1 00:00:01,480 --> 00:00:04,960 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff you should know, a production of iHeartRadio. 2 00:00:11,160 --> 00:00:13,800 Speaker 2: Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh, and there's 3 00:00:14,000 --> 00:00:16,880 Speaker 2: Chuck and Jerry's missing. We don't know where she is. 4 00:00:18,200 --> 00:00:21,640 Speaker 2: The Russians have her, at the very least, it's quite 5 00:00:21,680 --> 00:00:24,720 Speaker 2: possible the Russians have misled her in some way or another, 6 00:00:24,760 --> 00:00:28,080 Speaker 2: and maybe they tricked her into leaving when it was 7 00:00:28,080 --> 00:00:28,840 Speaker 2: time to record. 8 00:00:29,120 --> 00:00:33,120 Speaker 1: You cheeky boy, don't worry everybody, Jerry's just really on vacation. 9 00:00:33,320 --> 00:00:37,320 Speaker 1: But that was a very clever setup to this episode 10 00:00:37,800 --> 00:00:44,600 Speaker 1: on essentially on Russian propaganda and how you know, I 11 00:00:44,680 --> 00:00:46,879 Speaker 1: think we all knew that, like their propaganda machine was 12 00:00:47,000 --> 00:00:50,319 Speaker 1: big back in the cold worn stuff obviously, but it's 13 00:00:50,440 --> 00:00:53,280 Speaker 1: it's a really big problem now and has been for 14 00:00:53,320 --> 00:00:56,040 Speaker 1: a while, ever since the advent of the Internet and 15 00:00:56,160 --> 00:00:57,440 Speaker 1: especially social media. 16 00:00:58,400 --> 00:01:02,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, because those two things are wide open set up 17 00:01:02,920 --> 00:01:09,280 Speaker 2: for people to distribute misinformation, deliberate misinformation. The Russians are 18 00:01:09,280 --> 00:01:12,400 Speaker 2: far from the only ones that do it. They're just really, 19 00:01:12,640 --> 00:01:15,520 Speaker 2: really good at it, and they've been doing it for 20 00:01:15,520 --> 00:01:17,880 Speaker 2: a long time. They I would guess they were probably 21 00:01:17,880 --> 00:01:20,480 Speaker 2: the first country to really start doing this on like 22 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:24,600 Speaker 2: a wide scale. But I mean as far back I 23 00:01:24,640 --> 00:01:28,160 Speaker 2: think as twenty ten or at least the two thousand, Yeah, 24 00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:33,200 Speaker 2: but like the twenty tens, at least twenty thirteen at 25 00:01:33,240 --> 00:01:37,040 Speaker 2: the absolute latest. The Internet Research Agency was the first 26 00:01:37,120 --> 00:01:41,080 Speaker 2: kind of famous one that surfaced. And the whole premise 27 00:01:41,480 --> 00:01:45,880 Speaker 2: back then and now is to basically game social media 28 00:01:46,800 --> 00:01:50,320 Speaker 2: and use whatever you can whatever like weaknesses it has 29 00:01:50,360 --> 00:01:54,600 Speaker 2: in like the entire structure of it, to confuse people, 30 00:01:54,720 --> 00:02:00,480 Speaker 2: to sow discord and disinformation and chaos and questioning what 31 00:02:00,600 --> 00:02:04,400 Speaker 2: reality is, getting the media to start using words like 32 00:02:04,440 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 2: post truth and stuff like that, that kind of stuff. 33 00:02:07,320 --> 00:02:10,640 Speaker 2: It might not have a specific aim where it's like 34 00:02:10,760 --> 00:02:14,480 Speaker 2: we want to say, get Trump elected that was part 35 00:02:14,520 --> 00:02:16,480 Speaker 2: of this too, like that was a Russian name as well, 36 00:02:16,919 --> 00:02:21,320 Speaker 2: or we want to stir America up over the border crisis. 37 00:02:21,880 --> 00:02:25,960 Speaker 2: Just creating a climate where people question what's real or 38 00:02:25,960 --> 00:02:29,800 Speaker 2: what's true. That in and of itself is a huge 39 00:02:29,880 --> 00:02:33,520 Speaker 2: triumph for these Russian operations that have been going on 40 00:02:33,600 --> 00:02:34,760 Speaker 2: for more than a decade. 41 00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:37,000 Speaker 1: Yeah. I think that was one of the things that 42 00:02:37,080 --> 00:02:39,639 Speaker 1: chilled me most was it wasn't like we really need 43 00:02:39,639 --> 00:02:43,840 Speaker 1: to get people to believe this one thing right about Ukraine, 44 00:02:44,360 --> 00:02:47,560 Speaker 1: let's say it's more like, no, let's just so chaos 45 00:02:47,560 --> 00:02:52,359 Speaker 1: in confusion to where you doubt what you're reading and 46 00:02:52,720 --> 00:02:54,600 Speaker 1: you don't know what the truth is anymore. And that's 47 00:02:54,680 --> 00:02:56,840 Speaker 1: just like that feels even scarier, you know. 48 00:02:57,160 --> 00:03:01,680 Speaker 2: It does, because ultimately, eventually most people would be like, 49 00:03:01,800 --> 00:03:04,160 Speaker 2: it's not worth trying to get to the bottom of this. 50 00:03:04,680 --> 00:03:06,840 Speaker 2: You know, I'm just gonna stop. I'm just not going 51 00:03:06,880 --> 00:03:08,000 Speaker 2: to pay attention anymore. 52 00:03:08,080 --> 00:03:10,519 Speaker 1: I'm just not going to care, or I'll just share 53 00:03:10,560 --> 00:03:12,160 Speaker 1: something because like I read. 54 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:14,840 Speaker 2: It, yes, exactly sometimes on Reddit. 55 00:03:15,760 --> 00:03:19,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, good point. All right, So maybe we should jump 56 00:03:19,880 --> 00:03:23,840 Speaker 1: back a little bit and talk about the IRA, not 57 00:03:23,880 --> 00:03:27,919 Speaker 1: the Irish Republican Army, but the Internet Research Agency or 58 00:03:28,000 --> 00:03:30,240 Speaker 1: the Russian troll Farm as it might you might know 59 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 1: it better, as that was founded in twenty thirteen by 60 00:03:34,680 --> 00:03:38,920 Speaker 1: guy that was a former criminal eventually a successful entrepreneur 61 00:03:39,560 --> 00:03:44,280 Speaker 1: and kind of higher up oligarch in Russia and you know, 62 00:03:44,320 --> 00:03:48,800 Speaker 1: confidant of Vladimir Putin, and he also founded you know, 63 00:03:48,840 --> 00:03:50,920 Speaker 1: Confident up for a while because he also founded the 64 00:03:51,240 --> 00:03:53,800 Speaker 1: Wagner Group, which you may have read about the news, 65 00:03:53,840 --> 00:03:57,480 Speaker 1: the Russian Mercenary organization that would eventually try and Overthrow putin. 66 00:03:58,680 --> 00:04:02,320 Speaker 2: Yes, do you watch the age and see on Prime? No? 67 00:04:02,480 --> 00:04:02,800 Speaker 1: I don't. 68 00:04:03,280 --> 00:04:07,920 Speaker 2: It is magnificent. Yeah, it's one of the best spy 69 00:04:08,120 --> 00:04:09,760 Speaker 2: shows of recent times. 70 00:04:10,240 --> 00:04:11,000 Speaker 1: I love a spie show. 71 00:04:11,080 --> 00:04:14,320 Speaker 2: You guys liked Black Doves, right, yep. This is at 72 00:04:14,360 --> 00:04:18,520 Speaker 2: least on that caliber, if not higher. Michael Fossbender's in it, 73 00:04:18,720 --> 00:04:23,480 Speaker 2: Richard Gear, Jeffrey Wright, a bunch of other very talented people. 74 00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:27,600 Speaker 2: But it's all like spycraft stuff, and it's it's really 75 00:04:27,640 --> 00:04:32,440 Speaker 2: worth it. They just released their second season and I've 76 00:04:32,440 --> 00:04:35,880 Speaker 2: got three episodes left. I started two days ago, and 77 00:04:36,040 --> 00:04:38,400 Speaker 2: both seasons are well worth watching. 78 00:04:39,120 --> 00:04:41,479 Speaker 1: Okay, I did not watch Black Doves. Actually, I thought 79 00:04:41,520 --> 00:04:44,120 Speaker 1: you were talking about the what's the Gary Eelman show, 80 00:04:44,160 --> 00:04:45,599 Speaker 1: Wild Horses something horses. 81 00:04:47,360 --> 00:04:49,719 Speaker 2: I don't know, I know the one you're talking about. 82 00:04:49,760 --> 00:04:50,200 Speaker 2: You watch that? 83 00:04:50,680 --> 00:04:51,760 Speaker 1: Yeah, I watched that one. 84 00:04:51,880 --> 00:04:52,320 Speaker 2: Is it good? 85 00:04:53,200 --> 00:04:56,600 Speaker 1: Yeah? It's really good. I mean Gary Oldman's fantastic Slow Horses. 86 00:04:56,800 --> 00:04:59,360 Speaker 2: Slow Horses. I swear you watch Black Doves because Emily 87 00:04:59,400 --> 00:05:01,880 Speaker 2: said she liked it, the one with she may have 88 00:05:01,920 --> 00:05:03,040 Speaker 2: watched it, bend it like. 89 00:05:02,920 --> 00:05:06,640 Speaker 1: Beckham, Yeah, Kiera Knightley, I didn't. Yeah, I didn't see it. 90 00:05:06,960 --> 00:05:08,720 Speaker 1: May have watched that without me though, because she watched. 91 00:05:09,680 --> 00:05:12,520 Speaker 2: Okay, just watch them, watch them both, but definitely watch 92 00:05:12,560 --> 00:05:16,800 Speaker 2: the agency. It's much more likely to be in your 93 00:05:16,800 --> 00:05:18,679 Speaker 2: wheelhouse if either one of them are going. 94 00:05:18,560 --> 00:05:21,880 Speaker 1: To be all right, Okay, So back to the show. 95 00:05:22,600 --> 00:05:25,919 Speaker 2: Oh, I know I brought that up. They battle essentially 96 00:05:26,000 --> 00:05:28,960 Speaker 2: the Wagner Group, but it's Valhalla in the agency. 97 00:05:29,360 --> 00:05:33,880 Speaker 1: Okay, gotcha, sorry about that. That's okay. Everyone loves a 98 00:05:33,880 --> 00:05:35,760 Speaker 1: good recommendation from either one of us, I think. 