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Speaker 1: It's time for our weekly classic episode where we bring

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Speaker 1: you some of the best and strangest stuff from our archives. Matt,

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Speaker 1: this one is This one is an update because ever

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Speaker 1: since you and I started this show, as Paul helpfully

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Speaker 1: pointed out, ten years ago, this year we started the

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Speaker 1: audio podcast version of this we've been tuned in. I

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Speaker 1: feel like a sucker man. Every time I hear their

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Speaker 1: JFK updates, I think maybe, yeah, well I feel the

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Speaker 1: same way Ben. We get a little trickle it's trickled

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Speaker 1: down jfkanomics. Sorry, sorry, yeah, I know it's worth it. No,

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Speaker 1: it wasn't. But every once in a while you get

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Speaker 1: a few new documents that have been declassified and you think, oh,

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Speaker 1: maybe there's gonna be something in this trove that's gonna

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Speaker 1: let us know what really happened. And well there was.

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Speaker 1: There was some stuff that went down in twenty seventeen,

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Speaker 1: and we talked about it. That's what this episode is.

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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. Hello,

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Speaker 1: and welcome back to the show. My name is Matt

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Speaker 1: name they call me Ben, you are you? And that

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Speaker 1: makes this stuff they don't want you to know. Now,

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Speaker 1: we are looking at a developing situation, and in the past, guys,

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Speaker 1: we've been hesitant to cover things like as they're unfolding

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Speaker 1: because a peak behind the curtain here, of course, and

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Speaker 1: our super producer Paul Decktt will agree with us, hopefully.

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Speaker 1: I'm sure I'm looking at his body language. Oh, he's

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Speaker 1: wishing was he's hedging. He's hedging, he's hedging his bats.

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Speaker 1: I respect that. We We feel just terrible if we

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Speaker 1: report on something that is occurring in the news, right,

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Speaker 1: and by the time our episode comes out, the situation

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Speaker 1: is completely changed because like spoiler, you guys, this is

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Speaker 1: not live correct, right, we did this like a week ago.

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Speaker 1: The good thing about this specific topic is that the

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Speaker 1: occurrence happened in nineteen sixty three, So that makes it

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Speaker 1: fifty plus years of history that we can cover and

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Speaker 1: then bring in some of this new stuff that actually

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Speaker 1: occurred around nineteen sixties. Yeah, and you know, we don't

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Speaker 1: want to be old beans that I'm pretty good I'm

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Speaker 1: saying that now. I don't think so you don't think

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Speaker 1: I think it's work. I think it's gonna beans. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I don't know. Well right in and let us know.

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Speaker 1: Are they moldy or just stale? It's just like I'm

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Speaker 1: using it as like a just a term of figure

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Speaker 1: of speech. You guys are skeptical about bag of badgers,

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Speaker 1: but that took off, It really did. Okay, what are

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Speaker 1: we talking about today? Can we get to the thing

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Speaker 1: for crying out loud? Yes, let's start with the facts.

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Speaker 1: The brass tax. President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on

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Speaker 1: November twenty second, nineteen sixty three, at about twelve thirty

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Speaker 1: in the afternoon, in Dallas, Texas while they were writing

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Speaker 1: in a presidential motorcade and in the probably the biggest

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Speaker 1: understatement of our entire show, all hell broke loose. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's true. And then you fast forward several decades and

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Speaker 1: there's a survey by a site called five thirty eight

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Speaker 1: dot com and they found that only thirty three percent

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Speaker 1: of the people responding actually believe the findings of the

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Speaker 1: official Warren Commission. That's the one that concluded in nineteen

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Speaker 1: sixty four that the lone gunman Lee Harvey Oswald was

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Speaker 1: responsible for the death of President Kennedy. And today sixty

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Speaker 1: one percent of the US public believe that at least

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Speaker 1: one other person was involved. Yes, just a single gunman.

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Speaker 1: So you guys know, I'm kind of a Kennedy novice.

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Speaker 1: Can you catch me up on the Warren Commission? Sure?

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Speaker 1: The Warren Commission, we've talked to about this before on

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Speaker 1: the show, officially is known as the President's Commission on

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Speaker 1: the Assassination of President Kennedy, which I don't know. I

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Speaker 1: feel like one too many presidents in there, but that's fine.

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Speaker 1: I didn't name that. Can you make it into an

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Speaker 1: acronym for me? That helps me digest it a little better? Ben, Oh,

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Speaker 1: the tpcot aop K, that's better before Anyway, it was

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Speaker 1: formed by the President that immediately followed the president's death.

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Speaker 1: Lyndon Johnson, correct, by the way, was a real pill.

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Speaker 1: Apparently he was a pill. A lot of accusations have

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Speaker 1: been made about him in his involvement with the assassination

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Speaker 1: of JFK over the years. We have not found any

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Speaker 1: of them to be completely true, but there are some

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Speaker 1: juicy details in there. But has a very pleasant sounding name.

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Speaker 1: When you say the initials LBJ, it's very mollifluous. It

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Speaker 1: is I just what you know, there was a thing listeners, friends,

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Speaker 1: neighbors that Lyndon Johnson used to do. It was called

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Speaker 1: the Johnson treatment. He would get in people's faces, like

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Speaker 1: grab them by their lapels four heads inches away. He

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Speaker 1: followed one guy into a bathroom busted into the stall

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Speaker 1: y because that wouldn't fly today. Yeah, while he was

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Speaker 1: doing his business. Well, he's a large gentleman as well,

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Speaker 1: very tall and imposing, bit of a bull in the

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Speaker 1: china shop kind of scenario. Absolutely, what did old LBJ do? Okay?

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Speaker 1: So he formed the President's Commission on the Assassination of

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Speaker 1: President Kennedy on November twenty ninth, nineteen sixty three, just

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Speaker 1: a few days after President Kennedy was shot, and it

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Speaker 1: was all the whole reason to have this was to

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Speaker 1: investigate what happened on that day, right, because people wanted answers,

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Speaker 1: and the Commission acted as quickly as they could to

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Speaker 1: this day. You can read their full report. Well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: their quote unquote full report. All of the information. It

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Speaker 1: was given to the Commission quickly in government time isn't

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Speaker 1: like days, right, I mean this report likely took many

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Speaker 1: months to Yeah, yeah, this is not quickly in people time.

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Speaker 1: It's quickly in government time, so they were racing to

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Speaker 1: determine whether there was any truth, any sands to the

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Speaker 1: multitudinous rumors surrounding this assassination, and the commission eventually concluded

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Speaker 1: that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone under his own power,

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Speaker 1: no assistance from any criminal organization, intelligence agencies, any shady dude,

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Speaker 1: or foreign government or foreign government. That's very important, and

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Speaker 1: that Jack Ruby, the man who would later assassinate Oswald,

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Speaker 1: had no previous relationship with that guy either, So Jack

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Speaker 1: Ruby apparently the sas. Yeah, the story was that the

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Speaker 1: lone gunman was killed by a lone gunman and nothing

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Speaker 1: is related. Nothing to see here, folks know, none of

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Speaker 1: the conspiracies you've been reading about, or anyone's been saying

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Speaker 1: in papers or these weird rumors, none of that's true.

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Speaker 1: Please continue with your regularly scheduled programming. And when when

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Speaker 1: the When the three of us started this show, one

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Speaker 1: of the things that we wanted to do was to

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Speaker 1: explore the stuff on the fringes, right, and and we

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Speaker 1: stay away from the JFK assassination because there has already

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Speaker 1: been so much work done on it, right, and there's

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Speaker 1: stone comes in and makes a movie and then a

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Speaker 1: whole bunch of other conspiracy theories back into the left. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and nothing, you know, nothing that we would have found

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Speaker 1: would have been new news. It would have been old beans. Oh,

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Speaker 1: I'm not giving up on it, all right, I'm telling

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Speaker 1: you guys, say no, See, nobody gets old beans yet.

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Speaker 1: But that's just because of this episode hasn't come out.

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm I'm telling you, guys. Invest now get in

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Speaker 1: on the ground floor of these various catchphrases. So the Commission,

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Speaker 1: the Commission has a quote where they they sum up

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Speaker 1: this relationship quote. The Commission made intensive inquiry into the

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Speaker 1: backgrounds and relationships of Oswald and Ruby to determine whether

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Speaker 1: they knew each other or were involved in a plot

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Speaker 1: of any kind with each other or others. It was

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Speaker 1: unable to find any credible evidence to support the rumors

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Speaker 1: linking Oswald and Ruby directly or through others. The Commission

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Speaker 1: concluded that they were not involved in a conspiratorial relationship

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Speaker 1: with each other or with any third party. In quote,

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Speaker 1: and there is some very important information that will get

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Speaker 1: to towards the close of this show to discuss specifically

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Speaker 1: what may have been held to the Chess, to some

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Speaker 1: of the intelligence agencies, and not given to the Warren

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Speaker 1: Commission specifically, right, So they're doing their best, people on

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Speaker 1: the Warn Commission and doing their best. I hate to

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Speaker 1: steal a line from Beauty and the Beast, but the

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Speaker 1: typical conspiracy stuff you will you're going to hear about

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Speaker 1: the JFK assassination might as well be tal as old

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Speaker 1: as time at this point. However, recently there were documents files,

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Speaker 1: a plethora and I am using that word correctly of

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Speaker 1: files pertaining to the assassination that were classified for decades

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Speaker 1: and again, like in the past couple weeks, as we

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Speaker 1: record this, As Noel pointed out earlier, this is a

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Speaker 1: bit of a time travel experience. Whenever you're listening to

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Speaker 1: a podcast, we're in early November when we're recording this.

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Speaker 1: It's November. It's November. What year is it only? Just okay,

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Speaker 1: year of our Lord two thousand and seventeen. Oh, whoa

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Speaker 1: the whole time? Yeah, yeah, we are. Then, so recently

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Speaker 1: several of these documents, a plethora of these documents were

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Speaker 1: release were declassified and for years, people who do not

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Speaker 1: believe the official story or the findings of the Warring Commission,

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Speaker 1: have been have been vinced that there will be some

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Speaker 1: sort of great revelation that comes forth right in the

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Speaker 1: public eye. I have to put myself in that camp. Yeah, honestly,

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Speaker 1: because we've talked about these records being released by the

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Speaker 1: past at least two presidents. When when there's a date

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Speaker 1: that comes up, that's essentially, hey, if the president decides

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Speaker 1: he or she can release these documents, And every time

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Speaker 1: that has happened up until this year, they have said, uh, no,

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Speaker 1: we're not going to release the documents. Yeah, something something

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Speaker 1: always comes up. Yes, So there is this thing, this

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Speaker 1: act that Congress passed called the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act,

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Speaker 1: which they passed in nineteen ninety two. Bush Senior, Yes, yes,

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Speaker 1: George Bush at George HW. Bush. That is a George W.

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Speaker 1: Bush's father. Um, gotta do the voice? Do you give

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Speaker 1: you the voice? You were doing the voice off arrows Well.

