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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Noah.

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Speaker 1: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 1: super producer Alexis code named Doc Holliday Jackson. Most importantly,

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Speaker 1: you are here. That makes this the stuff they don't

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Speaker 1: want you to know. It is the top of the

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Speaker 1: week as we hurdle headlong toward December, and oh gosh,

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Speaker 1: fellow conspiracy realists, there is so much strange news. Guys,

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Speaker 1: before we get into it. Kim Jongoon just got some

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Speaker 1: more international attention. He is begging the He's begging the

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Speaker 1: families and the women of the DPRK to have more children.

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Speaker 3: That's interesting. Isn't it better to have less children and

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Speaker 3: overpopulated parts of the world.

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Speaker 1: Well, Kim seems very very upset about it. He was

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Speaker 1: speaking at the fifth National Congress of Mothers and no

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Speaker 1: statement from the Kim dynasty regarding the quality of life

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Speaker 1: and the Democratic Republic is AI taking jobs from clergy.

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Speaker 1: The United Kingdom believes that your favorite spiritual guides may

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Speaker 1: soon be replaced by computers. But that's all just mentions.

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Speaker 1: We're going to talk about spying. We're going to talk

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Speaker 1: about the QAnon queen and Discordianism. What I would say,

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Speaker 1: social hacking for chaotic good purposes before we do any

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Speaker 1: of that. As many of us have probably heard recently,

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Speaker 1: for anybody who submitted their DNA to submitted their DNA

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Speaker 1: to learn more about themselves, you may have gotten some

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Speaker 1: troubling news quite recently.

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Speaker 2: Oh, yes, very troubling news. There's an incident that we

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Speaker 2: will speak of shortly before we even get into it,

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Speaker 2: Guys ran into a thing with this story that we've

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Speaker 2: run into before, and we've made a whole I think

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Speaker 2: we made a whole episode about it. Twenty three and

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Speaker 2: meters Holding Company is incorporated in guess where do you

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Speaker 2: think I have to accuse myself? Oh, you already know, Delaware,

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Speaker 2: But the address of their principal offices are in South

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Speaker 2: San Francisco, California. I've actually been to those offices with

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Speaker 2: my team and I've gotten the sales pitch directly from

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Speaker 2: high up people there about how safe everyone's personal information

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Speaker 2: is when you give something as you know, personal as

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Speaker 2: literally the stuff that makes up who you are and

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Speaker 2: what you are. Yeah, they were very adamant about that,

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Speaker 2: as any company collecting that kind of data was and

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Speaker 2: currently is would state that they are now and will

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Speaker 2: be in the future.

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Speaker 3: At least they will continue.

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Speaker 2: Saying that until something like this happens. Here's a news

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Speaker 2: story from tech Crunch on December first, twenty twenty three.

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Speaker 2: Quote twenty three and me says hackers accessed quote significant

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Speaker 2: number unquote of files about users ancestry. Okay, what does

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Speaker 2: that mean? Well, twenty three and me apparently on Friday,

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Speaker 2: December first, stated that hackers had accessed around fourteen thousand

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Speaker 2: customer accounts in a data breach of their I guess

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Speaker 2: their servers now. Fourteen thousand is roughly zero point one

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Speaker 2: percent of its nearly fourteen million customers worldwide. People who

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Speaker 2: have actually spit into one of those things and sent

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Speaker 2: it in to twenty three and meters. That seems like

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Speaker 2: not that many people. You know, that's teen thousand individuals

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Speaker 2: and potentially data about everything from their login information, their birthdays,

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Speaker 2: you know, user names, all that normal stuff, that normal

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Speaker 2: private information that you share with all the companies you

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Speaker 2: share it with. But this is again also potentially super

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Speaker 2: specific information about you and your DNA. Here's the weird thing, guys.

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Speaker 2: The only reason we know about this is because twenty

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Speaker 2: three and meters as a publicly traded company, has to

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Speaker 2: put forward these what do you call them reports about

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Speaker 2: all kinds of things, and one of the things they

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Speaker 2: have to report on are instances of hacking, right, or

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Speaker 2: weird stuff that's going on that might affect the price

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Speaker 2: of their stock, right, or.

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Speaker 3: The kind of stuff that comes out like in shareholders

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Speaker 3: meetings or like.

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Speaker 2: When this is like that, it's like yes, But this

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Speaker 2: one in particular is like, hey, here's a heads up

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Speaker 2: to the sec and it has to get published basically,

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Speaker 2: so everybody has to get access to that information because

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Speaker 2: it could again mess with share price or how the

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Speaker 2: company performs on like quarterly earnings or something.

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Speaker 1: It's weird. How informed consent does imply to investors?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, exactly, just to investors. But hey, if you

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Speaker 2: want to read it, you can find Form eight h

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Speaker 2: KA Amendment number one. It's the current report pursuant to

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Speaker 2: Section thirteen or fifteen D of the Securities Exchange Act

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Speaker 2: of nineteen thirty four. The date of the report is

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Speaker 2: October tenth, twenty twenty three.

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Speaker 1: That's a banger, stem to stern, you know what I mean.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, Well, and it's great too, because you know, it's

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Speaker 2: a report on something pretty serious that happened, right, a

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Speaker 2: data breach. But the way it's written, because it is

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Speaker 2: these official forums, you know, and the way it's written,

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Speaker 2: and it's just, oh, it's beautiful. I highly recommend you

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Speaker 2: read it. You get stuff like this. The information accessed

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Speaker 2: by the threat actor in the credential stuffed accounts varied

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Speaker 2: by user account and generally included ancestry information and for

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Speaker 2: a subset of those accounts, health related information based upon

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Speaker 2: the user's genetics. Okay, which is again scary, like that's

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Speaker 2: your super protected health information, right.

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Speaker 1: Hippa could never no, no.

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Speaker 2: No, and health information could be a lot of things.

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Speaker 2: Let's get to why this became a much bigger story. Initially,

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Speaker 2: it's reported by twenty three and me it's about fourteen

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Speaker 2: thousand users that get affected. Then three days later, on

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Speaker 2: December fourth, there's another tech Crunch article and I'm just

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Speaker 2: going to read you the headline ready, so stoked twenty

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Speaker 2: three and meters confirms hackers stole Ancestry data on six

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Speaker 2: point nine million users. Six point nine million. That's a

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Speaker 2: little bit bigger than fourteen thousand.

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Speaker 1: Now I'm not a math surgeon, but I am attempted

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Speaker 1: to agree with you. This is something we were talking

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Speaker 1: of air a little bit about as well, Like that's

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Speaker 1: a jump, right.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, So twenty three and meters initially said the hackers

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Speaker 2: stole zero point one percent of customers information about fourteen

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Speaker 2: thousand individuals. They also said that they're assessing all of that, right,

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Speaker 2: And they said hackers were also able to access quote

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Speaker 2: a significant number of files containing profile information about other

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Speaker 2: users Ancestry unquote, but it didn't say anything about how many.

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Speaker 1: That's a problem with family trees, right, Yeah, that's part

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Speaker 1: of it.

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Speaker 2: Well, it also goes back you guys, remember those conversations

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Speaker 2: we're having about metadata and Facebook and how the connection

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Speaker 2: of just you and then imagine one user on Facebook.

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Speaker 2: You now imagine all the people you're friends with. Now

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Speaker 2: imagine all the people each one of those individuals as

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Speaker 2: friends with.

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Speaker 1: Right.

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Speaker 3: That's funny because I was even thinking about a family

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Speaker 3: tree being a form of metadata.

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Speaker 2: In a way. Yeah, sure, it's connections to other individuals

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Speaker 2: that also have very private personal information on twenty three

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Speaker 2: and meters, and that information can get shared amongst users

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Speaker 2: with a special thing called the DNA Relatives feature.

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Speaker 1: Oh finally great, Yeah cool.

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Speaker 3: Is this an opt in opt out kind of scenario? Okay, okay,

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Speaker 3: it is.

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Speaker 1: I'm clocking you have to opt out, of course.

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Speaker 3: Yes, that's when I said opt in opt out. I

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Speaker 3: mainly met out.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's an optional thing that you can you can

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Speaker 2: choose to do. And within this it shares with other

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Speaker 2: people you connect with or match with. I guess it

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Speaker 2: shares your DNA relatives display name. So your display name, right,

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Speaker 2: how recently you logged into your account, your relationship labels

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Speaker 2: such as masculine, feminine, or neutral, your predicted relationship and

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Speaker 2: percentage of DNA shared with your match.

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Speaker 3: Right.

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Speaker 2: Your ancestry reports your matching DNA segments, which is another

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Speaker 2: option within the optional thing. Your location another option your

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Speaker 2: birth location and family names. Oh, it feels like you

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Speaker 2: could have some identity problems going on. Your profile picture,

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Speaker 2: your birth year, your entire family tree can be linked

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Speaker 2: in this section.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and this goes to so first off, for a

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Speaker 1: lot of people in the audience. You might be wondering tonight.

