WEBVTT - This Is How Finance and Banking Worked Before Computers

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 2>And I'm Joe whysent Thal.

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<v Speaker 1>Joe, do you remember the episode we did with Stuart Butterfield,

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<v Speaker 1>the founder of Slack.

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<v Speaker 3>I do great episode Software Tech. I like when we

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<v Speaker 3>have tech and software episodes that aren't about just like

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<v Speaker 3>the markets, but like how technology actually.

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<v Speaker 1>Works, how it actually functions. Yes, all right, Well that's

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<v Speaker 1>a good jumping off point because there was a moment

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<v Speaker 1>in that episode where I think it was Stuart asked

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<v Speaker 1>a very innocent question, which is he basically said he

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<v Speaker 1>had no idea how banking worked before the advent of computers.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm glad he said that, because I have no idea either.

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<v Speaker 3>And when I you know, when I think about money,

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<v Speaker 3>and by this point we all sort of know like, oh,

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<v Speaker 3>like money is it is just a database entry? Right,

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<v Speaker 3>Well that makes a lot of sense to me at

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<v Speaker 3>a world of excel. But how do like databases work?

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<v Speaker 3>How did money as a database creation work before databases?

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<v Speaker 1>Well, that's exactly it, because nowadays I think money is

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<v Speaker 1>almost synonymous with an electronic database, Like that's basically what

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<v Speaker 1>it is at this point. But of course, for hundreds

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<v Speaker 1>and hundreds of years we did not have things like

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<v Speaker 1>Excel spreadsheets, So how did banking and finance and trade

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<v Speaker 1>actually work in those conditions?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and like I just don't understand how like people

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<v Speaker 3>traded stocks or people went into a bank and said

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<v Speaker 3>I want to get my money or without like, how

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<v Speaker 3>are they not just like always losing track of how

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<v Speaker 3>much money people had? How are they always not just

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<v Speaker 3>like forgetting oh you bought that stock, like it's on

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<v Speaker 3>pen and paper like type, Like in my mind, they

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<v Speaker 3>must have been losing track of stuff all the time.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, I think I said this in the Stewart episode,

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<v Speaker 1>but there were a lot of bank failures, there were

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of trading blow ups, so maybe they you know,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe the lack of technology was Actually that's sad. But

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<v Speaker 1>we do actually have the perfect guests to discuss this topic.

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<v Speaker 1>We are going to be speaking with Anne Murphy. She

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<v Speaker 1>is a professor of history and executive dean over at

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<v Speaker 1>the University of Portsmouth. She just wrote a new book.

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<v Speaker 1>It's called Virtuous Bankers, A Day in the Life of

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<v Speaker 1>the eighteenth century Bank of England. So the perfect person

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<v Speaker 1>to talk about pre computerized banking. We're also going to

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<v Speaker 1>be speaking. This is a double feature. We're going to

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<v Speaker 1>be speaking with John Handel, postdoctoral fellow at the McIntyre

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<v Speaker 1>School of Commerce at the University of Virginia. He's written

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<v Speaker 1>a lot about trade and technology in the eighteen hundreds

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<v Speaker 1>early nineteen hundreds, so we're going to take a journey

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<v Speaker 1>through the history of finance.

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<v Speaker 2>I can't wait. I'm really excited about this. So I

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<v Speaker 2>have so many questions.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, an in, John, thank you so much for

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<v Speaker 1>coming on our thoughts.

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<v Speaker 4>Oh, thank you for inviting me. It's lovely to be here.

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<v Speaker 5>As they say in sports talk radio, longtime listener, first

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<v Speaker 5>time caller, I was just so great to be here.

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<v Speaker 4>Nice.

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<v Speaker 1>So maybe I should start in sort of I'm going

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<v Speaker 1>to attempt chronological order here, but why don't we start

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<v Speaker 1>with you? And I mean, you know, the clue is

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<v Speaker 1>in the tie of your book. What was it actually

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<v Speaker 1>like a day in the life of the Bank of

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<v Speaker 1>England in the seventeen hundreds.

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<v Speaker 4>So it was a very busy place. The time I'm

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<v Speaker 4>writing about is the seventeen eighties, so it's just after

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<v Speaker 4>the War of American Independence and the British are having

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<v Speaker 4>a moment of real introspection about their finances and trying

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<v Speaker 4>to figure out whether everything is working well, which is

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<v Speaker 4>one of the reasons that the Bank of England kind

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<v Speaker 4>of looks inward at itself at this time and really

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<v Speaker 4>tries to figure out what it's doing and how it's

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<v Speaker 4>doing it and whether it's doing it well or not.

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<v Speaker 4>But the bank at this time, it's a twenty four

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<v Speaker 4>hour a day place. It opens at dawn, You've got

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<v Speaker 4>customers kind of milling around from about nine o'clock onwards,

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<v Speaker 4>and it's doing everything you would expect a bank to do,

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<v Speaker 4>but without those Excel spreadsheets. You know, it's doing them

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<v Speaker 4>all with ledgers and quill and ink. And it's my

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<v Speaker 4>view that it does it well and it doesn't lose

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<v Speaker 4>its customers money. It has a pretty good grasp of

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<v Speaker 4>where everybody is and whether there's money to trade, and

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<v Speaker 4>how it does all this stuff.

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<v Speaker 3>You said it's twenty four hours, and you know, even

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<v Speaker 3>like the FED, I don't think is twenty four hours,

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<v Speaker 3>or at least some of its operations have a certain

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<v Speaker 3>window or the closes or certain things don't happen on weekend.

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<v Speaker 3>So were there certain aspects of banking that from a

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<v Speaker 3>twenty four hour standpoint were more advanced I don't know,

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<v Speaker 3>a few hundred years ago than there are today.

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<v Speaker 4>So it's not necessarily operating twenty four hours a day,

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<v Speaker 4>so its standard business day is around about nine to five.

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<v Speaker 4>But because it can't just press an update button at

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<v Speaker 4>the end of the day to make sure all of

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<v Speaker 4>the accounts are updated for the start of the next

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<v Speaker 4>working day, the process of updating accounts takes place in

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<v Speaker 4>the evening, So from about four o'clock all the way

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<v Speaker 4>through sometimes to kind of ten eleven o'clock in the evening,

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<v Speaker 4>there are clerks updating the physical ledgers so that next day,

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<v Speaker 4>when the brokers walk in or when those business owners

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<v Speaker 4>who are there regularly walk in, their account is up

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<v Speaker 4>to date and they're ready to go for the new

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<v Speaker 4>business day. But the other reason it's twenty four hours

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<v Speaker 4>is because it's a vulnerable place. So it's at risk

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<v Speaker 4>of fire, it's at risk of wyatt, it's at risk

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<v Speaker 4>of people sort of wanting to break in, so it

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<v Speaker 4>has night watchmen who are there and active throughout the

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<v Speaker 4>night to make sure that the bank is safe.

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<v Speaker 1>I have a really basic question, which is what are

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<v Speaker 1>people doing at the bank of England in seventeen eighty.

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<v Speaker 1>You mentioned customers sort of milling outside of the building.

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<v Speaker 1>What are they waiting to actually do?

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<v Speaker 4>So one thing they're not doing so much is borrowing

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<v Speaker 4>money from the bank. The bank's private lending is not

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<v Speaker 4>very well advanced. They have their little bit of private

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<v Speaker 4>lending early in the sixteen late sixteen hundreds, early seventeen hundreds,

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<v Speaker 4>but it doesn't really take off. What a lot of

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<v Speaker 4>people there are doing is discounting bills of exchange, so

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<v Speaker 4>they're borrowing money in that way and facilitating trade. Also

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<v Speaker 4>in that way, they are managing notes, so they're coming

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<v Speaker 4>to the bank to exchange ready money for banknotes, other banknotes,

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<v Speaker 4>for Bank of England notes, or their banknotes that they

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<v Speaker 4>have back to ready money again. And the note business

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<v Speaker 4>is huge and occupies a lot of everybody's time. But

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<v Speaker 4>they're also there to buy and sell government debt. So

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<v Speaker 4>you could buy and sell government debt at the bank.

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<v Speaker 4>It's probably the main place where you could do that

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<v Speaker 4>throughout most of the eighteenth century. So that's one of

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<v Speaker 4>the things that they're there to do.

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<v Speaker 3>So I want to get more into the sort of

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<v Speaker 3>like pen and paper and the actual physical operations.

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<v Speaker 2>But John, why do you come in talk to us.

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<v Speaker 3>A little bit about your area of focus and just

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<v Speaker 3>sort of you're a little bit more on the trading

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<v Speaker 3>and financial activities side. Let do you talk a little

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<v Speaker 3>bit about your specific years in aero focus into sort

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<v Speaker 3>of like finance and trading pre computers.

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<v Speaker 5>So my work is essentially the sequel to Anne's work.

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<v Speaker 5>I pick up in the early eighteen hundreds around when

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<v Speaker 5>her book on the Bank of England finishes and what's

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<v Speaker 5>happening I focus primarily in the London Stock Exchange. And

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<v Speaker 5>what's happening in this period is a lot of the

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<v Speaker 5>trading that had gone on during the seventeen hundreds went

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<v Speaker 5>on in dispersed, often open locations, the lobby of the

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<v Speaker 5>Bank of England, in alleyways, in coffee shops, in taverns

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<v Speaker 5>even but beginning in the early eighteen hundreds, there's this

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<v Speaker 5>move to enclose financial markets and make them their own,

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<v Speaker 5>discreete spaces that would be governed by the association of

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<v Speaker 5>brokers who were met members of those exchanges. And so

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<v Speaker 5>the London Stock Exchange adopts a new set of rules

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<v Speaker 5>and begins to build its own premises, starting in eighteen

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<v Speaker 5>oh one and essentially stops allowing members of the public, clients, investors,

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<v Speaker 5>whomever to enter the exchange. The exchange becomes solely the

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<v Speaker 5>province of brokers. But much like what Anne was saying,

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<v Speaker 5>the London Stock Exchange is also a twenty four to

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<v Speaker 5>seven institution. It's not just the brokers who are there

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<v Speaker 5>on the trading floor from eleven to four, but there

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<v Speaker 5>are armies of clerks who are responsible for settling and

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<v Speaker 5>clearing trades after hours. Because the London Stock Exchange is

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<v Speaker 5>global and it's trading with markets in North America, in

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<v Speaker 5>Australia and Asia. During the nineteenth century, members are there

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<v Speaker 5>working at telegraph offices basically laid into the night as

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<v Speaker 5>late as eight or nine pm. And then one of

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<v Speaker 5>the other things that's often overlooked is that there is

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<v Speaker 5>a whole army of household servants basically live in servants

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<v Speaker 5>who actually lived at the London Stock Exchange. They brought

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<v Speaker 5>their families. They were called waiters, but they were essentially

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<v Speaker 5>the equivalent of porters, and they worked to guard the

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<v Speaker 5>entrances of the exchange, deliver telegrams and letters to the brokers,

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<v Speaker 5>keep the exchange clean and they lived there twenty four

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<v Speaker 5>to seven for most of the nineteenth century, so the

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<v Speaker 5>London Stock Exchange too, was a twenty four to seven

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<v Speaker 5>institution with a very complex human ecosystem.

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<v Speaker 3>Tracy, do you think you know what I really want

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<v Speaker 3>to say? I want a Netflix show that takes place

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<v Speaker 3>in the lobby of.

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<v Speaker 2>The Bank of England.

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<v Speaker 3>I think like a big series of like over the years.

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<v Speaker 3>I just like now, I really want their show to exist.

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<v Speaker 1>I think that would be perfect for like Sorkin treatment. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>all right, but actually this reminds me. I was having

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<v Speaker 1>lunch just last week with a couple of traders who

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<v Speaker 1>were active in the eighties and the nineties, and they

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<v Speaker 1>were talking about board boys. So they used to have

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<v Speaker 1>board boys who would write down trades on a blackboard

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<v Speaker 1>or a whiteboard. I don't know, you know, who owes

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<v Speaker 1>what to whom when there was active trading activity on

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<v Speaker 1>the floor. But this leads nicely into my next question,

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<v Speaker 1>which is it sounds like a lot of the record

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<v Speaker 1>keeping or the distribution of money, the movement of money

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<v Speaker 1>was just being done by people in the seventeen hundreds

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<v Speaker 1>and the eighteen hundreds as well.

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<v Speaker 4>That's absolutely right, and one of the things we don't

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<v Speaker 4>really know is how those individual stockbrokers were keeping their ledgers.

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<v Speaker 4>So if you look at images of the bank's lobby,

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<v Speaker 4>the kind of brokers exchange, you don't see much evidence

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<v Speaker 4>of people writing things down, So it probably looks like

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<v Speaker 4>a lot of people were keeping a sense of what

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<v Speaker 4>they were doing in their head until such time as

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<v Speaker 4>they went and registered with the Bank of England's clerks.