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Speaker 1: Um on October twenty six, nineteen ninety two. My daddy

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Speaker 1: pass uh this act, he signed it. And the final

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Speaker 1: release date because it's fifty fifty years after is uh

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Speaker 1: October twenty six, twenty seventeen. Yeah, So uh that that

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Speaker 1: was a date that, uh, the current president used to

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Speaker 1: release his document. Mister president, mister president, H question from

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Speaker 1: the front H bemble and stuff. They want you to

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Speaker 1: know what does this collection consist of. I'm gonna call

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Speaker 1: you all beans. All right, let's jump back into a

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Speaker 1: real world, Matt. So I could I just need to

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Speaker 1: go through some of this, sure, what is? But what's

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Speaker 1: in this collection? Okay? So this collection, uh, it's basically

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Speaker 1: all of the intelligence agencies and federal government organizations and

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Speaker 1: agencies in the US. They got all the documents relating

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Speaker 1: to the assassination of JFK, and they collected them all

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Speaker 1: and they sent them over to the National Archives. Okay,

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Speaker 1: So in this collection, it's approximately five million pages of

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Speaker 1: records like printed pages. Yeah, we're we're talking Indiana Jones

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Speaker 1: style vault just talk going all the way up to

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Speaker 1: four stories or whatever. M Eighty eight percent of these

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Speaker 1: records are open and full. So that's a huge amount

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Speaker 1: of five million records. No one accidentally used a black highlighter. Well,

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Speaker 1: according I don't think there's any such thing as a

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Speaker 1: black highlighter. It's an awesome Onion article where it says

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Speaker 1: the where it's like FBI and CIA realize that they've

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Speaker 1: been using black highlighters, so wonderful, So no black highlighters

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Speaker 1: in eighty eight percent, In eleven percent of them, they're

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Speaker 1: released in part with the black highlighters going through, which

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Speaker 1: would be stuff like proper names, dresses maybe you know,

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Speaker 1: it's usually proper names and proper places, specific places that

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Speaker 1: would be like a little dangerous, or numbers. That's where

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Speaker 1: you see stuff like blank met with blank approximately twelve

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Speaker 1: forty PM at blank, Yes on this blank exactly that

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Speaker 1: they blanked, oh about stuff about yeah yeah yeah. So

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Speaker 1: then one percent, there's a remaining one percent of this

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Speaker 1: five million pages that is identified as assassin related and

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Speaker 1: they remain completely sealed or at least up until this year.

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Speaker 1: And there was a governing board that that made the

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Speaker 1: call here, So it whenever we deal with government related

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Speaker 1: documentation or filing, we run into all these dry names.

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Speaker 1: So here's another one. The Assassination Records Review Board, Ye,

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Speaker 1: the a r rbaland they they are the ones who

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Speaker 1: said you have to you have to redact these these

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Speaker 1: eleven percent documents, right, and then this one percent nobody

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Speaker 1: can see. Ever, who do you think they get to

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Speaker 1: do the manual redacting. It has to be it can't

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Speaker 1: just be some intern It has to be something pretty

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Speaker 1: high level. Yeah, you have to have at that level compartmentalized,

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Speaker 1: a crappy kind of sloggy job. Can you imagine just

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Speaker 1: having to go through thousands of pages and just like

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Speaker 1: X stuff out that. I'm sure it's very process oriented,

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Speaker 1: and I bet it's viewed as highly important. I can imagine.

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Speaker 1: I think, I think you're right. I don't mean to

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Speaker 1: diminish it. I just mean in terms of process what

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Speaker 1: age ye? Sure? Um? And that agency the it was

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Speaker 1: a temp agency. It just it was there for a

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Speaker 1: time and then it went away after it fulfilled its job.

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Speaker 1: Are you talking about ARB. Yeah. ARBE only lasted from

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Speaker 1: ninety four, nineteen ninety four to nineteen ninety eight. Interesting,

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Speaker 1: and according to the Act itself, that Congress passed all

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Speaker 1: the records that would that were previously withheld, the one

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Speaker 1: percent and the eleven percent, All of those records should

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Speaker 1: be released on October twenty six, twenty seventeen, unless further

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Speaker 1: authorized by the President of the United States, which will

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Speaker 1: be withholding. Yes for withholding, So unless the President decided

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Speaker 1: or was told to decide to not release these documents

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Speaker 1: slippery slop, right, which happened again previously at the other

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Speaker 1: a little what do you call on the road the

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Speaker 1: markers the other markers where it could have been released

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Speaker 1: or at least in place. Sure. Yeah, And this, as

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Speaker 1: as you said, Matt, was signed by President George H. W. Bush,

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Speaker 1: who was just in the studio with us a moment

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Speaker 1: ago on October twenty sixth, nineteen ninety two. In July

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Speaker 1: of twenty seventeen, the National Archives released almost four thousand

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Speaker 1: records right. That included stuff from the FBI and the

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Speaker 1: CIA and somewhere. Some had been withheld in full in

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Speaker 1: the past, and some were released redacted. And I gotta

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Speaker 1: tell you, ladies and gentlemen, friends and neighbors, the three

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Speaker 1: of us spend a lot of time reading these terrible

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Speaker 1: scans from like the vault, the FBI vault, where you

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Speaker 1: can you can see someone has made some scribbled notes

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Speaker 1: in the margins and gone over, gone over it to

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Speaker 1: black out different parts of things. And they're they're tough

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Speaker 1: to read, you know, it's it's a it's a pain

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Speaker 1: to read. Yeah. I think it removes all this context.

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Speaker 1: I mean too, I mean like there's so much redactive

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Speaker 1: that it literally strips it of largely any meaning. You know,

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Speaker 1: it's very frustrating. Yeah, Not to mention, you're dealing with

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Speaker 1: intelligence agencies that are making these producing these documents, and

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Speaker 1: a lot of times there are like crypto cryptograms or

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Speaker 1: there are uh anagrams, they're like they're they're weird. There's

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Speaker 1: weird stuff that goes on in some of these documents.

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Speaker 1: Not to mention, they're already pretty dry. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

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Speaker 1: Uh So this the binality of evil aside, which is

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Speaker 1: what I'm going to categorize a lot of this redaction

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Speaker 1: stuff as the binality of evil aside, Right, the inactions

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Speaker 1: of good people aside. Uh, there is still a struggle

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Speaker 1: to release this information, yes, whatever it might contain, right,

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Speaker 1: And a lot of people wondered whether there would be

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Speaker 1: some smoking gutten, whether there would be some sort of

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Speaker 1: memo from you know, nineteen sixty two where one one

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Speaker 1: intelligence operative says to another, Hey, I just got off

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Speaker 1: the phone with so and so, and they said that

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Speaker 1: it's going down in Dallas. You know, yeah, that is

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Speaker 1: not the case. There's some stuff that's kind of close

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Speaker 1: to that, but it's not, it's not that specific, and

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Speaker 1: that wasn't the only release. That July release was actually

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Speaker 1: jumping the gun a bit on that October twenty six,

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Speaker 1: twenty seventeen date, because on the actual date, the National

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Speaker 1: Archives released another almost three thousand documents, which is huge,

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Speaker 1: and this included a bunch of other stuff that they

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Speaker 1: also released that was pertaining to that Assassination Records Review Board.

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Speaker 1: A lot of the emails, well they're emails from nineteen

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Speaker 1: ninety four to ninety nine eight, So I wonder what

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Speaker 1: that even looked like like forward forward for Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I don't know. But they released fifty two thousand plus

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Speaker 1: emails and almost seventeen thousand files from the from that

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Speaker 1: review board that actually decided what was going to be

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Speaker 1: redacted and not. And then on November third, just a

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Speaker 1: few days ago, there was another release from the National

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Speaker 1: Archives of six hundred and seventy six records and this

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Speaker 1: was Central Intelligence stuff they were previously denied entirely, the

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Speaker 1: CIA stuff. Yeah, yeah, the CIA stuff. And you also

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Speaker 1: have Department of Justice, Department of Defense, how Select Committee

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Speaker 1: on Assassinations, and even stuff from the National Archives like

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Speaker 1: a single document. So what does this all mean? You

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Speaker 1: can also. I think that was excellent review of the

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Speaker 1: chronology of this. You can, by the way, take a

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Speaker 1: line from Matt and view all these files yourself. You

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Speaker 1: can read along. Yeah, you can read along if you

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Speaker 1: are if you are willing to again put up with

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Speaker 1: some poor quality reproduction. Yeah, some scrolled new its and

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Speaker 1: margins and a lot of a lot of missing pieces. Right,

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Speaker 1: it's a crueling journey if you want to go on it.

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Speaker 1: But I really do think it's worth seeing the history.

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Speaker 1: And the big question is to what end does this matter?

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Speaker 1: Was there anything worth reading in there? We will tell

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Speaker 1: you after a quick word from our sponsors, assuming we

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Speaker 1: don't get assassinated during the break, We're back and I

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Speaker 1: think we'll just jump right in with a couple of

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Speaker 1: selected articles. A lot of these come from various news sources,

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Speaker 1: because we've kind of had to go through and research

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Speaker 1: via the news with all of the official researchers who

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Speaker 1: are going through all this stuff. Yeah, there's a gentleman

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Speaker 1: being interviewed on CBS. I was watching just before we

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Speaker 1: went in the studio, and he said he has this

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Speaker 1: massive team of researchers and interns and all these people

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Speaker 1: going through the documents, and he says they've been working

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Speaker 1: on it since that July release and they've gotten through

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Speaker 1: about eight percent of the newly released documents. Why didn't

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Speaker 1: we sick our team of interns and researchers on that, Well,

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Speaker 1: I mean, I guess we could have, So we don't

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Speaker 1: have one. We just sicked ourselves on it, which you

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Speaker 1: know's that's fine. So we went to all the top,

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Speaker 1: top notch news sources that you're familiar with, Daily Mail,

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Speaker 1: teen Vogue, National Inquirer has been killing it lately, by

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Speaker 1: the way. I know, really, I'm not kidding. I'm not kidding. Seriously,

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Speaker 1: good journalism coming out of teen Vogue. I don't know

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Speaker 1: what we did. We did look around, and that's what

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Speaker 1: we can't tell. If he's joking, I'm not, it's true.

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Speaker 1: Ask anybody she's okay, yeah, all right. See, And you're

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Speaker 1: probably wondering because we are moving a little quickly on

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Speaker 1: this stuff. You're you're probably thinking, Matt, no, Ben, you

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Speaker 1: You guys obviously just checked with someone off Mike about

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Speaker 1: teen Vogue got the co sign? You got the co sign?

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Speaker 1: Who is this mystery person? It is our new co worker,

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Speaker 1: Kathleen Quillian, who is sitting in with super producer Paul

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Speaker 1: helping to engineer this session. Yes, and she's going to

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Speaker 1: play a big part in the Stuff Media family very soon, right, Yes, Yes, indeed,

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Speaker 1: welcome spoiler, welcome, welcome. So point being, the point remains

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Speaker 1: that when you're looking at this sort of stuff, it

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Speaker 1: is paramount to investigate every single new source you can find. Yes,

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Speaker 1: you should, regardless of whatever your starting point may be ideologically, experientially, etc.

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Speaker 1: You owe it to yourself to check as many things,

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Speaker 1: especially things that come from places that you might disagree with. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: you got to get a lay of the land exact

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Speaker 1: to kind of be your own aggregator too. And it's like,

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Speaker 1: because you know this is the kind of stuff where

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Speaker 1: there are going to be, it's going to be mired

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Speaker 1: in various opinions on one side of the other, so

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Speaker 1: you kind of get the full picture, it's best to

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Speaker 1: kind of have a broad spectrum of material, which is

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Speaker 1: what we tried to do, what Matt largely tried to do.

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Speaker 1: This is his baby right now. Yeah, Matt's are Bloodhound

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Speaker 1: one us well, and I actually found just gonna let

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Speaker 1: everybody know, I found a CNN article that was in

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Speaker 1: my opinion, the best kind of middle ground for all

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Speaker 1: the sources I had been finding everything from the intercept

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Speaker 1: to the Guardian and just everything in between. The Fox News,

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Speaker 1: the CNN article hit the main I guess the main

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Speaker 1: documents that I found to be pertinent. Does that make sense?