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Speaker 1: You might be saying, well, why do I care? Because

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Speaker 1: that is not, for instance, a credit card number, a

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Speaker 1: routing number, or account number, et cetera. The issue is

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Speaker 1: social engineering. Yes, now you get a much more effective

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Speaker 1: call from your great grand uncle Lucifius name I made up.

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Speaker 1: Apologize to Lucifius who you know. Maybe it's not Lucifius

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Speaker 1: calling you directly because he's quote unquote he's probably really dead.

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Speaker 1: And then it's no, it's his step kid.

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Speaker 2: Well, yeah, I know, you're right. And as messed up

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Speaker 2: as it sounds, social engineering used on other companies just

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Speaker 2: trying to extract little bits of information about you by

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Speaker 2: having a certain amount. Let's say you've got sixty eight

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Speaker 2: percent of the information you would need to really impersonate somebody.

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Speaker 2: Call a company. Now you've got some of that information,

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Speaker 2: and there maybe the person's really nice and feels for you.

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Speaker 2: Then they give you, oh, maybe an extra you know,

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Speaker 2: a birth date or a current address or an email.

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Speaker 2: It's just it's really scary.

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Speaker 1: You're right, you're absolutely right.

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Speaker 2: Well, I mean, it's just a thing that cannon does happen.

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Speaker 2: And Okay, so the big question is, how in the

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Speaker 2: heck did twenty three and meters get hacked? This significantly

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Speaker 2: if you go on their website, guys, oh my god,

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Speaker 2: there's so much on their website about data protection and

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Speaker 2: GDPR compliance stuff within the terms of service and the

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Speaker 2: India Ual Data Sharing consent forms and the research consent

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Speaker 2: documents that they've got on their website, all about how

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Speaker 2: protected your information is, specifically because users feel a certain

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Speaker 2: type of way about their DNA information.

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Speaker 3: Right, Sure, I think maybe you should.

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Speaker 2: But it's it's it's priority one, right. But the way

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Speaker 2: the hackers got in, you guys, it sounds awful. But

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Speaker 2: the way people got in, whoever this person or persons were,

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Speaker 2: it was a thing called credential stuffing, which is when

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Speaker 2: you use the same let's say, email and password for

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Speaker 2: multiple accounts. So let's say you're MySpace that you love

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Speaker 2: into years in.

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Speaker 3: Years racing hand here, just for the record, I'm definitely

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Speaker 3: that guy.

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Speaker 2: Well, what if you're using that same password on twenty

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Speaker 2: three and meters and that same email. Well, hey, that's

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Speaker 2: easy because your MySpace thing got hacked for two thousand

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Speaker 2: and eight, So like it's.

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Speaker 1: Just no, what what'll guess? One two three five.

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Speaker 2: Well, it doesn't even matter even even if that password

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Speaker 2: is like super strong. If it's the exact same password, yes, god.

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Speaker 3: And they've already got it, then it's just a matter

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Speaker 3: of it's a numbers game. It's just like, let's try

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Speaker 3: We know these things exist, let's just try it out.

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Speaker 3: For however, many instances there are accounts associated with this email, right.

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Speaker 2: So yes, So basically these hackers got access to fourteen

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Speaker 2: thousand individual accounts and then through that little family tree

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Speaker 2: of other information, just got six point nine million exponentials.

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Speaker 3: What that is?

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Speaker 1: Yeah, sure they Kevin baconed it.

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Speaker 2: That's exactly what they did. Oh and here's the other

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Speaker 2: thing after this. Guess what twenty three and meter is

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Speaker 2: requiring all users to use?

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Speaker 1: Oh, I know, you have to opt out of the

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Speaker 1: new arbitration agreement they came. Oh yeah, terms of service?

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Speaker 3: Are they probably requiring you to use a strong ass

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Speaker 3: word they create for you?

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Speaker 2: Well, first they made everybody update their passwords, but I like,

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Speaker 2: where you're going ben update your password? And now everybody

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Speaker 2: has to use two factor authentications. Oh finally, which is

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Speaker 2: like why anyone doesn't use that nowadays? Is kind of

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Speaker 2: a wonder but I guess it is a real pain

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Speaker 2: in the neck often for users and then also probably

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Speaker 2: for the company itself.

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Speaker 1: And consider the demographic. Not it's a profile, but what

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Speaker 1: we see in the human experience is that people largely

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Speaker 1: tend to become more invested in their past as they

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Speaker 1: are more confronted by their mortality. What I'm saying in

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Speaker 1: a very diplomatic way is that there is a large

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Speaker 1: proportion of biologically older users right who may not have

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Speaker 1: the same digital savvy that a lot of people enjoy

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Speaker 1: right benefit from.

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Speaker 2: Very very true, dude.

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Speaker 3: I mean, when you get into this kind of convo,

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Speaker 3: looted levels of like change your password every periodically or whatever,

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Speaker 3: and two factor, even the tech savvyest of us can

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Speaker 3: get overwhelmed by this stuff.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, for sure. For sure. It's not easy by

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Speaker 2: any means. There's so much more to talk about here, guys.

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Speaker 2: We went on a pretty deep dive into the story

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Speaker 2: as we were all reading about today and just going

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Speaker 2: back to the twenty three and meters like origin story

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Speaker 2: and looking at what the what the original reasoning for

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Speaker 2: creating the company was, and like how they were going

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Speaker 2: to make money and how important it was going to

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Speaker 2: be to get everybody's DNA voluntarily, because we're going to

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Speaker 2: provide a service to let you know who you are,

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Speaker 2: what's going on with your body, the you know, things

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Speaker 2: you might need to be thinking about or worrying about

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Speaker 2: in the future because you've got these genes. If there's

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Speaker 2: a big enough pool, we can learn enough about humanity

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Speaker 2: that then we can predict things, right.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, we could. We could save the world or save

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Speaker 1: more people from terrible diseases.

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Speaker 2: We could. We can even drugs specifically based on you know,

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Speaker 2: small pockets of people within that population, like guys, I

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Speaker 2: didn't know this. One of the main reasons that twenty

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Speaker 2: three and meters has had problems is because the FDA

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Speaker 2: won't allow them to share a ton of information about

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Speaker 2: you that is found in your DNA. They won't let them.

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Speaker 2: They're like, no, no, no, yeah, I know that's that

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Speaker 2: person's spit and that is that individual's you know, genetic makeup.

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Speaker 2: But you cannot tell them the stuff you found in there.

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Speaker 1: Why because it violates it violates earlier existing legislation and

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Speaker 1: also the.

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Speaker 3: Hippas for others liked why would you not be able

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Speaker 3: to find out your own stuff? I don't understand right.

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Speaker 1: It's again it's earlier existing legislation regarding the role of

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Speaker 1: a private company as it intersects with your rights as

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Speaker 1: a person, at least in the United States and granted

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Speaker 1: in the EU and other regions or other countries. These

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Speaker 1: laws may differ your genetic mileage, may vary or at

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Speaker 1: least your rights.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and one of the FDA's main points is that

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Speaker 2: if you get that genetic information back and then twenty

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Speaker 2: three and meters as a company says, hey, cervical cancer,

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Speaker 2: you may have like a seventeen percent higher chance of

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Speaker 2: getting that because of the way your DNA makeup is.

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Speaker 2: The FDA is worried that you would make choices about

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Speaker 2: your own healthcare or get operations done, or you know,

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Speaker 2: seek whatever treatment that isn't necessary, right, because they're not

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Speaker 2: a doctor diagnosing you with something. They're just a company saying, hey,

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Speaker 2: here's a percentage chance that you are whatever.

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Speaker 3: So it's sort of like a more elaborate version of

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Speaker 3: like WebMD, you know, just like obsessively like looking up

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Speaker 3: things on WebMD.

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Speaker 2: Kind of what is your DNA?

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Speaker 3: What the heck?

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Speaker 2: All right, guys, let's talk about this more one day

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Speaker 2: for now, let's hear a word from our sponsor and

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Speaker 2: we'll be right back with more strange news.

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Speaker 1: And we have returned. One important note for everyone who

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Speaker 1: has messed around with twenty three and Me, please know

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Speaker 1: that the arbitration thing is happening now. You have a

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Speaker 1: limited amount of time to contact them and opt out

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Speaker 1: of the arbitration policy, which will remove your rights immediately.

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Speaker 1: If you are concerned, contact all one word arbitration opt

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Speaker 1: out at twenty three and me dot com. And best

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Speaker 1: of luck to everyone involved.

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Speaker 2: Thanks for mentioning, Evan.

