1 00:00:03,360 --> 00:00:06,480 Speaker 1: I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea. I was a 2 00:00:06,519 --> 00:00:09,800 Speaker 1: CIA officer stationed around the world in high threat posts 3 00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:11,559 Speaker 1: in Europe, Russia, and in Asia. 4 00:00:11,600 --> 00:00:14,680 Speaker 2: And I served in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East 5 00:00:14,760 --> 00:00:18,840 Speaker 2: and in war zones. We sometimes created conspiracies to deceive 6 00:00:18,880 --> 00:00:19,799 Speaker 2: our adversaries. 7 00:00:20,079 --> 00:00:23,760 Speaker 1: Now we're going to use our expertise to deconstruct conspiracy 8 00:00:23,800 --> 00:00:25,560 Speaker 1: theories large and small. 9 00:00:25,840 --> 00:00:26,720 Speaker 3: Could they be true? 10 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:28,280 Speaker 2: Or are we being manipulated? 11 00:00:28,800 --> 00:00:30,880 Speaker 1: This is mission implausible. 12 00:00:33,920 --> 00:00:36,800 Speaker 2: So today I'd like to welcome Darren Linnville, the co 13 00:00:36,920 --> 00:00:41,920 Speaker 2: director of Clempton University's Social Media Hub. And you study 14 00:00:42,720 --> 00:00:46,800 Speaker 2: fact based, theta driven stuff about conspiracy theories and social 15 00:00:46,880 --> 00:00:49,519 Speaker 2: media and misinformation, and. 16 00:00:49,680 --> 00:00:50,960 Speaker 1: You study stuff stuff. 17 00:00:51,520 --> 00:00:54,160 Speaker 4: I do feel that way sometimes, but yeah, study stuff. 18 00:00:54,160 --> 00:00:56,560 Speaker 4: We go down a lot of rabbit holes and it's 19 00:00:56,600 --> 00:00:58,520 Speaker 4: taking us somewhere different every other day. 20 00:00:58,800 --> 00:01:00,920 Speaker 2: So so, Dar, I guess the first question what everybody 21 00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:03,840 Speaker 2: wants to know is for you to prove to us 22 00:01:04,120 --> 00:01:08,120 Speaker 2: that Joe Biden is not a robotic clone and was 23 00:01:08,160 --> 00:01:12,000 Speaker 2: it executed in twenty twenty? Can you definitively prove that 24 00:01:12,000 --> 00:01:13,360 Speaker 2: that's untrue? Right now? 25 00:01:13,800 --> 00:01:14,959 Speaker 3: I can't prove what's. 26 00:01:18,319 --> 00:01:22,040 Speaker 2: So I guess the question is President Trump famously a 27 00:01:22,080 --> 00:01:24,800 Speaker 2: couple of weeks ago, posted this to ten million of 28 00:01:24,800 --> 00:01:28,320 Speaker 2: his followers. He reposted it, Okay, I got it. You know, 29 00:01:28,440 --> 00:01:31,440 Speaker 2: as someone who studies the science of this, what would 30 00:01:31,440 --> 00:01:34,600 Speaker 2: be the strategy behind this? I mean, why would somebody 31 00:01:34,680 --> 00:01:37,800 Speaker 2: post something like this unless it's supposed to be funny 32 00:01:37,840 --> 00:01:40,360 Speaker 2: or sarcastic? And I didn't get the comedy in it. 33 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:43,399 Speaker 2: So what's your sort of sense for posting this kind 34 00:01:43,440 --> 00:01:46,480 Speaker 2: of things that are obviously outlandish, you know, obviously a 35 00:01:46,520 --> 00:01:50,400 Speaker 2: conspiracy theory, and yet it's propagated out and popularized. And 36 00:01:50,440 --> 00:01:53,640 Speaker 2: so what would your sense be for why someone in 37 00:01:53,720 --> 00:01:54,560 Speaker 2: authority would do that? 38 00:01:54,720 --> 00:01:56,040 Speaker 3: Yeah, I think there's a couple of reasons. 39 00:01:56,320 --> 00:01:58,000 Speaker 4: First of all, Jerry think it's important to point out 40 00:01:58,000 --> 00:02:00,760 Speaker 4: you're not the target audience, So the fact that you 41 00:02:00,880 --> 00:02:05,960 Speaker 4: don't find it funny is completely inconsequential in the conversation, 42 00:02:06,360 --> 00:02:09,200 Speaker 4: many of his followers, even those that don't believe it 43 00:02:09,240 --> 00:02:13,079 Speaker 4: to be factual, which is presumably many or most of them, 44 00:02:13,480 --> 00:02:14,640 Speaker 4: would still find it funny. 45 00:02:14,919 --> 00:02:15,080 Speaker 3: You know. 46 00:02:15,160 --> 00:02:17,160 Speaker 4: The main reason he's going to post that sort of 47 00:02:17,200 --> 00:02:19,200 Speaker 4: thing is just to show that he's in on the 48 00:02:19,320 --> 00:02:24,200 Speaker 4: joke that he is part of the conversation, and being 49 00:02:24,760 --> 00:02:28,440 Speaker 4: part of that social media conversation has become increasingly important, 50 00:02:28,600 --> 00:02:31,960 Speaker 4: I think, to him and a frightening number of billionaires. 51 00:02:31,960 --> 00:02:35,160 Speaker 1: Frankly, Yeah, we used to think people in serious positions 52 00:02:35,200 --> 00:02:38,560 Speaker 1: did serious things, but I guess entertainment is part of 53 00:02:38,600 --> 00:02:41,480 Speaker 1: it now. That goes to my question. You know, we 54 00:02:41,520 --> 00:02:45,920 Speaker 1: look at conspiracy theories, and effective disinformation seems to be 55 00:02:46,040 --> 00:02:48,760 Speaker 1: similar in some ways the sticky conspiracy theories. You know, 56 00:02:48,800 --> 00:02:51,799 Speaker 1: they have some sort of basis in truth, and they 57 00:02:51,840 --> 00:02:53,680 Speaker 1: tell the stuff that we want to believe is true. 58 00:02:54,320 --> 00:02:56,959 Speaker 1: They appeal to our emotions and our feelings. 59 00:02:56,760 --> 00:02:59,639 Speaker 4: And they appeal to specific communities. They appeal to the 60 00:02:59,639 --> 00:03:03,000 Speaker 4: community that wants to believe that that thing is true, right, 61 00:03:03,040 --> 00:03:04,560 Speaker 4: and they're tailored for those communities. 62 00:03:04,600 --> 00:03:07,079 Speaker 1: No, exactly. So it seems so much of our interest nowadays, 63 00:03:07,120 --> 00:03:10,200 Speaker 1: for example, a bro podcasts is our desire to be entertained. 64 00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:13,960 Speaker 1: We get our politics amidst these crazy fun culture stories 65 00:03:14,000 --> 00:03:17,800 Speaker 1: because just straightforward talking politics is boring. Do you see this? 66 00:03:18,040 --> 00:03:19,639 Speaker 3: Yeah, I think that's absolutely the case. 67 00:03:19,680 --> 00:03:21,720 Speaker 4: I don't think that that's just today though, I think 68 00:03:21,880 --> 00:03:23,600 Speaker 4: that's long been the case. I mean, if you look 69 00:03:23,639 --> 00:03:27,560 Speaker 4: at back at journalism, during the era of yellow journalism, 70 00:03:27,560 --> 00:03:30,040 Speaker 4: it was much the same, you know, it was tailored 71 00:03:30,080 --> 00:03:34,480 Speaker 4: for specific communities and it was far from factual. Things 72 00:03:34,520 --> 00:03:37,960 Speaker 4: were different when there were just a few networks that 73 00:03:38,040 --> 00:03:41,640 Speaker 4: everybody was listening to the same thing. But I think 74 00:03:41,680 --> 00:03:45,520 Speaker 4: that's definitely become the case now where politics has been 75 00:03:45,560 --> 00:03:51,760 Speaker 4: integrated with entertainment and we can't separate them, and only 76 00:03:51,800 --> 00:03:56,200 Speaker 4: specific communities are gonna find certain messages entertaining. 77 00:03:57,200 --> 00:04:01,160 Speaker 2: Could you bore down on netword community? I mean, in 78 00:04:01,440 --> 00:04:04,720 Speaker 2: most communities, there's a social contract, right, we trust each other. 