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Speaker 1: It does give it to us. Okay. So the first

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Speaker 1: document involves a telephone call that was intercepted on September

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Speaker 1: twenty eighth, nineteen sixty three, allegedly from Lee Harvey Oswald

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Speaker 1: to a KGB agent in Mexico City. This is a

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Speaker 1: good one. Oh yeah, So this memo from the day

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Speaker 1: of Kennedy's assassination. It talks about this call that was

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Speaker 1: intercepted to the Russian embassy in Mexico. He spoke to

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Speaker 1: the console that I'm not gonna try and pronounce the

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Speaker 1: name Valie of Mirovich. Yes, this was an identified KGB officer,

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Speaker 1: and the gentleman was speaking in broken Russian. Can I

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Speaker 1: can I interject here? Yes? There is there is one

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Speaker 1: um Oddly I hesitated to use the word funny, but

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Speaker 1: I think it is funny. There is one odd side

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Speaker 1: note in this. In this conversation, Oswald insisted that the

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Speaker 1: conversation be held in Russian. Yes, and his Russian was

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Speaker 1: cartoonishly bad. It's like, uh, it's it's like like on

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Speaker 1: the level of saying, uh, bonus nachos instead of buenos

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Speaker 1: noche it cos you speaks Spanish. And to the point

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Speaker 1: where the KGB folks we're like having difficulty understanding him

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Speaker 1: and probably going blio mind the speak English and he's

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Speaker 1: and he's like yet, But it seems like perhaps they

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Speaker 1: knew there was some you know, some eavesdropping going on,

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Speaker 1: and maybe that was one of the reasons. But again,

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Speaker 1: you're speaking to a console at the Russian embassy in

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Speaker 1: Mexico and you're going to speak Russian. So I don't know,

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Speaker 1: Maybe it's just I guess to hide amongst all the

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Speaker 1: other conversations that occurred to day. Sure, and the person

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Speaker 1: who wrote the memos said that relayed the belief on

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Speaker 1: the FBI's part that Oswald was trying to get out right,

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Speaker 1: who's trying to get to the USSR Yes, or you

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Speaker 1: know or somewhere else who knows exactly want to get

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Speaker 1: a visa right for some reason, possibly even to get

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Speaker 1: into Cuba. And this whole trip that Lee Harvey Oswald

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Speaker 1: took to Mexico City very close to when the assassination occurred.

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Speaker 1: Is one of those things that just has a ton

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Speaker 1: of conspiracy theories surrounding it, and rightly so, I mean,

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Speaker 1: that's completely understandable, especially because the US government spent quite

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Speaker 1: a lot of of blood, sweat and tears time trying

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Speaker 1: to convince people otherwise, and now all of a sudden

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Speaker 1: the stories changed, like, oh, wait, we did know he

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Speaker 1: was in Mexico City, and like, ah, we did, we didn't, Wow,

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Speaker 1: we did, we didn't. Well, yeah, and especially when you

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Speaker 1: bring into account the tumultuous relationship that the US had

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Speaker 1: with Cuba, right especially you're right around that time and

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Speaker 1: specifically involving President Kennedy. So what's next. I really appreciate

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Speaker 1: that you mentioned Cuba here exactly. There's a cable from

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Speaker 1: the FBI in nineteen sixty seven, and it's just a cable.

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Speaker 1: So it's like, I don't know something that can you

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Speaker 1: explain cables really fast? We talked about these before. A

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Speaker 1: telegram kind of it's just almost just a quick communication

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Speaker 1: kind of thing coming from an operative or from a

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Speaker 1: diplomat or something. It's a lot of times you'll hear

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Speaker 1: hear cables used with diplomatic community, right, A cable will

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Speaker 1: depending on the context. A cable can function as a

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Speaker 1: straight point to point beefing that is not going to

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Speaker 1: be vulnerable in theory, vulnerable to the same sort of

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Speaker 1: surveillance techniques that could be used in a traditional letter

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Speaker 1: or something happening over an open line. So it's very

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Speaker 1: much like a telegram. But the thing is with a telegram,

424
00:26:15,320 --> 00:26:20,960
Speaker 1: for instance, you know, um, Johnny john Q, public could

425
00:26:21,160 --> 00:26:23,840
Speaker 1: with the right equipment just tune in and then also

426
00:26:24,000 --> 00:26:27,760
Speaker 1: hear whatever's happening. Right, So a cable is supposed to

427
00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:34,120
Speaker 1: be a little bit uh, not like leak proof, but

428
00:26:34,200 --> 00:26:38,600
Speaker 1: more more Yeah, yeah, yeah, leak resistant, more secure, And

429
00:26:40,119 --> 00:26:45,120
Speaker 1: that's why you hear the folks at Wiki leaks Julian osans,

430
00:26:45,280 --> 00:26:47,159
Speaker 1: is he still locked up? I think he is. I

431
00:26:47,160 --> 00:26:51,320
Speaker 1: think he's still just doing the treadmill at the embassy. Yeah, okay, well,

432
00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:56,280
Speaker 1: Wiki Leaks, you know, lives on cables, right, reporting cables,

433
00:26:56,640 --> 00:27:00,919
Speaker 1: And I bring that up to point out again that

434
00:27:01,160 --> 00:27:04,800
Speaker 1: cables are in theory more secure, and surely I would

435
00:27:04,800 --> 00:27:07,320
Speaker 1: think that the cable, the term cable probably doesn't mean

436
00:27:07,400 --> 00:27:09,879
Speaker 1: the same thing as today as it did then, and

437
00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:12,720
Speaker 1: actually it just confirmed. It looks like it just refers

438
00:27:12,760 --> 00:27:16,640
Speaker 1: to a confidential text message. So I'm wondering if maybe

439
00:27:16,640 --> 00:27:19,639
Speaker 1: today it might just be some kind of encrypted person

440
00:27:19,680 --> 00:27:22,720
Speaker 1: to person communication. See and now on the document itself,

441
00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:28,480
Speaker 1: in big bolded type, it says sent by coded teletype. Ah,

442
00:27:29,760 --> 00:27:32,960
Speaker 1: there you go. Okay, so what happened? Oh so this

443
00:27:33,080 --> 00:27:38,959
Speaker 1: was talking about a Cuban gentleman who is being interrogated.

444
00:27:40,960 --> 00:27:43,159
Speaker 1: There's a lot to go through this one document for

445
00:27:43,200 --> 00:27:46,359
Speaker 1: this tiny little thing. But anyway, this gentleman who was

446
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:53,879
Speaker 1: being interrogated was asked about whether or not Oswald was

447
00:27:53,880 --> 00:27:56,199
Speaker 1: a good shot, like just hey, is he you know,

448
00:27:56,400 --> 00:27:58,160
Speaker 1: is he good with the rifles? Are you a good sniper?

449
00:27:58,720 --> 00:28:02,920
Speaker 1: And the gentleman replied, oh, he was quite good. And

450
00:28:02,960 --> 00:28:05,560
Speaker 1: then when you know, he was further asked like, well,

451
00:28:05,560 --> 00:28:08,080
Speaker 1: why would you say that, and this gentleman said, well,

452
00:28:08,119 --> 00:28:12,160
Speaker 1: I knew him, this Cuban Cuban officer. So that's that's

453
00:28:12,160 --> 00:28:16,480
Speaker 1: another interesting thing, because you will find a lot of

454
00:28:16,520 --> 00:28:20,000
Speaker 1: experts and people who spend their entire careers researching just

455
00:28:20,080 --> 00:28:23,919
Speaker 1: this one day in Dallas in nineteen sixty three. Uh,

456
00:28:23,960 --> 00:28:27,199
Speaker 1: they believe that Oswald was actually a terrible shot, and

457
00:28:27,280 --> 00:28:30,680
Speaker 1: a lot of the evidence indicates that he was. He

458
00:28:30,800 --> 00:28:34,040
Speaker 1: was not the world's best sniper. And then you'll find

459
00:28:34,240 --> 00:28:37,320
Speaker 1: opposing evidence or opposing people with the opposing view that

460
00:28:37,359 --> 00:28:40,800
Speaker 1: he was actually an amazing crack shot. So maybe one

461
00:28:40,800 --> 00:28:42,720
Speaker 1: of those theories implies that he was some kind of

462
00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:47,280
Speaker 1: stooge or patsy, a fall guy or whatever, or was

463
00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:51,960
Speaker 1: in communication with Cuba or the Soviet Union via Cuba.

464
00:28:52,800 --> 00:28:55,680
Speaker 1: It is amazing. It's like, it's crazy. It goes on.

465
00:28:55,920 --> 00:28:59,080
Speaker 1: So remember what we said at the top, the official

466
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:06,120
Speaker 1: were in commission conclusion was that Jack Ruby acted alone,

467
00:29:06,520 --> 00:29:11,240
Speaker 1: right and just did what he saw as his patriotic duty.

468
00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:13,840
Speaker 1: I'm killing the guy who killed the president. Yeah, you know,

469
00:29:13,960 --> 00:29:18,400
Speaker 1: instant karma's gonna get you, etc. Someone. It turns out,

470
00:29:18,480 --> 00:29:21,960
Speaker 1: as this was revealed in these classified files, someone called

471
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:25,080
Speaker 1: the FBI threatening to kill Lee Harvey Oswald a day

472
00:29:25,120 --> 00:29:29,640
Speaker 1: before his murder. Wow. So a document from November twenty

473
00:29:29,640 --> 00:29:35,040
Speaker 1: fourth of sixty three indicated that j Edgar Hoover actually

474
00:29:35,080 --> 00:29:39,520
Speaker 1: addressed Oswald's death, specifically referencing that it was at the

475
00:29:39,520 --> 00:29:42,760
Speaker 1: hands of Jack Ruby, and the quote goes as follows.

476
00:29:43,040 --> 00:29:46,120
Speaker 1: Quote there is nothing further on the Oswald case except

477
00:29:46,200 --> 00:29:51,120
Speaker 1: that he is dead, Aux Hoover. Hoover then indicated that

478
00:29:51,280 --> 00:29:54,440
Speaker 1: agents in the FBI's Dallas Field office received a call

479
00:29:54,840 --> 00:29:59,960
Speaker 1: from a gentleman speaking in a very calm tone, who

480
00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:03,760
Speaker 1: who claimed to be a member of a committee that

481
00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:08,160
Speaker 1: was responsible for Oswald's assassination or they were a committee

482
00:30:08,200 --> 00:30:12,040
Speaker 1: that wanted to kill Oswald. Hello, I am a member

483
00:30:12,160 --> 00:30:17,240
Speaker 1: of a committee of concerned patriots, and we want you

484
00:30:17,320 --> 00:30:21,240
Speaker 1: to know that as patriots, we are planning to kill

485
00:30:21,800 --> 00:30:24,720
Speaker 1: the assassin of John F. Kennedy. Thank you for your time,

486
00:30:25,200 --> 00:30:32,960
Speaker 1: all right, then gonna log that call. So this this

487
00:30:33,000 --> 00:30:37,920
Speaker 1: situation develops further. Right now, we're getting into of course,

488
00:30:38,120 --> 00:30:42,200
Speaker 1: we're getting his jack or Hoover creep. Why is he

489
00:30:42,240 --> 00:30:45,360
Speaker 1: a creep? He's a creepy dude? Are you serious? Maybe?

490
00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:49,120
Speaker 1: I I Why do you think he's agreed because he

491
00:30:49,480 --> 00:30:53,800
Speaker 1: killed Martin Luther King Junior pretty obviously? Whoa dude? I've

492
00:30:53,840 --> 00:30:57,440
Speaker 1: never heard you that resolute about something like that. Well, okay, sorry,

493
00:30:57,560 --> 00:31:01,719
Speaker 1: he didn't pull the trigger. Yeah, but he ran He

494
00:31:01,800 --> 00:31:07,640
Speaker 1: ran active and illegal campaigns against against people that he

495
00:31:07,720 --> 00:31:10,560
Speaker 1: saw as a threat to his version of the status

496
00:31:10,640 --> 00:31:12,920
Speaker 1: quote I know he didn't he like have files on

497
00:31:13,160 --> 00:31:15,600
Speaker 1: like John Lennon even and then like he was basically

498
00:31:15,600 --> 00:31:18,040
Speaker 1: responsible for tailing anyone he saw it you're talking about

499
00:31:18,200 --> 00:31:26,160
Speaker 1: and tell pro Yeah, racist ultra nationalist power made all that,

500
00:31:26,240 --> 00:31:29,120
Speaker 1: but you use the term creep I thought, you know.