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Speaker 1: You're right, though, Matt. We need more people to know

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Speaker 1: about this, and it is an episode in the future.

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Speaker 1: Speaking of things people know and speaking of the moment

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Speaker 1: when they know them, I have some questions for our

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Speaker 1: fellow conspiracy realist and for you guys. The news broke

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Speaker 1: recently amid some ongoing chaos in the Latin American theater

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Speaker 1: that a guy named Victor Manuel Rocca, now retired from

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Speaker 1: decades of service as a diplomat in the National Security Council.

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Speaker 1: The Department of Justice DOJ were just broke that this

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Speaker 1: retired guy was moonlighting. He had a second job, and

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Speaker 1: it's not uncommon for public figures to have a second job, right,

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Speaker 1: like presidents do speeches and your local law enforcement named

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Speaker 1: moonlight at clubs, right, stuff like that.

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Speaker 3: Sure, but oftentimes there are clauses and employment agreements that

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Speaker 3: do prevent you from certain types of moonlighting that could

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Speaker 3: be conflicts of interest.

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Speaker 1: Right, Uh, nailed it. Yeah, that's what happened, because Uncle

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Speaker 1: Sam came out and said that this guy again, his

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Speaker 1: name is like Victor Manuel Rocca, has been charged and

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Speaker 1: arrested on suspicion of serving as a top spy an

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Speaker 1: infiltrator for the Cuban government for more than four decades,

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Speaker 1: forty years.

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Speaker 2: He really just did a bang up job. He got

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Speaker 2: him all that juicy info and now wait, hold on, right.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, so who's slapping his wrist? Yeah?

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Speaker 1: Probably somebody else in the cell pretty soon is going

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Speaker 1: to be slapping more than his risk slapping his wrist.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So this guy, uh, this guy, up until quite recently,

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Speaker 1: he was perceived to have a very strident, spotless public record,

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Speaker 1: both as a civilian and as a public servant. He

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Speaker 1: leaned in really hard, apparently into Trump support in his

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Speaker 1: later years because he retired fairly recently, and he got

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Speaker 1: to the point where people were saying, Hey, this guy's

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Speaker 1: little cartoonish about this, you know. And you can read

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Speaker 1: the full criminal complaint against him at Justice dot gov.

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Speaker 1: I'd like to go to some great work by Tim

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Speaker 1: Paget over at wlr INN in Miami and Tim Wrights,

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Speaker 1: the Tim Rights. The following This is the headline Tim Rights,

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Speaker 1: or the beginning paragraph. He says, a former US ambassador

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Speaker 1: in Latin America who lives in Miami was charged this

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Speaker 1: week for being a covert agent for Cuba for decades.

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Speaker 1: The mystery is what led him in that direction and

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Speaker 1: how much damage he may have done in the US.

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Speaker 1: And that's I don't know. I think before we go

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Speaker 1: any further, we have to acknowledge that post Cold War,

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Speaker 1: especially the United States has kind of been the bad

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Speaker 1: guy to Cuba, right Can we say that on a yeah?

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Speaker 3: Oh absolutely, in terms of the embargoes and all of

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Speaker 3: that stuff.

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Speaker 2: Right, Well, yeah, I mean the influence in Cuba before

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Speaker 2: the revolution.

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Speaker 3: I mean the perception is strong, yes, is that the

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Speaker 3: US is the bad guy?

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Speaker 2: I got you, Well, we haven't been friends. How about

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Speaker 2: that we haven't been good to them?

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Speaker 3: And I think I mentioned that there was a brief

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Speaker 3: moment where the borders opened up, and you know, Americans

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Speaker 3: were welcomed back into Cuba, and in that tiny amount

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Speaker 3: of time, my kid and their mom and stepdad visited

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Speaker 3: Cuba and then right after that trip shut right back up.

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Speaker 3: Just goes to show the tenuous nature of these types

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Speaker 3: of agreements.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, I had several close friends who also took advantage

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Speaker 1: of that, And I think during even during the official

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Speaker 1: closed down or before the brief opening of that civilian window,

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Speaker 1: there was still nonprofit travel. There's still military travel to Guantanamo.

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Speaker 1: When specific this guy was ambassador to Bolivia in two

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Speaker 1: thousand and two, like he was in the upper echelons,

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Speaker 1: he wasn't just some crooked consular officer sometimes stamping things

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Speaker 1: he should not have stamped. And yes, for any student

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Speaker 1: of presidential history here in the US, being ambassador Oblivion

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Speaker 1: two thousand and two means that he was active under

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Speaker 1: the George W. Bush administration. Again, super weird that that

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Speaker 1: guy's father was president and then he was in a

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Speaker 1: apparent democracy. So Rocca is leaning in hard to the

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Speaker 1: right wing area of American ideology as it sold to

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Speaker 1: the public. This means that if you have if you

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Speaker 1: have a Latin American leader who appears leftist, people like

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Speaker 1: Evomo rallies in Bolivia, or people like and I'm not

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Speaker 1: supporting these guys, but people who are you know, former

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Speaker 1: leaders of Venezuela like Ugo Chavez. Check out clips of

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Speaker 1: his morning show, which he did for quite some time.

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Speaker 1: This guy was all gased, no breaks against them. But

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Speaker 1: it appears the entire time, at least per the FBI

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Speaker 1: and per US authorities, he was maintaining some sort of ratline,

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Speaker 1: some sort of backdoor communication with Cuba. And what they're

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Speaker 1: saying in these complaints is that he purposely put himself

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Speaker 1: in a situation where he had access to non public information,

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Speaker 1: so not necessarily classified, not the stuff you can't know about,

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Speaker 1: but the stuff they don't want out yet, and he

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Speaker 1: was sharing that with Cuban intelligence, which means that they

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Speaker 1: were sharing that with their allies across the globe. Now

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Speaker 1: you might say, okay, look, I'm familiar with the United States.

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Speaker 1: I know that there have been quite a few public

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Speaker 1: figures of late who have clearly been compromised by foreign intelligence,

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Speaker 1: one of them, most notably being a former president of

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Speaker 1: the United States who is currently running for office again.

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Speaker 1: That is true, That entire statement is true. But the

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Speaker 1: question I have to ask here, the most immediate question,

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Speaker 1: Love you guys thoughts on this? What is like, what

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Speaker 1: are we defining as spying here? And what are we

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Speaker 1: defining as information? Was this guy damaging? Why did the

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Speaker 1: CIA call it? Or a former CIA case officer call

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Speaker 1: it the most damaging spy scandal in US history? Are

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Speaker 1: they making a mountain out of a molehill? Is there

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Speaker 1: more information we need?

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Speaker 2: I guess it's just a bit weird if it actually

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Speaker 2: did begin in nineteen seventy three, I think that's the

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Speaker 2: year right when he like allegedly made some trip and

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Speaker 2: became a quote good friend of the Cuban intelligence of

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Speaker 2: whatever Cuban intelligence apparatus. I mean, that's a lot of

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Speaker 2: time to be in like working through public offices in

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Speaker 2: the State Department, gathering intell at you know, all of

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Speaker 2: these different embassies, because he's how many embassies has he

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Speaker 2: worked out? Like, I don't even know it's it's it's

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Speaker 2: probably less than a dozen, but it's a lot.

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Speaker 1: Well that's still more than the average person, right, Yeah.

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Speaker 2: But I mean, what actions do you think could have

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Speaker 2: been taken from that stuff? Like if he's just assisting

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Speaker 2: the Republic of Cuba, what does that mean, right, Yeah.

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Speaker 1: That's a great question, Matt. What it means is that

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Speaker 1: it gives the Cuban government visibility on future plans. God,

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Speaker 1: it gives the government of Cuba the context of in

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Speaker 1: which those plans are germinated, in which they occur. And

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Speaker 1: so when he is arrested, the first time this is

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Speaker 1: reported in the West is by the Associated Press. When

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Speaker 1: he is arrested, we hear multiple diplomats, former peers of

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Speaker 1: his intelligence circles saying that they had no idea. They're

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Speaker 1: all saying he had the keys to the kingdom, he

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Speaker 1: had the crown jewels. If it's something had to do

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Speaker 1: with Cuba, this guy saw it. And I would also

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Speaker 1: shout out great work by four journalists over at the

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Speaker 1: New York Times, Glenn Thrush, Ernesto Londono, David c Adams,

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Speaker 1: and Francis Roebliz. You can read a great story about

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Speaker 1: this retired US diplomat accused of working as a secret

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Speaker 1: agent for Cuba. Attorney General Merrick Garland may be familiar

439
00:26:47,240 --> 00:26:48,119
Speaker 1: name to some people.

440
00:26:48,280 --> 00:26:48,720
Speaker 3: Merrick B.