99 00:05:36,080 --> 00:05:38,760 Speaker 2: Yeah. I also, I want to be clear here, this 100 00:05:38,960 --> 00:05:41,120 Speaker 2: was not brought to you by Prime. We're not trying 101 00:05:41,160 --> 00:05:45,479 Speaker 2: to manipulate you or propagandize you or market to you. 102 00:05:45,720 --> 00:05:48,600 Speaker 2: This is just I watch it on Prime and it's 103 00:05:48,640 --> 00:05:51,479 Speaker 2: on time, and it's so good that I just took 104 00:05:51,520 --> 00:05:56,000 Speaker 2: that time to share that with everybody. That's all exactly 105 00:05:56,000 --> 00:05:57,919 Speaker 2: what it seemed like on face value. And do you 106 00:05:57,960 --> 00:05:59,040 Speaker 2: know why I have to say that. 107 00:05:59,040 --> 00:06:01,560 Speaker 1: Chuck, I don't know, Josh, because of. 108 00:06:01,480 --> 00:06:04,839 Speaker 2: Stuff like this operation that we're going to talk about. 109 00:06:05,240 --> 00:06:08,120 Speaker 1: That's right. So the IRA that I spoke of, the 110 00:06:08,120 --> 00:06:10,599 Speaker 1: Internet Research Agency that what they did this is like 111 00:06:10,760 --> 00:06:15,160 Speaker 1: mid twenty tens. They hired a ton of you know, 112 00:06:15,360 --> 00:06:18,640 Speaker 1: young people basically who could speak English and who knew 113 00:06:18,640 --> 00:06:22,000 Speaker 1: a lot about politics to like, hey, why don't you 114 00:06:22,000 --> 00:06:23,760 Speaker 1: start a troll farm, you know, get on board this 115 00:06:23,800 --> 00:06:27,400 Speaker 1: troll farm and just create fake stuff, create fake news stories. 116 00:06:28,600 --> 00:06:31,840 Speaker 1: Although I'm love to even say those words together, fake 117 00:06:31,960 --> 00:06:35,920 Speaker 1: social media posts, YouTube videos. Eventually, you know, as you'll 118 00:06:35,920 --> 00:06:38,000 Speaker 1: see what would become like deep fakes and AI and 119 00:06:38,000 --> 00:06:40,960 Speaker 1: stuff like that. But this is before that. Yeah, and 120 00:06:41,360 --> 00:06:46,000 Speaker 1: while this was going on, Sputnik and Russia Today or 121 00:06:46,160 --> 00:06:51,000 Speaker 1: RT these are you know, I think legitimate or one point, 122 00:06:51,040 --> 00:06:52,920 Speaker 1: we're legitimate Russian news outlets. Right. 123 00:06:54,440 --> 00:06:58,600 Speaker 2: They were always backed by the Kremlin. Oh well okay, yeah, 124 00:06:58,640 --> 00:07:01,360 Speaker 2: but yeah, I think that they were still they still 125 00:07:01,400 --> 00:07:03,240 Speaker 2: had journalists and stuff like that, but they were trying 126 00:07:03,279 --> 00:07:07,400 Speaker 2: to get the Russian viewpoint across to Western audiences. 127 00:07:07,160 --> 00:07:12,480 Speaker 1: Right, So they started distributing stories around the world, basically, 128 00:07:12,960 --> 00:07:15,000 Speaker 1: like we were saying, trying to get people to like 129 00:07:16,640 --> 00:07:19,520 Speaker 1: to believe whatever they wanted to believe at the time, 130 00:07:19,600 --> 00:07:20,760 Speaker 1: like politically. 131 00:07:20,920 --> 00:07:25,840 Speaker 2: Right, And the twenty sixteen United States election was a 132 00:07:25,880 --> 00:07:30,080 Speaker 2: real big kind of debut. They've been kind of ated already, 133 00:07:30,480 --> 00:07:33,040 Speaker 2: but the twenty sixteen election they really showed just how 134 00:07:33,120 --> 00:07:35,640 Speaker 2: much they could monkey with stuff, or at least the 135 00:07:35,680 --> 00:07:39,440 Speaker 2: potential of them monkeying with stuff. And this is where 136 00:07:39,440 --> 00:07:43,640 Speaker 2: that the allegations of Trump colluding with the Russians, this 137 00:07:43,680 --> 00:07:46,560 Speaker 2: is what they were talking about unproven, by the way, 138 00:07:46,640 --> 00:07:51,720 Speaker 2: to Rachel Maddow's great dismay right Pizzagate. These they didn't 139 00:07:51,760 --> 00:07:55,520 Speaker 2: necessarily come up with these things, but they were able 140 00:07:55,600 --> 00:07:59,160 Speaker 2: to amplify them, yeah, and get people talking about them 141 00:07:59,200 --> 00:08:01,960 Speaker 2: and make people questioning what was what, you know, or 142 00:08:02,000 --> 00:08:05,120 Speaker 2: the Democrats like really keeping child sex slaves in the 143 00:08:05,160 --> 00:08:08,880 Speaker 2: basement of Comet Pizza in DC. Who knows? Maybe you 144 00:08:08,880 --> 00:08:11,240 Speaker 2: should take an assault rifle from North Carolina and go 145 00:08:11,280 --> 00:08:11,800 Speaker 2: find out. 146 00:08:12,200 --> 00:08:15,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly. So once this start sort of starts coming out, 147 00:08:15,960 --> 00:08:19,840 Speaker 1: and the United States and you know, all over North 148 00:08:19,880 --> 00:08:23,440 Speaker 1: American and Europe started realizing what was going on. In 149 00:08:23,520 --> 00:08:26,920 Speaker 1: February twenty twenty two, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 150 00:08:27,480 --> 00:08:29,080 Speaker 1: there started to be a little bit of action taken. 151 00:08:29,160 --> 00:08:32,719 Speaker 1: The EU banned Russian state media, including Sputnik and RT. 152 00:08:34,000 --> 00:08:37,680 Speaker 1: Other companies Google News dropped them from aggregation service. I 153 00:08:37,679 --> 00:08:41,800 Speaker 1: think Google, Microsoft and Apple all started like pulling their apps. 154 00:08:42,280 --> 00:08:45,160 Speaker 1: So that sort of started happening and then in twenty 155 00:08:45,200 --> 00:08:48,880 Speaker 1: three was when that failed uprising against Putin by the 156 00:08:48,920 --> 00:08:53,240 Speaker 1: Wagner group happened. And the long and short is after 157 00:08:53,320 --> 00:08:57,800 Speaker 1: all this, the IRA finally disbanded, but this work continued 158 00:08:57,920 --> 00:08:59,079 Speaker 1: among other groups. 159 00:08:59,360 --> 00:09:02,280 Speaker 2: Yeah, this is a good example of the whack a 160 00:09:02,320 --> 00:09:07,439 Speaker 2: mole that the West is playing. The Russian Internet disinformation 161 00:09:07,559 --> 00:09:11,640 Speaker 2: operations have the West on our heels. Clearly, there's basically 162 00:09:11,640 --> 00:09:13,720 Speaker 2: no one who knows what they're talking about with this 163 00:09:13,760 --> 00:09:16,559 Speaker 2: stuff who would disagree with that. The West still has 164 00:09:16,559 --> 00:09:19,240 Speaker 2: not figured out how to do it, aside from piecemeal 165 00:09:20,760 --> 00:09:26,280 Speaker 2: responses like taking Russia Times app off of the Apple market, 166 00:09:26,559 --> 00:09:29,360 Speaker 2: off of the Apple app store, you know, like that's 167 00:09:29,400 --> 00:09:32,240 Speaker 2: the kind of response we have to this. Still, and 168 00:09:32,280 --> 00:09:34,400 Speaker 2: this has been going on for more than a decade. 169 00:09:35,080 --> 00:09:37,320 Speaker 2: And one of the reasons why it's so hard to 170 00:09:37,400 --> 00:09:40,680 Speaker 2: do anything about it is because they use what the 171 00:09:40,840 --> 00:09:44,360 Speaker 2: Rand Corporation researchers Christopher Paula and Miriam Matthews call a 172 00:09:44,400 --> 00:09:49,840 Speaker 2: fire hose of falsehood, just put everything out there. It's 173 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:52,959 Speaker 2: not the quality, it's the quantity that they focus on. 174 00:09:53,520 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 1: Yeah. For sure, after CRIMEA was annexed in twenty fourteen, 175 00:09:59,600 --> 00:10:03,600 Speaker 1: and then obviously after the invasion of Ukraine in February 176 00:10:03,600 --> 00:10:06,199 Speaker 1: of twenty twenty two, they really ramped up a lot 177 00:10:06,240 --> 00:10:11,439 Speaker 1: of messaging to try and get you know, sentiment, sometimes 178 00:10:11,480 --> 00:10:13,720 Speaker 1: on their side, but a lot more times like just 179 00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:18,079 Speaker 1: against Ukraine and what was going on. And this eventually 180 00:10:18,120 --> 00:10:21,840 Speaker 1: it would become known as Dappelganger. But to be clear, 181 00:10:21,920 --> 00:10:26,000 Speaker 1: Dappelganger isn't like it wasn't Operation Dappelganger or there's not 182 00:10:26,080 --> 00:10:30,040 Speaker 1: an organization called Dappelganger. It's more of just sort of 183 00:10:30,679 --> 00:10:32,640 Speaker 1: I think the media sort of misread that and labeled 184 00:10:32,679 --> 00:10:34,679 Speaker 1: it that, but it's really just sort of this method 185 00:10:35,240 --> 00:10:38,560 Speaker 1: of doing what they're doing and how they're doing it. 186 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:43,559 Speaker 2: Yeah, to be specific, it's a way of cloning dummy 187 00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:47,880 Speaker 2: websites that look like actual legitimate websites. The ones some 188 00:10:47,920 --> 00:10:51,640 Speaker 2: of the ones that they targeted were Lamonde and France, 189 00:10:51,720 --> 00:10:55,240 Speaker 2: their website, Washington Post in the US, the Guardian in 190 00:10:55,280 --> 00:10:59,560 Speaker 2: the UK, and they would essentially just take they would 191 00:10:59,679 --> 00:11:02,720 Speaker 2: have the bots start sending links or putting links all 192 00:11:02,760 --> 00:11:05,760 Speaker 2: over the Internet to basically share, right, hey, look at 193 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:09,840 Speaker 2: this crazy article. Right. The Washington Post actually reported this, 194 00:11:09,920 --> 00:11:12,199 Speaker 2: so it seems like it would be legitimate. Then you 195 00:11:12,240 --> 00:11:14,360 Speaker 2: would click that and it would take you to a 196 00:11:14,400 --> 00:11:19,200 Speaker 2: different series of domains that got smaller and smaller to 197 00:11:19,600 --> 00:11:23,040 Speaker 2: where if you were in the area they were targeting, 198 00:11:23,080 --> 00:11:25,000 Speaker 2: say you were in the United States and you had 199 00:11:25,040 --> 00:11:27,760 Speaker 2: clicked you know, this thing to find out about whatever 200 00:11:27,800 --> 00:11:31,959 Speaker 2: this fake Washington Post thing was saying, it would it 201 00:11:32,000 --> 00:11:35,640 Speaker 2: would take you to this fake website like Washingtonpost dot PM, 202 00:11:36,200 --> 00:11:40,840 Speaker 2: just different enough that like you probably wouldn't notice, but 203 00:11:40,920 --> 00:11:43,760 Speaker 2: it's a different domain name. And the way that they 204 00:11:43,760 --> 00:11:46,760 Speaker 2: were able to get away with this was shell companies 205 00:11:46,800 --> 00:11:50,480 Speaker 2: and using shady kind of hosting services around the world. 