501
00:31:29,240 --> 00:31:32,520
Speaker 1: So Anyway, the FBI at this point contacted the Dallas

502
00:31:32,560 --> 00:31:36,360
Speaker 1: police just to reiterate to them, Hey, somebody just called

503
00:31:36,440 --> 00:31:39,080
Speaker 1: us and was really really creepy on the phone talking

504
00:31:39,080 --> 00:31:41,120
Speaker 1: about how they want to kill Oswald. Just do us

505
00:31:41,160 --> 00:31:46,440
Speaker 1: a favor and protect him, like really protect him please, Okay, yeah,

506
00:31:46,480 --> 00:31:49,400
Speaker 1: And they said, yeah, well, we'll totally do that, and

507
00:31:49,560 --> 00:31:52,600
Speaker 1: they did not. Yeah. Quote Ruby says no one was

508
00:31:52,680 --> 00:31:55,760
Speaker 1: associated with him and denies having made the telephone call

509
00:31:55,840 --> 00:31:58,800
Speaker 1: to our Dallas office last night. That's something Hoover said.

510
00:31:58,880 --> 00:32:01,240
Speaker 1: And Hoover went on to say that the FBI had

511
00:32:01,280 --> 00:32:06,800
Speaker 1: evidence of Oswald's guilt and intercepted communication he had with

512
00:32:06,960 --> 00:32:10,480
Speaker 1: Cuba and the Soviet Union. Hoover went on to say

513
00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:12,640
Speaker 1: he was concerned that there would be doubt in the

514
00:32:12,680 --> 00:32:17,080
Speaker 1: public sphere about Oswald's guilt and that President Johnson would

515
00:32:17,560 --> 00:32:21,000
Speaker 1: point a commission to investigate the assassination, which he did,

516
00:32:21,360 --> 00:32:27,160
Speaker 1: which that actually did happen. Yeah. However, Yeah, however, I

517
00:32:27,200 --> 00:32:29,440
Speaker 1: think at this point it's important for us to note

518
00:32:30,360 --> 00:32:33,320
Speaker 1: something we've mentioned on the show before. Yes, it's a

519
00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:37,560
Speaker 1: fascinating thing about the evolution of the phrase, the thought

520
00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:43,200
Speaker 1: terminating cliche, conspiracy theory. So, in the wake of the assassination,

521
00:32:43,640 --> 00:32:53,640
Speaker 1: US intelligence agencies sent confidential memos to various media institutions

522
00:32:53,680 --> 00:32:58,400
Speaker 1: of note like New York Times, Chicago Papers, San Francisco, etc.

523
00:32:59,040 --> 00:33:04,120
Speaker 1: And they look, here's the story. There's the official story.

524
00:33:04,160 --> 00:33:09,840
Speaker 1: If anyone says something different, make sure to make sure

525
00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:12,640
Speaker 1: to dismiss it and make sure to call it quote

526
00:33:13,080 --> 00:33:19,200
Speaker 1: a conspiracy theory. It's the originating place of this, right,

527
00:33:19,240 --> 00:33:23,520
Speaker 1: and that's how it entered the mainstream lexicon of the

528
00:33:23,640 --> 00:33:26,800
Speaker 1: United States. And that's why you have to be very careful.

529
00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:30,240
Speaker 1: You know, like we live in a world where there's

530
00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:33,840
Speaker 1: an information glut, and it's very very easy for someone

531
00:33:33,880 --> 00:33:38,440
Speaker 1: to go make a website that purports to be some

532
00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:42,280
Speaker 1: sort of legit news source, right, and then just write

533
00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:46,480
Speaker 1: all kinds of kakamami stuff, right, But you got to

534
00:33:46,520 --> 00:33:50,840
Speaker 1: be very careful when you hear everybody, and I mean

535
00:33:51,080 --> 00:33:56,440
Speaker 1: everybody in the West calling something a crazy conspiracy or

536
00:33:56,840 --> 00:34:00,000
Speaker 1: a person a conspiracy theorist writer shutting the stuff down

537
00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:03,280
Speaker 1: because you know, all right, I feel like I have

538
00:34:03,320 --> 00:34:06,600
Speaker 1: to do the rent just briefly, just briefly, just briefly, Okay, Yeah,

539
00:34:06,600 --> 00:34:08,560
Speaker 1: we've got like two more hours in the studio, right,

540
00:34:08,600 --> 00:34:12,600
Speaker 1: We're good, Okay, sorry, but just briefly. It is it

541
00:34:12,800 --> 00:34:17,360
Speaker 1: is a lack of critical thinking to say that anything

542
00:34:17,440 --> 00:34:23,799
Speaker 1: called a conspiracy theory is automatically um is automatically bullpoop, right,

543
00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:26,839
Speaker 1: because we're a family show, so you know, saying that

544
00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:32,120
Speaker 1: saying that, for instance, the Royal family of the United

545
00:34:32,200 --> 00:34:36,960
Speaker 1: Kingdom is descended from some secret race of half reptilian

546
00:34:37,000 --> 00:34:40,560
Speaker 1: alien half human hybrids, is that that would be called

547
00:34:40,600 --> 00:34:44,319
Speaker 1: a conspiracy theory, right, shout out to David Ike. Okay,

548
00:34:44,480 --> 00:34:47,160
Speaker 1: but then people are also calling a conspiracy theory to

549
00:34:47,200 --> 00:34:51,399
Speaker 1: say that international banks are laundry money for drug cards,

550
00:34:51,400 --> 00:34:53,680
Speaker 1: just like the whole use of like fake news right now,

551
00:34:53,719 --> 00:34:56,839
Speaker 1: you know, I mean, all stories and theories are not

552
00:34:56,880 --> 00:34:59,640
Speaker 1: created equal, and especially when a term is applied as

553
00:34:59,680 --> 00:35:02,640
Speaker 1: like a term of abuse or like a diminutive, that's

554
00:35:02,680 --> 00:35:05,520
Speaker 1: when things start getting sketchy. So it's like a conspiracy

555
00:35:05,560 --> 00:35:08,840
Speaker 1: theory versus a fringe notion or something, you know what

556
00:35:08,880 --> 00:35:10,160
Speaker 1: I mean, Like, I don't know when you when you

557
00:35:10,280 --> 00:35:14,560
Speaker 1: apply that term, it seems to large, large proportions of

558
00:35:14,560 --> 00:35:18,840
Speaker 1: the population discount the idea you know, a whole sure, Yeah, absolutely,

559
00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:21,680
Speaker 1: and that's a mistake. Yeah. And you know, I really

560
00:35:21,680 --> 00:35:24,919
Speaker 1: appreciate you bringing up the fake news concept because you're

561
00:35:25,160 --> 00:35:31,919
Speaker 1: absolutely right. Psychologically, we our species are built to seek classification, right,

562
00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:35,879
Speaker 1: to seek hierarchy, to seek order, which means that it's very,

563
00:35:36,000 --> 00:35:40,600
Speaker 1: very convenient to wrap everything up in a symbolic phrase

564
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:44,439
Speaker 1: and throw that phrase in as a shortcut to critical thinking.

565
00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:46,520
Speaker 1: It's like I like jazz, but I don't like fusion.

566
00:35:48,680 --> 00:35:52,680
Speaker 1: It's just saying that. Yea. So now we're already in

567
00:35:52,719 --> 00:35:55,320
Speaker 1: the thick of it. We're finding out from these released

568
00:35:55,360 --> 00:36:00,239
Speaker 1: files that at least several things, at least in a

569
00:36:00,280 --> 00:36:03,920
Speaker 1: few cases, the things that the Warren Commission and the

570
00:36:04,000 --> 00:36:07,200
Speaker 1: US at large we're saying turned out not to be true.

571
00:36:08,160 --> 00:36:11,480
Speaker 1: They don't quite jab. No, there's no fusion. There's just jazz.

572
00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:14,400
Speaker 1: So let's insert right here. If you haven't already listened

573
00:36:14,440 --> 00:36:17,320
Speaker 1: to our episode on or maybe watched our video. I

574
00:36:17,320 --> 00:36:18,839
Speaker 1: don't know if we have an episode on it on

575
00:36:19,920 --> 00:36:24,480
Speaker 1: the Central Intelligence agencies and the US government's plans and

576
00:36:24,680 --> 00:36:28,879
Speaker 1: tactics to assassinate Fidel Castro of Cuba, because you need,

577
00:36:29,120 --> 00:36:31,440
Speaker 1: you need to get that information right now. We did

578
00:36:31,480 --> 00:36:33,560
Speaker 1: do a video on that. Yeah, yeah, pause, go watch

579
00:36:33,600 --> 00:36:36,200
Speaker 1: that video then come back. Well maybe if you're driving,

580
00:36:36,239 --> 00:36:38,279
Speaker 1: just hang out. Should we just got an ad break

581
00:36:38,320 --> 00:36:40,880
Speaker 1: to give them time to do it? We can? Yeah,

582
00:36:41,520 --> 00:36:44,040
Speaker 1: what do you say? What better time than the present?

583
00:36:50,719 --> 00:36:54,360
Speaker 1: And we've returned, Let's say you want to do a

584
00:36:54,360 --> 00:36:57,239
Speaker 1: couple more specific files. Yeah, we have to keep going.

585
00:36:57,280 --> 00:37:00,040
Speaker 1: There's so much stuff here right, I don't know. I

586
00:37:00,080 --> 00:37:01,879
Speaker 1: candidly do not know if we were going to get

587
00:37:01,920 --> 00:37:04,080
Speaker 1: to all of it. So we do. We do want

588
00:37:04,120 --> 00:37:06,280
Speaker 1: your help after you listen to this episode of Folks.

589
00:37:06,360 --> 00:37:09,839
Speaker 1: If there's something that you feel your fellow listeners need

590
00:37:09,920 --> 00:37:12,600
Speaker 1: to know about this release, please write to us and

591
00:37:12,880 --> 00:37:15,000
Speaker 1: let us know and we'll we'll put it on the

592
00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:19,760
Speaker 1: air as well. So the CIA did consider placing mafia

593
00:37:19,880 --> 00:37:24,360
Speaker 1: hits on Castro. Yeah, mafia hits. So they now that

594
00:37:24,400 --> 00:37:27,560
Speaker 1: you've listened or watched that video, you know that there

595
00:37:27,600 --> 00:37:31,680
Speaker 1: were some crazy theories or some crazy plans brought up

596
00:37:31,800 --> 00:37:35,480
Speaker 1: by the government in the United States to kill Fidel Castro.

597
00:37:35,640 --> 00:37:41,120
Speaker 1: Exploding cigars, weird umbrellas, stuff in wetsuits that was poising. Yes, yeah,

598
00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:43,759
Speaker 1: like from like the novelty store. Well but but but

599
00:37:43,920 --> 00:37:49,160
Speaker 1: little more, but really crazy stuff that doesn't seem true.