79 00:04:04,760 --> 00:04:07,360 Speaker 2: When when you stop somebody on the street and ask 80 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:10,600 Speaker 2: for directions to the store, chances are they going to 81 00:04:10,600 --> 00:04:12,080 Speaker 2: tell you the truth, right, They're not going to lie you. 82 00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:15,080 Speaker 2: There is this sort of sense of social social community 83 00:04:15,160 --> 00:04:18,520 Speaker 2: and truthfulness amongst people who live in a certain place 84 00:04:18,560 --> 00:04:24,520 Speaker 2: or share certain ideals. But what is a community online 85 00:04:24,720 --> 00:04:28,120 Speaker 2: or people who live online or people who inform themselves 86 00:04:28,320 --> 00:04:31,240 Speaker 2: from social media. I didn't get the joke, so I'm 87 00:04:31,240 --> 00:04:33,919 Speaker 2: not in that community. But to be honestly, I'm not 88 00:04:33,920 --> 00:04:35,000 Speaker 2: really sure what that means. 89 00:04:35,240 --> 00:04:37,359 Speaker 4: You know, I think that social media is really good 90 00:04:37,600 --> 00:04:41,960 Speaker 4: at bringing people together and specific people with specific interests, 91 00:04:42,000 --> 00:04:46,479 Speaker 4: specific ideology often sometimes specific sets of beliefs. And you 92 00:04:46,480 --> 00:04:48,120 Speaker 4: can see this in all kinds of ways. I mean, 93 00:04:48,560 --> 00:04:52,839 Speaker 4: there was no furry community to speak of before before 94 00:04:52,920 --> 00:04:56,200 Speaker 4: social media and and before the Internet and it and 95 00:04:56,320 --> 00:04:59,760 Speaker 4: it really helped foster both small and large groups of 96 00:04:59,760 --> 00:05:04,640 Speaker 4: people with specific beliefs and ideas and senses of humor 97 00:05:04,720 --> 00:05:07,320 Speaker 4: sometimes that are going to bring them together. And we 98 00:05:07,360 --> 00:05:11,400 Speaker 4: see this across the political spectrum. And we've seen this 99 00:05:11,920 --> 00:05:16,320 Speaker 4: exacerbated in recent years by changes in social media. 100 00:05:16,400 --> 00:05:17,840 Speaker 3: You know, it used to be I think that. 101 00:05:17,839 --> 00:05:22,440 Speaker 4: The idea that people were siloed in tiny little communities 102 00:05:22,560 --> 00:05:26,200 Speaker 4: was a bit overdone because when you looked at the 103 00:05:26,240 --> 00:05:30,360 Speaker 4: actual data in years gone by, people really did actually 104 00:05:30,400 --> 00:05:35,160 Speaker 4: engage with multiple viewpoints, sometimes even more so than in 105 00:05:35,200 --> 00:05:38,160 Speaker 4: their actual, you know, non digital lived experience. I live 106 00:05:38,160 --> 00:05:40,880 Speaker 4: in South Carolina. You know, you go to some small 107 00:05:40,880 --> 00:05:45,919 Speaker 4: towns in South Carolina and people aren't getting any large 108 00:05:46,040 --> 00:05:49,200 Speaker 4: variety of political beliefs or ideas, just like if you 109 00:05:49,240 --> 00:05:54,080 Speaker 4: go on truth social it's the same. Whereas today this 110 00:05:54,279 --> 00:05:58,760 Speaker 4: siloing has been exacerbated because so much social media has 111 00:05:58,839 --> 00:06:02,560 Speaker 4: been separated and bought X bought Twitter named it X 112 00:06:02,600 --> 00:06:07,679 Speaker 4: and a lot of left leaning users went to Blue Sky, 113 00:06:07,760 --> 00:06:10,560 Speaker 4: A lot of people have gone to Telegram, where everything 114 00:06:10,640 --> 00:06:15,159 Speaker 4: is based off of very you know, private, smaller groups, 115 00:06:15,240 --> 00:06:18,240 Speaker 4: and they aren't getting those outside viewpoints that they did 116 00:06:18,240 --> 00:06:19,520 Speaker 4: in the past, which. 117 00:06:19,480 --> 00:06:22,920 Speaker 2: Brings us to cannibalism. So when I was in Germany 118 00:06:23,760 --> 00:06:27,360 Speaker 2: that online there was this big case where a guy 119 00:06:27,520 --> 00:06:31,000 Speaker 2: that people who wanted to be serious, people who wanted 120 00:06:31,040 --> 00:06:34,479 Speaker 2: to be cannibals, got online, formed their own community among 121 00:06:34,640 --> 00:06:37,840 Speaker 2: smaller community of people who had this fetish who wanted 122 00:06:37,880 --> 00:06:41,839 Speaker 2: to be eaten, and they could only actually get together 123 00:06:42,880 --> 00:06:46,880 Speaker 2: because of social media, and of course eventually they did 124 00:06:46,880 --> 00:06:49,800 Speaker 2: and this one individual was killed and eaten by another 125 00:06:49,800 --> 00:06:52,200 Speaker 2: individual voluntarily and it went to court as to whether 126 00:06:52,240 --> 00:06:56,719 Speaker 2: that was voluntary or not. But in the counter terrorism center, 127 00:06:56,920 --> 00:07:00,000 Speaker 2: we did talk with our foreign counterparts about, well, okay, 128 00:07:00,440 --> 00:07:02,880 Speaker 2: someone wants to commit a terrorist act, they live in 129 00:07:02,920 --> 00:07:05,880 Speaker 2: the middle of this small German village. How are they 130 00:07:05,880 --> 00:07:08,919 Speaker 2: going to meet somebody else, you know, to find someone 131 00:07:08,920 --> 00:07:11,679 Speaker 2: else who also wants to commit a terrorist attack. Because 132 00:07:11,720 --> 00:07:16,600 Speaker 2: whereas before and again in Germany the bodder Minehoff Gang, 133 00:07:16,880 --> 00:07:19,200 Speaker 2: they all had to get together in the university. That's 134 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:22,000 Speaker 2: where they found their way together, but that no longer happened. 135 00:07:22,000 --> 00:07:25,200 Speaker 2: So communities can be you know, one person sitting thousands 136 00:07:25,240 --> 00:07:29,440 Speaker 2: of miles away from another person and getting up into all. 137 00:07:29,280 --> 00:07:32,280 Speaker 1: Sorts of So maybe a community of terrorists who want 138 00:07:32,320 --> 00:07:34,080 Speaker 1: to use cannibalism as part of their. 139 00:07:34,040 --> 00:07:37,280 Speaker 2: Well, that's why you wrote so well in the CIA. Joh. 140 00:07:37,920 --> 00:07:38,120 Speaker 3: Yeah. 141 00:07:38,120 --> 00:07:40,080 Speaker 4: And the concern here is that, you know, things that 142 00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:42,920 Speaker 4: might be mocked, or might be or might not be 143 00:07:43,440 --> 00:07:48,320 Speaker 4: normalized in broader society become quite normal in smaller communities. 144 00:07:48,360 --> 00:07:50,560 Speaker 4: I mean, goodness knows, we've seen this with the q 145 00:07:50,680 --> 00:07:51,920 Speaker 4: and On community, for instance. 146 00:07:52,360 --> 00:07:53,120 Speaker 3: Some of their. 147 00:07:53,520 --> 00:07:56,960 Speaker 4: Beliefs and understandings of the world would not go far 148 00:07:57,200 --> 00:07:59,600 Speaker 4: in the broader society, but when all they talk to 149 00:07:59,720 --> 00:08:02,240 Speaker 4: is each each other, those things come very normal. 150 00:08:02,400 --> 00:08:04,840 Speaker 1: And communities the interests are sometimes good, right, I can 151 00:08:05,040 --> 00:08:06,920 Speaker 1: if I get online and I get a social media 152 00:08:06,920 --> 00:08:08,400 Speaker 1: thing that can follow the New York Knicks or in 153 00:08:08,400 --> 00:08:10,280 Speaker 1: the playoffs, or something that's to me that's interesting and 154 00:08:10,320 --> 00:08:11,640 Speaker 1: I want to hear what people are saying. 