206 00:11:51,240 --> 00:11:56,400 Speaker 2: And that that was doppelganger, that technique that they used 207 00:11:56,440 --> 00:12:01,640 Speaker 2: for getting this stuff out. There is no operation like this. 208 00:12:01,920 --> 00:12:06,080 Speaker 2: These these using bots or creating like fake accounts on 209 00:12:06,120 --> 00:12:09,920 Speaker 2: Facebook or whatever. That wasn't dopplgetor that is constant. It's 210 00:12:09,960 --> 00:12:12,680 Speaker 2: so constant and so embedded that there's no name for that. 211 00:12:13,040 --> 00:12:16,200 Speaker 2: Doppelganger was just the technique of the way that they 212 00:12:16,320 --> 00:12:20,679 Speaker 2: use the infrastructure of the Internet to deliver misinformation for 213 00:12:20,720 --> 00:12:22,000 Speaker 2: this short period of time. 214 00:12:22,640 --> 00:12:25,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, sort of one of the main companies. And we're 215 00:12:25,920 --> 00:12:27,400 Speaker 1: not going to go through all of these because it's 216 00:12:27,400 --> 00:12:29,440 Speaker 1: a little mind numbing. But there's one called the Social 217 00:12:29,480 --> 00:12:33,640 Speaker 1: Design Agency, which is a pr firm that started up 218 00:12:33,640 --> 00:12:36,960 Speaker 1: in twenty twenty two, founded by a political consultant who 219 00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:42,720 Speaker 1: had you know, that was their business, so you know, 220 00:12:42,720 --> 00:12:45,080 Speaker 1: they know exactly how to do it, and the Russian 221 00:12:45,080 --> 00:12:46,880 Speaker 1: government all of a sudden was like, wait a minute, 222 00:12:47,160 --> 00:12:49,319 Speaker 1: we would love to hire you to do like all 223 00:12:49,360 --> 00:12:52,840 Speaker 1: this stuff. It's literally as of I think a couple 224 00:12:52,880 --> 00:12:56,600 Speaker 1: of years ago, run by the Kremlin and directed by 225 00:12:56,720 --> 00:13:00,400 Speaker 1: the Putin administration, so they're kind of in the middle 226 00:13:00,480 --> 00:13:03,640 Speaker 1: of most of this doppelganger activity. Yes, and you know, 227 00:13:03,720 --> 00:13:05,720 Speaker 1: like you said, when you go to one of these websites, 228 00:13:05,720 --> 00:13:07,600 Speaker 1: when you click on the link, if you're not paying 229 00:13:07,640 --> 00:13:10,720 Speaker 1: attention to the dot whatever, and you realize it's not 230 00:13:10,880 --> 00:13:14,280 Speaker 1: you know, Washingtonpost dot com. It looks like it, it 231 00:13:14,320 --> 00:13:16,920 Speaker 1: smells like it, it acts like it for the most part. 232 00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:19,960 Speaker 1: So it's really easy to fool people. 233 00:13:20,240 --> 00:13:22,959 Speaker 2: It is. I mean, if you really look closely, and 234 00:13:23,000 --> 00:13:25,880 Speaker 2: you look with a skeptical eye, you'll turn up some stuff. 235 00:13:25,920 --> 00:13:29,160 Speaker 2: I saw. One example is that the US must not 236 00:13:29,280 --> 00:13:34,400 Speaker 2: become the world's gendarme, which is police in French, like 237 00:13:34,440 --> 00:13:37,600 Speaker 2: the Washington Post would not use a phrase like that, right. 238 00:13:38,080 --> 00:13:40,439 Speaker 1: But you have to know that, like I think they 239 00:13:40,480 --> 00:13:43,000 Speaker 1: count on just fire hosing it such where they're like, well, 240 00:13:43,040 --> 00:13:45,160 Speaker 1: who cares if most people don't, If we just get 241 00:13:45,200 --> 00:13:46,800 Speaker 1: this percentage of people, that's great. 242 00:13:47,400 --> 00:13:50,120 Speaker 2: Yes, And even more than that, I feel like going 243 00:13:50,160 --> 00:13:53,600 Speaker 2: to the trouble of actually creating the article on the 244 00:13:53,640 --> 00:13:58,360 Speaker 2: fake website is almost superfluous because so many people on 245 00:13:58,400 --> 00:14:03,440 Speaker 2: the internet just share, Yeah, share, like that headline gotcha? Now, 246 00:14:03,520 --> 00:14:06,520 Speaker 2: I think that this is going on, not even bothering 247 00:14:06,559 --> 00:14:10,360 Speaker 2: to click into this to read the actual article. All 248 00:14:10,400 --> 00:14:12,760 Speaker 2: I need is the headline because it got me juiced up. 249 00:14:13,559 --> 00:14:16,079 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. And of course they're amplifying this through 250 00:14:16,120 --> 00:14:20,760 Speaker 1: the bot farms. Russian social media bots will post links 251 00:14:20,800 --> 00:14:23,280 Speaker 1: and then there are more bots that retweet these links. 252 00:14:24,320 --> 00:14:25,920 Speaker 1: I think I mentioned on the show. I saw a 253 00:14:25,960 --> 00:14:28,320 Speaker 1: picture of a bot farm one not too long ago 254 00:14:28,320 --> 00:14:29,440 Speaker 1: that was in big expose. 255 00:14:29,960 --> 00:14:31,520 Speaker 2: Were they all just doing grass? 256 00:14:32,160 --> 00:14:36,000 Speaker 1: No? That was terrifying. It was like a dude sitting 257 00:14:36,000 --> 00:14:38,160 Speaker 1: at a desk on a computer and there were a 258 00:14:38,320 --> 00:14:42,920 Speaker 1: thousand cell phones connected hardwired to the computer, and then 259 00:14:42,920 --> 00:14:45,400 Speaker 1: there were dozens and dozens of these guys with hundreds 260 00:14:45,440 --> 00:14:48,600 Speaker 1: and hundreds of smartphones wow, connected on a big wall. 261 00:14:49,000 --> 00:14:51,760 Speaker 1: So when you see how it actually works, like literally 262 00:14:51,760 --> 00:14:54,360 Speaker 1: connecting to phones to send this stuff out and amplify it, 263 00:14:54,360 --> 00:14:57,880 Speaker 1: it's just it feels really dystopian and scary. 264 00:14:58,320 --> 00:15:00,640 Speaker 2: Yeah. I feel like it's becoming clear that we're going 265 00:15:00,680 --> 00:15:03,640 Speaker 2: to have to abandon the Internet and come up with 266 00:15:03,680 --> 00:15:06,160 Speaker 2: a new one because this one got cooked. 267 00:15:07,400 --> 00:15:10,440 Speaker 1: A creed. Should we take a break? All right, Well, 268 00:15:10,520 --> 00:15:12,760 Speaker 1: we're going to ruminate that, and I hope we can 269 00:15:12,840 --> 00:15:15,240 Speaker 1: even come back after we ruminate, but we'll be right back. 270 00:15:15,280 --> 00:15:31,200 Speaker 3: I hope. 271 00:15:39,520 --> 00:15:42,920 Speaker 1: All right. So I mentioned after the invasion of Ukraine 272 00:15:42,960 --> 00:15:45,400 Speaker 1: in February twenty twenty two, that's when things really ramped 273 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:50,080 Speaker 1: up again. They you know, a lot of these ideas 274 00:15:50,120 --> 00:15:53,840 Speaker 1: were really pretty clever. There was a one group that 275 00:15:53,960 --> 00:15:56,480 Speaker 1: launched sort of like a Snopes like site, but a 276 00:15:56,520 --> 00:15:59,880 Speaker 1: fake one, I know, War on Fakes, and it was 277 00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:04,800 Speaker 1: design to discredit Ukraine and support Russia obviously. And then 278 00:16:04,840 --> 00:16:10,400 Speaker 1: another one called are in Reliable Recent News which replace 279 00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:14,440 Speaker 1: reliable Russian news. So on one side you've got something 280 00:16:14,480 --> 00:16:16,520 Speaker 1: that says like, hey, this is reliable news, so this 281 00:16:16,640 --> 00:16:18,840 Speaker 1: is real. On the other side, it's like, hey, we 282 00:16:19,280 --> 00:16:22,280 Speaker 1: root out the fake stuff, but it's fake, so it's 283 00:16:22,360 --> 00:16:24,720 Speaker 1: almost like, you know, it's not almost like they've got 284 00:16:24,760 --> 00:16:25,680 Speaker 1: all their bases covered. 285 00:16:25,840 --> 00:16:28,080 Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean, if you pay too close attention to this, 286 00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:30,600 Speaker 2: you'll start bleeding out of your ear guaranteed. 287 00:16:31,160 --> 00:16:32,240 Speaker 1: Yeah. 288 00:16:32,360 --> 00:16:37,920 Speaker 2: Doppelganger got its name from the EU's Disinformation Lab. One 289 00:16:37,920 --> 00:16:41,200 Speaker 2: of the disheartening things to me, Chuck was figuring out 290 00:16:41,280 --> 00:16:44,960 Speaker 2: that the people who are tracking this stuff, there's not 291 00:16:45,040 --> 00:16:49,320 Speaker 2: a government agency involved anywhere. These are all like independent 292 00:16:50,040 --> 00:16:52,920 Speaker 2: NGOs that are dedicated to tracking disinformation. 