600
00:37:49,280 --> 00:37:51,160
Speaker 1: In the National Spy Museum, I think you can see

601
00:37:51,200 --> 00:37:52,799
Speaker 1: some of that stuff. There are a couple of other

602
00:37:52,800 --> 00:37:57,239
Speaker 1: places where you can find it. But this specifically was

603
00:37:57,400 --> 00:38:02,000
Speaker 1: a Rockefeller commission from nineteen seventy five, and he was

604
00:38:02,080 --> 00:38:06,120
Speaker 1: detailing the CIA's role in all kinds of foreign assassinations

605
00:38:06,160 --> 00:38:09,560
Speaker 1: and specifically plans to assassinate Castro in the early days

606
00:38:09,560 --> 00:38:12,640
Speaker 1: of the Kennedy administration. And the report said that Attorney

607
00:38:12,640 --> 00:38:18,200
Speaker 1: General Robert Kennedy, the brother of President JFK also assassinated. Yes,

608
00:38:18,360 --> 00:38:21,160
Speaker 1: and a whole other story, a whole series of episodes,

609
00:38:21,200 --> 00:38:23,839
Speaker 1: but we'll get into that some other time. He told

610
00:38:23,880 --> 00:38:27,280
Speaker 1: the FBI that he'd learned the CIA hired some intermediary,

611
00:38:27,480 --> 00:38:30,880
Speaker 1: another person, a third party to come through an approach

612
00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:35,880
Speaker 1: Sam gen Kanna Gian Kanna. Does that sound familiar to

613
00:38:35,880 --> 00:38:41,279
Speaker 1: you from the Terminator movies? No, this is a prominent

614
00:38:41,520 --> 00:38:45,360
Speaker 1: mafia person and known mafia person at the time, with

615
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:47,959
Speaker 1: the proposition they broach this guy saying, hey, we're gonna

616
00:38:48,000 --> 00:38:51,920
Speaker 1: pay a hundred and fifty thousand dollars to get somebody

617
00:38:51,960 --> 00:38:54,279
Speaker 1: with it, either within your organization or somebody else, to

618
00:38:54,600 --> 00:38:58,480
Speaker 1: kill Castro in Cuba. Like, that's crazy. The government was

619
00:38:58,520 --> 00:39:01,000
Speaker 1: going to hire mafia hitman. Well, I mean it probably,

620
00:39:01,040 --> 00:39:03,600
Speaker 1: like you know, it gives them plausible deniability, right, I

621
00:39:03,680 --> 00:39:06,160
Speaker 1: mean if it's not like, if it's someone that's completely

622
00:39:06,280 --> 00:39:08,759
Speaker 1: not not connected to the government. Oh yeah, sure, in

623
00:39:08,760 --> 00:39:11,120
Speaker 1: this case, it would probably be layer upon layer upon layer.

624
00:39:11,160 --> 00:39:14,879
Speaker 1: If you're talking about the government hiring a mafia guy

625
00:39:14,960 --> 00:39:16,960
Speaker 1: to hire some other guys. And I know that one

626
00:39:17,040 --> 00:39:20,600
Speaker 1: hundred and fifty grand doesn't sound like a really big

627
00:39:20,640 --> 00:39:25,879
Speaker 1: amount of money, but today, right, right today, it's today. Yeah,

628
00:39:25,480 --> 00:39:29,239
Speaker 1: I did the inflation calculation work on this. Uh, it's

629
00:39:29,480 --> 00:39:32,840
Speaker 1: it's about one point two million dollars. Wow, I'd do

630
00:39:32,880 --> 00:39:36,320
Speaker 1: a hit for that. Well what, Well, here's the here's

631
00:39:36,320 --> 00:39:39,560
Speaker 1: the problem. Don't sit don't ever say that I redact that. Here,

632
00:39:39,600 --> 00:39:43,359
Speaker 1: here's the issue. The Attorney General, Robert Kennedy had been

633
00:39:43,400 --> 00:39:47,880
Speaker 1: trying to prosecute this gentleman. He know he's a Sicilian mobster.

634
00:39:47,960 --> 00:39:50,319
Speaker 1: They've got files on him, they've been trailing him, they've

635
00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:52,839
Speaker 1: been tracking him, they've been listening to him. They've been

636
00:39:52,840 --> 00:39:55,359
Speaker 1: trying to get him on something big. And if the

637
00:39:55,400 --> 00:39:58,120
Speaker 1: government is going to pay him that much money to

638
00:39:58,160 --> 00:40:01,840
Speaker 1: go do an assassination makes the state's case or the

639
00:40:01,840 --> 00:40:04,520
Speaker 1: you know, the government's case a little bit harder to prosecute.

640
00:40:05,000 --> 00:40:08,399
Speaker 1: Um quote. Attorney General Kennedy stated that CIA should never

641
00:40:08,480 --> 00:40:11,360
Speaker 1: undertake the use of mafia people again without first checking

642
00:40:11,360 --> 00:40:16,719
Speaker 1: with the Department of Justice. Check check in, y Yeah,

643
00:40:17,320 --> 00:40:20,360
Speaker 1: just check in, because it would be difficult to prosecute

644
00:40:20,360 --> 00:40:23,279
Speaker 1: such people in the future. But that's so weird though.

645
00:40:23,320 --> 00:40:26,880
Speaker 1: They didn't say never do this, No, they just say, guys,

646
00:40:26,920 --> 00:40:30,719
Speaker 1: just check in your dad first, ask your dead first. Yeah.

647
00:40:31,080 --> 00:40:34,319
Speaker 1: It was Robert Kennedy, So I was like, uh. The

648
00:40:34,400 --> 00:40:37,560
Speaker 1: report also said that the CIA was later interested in

649
00:40:37,680 --> 00:40:41,479
Speaker 1: using mobsters to deliver a poison pale to castro uh

650
00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:45,440
Speaker 1: to order to kill him. Thank you you got you know?

651
00:40:45,520 --> 00:40:47,719
Speaker 1: That was that was fantastic And I feel like there's

652
00:40:47,760 --> 00:40:50,680
Speaker 1: a little bit of President Obama influence in there. Oh,

653
00:40:50,880 --> 00:40:54,600
Speaker 1: there was the cadence I think you are. I think

654
00:40:54,719 --> 00:40:58,120
Speaker 1: Matt is just owning you just got a promotion, my friend?

655
00:40:58,400 --> 00:41:03,120
Speaker 1: WHOA WHOA am I impersonator in chief? Yes? Yes, so

656
00:41:03,840 --> 00:41:06,520
Speaker 1: pretend to be a president and call the CIA for

657
00:41:06,640 --> 00:41:09,960
Speaker 1: US and get this sorted out. Okay, good, Okay, Well

658
00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:14,239
Speaker 1: we're done here. Everybody have a great week. No continuing

659
00:41:14,239 --> 00:41:19,640
Speaker 1: though on this. One thing that's hugely important about this

660
00:41:19,719 --> 00:41:25,920
Speaker 1: point in specific, is that this sort of contradictory, this

661
00:41:26,080 --> 00:41:30,200
Speaker 1: contradictory set of pursuits by various government agencies, this situation

662
00:41:30,239 --> 00:41:31,920
Speaker 1: where the left hand does not know what the right

663
00:41:31,920 --> 00:41:34,879
Speaker 1: hand is doing, lends a lot of credence and gives

664
00:41:34,920 --> 00:41:39,120
Speaker 1: a lot of sand to the claims that intelligence agencies

665
00:41:39,160 --> 00:41:42,120
Speaker 1: in the US and in other countries function as their

666
00:41:42,160 --> 00:41:46,719
Speaker 1: own independent governments. Yeah. Absolutely, And then you imagine that

667
00:41:46,800 --> 00:41:51,360
Speaker 1: these independent governments, you know, in their own functionings, sometimes

668
00:41:51,440 --> 00:41:54,319
Speaker 1: doing the same work or at least overlapping, sometimes just

669
00:41:54,400 --> 00:41:59,160
Speaker 1: doing vastly different stuff. But is there anyone in charge?

670
00:42:00,120 --> 00:42:02,960
Speaker 1: When you think about the government that we've elected for

671
00:42:03,120 --> 00:42:05,600
Speaker 1: the people, by the people, democracy that we have in

672
00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:11,440
Speaker 1: this country, Like you've got these operating hands, if you will,

673
00:42:11,440 --> 00:42:15,479
Speaker 1: and this octopus, like where is the head? I don't

674
00:42:15,480 --> 00:42:17,440
Speaker 1: think it's the elected official. This is the point that

675
00:42:17,480 --> 00:42:19,759
Speaker 1: if you cut off one head and grows somewhere else,

676
00:42:19,760 --> 00:42:21,319
Speaker 1: so that there's so many heads that you don't know

677
00:42:21,360 --> 00:42:24,920
Speaker 1: which one's the real head. Oh my god, what is happening?

678
00:42:25,080 --> 00:42:29,000
Speaker 1: I am seriously, I am waiting at some point, I

679
00:42:29,360 --> 00:42:31,840
Speaker 1: you know, I know not everybody loves Marvel movies, but

680
00:42:31,920 --> 00:42:36,480
Speaker 1: at some point I'm hoping that a stranger like shakes

681
00:42:36,560 --> 00:42:40,360
Speaker 1: my hand and like whispers Halidram. You know you should

682
00:42:40,360 --> 00:42:42,480
Speaker 1: just start doing that with people. I can't do it. No, No,

683
00:42:42,560 --> 00:42:45,360
Speaker 1: let's go over real well at parties, it's like you

684
00:42:45,360 --> 00:42:47,879
Speaker 1: can't give yourself a nickname. You can't be the one

685
00:42:47,880 --> 00:42:49,880
Speaker 1: who goes up to people and says hail Hider, I

686
00:42:49,920 --> 00:42:52,719
Speaker 1: got you well, like started start the conversation would be like, hey,

687
00:42:52,719 --> 00:42:54,920
Speaker 1: did you hear Taylor swifts new stuff? Man? I was

688
00:42:55,000 --> 00:42:59,879
Speaker 1: jamming on it all day, The Deil Too Much Best

689
00:43:00,160 --> 00:43:02,440
Speaker 1: Great Mean This Morning where it was squid word from

690
00:43:02,640 --> 00:43:04,799
Speaker 1: SpongeBob and it was like a split screen where it's

691
00:43:04,840 --> 00:43:07,560
Speaker 1: like his eyes closed and it says you when you're

692
00:43:07,600 --> 00:43:10,239
Speaker 1: asleep and realize Taylor Swift's new album comes out at

693
00:43:10,280 --> 00:43:14,640
Speaker 1: midnight and the next frame was the same as my

694
00:43:14,680 --> 00:43:17,120
Speaker 1: wife is Paul's head because he was stoked about it.

695
00:43:18,400 --> 00:43:21,840
Speaker 1: The single tier, Oh my gosh, oh ann Maria Bamf's

696
00:43:22,239 --> 00:43:24,600
Speaker 1: new show or the second season comes out to check

697
00:43:24,640 --> 00:43:31,840
Speaker 1: it out. It's awesome, Okay, plugging other shows and albums. Yes, well,

698
00:43:31,880 --> 00:43:38,759
Speaker 1: it's important. This is important stuff, you know, and we

699
00:43:38,800 --> 00:43:42,680
Speaker 1: are we are very conscious that this kind of sifting

700
00:43:42,840 --> 00:43:48,160
Speaker 1: through archival information can be dry, right, and we also

701
00:43:48,640 --> 00:43:52,360
Speaker 1: acknowledge that we're talking about stuff that has dangerous implications

702
00:43:52,520 --> 00:43:56,279
Speaker 1: in the present day, and we're we're trying to keep

703
00:43:56,280 --> 00:43:59,440
Speaker 1: our chins up about it. But the situation is dire

704
00:43:59,719 --> 00:44:02,759
Speaker 1: as we record this, and there are a ton more

705
00:44:02,880 --> 00:44:06,520
Speaker 1: documents that we didn't discuss. I mean literally thousands, and

706
00:44:06,920 --> 00:44:09,359
Speaker 1: each of them probably has a tiny little story to tell.

707
00:44:09,480 --> 00:44:11,880
Speaker 1: And that's why we're encouraging you to go in and

708
00:44:11,920 --> 00:44:14,600
Speaker 1: do some of the research yourself, or at least sift

709
00:44:14,680 --> 00:44:17,120
Speaker 1: through the news sites. Well let's we're not even to

710
00:44:17,200 --> 00:44:20,040
Speaker 1: the crazy, but let's laundry list a couple okay, yeah, okay,

711
00:44:20,080 --> 00:44:23,920
Speaker 1: so FBI director, and again this is this is a

712
00:44:23,960 --> 00:44:27,200
Speaker 1: lot of MATS research you need to spot on job man,

713
00:44:27,280 --> 00:44:31,080
Speaker 1: Thank you so much. You got it. So FBI Director

714
00:44:31,080 --> 00:44:33,880
Speaker 1: Hoover right forwarded a memo to the White House in

715
00:44:34,040 --> 00:44:39,120
Speaker 1: sixty three, right after Kennedy's death, and it was this

716
00:44:39,200 --> 00:44:44,520
Speaker 1: memo was classified as top secret for years, and it's

717
00:44:45,280 --> 00:44:52,000
Speaker 1: it's it's exploring the US Intelligence agency's best guesses toward

718
00:44:52,080 --> 00:44:57,319
Speaker 1: the Soviet Union's reaction to the assassination. Yeah, and we

719
00:44:57,400 --> 00:45:00,160
Speaker 1: have a quote here. According to our source, official of

720
00:45:00,200 --> 00:45:02,600
Speaker 1: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union believe that there

721
00:45:02,719 --> 00:45:05,879
Speaker 1: was some well organized conspiracy on the part of the

722
00:45:05,960 --> 00:45:09,320
Speaker 1: ultra right in the United States to affect a coup.