155 00:08:11,760 --> 00:08:13,680 Speaker 4: Of course, no community is a wonderful thing. I think 156 00:08:13,680 --> 00:08:16,760 Speaker 4: we can all agree with that. But many wonderful things 157 00:08:16,480 --> 00:08:18,400 Speaker 4: have negative outliers. 158 00:08:18,800 --> 00:08:21,960 Speaker 1: It seems that now people are starting to view that 159 00:08:21,520 --> 00:08:25,200 Speaker 1: the public spaces are polluted, and sometimes it's because officials 160 00:08:25,760 --> 00:08:28,560 Speaker 1: like Trump and others are deriding the mainstream media and 161 00:08:28,640 --> 00:08:31,120 Speaker 1: saying bad things about them, and so people are often 162 00:08:31,160 --> 00:08:34,520 Speaker 1: searching for smaller news sites other kind of places then 163 00:08:34,520 --> 00:08:37,280 Speaker 1: get news and entertainment and avoiding what they call the 164 00:08:37,360 --> 00:08:40,199 Speaker 1: mainstream media. And to me, like one of the answers 165 00:08:40,360 --> 00:08:42,440 Speaker 1: of getting people back to some sort of truth based 166 00:08:42,600 --> 00:08:45,400 Speaker 1: stuff is actually the mainstream media. Like the mainstream media is, 167 00:08:45,880 --> 00:08:48,200 Speaker 1: it gets things wrong, and it has a corporate interest 168 00:08:48,200 --> 00:08:50,040 Speaker 1: and all those type of things, but it does have 169 00:08:50,080 --> 00:08:52,600 Speaker 1: professionalism where people are trying to fact check things. So 170 00:08:53,280 --> 00:08:55,680 Speaker 1: my opinion is I think we actually ought to be 171 00:08:55,760 --> 00:08:57,440 Speaker 1: moving back towards the mainstream media. 172 00:08:57,600 --> 00:09:01,440 Speaker 4: Oh I'm biased, but of course I completely agree with you. 173 00:09:01,480 --> 00:09:05,360 Speaker 4: I think that when we look at the effect of 174 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:13,079 Speaker 4: things like state influence campaigns and the spread of malign influence, disinformation, 175 00:09:13,160 --> 00:09:16,079 Speaker 4: whatever we want to call it, over the past several years, 176 00:09:16,600 --> 00:09:20,120 Speaker 4: and the rise of the prominence and prevalence of these things, 177 00:09:20,840 --> 00:09:24,480 Speaker 4: one of the single biggest impacts of that, I think, 178 00:09:24,600 --> 00:09:28,000 Speaker 4: and purposefully so on the part of for instance, the Russians, 179 00:09:28,840 --> 00:09:32,679 Speaker 4: is the spread of doubt, and I think many of 180 00:09:32,760 --> 00:09:35,000 Speaker 4: us in the West and the United States especially have, 181 00:09:35,120 --> 00:09:38,840 Speaker 4: as you said, John, this tendency to just doubt what 182 00:09:38,960 --> 00:09:42,640 Speaker 4: we see. And sometimes that can be healthy, but it 183 00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:46,719 Speaker 4: has a really negative consequence as well, that people are 184 00:09:46,720 --> 00:09:51,160 Speaker 4: beginning to doubt the objective truth as well as the 185 00:09:51,240 --> 00:09:55,079 Speaker 4: thing that might possibly be disinformation. You know, as we're 186 00:09:55,120 --> 00:09:58,480 Speaker 4: having this conversation, the LA riots are ongoing, and just 187 00:09:58,480 --> 00:10:02,239 Speaker 4: a couple of days ago, Governor Newsom posted these images 188 00:10:02,600 --> 00:10:07,480 Speaker 4: of National guardsmen sleeping on the floor and he commented 189 00:10:07,480 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 4: on how awful this was that they were being treated 190 00:10:09,200 --> 00:10:13,520 Speaker 4: this way, and immediately users responded by saying, oh, that's fake. 191 00:10:13,559 --> 00:10:17,240 Speaker 4: Those are images from Afghanistan in twenty twenty. They asked 192 00:10:17,280 --> 00:10:20,560 Speaker 4: Grok if it was true, and Grock responded that yes, 193 00:10:20,600 --> 00:10:23,360 Speaker 4: these are images from twenty twenty. So even the technology 194 00:10:23,360 --> 00:10:26,760 Speaker 4: we rely on to give us the truth failed us, 195 00:10:27,040 --> 00:10:30,760 Speaker 4: and it was just because we're so accustomed to this 196 00:10:30,920 --> 00:10:34,839 Speaker 4: belief that we're being lied to. In some cases we are, 197 00:10:34,960 --> 00:10:38,440 Speaker 4: but we're so accustomed to that sort of knee jerk 198 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:41,480 Speaker 4: reaction that doubt is always present. 199 00:10:41,520 --> 00:10:46,199 Speaker 1: Now, all right, let's take a break, we'll be right back. 200 00:10:58,160 --> 00:11:01,400 Speaker 2: So Jaran. You mentioned Russian there's a a huge overlap 201 00:11:01,480 --> 00:11:04,760 Speaker 2: between some of your research now and what John and 202 00:11:04,800 --> 00:11:07,560 Speaker 2: I used to do in our former days. You seem 203 00:11:07,600 --> 00:11:11,400 Speaker 2: to have done a lot of research in Storm fifteen sixteen, 204 00:11:11,720 --> 00:11:13,960 Speaker 2: and I was wondering if you could take us through 205 00:11:14,200 --> 00:11:18,000 Speaker 2: some of the nastiness that it's been involved in. I 206 00:11:18,000 --> 00:11:21,960 Speaker 2: think people may be surprised at the scope, the spectrum, 207 00:11:22,120 --> 00:11:23,880 Speaker 2: and the depth of what it's done. 208 00:11:24,040 --> 00:11:27,120 Speaker 4: Yeah, Storm fifteen sixteen is a fascinating example of how 209 00:11:27,960 --> 00:11:32,480 Speaker 4: Russian disinformation has evolved and really evolved into something that 210 00:11:32,600 --> 00:11:34,959 Speaker 4: has come full circle into what it was in the past. 211 00:11:35,200 --> 00:11:37,440 Speaker 4: My lab here at Clemson, the Media Forensics, said we 212 00:11:37,480 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 4: identified Storm fifteen sixteen for the first time in twenty thirteen, 213 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:43,840 Speaker 4: and then a team at Microsoft actually named it Storm 214 00:11:43,840 --> 00:11:47,640 Speaker 4: fifteen sixteen because I guess we live in a spy novel. 215 00:11:47,960 --> 00:11:50,520 Speaker 4: It's a narrative laundering campaign that uses a number of 216 00:11:50,559 --> 00:11:55,200 Speaker 4: different tactics. Narrative laundering is a process by which an 217 00:11:55,280 --> 00:11:59,080 Speaker 4: actor places a bit of false information. That's the first 218 00:11:59,080 --> 00:12:01,680 Speaker 4: of three steps in there blaundering. You place that information. 219 00:12:02,000 --> 00:12:05,000 Speaker 4: In the case of Storm fifteen sixteen, it's often takes 220 00:12:05,040 --> 00:12:09,120 Speaker 4: the form of a single YouTube video, for instance, and 221 00:12:09,160 --> 00:12:15,720 Speaker 4: then you layer that false narrative through various methods. 222 00:12:15,840 --> 00:12:18,480 Speaker 3: It might include foreign. 