293 00:16:53,200 --> 00:16:55,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's interesting journalists. 294 00:16:55,120 --> 00:16:58,120 Speaker 2: Like these are the people doing the actual work, and 295 00:16:58,160 --> 00:17:01,680 Speaker 2: then seven years later the governments like, oh, we're going 296 00:17:01,760 --> 00:17:04,320 Speaker 2: to have our Department of Justice do something about this. 297 00:17:04,840 --> 00:17:05,080 Speaker 1: Right. 298 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:08,639 Speaker 2: So where that's where Doppelganger got its name from. I 299 00:17:08,640 --> 00:17:12,320 Speaker 2: think it's basically it suggests that these are or it 300 00:17:12,359 --> 00:17:16,639 Speaker 2: points out like the cloned sites, they're like Dappelgangers of 301 00:17:16,680 --> 00:17:17,359 Speaker 2: the real thing. 302 00:17:17,840 --> 00:17:18,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, exactly. 303 00:17:20,640 --> 00:17:24,040 Speaker 2: But that war on Ukraine, after the invasion of Ukraine, 304 00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:29,560 Speaker 2: they really ramped up the misinformation flood that was coming. 305 00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:34,320 Speaker 2: Like they targeted in twenty twenty four and I think 306 00:17:34,359 --> 00:17:38,520 Speaker 2: twenty twenty three, their main targets were France, Germany, the US, 307 00:17:38,680 --> 00:17:42,680 Speaker 2: the UK and Ukraine. And essentially what they were trying 308 00:17:42,720 --> 00:17:46,320 Speaker 2: to do was to make the people, the public in 309 00:17:46,359 --> 00:17:50,879 Speaker 2: each of those countries lose support or turn on the 310 00:17:50,960 --> 00:17:54,680 Speaker 2: idea of supporting Ukraine so that Russia could get them 311 00:17:54,720 --> 00:17:57,400 Speaker 2: out of the Ukraine business in Russia could just get 312 00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:00,919 Speaker 2: back to trying to take over Ukraine as best it could. 313 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:02,879 Speaker 1: Yeah, and they, you know, they did it in a 314 00:18:02,880 --> 00:18:06,080 Speaker 1: lot of ways. Obviously, some ways were just fake articles 315 00:18:06,119 --> 00:18:10,399 Speaker 1: about like, you know, stuff that Ukraine does, or maybe 316 00:18:10,400 --> 00:18:15,600 Speaker 1: a fake article about that whitewashes a Russian atrocity like 317 00:18:15,640 --> 00:18:19,960 Speaker 1: the Buka massacre, like that never happened, right, But cleverly 318 00:18:20,359 --> 00:18:24,400 Speaker 1: they're also going like through celebrities and like faking that, 319 00:18:24,760 --> 00:18:27,760 Speaker 1: you know, Taylor, like a real influential celebrity like Taylor 320 00:18:27,800 --> 00:18:32,760 Speaker 1: Swift or Kim Kardashian, Like fake messages where they're supporting 321 00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:37,960 Speaker 1: or they're criticizing America and Europe for supporting Ukraine. Or 322 00:18:38,040 --> 00:18:39,440 Speaker 1: did you find something about Oprah? 323 00:18:39,680 --> 00:18:42,359 Speaker 2: Yeah, do you want to read that quote? Go ahead, 324 00:18:42,760 --> 00:18:47,720 Speaker 2: Oprah says supporting Ukrainians is unacceptable. Their actions destroy lives 325 00:18:47,760 --> 00:18:48,640 Speaker 2: in societies. 326 00:18:49,560 --> 00:18:53,760 Speaker 1: Yeah, so you know, especially if you're some like young 327 00:18:53,800 --> 00:18:57,600 Speaker 1: person who supports Taylor Swift or Kim Kardashian, you're probably 328 00:18:58,640 --> 00:19:00,800 Speaker 1: you know, not even aware that this kind of stuff 329 00:19:00,840 --> 00:19:03,000 Speaker 1: even goes on. All you're thinking is like, well, Taylor 330 00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:06,040 Speaker 1: Swift said, Ukraine deserves what's coming, So that's probably true. 331 00:19:06,080 --> 00:19:08,600 Speaker 2: That's exactly right, that's exactly what they're trying to do. 332 00:19:09,119 --> 00:19:12,480 Speaker 1: Or maybe not deserves what's coming, but like America, this 333 00:19:12,520 --> 00:19:15,119 Speaker 1: is what a big sort of angle for them is. 334 00:19:16,240 --> 00:19:18,560 Speaker 1: America first, like, we shouldn't get involved in this. Let 335 00:19:18,640 --> 00:19:20,520 Speaker 1: Ukraine handle it themselves. 336 00:19:20,240 --> 00:19:24,119 Speaker 2: Right, And so that you just hit the nail on 337 00:19:24,160 --> 00:19:28,240 Speaker 2: the head. As far as why Republicans typically get targeted 338 00:19:28,280 --> 00:19:33,439 Speaker 2: with this stuff, it's not because the Trump administration is 339 00:19:33,480 --> 00:19:37,439 Speaker 2: colluding with the Russians. It's because the message that the 340 00:19:37,480 --> 00:19:42,840 Speaker 2: Trump administration and MAGA in general and Republicans by extension, 341 00:19:43,359 --> 00:19:46,200 Speaker 2: are basically basing their platform on. It's like you said, 342 00:19:46,359 --> 00:19:50,439 Speaker 2: America first, focus on domestic issues, get ourselves out of 343 00:19:50,480 --> 00:19:55,920 Speaker 2: foreign affairs, and that goes lockstep with what Putin wants. 344 00:19:55,960 --> 00:19:58,880 Speaker 2: It's like, yes, America, go mess with your own stuff, 345 00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:03,280 Speaker 2: and by pointing out and creating turmoil about all the 346 00:20:03,280 --> 00:20:05,800 Speaker 2: things that are going on in America at any given time. 347 00:20:06,119 --> 00:20:08,720 Speaker 2: It makes it seem even that more urgent to just 348 00:20:08,760 --> 00:20:11,800 Speaker 2: stop giving money to Ukraine when we've got all of 349 00:20:11,880 --> 00:20:15,240 Speaker 2: these middle class white people who need that money too, 350 00:20:15,359 --> 00:20:18,280 Speaker 2: and like tax breaks and stuff like that. That kind 351 00:20:18,359 --> 00:20:23,480 Speaker 2: of messaging that's not necessarily wrong, but is making it 352 00:20:23,520 --> 00:20:28,119 Speaker 2: seem like the American public sentiment is behind that. That's 353 00:20:28,200 --> 00:20:30,840 Speaker 2: the part that's wrong. They're manipulating that to kind of 354 00:20:30,880 --> 00:20:33,520 Speaker 2: try to get the public to swing that way, all 355 00:20:33,560 --> 00:20:35,840 Speaker 2: because they just want to be able to invade Ukraine 356 00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:36,400 Speaker 2: more easily. 357 00:20:36,920 --> 00:20:40,240 Speaker 1: Yeah. They had one project called the Good Old USA Project, 358 00:20:41,200 --> 00:20:44,560 Speaker 1: which one of the SDA founders had come up with 359 00:20:44,560 --> 00:20:46,760 Speaker 1: with some other people, and it targeted voters in six 360 00:20:46,800 --> 00:20:49,960 Speaker 1: swing states during the last election in twenty twenty four 361 00:20:50,600 --> 00:20:54,120 Speaker 1: about just that, like let's not help Ukraine, like why 362 00:20:54,119 --> 00:20:56,720 Speaker 1: are we doing that when we have problems here? And 363 00:20:57,400 --> 00:21:01,920 Speaker 1: they also spent about ten million bucks encouraging right wing 364 00:21:02,040 --> 00:21:06,359 Speaker 1: influencers to get on board with pro Russia opinions. So 365 00:21:06,640 --> 00:21:09,760 Speaker 1: that's why if you've if you've ever been on like 366 00:21:09,880 --> 00:21:12,919 Speaker 1: the comment section of any social media site about anything 367 00:21:12,960 --> 00:21:16,480 Speaker 1: political like this, first of all, we would both encourage 368 00:21:16,480 --> 00:21:19,040 Speaker 1: you to stop doing that because it's just not good 369 00:21:19,040 --> 00:21:21,280 Speaker 1: for your mental health and well being. But if you 370 00:21:21,320 --> 00:21:23,480 Speaker 1: do and you see people saying like, oh yeah, thanks, 371 00:21:23,520 --> 00:21:26,840 Speaker 1: comrade or whatever Russian bought, like, that's that's what they're 372 00:21:26,880 --> 00:21:27,680 Speaker 1: talking about here. 373 00:21:28,320 --> 00:21:31,520 Speaker 2: Yeah, And to be fair, those right wing influencers, the 374 00:21:31,560 --> 00:21:35,960 Speaker 2: YouTubers that were hired to disseminate Russian propaganda were not 375 00:21:36,119 --> 00:21:39,080 Speaker 2: aware that that's what they were doing. They were hired 376 00:21:39,119 --> 00:21:42,480 Speaker 2: by a front company called Tenant Media. Yeah, they hired 377 00:21:42,520 --> 00:21:47,120 Speaker 2: like six hardcore right wing YouTubers and just basically said, hey, 378 00:21:47,920 --> 00:21:49,960 Speaker 2: let's talk about this kind of thing. But they were 379 00:21:50,000 --> 00:21:52,640 Speaker 2: not aware that they were being paid by the Kremlin. 380 00:21:52,920 --> 00:21:55,280 Speaker 2: They didn't know that. And then once that was exposed, 381 00:21:55,600 --> 00:21:59,600 Speaker 2: that company dissolved in. Those people, well, I guess had 382 00:21:59,600 --> 00:22:01,640 Speaker 2: to eat some crow, I would guess. 