723
00:45:09,880 --> 00:45:12,520
Speaker 1: They seem convinced that the assassination was not the deed

724
00:45:12,520 --> 00:45:14,480
Speaker 1: of one man, but that it arose out of a

725
00:45:14,560 --> 00:45:21,040
Speaker 1: carefully planned campaign in which several people played a part. WHOA, Now,

726
00:45:21,640 --> 00:45:25,600
Speaker 1: are they falling prey to the conspiracy theories? Are they

727
00:45:25,680 --> 00:45:29,600
Speaker 1: spreading propaganda? Because we do know after the assassination, the

728
00:45:29,680 --> 00:45:36,440
Speaker 1: USSR did pretty effectively capitalize on the opportunity to spread

729
00:45:36,480 --> 00:45:42,640
Speaker 1: dissent and shout out to General Smedley Butler. We do

730
00:45:42,800 --> 00:45:45,880
Speaker 1: know that there have been coup attempts in the United States.

731
00:45:45,920 --> 00:45:48,319
Speaker 1: You're typically not going to read about them in your

732
00:45:48,640 --> 00:45:53,560
Speaker 1: history books. Smedley Sedley m D. L. E. Y sounds

733
00:45:53,560 --> 00:45:56,400
Speaker 1: like a made up name. I love it. Speaking speaking

734
00:45:56,440 --> 00:46:01,200
Speaker 1: of my daddy, George HW. Bush, his daddy, my grandpa,

735
00:46:01,440 --> 00:46:05,480
Speaker 1: my grandpappy. He's the guy who supposedly went through and

736
00:46:05,640 --> 00:46:09,759
Speaker 1: decided to do the business plot. Isn't that crazy? My

737
00:46:09,840 --> 00:46:12,520
Speaker 1: daddy was a businessman and his daddy was a business man.

738
00:46:12,800 --> 00:46:16,000
Speaker 1: My daddy was a CIA man. President President Bush. Yeah, yeah,

739
00:46:16,000 --> 00:46:18,279
Speaker 1: thank you for coming by. We're in the middle of

740
00:46:18,280 --> 00:46:21,000
Speaker 1: the show though. Oh well, I'm sorry. I'll just go

741
00:46:21,040 --> 00:46:23,359
Speaker 1: in the corner and do some painting. Okay, all right,

742
00:46:24,440 --> 00:46:30,120
Speaker 1: all right, I'll be over here. Okay, Hey, can you sleep, Matt? Yeah?

743
00:46:30,280 --> 00:46:32,000
Speaker 1: Why do you keep bringing that guy to this? Why

744
00:46:32,000 --> 00:46:34,080
Speaker 1: do you keep letting push you around like that? He

745
00:46:34,160 --> 00:46:36,200
Speaker 1: just pushes you out of your chair and then does

746
00:46:36,239 --> 00:46:38,719
Speaker 1: this is a little creepy laugh. I gotta admit. When

747
00:46:38,719 --> 00:46:41,360
Speaker 1: he was in office, just I know, it's okay. I

748
00:46:41,400 --> 00:46:43,200
Speaker 1: can hear you talking about me over there, I know,

749
00:46:43,320 --> 00:46:46,520
Speaker 1: just give me two seconds. Okay. When he was in office,

750
00:46:46,520 --> 00:46:49,000
Speaker 1: I wasn't the biggest fan. But afterwards, like this guy

751
00:46:49,200 --> 00:46:52,240
Speaker 1: is chill, Yeah, like he is so cool. He's just painting.

752
00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:53,799
Speaker 1: He likes to go to gamel. He likes to go

753
00:46:53,800 --> 00:46:55,560
Speaker 1: to briefs games. Did you know he can play the

754
00:46:55,640 --> 00:46:58,520
Speaker 1: rhythm guitar part for every three eleven song? Dude, I've

755
00:46:58,520 --> 00:47:00,719
Speaker 1: been trying to learn the you know. Did you know

756
00:47:00,760 --> 00:47:03,720
Speaker 1: that amber is the color of his energy? He keeps

757
00:47:03,760 --> 00:47:06,600
Speaker 1: saying that. I feel like he thinks that that was

758
00:47:06,680 --> 00:47:10,920
Speaker 1: his idea, But it's clearly a lyric from three to eleven? Right, Okay,

759
00:47:11,040 --> 00:47:16,080
Speaker 1: so point peede, yes, before we get through derailed. These

760
00:47:16,200 --> 00:47:20,160
Speaker 1: various these various pieces of information are coming out, and

761
00:47:20,280 --> 00:47:25,160
Speaker 1: in many cases, if they are not contradicting the official narrative,

762
00:47:25,520 --> 00:47:28,560
Speaker 1: they are at the very least complicating it. Yes, you know,

763
00:47:28,880 --> 00:47:33,799
Speaker 1: so we have we have people who are saying, ah,

764
00:47:34,120 --> 00:47:38,080
Speaker 1: never mind this official stuff called all a conspiracy theory.

765
00:47:38,120 --> 00:47:42,600
Speaker 1: But that then at the same time, we are finding

766
00:47:42,920 --> 00:47:49,800
Speaker 1: secret communication between people where an intelligence agency is saying, ah,

767
00:47:49,800 --> 00:47:54,240
Speaker 1: pretty much everybody thinks, like the world's other superpowers, pretty

768
00:47:54,239 --> 00:47:57,279
Speaker 1: convinced that not one guy did this exactly. And then

769
00:47:57,280 --> 00:48:00,239
Speaker 1: they're like, okay, well don't tell anybody, just want you

770
00:48:00,320 --> 00:48:04,520
Speaker 1: to know, and let's just keep it secret. That's it

771
00:48:04,560 --> 00:48:06,920
Speaker 1: feels strange now, but we have to we have to understand,

772
00:48:07,000 --> 00:48:10,400
Speaker 1: one of the one of the most vulnerable points of

773
00:48:10,880 --> 00:48:15,759
Speaker 1: any any state powers existence is always going to be

774
00:48:16,200 --> 00:48:20,719
Speaker 1: the succession, right, the passage of power from one typically

775
00:48:20,719 --> 00:48:24,359
Speaker 1: one individual to another. So for instance, in the case

776
00:48:24,480 --> 00:48:28,239
Speaker 1: of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea, one

777
00:48:28,239 --> 00:48:31,920
Speaker 1: of the things that is always a big flashpoint and

778
00:48:32,040 --> 00:48:35,680
Speaker 1: really dangerous part of time for the world, not just

779
00:48:35,719 --> 00:48:39,479
Speaker 1: in that region, is when they pass from father to son.

780
00:48:39,920 --> 00:48:42,040
Speaker 1: I don't know what's going to happen, you know, look

781
00:48:42,080 --> 00:48:46,399
Speaker 1: at it, Look at Turkey, right, look at Italy. This

782
00:48:46,640 --> 00:48:50,080
Speaker 1: so in the context of the time, this is very,

783
00:48:50,200 --> 00:48:52,480
Speaker 1: very dangerous for the US. It is vulnerable now in

784
00:48:52,520 --> 00:48:56,960
Speaker 1: a way that it has not been right at least

785
00:48:57,000 --> 00:49:01,399
Speaker 1: for a long long time since the probably the death

786
00:49:01,440 --> 00:49:04,520
Speaker 1: of Lincoln is the last time it was that vulnerable.

787
00:49:05,239 --> 00:49:09,120
Speaker 1: And let's see one more example, maybe absolutely okay, So

788
00:49:09,160 --> 00:49:13,440
Speaker 1: for our last entry for the day, we have a document,

789
00:49:13,560 --> 00:49:17,080
Speaker 1: a top secret document from nineteen seventy five that was

790
00:49:17,239 --> 00:49:21,120
Speaker 1: created for the Rockefeller Commission. And in this document there

791
00:49:21,360 --> 00:49:25,520
Speaker 1: is a transcript of a testimony of a former CIA

792
00:49:25,840 --> 00:49:29,760
Speaker 1: director by the name of Richard Helms. And in this document,

793
00:49:30,440 --> 00:49:36,160
Speaker 1: Helms says that he believes that former President Richard Nixon

794
00:49:36,239 --> 00:49:41,200
Speaker 1: old Tricky Dickey believed that the CIA was actually directly

795
00:49:41,200 --> 00:49:48,240
Speaker 1: responsible for assassinating the South Vietnamese president go Den Dean,

796
00:49:48,440 --> 00:49:52,160
Speaker 1: who died after a coup that was linked to the

797
00:49:52,280 --> 00:49:57,799
Speaker 1: Central Intelligence Agency. And we've got a quote from Helms himself, right,

798
00:49:58,360 --> 00:50:02,160
Speaker 1: we do. Indeed, it goes as quote, there's absolutely no

799
00:50:02,280 --> 00:50:04,720
Speaker 1: evidence of this in the agency records. And the whole

800
00:50:04,719 --> 00:50:07,279
Speaker 1: thing has been I mean, rather, what is the word

801
00:50:07,360 --> 00:50:10,719
Speaker 1: I want? Heated by the fact that President Johnson used

802
00:50:10,719 --> 00:50:14,080
Speaker 1: to go around saying that the reason President Kennedy was

803
00:50:14,080 --> 00:50:17,919
Speaker 1: assassinated was that he had assassinated President Team and this

804
00:50:18,040 --> 00:50:21,800
Speaker 1: was just justice. And then Helms ads, uh, where he

805
00:50:21,880 --> 00:50:25,600
Speaker 1: gotten this from? I don't know, and just yeah, this

806
00:50:25,719 --> 00:50:30,799
Speaker 1: is during a deposition, and there was the context of

807
00:50:30,800 --> 00:50:34,640
Speaker 1: the conversations that Helms was asked if there was any

808
00:50:34,640 --> 00:50:39,000
Speaker 1: way Oswald was in some way a CIA agent or

809
00:50:40,239 --> 00:50:44,200
Speaker 1: an asset or an operative or an agent of something else.