441
00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:52,320
Speaker 1: Garland, excuse me, says that this is one of the

442
00:26:52,400 --> 00:26:57,440
Speaker 1: highest reaching, longest lasting infiltrations of the US government by

443
00:26:57,480 --> 00:27:01,560
Speaker 1: a foreign agent. So sorry, Russia, good hustle. You know

444
00:27:02,560 --> 00:27:05,280
Speaker 1: I love the Americans too, you guys. I get the

445
00:27:05,400 --> 00:27:10,399
Speaker 1: Mordecai Venanu stuff. This Roca has you guys. Uh, he

446
00:27:10,520 --> 00:27:12,439
Speaker 1: lapped you. He's got you at a loss.

447
00:27:12,680 --> 00:27:16,720
Speaker 2: I don't understand this spin. This guy who made it

448
00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:23,200
Speaker 2: this far undercover, like completely nobody knows, right, he tells

449
00:27:23,240 --> 00:27:25,400
Speaker 2: some undercover FBI.

450
00:27:25,200 --> 00:27:29,520
Speaker 1: A channels, Right, yeah, he says, I got some real

451
00:27:29,680 --> 00:27:30,719
Speaker 1: grand slams.

452
00:27:30,800 --> 00:27:31,360
Speaker 3: Isn't that the.

453
00:27:31,359 --> 00:27:32,520
Speaker 2: Quote something like that?

454
00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:36,880
Speaker 3: But that's that's like a perfect storm like conditions, right,

455
00:27:37,040 --> 00:27:40,760
Speaker 3: Like it seems a little suspects that that was just random.

456
00:27:41,160 --> 00:27:44,440
Speaker 2: Well, I just don't understand how you go through all

457
00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:46,640
Speaker 2: of what he's gone through, right, and then you just decide,

458
00:27:47,040 --> 00:27:50,199
Speaker 2: you know what, this looks like a good place for beans.

459
00:27:50,840 --> 00:27:53,600
Speaker 3: Still, he knew who he was talking to. It wasn't

460
00:27:53,680 --> 00:27:57,360
Speaker 3: like accidental, like well, well, no, it was an undercover

461
00:27:58,040 --> 00:28:01,600
Speaker 3: undercover you're saying that with all his training, you would

462
00:28:01,600 --> 00:28:03,280
Speaker 3: think he would have been able to sniff that out,

463
00:28:03,320 --> 00:28:06,480
Speaker 3: and then he wouldn't have been so loose lipped, therefore

464
00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:09,879
Speaker 3: sinking ships or just not tell anyone ever.

465
00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:13,080
Speaker 1: Yeah, just don't make it to the coffee shop, you

466
00:28:13,119 --> 00:28:16,400
Speaker 1: know what I mean. But that's what this is what

467
00:28:16,640 --> 00:28:21,320
Speaker 1: appears to have happened. To your point, Matt, he is

468
00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:25,919
Speaker 1: on record speaking with undercover FBI working in concert with

469
00:28:26,040 --> 00:28:29,840
Speaker 1: the CIA. There's a lot of alphabet soup here wherein

470
00:28:30,400 --> 00:28:33,919
Speaker 1: he is saying stuff like this was a real grand

471
00:28:33,960 --> 00:28:38,200
Speaker 1: slam for me. He's alluding to some of his activities

472
00:28:38,720 --> 00:28:42,160
Speaker 1: not just in not just in the Caribbean, Central and

473
00:28:42,200 --> 00:28:46,080
Speaker 1: South America, but also as far as far east as Italy.

474
00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:51,920
Speaker 1: The Department has brought more and more charges here. Here's

475
00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:54,760
Speaker 1: what I think, Here's what I pause, and I'm gonna

476
00:28:54,760 --> 00:28:58,760
Speaker 1: be again, this is absolutely honest. We have no proof

477
00:28:58,800 --> 00:29:05,840
Speaker 1: of this. I highly suspect that the US government knew

478
00:29:05,960 --> 00:29:11,040
Speaker 1: this guy was shaky far before the FBI said, oh,

479
00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:14,560
Speaker 1: we just found out about it a year ago. Because

480
00:29:15,360 --> 00:29:19,240
Speaker 1: if you are, if you are actually playing that kind

481
00:29:19,280 --> 00:29:23,720
Speaker 1: of reindeer game, then you're not going to expose a

482
00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:26,600
Speaker 1: vulnerability that you have caught. You're going to turn it

483
00:29:27,080 --> 00:29:30,600
Speaker 1: into an opportunity. And I posit to you also that

484
00:29:30,640 --> 00:29:36,160
Speaker 1: we see indeed a larger pattern of snapping down on

485
00:29:36,360 --> 00:29:41,280
Speaker 1: people that ordinarily would have been allowed to You know what,

486
00:29:41,320 --> 00:29:45,040
Speaker 1: It's like, this is so weird. It's like, it's like

487
00:29:45,120 --> 00:29:48,840
Speaker 1: tagging wild animals. It's like when biologists tag a bird

488
00:29:49,400 --> 00:29:51,200
Speaker 1: or you know, a tiger or something like.

489
00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:54,760
Speaker 3: You to check for radiation and environments and things.

490
00:29:54,840 --> 00:29:57,520
Speaker 1: You're still wild. Go do your thing, bro, you know,

491
00:29:57,960 --> 00:30:02,960
Speaker 1: and don't worry. Don't worry about that. Don't worry about

492
00:30:03,040 --> 00:30:05,760
Speaker 1: that black what is it usually like? Don't worry about

493
00:30:05,760 --> 00:30:09,120
Speaker 1: that black suv that's kind of lingering behind you at

494
00:30:09,120 --> 00:30:12,000
Speaker 1: the airport, right, because you're on your own.

495
00:30:12,080 --> 00:30:12,680
Speaker 3: You're wild.

496
00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:17,240
Speaker 1: You're so smart, bro, And we see a larger pattern.

497
00:30:17,440 --> 00:30:20,480
Speaker 1: I want to thank the New York Times for pointing

498
00:30:20,520 --> 00:30:23,440
Speaker 1: this out, because not as many sources are pointing this

499
00:30:23,520 --> 00:30:26,680
Speaker 1: out as they should. This comes on the heels of

500
00:30:26,960 --> 00:30:33,960
Speaker 1: other accusations of other charges. In October of twenty twenty three,

501
00:30:34,680 --> 00:30:40,200
Speaker 1: a New Jersey Senator, Robert Menendez, was charged with conspiring

502
00:30:40,320 --> 00:30:44,320
Speaker 1: to act as an agent of the Egyptian government. There

503
00:30:44,360 --> 00:30:47,760
Speaker 1: are foxes in the henhouse, right, But the question is

504
00:30:48,480 --> 00:30:53,040
Speaker 1: how long did Uncle Sam know about these conflicts of interest?

505
00:30:53,160 --> 00:30:58,080
Speaker 1: Your earlier phrase, and why, perhaps most importantly, why is

506
00:30:58,400 --> 00:31:02,440
Speaker 1: now the time to clamp down on these. That's the question.

507
00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:04,800
Speaker 2: It's a good one, do. I don't know why.

508
00:31:04,920 --> 00:31:06,920
Speaker 1: I think Matt put the word out. I think Matt,

509
00:31:07,000 --> 00:31:10,360
Speaker 1: I think you've got my eye on the spy.

510
00:31:10,640 --> 00:31:13,560
Speaker 2: You know what I'm saying, Ben can I really quickly?

511
00:31:14,000 --> 00:31:17,920
Speaker 2: And you shared an ABC News article for this story. Man,

512
00:31:18,440 --> 00:31:20,960
Speaker 2: I've was seeing this all the time, this kind of

513
00:31:21,040 --> 00:31:23,280
Speaker 2: thing in news stories. I'm just going to read a

514
00:31:23,360 --> 00:31:27,120
Speaker 2: quote here ready dot dot that later led to assignments

515
00:31:27,120 --> 00:31:31,200
Speaker 2: in Havana, Cuba between nineteen ninety five and nineteen ninety five.

516
00:31:31,800 --> 00:31:33,520
Speaker 3: What yeah, what?

517
00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:34,240
Speaker 2: Who wrote?

518
00:31:34,600 --> 00:31:37,920
Speaker 1: It's Mandela effect. It's a multiversal thing. It was a

519
00:31:38,160 --> 00:31:41,840
Speaker 1: nineteen ninety five in a different universe versus nineteen ninety

520
00:31:41,880 --> 00:31:45,200
Speaker 1: five in the current timeline. Everybody please check out the

521
00:31:45,240 --> 00:31:47,160
Speaker 1: amazing sci fi show Fringe.

522
00:31:48,440 --> 00:31:50,200
Speaker 3: It's been rewatching it lately. Holds up?

523
00:31:50,320 --> 00:31:54,160
Speaker 1: Wait really, I like I think too till the end

524
00:31:54,240 --> 00:31:54,800
Speaker 1: of the season.

525
00:31:54,840 --> 00:31:58,040
Speaker 3: But I have been watching them. The beginning is as

526
00:31:58,080 --> 00:31:59,760
Speaker 3: good as I remember it, being the one on the

527
00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:04,560
Speaker 3: air plane, in particular with the weird melty like people pilot. Yeah,

528
00:32:04,560 --> 00:32:06,960
Speaker 3: I know, the whole airplane's full of like weird corpses

529
00:32:07,040 --> 00:32:09,960
Speaker 3: that their skin is melted off and gone trans That

530
00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:11,600
Speaker 3: very first couple of episodes are great.

531
00:32:11,840 --> 00:32:15,120
Speaker 1: Yeah, my favorite is the flower based episode. I think

532
00:32:15,160 --> 00:32:17,960
Speaker 1: white tum, I think it's white to something like that.

533
00:32:18,000 --> 00:32:20,400
Speaker 1: It's beautiful, it's poetry on screen.

534
00:32:20,760 --> 00:32:24,280
Speaker 3: And the guy that plays the crazy scientist he eats

535
00:32:24,320 --> 00:32:27,160
Speaker 3: tomatoes very aggressively in the Lord of the Rings movie.

536
00:32:27,240 --> 00:32:28,440
Speaker 3: Just putting that out there.

537
00:32:28,320 --> 00:32:32,640
Speaker 1: Right, And so this guy broke up. He is not again,

538
00:32:32,880 --> 00:32:38,360
Speaker 1: he is not a low visibility figure to these authorities

539
00:32:38,400 --> 00:32:41,400
Speaker 1: that are now cracking down on him, just like the

540
00:32:41,480 --> 00:32:46,560
Speaker 1: senator who is charged for working with Egypt. This indictment

541
00:32:46,720 --> 00:32:51,520
Speaker 1: says that Roca unlawfully enriched himself or attempted to do

542
00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:58,080
Speaker 1: so while furthering the intelligence interest of Cuba. So does

543
00:32:58,120 --> 00:33:02,600
Speaker 1: that mean that he was spouting ideology to both sides

544
00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:05,880
Speaker 1: of the game and then making a pretty penny off

545
00:33:05,920 --> 00:33:11,400
Speaker 1: the like off the discrepancy. Probably. The indictments thirty eight pages,

546
00:33:11,480 --> 00:33:13,600
Speaker 1: you can read it online. We'll save you some time

547
00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:16,120
Speaker 1: because we're going to move on here. But what you

548
00:33:16,200 --> 00:33:21,000
Speaker 1: need to know, folks, is that there is no law

549
00:33:21,360 --> 00:33:27,280
Speaker 1: against your public officials making a lot of money by

550
00:33:27,320 --> 00:33:31,080
Speaker 1: breaking the same rules you were expected to follow Congress

551
00:33:31,160 --> 00:33:35,400
Speaker 1: is never going to have a substantive insider trading bill.

552
00:33:35,840 --> 00:33:40,080
Speaker 1: They're never going to apply it to themselves. And with this,

553
00:33:40,680 --> 00:33:42,480
Speaker 1: before we go to the break, I want to leave

554
00:33:42,520 --> 00:33:47,480
Speaker 1: you with a question, how many other folks are out there?

555
00:33:47,760 --> 00:33:50,240
Speaker 1: How long have they been operating, and why is the

556
00:33:50,360 --> 00:33:54,680
Speaker 1: US government choosing to point them out today? One A

557
00:33:54,800 --> 00:33:59,720
Speaker 1: three three STDWYTK Conspiracydiheartradio dot Com will be right back.

558
00:34:06,160 --> 00:34:10,480
Speaker 3: And we have returned with one final piece of strange news. Uh.

559
00:34:10,960 --> 00:34:13,080
Speaker 3: In the way of an update, We've We've done a

560
00:34:13,120 --> 00:34:17,120
Speaker 3: couple of updates on this topic, recently the QAnon Queen.

561
00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:19,839
Speaker 3: You all remember the q Andon Queen? Yeah?

562
00:34:19,840 --> 00:34:20,719
Speaker 2: Oh yeah?

563
00:34:20,360 --> 00:34:24,439
Speaker 3: Uh? Did did Dolo? Romana? Did Dolo? Have you guys

564
00:34:24,480 --> 00:34:27,280
Speaker 3: seen that a movie or read the book Doctor Sleep.

565
00:34:28,000 --> 00:34:29,920
Speaker 3: It's a it's sort of a I guess a sequel

566
00:34:29,960 --> 00:34:32,640
Speaker 3: to The Shining. I think it's one of Stephen King's

567
00:34:32,680 --> 00:34:35,399
Speaker 3: better Latter day books. And he does a good job

568
00:34:35,440 --> 00:34:37,880
Speaker 3: of incorporating a lot of the things about The Shining.

569
00:34:37,880 --> 00:34:40,000
Speaker 3: And it's nice to see where Danny ends up, and

570
00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:42,799
Speaker 3: he ends up a lot like Jack, but you know,

571
00:34:42,800 --> 00:34:45,280
Speaker 3: a little more of a benevolent version of Jack played

572
00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:49,000
Speaker 3: by Ewan McGregor in the film, which is directed by

573
00:34:49,080 --> 00:34:51,360
Speaker 3: Mike Flanagan, who has kind of become the you know,

574
00:34:51,680 --> 00:34:55,720
Speaker 3: more modern day torch bearer of like good Stephen King adaptations.

575
00:34:56,480 --> 00:35:00,120
Speaker 3: There in that book and in that movie, there's a

576
00:35:00,239 --> 00:35:05,600
Speaker 3: roving band of psychic vampires that live in caravans and

577
00:35:05,640 --> 00:35:09,319
Speaker 3: they rove around the United States looking for people that

578
00:35:09,400 --> 00:35:12,000
Speaker 3: possess the shining, you know that that ability, and they

579
00:35:12,040 --> 00:35:15,600
Speaker 3: sucked them dryer of their they seem the steam is

580
00:35:15,640 --> 00:35:19,120
Speaker 3: what they call it, right, so Didulo in her whole posse,

581
00:35:19,719 --> 00:35:25,120
Speaker 3: And they're weird like intimidation of Canada roving around in

582
00:35:25,200 --> 00:35:27,959
Speaker 3: these like motor homes. For some reason, in my mind,

583
00:35:28,160 --> 00:35:31,719
Speaker 3: I connect it to that in terms of just like, oh,

584
00:35:31,760 --> 00:35:33,640
Speaker 3: you don't want to see them rolling into your town.

585
00:35:34,360 --> 00:35:38,120
Speaker 3: And that was certainly the case when this group occupied

586
00:35:38,320 --> 00:35:44,520
Speaker 3: an abandoned school in a small town in Saskatchewan. Is

587
00:35:44,520 --> 00:35:47,000
Speaker 3: it Saskatoon? Do people say that? Is that just sort

588
00:35:47,000 --> 00:35:50,600
Speaker 3: of being funny or I think it's Saskatchewan. But we've

589
00:35:50,600 --> 00:35:52,160
Speaker 3: talked about that was the last thing we talked about,

590
00:35:52,160 --> 00:35:57,080
Speaker 3: where they essentially occupied an abandoned school in this very

591
00:35:57,120 --> 00:35:59,640
Speaker 3: very small town, like in the you know, numbering in

592
00:35:59,680 --> 00:36:04,279
Speaker 3: the thousands, like in terms of population, and we're you know,

593
00:36:04,400 --> 00:36:07,359
Speaker 3: using some really crazy intimidation tactics that were just kind

594
00:36:07,360 --> 00:36:10,560
Speaker 3: of spooky, like videoing the people of the town that

595
00:36:10,600 --> 00:36:13,200
Speaker 3: were watching them, you know, from the rooftops and like

596
00:36:13,320 --> 00:36:15,840
Speaker 3: setting out this like like do not cross this like

597
00:36:15,960 --> 00:36:19,120
Speaker 3: rope line kind of and just weird stuff. And just

598
00:36:19,360 --> 00:36:23,040
Speaker 3: for you know, by way of a quick reminder, this

599
00:36:23,160 --> 00:36:29,880
Speaker 3: whole posse led by Dodulo. They are QAnon believers, whatever

600
00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:31,840
Speaker 3: that means. That can be a lot of different things.

601
00:36:32,080 --> 00:36:35,040
Speaker 3: But Dedulo has convinced her followers that she is the

602
00:36:35,160 --> 00:36:39,480
Speaker 3: legitimate Queen of Canada and caused a lot of people

603
00:36:39,520 --> 00:36:41,799
Speaker 3: that have you know, fallen into her ranks to quit

604
00:36:41,840 --> 00:36:45,640
Speaker 3: their jobs. She was convinced convincing them that they would

605
00:36:45,719 --> 00:36:48,640
Speaker 3: you know, didn't have to pay their bills, and subsequently

606
00:36:48,680 --> 00:36:51,000
Speaker 3: a lot of them like lost their homes and had

607
00:36:51,040 --> 00:36:53,440
Speaker 3: their power turned off and their utilities turned off and

608
00:36:53,480 --> 00:36:55,840
Speaker 3: all of that. But as is often the case with

609
00:36:55,880 --> 00:36:58,640
Speaker 3: people that really go down the rabbit hole with cult leaders,

610
00:36:59,080 --> 00:37:01,640
Speaker 3: they still were in her corner, you know, even when

611
00:37:01,719 --> 00:37:04,840
Speaker 3: things went completely pear shaped in terms of their actual lives.

612
00:37:05,760 --> 00:37:09,879
Speaker 3: But it turns out that there are some people out there.

613
00:37:10,280 --> 00:37:13,759
Speaker 3: You maybe will recall that Dodula was using Telegram, which

614
00:37:13,800 --> 00:37:16,360
Speaker 3: is an app that's like an encrypted kind of chat

615
00:37:16,440 --> 00:37:20,320
Speaker 3: sort of app often used by drug dealers and folks

616
00:37:20,360 --> 00:37:22,799
Speaker 3: that don't want people to be able to access the

617
00:37:22,800 --> 00:37:25,719
Speaker 3: information that they're putting out there. Because it's encrypted, you

618
00:37:25,760 --> 00:37:28,600
Speaker 3: have to be invited to these private channels. And Dodulo

619
00:37:28,719 --> 00:37:32,240
Speaker 3: was using Telegram in order to spread her doctrine, whatever

620
00:37:32,280 --> 00:37:34,520
Speaker 3: it might be. And let's be honest, it's very vague

621
00:37:34,640 --> 00:37:38,279
Speaker 3: what her whole, you know, thing is. And there are

622
00:37:38,320 --> 00:37:41,359
Speaker 3: some I guess you could call them benevolent trolls out

623
00:37:41,360 --> 00:37:45,440
Speaker 3: there that are trying to shut her down by infiltrating

624
00:37:45,520 --> 00:37:49,040
Speaker 3: her telegram exchanges. And I think that's pretty interesting. So

625
00:37:49,160 --> 00:37:53,800
Speaker 3: Vice mac Lemoreux reports in Vice, I'll just read the headline,

626
00:37:53,840 --> 00:37:59,000
Speaker 3: trolls tricked the QAnon queen's followers into volunteering to kill

627
00:38:00,800 --> 00:38:04,000
Speaker 3: So a lot of times, these types of leaders, they'll

628
00:38:04,760 --> 00:38:09,200
Speaker 3: really just straddle the boundary between legal and illegal. You know,

629
00:38:09,280 --> 00:38:13,319
Speaker 3: they'll invite people to make up their own minds, but

630
00:38:13,360 --> 00:38:18,000
Speaker 3: they won't outright say do this illegal thing. But if

631
00:38:18,040 --> 00:38:20,279
Speaker 3: you are able to kind of game the system, like

632
00:38:20,320 --> 00:38:22,600
Speaker 3: these benevolent trolls have been able to do. You can

633
00:38:22,680 --> 00:38:27,560
Speaker 3: get folks following these types of people to basically admit to, yeah,

634
00:38:27,640 --> 00:38:31,320
Speaker 3: I will do this absolutely illegal thing that could cause

635
00:38:32,120 --> 00:38:33,880
Speaker 3: a kind of sea change in terms of like the

636
00:38:33,880 --> 00:38:37,279
Speaker 3: way the authorities are viewing these types of folks. So

637
00:38:37,880 --> 00:38:42,360
Speaker 3: shortly after Romana Dedulo set up a new group on

638
00:38:42,520 --> 00:38:47,719
Speaker 3: telegram that she titled Volunteer, Peace, Prosperity and Love Officers.

639
00:38:48,320 --> 00:38:51,640
Speaker 3: This is sort of a way to organize followers by region.

640
00:38:53,080 --> 00:38:58,120
Speaker 3: Another little subgroup popped up that had a very specifically

641
00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:02,319
Speaker 3: violent bent, and it was intended to recruit what the

642
00:39:02,520 --> 00:39:07,120
Speaker 3: thread or the group referred to as military tribunal officers

643
00:39:07,400 --> 00:39:12,400
Speaker 3: who would essentially act as judge, jury, and executioner for

644
00:39:12,719 --> 00:39:17,560
Speaker 3: Dedulo and her aims, you know, her goals, because one

645
00:39:17,560 --> 00:39:20,200
Speaker 3: thing that we maybe remember is that she was very

646
00:39:20,320 --> 00:39:25,000
Speaker 3: much saying that we need to take down anyone that

647
00:39:25,040 --> 00:39:29,239
Speaker 3: opposes us. So what this group is essentially done is

648
00:39:29,480 --> 00:39:32,560
Speaker 3: get people to come out of the woodwork and say, yes, yes,

649
00:39:32,640 --> 00:39:38,520
Speaker 3: I will absolutely murder people for this cause, which you know,

650
00:39:38,719 --> 00:39:41,839
Speaker 3: as you can imagine, especially if you've got someone that's

651
00:39:42,239 --> 00:39:46,400
Speaker 3: you know, benevolent, they will share this information via screenshots

652
00:39:46,440 --> 00:39:49,000
Speaker 3: which you can find on the Vice article, and show

653
00:39:49,120 --> 00:39:51,759
Speaker 3: that there are people within this group that intend to

654
00:39:52,239 --> 00:39:55,919
Speaker 3: do harm to officials, to people that you know would

655
00:39:55,920 --> 00:39:59,800
Speaker 3: oppose this group. So within this new subgroup that was

656
00:40:00,200 --> 00:40:02,880
Speaker 3: and you have folks responding with things like I would

657
00:40:02,920 --> 00:40:05,120
Speaker 3: like to get the show on the road as much

658
00:40:05,120 --> 00:40:07,360
Speaker 3: as the next person, but I am not sure that

659
00:40:07,360 --> 00:40:09,680
Speaker 3: this is something I want to have on my conscience.

660
00:40:09,840 --> 00:40:13,160
Speaker 3: That being said, I also know this needs to be done.

661
00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:16,319
Speaker 1: Oh shout out Clyde barrowly.

662
00:40:17,160 --> 00:40:21,200
Speaker 3: Great, great, very good handle Clyde Barrow being a bonnie

663
00:40:21,239 --> 00:40:25,880
Speaker 3: and Clyde very famous mass murderer, right and criminal. So

664
00:40:26,000 --> 00:40:28,960
Speaker 3: within this group, at this point, people start bandying back

665
00:40:28,960 --> 00:40:33,320
Speaker 3: and forth. How can we kill our enemies without being

666
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:36,240
Speaker 3: too obvious about it? And this is maybe my favorite

667
00:40:36,280 --> 00:40:41,800
Speaker 3: part is one of the popular methods was taking people

668
00:40:41,960 --> 00:40:45,880
Speaker 3: out into the Alaskan wilderness and leaving them to be

669
00:40:46,000 --> 00:40:47,600
Speaker 3: devoured by polar bears.

670
00:40:48,040 --> 00:40:52,960
Speaker 2: See here's my problem. How can you differentiate someone who

671
00:40:53,000 --> 00:40:55,359
Speaker 2: is actually a part of the group from someone who

672
00:40:55,440 --> 00:40:59,160
Speaker 2: was on their toatrol because that quotation could be from

673
00:40:59,480 --> 00:41:00,879
Speaker 2: an uber control on there.

674
00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:04,600
Speaker 3: Right, Absolutely, it's a good point, but at the end

675
00:41:04,600 --> 00:41:08,960
Speaker 3: of the day, this effort is still kind of interesting, right,

676
00:41:09,640 --> 00:41:10,640
Speaker 3: can we at least agree with that?

677
00:41:11,840 --> 00:41:13,880
Speaker 2: I guess what I mean is like, once you begin

678
00:41:13,960 --> 00:41:16,520
Speaker 2: the troll in mass like you've got.

679
00:41:17,600 --> 00:41:20,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, especially when you're hiding behind a you know, a

680
00:41:20,080 --> 00:41:24,799
Speaker 3: non discreen like, there's really no way to determine who

681
00:41:24,840 --> 00:41:28,560
Speaker 3: you actually are and how serious you actually are. And honestly,

682
00:41:28,680 --> 00:41:32,800
Speaker 3: it's not like, short of cyber let's say, forensic techniques,

683
00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:35,279
Speaker 3: can you actually trace this stuff down to an individual.

684
00:41:35,480 --> 00:41:37,319
Speaker 3: And part of the whole deal with telegram is that

685
00:41:37,320 --> 00:41:40,360
Speaker 3: you kind of can't do that unless there are methods

686
00:41:40,360 --> 00:41:41,960
Speaker 3: that I'm not aware of. The whole deal is that

687
00:41:42,000 --> 00:41:44,040
Speaker 3: it's you know, encrypted, But.

688
00:41:44,160 --> 00:41:47,879
Speaker 1: Add to by the way the just interjector add to

689
00:41:47,920 --> 00:41:51,320
Speaker 1: the fact that by the nature of what you're describing

690
00:41:51,360 --> 00:41:57,280
Speaker 1: there with Telegram, with any encrypted or encrypted app, there's

691
00:41:57,600 --> 00:42:04,080
Speaker 1: also no kind of there's no real barrier to infiltration. Sure,

692
00:42:04,080 --> 00:42:08,399
Speaker 1: so it's super easy to it's super easy to even

693
00:42:08,440 --> 00:42:10,600
Speaker 1: if you agree with the cause, it's super easy to

694
00:42:10,640 --> 00:42:13,359
Speaker 1: be an armchair warrior. There are probably a lot more

695
00:42:13,400 --> 00:42:19,320
Speaker 1: people online who see themselves as a supporter, loyal subject

696
00:42:19,560 --> 00:42:23,320
Speaker 1: of the q Aton queen who had never visited even Canada.

697
00:42:23,840 --> 00:42:27,440
Speaker 3: That's very true. And this reminds me of the Riddler

698
00:42:27,560 --> 00:42:32,280
Speaker 3: character in the Batman movie and how that person used

699
00:42:32,360 --> 00:42:35,560
Speaker 3: social media, and you know, probably it's I think it

700
00:42:35,600 --> 00:42:38,160
Speaker 3: was sort of an encrypted kind of like you know,

701
00:42:38,320 --> 00:42:41,120
Speaker 3: peer to peer kind of chat that he used to

702
00:42:41,200 --> 00:42:45,160
Speaker 3: coordinate what ultimately was a terrorist attack. But you can't

703
00:42:45,239 --> 00:42:49,200
Speaker 3: to your point, Matt, you can't really differentiate between bluster

704
00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:53,360
Speaker 3: and actual action until you do the action. You just

705
00:42:53,480 --> 00:42:56,840
Speaker 3: can't write. But this person, Dogwood, who I think is

706
00:42:56,880 --> 00:42:59,600
Speaker 3: the sort of brains behind this whole, you know, attempt

707
00:42:59,680 --> 00:43:03,280
Speaker 3: to expose some of these members. This is what Dogwood

708
00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:06,040
Speaker 3: had to say. And Dogwood used their screen name to

709
00:43:06,080 --> 00:43:10,120
Speaker 3: protect themselves from any you know, fallout or damage to

710
00:43:10,160 --> 00:43:14,080
Speaker 3: their career. It did expose some of the bloodthirsty nature

711
00:43:14,120 --> 00:43:17,600
Speaker 3: of the followers. It showed how dangerous these people really are.

712
00:43:17,960 --> 00:43:20,600
Speaker 3: They can be told anything by the cult leader and

713
00:43:20,680 --> 00:43:23,480
Speaker 3: they believe her and act on her orders.

714
00:43:23,840 --> 00:43:24,040
Speaker 2: Wow.

715
00:43:24,600 --> 00:43:26,640
Speaker 3: And it would seem that this is something that this

716
00:43:26,880 --> 00:43:31,399
Speaker 3: Dogwood and their ilk or they're like do kind of

717
00:43:31,480 --> 00:43:33,880
Speaker 3: on a regular basis. It's sort of like a white

718
00:43:33,920 --> 00:43:37,360
Speaker 3: hat kind of hacker kind of mentality, I guess where

719
00:43:37,560 --> 00:43:40,600
Speaker 3: you were, you know, again, to your point, like infiltrate

720
00:43:40,719 --> 00:43:43,680
Speaker 3: is maybe a strong word, because all you have to

721
00:43:43,680 --> 00:43:46,160
Speaker 3: do is just join the group or get an invite

722
00:43:46,239 --> 00:43:48,600
Speaker 3: or whatever. I mean, it's not that hard to get

723
00:43:48,640 --> 00:43:51,080
Speaker 3: an invite to a telegram channel, because what do cult

724
00:43:51,120 --> 00:43:53,520
Speaker 3: leaders want to do. They want to recruit people, so

725
00:43:53,680 --> 00:43:57,480
Speaker 3: they're not always vetting people that are like becoming members

726
00:43:57,520 --> 00:43:59,960
Speaker 3: of their channel. They want to have as many people

727
00:44:00,080 --> 00:44:01,759
Speaker 3: as they as they can, and as long as you're

728
00:44:02,160 --> 00:44:05,400
Speaker 3: seeming to be, you know, of their way of thinking,

729
00:44:05,440 --> 00:44:08,399
Speaker 3: then they're probably going to welcome you in. But Ben,

730
00:44:08,480 --> 00:44:10,560
Speaker 3: you you found a really good quote I believe also

731
00:44:10,600 --> 00:44:14,000
Speaker 3: in the Vice article that sort of you know, spells

732
00:44:14,040 --> 00:44:16,239
Speaker 3: out this Dogwood's mentality.

733
00:44:16,400 --> 00:44:19,799
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, Well, to your point, from the idea of

734
00:44:20,440 --> 00:44:26,080
Speaker 1: recreational discordianism, right acting as an agent of chaotic good,

735
00:44:26,920 --> 00:44:32,759
Speaker 1: Dogwood points out that they are doing this somewhat recreationally,

736
00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:35,120
Speaker 1: they're not being paid to do so. I think the

737
00:44:35,200 --> 00:44:38,440
Speaker 1: quote you're referring to is specifically where Dogwood says, who

738
00:44:38,560 --> 00:44:41,720
Speaker 1: is identified as male in this Vice article says, quote,

739
00:44:41,800 --> 00:44:46,480
Speaker 1: some people play video games, we infiltrate cults, which is

740
00:44:46,600 --> 00:44:49,200
Speaker 1: kind of cool. It's something to think about the next time,

741
00:44:49,239 --> 00:44:52,839
Speaker 1: you know, like Doc and me or deep in Starfield logistics.

742
00:44:53,120 --> 00:44:58,000
Speaker 1: Maybe if the game gets too complicated or whatever, Dark

743
00:44:58,040 --> 00:45:00,919
Speaker 1: Souls or whatever, No Man's Sky or playing guys, maybe

744
00:45:00,920 --> 00:45:05,319
Speaker 1: we should all just team up and infiltrate Occult's telegram.

745
00:45:04,840 --> 00:45:08,400
Speaker 3: Parlay that energy into like something that could potentially, you know,

746
00:45:08,480 --> 00:45:09,320
Speaker 3: yield dividends.

747
00:45:09,880 --> 00:45:13,120
Speaker 1: Let's work for Cuba. You know, surely they've got to telegram.

748
00:45:13,360 --> 00:45:14,600
Speaker 1: We'll never get caught.

749
00:45:14,719 --> 00:45:18,439
Speaker 3: Well, And there's another interesting quote from Dogwood is they

750
00:45:18,480 --> 00:45:22,440
Speaker 3: prey on vulnerable people. We are vastly smarter than this cult,

751
00:45:22,600 --> 00:45:27,520
Speaker 3: especially on a ridiculous, childish platform like telegram. They're always

752
00:45:27,600 --> 00:45:30,760
Speaker 3: there to expose them, point out their falsehoods, and track

753
00:45:30,840 --> 00:45:34,719
Speaker 3: their locations. It's to take our nations of Canada and

754
00:45:34,760 --> 00:45:38,680
Speaker 3: the US back from the pandemic vultures of the Internet.

755
00:45:38,960 --> 00:45:43,960
Speaker 1: I love that frame itself. Vultures so good, perfectly poetically

756
00:45:44,080 --> 00:45:50,800
Speaker 1: encapsulates so many grifts that occurred during the COVID shutdown.

757
00:45:50,880 --> 00:45:53,240
Speaker 1: And by the way, I think it's important for everybody

758
00:45:53,360 --> 00:45:58,839
Speaker 1: realize COVID continues. Mass media minds it continues, but also

759
00:45:58,960 --> 00:46:01,520
Speaker 1: mass media is severely downplaying it.

760
00:46:03,800 --> 00:46:06,400
Speaker 3: You're saying the reality of COVID, the virus, but also

761
00:46:06,560 --> 00:46:12,000
Speaker 3: the fallout psychologically of COVID continues. That is what QAnon is,

762
00:46:12,080 --> 00:46:15,000
Speaker 3: I would argue, is what allowed it to flourish was

763
00:46:15,040 --> 00:46:18,400
Speaker 3: people being pent up and having nowhere to funnel this

764
00:46:18,520 --> 00:46:20,160
Speaker 3: aggression and this anxiety.

765
00:46:20,239 --> 00:46:23,320
Speaker 1: You know, there's definitely some gas, some high octane gas

766
00:46:23,320 --> 00:46:26,240
Speaker 1: in the tank, right. No, as you guys know, we've

767
00:46:26,280 --> 00:46:31,440
Speaker 1: also received some updates from our Canadian conspiracy realist, some

768
00:46:31,520 --> 00:46:35,400
Speaker 1: of whom do live around Saskatoon, which I think is

769
00:46:35,440 --> 00:46:38,520
Speaker 1: that is that the biggest city in Saskatchewan. Is that correct?

770
00:46:38,640 --> 00:46:43,000
Speaker 3: It is in Saskatchewan. It is in Richmond. Uh, Saskatchewan

771
00:46:43,440 --> 00:46:48,879
Speaker 3: is the province Richmond, Yeah, and Saskatoon is something else.

772
00:46:48,960 --> 00:46:53,080
Speaker 1: That's why is the largest city in the province of Saskatchewan.

773
00:46:53,400 --> 00:46:57,440
Speaker 1: But I think we're all grateful right to the to

774
00:46:57,600 --> 00:47:00,200
Speaker 1: our neighbors to the north who have been given you know,

775
00:47:00,400 --> 00:47:04,960
Speaker 1: these updates sometimes that don't make the don't make the

776
00:47:05,040 --> 00:47:06,879
Speaker 1: mass media news.

777
00:47:06,600 --> 00:47:10,160
Speaker 3: And absolutely not. Honestly, it's this person advice that's that's

778
00:47:10,239 --> 00:47:12,759
Speaker 3: largely if you look up the story about the QAnon queen,

779
00:47:13,080 --> 00:47:15,880
Speaker 3: it's this one person, Mark Lemaru, who's been like, you know,

780
00:47:15,960 --> 00:47:19,920
Speaker 3: really leading the charge into this research. Absolutely, and I

781
00:47:19,960 --> 00:47:22,839
Speaker 3: think this is a this is endemic of something that

782
00:47:23,080 --> 00:47:26,080
Speaker 3: maybe we have given a pass to, or at the

783
00:47:26,160 --> 00:47:29,120
Speaker 3: very least sort of brushed aside because we don't take

784
00:47:29,160 --> 00:47:32,239
Speaker 3: it that seriously. And maybe you know, this is a

785
00:47:32,360 --> 00:47:35,319
Speaker 3: niche kind of thing, but what do niche things do.

786
00:47:35,560 --> 00:47:40,319
Speaker 3: They blossom and they metastasize if left unchecked. So I

787
00:47:40,320 --> 00:47:42,480
Speaker 3: think it's something that's very important to keep an eye on,

788
00:47:42,760 --> 00:47:44,719
Speaker 3: and and just to to go back really quickly for

789
00:47:44,760 --> 00:47:49,240
Speaker 3: one more update. The occupation of that school in Richmond.

790
00:47:49,680 --> 00:47:53,600
Speaker 3: I think due to a fire code violation, they were

791
00:47:53,840 --> 00:47:56,560
Speaker 3: kind of chased out. It was something like there was

792
00:47:56,600 --> 00:47:59,600
Speaker 3: a video that showed a like a heater or something

793
00:47:59,680 --> 00:48:03,279
Speaker 3: leading against some sort of propane tank, and an inspector

794
00:48:03,400 --> 00:48:05,600
Speaker 3: came and said, y'all got to go because I think

795
00:48:05,640 --> 00:48:09,120
Speaker 3: they were exercising squatters' rights. I think that was sort

796
00:48:09,120 --> 00:48:10,880
Speaker 3: of what it was that sort of allowed them to

797
00:48:10,920 --> 00:48:14,400
Speaker 3: be quote unquote legitimate in their occupation of that that

798
00:48:14,520 --> 00:48:18,600
Speaker 3: space because it had been abandoned for so long and

799
00:48:18,640 --> 00:48:21,759
Speaker 3: they weren't actually hurting anybody or threatening anybody directly. It

800
00:48:21,800 --> 00:48:24,520
Speaker 3: was more like they were menacing people with their camera

801
00:48:24,560 --> 00:48:25,280
Speaker 3: phones and stuff.

802
00:48:25,440 --> 00:48:29,319
Speaker 1: But similar to Waco, right, it is. Yes, there were

803
00:48:29,600 --> 00:48:36,440
Speaker 1: outward threatening people at first, but internally an apocalyptic narrative

804
00:48:36,840 --> 00:48:37,680
Speaker 1: that's exactly right.

805
00:48:37,960 --> 00:48:42,719
Speaker 3: And apparently they have left this school in Richmond, but

806
00:48:42,760 --> 00:48:46,960
Speaker 3: they haven't gone far. There is a farm, another abandoned space,

807
00:48:47,000 --> 00:48:50,000
Speaker 3: I believe, nearby, and a lot of the locals there

808
00:48:50,000 --> 00:48:52,520
Speaker 3: in Richmond are concerned they're going to come back. So

809
00:48:53,080 --> 00:48:57,120
Speaker 3: I think we end this one there. It's very interesting

810
00:48:57,160 --> 00:49:00,239
Speaker 3: stuff and very eerie and again a huge shot out

811
00:49:00,280 --> 00:49:04,480
Speaker 3: to mac lemerou Lemereau. Forgive me if I'm mispronouncing your name,

812
00:49:04,480 --> 00:49:07,040
Speaker 3: but because I think this is a very important work,

813
00:49:07,400 --> 00:49:11,200
Speaker 3: and whether or not this person is going to take

814
00:49:11,239 --> 00:49:14,960
Speaker 3: over the whole of Canada or the world, there are

815
00:49:15,360 --> 00:49:19,480
Speaker 3: people that think this person has something of value to say,

816
00:49:20,000 --> 00:49:22,719
Speaker 3: and that's kind of scary. Agreed.

817
00:49:23,239 --> 00:49:27,919
Speaker 1: Adding some more frightening frightening yule to the log here,

818
00:49:28,600 --> 00:49:32,840
Speaker 1: How we have to wonder how many cultic organizations don't

819
00:49:32,840 --> 00:49:35,799
Speaker 1: get mass media attention because they are not attached to

820
00:49:35,880 --> 00:49:39,560
Speaker 1: viral headlines like QAnon or other buzzwords. Let us know

821
00:49:39,640 --> 00:49:42,160
Speaker 1: what's going on in your neck of the woods. Let

822
00:49:42,239 --> 00:49:45,640
Speaker 1: us know your experience with twenty three and me, and

823
00:49:46,120 --> 00:49:49,160
Speaker 1: you know, if you are currently spying for a government

824
00:49:49,239 --> 00:49:52,200
Speaker 1: while working as a US official, why not give us

825
00:49:52,239 --> 00:49:52,680
Speaker 1: a shout.

826
00:49:52,840 --> 00:49:54,440
Speaker 3: We'd love to hear from you.

827
00:49:54,680 --> 00:49:58,000
Speaker 1: We promised not to snitch. Fingers crossed. There are a

828
00:49:58,040 --> 00:49:59,520
Speaker 1: lot of ways to find us online.

829
00:49:59,560 --> 00:50:01,759
Speaker 3: That's right. You can find us at the handle conspiracy

830
00:50:01,800 --> 00:50:07,319
Speaker 3: Stuff on x Facebook and YouTube, Conspiracy Stuff show on

831
00:50:07,440 --> 00:50:08,600
Speaker 3: Instagram and TikTok.

832
00:50:08,800 --> 00:50:11,319
Speaker 2: Hey, we have a phone number. It is one eight

833
00:50:11,480 --> 00:50:16,279
Speaker 2: three three STDWYTK. When you call in, give yourself a

834
00:50:16,280 --> 00:50:19,120
Speaker 2: cool nickname. You've got three minutes. Say whatever you'd like.

835
00:50:19,200 --> 00:50:20,919
Speaker 2: We just can't wait to hear what you're gonna say.

836
00:50:20,920 --> 00:50:23,799
Speaker 2: We just can't wait. If you don't want to do that,

837
00:50:23,880 --> 00:50:25,800
Speaker 2: why not instead send us an email.

838
00:50:26,040 --> 00:50:47,200
Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

839
00:50:47,400 --> 00:50:49,440
Speaker 2: Stuff they Don't want you to Know is a production

840
00:50:49,560 --> 00:50:54,080
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

841
00:50:54,160 --> 00:50:57,399
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.