223 00:12:18,400 --> 00:12:21,040 Speaker 4: Media outlets that might place that story or write a 224 00:12:21,040 --> 00:12:23,760 Speaker 4: story on your behalf for a few dollars or rubles, 225 00:12:23,760 --> 00:12:24,400 Speaker 4: as the case may be. 226 00:12:24,920 --> 00:12:25,680 Speaker 3: It may be. 227 00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:31,280 Speaker 4: Some an influencer or a social media influencer that you have 228 00:12:31,360 --> 00:12:34,480 Speaker 4: in your employ or it may even be various state 229 00:12:34,559 --> 00:12:39,760 Speaker 4: actors state media. The Russians often use the social media 230 00:12:40,120 --> 00:12:44,400 Speaker 4: accounts of their embassies, for instance, to put out some 231 00:12:44,440 --> 00:12:46,640 Speaker 4: of these stories. And that's the layering process, and that 232 00:12:46,679 --> 00:12:50,360 Speaker 4: takes us to that final process, which is integration, where 233 00:12:50,760 --> 00:12:56,080 Speaker 4: these stories go from just coming from your state operated 234 00:12:56,160 --> 00:13:00,360 Speaker 4: voices to the general population and that and all of 235 00:13:00,360 --> 00:13:02,280 Speaker 4: this is done in such a way that each step 236 00:13:02,280 --> 00:13:06,080 Speaker 4: in the process adds a little bit of credibility to 237 00:13:06,120 --> 00:13:09,320 Speaker 4: the story, takes it farther away from that original placement, 238 00:13:09,360 --> 00:13:11,520 Speaker 4: so that it's harder and harder to tell where that 239 00:13:11,559 --> 00:13:15,160 Speaker 4: story came from, until it's just part of the organic conversation. 240 00:13:15,800 --> 00:13:18,199 Speaker 2: Except dere I mean, really, where are they going to 241 00:13:18,240 --> 00:13:20,760 Speaker 2: find right wing influencers in the United States who would 242 00:13:20,760 --> 00:13:23,920 Speaker 2: propagate these stories for money? Through an intermediary? 243 00:13:24,400 --> 00:13:26,000 Speaker 4: I can tell you where one of them lives. We 244 00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:29,560 Speaker 4: were able to track down one of the influencers. He 245 00:13:29,640 --> 00:13:34,120 Speaker 4: lives in Massachusetts, and he took one hundred dollars from 246 00:13:34,200 --> 00:13:41,000 Speaker 4: a known Russian agent to place a video of They 247 00:13:41,040 --> 00:13:44,280 Speaker 4: were really West Africans, part of the West African community 248 00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:48,640 Speaker 4: in Saint Petersburg, but they were pretending to be Haitian 249 00:13:48,800 --> 00:13:52,040 Speaker 4: immigrants who were brought to North Georgia to. 250 00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:54,240 Speaker 3: Vote in the twenty twenty four election. 251 00:13:55,559 --> 00:13:59,599 Speaker 4: Most of Storm fifteen sixteen, though, has targeted Ukraine and 252 00:14:00,559 --> 00:14:06,640 Speaker 4: specifically the Zelenski campaign. We've specifically been tracking stories that 253 00:14:07,600 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 4: are created from whole cloth stories like oh Olena Zelenska 254 00:14:11,880 --> 00:14:17,280 Speaker 4: spent over a million dollars at Cardier and here's a video. 255 00:14:17,880 --> 00:14:22,160 Speaker 4: Yeah yeah, yeah, yes, yes, yes, he bought two Yeah, 256 00:14:22,200 --> 00:14:26,040 Speaker 4: it's valued seventy five million dollars he's bought. I've lost 257 00:14:26,080 --> 00:14:27,880 Speaker 4: track of how many villas at this point. The first 258 00:14:27,960 --> 00:14:30,440 Speaker 4: villa he bought was back and he bought I'm putting 259 00:14:30,440 --> 00:14:35,160 Speaker 4: that in air quotes, was back in December of twenty 260 00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:38,600 Speaker 4: twenty three. He bought this Egyptian villa. And that story 261 00:14:38,640 --> 00:14:41,640 Speaker 4: they actually brought full circle because they had this fake 262 00:14:42,040 --> 00:14:45,840 Speaker 4: journalist tell the story about him buying this villa in Egypt, 263 00:14:46,960 --> 00:14:49,880 Speaker 4: and then a few months later they brought the story 264 00:14:49,920 --> 00:14:54,240 Speaker 4: back by fake murdering the fake journalist in another fake story. 265 00:14:54,480 --> 00:14:57,480 Speaker 4: And so these stories, some of them may seem ridiculous, 266 00:14:57,520 --> 00:15:01,520 Speaker 4: but they're actually very well crafted, especially to target a 267 00:15:01,520 --> 00:15:04,480 Speaker 4: specific audience. So let me tell you just how well 268 00:15:04,520 --> 00:15:08,640 Speaker 4: that's done. There was one video that Storm fifteen sixteen 269 00:15:08,760 --> 00:15:13,760 Speaker 4: did the day after the US election. It appeared and 270 00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:17,080 Speaker 4: went completely viral. If you were a right leaning American 271 00:15:17,320 --> 00:15:20,520 Speaker 4: on telegram or X the day after the election, you 272 00:15:20,600 --> 00:15:23,000 Speaker 4: almost surely saw this video was shared by millions and 273 00:15:23,040 --> 00:15:25,480 Speaker 4: millions of people, were seen by millions of millions of people, 274 00:15:25,600 --> 00:15:26,960 Speaker 4: shared by tens of thousands. 275 00:15:27,480 --> 00:15:27,880 Speaker 3: It was a. 276 00:15:27,880 --> 00:15:32,680 Speaker 4: Video of two supposed Ukrainian soldiers. They didn't have any 277 00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:35,920 Speaker 4: markings on them other than just a Ukrainian trident that 278 00:15:36,200 --> 00:15:41,760 Speaker 4: to supposed Ukrainian soldiers shooting at a mannequin with a 279 00:15:41,800 --> 00:15:43,960 Speaker 4: Maga T shirt on and a red hat and then 280 00:15:44,040 --> 00:15:46,240 Speaker 4: lighting it on fire. The video itself looked like something 281 00:15:46,280 --> 00:15:48,080 Speaker 4: I would have made in my backyard when I was 282 00:15:48,080 --> 00:15:51,120 Speaker 4: in middle school. It looked extremely sophomoric, but it was 283 00:15:51,120 --> 00:15:56,000 Speaker 4: actually really carefully crafted, not to reveal anything that they 284 00:15:56,000 --> 00:15:58,120 Speaker 4: didn't want you to see, as in where in the 285 00:15:58,120 --> 00:16:01,640 Speaker 4: world this might have been videotape, but to tell a 286 00:16:01,800 --> 00:16:06,080 Speaker 4: very concise story. That concise story being Ukraine hates Trump. 287 00:16:06,400 --> 00:16:10,640 Speaker 4: This video appeared because of the Storm fifteen sixteen campaign, 288 00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:14,160 Speaker 4: so we traced the roots of this video. We traced 289 00:16:14,200 --> 00:16:17,240 Speaker 4: it to a discord channel two weeks earlier, first place 290 00:16:17,320 --> 00:16:20,080 Speaker 4: it ever appeared, and it was a Russian language discord 291 00:16:20,160 --> 00:16:25,480 Speaker 4: channel pro Ukrainian discord channel where a user named Ukraine 292 00:16:25,520 --> 00:16:29,480 Speaker 4: is Life. His first post was I have a nice video. 293 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:32,360 Speaker 4: How do I share a video? His first post ever, 294 00:16:32,680 --> 00:16:34,760 Speaker 4: He posts the video, then a couple of days later, 295 00:16:34,880 --> 00:16:37,160 Speaker 4: goes to a telegram channel, the telegram channel of the 296 00:16:37,200 --> 00:16:40,960 Speaker 4: seventy ninth Airborne Assault Brigade, that's the Ukrainian Brigade. 297 00:16:41,120 --> 00:16:42,880 Speaker 3: For those of you that don't spend. 