383 00:22:01,920 --> 00:22:04,800 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. Another thing, if you ever heard, you know, 384 00:22:05,760 --> 00:22:08,600 Speaker 1: you know, George Soros is paying those protesters like that 385 00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:11,800 Speaker 1: by the hour, like paid protesters, paid protesters. Yeah, that 386 00:22:11,920 --> 00:22:16,000 Speaker 1: comes from a fake Washington Post article, like you know, 387 00:22:16,160 --> 00:22:21,240 Speaker 1: from one of these like completely fake cloned websites. That's 388 00:22:21,240 --> 00:22:24,959 Speaker 1: where that comes from. It was right after Israel invaded 389 00:22:25,000 --> 00:22:28,880 Speaker 1: Gaza in spring of twenty twenty four and that there, 390 00:22:28,880 --> 00:22:31,480 Speaker 1: you know, all the protesters were going on, and there 391 00:22:31,520 --> 00:22:33,720 Speaker 1: was a fake Washington Post article that came out about 392 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:38,720 Speaker 1: the Sorols Foundation and Rockefeller like paying people thirty bucks 393 00:22:38,720 --> 00:22:39,760 Speaker 1: an hour to go protest. 394 00:22:40,280 --> 00:22:43,840 Speaker 2: Yeah. Uh, well, the one I remember was that the 395 00:22:43,960 --> 00:22:48,440 Speaker 2: Ukrainian government was actually like Nazis. Oh yeah, yeah, and 396 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:53,000 Speaker 2: really what Russia's doing is liberating the Ukrainian people. I 397 00:22:53,040 --> 00:22:55,520 Speaker 2: remember that one for sure. That definitely came from this 398 00:22:55,600 --> 00:22:56,640 Speaker 2: Doppelganger era. 399 00:22:57,440 --> 00:22:59,959 Speaker 1: Yeah. One of the weirder ones was Princess Kate when 400 00:23:00,119 --> 00:23:03,679 Speaker 1: she sort of disappeared from the public eye. Yeah, and 401 00:23:03,920 --> 00:23:05,760 Speaker 1: you know this is before she revealed it was because 402 00:23:05,800 --> 00:23:08,840 Speaker 1: of a cancer diagnosis. But they jumped on that and 403 00:23:08,880 --> 00:23:11,960 Speaker 1: sort of hijacked that with all sorts of weird conspiracy theories. 404 00:23:12,440 --> 00:23:15,240 Speaker 1: And again I think that was one just to just 405 00:23:15,280 --> 00:23:17,480 Speaker 1: to create tension and chaos in the UK. 406 00:23:18,040 --> 00:23:20,879 Speaker 2: Yes, I don't remember where I found this, but I 407 00:23:20,920 --> 00:23:25,800 Speaker 2: saw that their involvement in conspiracy theories is topic agnostic. 408 00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:28,240 Speaker 2: They don't care about the subject. Whatever it is that 409 00:23:28,280 --> 00:23:31,480 Speaker 2: will push people's buttons, that will get emotional responses and 410 00:23:31,520 --> 00:23:33,760 Speaker 2: get people worked up, they will get in there and 411 00:23:33,800 --> 00:23:35,960 Speaker 2: amplify it if they if they didn't make it up 412 00:23:36,000 --> 00:23:40,840 Speaker 2: themselves in the first place. Man, they also apparently, according 413 00:23:40,880 --> 00:23:47,000 Speaker 2: to I think the Good Old USA Project, that they 414 00:23:47,359 --> 00:23:50,920 Speaker 2: there was a whole group at the Social Design Agency who, again, 415 00:23:50,960 --> 00:23:52,600 Speaker 2: like you said, seem to be the ones behind this. 416 00:23:54,040 --> 00:23:56,280 Speaker 2: If all of a sudden you start to hear negative 417 00:23:56,359 --> 00:23:59,040 Speaker 2: chatter about stuff, you should know, I'm going to go 418 00:23:59,080 --> 00:24:01,880 Speaker 2: ahead and say it was probably them after this episode 419 00:24:01,880 --> 00:24:02,320 Speaker 2: comes out. 420 00:24:02,920 --> 00:24:04,040 Speaker 1: What's a little worried about that. 421 00:24:04,320 --> 00:24:07,720 Speaker 2: I am hopefully we're still under the radar enough. 422 00:24:08,240 --> 00:24:09,320 Speaker 1: Well, I like to think so. 423 00:24:11,240 --> 00:24:12,720 Speaker 2: Yeah. And if all of a sudden, Chuck and I 424 00:24:12,800 --> 00:24:15,160 Speaker 2: die in a fiery car crash together, it was probably 425 00:24:15,160 --> 00:24:15,720 Speaker 2: the Kremlin. 426 00:24:16,359 --> 00:24:17,600 Speaker 1: I'm not flying anytime soon. 427 00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:21,600 Speaker 2: You have to, although I don't want to say when 428 00:24:21,680 --> 00:24:24,520 Speaker 2: or how. We should probably edit this part out. But 429 00:24:24,560 --> 00:24:26,800 Speaker 2: there was a whole group at the Social Design Agency 430 00:24:26,880 --> 00:24:30,600 Speaker 2: that was their job was to monitor social media posts 431 00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:34,840 Speaker 2: from GOP lawmakers to figure out what was on America's 432 00:24:34,880 --> 00:24:37,639 Speaker 2: mind or what people were worried about or angry about, 433 00:24:37,880 --> 00:24:40,240 Speaker 2: and then they would start making memes and stuff based 434 00:24:40,280 --> 00:24:43,119 Speaker 2: on that and try to create like I guess, mess 435 00:24:43,200 --> 00:24:46,480 Speaker 2: from that, just from like one tweet or something could 436 00:24:46,520 --> 00:24:46,760 Speaker 2: do it. 437 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:50,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, for sure. I don't know how much you want 438 00:24:50,080 --> 00:24:51,760 Speaker 1: to get into this nuts and bolt section. 439 00:24:52,840 --> 00:24:55,160 Speaker 2: We kind of already covered it really. 440 00:24:55,359 --> 00:24:57,959 Speaker 1: Yeah, it gets sort of in the weeds, but like 441 00:24:58,000 --> 00:24:59,960 Speaker 1: you sort of mentioned earlier, we just want to be clear. 442 00:25:00,080 --> 00:25:03,680 Speaker 1: It's like they'll use disposable domains that are owned by 443 00:25:03,800 --> 00:25:07,719 Speaker 1: other companies. They will use virtual offices and set up 444 00:25:07,720 --> 00:25:12,280 Speaker 1: shell companies. They'll work with you know in places like 445 00:25:13,520 --> 00:25:15,480 Speaker 1: sometimes at the far reaches of the earth. Well they'll 446 00:25:15,520 --> 00:25:19,800 Speaker 1: set up like some company in Malaysia where you know, 447 00:25:19,840 --> 00:25:22,520 Speaker 1: it's then it goes to another shell company in Lithuania 448 00:25:22,520 --> 00:25:25,520 Speaker 1: and it's just you know, it's also obfuscated. And that's 449 00:25:25,560 --> 00:25:28,040 Speaker 1: the whole point, you know that you don't know, it's 450 00:25:28,080 --> 00:25:30,560 Speaker 1: hard to even trace back to any origin. 451 00:25:30,320 --> 00:25:33,960 Speaker 2: Right, and it's just very decentralized. And then the companies, 452 00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:37,560 Speaker 2: these shell companies are just legitimate enough to provide cover 453 00:25:37,880 --> 00:25:42,159 Speaker 2: for the shady hosting companies to say like, well they're legal. 454 00:25:42,280 --> 00:25:46,280 Speaker 2: There's a UK company, so you know, we don't have 455 00:25:46,320 --> 00:25:51,760 Speaker 2: any obligation to check what they're doing, right, And as 456 00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:54,760 Speaker 2: it gets closer and closer to the actual fake website, 457 00:25:55,080 --> 00:25:59,400 Speaker 2: the companies just get shadier and shadier, and apparently they're 458 00:25:59,440 --> 00:26:01,480 Speaker 2: not the one thing didn't come up with this technique. 459 00:26:01,520 --> 00:26:08,320 Speaker 2: It's fairly common among bad actors. Yeah, like Brad Pitt. 460 00:26:08,520 --> 00:26:10,000 Speaker 2: I guess I. 461 00:26:09,960 --> 00:26:12,359 Speaker 1: Was trying to think of a bad actor. I didn't 462 00:26:12,359 --> 00:26:12,920 Speaker 1: want to be mean. 463 00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:15,480 Speaker 2: I think you can be mean to Brad Pitt at 464 00:26:15,520 --> 00:26:15,920 Speaker 2: this point. 465 00:26:16,200 --> 00:26:19,560 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, because he's a fine actor. Oh yeah, and 466 00:26:19,640 --> 00:26:24,879 Speaker 1: a fine piece you know, a piece of what you know? 467 00:26:26,160 --> 00:26:29,160 Speaker 1: Did you see he and Ed Norton at the soccer match? 468 00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:29,720 Speaker 3: No? 469 00:26:29,800 --> 00:26:30,560 Speaker 2: I heard about it. 470 00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:32,880 Speaker 1: Yeah, it's kind of fun, the old fight club thing. 471 00:26:33,920 --> 00:26:35,000 Speaker 2: What was I gonna say? 472 00:26:35,840 --> 00:26:37,720 Speaker 1: You were gonna say, we're gonna take a break, right. 473 00:26:37,960 --> 00:26:40,240 Speaker 2: Yeah, I think whatever I was saying, just peter it out. 474 00:26:40,240 --> 00:26:40,760 Speaker 2: Didn't matter. 475 00:26:41,040 --> 00:26:43,240 Speaker 1: All right, Well, Josh is gonna Peter back up and 476 00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:44,639 Speaker 1: we'll be back right after this. 477 00:27:09,359 --> 00:27:12,919 Speaker 2: Okay, So we're back, and we know about Doppelganger. Like 478 00:27:13,000 --> 00:27:18,199 Speaker 2: I said, thanks to journalists and non governmental organizations that 479 00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:22,840 Speaker 2: are dedicated to tracking and fighting disinformation. The first one 480 00:27:23,160 --> 00:27:25,480 Speaker 2: where it came up even before it was called Doppelganger, 481 00:27:25,480 --> 00:27:29,800 Speaker 2: because remember that was the EU's Disinfo Lab that gave 482 00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:32,399 Speaker 2: it that title. But a full year or so before that, 483 00:27:33,440 --> 00:27:39,080 Speaker 2: a German website t online not the thing it does. 484 00:27:39,240 --> 00:27:42,760 Speaker 2: It sounds super fake. They published an article where they 485 00:27:42,760 --> 00:27:45,800 Speaker 2: were like, hey, there's a bunch of new Facebook accounts, 486 00:27:46,240 --> 00:27:48,919 Speaker 2: all of our German women. And the weird thing is 487 00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:53,159 Speaker 2: they all say that they work for Netflix, and even weirder, 488 00:27:53,280 --> 00:27:56,080 Speaker 2: every single one of them seems to be really really 489 00:27:56,960 --> 00:28:02,080 Speaker 2: adamant about Germany not funding you and just leaving Russia alone. 