speaker 1>are not really increasing, and that's a big reason why

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<v Speaker 1>we see these huge moves and treasury utes recently. I

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<v Speaker 1>think a few weeks ago, we sell the tenure, just

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<v Speaker 1>jump twenty five basis points, we sell the treasury market

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<v Speaker 1>break in March, and we've had flash crashes in the past,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's kind of there's this storm brewing from my perspective,

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<v Speaker 1>where you have enormous issuance, you have a weak market structure,

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<v Speaker 1>and you also have a demand side for treasuries that

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<v Speaker 1>that's becoming a little uncertain. So uh, that's just with

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<v Speaker 1>the treasury please no, So I want to explore like

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<v Speaker 1>the liquidity side a little bit more. And one of

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<v Speaker 1>the things that we talked about in a recent episode.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, like treasuries and reserves are not that different

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<v Speaker 1>from a sort of like economic perspective, Right, So, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>you talk about there's a huge increase into the market

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<v Speaker 1>of these treasuries that the FED will be getting rid

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<v Speaker 1>of reducing, but on the other hand, it's also diminishing

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<v Speaker 1>the reserves the liability side of the balance sheet, and

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<v Speaker 1>so on some level there's an evenness to it. And

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<v Speaker 1>economically they're not radically different, they are somewhat different. Explain

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<v Speaker 1>further the effect on liquidity from swapping two assets that

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<v Speaker 1>are not that different. Yeah, that's a really good question.

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<v Speaker 1>So I think there's a couple of things to this.

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<v Speaker 1>One is that reserves can only be held by commercial banks,

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<v Speaker 1>so occurrence, So reserves are basically deposits at the FED,

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<v Speaker 1>and only commercial banks probably speaking, can have deposits at

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<v Speaker 1>the at the FED. So from a commercial banks standpoint, Joe,

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<v Speaker 1>you're you're right, it's it's very equivalent. I mean, there's

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<v Speaker 1>more interest rate risk in a treasury, for example, but

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<v Speaker 1>for a commercial banks standpoint, I can have reserves in

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<v Speaker 1>my liquidity portfolio, or I can have treasuries. And what

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<v Speaker 1>they've been doing for the past couple of years is

0:12:56.840 --> 0:12:59.080
<v Speaker 1>they're making that choice to say that I want to

0:12:59.120 --> 0:13:02.679
<v Speaker 1>have treasuries rather than reserves, since treasuries are using much

0:13:02.679 --> 0:13:05.840
<v Speaker 1>more than interest on reserves. But that's not the decision

0:13:06.000 --> 0:13:09.880
<v Speaker 1>faced by people who are not banks. So for example,

0:13:10.000 --> 0:13:13.640
<v Speaker 1>you and me, we have deposits at a commercial bank.

0:13:13.920 --> 0:13:17.080
<v Speaker 1>We don't we're not eligible to hold reserves at the FED.

0:13:18.080 --> 0:13:21.040
<v Speaker 1>So when the FED is doing QT, from from our perspective,

0:13:21.559 --> 0:13:25.040
<v Speaker 1>the deposits in the system are declining. So when the

0:13:25.040 --> 0:13:29.920
<v Speaker 1>FED does QT, it reduces reserve assets at commercial bank

0:13:30.280 --> 0:13:33.800
<v Speaker 1>which are often backed by deposit liabilities. So it's this

0:13:33.920 --> 0:13:37.280
<v Speaker 1>two tiered monetary system we have where non banks have

0:13:37.520 --> 0:13:40.200
<v Speaker 1>deposits at banks and banks sold deposits at the FED.

0:13:40.600 --> 0:13:45.000
<v Speaker 1>So from our perspective, we're losing bank deposits, which are

0:13:45.200 --> 0:13:49.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, carry credit risk and don't earn idle R.

0:13:49.120 --> 0:13:52.800
<v Speaker 1>So the substitution is it's not perfect. But I think

0:13:52.920 --> 0:13:57.120
<v Speaker 1>more broadly, the point though, is it seems like right

0:13:57.160 --> 0:14:01.240
<v Speaker 1>now what's happening is that treasury start becoming less cash.

0:14:01.320 --> 0:14:03.640
<v Speaker 1>Like you can see this in the lack of flight

0:14:03.720 --> 0:14:07.240
<v Speaker 1>to safety in market volatility, bonds are selling off and

0:14:07.440 --> 0:14:12.319
<v Speaker 1>stocks are selling off. So when we have high inflation

0:14:12.559 --> 0:14:15.840
<v Speaker 1>and we have a lot of rate volatility, it seems

0:14:15.920 --> 0:14:18.720
<v Speaker 1>like the market is not rushing to treasuries as safety.

0:14:19.000 --> 0:14:21.600
<v Speaker 1>They're rushing through just cash. And so that that makes

0:14:21.640 --> 0:14:24.560
<v Speaker 1>it I think this asset swap that that you talked about,

0:14:24.560 --> 0:14:28.280
<v Speaker 1>which is broadly what QUE is not as perfect substitutes

0:14:28.320 --> 0:14:46.680
<v Speaker 1>for each other. So I just want to touch on

0:14:46.680 --> 0:14:49.960
<v Speaker 1>on one consequence of the dynamic you just described before

0:14:50.000 --> 0:14:52.640
<v Speaker 1>we go more into q T and the mechanics there.

0:14:53.000 --> 0:14:55.960
<v Speaker 1>But we've spoken about this before, I think last year,

0:14:56.280 --> 0:14:59.880
<v Speaker 1>but the implication that banks aren't necessarily buying treasuries but

0:15:00.000 --> 0:15:02.880
<v Speaker 1>because they think that, you know, interest rates are going

0:15:02.920 --> 0:15:05.360
<v Speaker 1>to go up or down, but they're buying them because

0:15:05.360 --> 0:15:08.880
<v Speaker 1>they have to buy treasuries to satisfy liquidity coverage ratios

0:15:08.960 --> 0:15:12.880
<v Speaker 1>and regulatory requirements and things like that, and treasuries are

0:15:12.880 --> 0:15:16.720
<v Speaker 1>sort of the best option of the assets that are

0:15:16.800 --> 0:15:20.080
<v Speaker 1>available to do that. So what does that actually mean

0:15:20.120 --> 0:15:22.800
<v Speaker 1>when it comes to treasury yields? Like when we look

0:15:22.840 --> 0:15:26.000
<v Speaker 1>at a treasury yield, now, how much information is that

0:15:26.120 --> 0:15:30.880
<v Speaker 1>actually giving us about investors, expectations for the future direction

0:15:30.920 --> 0:15:33.320
<v Speaker 1>of the economy and things like that. When I look

0:15:33.360 --> 0:15:36.120
<v Speaker 1>at tragedy yields, I don't actually think there's a lot

0:15:36.160 --> 0:15:41.360
<v Speaker 1>of information content. And I don't think so because as

0:15:41.400 --> 0:15:43.600
<v Speaker 1>you as you know to Treasury Tracy, there's a lot

0:15:43.640 --> 0:15:46.760
<v Speaker 1>of people who buy treasuries for different reasons. So you

0:15:46.800 --> 0:15:49.480
<v Speaker 1>do have investors who, let's say, look at growth and

0:15:49.520 --> 0:15:52.960
<v Speaker 1>inflation and look at yields and make a judgment. But

0:15:53.080 --> 0:15:56.560
<v Speaker 1>treasuries are very special in the financial system and that

0:15:56.600 --> 0:16:00.240
<v Speaker 1>they are considered a high quality asset, a credit risk

0:16:00.280 --> 0:16:04.360
<v Speaker 1>free asset, and under a range of regulations people have

0:16:04.480 --> 0:16:07.360
<v Speaker 1>to buy them just because the regulations tell them too.

0:16:07.800 --> 0:16:11.720
<v Speaker 1>And banks, for example, they have to hold high quality

0:16:11.760 --> 0:16:14.760
<v Speaker 1>liquid assets, as you mentioned, under things like the liquidity

0:16:14.800 --> 0:16:18.320
<v Speaker 1>coverage ratio. What qualifies as high quality looquoid assets a

0:16:18.440 --> 0:16:21.200
<v Speaker 1>very very narrow range of assets, treasuries being one of them,

0:16:21.200 --> 0:16:23.720
<v Speaker 1>and so they have to buy some of that. But

0:16:23.800 --> 0:16:26.280
<v Speaker 1>it's not just them. Um, if you look at let's say,

0:16:26.800 --> 0:16:29.840
<v Speaker 1>government sponsored emprises like Fannie may or Freddie Mac, they

0:16:29.880 --> 0:16:32.160
<v Speaker 1>also have similar regulations that they have to buy high

0:16:32.200 --> 0:16:35.280
<v Speaker 1>quality liquid assets. Or if you look abroad, if you

0:16:35.320 --> 0:16:39.040
<v Speaker 1>are a foreign reserve manager, if you're managing the foreign

0:16:39.080 --> 0:16:42.640
<v Speaker 1>reserves of let's say Japan or China or some other countries,

0:16:43.840 --> 0:16:47.320
<v Speaker 1>you can't really buy just equities or anything like that.

0:16:48.080 --> 0:16:51.240
<v Speaker 1>You usually other than the substational make usually you're very

0:16:51.320 --> 0:16:54.560
<v Speaker 1>very conservative, and so you can only buy things like treasuries.

0:16:54.920 --> 0:16:58.280
<v Speaker 1>So there's a there's a lot of demand for treasuries

0:16:58.360 --> 0:17:01.920
<v Speaker 1>that that's just not that UH driven by fundamentals. And

0:17:02.000 --> 0:17:03.720
<v Speaker 1>of course you can have hedge funds who are just

0:17:03.760 --> 0:17:05.800
<v Speaker 1>buying it as part of a basis trade where they

0:17:05.800 --> 0:17:08.880
<v Speaker 1>care about the spread between the trusuries and something else

0:17:09.000 --> 0:17:11.960
<v Speaker 1>rather than the absolute level of the trusuries as measured

0:17:11.960 --> 0:17:15.600
<v Speaker 1>by UH. It's the economic fundamentals. So it's it's really

0:17:15.640 --> 0:17:17.640
<v Speaker 1>hard to to look at from my perspective, to look

0:17:17.680 --> 0:17:23.879
<v Speaker 1>at price and infer economic conditions. So thinking about, you know,

0:17:23.920 --> 0:17:27.399
<v Speaker 1>in terms of like the mechanics or the implications of

0:17:27.520 --> 0:17:30.480
<v Speaker 1>quantitative tightening, why don't we start off with a sort

0:17:30.520 --> 0:17:33.680
<v Speaker 1>of kind of basic question. But it's like, why does

0:17:33.720 --> 0:17:37.439
<v Speaker 1>the Fed feel an impulse to reduce the size of

0:17:37.480 --> 0:17:40.359
<v Speaker 1>its balance sheet because it has the rate channel it

0:17:40.400 --> 0:17:44.000
<v Speaker 1>can hike rate it has it's been hiking fairly aggressively

0:17:44.080 --> 0:17:48.480
<v Speaker 1>seventy seventy five at the last meeting. Where does the

0:17:48.600 --> 0:17:52.600
<v Speaker 1>urgency or just even the impulse come from to decreased holdings?

0:17:53.800 --> 0:17:56.720
<v Speaker 1>I think from the FETs perspective, it's it's a lot

0:17:56.800 --> 0:17:59.280
<v Speaker 1>like you and Tracy suggested earlier in the show, the

0:17:59.320 --> 0:18:04.160
<v Speaker 1>FETE doesn't really understand what exactly happens, and so they

0:18:04.160 --> 0:18:06.000
<v Speaker 1>want to do with something that they understand they think

0:18:06.000 --> 0:18:10.119
<v Speaker 1>they understand well, like the overnight rate. So it seems

0:18:10.160 --> 0:18:12.000
<v Speaker 1>from what I hear, they want to get out of

0:18:12.000 --> 0:18:14.160
<v Speaker 1>this Balanciet stuff and go to something that they feel

0:18:14.200 --> 0:18:17.160
<v Speaker 1>like they're more comfortable with, which is raising the over

0:18:17.520 --> 0:18:20.240
<v Speaker 1>night rate. And you know, as you said, as you mentioned,

0:18:20.600 --> 0:18:23.280
<v Speaker 1>you have disagreements within the FED as to what exactly

0:18:23.440 --> 0:18:25.679
<v Speaker 1>QUI does. How you have people who would be like, oh,

0:18:25.720 --> 0:18:27.439
<v Speaker 1>you know, he doesn't really do anything, just solving one

0:18:27.440 --> 0:18:29.800
<v Speaker 1>asked for another. And you have people in the market

0:18:29.840 --> 0:18:33.160
<v Speaker 1>who look at KUI and just max long because QWI

0:18:33.240 --> 0:18:35.520
<v Speaker 1>makes the market go higher. So I think there's a

0:18:35.840 --> 0:18:38.840
<v Speaker 1>there's just not very clear what it actually does, and

0:18:38.920 --> 0:18:41.000
<v Speaker 1>they don't want to be doing things that they don't

0:18:41.000 --> 0:18:43.359
<v Speaker 1>really understand. What do you think it does? Can you

0:18:43.520 --> 0:18:46.440
<v Speaker 1>sort of describe for us what draining liquidity would look

0:18:46.480 --> 0:18:51.800
<v Speaker 1>like in the current period versus draining liquidity from say

0:18:51.440 --> 0:18:54.720
<v Speaker 1>or nineteen, because I think that might help us sort

0:18:54.720 --> 0:18:59.240
<v Speaker 1>of understand the differences here and the difference in the mechanism. Sure,

0:18:59.440 --> 0:19:04.160
<v Speaker 1>so when the FED drains liquidity out of the financial system,

0:19:04.200 --> 0:19:07.480
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't actually have control where the liquidity comes out of.

0:19:07.640 --> 0:19:09.680
<v Speaker 1>It can come out of the banking system, which you

0:19:09.720 --> 0:19:12.760
<v Speaker 1>would drain reserves and deposits, or it can come out

0:19:12.760 --> 0:19:15.879
<v Speaker 1>of the RAP, which which just decrease the RAP size.

0:19:16.560 --> 0:19:19.600
<v Speaker 1>Now the RAP, as you see right now, it's very large.

0:19:19.600 --> 0:19:22.919
<v Speaker 1>It's two two point two trillion. The the RP you

0:19:22.960 --> 0:19:25.359
<v Speaker 1>can think of as just the true excess liquidity in

0:19:25.400 --> 0:19:28.520
<v Speaker 1>the final nancial system. There's all this money that people

0:19:28.520 --> 0:19:31.399
<v Speaker 1>have nowhere else to invest in, and so they just

0:19:31.480 --> 0:19:34.119
<v Speaker 1>leave it on deposit at the FED at the end

0:19:34.119 --> 0:19:38.480
<v Speaker 1>received the IRP rate. So when you do q T,

0:19:39.280 --> 0:19:42.360
<v Speaker 1>if money is coming out of the IRP, you're it's

0:19:42.359 --> 0:19:45.200
<v Speaker 1>going to be a very benign because you're taking money

0:19:45.280 --> 0:19:48.840
<v Speaker 1>out that really nobody wants, or you could take it

0:19:48.880 --> 0:19:52.199
<v Speaker 1>out of the banking system, which conceivably someone somewhere is

0:19:52.320 --> 0:19:56.439
<v Speaker 1>reliant upon that that that liquidity. The FED beforehand doesn't

0:19:56.440 --> 0:19:59.160
<v Speaker 1>actually know what will happen if you listen to fit

0:19:59.200 --> 0:20:02.520
<v Speaker 1>precedents tak over the past few months. They just look

0:20:02.560 --> 0:20:04.680
<v Speaker 1>at the RAP and they think that there's a lot

0:20:04.680 --> 0:20:07.399
<v Speaker 1>of excess liquidity in the system, and so they can

0:20:07.440 --> 0:20:10.320
<v Speaker 1>they can we can just do aggressive QT, no problem.

0:20:10.359 --> 0:20:12.800
<v Speaker 1>But if you notice what's happening right now is that

0:20:12.880 --> 0:20:15.520
<v Speaker 1>the RP is not declining, it will probably go much

0:20:15.560 --> 0:20:17.880
<v Speaker 1>higher in my view, right so I have to say,

0:20:17.920 --> 0:20:21.800
<v Speaker 1>we're recording this right before quarter end, so right before

0:20:21.840 --> 0:20:25.480
<v Speaker 1>the end of June, and there is a very high

0:20:25.640 --> 0:20:28.680
<v Speaker 1>chance that it could shoot up. I think in May

0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:32.320
<v Speaker 1>it went above something like two trillion dollars, which was

0:20:32.359 --> 0:20:34.560
<v Speaker 1>a record at the time, but we could get another

0:20:34.600 --> 0:20:39.639
<v Speaker 1>record before this episode actually publishes. Yeah, when I used

0:20:39.640 --> 0:20:41.600
<v Speaker 1>to round the rap, we were very surprised for like

0:20:41.640 --> 0:20:45.520
<v Speaker 1>five billion. Now that that's that's too low. Um, what happens.

0:20:45.600 --> 0:20:48.680
<v Speaker 1>So the reason is that you have all this liquidity. Um,

0:20:48.840 --> 0:20:51.919
<v Speaker 1>how it gets strained ultimately depends on who buys the

0:20:52.000 --> 0:20:55.720
<v Speaker 1>newly issued treasuries and how they finance it. If the

0:20:55.760 --> 0:20:59.640
<v Speaker 1>treasuries are purchased by people who are levered investors, then

0:20:59.640 --> 0:21:02.679
<v Speaker 1>a drain it's the RP. For example, if you are

0:21:02.720 --> 0:21:05.199
<v Speaker 1>a hedge fund and you buy the newly issued our

0:21:05.520 --> 0:21:09.679
<v Speaker 1>treasuries with repo loan, then the cash from that repole

0:21:09.720 --> 0:21:14.480
<v Speaker 1>loan ultimately comes from the RAP. A money market fund

0:21:14.680 --> 0:21:17.879
<v Speaker 1>will withdraw money from the RP and lend it in

0:21:17.960 --> 0:21:21.480
<v Speaker 1>repo to the hedge fund investor. Money fund investors can

0:21:21.480 --> 0:21:25.840
<v Speaker 1>only lend, can only make specific investments, very narrow one

0:21:25.840 --> 0:21:28.600
<v Speaker 1>of them is repo, so that's basically the only that

0:21:28.760 --> 0:21:32.520
<v Speaker 1>in increased bill issuance, but broadly speaking, that would be

0:21:32.560 --> 0:21:35.240
<v Speaker 1>how you get the RP lower. On the other hand,

0:21:35.720 --> 0:21:38.320
<v Speaker 1>if the people who buy the newly issue treasuries are

0:21:38.600 --> 0:21:42.720
<v Speaker 1>let's say cash investors who are buying it with deposits

0:21:42.800 --> 0:21:45.720
<v Speaker 1>they held out commercial banks, then what you will see

0:21:45.840 --> 0:21:49.720
<v Speaker 1>is that liquidity will be drained out of the banking system.

0:21:49.760 --> 0:21:53.240
<v Speaker 1>So that means that what's being drained is not necessarily

0:21:53.280 --> 0:21:56.440
<v Speaker 1>liquidity that's held in the RAP that no one wants

0:21:56.560 --> 0:22:00.000
<v Speaker 1>that's access, but liquidity in the banking system that maybe

0:22:00.119 --> 0:22:03.879
<v Speaker 1>someone somewhere is relying on. Now beforehand, it's hard to

0:22:03.920 --> 0:22:06.159
<v Speaker 1>see where the where the liquidity will be drained, but

0:22:06.480 --> 0:22:08.119
<v Speaker 1>the way that I look at this is I just

0:22:08.119 --> 0:22:10.600
<v Speaker 1>look at what's actually been happening the past few months.

0:22:11.280 --> 0:22:14.240
<v Speaker 1>So the past few months, when the Treasury has been

0:22:14.280 --> 0:22:17.840
<v Speaker 1>issuing coupon debt, the people who have been buying it

0:22:18.200 --> 0:22:22.080
<v Speaker 1>have been people who are holding money at a commercial bank.

0:22:22.440 --> 0:22:25.600
<v Speaker 1>So you can see that what the increases over the

0:22:25.600 --> 0:22:29.040
<v Speaker 1>past few months, the amount of reserves in the commercial

0:22:29.080 --> 0:22:32.199
<v Speaker 1>banking system is declining, but the amount of in the

0:22:32.280 --> 0:22:35.919
<v Speaker 1>RP is not declining. So just how the financial system

0:22:35.960 --> 0:22:38.800
<v Speaker 1>is currently configured that there doesn't seem like there's going

0:22:38.800 --> 0:22:42.360
<v Speaker 1>to be any increased demand for leverage treasury investing. So

0:22:42.480 --> 0:22:48.159
<v Speaker 1>going forward, what you can actually see is that the

0:22:48.240 --> 0:22:51.639
<v Speaker 1>draining from QT comes out of the commercial banking system,

0:22:51.760 --> 0:22:55.560
<v Speaker 1>whereas the RAP continues to increase. This, in a sense,

0:22:55.720 --> 0:22:58.280
<v Speaker 1>is kind of like a double tightening effect because when

0:22:58.359 --> 0:23:01.320
<v Speaker 1>the RAP goes higher, it's also draining liquidity out of

0:23:01.320 --> 0:23:04.040
<v Speaker 1>the banking system. So this is why it seems on

0:23:04.080 --> 0:23:07.560
<v Speaker 1>this side of the equation. From my perspective, draining liquidity

0:23:07.680 --> 0:23:10.919
<v Speaker 1>can also be disruptive. You're not draining liquidity out of

0:23:10.920 --> 0:23:14.479
<v Speaker 1>the RAP, which would be painless for the financial system,

0:23:14.680 --> 0:23:17.679
<v Speaker 1>You're draining it out of the banking system, and the

0:23:17.800 --> 0:23:20.800
<v Speaker 1>RAP is also suching liquidity out of the banking system.

0:23:21.200 --> 0:23:26.040
<v Speaker 1>Let me ask you another kind of slightly bigger picture question,

0:23:26.119 --> 0:23:29.879
<v Speaker 1>But you talked about the balance sheet remains a tool

0:23:30.119 --> 0:23:32.400
<v Speaker 1>that the FED is, you know, it's hard to quantify

0:23:32.440 --> 0:23:36.120
<v Speaker 1>its effects, perhaps it's a little bit uncomfortable using it

0:23:36.200 --> 0:23:38.960
<v Speaker 1>and so forth. And it seems to me that you know,

0:23:39.080 --> 0:23:42.720
<v Speaker 1>you're thinking about the difference between post Grade Financial Crisis

0:23:43.320 --> 0:23:46.800
<v Speaker 1>and post COVID that QUEI was sort of used differently,

0:23:46.800 --> 0:23:49.960
<v Speaker 1>and so post Great Financial Crisis, the FED it to

0:23:50.040 --> 0:23:53.399
<v Speaker 1>hit the zero lower bound and felt it needed to

0:23:53.440 --> 0:23:56.879
<v Speaker 1>ease further, and so it brought assets, whereas my sense

0:23:56.920 --> 0:23:59.720
<v Speaker 1>of sort of march was that there was a big

0:23:59.840 --> 0:24:03.679
<v Speaker 1>l and specifically of this liquidity effect and of this

0:24:04.080 --> 0:24:06.719
<v Speaker 1>uh you know, wanting to sort of credit easing and

0:24:06.760 --> 0:24:11.719
<v Speaker 1>backstop credit market specifically via asset purchases. I guess you know,

0:24:11.760 --> 0:24:14.800
<v Speaker 1>the question I've wondered is did they sort of backdoor

0:24:14.920 --> 0:24:18.359
<v Speaker 1>themselves into using a tool that it actually never really

0:24:18.400 --> 0:24:22.000
<v Speaker 1>wanted that because it had this unusual situation, they didn't

0:24:22.000 --> 0:24:24.159
<v Speaker 1>really want to have to go back to QUEI, but

0:24:24.200 --> 0:24:27.200
<v Speaker 1>they sort of were forced to. And it's stuck around

0:24:27.480 --> 0:24:30.840
<v Speaker 1>longer because they had this sort of different need when

0:24:30.880 --> 0:24:35.200
<v Speaker 1>COVID hit, I think you're you're right that they used

0:24:35.240 --> 0:24:39.480
<v Speaker 1>to QUEI differently in COVID. So POSTDFC, it was largely

0:24:39.560 --> 0:24:43.040
<v Speaker 1>used as a tool to lower longer dated interest rates.

0:24:43.119 --> 0:24:45.679
<v Speaker 1>So the Fed hit the zero bound, they wanted to

0:24:45.720 --> 0:24:48.399
<v Speaker 1>continue to ease by putting downward pressure on longer date

0:24:48.480 --> 0:24:50.640
<v Speaker 1>interest rates. So in order to do that, it bought

0:24:50.680 --> 0:24:54.879
<v Speaker 1>a lot of treasuries now tasks for to March, it

0:24:54.960 --> 0:24:57.600
<v Speaker 1>was a little bit different because the treasury market broke.

0:24:58.320 --> 0:25:01.359
<v Speaker 1>So what that meant was that people who wanted to

0:25:01.920 --> 0:25:05.639
<v Speaker 1>sell their shoulders for cash cannot do that. So on

0:25:05.680 --> 0:25:08.720
<v Speaker 1>a global scale, treasuries are kind of where people keep

0:25:08.760 --> 0:25:11.560
<v Speaker 1>their dollars. It's kind of like a huge bank, so

0:25:11.600 --> 0:25:14.159
<v Speaker 1>to speak. So for example, if you and I we

0:25:14.359 --> 0:25:15.840
<v Speaker 1>go to the bank and we want to get our

0:25:15.880 --> 0:25:18.520
<v Speaker 1>cash out because we need cash, we expect to be

0:25:18.600 --> 0:25:21.080
<v Speaker 1>able to get that. But if the bank says, sorry,

0:25:21.119 --> 0:25:23.560
<v Speaker 1>I don't have any cash, then you know, we panic.

0:25:23.640 --> 0:25:25.840
<v Speaker 1>There's a there's a run on that bank. And that's

0:25:25.880 --> 0:25:29.600
<v Speaker 1>what happened in March. The trosury market. Everyone wanted to

0:25:29.640 --> 0:25:32.159
<v Speaker 1>sell their trogrees for cash, realized that they could not

0:25:32.320 --> 0:25:34.520
<v Speaker 1>actually sell their trajury for cash. In a sense, there

0:25:34.560 --> 0:25:36.359
<v Speaker 1>was a run on the market, and they started selling

0:25:36.400 --> 0:25:39.560
<v Speaker 1>everything else they could to get cash. The FEDS saw that,

0:25:40.080 --> 0:25:44.480
<v Speaker 1>and they wanted to help that by basically backstoppying the

0:25:44.520 --> 0:25:47.480
<v Speaker 1>troldan market, becoming a liquidity privator of last resort, and

0:25:47.520 --> 0:25:50.040
<v Speaker 1>they purchased let's say, about trillion dollars of tresuries in

0:25:50.080 --> 0:25:54.560
<v Speaker 1>one month. That's how KEE came back in. But it

0:25:54.680 --> 0:26:00.400
<v Speaker 1>stayed far, far far beyond uh, the liquidity event at

0:26:00.440 --> 0:26:03.600
<v Speaker 1>that stage. I think it morphed back into easing financial

0:26:03.640 --> 0:26:06.239
<v Speaker 1>conditions as you suggested, which I take to meet the

0:26:06.280 --> 0:26:10.000
<v Speaker 1>original QUWI motivation of putting down red pressure on interest rates.

0:26:10.560 --> 0:26:13.359
<v Speaker 1>So that's how I think about that. I agree it

0:26:13.400 --> 0:26:16.680
<v Speaker 1>probably was not super necessary after after for the length

0:26:16.680 --> 0:26:20.000
<v Speaker 1>of time that they kept it. You know, you mentioned

0:26:20.400 --> 0:26:23.919
<v Speaker 1>the treasury market blow up in and again this is

0:26:23.960 --> 0:26:26.040
<v Speaker 1>something that we've been talking about quite a lot recently

0:26:26.080 --> 0:26:29.000
<v Speaker 1>on other episodes. We also had the repo blow up

0:26:29.040 --> 0:26:32.680
<v Speaker 1>from and I think the response to that was the

0:26:32.760 --> 0:26:36.280
<v Speaker 1>creation of the Standing Repo Facility the s r F,

0:26:36.720 --> 0:26:40.919
<v Speaker 1>which basically allowed banks to exchange treasuries for dollars, And

0:26:40.960 --> 0:26:44.600
<v Speaker 1>so I'm wondering, does the existence of something like that

0:26:45.000 --> 0:26:47.639
<v Speaker 1>doesn't make it less possible that we're going to get

0:26:47.720 --> 0:26:50.560
<v Speaker 1>some sort of major blow up or are there limits

0:26:50.560 --> 0:26:53.440
<v Speaker 1>to what the SRF can do in the current environment.

0:26:54.800 --> 0:26:58.720
<v Speaker 1>So last time around, QT basically contributed to the blow

0:26:58.800 --> 0:27:01.679
<v Speaker 1>up of the report market, as you noted. So I

0:27:01.720 --> 0:27:04.080
<v Speaker 1>don't I don't think that's going to happen this sun around.

0:27:04.119 --> 0:27:06.320
<v Speaker 1>But so I mean, we we never have the same

0:27:06.359 --> 0:27:08.960
<v Speaker 1>thing blow up. Usually I think stress will be in

0:27:09.040 --> 0:27:11.919
<v Speaker 1>somewhere else. And I think too to understand why I

0:27:11.920 --> 0:27:14.280
<v Speaker 1>think the stress would be somewhere else, it's helpful to

0:27:14.320 --> 0:27:17.399
<v Speaker 1>revisit what actually happened. Why did QT caused the report

0:27:17.440 --> 0:27:23.400
<v Speaker 1>market to blow up? In for some context, in twenty UM,

0:27:23.400 --> 0:27:27.000
<v Speaker 1>heading into let's say, say September, when the report market

0:27:27.000 --> 0:27:30.280
<v Speaker 1>blew up, there was a tremendous demand for report financing.

0:27:30.520 --> 0:27:33.840
<v Speaker 1>The amount of repot demand for report financing increased by

0:27:33.880 --> 0:27:36.240
<v Speaker 1>a few hundred billion in the in the months leading

0:27:36.280 --> 0:27:38.240
<v Speaker 1>up to September twenty nineteen. And those are all the

0:27:38.240 --> 0:27:42.680
<v Speaker 1>hedge funds doing the doing their basis trades, and that

0:27:42.720 --> 0:27:48.040
<v Speaker 1>pushed report rates um steadily higher and ultimately above interest

0:27:48.119 --> 0:27:52.959
<v Speaker 1>on reserves. So the banks saw the saw that report

0:27:53.000 --> 0:27:57.560
<v Speaker 1>rates were above interest on reserves, and they note that

0:27:57.880 --> 0:28:01.399
<v Speaker 1>lending in treasury back repo from a regulatory standpoint, is

0:28:01.480 --> 0:28:04.399
<v Speaker 1>equivalent to holding reserves at the FED. So they figured

0:28:04.480 --> 0:28:07.800
<v Speaker 1>that they can earn some extra return by shifting the

0:28:07.840 --> 0:28:12.120
<v Speaker 1>composition of their liquidity portfolio to fewer reserves and more

0:28:12.160 --> 0:28:16.919
<v Speaker 1>repot and so heading into September, the banks became the

0:28:17.000 --> 0:28:19.639
<v Speaker 1>marginal lender in the report market to the tune of

0:28:19.720 --> 0:28:24.159
<v Speaker 1>hundreds of billions of dollars. So QT was playing in

0:28:24.160 --> 0:28:27.240
<v Speaker 1>the background, and what QT was doing it was withdrawing

0:28:27.320 --> 0:28:31.080
<v Speaker 1>the amount of UH excess cash the banks out the reserves.

0:28:31.440 --> 0:28:34.960
<v Speaker 1>So as we had from a demand side, continued demand

0:28:35.000 --> 0:28:38.600
<v Speaker 1>for report financing, and on the supply side, thanks being

0:28:38.600 --> 0:28:41.280
<v Speaker 1>the marginal lenders in the market, their extra cash bell

0:28:41.400 --> 0:28:45.080
<v Speaker 1>declining because of QT. Eventually the market hid an air

0:28:45.120 --> 0:28:50.240
<v Speaker 1>pocket where report rates spiked higher uncontrollably. Another way to

0:28:50.280 --> 0:28:53.120
<v Speaker 1>think about this is that the markets that benefited from

0:28:53.560 --> 0:28:57.640
<v Speaker 1>KWI cash were hurt by QT and the major beneficiary

0:28:57.720 --> 0:29:00.840
<v Speaker 1>in QWI cash last time around, as report we don't

0:29:00.880 --> 0:29:03.600
<v Speaker 1>have that problem at all. The sign because report rates

0:29:03.640 --> 0:29:06.840
<v Speaker 1>are much lower than io R. Banks are not lending

0:29:06.880 --> 0:29:10.480
<v Speaker 1>in report. What they have been lending in, as I

0:29:10.560 --> 0:29:14.440
<v Speaker 1>mentioned earlier, is in treasuries and agency nbs to the

0:29:14.480 --> 0:29:17.360
<v Speaker 1>tune of well put five trillion dollars the past couple

0:29:17.360 --> 0:29:20.360
<v Speaker 1>of years. So we have this dynamic. We have a

0:29:20.400 --> 0:29:24.080
<v Speaker 1>similar dynamic playing out, but just not in the report market.

0:29:24.080 --> 0:29:28.240
<v Speaker 1>The semiround tremendous demand, continued demand for financing by the

0:29:28.320 --> 0:29:32.320
<v Speaker 1>U S trusury met by the marginal lender in the market,

0:29:32.360 --> 0:29:35.880
<v Speaker 1>the commercial banks having less cash to lend. So if

0:29:35.920 --> 0:29:38.560
<v Speaker 1>there is another blow up because of the q T,

0:29:39.040 --> 0:29:42.680
<v Speaker 1>it's very likely to be in my view, in the

0:29:42.680 --> 0:29:46.600
<v Speaker 1>treasury market, since the same dynamic is playing out, And

0:29:46.680 --> 0:29:50.800
<v Speaker 1>what that could eventually mean is some kind of let's say,

0:29:50.840 --> 0:29:54.719
<v Speaker 1>liquidity backstop for the treasury market rather than for the report,

0:29:54.760 --> 0:29:58.000
<v Speaker 1>which I think is probably very logical given what the

0:29:58.000 --> 0:30:00.960
<v Speaker 1>FED is already doing. Uh if you room call. As

0:30:00.960 --> 0:30:05.520
<v Speaker 1>he noted Tracy, when the report market blew up, FED

0:30:05.600 --> 0:30:09.000
<v Speaker 1>stepped in with an emergency liquidity facility for report. When

0:30:09.040 --> 0:30:11.400
<v Speaker 1>the ethics spot lines blow up, the FED has their

0:30:11.400 --> 0:30:14.240
<v Speaker 1>FICX swot lines. When the commercial paper market blows up,

0:30:14.280 --> 0:30:16.360
<v Speaker 1>they have their you know they have their tools for that.

0:30:16.440 --> 0:30:18.800
<v Speaker 1>In the past, when the treasury market blew up, it's

0:30:19.320 --> 0:30:21.680
<v Speaker 1>they just did qui, which is a very blunt instrument.

0:30:22.200 --> 0:30:24.959
<v Speaker 1>A more calibrated instrument would probably be some kind of

0:30:25.040 --> 0:30:28.840
<v Speaker 1>emergency backstop willing to buy treasuries that you know, a

0:30:28.880 --> 0:30:31.920
<v Speaker 1>set interest rate set above the market as a liquidity backstop.

0:30:32.000 --> 0:30:36.000
<v Speaker 1>There is a standing report facility right exactly that provides

0:30:36.160 --> 0:30:40.040
<v Speaker 1>emergency liquidity. If you have treasuries, you can repull that

0:30:40.120 --> 0:30:43.480
<v Speaker 1>for cash. So it provides emergency cash. It doesn't have

0:30:44.400 --> 0:30:47.320
<v Speaker 1>doesn't put a ceiling on rates in case the trajey

0:30:47.320 --> 0:30:51.400
<v Speaker 1>market blows up because it's selling in theory, why is

0:30:51.440 --> 0:30:56.000
<v Speaker 1>that not sufficient to avoid a blow up? If any holder,

0:30:56.080 --> 0:30:59.200
<v Speaker 1>if a holder of treasuries can know that there is

0:30:59.280 --> 0:31:01.840
<v Speaker 1>this there's window or the desk out there that will

0:31:01.880 --> 0:31:05.520
<v Speaker 1>swap at any time treasuries for cash, why doesn't they

0:31:05.520 --> 0:31:07.920
<v Speaker 1>add short circuit the sort of run dynamics in the

0:31:07.920 --> 0:31:11.760
<v Speaker 1>first place. Exactly, So that has to do with a

0:31:11.800 --> 0:31:14.440
<v Speaker 1>balance sheet constraints, and I'll explain that a little bit

0:31:14.480 --> 0:31:18.080
<v Speaker 1>more so. When the people who have access to the

0:31:18.080 --> 0:31:22.920
<v Speaker 1>FEDS report facility are the primary dealers, So if you

0:31:23.000 --> 0:31:25.880
<v Speaker 1>want to have liquidity flow from the standard report facility

0:31:25.960 --> 0:31:28.560
<v Speaker 1>to the market, it has to go through the primary dealers.

0:31:28.600 --> 0:31:31.520
<v Speaker 1>And how that would play out is the primary dealer

0:31:31.560 --> 0:31:34.280
<v Speaker 1>would borrow from the FED, let's say a hundred dollars

0:31:34.280 --> 0:31:37.400
<v Speaker 1>from the FED, and then let's say, on the asset side,

0:31:38.040 --> 0:31:40.520
<v Speaker 1>lend out that hundred dollars, so it expands the balance

0:31:40.560 --> 0:31:44.800
<v Speaker 1>sheet of a primary dealer. Primary dealers are basically like

0:31:44.840 --> 0:31:48.000
<v Speaker 1>the pipes to which money flows from UH the FED

0:31:48.280 --> 0:31:52.600
<v Speaker 1>or money market fled cash investors into the broader market PREGFC.

0:31:52.840 --> 0:31:54.760
<v Speaker 1>There is not a lot of limit to how why

0:31:54.840 --> 0:31:57.400
<v Speaker 1>these pipes could be post GFC, because I'm all the

0:31:57.480 --> 0:32:00.800
<v Speaker 1>number of regulations the pipes actually have kind of a

0:32:00.840 --> 0:32:04.640
<v Speaker 1>fixed size. So for example, if there's a tremendous need

0:32:04.720 --> 0:32:08.040
<v Speaker 1>for liquidity, a primary Julie cannot borrow like a hundred

0:32:08.040 --> 0:32:09.880
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars from the FED and just lend it out

0:32:09.880 --> 0:32:13.120
<v Speaker 1>to the market because they would hit these regulatory constraints.

0:32:13.160 --> 0:32:16.440
<v Speaker 1>From a high level, pre GFC, the dealers were doing

0:32:16.480 --> 0:32:19.480
<v Speaker 1>about three trillion dollars in repo. Now that's you know

0:32:19.480 --> 0:32:22.320
<v Speaker 1>pre GFC lets in two thousand and seven. Today they're

0:32:22.360 --> 0:32:25.280
<v Speaker 1>doing about one point five trillion so you know, everything

0:32:25.480 --> 0:32:28.240
<v Speaker 1>in the market has gone much bigger, but yet the repo,

0:32:28.400 --> 0:32:31.680
<v Speaker 1>the amount of repo primary dealers do has gone smaller

0:32:31.720 --> 0:32:34.640
<v Speaker 1>by half. And that's those are the pipes of the

0:32:34.680 --> 0:32:38.560
<v Speaker 1>financial system becoming more constrained. And also why we had

0:32:38.560 --> 0:32:41.800
<v Speaker 1>these blow ups in March. Dealers, even though at the

0:32:41.840 --> 0:32:44.920
<v Speaker 1>time they also had access to this repo facility that

0:32:45.000 --> 0:32:47.760
<v Speaker 1>FED had their balance sheets, the pipes were simply not

0:32:47.840 --> 0:32:51.000
<v Speaker 1>wide enough to to accommodate all that. So um, they

0:32:51.000 --> 0:32:53.360
<v Speaker 1>could there are regulatory things they can do to tweak that,

0:32:53.600 --> 0:32:57.240
<v Speaker 1>and I think there's work being done on that side. Um,

0:32:57.280 --> 0:33:16.400
<v Speaker 1>but at the moment it's not complete yet. So what

0:33:16.400 --> 0:33:20.080
<v Speaker 1>would cause the FED to pause QT? Like, what would

0:33:20.080 --> 0:33:22.560
<v Speaker 1>be the catalyst for it to step back and go,

0:33:23.440 --> 0:33:26.160
<v Speaker 1>wait a second, we're doing this set too rapid a pace,

0:33:26.480 --> 0:33:29.840
<v Speaker 1>or we're doing too much too soon and basically reconsider.

0:33:30.720 --> 0:33:33.600
<v Speaker 1>So I think thinking is that eventually the FED would

0:33:33.600 --> 0:33:36.800
<v Speaker 1>become well hike or do qut and eventually something will

0:33:36.840 --> 0:33:39.959
<v Speaker 1>blow up and they'll have to to reverse. I actually

0:33:40.040 --> 0:33:44.040
<v Speaker 1>think that's that's totally accurate in what happened in the past.

0:33:44.200 --> 0:33:47.080
<v Speaker 1>But I think what's happening now is that the FED

0:33:47.160 --> 0:33:51.120
<v Speaker 1>actually has enough tools so that they don't have to stop.

0:33:51.320 --> 0:33:54.440
<v Speaker 1>So if you think about broadly speaking, the FETE has

0:33:54.480 --> 0:33:57.760
<v Speaker 1>basically become a one mandate bank. For the moment, the

0:33:57.840 --> 0:34:00.040
<v Speaker 1>power was telling you that it's it's can can a

0:34:00.120 --> 0:34:03.200
<v Speaker 1>bit to price stability is unconditional. He's telling you that

0:34:03.680 --> 0:34:06.600
<v Speaker 1>full employment is conditional price ability. So the only thing

0:34:06.680 --> 0:34:10.200
<v Speaker 1>that happens that matters for him right now is is inflation.

0:34:10.280 --> 0:34:13.120
<v Speaker 1>And so he's going to be very aggressive in his

0:34:13.400 --> 0:34:17.839
<v Speaker 1>monetary tightening, and that means of course not stopping QUT

0:34:18.000 --> 0:34:21.279
<v Speaker 1>and not stopping grade hikes. He can do that now

0:34:21.480 --> 0:34:24.520
<v Speaker 1>because the FED has rolled out so many new facilities

0:34:24.840 --> 0:34:28.520
<v Speaker 1>such that wide sectors of the economy can be supported

0:34:28.960 --> 0:34:34.920
<v Speaker 1>even if something breaks. The FED during March pioneered facilities

0:34:35.000 --> 0:34:38.000
<v Speaker 1>to make the blender of last resort for wide range

0:34:38.040 --> 0:34:41.600
<v Speaker 1>of markets and for ride range of sectors. For example,

0:34:42.200 --> 0:34:45.520
<v Speaker 1>their back stopping the municipal bond market through their Municipal

0:34:45.560 --> 0:34:48.480
<v Speaker 1>Licuity facility lasts him around, and the corporate bond market

0:34:48.560 --> 0:34:52.040
<v Speaker 1>through the Corporate credit facility and Becauceivably they could also

0:34:52.120 --> 0:34:56.320
<v Speaker 1>have new treasury facilities as well. So I think eventually

0:34:56.440 --> 0:34:58.840
<v Speaker 1>something will break, because it always breaks but it doesn't

0:34:58.880 --> 0:35:01.160
<v Speaker 1>mean that they'll stop, just means that they could use

0:35:01.239 --> 0:35:06.080
<v Speaker 1>their facilities to further extend their tidying. These facilities, in

0:35:06.200 --> 0:35:10.239
<v Speaker 1>my view, greatly extend the possibility of of how restrictive

0:35:10.280 --> 0:35:14.879
<v Speaker 1>Monterrey policy can be simply because the remove liquidity risk. Wait, sorry,

0:35:14.920 --> 0:35:16.560
<v Speaker 1>can you just explain that a little further. You're saying

0:35:16.600 --> 0:35:22.839
<v Speaker 1>these new facilities, the facilities that were pioneered in these

0:35:22.880 --> 0:35:27.000
<v Speaker 1>new facilities that were pioneered in Mary, the explicit backstopping

0:35:27.080 --> 0:35:30.080
<v Speaker 1>of the credit markets, the MUNI facility, which was obviously

0:35:30.239 --> 0:35:33.920
<v Speaker 1>extraordinary and sort of you know, this brand new thing explained,

0:35:33.960 --> 0:35:35.840
<v Speaker 1>How do you see them potentially being used? Because I

0:35:35.840 --> 0:35:38.640
<v Speaker 1>feel like these facilities have largely been forgotten about. No

0:35:38.680 --> 0:35:40.560
<v Speaker 1>one ever talks about either one of those these days,

0:35:40.800 --> 0:35:44.080
<v Speaker 1>exactly exactly, so they've all forgotten and they're not commissioned

0:35:44.160 --> 0:35:46.719
<v Speaker 1>right now. So what I'm saying is that if q

0:35:46.960 --> 0:35:50.560
<v Speaker 1>T or if FED rc TIKES actually breaks something in

0:35:50.560 --> 0:35:53.239
<v Speaker 1>the market, the FED does not have to stop. It

0:35:53.360 --> 0:35:55.880
<v Speaker 1>does not have to stop because it can continue to

0:35:56.040 --> 0:35:59.040
<v Speaker 1>keep the financial markets coming along so it can repair,

0:35:59.520 --> 0:36:01.920
<v Speaker 1>it can can continue to tighten in pursuit of its

0:36:01.960 --> 0:36:06.800
<v Speaker 1>inflation goal. While sort of more strategically repairing potential breaks

0:36:06.840 --> 0:36:11.560
<v Speaker 1>in the financial market exactly, Joe, Okay. Interesting because again,

0:36:12.280 --> 0:36:14.680
<v Speaker 1>the FED has become lender of last resort to such

0:36:14.719 --> 0:36:18.319
<v Speaker 1>a wide wide range of market participants, from the corporations,

0:36:18.800 --> 0:36:22.480
<v Speaker 1>from the to the municipals, and indirectly to small businesses

0:36:22.960 --> 0:36:26.239
<v Speaker 1>through the banking system through their mainstream lending facility. So

0:36:27.000 --> 0:36:31.759
<v Speaker 1>it's basically such so significantly expanded their footprint that there's

0:36:31.880 --> 0:36:35.800
<v Speaker 1>less reliance on the transmission of monetary policy through the market,

0:36:36.320 --> 0:36:39.120
<v Speaker 1>and you can kind of, uh, well, it's not ideal,

0:36:39.200 --> 0:36:41.279
<v Speaker 1>but you can kind of indirectly reach it through these

0:36:41.320 --> 0:36:44.440
<v Speaker 1>programs such that even if something breaks, it doesn't actually

0:36:44.520 --> 0:36:48.919
<v Speaker 1>mean they have to back down, lower rates and continue QB,

0:36:49.239 --> 0:36:51.960
<v Speaker 1>especially if inflation is too high. What's your bet on

0:36:52.160 --> 0:36:55.239
<v Speaker 1>what could break if you had to, if you had

0:36:55.280 --> 0:36:57.719
<v Speaker 1>to wager something right now, like, what would it be?

0:36:57.840 --> 0:37:01.080
<v Speaker 1>Where's the biggest area of weakness. I still believe the

0:37:01.120 --> 0:37:05.799
<v Speaker 1>trophy market is the highest risk. That's first, because as

0:37:05.880 --> 0:37:08.680
<v Speaker 1>I mentioned the report, breakup dynamics that we saw in

0:37:08.719 --> 0:37:11.440
<v Speaker 1>the prior QUTY are playing out in the trophy market.

0:37:12.280 --> 0:37:15.880
<v Speaker 1>Have tremendous supply coming up the few years, the demand,

0:37:16.840 --> 0:37:19.360
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't seem like it's there because the marginal investor

0:37:19.480 --> 0:37:23.279
<v Speaker 1>is disappearing and we have very weak, low liquidity, weak

0:37:23.400 --> 0:37:26.400
<v Speaker 1>market structure, and just watching the trophy market over the

0:37:26.440 --> 0:37:30.120
<v Speaker 1>past few weeks seems like it's becoming more volatile. So

0:37:30.280 --> 0:37:33.280
<v Speaker 1>I think that's probably the place that that is most

0:37:33.440 --> 0:37:36.279
<v Speaker 1>likely to break this time around. So one of the

0:37:37.600 --> 0:37:39.400
<v Speaker 1>things you know, as you were talking about in the beginning,

0:37:39.480 --> 0:37:41.839
<v Speaker 1>it can be sort of hard to well, it can

0:37:41.880 --> 0:37:44.520
<v Speaker 1>be hard to predict what's going to break. It can

0:37:44.600 --> 0:37:48.640
<v Speaker 1>also be hard to predict where the liquidity is going

0:37:48.800 --> 0:37:50.960
<v Speaker 1>to get drained out of the system first. Like all

0:37:51.040 --> 0:37:53.760
<v Speaker 1>of these things, it doesn't seem like it's a hard science,

0:37:53.920 --> 0:37:58.840
<v Speaker 1>and anticipating it is. This sort of fundamentally why the

0:37:59.000 --> 0:38:05.120
<v Speaker 1>FED is so uncomfortable quantifying the tightening effect of balance

0:38:05.160 --> 0:38:09.000
<v Speaker 1>sheet policy, because you know, it's sort of easy to see,

0:38:09.120 --> 0:38:11.960
<v Speaker 1>like the transmission mechanism of a rate increase. It's like

0:38:12.360 --> 0:38:14.160
<v Speaker 1>your high rates and rates go up, and then you

0:38:14.239 --> 0:38:16.640
<v Speaker 1>see it in mortgages and car loans and that titan

0:38:16.719 --> 0:38:20.320
<v Speaker 1>is the housing market. It's somewhat straightforward, I think, whereas

0:38:20.320 --> 0:38:23.040
<v Speaker 1>if there's so much uncertainty about where is the liquidity

0:38:23.200 --> 0:38:26.960
<v Speaker 1>going to come from or be pulled from? It seems

0:38:27.040 --> 0:38:30.600
<v Speaker 1>that makes it inherently a much tougher tool to quantify

0:38:30.680 --> 0:38:34.399
<v Speaker 1>and calibrate. I agree completely with that, and I don't

0:38:34.480 --> 0:38:38.040
<v Speaker 1>actually know if the FED under understands this. If you hear,

0:38:38.320 --> 0:38:40.480
<v Speaker 1>I think there's work from the ft that's also been

0:38:40.560 --> 0:38:43.160
<v Speaker 1>mentioned from by Governor Waller that you know, let's say

0:38:43.160 --> 0:38:46.560
<v Speaker 1>two trillon dollars of QUEI is a QT is equal

0:38:46.600 --> 0:38:50.040
<v Speaker 1>to like fifty basis points. I suspect that's probably not true,

0:38:50.120 --> 0:38:53.000
<v Speaker 1>and it will be something that they wish they didn't say,

0:38:53.200 --> 0:38:55.880
<v Speaker 1>because the thing is, there's so many moving parts to this.

0:38:56.080 --> 0:38:57.880
<v Speaker 1>There's so many ways that it can go. It's not

0:38:58.000 --> 0:39:00.680
<v Speaker 1>something that can fit it in an equation. Now, if

0:39:00.719 --> 0:39:02.480
<v Speaker 1>you want to approach the world as if you are

0:39:02.560 --> 0:39:05.359
<v Speaker 1>a giant equation, you need to have relationships that are

0:39:05.400 --> 0:39:07.919
<v Speaker 1>consistent and don't change. And this is very much true

0:39:07.920 --> 0:39:11.360
<v Speaker 1>in physics. If I drop rock here, uh, you know,

0:39:11.560 --> 0:39:14.200
<v Speaker 1>my points per second square goes down, saying if I

0:39:14.320 --> 0:39:15.719
<v Speaker 1>dropped it in London, or if I dropped it a

0:39:15.840 --> 0:39:18.520
<v Speaker 1>hundred years ago. That works well for things that don't change.

0:39:18.600 --> 0:39:21.480
<v Speaker 1>But if you're looking at the financial markets, The relationships

0:39:21.520 --> 0:39:24.520
<v Speaker 1>are always changing their different regimes, and there are different

0:39:24.560 --> 0:39:28.560
<v Speaker 1>actors and different regulatory changes, so you just really can't

0:39:28.680 --> 0:39:31.680
<v Speaker 1>know what will happen. In the estimate, I think is

0:39:31.880 --> 0:39:35.120
<v Speaker 1>is just not very useful, and so with in that sense,

0:39:35.160 --> 0:39:37.680
<v Speaker 1>it's kind of good that they get out of this. Yeah,

0:39:38.600 --> 0:39:41.520
<v Speaker 1>this is a related question, But what's the future of

0:39:41.640 --> 0:39:45.200
<v Speaker 1>the FED and its relationship with financial markets in the

0:39:45.320 --> 0:39:48.239
<v Speaker 1>sense that you know, as you've been describing now for

0:39:48.360 --> 0:39:51.840
<v Speaker 1>the past at least the past ten years, you know,

0:39:51.960 --> 0:39:54.720
<v Speaker 1>more than a decade since two thousand eight, Whenever something

0:39:54.800 --> 0:39:57.440
<v Speaker 1>goes wrong, the FED comes up with some sort of

0:39:57.600 --> 0:40:01.320
<v Speaker 1>new program to enable it to keep pursuing its policy

0:40:01.360 --> 0:40:04.200
<v Speaker 1>goals or keep doing what it was doing. Is that

0:40:04.680 --> 0:40:07.760
<v Speaker 1>just how it's going to be for the foreseeable future?

0:40:07.920 --> 0:40:10.440
<v Speaker 1>You know, something goes wrong, the FED comes up with

0:40:10.520 --> 0:40:13.160
<v Speaker 1>a new program, it gets added, Eventually it becomes the

0:40:13.200 --> 0:40:16.080
<v Speaker 1>new normal. Eventually something else goes wrong and there's a

0:40:16.120 --> 0:40:18.640
<v Speaker 1>new program, and so on and so forth. Or is

0:40:18.719 --> 0:40:22.440
<v Speaker 1>there going to be a larger shift or break in

0:40:22.560 --> 0:40:26.279
<v Speaker 1>this pattern at some point? I think going forward, I

0:40:26.360 --> 0:40:30.200
<v Speaker 1>think the inventible outcome is probably a reversal of the

0:40:30.360 --> 0:40:35.239
<v Speaker 1>Fedatricia Court. Simply because the FED itself is becoming so

0:40:35.320 --> 0:40:37.640
<v Speaker 1>much more involved in the markets, it's going to need

0:40:38.000 --> 0:40:40.920
<v Speaker 1>to have more accountability. It's it's going it's it's essentially

0:40:41.000 --> 0:40:43.680
<v Speaker 1>becoming lend of lasted work to everyone in the system.

0:40:43.760 --> 0:40:46.560
<v Speaker 1>But also because of changes in the structure of the

0:40:46.760 --> 0:40:49.520
<v Speaker 1>economy such that the FED probably can't carry out its

0:40:49.560 --> 0:40:51.960
<v Speaker 1>task the same way that it was able to say

0:40:52.040 --> 0:40:54.640
<v Speaker 1>at its inception. And this has to do with how

0:40:54.840 --> 0:40:57.840
<v Speaker 1>the public sector is just the bigger part of the economy.

0:40:58.000 --> 0:41:01.320
<v Speaker 1>For example, if you think back hundred years ago, the

0:41:01.840 --> 0:41:04.239
<v Speaker 1>government was a very small part of the economy, and

0:41:04.560 --> 0:41:08.279
<v Speaker 1>the FED, with its mandate of controlling inflation, it can

0:41:08.360 --> 0:41:11.560
<v Speaker 1>simply adjust interest rates, and private actors respond to that.

0:41:11.760 --> 0:41:14.400
<v Speaker 1>It works much better. If you are a private sector actor,

0:41:14.960 --> 0:41:17.560
<v Speaker 1>you care about the price of money, and if industrates

0:41:17.600 --> 0:41:20.720
<v Speaker 1>are higher, you moderate your economic activity and af ingistration

0:41:20.840 --> 0:41:25.840
<v Speaker 1>or lower. You know, maybe you spend more um. But

0:41:26.520 --> 0:41:29.160
<v Speaker 1>the structure of the economy has changed so much over

0:41:29.239 --> 0:41:31.960
<v Speaker 1>the past hundred years such that there's a greater part

0:41:32.040 --> 0:41:34.840
<v Speaker 1>of the economy that's basically the public sector, and the

0:41:34.920 --> 0:41:38.080
<v Speaker 1>public sector doesn't really care about interest rates. So when

0:41:38.120 --> 0:41:40.600
<v Speaker 1>the FED hikes. When the FED cuts, that doesn't really

0:41:40.640 --> 0:41:44.000
<v Speaker 1>affect their economic activity. Their economic activity has to be

0:41:44.080 --> 0:41:48.920
<v Speaker 1>effected through the legislative process. So as this trend continues,

0:41:49.360 --> 0:41:52.640
<v Speaker 1>as one, a greater part of the economy becomes insensitive

0:41:52.880 --> 0:41:56.439
<v Speaker 1>to the FEDS interest rates, thus making the FED less

0:41:56.440 --> 0:42:00.480
<v Speaker 1>effective in controlling rates. And two, as a FED becomes

0:42:01.040 --> 0:42:03.600
<v Speaker 1>much more involved as lender of last resort to a

0:42:03.680 --> 0:42:07.080
<v Speaker 1>wide range of the market, essentially becoming more in the

0:42:07.160 --> 0:42:10.439
<v Speaker 1>allocation of credit business, which I think is probably something

0:42:10.480 --> 0:42:14.160
<v Speaker 1>that more probably belongs to, if not the private sector,

0:42:14.239 --> 0:42:17.880
<v Speaker 1>at least someone that has public mandate. So it seems

0:42:18.040 --> 0:42:20.359
<v Speaker 1>we're heading towards the world. It will make more sense

0:42:20.600 --> 0:42:23.640
<v Speaker 1>or more coordination between Fed and Treasury to achieve these

0:42:23.719 --> 0:42:26.560
<v Speaker 1>goals simply because the FED is doing more stuff that

0:42:26.760 --> 0:42:31.760
<v Speaker 1>is physical policy alike, and also it has less ability

0:42:31.840 --> 0:42:35.440
<v Speaker 1>to influence economic outcomes. All right, Joseph, it was so

0:42:35.600 --> 0:42:37.920
<v Speaker 1>good having you back on odd Lots. Thank you so much,

0:42:38.120 --> 0:42:40.800
<v Speaker 1>really appreciate it. Thank you so much for inviting me.

0:42:40.840 --> 0:42:43.840
<v Speaker 1>I love odd Lots and I really appreciate the opportunity.

0:42:43.960 --> 0:42:46.839
<v Speaker 1>Thanks Tracy, and thanks Joe, thank you. It's great, great chat.

0:43:00.640 --> 0:43:03.600
<v Speaker 1>So Joe, I thought that was incredibly interesting and really

0:43:03.680 --> 0:43:05.719
<v Speaker 1>good to get into the weeds of some of this.

0:43:06.040 --> 0:43:09.239
<v Speaker 1>And also, I mean, one thing that is becoming clear

0:43:09.360 --> 0:43:12.160
<v Speaker 1>from recent episodes is that lots of people seem to

0:43:12.239 --> 0:43:15.640
<v Speaker 1>be saying that liquidity in the treasury market has deteriorated

0:43:15.719 --> 0:43:19.200
<v Speaker 1>for various reasons and that there are some vulnerabilities there.

0:43:19.560 --> 0:43:22.760
<v Speaker 1>But Joseph's mentioned of the idea of treasury is becoming

0:43:22.880 --> 0:43:27.080
<v Speaker 1>less like cash um or less cash like in the

0:43:27.160 --> 0:43:29.279
<v Speaker 1>way they are traded and in their position in the

0:43:29.360 --> 0:43:33.080
<v Speaker 1>financial system. That would actually be a sea change for markets.

0:43:33.200 --> 0:43:36.680
<v Speaker 1>I think it's weird because, I mean, clearly, with the

0:43:36.800 --> 0:43:42.239
<v Speaker 1>existence of the standing repo facility, the FEDS goal is

0:43:42.320 --> 0:43:45.520
<v Speaker 1>to make it more explicitly cash like. I mean, that's

0:43:45.560 --> 0:43:48.640
<v Speaker 1>the idea right there. Similar it's always been somewhat money

0:43:48.719 --> 0:43:52.839
<v Speaker 1>like and similar to cash and okay, and now they

0:43:52.880 --> 0:43:56.239
<v Speaker 1>have this formal standing repo facility so that at least

0:43:56.280 --> 0:43:59.399
<v Speaker 1>the primary dealers can swap them into cash at any time,

0:43:59.480 --> 0:44:02.080
<v Speaker 1>even when it is not an emergency. So the fact

0:44:02.160 --> 0:44:06.320
<v Speaker 1>that like liquidity is still deteriorating, the fact that you know,

0:44:06.400 --> 0:44:09.080
<v Speaker 1>we have had all these issues, uh, you know, raises

0:44:09.200 --> 0:44:12.160
<v Speaker 1>it to his point. There's clearly still a lot of

0:44:12.719 --> 0:44:15.760
<v Speaker 1>unfinished business. Yeah. The other thing that kind of struck

0:44:15.840 --> 0:44:19.000
<v Speaker 1>me from that conversation was his description of how when

0:44:19.040 --> 0:44:21.840
<v Speaker 1>the r r P. I don't think we ever actually

0:44:21.880 --> 0:44:23.839
<v Speaker 1>said what the r r P stands for, but it's

0:44:23.880 --> 0:44:27.920
<v Speaker 1>the reverse repurchase facility. But when the r RP goes up,

0:44:28.280 --> 0:44:31.360
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't necessarily mean that liquidity in the overall system

0:44:31.440 --> 0:44:33.640
<v Speaker 1>is going up, which I think there are still a

0:44:33.719 --> 0:44:35.400
<v Speaker 1>lot of people out there that look at the r

0:44:35.480 --> 0:44:38.880
<v Speaker 1>r P at two trillion dollars or whatever and they

0:44:38.960 --> 0:44:42.240
<v Speaker 1>go like, oh, liquidity slashing around the system by everything

0:44:42.960 --> 0:44:46.239
<v Speaker 1>I'm thinking. I'm thinking in particular of a certain sub

0:44:46.320 --> 0:44:48.839
<v Speaker 1>credit where the r r P is a really big

0:44:48.880 --> 0:44:52.640
<v Speaker 1>talking point. But Joseph's point that actually the RRP going

0:44:52.719 --> 0:44:55.120
<v Speaker 1>up means liquidity might not be going out of the

0:44:55.160 --> 0:44:57.920
<v Speaker 1>banking system and so you know, financial conditions are tightening,

0:44:58.040 --> 0:45:01.320
<v Speaker 1>that's worth remembering. And just to his is broader point

0:45:01.640 --> 0:45:05.040
<v Speaker 1>which he hit a few different ways, like the sort

0:45:05.080 --> 0:45:10.799
<v Speaker 1>of relationship between quantitative tightening and where liquidity can come

0:45:10.840 --> 0:45:12.680
<v Speaker 1>out of the market at any given time and to

0:45:13.040 --> 0:45:16.319
<v Speaker 1>some degree, you know, the unpredictability of it, the faith

0:45:16.600 --> 0:45:19.600
<v Speaker 1>it's different under different regimes. I think that may be

0:45:19.760 --> 0:45:23.480
<v Speaker 1>like the clearest explanation of like why the FED and

0:45:23.560 --> 0:45:26.840
<v Speaker 1>nobody else really even like talks about the tightening effects

0:45:26.880 --> 0:45:29.080
<v Speaker 1>of QT, in part because like it's just not nearly

0:45:29.200 --> 0:45:32.160
<v Speaker 1>as straightforward or predictable. So the idea of like putting

0:45:32.200 --> 0:45:35.200
<v Speaker 1>a number on it or saying like, okay, QT is

0:45:35.280 --> 0:45:38.399
<v Speaker 1>like worth this many rate cuts or sorry raid hikes

0:45:38.440 --> 0:45:43.320
<v Speaker 1>or whatever, like it seems way harder to judge. Yeah, no,

0:45:43.880 --> 0:45:45.919
<v Speaker 1>I actually just keep the balance sheet big and forget

0:45:45.920 --> 0:45:48.960
<v Speaker 1>about it. Seems like it cousable. That's that's if I

0:45:49.000 --> 0:45:50.920
<v Speaker 1>were there, like, let's just yeah, it's just too much

0:45:50.960 --> 0:45:54.600
<v Speaker 1>of a headache. Figure it's future and whatever. I just

0:45:54.680 --> 0:45:56.160
<v Speaker 1>keep it there. That would be that was well, I

0:45:56.200 --> 0:45:58.160
<v Speaker 1>mean we were on the phone. That would be my vote.

0:45:58.239 --> 0:46:01.359
<v Speaker 1>You know what everyone can pain for Joe for FED

0:46:01.480 --> 0:46:06.320
<v Speaker 1>share Uh, you know, a simplified FED, simplified open market operations.

0:46:07.200 --> 0:46:10.759
<v Speaker 1>That's Joe's that's Joe's campaign platform. Balancie. It only goes

0:46:10.800 --> 0:46:12.960
<v Speaker 1>in one direction when I'm on the bed, only get

0:46:13.400 --> 0:46:15.040
<v Speaker 1>We never do the opposite, you know what. I think

0:46:15.080 --> 0:46:17.759
<v Speaker 1>that might actually be a very successful talking point. Okay,

0:46:17.920 --> 0:46:20.839
<v Speaker 1>let's leave it there before we say anything else sounds good.

0:46:20.880 --> 0:46:23.920
<v Speaker 1>Let's leave it there. Okay, this has been another episode

0:46:24.000 --> 0:46:26.480
<v Speaker 1>of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can

0:46:26.520 --> 0:46:29.279
<v Speaker 1>follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe

0:46:29.360 --> 0:46:31.839
<v Speaker 1>Why Isn't Though. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:46:31.880 --> 0:46:35.080
<v Speaker 1>the Stalwart. Follow our guest Joseph Wange on Twitter. He's

0:46:35.200 --> 0:46:39.799
<v Speaker 1>at fed Guy twelve. Follow our producer Kermen Rodriguez at

0:46:39.920 --> 0:46:43.360
<v Speaker 1>Kermen armand, and check out all of the Bloomberg podcasts

0:46:43.440 --> 0:46:47.320
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter under the handle at podcasts. Thanks for listening

0:47:08.520 --> 0:47:10.400
<v Speaker 1>year to