810
00:50:44,239 --> 00:50:47,520
Speaker 1: And that's right when the document ends. But is this

811
00:50:47,520 --> 00:50:50,839
Speaker 1: when the story ends. We've given just a few examples, right,

812
00:50:51,360 --> 00:50:54,360
Speaker 1: And I know that this episode is running a little

813
00:50:54,880 --> 00:50:58,520
Speaker 1: a little long because we're digging into this stuff. But

814
00:50:58,960 --> 00:51:02,439
Speaker 1: the big question is is this the whole story? That's

815
00:51:02,440 --> 00:51:05,960
Speaker 1: where one document ends. Where does the story end? Are

816
00:51:06,000 --> 00:51:09,239
Speaker 1: we finally, in twenty seventeen, up to speed on exactly

817
00:51:09,280 --> 00:51:14,000
Speaker 1: what the US intelligence agency did or did not know

818
00:51:14,640 --> 00:51:20,480
Speaker 1: regarding this assassination. I don't think we're there. Here's where

819
00:51:20,520 --> 00:51:25,160
Speaker 1: it gets crazy. Some of these files we mentioned right

820
00:51:25,760 --> 00:51:28,160
Speaker 1: are still secret. They were all supposed to be released,

821
00:51:28,400 --> 00:51:30,920
Speaker 1: and they were released under if you're listening to this

822
00:51:30,960 --> 00:51:34,359
Speaker 1: in the future, they were released under the auspice of

823
00:51:34,400 --> 00:51:39,480
Speaker 1: the Trump administration, right, But not all of them were

824
00:51:39,520 --> 00:51:42,160
Speaker 1: released they were supposed to be And we have no

825
00:51:42,320 --> 00:51:46,080
Speaker 1: idea when more even if the other stuff will ever

826
00:51:46,480 --> 00:51:50,760
Speaker 1: make it into the public sphere. In the eleventh hour,

827
00:51:51,760 --> 00:51:58,200
Speaker 1: right before this stuff went public became declassified. Intelligence agencies,

828
00:51:58,719 --> 00:52:04,239
Speaker 1: the FBI, CIA, all your favorite alphabet soup members of

829
00:52:04,960 --> 00:52:09,920
Speaker 1: the US government. They pressured Trump successfully or in pressured

830
00:52:09,960 --> 00:52:14,319
Speaker 1: the administration, I should say, successfully, to keep some of

831
00:52:14,320 --> 00:52:21,040
Speaker 1: the stuff secret pass the due date. In light of

832
00:52:21,080 --> 00:52:27,319
Speaker 1: everybody's favorite boogeyman, national security, national security, What does that mean?

833
00:52:27,760 --> 00:52:30,799
Speaker 1: It's just like tagging base, you know, okay, you know,

834
00:52:30,920 --> 00:52:34,000
Speaker 1: like anytime you don't want to tell the public something

835
00:52:34,040 --> 00:52:37,960
Speaker 1: your own national security. You know, I'd say I wish

836
00:52:38,000 --> 00:52:39,880
Speaker 1: I could do that in my private life. For the

837
00:52:39,920 --> 00:52:43,520
Speaker 1: good of the realm, Can we just say that from

838
00:52:43,520 --> 00:52:46,000
Speaker 1: now on? We can? We can try it. Well, let's

839
00:52:46,000 --> 00:52:48,760
Speaker 1: have let's let's let's call up some of our friends

840
00:52:48,760 --> 00:52:51,120
Speaker 1: over there in the intelligence agencies and just say, hey, man,

841
00:52:51,480 --> 00:52:53,879
Speaker 1: from now on, if you're gonna say national security, dude,

842
00:52:54,160 --> 00:52:56,400
Speaker 1: those guys are not your friends. I've been on the

843
00:52:56,400 --> 00:52:59,279
Speaker 1: phone with FBI Field Office a couple of times now

844
00:52:59,440 --> 00:53:02,280
Speaker 1: working on this other stuff. I think I've got some sway.

845
00:53:02,480 --> 00:53:05,520
Speaker 1: I know Paul. Paul's got sway all over Atlanta right now.

846
00:53:05,600 --> 00:53:08,239
Speaker 1: Superproducer Paul. Yeah, he can make some calls and just

847
00:53:08,239 --> 00:53:10,840
Speaker 1: be like, guys, it's now for the good of the realm.

848
00:53:10,880 --> 00:53:16,279
Speaker 1: One call, that's Paul. That's pretty good. That's pretty good, Paul.

849
00:53:16,880 --> 00:53:22,239
Speaker 1: So so, unless you are as fortunate as the three

850
00:53:22,280 --> 00:53:25,840
Speaker 1: of us to have a superproducer like Paul right in

851
00:53:26,200 --> 00:53:31,279
Speaker 1: your circle, you are probably lost at sea a little bit. Conceptually,

852
00:53:31,280 --> 00:53:33,960
Speaker 1: when you hear the phrase national security, it's one of

853
00:53:34,000 --> 00:53:37,560
Speaker 1: those words that just gets thrown around willy nilly, the

854
00:53:37,640 --> 00:53:41,719
Speaker 1: same way that people used to add the descriptor digital

855
00:53:41,840 --> 00:53:44,399
Speaker 1: in front of everything in the nineties, it didn't matter

856
00:53:44,440 --> 00:53:47,080
Speaker 1: what it was. It was digital, you could charge five

857
00:53:47,120 --> 00:53:51,560
Speaker 1: dollars more. So, national security in this context could mean

858
00:53:51,800 --> 00:53:56,319
Speaker 1: several things. Let's break down into let's say three or

859
00:53:56,320 --> 00:54:01,399
Speaker 1: four things. First is preventing the spread of intelligence techniques, strategies,

860
00:54:01,520 --> 00:54:06,000
Speaker 1: spycraft highly important. Absolutely, there's the methods of gathering intelligence,

861
00:54:06,160 --> 00:54:09,880
Speaker 1: not the intelligence itself, right right, because if somebody else

862
00:54:10,120 --> 00:54:12,960
Speaker 1: knows how this stuff was gathered, then the jig is up.

863
00:54:13,239 --> 00:54:16,680
Speaker 1: They can protect against it, right exactly, This is an

864
00:54:16,760 --> 00:54:22,240
Speaker 1: understandable concern, right if forever we're talking about what nineteen

865
00:54:22,320 --> 00:54:24,920
Speaker 1: sixties and prior to that, maybe a little bit after that,

866
00:54:24,960 --> 00:54:29,040
Speaker 1: but mostly you're dealing with before the assassination, so late fifties,

867
00:54:29,080 --> 00:54:32,280
Speaker 1: early sixties technology. So if this stuff is held back

868
00:54:32,640 --> 00:54:37,040
Speaker 1: to protect techniques from the nineteen forties, it's literally on

869
00:54:37,120 --> 00:54:40,600
Speaker 1: display in spy museums around the country. Right, then the

870
00:54:40,680 --> 00:54:45,720
Speaker 1: question becomes, can you plausibly believe, right apply critical thinking,

871
00:54:45,760 --> 00:54:48,160
Speaker 1: can you plausibly believe that some of the world's most

872
00:54:48,239 --> 00:54:52,400
Speaker 1: well funded intelligence operatives would still be using the same

873
00:54:52,440 --> 00:54:57,759
Speaker 1: techniques for decades? Well, I have to just interject here

874
00:54:57,760 --> 00:55:00,319
Speaker 1: and say I think some of the techniques are very

875
00:55:00,400 --> 00:55:05,840
Speaker 1: much human and psychologically based chat perhaps maybe existing in

876
00:55:05,880 --> 00:55:09,280
Speaker 1: some of these documents humans right, yes, yes, yes, exactly,

877
00:55:09,920 --> 00:55:14,440
Speaker 1: which are the shortened terms for human intelligence versus signals intelligence.

878
00:55:15,000 --> 00:55:20,480
Speaker 1: The second, the second category here genre of national security,

879
00:55:20,480 --> 00:55:24,400
Speaker 1: would be to protect the existing relationship between the United

880
00:55:24,440 --> 00:55:27,920
Speaker 1: States and a foreign government. Clearly very important. Yeah, and

881
00:55:28,840 --> 00:55:33,440
Speaker 1: you know, we have a lot of what did somebody

882
00:55:33,520 --> 00:55:35,719
Speaker 1: just called this on NPR called the China and the

883
00:55:35,800 --> 00:55:39,440
Speaker 1: United States frenemies. But it's we have a lot of

884
00:55:39,440 --> 00:55:43,200
Speaker 1: those that we've cultivated over the years. Those relationships. There

885
00:55:43,280 --> 00:55:46,280
Speaker 1: is no such thing as friendship in a geopolitical sphere.

886
00:55:46,320 --> 00:55:50,600
Speaker 1: There are interests that aligne exactly, interested align temporarily or

887
00:55:50,600 --> 00:55:54,560
Speaker 1: you know, maybe in long term for a specific thing. Sure, so, yeah,

888
00:55:54,719 --> 00:55:59,480
Speaker 1: I completely agree. Now we have another question. If information

889
00:55:59,600 --> 00:56:04,279
Speaker 1: is being withheld to protect the relationship, the confidential relationship

890
00:56:04,280 --> 00:56:07,839
Speaker 1: between two countries, then this would mean that there could

891
00:56:07,880 --> 00:56:13,080
Speaker 1: either be privileged knowledge somebody maybe has a skeleton in

892
00:56:13,080 --> 00:56:17,359
Speaker 1: the closet, right, maybe maybe the Union knows something that

893
00:56:17,400 --> 00:56:22,880
Speaker 1: the US public doesn't, right, or there could be collusion

894
00:56:23,160 --> 00:56:25,359
Speaker 1: on the part of another country. Right, Oh, that would

895
00:56:25,400 --> 00:56:28,680
Speaker 1: never happen, No, I'm not here man. It's crazy. It's

896
00:56:28,680 --> 00:56:32,439
Speaker 1: crazy talk, right U. And one example of this, of course,

897
00:56:32,480 --> 00:56:35,760
Speaker 1: as we mentioned, the be the USSR's efforts to spread

898
00:56:35,800 --> 00:56:43,959
Speaker 1: propaganda after the assassination, or of course, similar attempts by

899
00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:48,120
Speaker 1: the US in other foreign countries, very similar attempts, or

900
00:56:48,160 --> 00:56:52,359
Speaker 1: the worst, strikingly similar work. So there's here's the here's

901
00:56:52,400 --> 00:56:56,520
Speaker 1: the here's the third genre. It could be when they

902
00:56:56,560 --> 00:57:01,400
Speaker 1: say national security, it could mean protecting the lives of

903
00:57:01,640 --> 00:57:07,040
Speaker 1: current or former government officials. Right. So, let's say one

904
00:57:07,040 --> 00:57:09,719
Speaker 1: of the theories we hear a lot about JFK is

905
00:57:09,760 --> 00:57:14,600
Speaker 1: that a secret service member accidentally fired the fatal shot

906
00:57:16,160 --> 00:57:19,880
Speaker 1: as one of the theories, right, again unproven? Right? So

907
00:57:21,200 --> 00:57:25,800
Speaker 1: what is when we talked about government conspiracies, there's people

908
00:57:26,280 --> 00:57:31,600
Speaker 1: often go to the idea of some great collusion in advance. Right.

909
00:57:32,160 --> 00:57:36,640
Speaker 1: The same the same institution that cannot, for the life

910
00:57:36,640 --> 00:57:41,280
Speaker 1: of it figure out how to do effective policy, is

911
00:57:41,360 --> 00:57:47,760
Speaker 1: also capable of these supervillain level Rube Goldberg machinations. Right. Yeah,

912
00:57:47,800 --> 00:57:53,840
Speaker 1: Its razor lends itself to covering up a mistake. Right,

913
00:57:53,920 --> 00:57:57,280
Speaker 1: So how much more realistic is it that someone screwed

914
00:57:57,400 --> 00:58:02,760
Speaker 1: up and the people are trying to remove that from history.

915
00:58:02,920 --> 00:58:07,160
Speaker 1: So imagine being a retired official and the public learns

916
00:58:07,200 --> 00:58:13,320
Speaker 1: that you did something negligent, right, accidental, unintentional, and then

917
00:58:13,400 --> 00:58:17,160
Speaker 1: you find yourself up a very dangerous creek with no

918
00:58:17,280 --> 00:58:22,400
Speaker 1: paddle whatsoever, especially in the age of cheap information. Totally.

919
00:58:22,760 --> 00:58:27,120
Speaker 1: So in conclusion, here, guys, the craziest thing is that,

920
00:58:27,840 --> 00:58:32,000
Speaker 1: at least according to Trump's Twitter feed, he has released

921
00:58:32,120 --> 00:58:36,960
Speaker 1: everything and long ahead of schedule. That's what he's saying. However,

922
00:58:38,160 --> 00:58:42,440
Speaker 1: it seems pretty certain that there's at least a small

923
00:58:42,560 --> 00:58:47,680
Speaker 1: number of documents that remain hidden. It seems pretty clear.