490 00:28:02,440 --> 00:28:05,360 Speaker 1: I'm sure Netflix is like seriously, thanks. 491 00:28:05,119 --> 00:28:08,639 Speaker 2: I know, although Netflix is probably like, hey, any publicity's good. 492 00:28:08,680 --> 00:28:11,879 Speaker 1: Well, yeah, that's a good point. I get this is 493 00:28:13,480 --> 00:28:15,760 Speaker 1: this is not this, But I know you're not on 494 00:28:16,040 --> 00:28:19,360 Speaker 1: social media a lot, but on Instagram I will get 495 00:28:19,440 --> 00:28:21,040 Speaker 1: I will have to block a lot of people that 496 00:28:21,160 --> 00:28:25,240 Speaker 1: come on to follow me because it's clear that it's 497 00:28:25,240 --> 00:28:29,480 Speaker 1: some sort of a some sort of a porn thing. Sure, 498 00:28:29,920 --> 00:28:32,480 Speaker 1: Or I will get a comment from someone on some 499 00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:36,199 Speaker 1: random like I'll leave a comment on some random like 500 00:28:36,200 --> 00:28:38,480 Speaker 1: like Instagram posts that I think is cool or whatever, 501 00:28:38,840 --> 00:28:42,520 Speaker 1: and then someone will comment on that like oh yeah, totally, 502 00:28:42,760 --> 00:28:46,560 Speaker 1: Chuck Brian or whatever, Chuck the podcaster, And then I'll 503 00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:48,479 Speaker 1: look at you like who is this and it's you know, 504 00:28:48,520 --> 00:28:51,880 Speaker 1: it's clearly some fake person, and I just I don't 505 00:28:51,920 --> 00:28:54,280 Speaker 1: know what the angle is and I always block it, 506 00:28:54,360 --> 00:28:58,160 Speaker 1: so obviously I don't know, but I wonder what the 507 00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:02,600 Speaker 1: goal is. I got to be separating me from money somehow. 508 00:29:03,040 --> 00:29:06,120 Speaker 2: Somehow, or yeah or yeah, or getting money to somebody 509 00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:09,160 Speaker 2: like an influencer something or to boost whatever thing you 510 00:29:09,240 --> 00:29:10,080 Speaker 2: said was cool. 511 00:29:10,680 --> 00:29:14,640 Speaker 1: Maybe it's very strange, but it's always quite obvious what 512 00:29:14,680 --> 00:29:19,080 Speaker 1: it is because they have like zero posts, uh follow 513 00:29:19,120 --> 00:29:22,280 Speaker 1: a ton of people, no one follows them, and it's 514 00:29:22,360 --> 00:29:25,239 Speaker 1: usually some you know, if I can be frank, it's 515 00:29:25,320 --> 00:29:28,960 Speaker 1: usually some very like well endowed you know woman. 516 00:29:29,520 --> 00:29:31,680 Speaker 2: Yeah. Do you remember there was a period of time 517 00:29:31,720 --> 00:29:34,880 Speaker 2: when AI slop was really starting to gear up, where 518 00:29:34,960 --> 00:29:38,680 Speaker 2: it does not matter what video you were watching on 519 00:29:38,760 --> 00:29:41,920 Speaker 2: like YouTube or whatever. In the search it was like 520 00:29:42,160 --> 00:29:46,560 Speaker 2: a very beautiful woman standing there like Vana White, right 521 00:29:46,600 --> 00:29:49,600 Speaker 2: next to the video screen, like learn all about C 522 00:29:49,760 --> 00:29:53,720 Speaker 2: plus plus coding from me the sixty secretary, you know. 523 00:29:54,320 --> 00:29:57,480 Speaker 2: Like it was all videos were like that for a minute, 524 00:29:57,480 --> 00:29:59,160 Speaker 2: and I was like, God, is this how it's going 525 00:29:59,240 --> 00:30:00,720 Speaker 2: to be from now on? And then it seems to 526 00:30:00,800 --> 00:30:01,400 Speaker 2: have vanished. 527 00:30:02,080 --> 00:30:03,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, And you know the only reason I bring all 528 00:30:03,800 --> 00:30:06,520 Speaker 1: that up is because it's just sort of backs up 529 00:30:06,520 --> 00:30:09,800 Speaker 1: this thing that we're talking about in this idea that 530 00:30:09,840 --> 00:30:13,760 Speaker 1: I keep edging toward, which is like, God, maybe it's 531 00:30:13,840 --> 00:30:16,400 Speaker 1: just best to get off and away from all of 532 00:30:16,440 --> 00:30:19,360 Speaker 1: that stuff all together. Yes, is really going in the 533 00:30:19,360 --> 00:30:20,320 Speaker 1: wrong direction. 534 00:30:20,560 --> 00:30:22,680 Speaker 2: No, it definitely is. There's this thing called the dead 535 00:30:22,720 --> 00:30:25,120 Speaker 2: Internet theory. Been wanting to do at least the short 536 00:30:25,160 --> 00:30:27,720 Speaker 2: stuff on it, but essentially it says that the Internet 537 00:30:28,000 --> 00:30:32,760 Speaker 2: has become a just a bunch of bots interacting with 538 00:30:32,840 --> 00:30:36,240 Speaker 2: bots trying to gain social media algorithms to make money 539 00:30:36,240 --> 00:30:40,640 Speaker 2: for some dude or whatever country Singapore or something like that, right, 540 00:30:41,080 --> 00:30:45,880 Speaker 2: And some studies have found that perhaps a third of 541 00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:50,320 Speaker 2: accounts on either Instagram or Facebook, probably Facebook, are bots 542 00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:53,440 Speaker 2: a third man, and that it's just gotten so far 543 00:30:53,480 --> 00:30:55,200 Speaker 2: out of hand that we're never going to get it back. 544 00:30:55,480 --> 00:30:58,120 Speaker 2: And also, like those long tail articles where you make 545 00:30:58,160 --> 00:31:00,840 Speaker 2: like five cents but it costs nothing to have an 546 00:31:00,880 --> 00:31:05,200 Speaker 2: AI write and publish that article, those have have pushed 547 00:31:05,800 --> 00:31:10,440 Speaker 2: actual human written, researched articles about any given thing from 548 00:31:10,480 --> 00:31:13,480 Speaker 2: like page one Google search to like page twenty. So 549 00:31:14,000 --> 00:31:16,520 Speaker 2: there's still like no reason to go in and search 550 00:31:16,560 --> 00:31:20,240 Speaker 2: for anything anymore unless you want some AI article broken 551 00:31:20,320 --> 00:31:25,880 Speaker 2: into fifty different small paragraphs or sections that are basically 552 00:31:25,960 --> 00:31:29,640 Speaker 2: repeat themselves over and over again, that's what you have available. 553 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:32,240 Speaker 2: So it does seem like the Internet is pretty dead. 554 00:31:32,920 --> 00:31:36,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, I've noticed even on Instagram from some sites all 555 00:31:36,360 --> 00:31:38,920 Speaker 1: I can follow, like music sites or whatever, it's sort 556 00:31:38,960 --> 00:31:42,760 Speaker 1: of a dead giveaway. Now if the caption instead of 557 00:31:42,800 --> 00:31:46,080 Speaker 1: being like, you know, led Zeppelin performs at this performance 558 00:31:46,120 --> 00:31:48,600 Speaker 1: and it was awesome, it's now some really long, like 559 00:31:48,680 --> 00:31:52,120 Speaker 1: four paragraph thing with like this detailed history of like 560 00:31:52,200 --> 00:31:53,800 Speaker 1: led Zeppelin was a band and blah blah blah, and 561 00:31:53,800 --> 00:31:56,040 Speaker 1: it's just so obvious AI is doing it. Yeah, and 562 00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:57,720 Speaker 1: it's just it's kind of ruining what I used to 563 00:31:57,800 --> 00:32:01,360 Speaker 1: like about Instagram, along with a lot of other stuff. Yeah, 564 00:32:01,400 --> 00:32:03,480 Speaker 1: like you know, these fake busting women. It's like it 565 00:32:03,560 --> 00:32:06,840 Speaker 1: just makes me want to run away. Stop it, run away. 566 00:32:06,920 --> 00:32:09,080 Speaker 2: Something else is going to come along, because there is 567 00:32:09,560 --> 00:32:12,840 Speaker 2: like it's very clear that the Internet, and it's like 568 00:32:13,160 --> 00:32:15,880 Speaker 2: ideally is really great and useful and important and we 569 00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:18,760 Speaker 2: need it. It's just this version of it is no 570 00:32:18,880 --> 00:32:21,360 Speaker 2: longer useful, so we need to figure out a different one. 571 00:32:21,520 --> 00:32:23,240 Speaker 2: And somebody right now it'll. 572 00:32:22,960 --> 00:32:25,560 Speaker 1: Well it just it sucks because I don't like to 573 00:32:25,560 --> 00:32:28,120 Speaker 1: support that company because they're part of Meta, which I 574 00:32:28,160 --> 00:32:30,960 Speaker 1: hate and got off of Facebook. But I do like 575 00:32:31,000 --> 00:32:34,320 Speaker 1: the connection with listeners and be able to chat stuff up. 576 00:32:34,360 --> 00:32:37,920 Speaker 1: So it's, uh yeah, it feels like it's a no 577 00:32:38,000 --> 00:32:38,560 Speaker 1: in situation. 578 00:32:38,640 --> 00:32:41,560 Speaker 2: Sometimes I think what'll probably become is more of an 579 00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:46,320 Speaker 2: emphasis on email maybe again, and then like they'll that'll 580 00:32:46,320 --> 00:32:49,000 Speaker 2: get taken over and then it'll be handwritten letters. 581 00:32:50,160 --> 00:32:54,440 Speaker 1: That'd be great. Speaking of Meta though, in twenty twenty two, 582 00:32:54,480 --> 00:32:58,560 Speaker 1: and this was after that t online group that you mentioned, 583 00:32:58,760 --> 00:33:01,440 Speaker 1: sort of out of this whole thing. Mm hm, that's 584 00:33:01,480 --> 00:33:04,800 Speaker 1: when like Meta and some other higher profile companies started 585 00:33:04,840 --> 00:33:07,280 Speaker 1: saying like, oh, well, like we know this is going on. 586 00:33:07,320 --> 00:33:09,600 Speaker 1: We're going to start removing pages and we're going to 587 00:33:09,640 --> 00:33:11,320 Speaker 1: start deleting this and we're going to take this super 588 00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:14,920 Speaker 1: serious and who knows what's going on on the inside. 589 00:33:15,240 --> 00:33:17,800 Speaker 1: I sound like I'm being cynical, because I probably feel 590 00:33:17,800 --> 00:33:21,680 Speaker 1: like I am. But they have found that like a 591 00:33:21,680 --> 00:33:23,840 Speaker 1: lot of it is coming through ads, and like they're 592 00:33:23,880 --> 00:33:28,000 Speaker 1: not even catching a ninety five percent of undeclared political 593 00:33:28,040 --> 00:33:31,560 Speaker 1: ads aren't being caught in this supposed sweep to clean things. 594 00:33:31,440 --> 00:33:35,760 Speaker 2: Up right, Yeah, because it's not just posts or bots 595 00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:39,760 Speaker 2: creating posts or even commenting, it's buying ads, and so 596 00:33:39,880 --> 00:33:44,160 Speaker 2: Facebook has a huge financial incentive to not root those 597 00:33:44,200 --> 00:33:46,400 Speaker 2: things out because they make tons of cash off of it. 598 00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:47,760 Speaker 1: Yeah. 599 00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:50,040 Speaker 2: So yeah, I mean they said that they're doing this, 600 00:33:50,160 --> 00:33:54,280 Speaker 2: they're not actually doing it. And that's a good example 601 00:33:54,320 --> 00:33:56,640 Speaker 2: of the whole whack a mole thing too. Is like 602 00:33:56,680 --> 00:34:00,000 Speaker 2: a big company like that trying to police their own 603 00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:03,000 Speaker 2: social media site that's gotten out of their own control. 604 00:34:03,640 --> 00:34:07,000 Speaker 2: That's not a good technique either, although I think all 605 00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:09,399 Speaker 2: of us could probably agree that medic could do way, 606 00:34:09,719 --> 00:34:14,240 Speaker 2: way more than it does. So the finally, in September 607 00:34:14,280 --> 00:34:17,560 Speaker 2: twenty twenty four, after this has been identified for two 608 00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:20,479 Speaker 2: full years, the US Department of Justice is like, we're 609 00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:21,879 Speaker 2: going to take charge here. 610 00:34:22,400 --> 00:34:23,440 Speaker 1: Yeah, we'll take care of it. 611 00:34:23,520 --> 00:34:29,040 Speaker 2: Get this. They took down thirty two websites wow, that 612 00:34:29,080 --> 00:34:33,040 Speaker 2: were related to Doppelganger, and they were like, this is 613 00:34:33,120 --> 00:34:37,680 Speaker 2: too risky before a US election, So we're gonna we're 614 00:34:37,680 --> 00:34:40,560 Speaker 2: gonna do We're gonna go the nuclear option and take 615 00:34:40,600 --> 00:34:41,960 Speaker 2: down thirty two websites. 616 00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:47,480 Speaker 1: Yeah. I think the cynicism is coming through. It's I mean, 617 00:34:47,520 --> 00:34:49,600 Speaker 1: whack a mole didn't even begin to describe it. I'm 618 00:34:49,600 --> 00:34:51,799 Speaker 1: sure like Russia hears the stuff and they're just like 619 00:34:51,880 --> 00:34:53,799 Speaker 1: laughing into their vodka, you know. 620 00:34:54,640 --> 00:34:56,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, Well that's the point that a lot of people make, 621 00:34:56,680 --> 00:35:01,440 Speaker 2: is that it might not even be changing people's minds, 622 00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:04,719 Speaker 2: but just the fact that we know it exists makes 623 00:35:04,719 --> 00:35:08,080 Speaker 2: you question everything then, And so you're right, are questioning 624 00:35:08,120 --> 00:35:12,000 Speaker 2: the legitimate stuff too, So you're not learning anything. Everything 625 00:35:12,080 --> 00:35:12,840 Speaker 2: has an angle. 626 00:35:13,920 --> 00:35:16,200 Speaker 1: Yeah, and now we're seeing of course, and we've talked 627 00:35:16,200 --> 00:35:18,440 Speaker 1: about I think we did a whole episode on deep fakes, right, 628 00:35:18,480 --> 00:35:21,520 Speaker 1: mm hmm, yeah, on deep fake and obviously the advent 629 00:35:21,560 --> 00:35:24,640 Speaker 1: of AI technology, which is now completely taken over already 630 00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:29,040 Speaker 1: where they have, you know, a fake video going up 631 00:35:29,080 --> 00:35:31,960 Speaker 1: where it looks like Joe Biden doing something, or it 632 00:35:31,960 --> 00:35:34,960 Speaker 1: looks like anybody doing something, and they will take you know, 633 00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:37,920 Speaker 1: they try to evade detection, so they'll post a video 634 00:35:38,120 --> 00:35:41,560 Speaker 1: just a little differently in different iterations, like with just 635 00:35:41,600 --> 00:35:44,520 Speaker 1: a few milliseconds trimmed out, so they can't be automatically 636 00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:47,400 Speaker 1: rooted out when like a company builds a system to 637 00:35:47,480 --> 00:35:51,160 Speaker 1: root out this kind of stuff, right, and we're already 638 00:35:51,160 --> 00:35:53,279 Speaker 1: at the point like AI has moved so fast, we're 639 00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:55,960 Speaker 1: already at the point where people all over the place. 640 00:35:56,000 --> 00:35:57,960 Speaker 1: For months now, I have been going like, I don't 641 00:35:58,000 --> 00:35:59,400 Speaker 1: even know if this is real, Like I don't know 642 00:35:59,560 --> 00:36:02,240 Speaker 1: if what I can believe anymore. So like it's working. 643 00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:04,000 Speaker 1: What they're doing is working, right. 644 00:36:05,000 --> 00:36:07,439 Speaker 2: The thing that got me is that they've figured out 645 00:36:08,000 --> 00:36:13,880 Speaker 2: because AI companies train their models on like the Internet 646 00:36:14,520 --> 00:36:17,200 Speaker 2: and specific parts of the Internet, the Russians have figured 647 00:36:17,200 --> 00:36:20,400 Speaker 2: out that they can flood those parts of the Internet 648 00:36:20,400 --> 00:36:24,000 Speaker 2: with misinformation, and that's what the AI is going to 649 00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:28,000 Speaker 2: learn and think is real. So the AI is going 650 00:36:28,040 --> 00:36:31,000 Speaker 2: to just give out bad information or misinformation as well 651 00:36:31,040 --> 00:36:33,640 Speaker 2: because that's what it thinks is true. 652 00:36:33,920 --> 00:36:37,359 Speaker 1: Yeah, I'm going to go live in a cave right 653 00:36:37,400 --> 00:36:38,520 Speaker 1: after we record. 654 00:36:38,200 --> 00:36:41,800 Speaker 2: This, We'll get into Buddhism. 655 00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:43,440 Speaker 1: Yeah, let's let's do that. 656 00:36:43,880 --> 00:36:47,640 Speaker 2: So, like we said, I don't know if we gave 657 00:36:47,640 --> 00:36:50,359 Speaker 2: our a hat tip to Olivia, who really did a 658 00:36:50,400 --> 00:36:54,880 Speaker 2: good exhaustive job on explaining this, But one of the 659 00:36:54,880 --> 00:36:57,720 Speaker 2: things she points out is that it's really unclear whether 660 00:36:57,800 --> 00:36:59,520 Speaker 2: this actually sways opinion. 661 00:37:00,320 --> 00:37:02,680 Speaker 1: Yeah, there have been some studies, right, Yeah, but. 662 00:37:03,120 --> 00:37:06,399 Speaker 2: I mean just anecdotally, I think it does, but maybe 663 00:37:06,440 --> 00:37:08,120 Speaker 2: it's one of those things where like, Okay, if it 664 00:37:08,160 --> 00:37:11,920 Speaker 2: really comes down to somebody saying, do you truly believe that? 665 00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:14,400 Speaker 2: Are you gonna be like yes, then maybe it doesn't 666 00:37:14,400 --> 00:37:18,720 Speaker 2: really sway opinion. But there was a study that looked 667 00:37:18,760 --> 00:37:22,640 Speaker 2: at disinformation efforts by Russian the twenty sixteen US election, 668 00:37:23,560 --> 00:37:26,319 Speaker 2: and it basically found that, like it had almost no 669 00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:27,400 Speaker 2: effect whatsoever. 670 00:37:28,080 --> 00:37:31,280 Speaker 1: Yeah, they found that one percent of social media users 671 00:37:31,280 --> 00:37:36,080 Speaker 1: got seventy percent of the exposures, so a few people 672 00:37:36,440 --> 00:37:39,520 Speaker 1: getting most of this stuff, but that's still thirty percent 673 00:37:39,640 --> 00:37:43,840 Speaker 1: on the other ninety nine percent. And they also point 674 00:37:43,840 --> 00:37:46,000 Speaker 1: out that like a lot of the people getting exposed 675 00:37:46,040 --> 00:37:52,560 Speaker 1: to this are Republicans because the Russian posts are you know, again, 676 00:37:52,560 --> 00:37:55,200 Speaker 1: they're sort of targeting them about like hey, America first stuff, 677 00:37:55,239 --> 00:37:57,480 Speaker 1: America first stuff, and they already believe that stuff anyway, 678 00:37:58,080 --> 00:38:00,640 Speaker 1: so it's not maybe like they're changing minds, maybe that's 679 00:38:00,640 --> 00:38:03,080 Speaker 1: the point, but they're reinforcing beliefs for sure. 680 00:38:03,280 --> 00:38:06,680 Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, but again, that fire hose or the fire 681 00:38:06,719 --> 00:38:11,960 Speaker 2: hose of misinformation or false information, that's the technique, and 682 00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:14,399 Speaker 2: it seems to be working. The thing that stuck out 683 00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:18,800 Speaker 2: to me was I couldn't find anything about what they're doing. Now, 684 00:38:19,880 --> 00:38:23,320 Speaker 2: it seems like they're still doing much the same because 685 00:38:23,320 --> 00:38:25,479 Speaker 2: it works really, really well and it can just pop 686 00:38:25,600 --> 00:38:27,680 Speaker 2: up anywhere. Like there is a story I found, I 687 00:38:27,719 --> 00:38:31,240 Speaker 2: don't know if you saw it, where a twenty sixteen 688 00:38:31,280 --> 00:38:35,960 Speaker 2: disinformation campaign from Russia actually managed to get real life 689 00:38:36,840 --> 00:38:41,399 Speaker 2: Texans to battle one another, at least verbally. I don't 690 00:38:41,440 --> 00:38:46,240 Speaker 2: think anyone was physically injured over the Islamification of Texas, 691 00:38:46,640 --> 00:38:51,000 Speaker 2: which was just complete bunk made up by the disinformation group. 692 00:38:51,280 --> 00:38:53,720 Speaker 2: And even more than that, they made up the group 693 00:38:54,560 --> 00:38:56,839 Speaker 2: that the protesters joined. They also made up the group 694 00:38:56,840 --> 00:38:59,360 Speaker 2: that the counter protesters joined, So the whole thing was 695 00:38:59,400 --> 00:39:05,080 Speaker 2: totally fat, fabricated and social engineered. So like that works, 696 00:39:05,400 --> 00:39:07,600 Speaker 2: and at the time, these people were not thinking that 697 00:39:07,640 --> 00:39:10,239 Speaker 2: they were being manipulated by Russians, right, They thought it 698 00:39:10,280 --> 00:39:12,720 Speaker 2: was real. So it's going to keep continuing to work, 699 00:39:13,080 --> 00:39:15,640 Speaker 2: so there's no reason for them to stop. I'm curious 700 00:39:15,680 --> 00:39:17,960 Speaker 2: about what the next thing is that they're doing now 701 00:39:18,000 --> 00:39:20,759 Speaker 2: that we're going to find out about three years from now. 702 00:39:20,680 --> 00:39:23,759 Speaker 1: You know, right, yeah, for sure. The other thing that 703 00:39:23,800 --> 00:39:25,560 Speaker 1: sort of would send a chill up your spine is 704 00:39:25,640 --> 00:39:28,799 Speaker 1: like none of this is even secret anymore. Like it's 705 00:39:28,880 --> 00:39:30,479 Speaker 1: out and they know it's out, and they don't care. 706 00:39:31,880 --> 00:39:33,640 Speaker 2: They're in crowd if. 707 00:39:33,520 --> 00:39:36,360 Speaker 1: They're out and proud with their what they call a 708 00:39:36,400 --> 00:39:40,200 Speaker 1: high reach, low impact campaign, which is, like you said, again, 709 00:39:40,239 --> 00:39:43,480 Speaker 1: the fire hose and the volume of content doesn't really 710 00:39:43,880 --> 00:39:46,480 Speaker 1: matter how much people believe it or not, as long 711 00:39:46,480 --> 00:39:49,040 Speaker 1: as you're sowing chaos and getting people to eventually think 712 00:39:49,120 --> 00:39:51,680 Speaker 1: like I don't even know, like maybe I'll just disengage 713 00:39:51,680 --> 00:39:56,960 Speaker 1: altogether because I don't know what's real. When widespread coverage 714 00:39:56,960 --> 00:40:00,840 Speaker 1: of Doppelganger came out, the Russian government was like, awesome, 715 00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:05,200 Speaker 1: let's give more funding to the SDA. And there's even 716 00:40:05,360 --> 00:40:11,280 Speaker 1: a suggestion that SDA deliberately leaked Operation Doppelganger like information 717 00:40:11,400 --> 00:40:16,040 Speaker 1: about that just to get more media coverage about it. Right, man, 718 00:40:17,080 --> 00:40:18,359 Speaker 1: I really do want to go live in a cave 719 00:40:18,400 --> 00:40:18,759 Speaker 1: after this. 720 00:40:19,080 --> 00:40:22,760 Speaker 2: The best suggestion I saw was to fight fire with fire. 721 00:40:22,920 --> 00:40:25,239 Speaker 2: That the whole wackamle thing is never ever going to work, 722 00:40:25,239 --> 00:40:28,160 Speaker 2: and it actually just helps Russia, like you said, just 723 00:40:28,200 --> 00:40:31,920 Speaker 2: by giving it publicity, and that essentially the best thing 724 00:40:32,280 --> 00:40:35,840 Speaker 2: the West could do is to create its own SDA 725 00:40:36,680 --> 00:40:40,040 Speaker 2: and just turn it on Russia that that's basically the 726 00:40:40,080 --> 00:40:42,480 Speaker 2: only option to get them to stop. 727 00:40:43,360 --> 00:40:45,000 Speaker 1: That sounds like a great idea for sure. 728 00:40:46,800 --> 00:40:49,759 Speaker 2: Well, since Chuck and I are jaded, I think it's 729 00:40:49,920 --> 00:40:51,680 Speaker 2: time for listener mail. 730 00:40:54,200 --> 00:40:58,000 Speaker 1: Is beyond jaded, all right, guys, for this is a 731 00:40:58,080 --> 00:41:01,040 Speaker 1: nice light way to end. Guys. For years, my wife 732 00:41:01,080 --> 00:41:05,359 Speaker 1: and I have had an argument over the pronunciation of biopic, 733 00:41:06,000 --> 00:41:08,239 Speaker 1: like when you make a movie about a person like 734 00:41:08,239 --> 00:41:12,200 Speaker 1: a biographical picture. We've both been stubborn to admit defeat. 735 00:41:12,880 --> 00:41:16,759 Speaker 1: She's part of the biopic crowd, but I prefer biopic. 736 00:41:17,280 --> 00:41:19,279 Speaker 1: She of course claims she's right because she's a former 737 00:41:19,320 --> 00:41:21,960 Speaker 1: elementary school teacher and a big study of English lit 738 00:41:22,520 --> 00:41:25,239 Speaker 1: and knows the truth. Blah blah blah. But it wasn't 739 00:41:25,320 --> 00:41:28,680 Speaker 1: until Chuck said biopic in your recent Howard Hughes episode 740 00:41:28,680 --> 00:41:31,000 Speaker 1: that I got the vindication I needed. I don't care 741 00:41:31,000 --> 00:41:33,359 Speaker 1: if Chuck and I are wrong, it doesn't matter. All 742 00:41:33,400 --> 00:41:35,279 Speaker 1: that matters is I know I'm not alone anymore. And 743 00:41:35,320 --> 00:41:38,440 Speaker 1: we'll continue with my pronunciation, and I'll make sure to 744 00:41:38,440 --> 00:41:40,520 Speaker 1: pass this down to my seven and four year old kids. 745 00:41:41,080 --> 00:41:45,160 Speaker 1: That is from Kevin Croyle in North Carolina, and I 746 00:41:45,200 --> 00:41:49,040 Speaker 1: also got a really rude email from a very I 747 00:41:49,040 --> 00:41:52,040 Speaker 1: guess angry person that I said it differently and they 748 00:41:52,040 --> 00:41:55,640 Speaker 1: were like, a goosh, you'd like being wrong. I guess 749 00:41:55,640 --> 00:41:57,080 Speaker 1: it is wrong. I don't even know. I never thought 750 00:41:57,120 --> 00:42:00,520 Speaker 1: about it. But I don't say biography. I say biography, 751 00:42:01,160 --> 00:42:03,360 Speaker 1: so I say biopic and I don't know. That's just 752 00:42:03,360 --> 00:42:04,960 Speaker 1: how it flowed out of my mouth. So I may 753 00:42:05,000 --> 00:42:05,879 Speaker 1: be wrong. I don't care. 754 00:42:06,160 --> 00:42:07,800 Speaker 2: Yeah, you may be prettrazy. 755 00:42:08,200 --> 00:42:09,600 Speaker 1: You say biopic, right, mm. 756 00:42:09,480 --> 00:42:12,480 Speaker 2: Hmm, but that's just what I've always heard, and I'm 757 00:42:12,480 --> 00:42:14,919 Speaker 2: so used to you saying biopic. Now that's not even 758 00:42:15,080 --> 00:42:17,440 Speaker 2: I think that they're both right. I think you managed 759 00:42:17,480 --> 00:42:19,799 Speaker 2: to wedge it into reality. 760 00:42:19,880 --> 00:42:23,560 Speaker 1: Well maybe someday when someone writes the biography on our lives, 761 00:42:24,400 --> 00:42:29,040 Speaker 1: it'll make it creat to do a biopic. Yeah all right. 762 00:42:28,920 --> 00:42:30,600 Speaker 2: Well, who is that from? The nice one? 763 00:42:31,080 --> 00:42:31,840 Speaker 1: That is from Kevin? 764 00:42:32,280 --> 00:42:34,560 Speaker 2: Thanks Kevin, that was very nice and I'm glad. Do 765 00:42:34,560 --> 00:42:39,040 Speaker 2: you feel vindicated sorry to your wife although she and 766 00:42:39,120 --> 00:42:40,719 Speaker 2: I share the same pronunciation. 767 00:42:41,120 --> 00:42:43,680 Speaker 1: Okay, yeah, we can all have an arm wrestling match 768 00:42:43,680 --> 00:42:44,080 Speaker 1: one day. 769 00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:47,200 Speaker 2: Or something if you want to be like Kevin and 770 00:42:47,239 --> 00:42:50,040 Speaker 2: write to us about feeling vindicated by me or Chuck 771 00:42:50,120 --> 00:42:52,560 Speaker 2: or Jerry or whoever we want to hear about it, 772 00:42:52,920 --> 00:42:58,960 Speaker 2: Send it off to Stuff Podcasts at iHeartRadio dot com. 773 00:42:59,080 --> 00:43:01,399 Speaker 2: Stuff you should know the production of iHeartRadio. 774 00:43:01,880 --> 00:43:06,239 Speaker 1: For more podcasts myheart Radio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 775 00:43:06,360 --> 00:43:08,200 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.