298 00:16:42,680 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 4: Much time on Russian language social media, it's important to 299 00:16:45,640 --> 00:16:49,240 Speaker 4: know that Ukrainian and Russian military units all have their 300 00:16:49,280 --> 00:16:52,880 Speaker 4: own telegram channels where they get on and talk about life. 301 00:16:53,000 --> 00:16:56,720 Speaker 4: This is supposedly one of those telegram channels, but it 302 00:16:56,760 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 4: wasn't the only telegram channel of the seventy ninth Airborn 303 00:16:59,680 --> 00:17:03,720 Speaker 4: Assault brigade. It was the much smaller one and not 304 00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:07,320 Speaker 4: the one linked to from the Ukrainian government's website. So 305 00:17:07,440 --> 00:17:11,000 Speaker 4: from that page, which was clearly, you know, a false 306 00:17:11,200 --> 00:17:15,800 Speaker 4: Russian account, it went to the telegram channel of a 307 00:17:15,880 --> 00:17:21,600 Speaker 4: Ukrainian separatist politician, from there to prov to English which 308 00:17:21,680 --> 00:17:25,760 Speaker 4: is Russian state media, and then eventually to accounts run 309 00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:30,800 Speaker 4: by the Storm fifteen sixteen campaign, social media accounts influencers 310 00:17:30,800 --> 00:17:34,040 Speaker 4: that are in their employment and the next day it 311 00:17:34,080 --> 00:17:37,800 Speaker 4: went viral across social media, essentially the start of Russia's 312 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:40,080 Speaker 4: lobbying campaign of the Trump administration. 313 00:17:41,080 --> 00:17:42,920 Speaker 1: They've they've had a lot of experience with that, and 314 00:17:43,680 --> 00:17:45,639 Speaker 1: I mean you mentioned that, and you mentioned this in 315 00:17:45,680 --> 00:17:48,600 Speaker 1: the Storm fifteen sixteen, but you also mentioned and I 316 00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:51,359 Speaker 1: think it's true, Daran, is that there's a long history 317 00:17:51,359 --> 00:17:54,480 Speaker 1: of this, especially with the Russians. Right, there's terms they use, 318 00:17:54,520 --> 00:17:57,480 Speaker 1: whether we call it political warfare or subversion or active measures. 319 00:17:57,840 --> 00:18:00,440 Speaker 1: The key here is these are really the output of 320 00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:04,560 Speaker 1: large bureaucracies, are professionally run by intelligence services, and they're 321 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:07,639 Speaker 1: meant to like erode our political order based on facts 322 00:18:07,640 --> 00:18:09,879 Speaker 1: and truth. And there's a long history of these and 323 00:18:09,880 --> 00:18:11,800 Speaker 1: I'm sure you've written about some of them, the Protocols 324 00:18:11,800 --> 00:18:13,840 Speaker 1: of the Elders de Zion back in the Tzaris days, 325 00:18:13,920 --> 00:18:18,560 Speaker 1: or Operation Trust, the Nuclear Winter campaign, the Nuclear Freeze campaign, 326 00:18:18,600 --> 00:18:21,840 Speaker 1: this fake story that the AIDS was created by the Pentagon. 327 00:18:22,359 --> 00:18:26,520 Speaker 1: So in some ways, you know, these are different ways 328 00:18:26,520 --> 00:18:28,840 Speaker 1: that going at the same thing, and it's finding a 329 00:18:28,840 --> 00:18:31,920 Speaker 1: way to find a weakness inside your enemy and exploit 330 00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:34,600 Speaker 1: that and create friction inside your enemies. 331 00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:38,399 Speaker 4: You're absolutely right, John, they're using fundamentally the same tactics, 332 00:18:38,920 --> 00:18:41,840 Speaker 4: the same systems that they used in the past. That 333 00:18:42,080 --> 00:18:45,240 Speaker 4: the important difference is that what took them months or 334 00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:47,240 Speaker 4: sometimes even years to do in the past, they're doing 335 00:18:47,280 --> 00:18:48,359 Speaker 4: in days now. 336 00:18:48,119 --> 00:18:50,080 Speaker 1: And to Russians and when in many ways it's a 337 00:18:50,080 --> 00:18:51,840 Speaker 1: little bit when we think of warfare, we think of 338 00:18:51,840 --> 00:18:55,400 Speaker 1: our military, and the military does warfare, but for years, 339 00:18:55,480 --> 00:18:59,600 Speaker 1: especially since the Soviet Union to Russia, the political sphere 340 00:18:59,720 --> 00:19:02,040 Speaker 1: and the information sphere is as big a part of 341 00:19:02,119 --> 00:19:04,480 Speaker 1: warfare in a certain sense as is the military. So 342 00:19:04,480 --> 00:19:06,800 Speaker 1: it's an all of government approach is something we often 343 00:19:06,800 --> 00:19:09,520 Speaker 1: talk about, but the missions have been doing it for years, decades. 344 00:19:09,640 --> 00:19:11,720 Speaker 4: The same is true with China and many other countries 345 00:19:12,160 --> 00:19:14,800 Speaker 4: and we're behind the ball on all of these things 346 00:19:14,840 --> 00:19:16,440 Speaker 4: relative to those countries. 347 00:19:16,280 --> 00:19:18,359 Speaker 2: And maybe we need to be behind the ball and 348 00:19:18,600 --> 00:19:23,280 Speaker 2: centrally organizing this. You need and you need authoritarian government, right, 349 00:19:23,320 --> 00:19:27,080 Speaker 2: It's hard for a dispersed democracy to do that. So 350 00:19:27,280 --> 00:19:32,800 Speaker 2: terminology is important. Malign influenced misinformation. Back in the fifties, 351 00:19:32,920 --> 00:19:37,159 Speaker 2: the CIA was involved in an information campaign that was 352 00:19:37,320 --> 00:19:41,119 Speaker 2: enormously successful Radio Free Europe. Right, it started it up, 353 00:19:41,160 --> 00:19:46,080 Speaker 2: and that the whole point was to be uncensored, truthful 354 00:19:46,160 --> 00:19:49,680 Speaker 2: information into the Soviet Union and the East Bloc where 355 00:19:50,119 --> 00:19:54,080 Speaker 2: everything was lies, and it was enormously successful, so successful 356 00:19:54,080 --> 00:19:56,320 Speaker 2: in fact, that CIA withdrew from it after a couple 357 00:19:56,359 --> 00:19:58,919 Speaker 2: of years and it continued to run by itself. And 358 00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:04,760 Speaker 2: you till just this now until now, oh god yeah. 359 00:20:05,160 --> 00:20:10,680 Speaker 2: Whereas before in the nineteen fifties, truth was the real weapon, right, 360 00:20:10,720 --> 00:20:13,199 Speaker 2: beaming it into lies, and now it seems to be 361 00:20:13,240 --> 00:20:15,960 Speaker 2: the other way. What's changed? Is it social media? 362 00:20:16,040 --> 00:20:18,080 Speaker 4: I think social media is important, but it's not just 363 00:20:18,119 --> 00:20:20,840 Speaker 4: social media. I think a lot of technologies have made 364 00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:24,680 Speaker 4: these processes easier. It's so much easier, for instance, to 365 00:20:25,000 --> 00:20:29,439 Speaker 4: set up a web page that looks to be a 366 00:20:29,560 --> 00:20:32,480 Speaker 4: legitimate news outlet. I mean, this is done by both 367 00:20:32,600 --> 00:20:35,800 Speaker 4: people who just want to set up small news outlets startups, 368 00:20:36,520 --> 00:20:39,760 Speaker 4: but it's also true of foreign information operations. You know, 369 00:20:40,640 --> 00:20:44,760 Speaker 4: I've seen websites that were made by the Rani IRGC 370 00:20:44,960 --> 00:20:47,680 Speaker 4: that looked like a website that I would find interesting 371 00:20:47,960 --> 00:20:51,199 Speaker 4: and might stop and read. And the Russians did the 372 00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:54,280 Speaker 4: same thing with Storm fifteen sixteen, where they created legitimate 373 00:20:54,359 --> 00:20:59,040 Speaker 4: sounding and appearing news pages like Wether, DC Weekly or 374 00:20:59,040 --> 00:21:01,920 Speaker 4: the Miami Chronic. These things sound legitimate. You go to 375 00:21:02,000 --> 00:21:05,359 Speaker 4: their web page, they look professional, and they have content 376 00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:08,440 Speaker 4: that's all created by AI. It's both the ease of 377 00:21:09,359 --> 00:21:13,440 Speaker 4: digital technology. AI is facilitating a lot of these things. 378 00:21:13,440 --> 00:21:18,359 Speaker 4: We're seeing more and more troll campaigns that are operated 379 00:21:19,000 --> 00:21:24,399 Speaker 4: entirely by artificial intelligence. So social media certainly facilitates the 380 00:21:24,440 --> 00:21:28,920 Speaker 4: dissemination of these false stories, but it's just one cog 381 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:30,560 Speaker 4: in a larger machine. 382 00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:34,080 Speaker 5: Let's pause for a second. 383 00:21:34,119 --> 00:21:34,760 Speaker 3: We'll be right back. 384 00:21:41,640 --> 00:21:43,600 Speaker 1: What do you think the impact of so much anger 385 00:21:43,640 --> 00:21:46,159 Speaker 1: online is on our lives when we didn't seem to 386 00:21:46,160 --> 00:21:48,680 Speaker 1: have that in the or have that outlet in the past. 387 00:21:49,000 --> 00:21:51,399 Speaker 4: For me personally, it's less time on social media. But 388 00:21:51,480 --> 00:21:54,520 Speaker 4: you're absolutely right. I mean people for some reason, and 389 00:21:54,560 --> 00:21:56,920 Speaker 4: I think that many of those reasons are actually quite 390 00:21:56,960 --> 00:21:59,240 Speaker 4: obvious or incapable of operating in the same way that 391 00:21:59,280 --> 00:22:01,000 Speaker 4: they do and the world as they do in the 392 00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:05,000 Speaker 4: digital world. I think if people treated the digital world 393 00:22:05,320 --> 00:22:07,960 Speaker 4: more like they do the real world, we'd all be 394 00:22:08,040 --> 00:22:10,239 Speaker 4: better off. You know, people in the real world, they 395 00:22:10,240 --> 00:22:13,119 Speaker 4: walk down the sidewalk and they know, oh, this person 396 00:22:13,680 --> 00:22:15,240 Speaker 4: is a stranger. I'm not going to give them my 397 00:22:15,880 --> 00:22:17,240 Speaker 4: I'm not going to let them in my home or 398 00:22:17,240 --> 00:22:19,280 Speaker 4: give them my phone with all my all my contact 399 00:22:19,320 --> 00:22:21,560 Speaker 4: information just because they're wearing a T shirt that I like, 400 00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:25,359 Speaker 4: or because they said something positive about the politician that 401 00:22:25,440 --> 00:22:29,520 Speaker 4: I approve of. But we do that every day on social. 402 00:22:29,200 --> 00:22:31,680 Speaker 1: Media, or say nasty things to people who or. 403 00:22:31,600 --> 00:22:33,639 Speaker 3: Say nasty things yeah, that they would never do in 404 00:22:33,680 --> 00:22:34,040 Speaker 3: real life. 405 00:22:34,080 --> 00:22:37,280 Speaker 1: I see these people who are completely anonymous, just spewing 406 00:22:37,280 --> 00:22:39,399 Speaker 1: this horrible things. You're like, you know, to me, when 407 00:22:39,400 --> 00:22:41,240 Speaker 1: I grew up with that, you know, like, what kind 408 00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:42,880 Speaker 1: of tough guy are you that you're using a fake 409 00:22:42,960 --> 00:22:43,840 Speaker 1: name to attack somebody? 410 00:22:43,880 --> 00:22:47,359 Speaker 4: That just seems that, Yeah, I think anonymity seems Lots 411 00:22:47,400 --> 00:22:50,359 Speaker 4: of research suggests that Anonymity plays an important role in 412 00:22:50,400 --> 00:22:55,520 Speaker 4: this because it just takes away any possible negative consequences 413 00:22:55,520 --> 00:22:59,800 Speaker 4: for your actions. We've seen that the anonymity that comes 414 00:23:00,080 --> 00:23:04,600 Speaker 4: with social media makes us more likely to align with 415 00:23:04,920 --> 00:23:08,000 Speaker 4: the group norms. Lots of research shows this of a 416 00:23:08,040 --> 00:23:11,560 Speaker 4: particular community, you surrender your own identity in favor of 417 00:23:11,600 --> 00:23:16,159 Speaker 4: the group identity. We're actually seeing increased anonymity in places 418 00:23:16,400 --> 00:23:20,919 Speaker 4: like x after Elon's takeover. More and more accounts there 419 00:23:20,960 --> 00:23:23,000 Speaker 4: are anonymous relative to what they were before. 420 00:23:23,080 --> 00:23:25,560 Speaker 2: And for those of us who want to operate an 421 00:23:25,600 --> 00:23:29,000 Speaker 2: a fit based world something the research. You know, one 422 00:23:29,280 --> 00:23:31,840 Speaker 2: thing I hear all the time is people need to 423 00:23:31,880 --> 00:23:35,080 Speaker 2: be literate, right that you need to understand sort of 424 00:23:35,080 --> 00:23:38,480 Speaker 2: how to deal with social media. And I see you've 425 00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:42,439 Speaker 2: got a spot the troll quiz. So how do people 426 00:23:42,600 --> 00:23:45,399 Speaker 2: get on? How do people find spot patrol? And what 427 00:23:45,440 --> 00:23:47,439 Speaker 2: are things that people can do to become more socially 428 00:23:47,480 --> 00:23:49,920 Speaker 2: literate so that they're not we're all hoodwinked to a 429 00:23:49,960 --> 00:23:52,480 Speaker 2: certain extent, right, I mean you start reading something and 430 00:23:52,480 --> 00:23:54,760 Speaker 2: you're like, I don't know is this AI? Is this real? 431 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:56,320 Speaker 3: It's funny that you brought this up, Jerry. 432 00:23:56,359 --> 00:24:00,240 Speaker 4: We made spot Patrol just before the twenty twenty action, 433 00:24:00,880 --> 00:24:03,240 Speaker 4: and it's had a lot of success. It's had well 434 00:24:03,280 --> 00:24:07,640 Speaker 4: over a million users at this point. It's an eight 435 00:24:07,680 --> 00:24:11,240 Speaker 4: minute quiz. It walks you through several different accounts and 436 00:24:11,280 --> 00:24:13,000 Speaker 4: you have to decide whether it's a real account or 437 00:24:13,000 --> 00:24:16,480 Speaker 4: a fake account. The original spot Control it was created 438 00:24:16,520 --> 00:24:20,920 Speaker 4: to differentiate between Russian made accounts and real people. We've 439 00:24:20,960 --> 00:24:24,520 Speaker 4: we've tested, it's actually been shown to have a positive 440 00:24:24,520 --> 00:24:27,000 Speaker 4: effect over time on the way people interact with this 441 00:24:27,160 --> 00:24:29,800 Speaker 4: with social media and made made people a little bit 442 00:24:29,880 --> 00:24:34,240 Speaker 4: more critical in their evaluation of social media accounts. It's outdated, 443 00:24:34,240 --> 00:24:36,360 Speaker 4: It's horribly outdated at this point right now, and we're 444 00:24:36,520 --> 00:24:40,560 Speaker 4: literally in the process of updating the spot Control quiz 445 00:24:40,720 --> 00:24:44,240 Speaker 4: as we speak. We're expanding it past just Russian trolls 446 00:24:45,359 --> 00:24:49,880 Speaker 4: to include other state operations and especially fraud fraud. Online 447 00:24:49,920 --> 00:24:53,720 Speaker 4: fraud is a huge problem, built to the tune of 448 00:24:53,760 --> 00:24:56,160 Speaker 4: billions of dollars in the United States alone every