924
00:58:48,840 --> 00:58:53,000
Speaker 1: But what we do have is thousands more documents to

925
00:58:53,000 --> 00:58:59,520
Speaker 1: tread through. And you know, as researchers and historians and

926
00:58:59,680 --> 00:59:02,880
Speaker 1: inns are going through all of this stuff, you know,

927
00:59:03,040 --> 00:59:06,800
Speaker 1: perhaps there's going to be some new revelation. Maybe not

928
00:59:06,840 --> 00:59:09,720
Speaker 1: the kind of thing that I'm was hoping for after

929
00:59:09,760 --> 00:59:13,040
Speaker 1: all of these years, but something. Surely they wouldn't let

930
00:59:13,040 --> 00:59:15,360
Speaker 1: it out though, man. I mean, you know, they know

931
00:59:15,440 --> 00:59:18,640
Speaker 1: what's in there. They're giving people something to play with

932
00:59:18,800 --> 00:59:22,640
Speaker 1: and you know, feel good about or whatever, feel like informed,

933
00:59:22,720 --> 00:59:24,960
Speaker 1: But there's not going to be an answer. The government

934
00:59:24,960 --> 00:59:27,720
Speaker 1: wouldn't allow that to happen. I don't. I don't think.

935
00:59:27,920 --> 00:59:30,560
Speaker 1: And if it's, if it's a case of national security,

936
00:59:30,840 --> 00:59:35,840
Speaker 1: then again the implications are dangerous. It's twenty seventeen, yeah,

937
00:59:35,840 --> 00:59:38,680
Speaker 1: and if that stuff still applies, I think we can

938
00:59:38,720 --> 00:59:41,480
Speaker 1: all agree. I think we can all agree, folks that

939
00:59:41,840 --> 00:59:45,480
Speaker 1: the idea of protecting a spycraft technique from the forties

940
00:59:45,520 --> 00:59:48,480
Speaker 1: to the sixties doesn't pan out. It's like tape recorders

941
00:59:48,480 --> 00:59:51,200
Speaker 1: and suitcases, dude, like they're on display like in the

942
00:59:51,320 --> 00:59:54,400
Speaker 1: spin music. I see, it's I don't know. Well, in

943
00:59:54,440 --> 00:59:57,680
Speaker 1: my opinion, there's still the possibility that there's a needle

944
00:59:57,720 --> 01:00:01,760
Speaker 1: inside this haystack, but there hasn't been enough time and

945
01:00:01,920 --> 01:00:05,640
Speaker 1: enough human hands and eyes working through it. So will

946
01:00:05,680 --> 01:00:07,479
Speaker 1: you at least agree with me that the government knows

947
01:00:07,520 --> 01:00:11,880
Speaker 1: exactly what's in there? Though, I mean again, we're dealing

948
01:00:11,960 --> 01:00:15,520
Speaker 1: with the octopus with they do. So yeah, I don't

949
01:00:15,560 --> 01:00:19,360
Speaker 1: know if everybody knows, because there are, yeah, there are

950
01:00:19,440 --> 01:00:22,680
Speaker 1: factions at play. There are factions, and it's been a

951
01:00:22,720 --> 01:00:26,120
Speaker 1: long time, and humans die. That's the one thing we

952
01:00:26,160 --> 01:00:29,400
Speaker 1: all do now, is there is there something there? There

953
01:00:29,480 --> 01:00:33,120
Speaker 1: must be there, There must be otherwise the intelligence agencies

954
01:00:33,160 --> 01:00:37,800
Speaker 1: would not have pressured the current administration so strongly not

955
01:00:37,880 --> 01:00:40,720
Speaker 1: to release some stuff in the previous several ran the

956
01:00:40,800 --> 01:00:44,680
Speaker 1: previous several So there is there is something something is

957
01:00:44,760 --> 01:00:48,920
Speaker 1: rotten in this particular Denmark, right, So are you planning

958
01:00:48,960 --> 01:00:51,520
Speaker 1: on going through these files? You can do it. You

959
01:00:51,520 --> 01:00:55,160
Speaker 1: can find them literally search new JFK files and you

960
01:00:55,160 --> 01:00:58,480
Speaker 1: will find the National Archives link that has a spreadsheet

961
01:00:58,520 --> 01:01:02,320
Speaker 1: in it, and it also has every single file on

962
01:01:02,320 --> 01:01:04,680
Speaker 1: that website. So if you have an Internet connection and

963
01:01:05,040 --> 01:01:07,400
Speaker 1: a little hotzpa, you can get in there and just

964
01:01:07,440 --> 01:01:09,920
Speaker 1: start doing it. Because I've been going through it for

965
01:01:09,920 --> 01:01:13,000
Speaker 1: the past several days just trying to find things, but

966
01:01:13,040 --> 01:01:16,200
Speaker 1: there's just too much. And like we said, you're going

967
01:01:16,240 --> 01:01:19,240
Speaker 1: to find all kinds of weird phrases in there. And

968
01:01:19,320 --> 01:01:21,600
Speaker 1: there's something I want to point everyone too if you're

969
01:01:21,600 --> 01:01:25,240
Speaker 1: going to look into this, it's the Merry Ferrell Foundations

970
01:01:25,360 --> 01:01:29,200
Speaker 1: CIA cryptomes two point z. It's a really cool website.

971
01:01:29,240 --> 01:01:31,120
Speaker 1: You can go to m A R Y F E

972
01:01:31,400 --> 01:01:33,400
Speaker 1: R R E l L dot org and you can

973
01:01:33,400 --> 01:01:36,880
Speaker 1: find this thing and it has a huge list that's

974
01:01:36,920 --> 01:01:41,120
Speaker 1: crowdsourced of all these different acronyms and stuff that are

975
01:01:41,240 --> 01:01:44,520
Speaker 1: used by all the intelligence agencies to represent certain things.

976
01:01:45,120 --> 01:01:48,200
Speaker 1: And it's fascinating when you go through these documents and

977
01:01:48,240 --> 01:01:50,320
Speaker 1: you see legend kind of like it actually gives you

978
01:01:50,320 --> 01:01:52,680
Speaker 1: like a little yeah, yeah, exactly, and it's it's not

979
01:01:52,760 --> 01:01:58,880
Speaker 1: just a you know, ibex ob ibex equals this or

980
01:01:59,040 --> 01:02:01,400
Speaker 1: you know, whatever it is. It gives you a full

981
01:02:01,400 --> 01:02:03,600
Speaker 1: description of all the different ways that it can be used,

982
01:02:03,680 --> 01:02:06,840
Speaker 1: things that it can refer to. It's it's really neat.

983
01:02:06,880 --> 01:02:09,080
Speaker 1: I'm on that as soon as we wrap here. So

984
01:02:09,160 --> 01:02:13,560
Speaker 1: tell us what you find and while you're online, find

985
01:02:13,640 --> 01:02:17,080
Speaker 1: us if you haven't already. You can find us on Instagram,

986
01:02:17,120 --> 01:02:18,920
Speaker 1: you can find us on Twitter, you can find us

987
01:02:18,960 --> 01:02:22,560
Speaker 1: on Facebook. We have names that are all approximations of

988
01:02:22,560 --> 01:02:26,360
Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff. Yes, you know, and we would love to

989
01:02:26,400 --> 01:02:31,360
Speaker 1: hear your opinion specifically. Have you already looked into this?

990
01:02:31,840 --> 01:02:34,640
Speaker 1: Do you think that there is something important yet to

991
01:02:34,760 --> 01:02:37,960
Speaker 1: be revealed? Did we miss something? Let us know and

992
01:02:37,960 --> 01:02:40,880
Speaker 1: we'll put it in the shout out. And speaking of

993
01:02:40,920 --> 01:02:44,560
Speaker 1: shout outs, we want to thank everybody who wrote in

994
01:02:45,000 --> 01:02:50,280
Speaker 1: to us via various different things, you know, social media,

995
01:02:51,000 --> 01:02:56,680
Speaker 1: snail mail, mirrors in the dark at midnight, cables, cables.

996
01:02:56,720 --> 01:02:59,560
Speaker 1: We see all of it in actually for this episode,

997
01:02:59,560 --> 01:03:01,880
Speaker 1: but it is on pretty excessively long, so we're going

998
01:03:01,920 --> 01:03:04,120
Speaker 1: to hold it back for the next one. But we

999
01:03:04,320 --> 01:03:06,000
Speaker 1: you know, I know, we don't do it every episode,

1000
01:03:06,000 --> 01:03:07,439
Speaker 1: but we're going to try to get back into doing

1001
01:03:07,440 --> 01:03:10,400
Speaker 1: the shout out corner. We have a we have a

1002
01:03:10,400 --> 01:03:15,200
Speaker 1: actually we have a a astonishing piece of correspondence that

1003
01:03:15,240 --> 01:03:18,400
Speaker 1: we received recently. Yes, and we want to give it

1004
01:03:18,400 --> 01:03:21,640
Speaker 1: its full do so please do tune in next week

1005
01:03:21,720 --> 01:03:27,680
Speaker 1: because unlike the US government, we actually release revelatory things.

1006
01:03:27,960 --> 01:03:30,160
Speaker 1: That's right until we get shout I was a sick

1007
01:03:30,200 --> 01:03:33,720
Speaker 1: burn on the US government. You know, I'm punchy today, man.

1008
01:03:33,160 --> 01:03:36,800
Speaker 1: And without actually going to shout out corner, we want

1009
01:03:36,840 --> 01:03:39,080
Speaker 1: to give a huge shout out to Samuel who sent

1010
01:03:39,200 --> 01:03:42,160
Speaker 1: us something in the snail mail. So can we just

1011
01:03:42,280 --> 01:03:45,000
Speaker 1: say what it is? Signet rings they go on your

1012
01:03:45,040 --> 01:03:48,480
Speaker 1: pinky and you can seal documents with wax with them. Yea.

1013
01:03:48,800 --> 01:03:51,400
Speaker 1: I took the one that has the alien head. I'm

1014
01:03:51,480 --> 01:03:54,480
Speaker 1: very excited about it. Mine's sort of like a looks

1015
01:03:54,520 --> 01:03:56,440
Speaker 1: sort of like a Coca Pele kind of figure. I

1016
01:03:56,440 --> 01:03:59,120
Speaker 1: don't think that's what it is, but Samuel, what is it?

1017
01:03:59,280 --> 01:04:01,360
Speaker 1: What's what's the squad ugly one. I took it because

1018
01:04:01,360 --> 01:04:02,959
Speaker 1: I thought it was neat looking, but I don't quite

1019
01:04:03,000 --> 01:04:07,000
Speaker 1: know what it is. Ben's yours is Illuminati triangle, right

1020
01:04:07,320 --> 01:04:11,080
Speaker 1: they all see nine yea. So we will put pictures

1021
01:04:11,200 --> 01:04:14,760
Speaker 1: of these rings up and go check us out on Instagram.

1022
01:04:15,960 --> 01:04:18,960
Speaker 1: And that's the end of this classic episode. If you

1023
01:04:19,040 --> 01:04:23,120
Speaker 1: have any thoughts or questions about this episode, you can

1024
01:04:23,160 --> 01:04:25,720
Speaker 1: get into contact with us in a number of different ways.

1025
01:04:25,960 --> 01:04:27,520
Speaker 1: One of the best is to give us a call.

1026
01:04:27,560 --> 01:04:31,680
Speaker 1: Our number is one eight three three stdwy t K.

1027
01:04:32,200 --> 01:04:34,000
Speaker 1: If you don't want to do that, you can send

1028
01:04:34,040 --> 01:04:37,320
Speaker 1: us a good old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at

1029
01:04:37,320 --> 01:04:41,240
Speaker 1: iHeartRadio dot com. Stuff they don't want you to know

1030
01:04:41,480 --> 01:04:44,640
Speaker 1: is a production of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from my

1031
01:04:44,760 --> 01:04:48,240
Speaker 1: heart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever

1032
01:04:48,320 --> 01:04:49,640
Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows.