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Speaker 1: First, you need to know what hypersonic means. It's extra

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Speaker 1: large because four hours simply enough. This is armstrong and

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Speaker 1: getty extra large. Sometimes we get on topic or we're

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Speaker 1: gonna do like an extra large, in depth interview with somebody,

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Speaker 1: and that's about China and this technology that they're getting

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Speaker 1: from us, and it all results in having hypersonic capabilities,

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Speaker 1: which would be a missile that can go a mile

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Speaker 1: a second or faster. Indeed, something that would take an

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Speaker 1: hour or two to reach its target now can do

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Speaker 1: it in minutes. And uh, we can't see them coming

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Speaker 1: if they got this technology, so that's a problem. Ellen Nakashima,

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Speaker 1: national security reporter for the Washington Post, joins us to

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Speaker 1: talk about China building advanced weapons systems using American chip technology. Ellen,

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Speaker 1: how are you hey? I'm well, thanks thanks for having

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Speaker 1: me good. It's actually it's been too long since we've

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Speaker 1: spoken to you, and this is a real pleasure. Although

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Speaker 1: it's an incredibly serious topic. Where do you suppose we

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Speaker 1: ought to start? I mean, this is just one of many, many,

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Speaker 1: many examples of how difficult it's going to be as

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Speaker 1: the friendship with China becomes more and more adversarial. Because

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Speaker 1: we're so intertwined economically, for instance. Yeah, absolutely, So the

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Speaker 1: story I wrote is just another example of the challenge

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Speaker 1: and difficulty the US is having a will have in

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Speaker 1: trying to compete with China militarily, economically, and technologically, and

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Speaker 1: especially in the latter where a lot of the technologies

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Speaker 1: that the US makes are can be used for both commercial, civilian,

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Speaker 1: innocent great purposes and military purposes, and so trying to

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Speaker 1: put controls or regulate that part can be difficult because

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Speaker 1: the same fake computer chip semi computer chip that is

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Speaker 1: used in a data center or email server could be

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Speaker 1: used in a supercomputer that can make a weapon. So

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Speaker 1: that's sort of the heart of one of the challenges, right,

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Speaker 1: is dual these technologies. I was surprised to see that

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Speaker 1: the semiconductor chips are now China's top import. That's how

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Speaker 1: important it is to them to be at the cutting

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Speaker 1: edge of this. And I thought I was also interesting

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Speaker 1: you pointing out that a lot of the people that

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Speaker 1: are the higher ups in some of these companies were

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Speaker 1: in the military formally. That seems like an interesting coincidence. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's right. Semiconductors are now that China's number one import.

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Speaker 1: Ahead of even oil, and that's to show how important

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Speaker 1: they are to China's uh, both its advancing economy and

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Speaker 1: it's it's huge effort to modernize its military, which the

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Speaker 1: United States sees as a destabilizing program. So China's they've

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Speaker 1: China has this strategy that people call military civil fusion,

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Speaker 1: which is a fancy way of saying that they're using

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Speaker 1: civilian companies to help advance their military build up. And

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Speaker 1: then the other side of the coin is the biggest

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Speaker 1: market in the world is hungry for one of the

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Speaker 1: United states most important exports. And the bad news it's

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Speaker 1: it's being used for quasi military, purely military reasons, and

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Speaker 1: what the heck do we do about it? Exactly? That's right,

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Speaker 1: I mean, but that is also one of the leavers

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Speaker 1: the United States currently has is that because China is

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Speaker 1: so dependent on certain technologies that only the United States

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Speaker 1: really has right now, the US can try to uh

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Speaker 1: cut back on that, choke back on that point to

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Speaker 1: slow China down. But the downside of that is it

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Speaker 1: will speed up China's efforts to build its own indigenous

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Speaker 1: capabilities to develop design tools and semiconductor chips, just which

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Speaker 1: is what it's trying to do right now, or turn

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Speaker 1: to other countries around the world that might have companies

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Speaker 1: that can sell in these things. So at this point

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Speaker 1: in the complex challenge, I'd say so, at this point,

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Speaker 1: we have some sort of hypersonic hypersonic weapon and nobody

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Speaker 1: else does. Is that correct? China and the Unitedates have

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Speaker 1: hypersonic weapons programs, but China is the only country in

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Speaker 1: the world to gate that has actually, feel it feel

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Speaker 1: tested a hypersonic UM weapon. Several years ago. You wrote

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Speaker 1: the article and we both read it. For folks who

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Speaker 1: are not familiar with this, what are these hypersonic weapons

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Speaker 1: and why do they matter? Yeah, so, hypersonics is a

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Speaker 1: type of technology that's been around for a while. Even

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Speaker 1: during in the Cold War, both the Soviets and the

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Speaker 1: Americans were testing ways to make warheads hypersonic. What's changed

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Speaker 1: I get in UM the last few years is the

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Speaker 1: ability to do these mid range UM UH hypersonic guide

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Speaker 1: vehicles and things that uh. What some experts military experts

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Speaker 1: tell me is that that could put US Basis in

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Speaker 1: the Pacific, US carriers in the Indo Pacific region at

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Speaker 1: risk from even a conventional missile because of the high

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Speaker 1: speeds these are going faster and five times the speed

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Speaker 1: of sound, and as I think you said in the opening,

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Speaker 1: that makes it much harder to detect in conventional ways. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And so that is what the U. S. Military is

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Speaker 1: working on now, is trying to uh feel a better

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Speaker 1: way to to detect these speeding through the atmosphere. Interesting. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: in your article you point out that the only way

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Speaker 1: to see them is from space, and by the time

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Speaker 1: you're aware that they're launched and heading your way, there's

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Speaker 1: no time to determine what they are, who sent them,

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Speaker 1: what the intent is, and do anything about it. So

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Speaker 1: you know, we're back to more or less defensive defenselessness

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Speaker 1: against UH missiles. So it's not good. Well, we know

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Speaker 1: when China has a workable hypersonic arsenal or will we

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Speaker 1: find out the first time when they sink one of

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Speaker 1: our ships. I imagine we we know um through their

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Speaker 1: efforts to test because even though they can, a lot

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Speaker 1: of their development is happening through stimulations on these very

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Speaker 1: fast supercomputers, which is part of what my story was about.

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Speaker 1: A certain point they actually have to put put it

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Speaker 1: up in the air, and so you know we will

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Speaker 1: will eventually here of course sometimes uh you know, letting

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Speaker 1: your adversaries know you've got the better weapon. That mean

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Speaker 1: that's worked for us for seventy five years, and not

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Speaker 1: letting people know we've got a better weapon with the

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Speaker 1: atomic weapons. So sometimes you want people to know, right,

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Speaker 1: And we also want China to know that we're putting

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Speaker 1: a major investment into uh back into developing these advanced technologies,

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Speaker 1: and the Biden administration is also mounting a major effort

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Speaker 1: to restore and build up the semiconductor high performance computing

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Speaker 1: industry to make sure that it doesn't leave the advantage

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Speaker 1: to China. You know what struck me about your article,

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Speaker 1: maybe more than anything, is we've been talking about the

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Speaker 1: rise of China and the cooling of relations and the

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Speaker 1: rest of it, and the potential for ugliness to break out,

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Speaker 1: and often the discussion centers around Taiwan, which is vulnerable

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Speaker 1: and it's a point of contention for the communist Chinese

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Speaker 1: and the rest of it. And it astounded me reading

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Speaker 1: your piece that some of these chips that we're talking

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Speaker 1: about that are being used for the hypersonic weapons research,

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Speaker 1: they're being cranked out by a factory in Taiwan. That's right.

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Speaker 1: The t SMC, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Center, is the

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Speaker 1: main chip factory chip boundary in the world for these

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Speaker 1: UH super advanced, the most the most advanced semi conductor

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Speaker 1: chips in the world, and they are the tiny, tiny,

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Speaker 1: tiny chips in the Gang Tinier and Tinier, and you

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Speaker 1: can pack more and more um UH semiconductor of technology

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Speaker 1: into them. And that is where that's that is part

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Speaker 1: of the challenge for the United States because while it

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Speaker 1: can slap export controls UM that would affect what US

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Speaker 1: companies can send to Chinese military entities, for instance, it

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Speaker 1: doesn't those experts. Controls don't directly affect a Taiwan factory.

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Speaker 1: But I but Biden administrations as it is working with

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Speaker 1: like minded partners including Taiwan, to try to make sure

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Speaker 1: that they are in line with the US policy. Taiwanan's

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Speaker 1: official stay that they also want to generally observe US

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Speaker 1: exports controls, even if they aren't technically strictly bound by them,

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Speaker 1: because of course Taiwan knows who's who. It means, you know,

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Speaker 1: the defender and benefactors in this area, right. It's just

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Speaker 1: it strikes me it's like France is selling Hitler tank parts.

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Speaker 1: I mean, it's just it strikes me as bizarres I

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Speaker 1: will reach, should I be if Taiwan's continuing to sell

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Speaker 1: them chips, sell the community Chinese chips exactly. I mean,

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Speaker 1: it just goes to show how powerful the allure of

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Speaker 1: the Chinese marketing Taiwan. I think three of Taiwan's market

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Speaker 1: is China. Also troubles me that we we aren't producing

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Speaker 1: Ford and GM vehicles right now because we don't have

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Speaker 1: enough computer chips yet China. China is making sure they've

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Speaker 1: got plenty for everything, right, and that's part of this

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Speaker 1: whole effort effort by Biden to try to build back

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Speaker 1: the UH American semi conductor chip industry. The chips that

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Speaker 1: are going into the cars are not as as sophisticated

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Speaker 1: or advanced as the ones that are going to companies

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Speaker 1: like UM Fighting UM in China and going into the

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Speaker 1: super supercomputers that are testing hypersonic weapons and things like that.

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Speaker 1: But you know, I don't know nearly what you do

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Speaker 1: about this topic, but it strikes me that the Biden

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Speaker 1: administration's move to put the Fighting Company in six other

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Speaker 1: Chinese firms on an export blacklist. I mean, can't the

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Speaker 1: Chinese get around that pretty easily. So one of the

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Speaker 1: ways they get around that is by going to UH

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Speaker 1: other countries that may not UH, that have other potential

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Speaker 1: UH in stries or companies that are are able to

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Speaker 1: sell them the technology. And that's one of the drawbacks

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Speaker 1: of these expert controls. If they're not multilateral, then you know, industry,

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Speaker 1: American industry will say, well, you're just creating a unequaled

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Speaker 1: playing field. You're putting us at a disadvantage because in

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Speaker 1: the Chinese will go to country companies in other countries. Now,

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Speaker 1: the thing is that in the area of of these

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Speaker 1: very advanced semiconductors microprocessors, there are only really a handful

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Speaker 1: of companies that can produce the technology that Chinese chip

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Speaker 1: maker like fighting needs. There are three we call them

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Speaker 1: design Electronic Design Automation companies software companies in the world

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Speaker 1: too are American and one is British, but it's maybe

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Speaker 1: going to be bought by an American company in Video.

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Speaker 1: And the two that are Americans are in Silicon Valley,

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Speaker 1: Synopsis and Cadence, and they will be bound by this

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Speaker 1: new entity lift export control to not celtic id um

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Speaker 1: um your national security is your thing. And I thinking

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Speaker 1: really big picture on this. As I've heard many people

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Speaker 1: describe this, it's a it's a contest between two systems.

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Speaker 1: Are our democracy free market versus their communists over the

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Speaker 1: way they look at society over there. And I just

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Speaker 1: I worry that at least short term, that they might

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Speaker 1: have the advantage in the way that they can harness

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Speaker 1: well everyone in the country for use of overtrying trying

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Speaker 1: to overtake the United States economically and military. Is that

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Speaker 1: as as their singular goal, where whereas our companies, you know,

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Speaker 1: they're they're not hell bent on that. Uh. You know,

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Speaker 1: any company the United States just wants to make a profit.

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Speaker 1: They're not thinking what's the best way to help the

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Speaker 1: United States defeat China. And I don't know how do

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Speaker 1: you look at that just the battle of the two systems. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that just goes back to what I said at the

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Speaker 1: top about the military civil fusion strategy that Shijun King

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Speaker 1: is implementing in China. You just described it perfectly. The

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Speaker 1: Chinese State Communist Party is able to harness its uh

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Speaker 1: it's companies or the benefit of the military, of the

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Speaker 1: People's Liberation Army whereas in the United States we have

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Speaker 1: our system that's more free market, uh, non interventionist. The

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Speaker 1: US government isn't supposed to really interfere in in in

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Speaker 1: in the doings of country of companies. In fact, it's

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Speaker 1: supposed to try to help them. You just innovate and

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Speaker 1: be competitive. And but now there's more and more talk

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Speaker 1: of of actually having some form of industrial policy in

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Speaker 1: the United States to try the help compete against country

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Speaker 1: like like China, which means pouring more investment into these

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Speaker 1: strategic areas, um, incentivizing R and D in keep fields

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Speaker 1: that you know can can make can make America more

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Speaker 1: competitive and make it keep it edge against China. It's

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Speaker 1: you know, the military used to be uh, the police,

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Speaker 1: the US military, where we developed our social intelligence, the internet,

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Speaker 1: bell Crow, all of these things came out of our

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Speaker 1: military defense establishment and then became commercialized. Well, States is

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Speaker 1: thinking it's time to try to get back into that

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Speaker 1: mindset again to keep the competitive edge. Ellen Na Kashima,

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Speaker 1: national security reporter reporter for The Washington Post. Ellen, great

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Speaker 1: stuff really interesting, will post it at armstrong and getty

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Speaker 1: dot com so folk can find it easily. Great to

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Speaker 1: talk to you. Thank you thank you for having me.

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Speaker 1: Absolutely Well, I'll tell you what. That whole national policy

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Speaker 1: thing is such an interesting question, especially as a free

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Speaker 1: market guy and a small government guy. There's there's nobody

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Speaker 1: who thinks, like the height of World War two that

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Speaker 1: um FDR and Truman should have left getting tanks ready

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Speaker 1: to the open market. You know, there's got to be

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Speaker 1: national policy during a period of crisis. The annoying thing,

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Speaker 1: and I'm sure if Tim sanderfor are great libertarian friends listening,

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Speaker 1: he's gnashing his teeth. The annoying thing is that, especially

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Speaker 1: on the left, there's a war against this and a

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Speaker 1: war against that, and on the right it was the

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Speaker 1: war against drugs. And everybody's constantly pitching a war footing

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Speaker 1: for everything because they know. And Kevin Williamson wrote a

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Speaker 1: brilliant piece about this like six months a year ago. Um,

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Speaker 1: that's why that's so popular. Because you can throw away

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Speaker 1: all the rules. You can just you can do anything

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Speaker 1: you want, you can abuse anybody's right, you can accomplish,

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Speaker 1: you can well, you can do anything you want if

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Speaker 1: we're actually at war. That's why everybody's always saying we're

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Speaker 1: at war with this, we're at war with that. And

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Speaker 1: it's it's mostly used to suspend our rights in grow government.

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Speaker 1: On the other hand, if this is now go time

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Speaker 1: to quote the Seinfeld Show with China, is it time

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Speaker 1: for a more nationally coordinated effort? And what does that

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Speaker 1: look like? They are at war? Shooting hasn't started, but

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Speaker 1: the build up has begun, well said, Yeah, man, that's complicated.

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Speaker 1: Wolf Good good, good conversation, though really enjoyed it. Extra

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Speaker 1: large