year 449 00:24:56,720 --> 00:24:59,239 Speaker 4: and something that we're hoping to try to combat. I'll 450 00:24:59,280 --> 00:25:01,720 Speaker 4: say one more thing about the spot Patrol quiz, and 451 00:25:01,760 --> 00:25:05,760 Speaker 4: that is that we actually we tested it, as I said, 452 00:25:05,880 --> 00:25:09,119 Speaker 4: and one particular thing that we looked at in our 453 00:25:09,160 --> 00:25:13,200 Speaker 4: test of it was age and the effective of age, 454 00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:16,240 Speaker 4: and we found that older adults, so those over the 455 00:25:16,240 --> 00:25:18,800 Speaker 4: age of sixty before taking the troll quiz, we did 456 00:25:18,800 --> 00:25:20,800 Speaker 4: a test to control group study before taking the troll 457 00:25:20,880 --> 00:25:25,600 Speaker 4: quiz were less than chance in their ability to identify 458 00:25:25,960 --> 00:25:28,520 Speaker 4: a real account from a Russian troll. So they were 459 00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:31,120 Speaker 4: just more likely to get it wrong no matter whether 460 00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:32,679 Speaker 4: it was a real person or a Russian troll. They 461 00:25:32,920 --> 00:25:37,359 Speaker 4: would have been better off flipping a coin. After taking 462 00:25:37,359 --> 00:25:39,200 Speaker 4: the troll quiz, we were able to get them up 463 00:25:39,200 --> 00:25:39,680 Speaker 4: to chance. 464 00:25:40,080 --> 00:25:42,560 Speaker 2: Oh my god, our community is not doing well. 465 00:25:42,680 --> 00:25:45,040 Speaker 1: John, Well, that was gonna be my question about age 466 00:25:45,080 --> 00:25:48,520 Speaker 1: and differences, Like are the younger generations they're more expecting 467 00:25:48,680 --> 00:25:52,159 Speaker 1: bad actors online? And it's funny, So my son just 468 00:25:52,200 --> 00:25:55,679 Speaker 1: recently came through. He's in university and he started to 469 00:25:55,720 --> 00:25:59,080 Speaker 1: give his credit card information to a person who texted 470 00:25:59,119 --> 00:26:01,399 Speaker 1: him about some sort of problems with this Department of 471 00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:04,960 Speaker 1: Transportation and as tolls or something, and like we were like, 472 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:07,879 Speaker 1: what are you doing? That's clearly a fake thing. You 473 00:26:07,920 --> 00:26:10,920 Speaker 1: don't have a car, but why are you answering this thing? 474 00:26:10,960 --> 00:26:13,000 Speaker 1: I thought they were like much smarter than we were 475 00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:13,199 Speaker 1: on that. 476 00:26:13,560 --> 00:26:15,240 Speaker 4: I think what we're starting to find is actually just 477 00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:18,000 Speaker 4: that they're susceptible to different types of things. Yeah, and 478 00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:20,359 Speaker 4: we just don't talk about it as much because they 479 00:26:20,359 --> 00:26:22,560 Speaker 4: don't have as much money and so they're not they're 480 00:26:22,560 --> 00:26:23,800 Speaker 4: not losing as much. 481 00:26:24,600 --> 00:26:27,800 Speaker 1: The scam thing is a huge, obviously huge deal. You know, 482 00:26:27,840 --> 00:26:31,840 Speaker 1: the disinformation misinformation is is hurting our body politic, but 483 00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:35,959 Speaker 1: the scam fraud part of this is doing complete damage 484 00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:39,560 Speaker 1: to families and between generations. And yeah, it's a real problem. 485 00:26:39,359 --> 00:26:41,399 Speaker 4: And it's a huge part of the economy in other countries. 486 00:26:41,440 --> 00:26:44,560 Speaker 4: It's as much as I've read a third of the 487 00:26:44,600 --> 00:26:50,200 Speaker 4: GDP of North Korea just the systematized process of defrauding 488 00:26:50,280 --> 00:26:52,160 Speaker 4: other the citizens of other nations. 489 00:26:52,200 --> 00:26:56,040 Speaker 2: There's you know, there's a social contract within societies, within communities, 490 00:26:56,119 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 2: right that allows us to function. You assume the other 491 00:26:59,080 --> 00:27:01,000 Speaker 2: guy is going to stop when there's a stop sign 492 00:27:01,040 --> 00:27:03,720 Speaker 2: when you're driving. I mean, there's a sense of trust. 493 00:27:03,720 --> 00:27:06,240 Speaker 2: And yet, coming back to the first question about why 494 00:27:06,280 --> 00:27:11,320 Speaker 2: Trump would post about retweet something about Hunter Biden being 495 00:27:11,359 --> 00:27:14,600 Speaker 2: a robotic clone, is that I'm going to misquote Hannah 496 00:27:14,640 --> 00:27:18,800 Speaker 2: Aren't here, but it's not to get people to believe things, 497 00:27:18,800 --> 00:27:21,840 Speaker 2: but get them to believe nothing, because if you believe nothing, 498 00:27:21,840 --> 00:27:27,639 Speaker 2: if you're suspicious of everything and of everyone, we become weaker. 499 00:27:27,720 --> 00:27:31,560 Speaker 2: Our society is weaker, our institutions become weaker. And do 500 00:27:31,640 --> 00:27:34,480 Speaker 2: you get a sense that the Russians are looking to 501 00:27:35,640 --> 00:27:37,200 Speaker 2: you know that that's part of it, is to get 502 00:27:37,280 --> 00:27:38,280 Speaker 2: us to believe nothing. 503 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:40,560 Speaker 3: I think that's absolutely a huge part of it. 504 00:27:40,560 --> 00:27:43,720 Speaker 4: It's certainly part of it in the ways in which 505 00:27:43,760 --> 00:27:47,840 Speaker 4: they target their own people. The biggest targets of influence 506 00:27:47,920 --> 00:27:52,119 Speaker 4: operations have been and continue to be the citizens of 507 00:27:52,480 --> 00:27:56,040 Speaker 4: autocratic nations around the world. And we've definitely seen the 508 00:27:56,080 --> 00:27:59,760 Speaker 4: way that Putin spreads his fireus hose of falsehoods and 509 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:03,880 Speaker 4: exits owned people. Because if you don't believe anything, you're 510 00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:08,879 Speaker 4: certainly not gonna believe anything strong enough to decide to 511 00:28:09,160 --> 00:28:11,560 Speaker 4: go against the nation's leader and try to do something 512 00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:16,400 Speaker 4: dangerous like revolt that takes belief. And so it's much 513 00:28:16,440 --> 00:28:18,520 Speaker 4: safer for these autocrats to keep their. 514 00:28:18,359 --> 00:28:19,680 Speaker 3: People believing nothing. 515 00:28:20,359 --> 00:28:22,320 Speaker 4: You certainly don't want them thinking the grass is greener 516 00:28:22,359 --> 00:28:24,400 Speaker 4: on the other side of the fence, Yes, And that's 517 00:28:24,440 --> 00:28:28,159 Speaker 4: another reason they target the West. They target the West 518 00:28:28,240 --> 00:28:34,639 Speaker 4: with these accusations of corruption and that we're decadent and 519 00:28:34,760 --> 00:28:39,600 Speaker 4: weak because in large part who they're actually targeting is 520 00:28:39,600 --> 00:28:40,560 Speaker 4: their own people. 521 00:28:40,840 --> 00:28:42,600 Speaker 1: So they can tell their people that, oh, look, they're 522 00:28:42,640 --> 00:28:45,960 Speaker 1: no different than we are. It's bad everywhere, right. You know, 523 00:28:45,960 --> 00:28:48,320 Speaker 1: if you think the West is something that you should 524 00:28:48,360 --> 00:28:50,800 Speaker 1: be looking up to, that's a mistake. Can we trust 525 00:28:51,080 --> 00:28:54,120 Speaker 1: our federal government now as purveyors of information? I mean, 526 00:28:54,160 --> 00:28:57,920 Speaker 1: our economic statistics are that all of our business relies on, 527 00:28:58,120 --> 00:29:01,200 Speaker 1: and our economy comes from the US government, the FBI, 528 00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:04,800 Speaker 1: the Justice Department, that the Director of National Intelligence, Homeland Security, 529 00:29:05,040 --> 00:29:09,440 Speaker 1: looking at federal elections, all of these CC government information, 530 00:29:10,480 --> 00:29:13,040 Speaker 1: and it seems like we have an administration who wants 531 00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:16,680 Speaker 1: to put out information that just helps them as opposed 532 00:29:16,720 --> 00:29:21,200 Speaker 1: to fact based information. Do you see any concern there? 533 00:29:21,400 --> 00:29:22,240 Speaker 3: Concern? Yes? 534 00:29:22,680 --> 00:29:24,760 Speaker 4: I think in part it depends on what you're talking 535 00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:26,720 Speaker 4: about when you talk about the government. If we're talking 536 00:29:26,720 --> 00:29:30,200 Speaker 4: about individual politicians, have we ever been able to trust 537 00:29:30,200 --> 00:29:32,520 Speaker 4: individual politicians? Is that any different than it was in 538 00:29:32,520 --> 00:29:36,000 Speaker 4: the past. But if you're talking about institutions, I guess 539 00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:39,920 Speaker 4: I'm more concerned about what they're allowed to say or 540 00:29:39,960 --> 00:29:43,440 Speaker 4: what they are empowered to say than I am about 541 00:29:43,480 --> 00:29:48,320 Speaker 4: them actually saying things that are factually incorrect. These institutions 542 00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:54,240 Speaker 4: are still operated by bureaucrats, you know, largely a political bureaucrats. 543 00:29:54,280 --> 00:29:57,640 Speaker 4: Maybe at the top that's not the case, but institutionally, 544 00:29:58,040 --> 00:30:01,200 Speaker 4: I think it still is. And I think that the 545 00:30:01,280 --> 00:30:05,280 Speaker 4: real problem is going to be when the people within 546 00:30:05,400 --> 00:30:09,760 Speaker 4: those institutions just don't feel empowered to say what they 547 00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:10,720 Speaker 4: think they need to say. 548 00:30:10,800 --> 00:30:14,080 Speaker 2: We've been going down the road talking mostly about politics, 549 00:30:14,080 --> 00:30:17,120 Speaker 2: but I wonder if you could talk about health as well. 550 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:21,640 Speaker 2: The fact that RFK Junior just fired all the oversight 551 00:30:21,640 --> 00:30:25,760 Speaker 2: from the CDC right independent scientists and medical practitioners who 552 00:30:25,760 --> 00:30:30,000 Speaker 2: decide on vaccine safety for example, right, and they the 553 00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:33,080 Speaker 2: entire board was fired, and he brought on the people 554 00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:35,840 Speaker 2: that he wants on that most of them I think 555 00:30:35,920 --> 00:30:39,480 Speaker 2: are not independent, right, they're sort of his people. I 556 00:30:39,520 --> 00:30:41,000 Speaker 2: was wondering if you can give you a sense of 557 00:30:41,320 --> 00:30:45,760 Speaker 2: what the difference is if you see any between misinformation 558 00:30:46,040 --> 00:30:50,760 Speaker 2: on politics and misinformation on something that people really concerned 559 00:30:50,760 --> 00:30:54,240 Speaker 2: about the health of their children and medical information. 560 00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:58,080 Speaker 4: I think it's obviously different. I think that the potential 561 00:30:58,160 --> 00:31:01,840 Speaker 4: harms are far more palpable in the latter in the 562 00:31:01,880 --> 00:31:05,520 Speaker 4: case of public health. Obviously we've seen this to be 563 00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:08,320 Speaker 4: the case in Texas with muss outbreaks. 564 00:31:08,480 --> 00:31:10,120 Speaker 2: You know, the Russians involved in this at all or 565 00:31:10,160 --> 00:31:11,920 Speaker 2: is this not something they care about so much? 566 00:31:12,240 --> 00:31:16,320 Speaker 4: They have been involved in these sorts of conspiracy theories 567 00:31:16,320 --> 00:31:20,080 Speaker 4: in the past, mostly piggybacking in order to integrate into 568 00:31:20,120 --> 00:31:23,440 Speaker 4: particular communities, to appear part of a community. 569 00:31:23,480 --> 00:31:26,120 Speaker 3: They've used some of this messaging during COVID. There was 570 00:31:26,160 --> 00:31:29,800 Speaker 3: a lot of talk about Russian disinformation around COVID, and 571 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:32,560 Speaker 3: there was some you know, they did try to denigrate 572 00:31:33,080 --> 00:31:36,960 Speaker 3: other vaccines, for instance, in favor of their own, but 573 00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:40,200 Speaker 3: it was still relatively limited because I think even Russia 574 00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:42,320 Speaker 3: understood that they were part of about global community and 575 00:31:42,480 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 3: really this was something that needed to be beaten globally 576 00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:47,520 Speaker 3: and if it spread one place, it was going to 577 00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:51,480 Speaker 3: spread everywhere. But I think overall what we're seeing is 578 00:31:51,560 --> 00:31:56,600 Speaker 3: still regarding distrust of science, distrust of the medical community, 579 00:31:56,640 --> 00:31:59,640 Speaker 3: as just the effect of the COVID pandemic. You know, 580 00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:03,880 Speaker 3: people got mad at the nerds, they got mad at academia, 581 00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:08,720 Speaker 3: and they're still mad at academia and medical professionals, and 582 00:32:08,960 --> 00:32:10,239 Speaker 3: they're taking it out on us. 583 00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:10,520 Speaker 1: Now. 584 00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:13,280 Speaker 5: There's a lot more to talk about on this subject, 585 00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:16,080 Speaker 5: which we will next week on part two of our 586 00:32:16,120 --> 00:32:21,960 Speaker 5: conversation with Darren Linnville. Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, 587 00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:27,200 Speaker 5: Jerry O'Shea, John Seipher, and Jonathan Stern. The associate producer 588 00:32:27,440 --> 00:32:31,240 Speaker 5: is Rachel Harner. Mission Implausible is a production of honorable 589 00:32:31,280 --> 00:32:42,360 Speaker 5: mention and abominable pictures for iHeart Podcasts.