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<v Speaker 4>The other really interesting thing is the Bank of England

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<v Speaker 4>is operating a inscribed stock ledger system in which they

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<v Speaker 4>can keep the only legally binding record of stock ownership.

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<v Speaker 4>So individuals didn't have a receipt that they would take

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<v Speaker 4>away with them that would be legally binding. In fact,

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<v Speaker 4>that the receipt that they were given was worthless, and

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<v Speaker 4>thus they had to completely trust that the Bank of

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<v Speaker 4>England could keep their ledgers straight and that could keep

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<v Speaker 4>the sense of ownership within those ledgers, you know, completely trustworthy.

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<v Speaker 3>I'm so glad you brought that up, because I was

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<v Speaker 3>going to go to this question of the receipt right

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<v Speaker 3>Like we placed a trade online or do some transaction,

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<v Speaker 3>usually these days will get like some email that comes

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<v Speaker 3>from the financial entity might have some string of eleven

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<v Speaker 3>numbers and letters or something that we don't really care

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<v Speaker 3>about unless there's something that we need to go back

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<v Speaker 3>and dispute whether something has happened.

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<v Speaker 2>But talk to us a little bit more.

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<v Speaker 3>If like there's just these one entities in the background

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<v Speaker 3>and they're working overnight and they're humans and they're writing

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<v Speaker 3>things down, possibly making mistakes. Maybe both of you could

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<v Speaker 3>talk about this a little bit, like that role of

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<v Speaker 3>trust and the institution and what happens if you know

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<v Speaker 3>there's a dispute.

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<v Speaker 4>So it's trust, but with checks and balances. So when

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<v Speaker 4>a transaction happens, there's a buyer and there's a seller,

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<v Speaker 4>both the buyer and the seller are supposed to be

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<v Speaker 4>there to sign off on the trade. So to one

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<v Speaker 4>to sell and one to accept is also signed off

0:12:25.240 --> 0:12:29.120
<v Speaker 4>by a clerk. There's a whole process of checking between

0:12:29.320 --> 0:12:34.360
<v Speaker 4>the stock transfer books and the stock ledgers. And also

0:12:35.000 --> 0:12:37.959
<v Speaker 4>any individual could go into the Bank of England, either

0:12:38.000 --> 0:12:40.640
<v Speaker 4>them or their representatives, and they could look at the

0:12:40.640 --> 0:12:44.640
<v Speaker 4>stock ledgers to check that their account stood as they

0:12:44.760 --> 0:12:49.680
<v Speaker 4>understood it. So there are trust happens, but there's with

0:12:49.840 --> 0:12:52.600
<v Speaker 4>checks and balances also, So.

0:12:53.160 --> 0:12:56.280
<v Speaker 5>I would say in the nineteenth century again, this begins

0:12:56.320 --> 0:12:59.520
<v Speaker 5>to change this process of how you've established trust in

0:12:59.520 --> 0:13:03.480
<v Speaker 5>a financial market. So it's actually quite difficult to create

0:13:03.520 --> 0:13:07.439
<v Speaker 5>something like a receipt for a stock transaction, especially if

0:13:07.480 --> 0:13:10.720
<v Speaker 5>you were far away from London. So if you, for instance,

0:13:10.800 --> 0:13:14.320
<v Speaker 5>lived in the provinces of England, you sent an order

0:13:14.400 --> 0:13:17.920
<v Speaker 5>down by mail to your broker in London. Finding a

0:13:17.920 --> 0:13:19.800
<v Speaker 5>broker would be its own problem. But let's say you

0:13:19.880 --> 0:13:22.680
<v Speaker 5>find one, how do you know that he got you

0:13:22.920 --> 0:13:26.520
<v Speaker 5>a good market price. One of the big issues was

0:13:26.559 --> 0:13:29.400
<v Speaker 5>that the rule for marking prices, for putting a price

0:13:29.440 --> 0:13:32.000
<v Speaker 5>on the blackboard that would then be included in the

0:13:32.080 --> 0:13:36.880
<v Speaker 5>daily price list, it was by agreement of the brokers

0:13:36.920 --> 0:13:39.080
<v Speaker 5>doing the deal, so you had to actually agree with

0:13:39.120 --> 0:13:41.160
<v Speaker 5>the person that you either bought or sold stock for

0:13:41.280 --> 0:13:44.520
<v Speaker 5>that you would mark the price. Officially, you could often

0:13:44.559 --> 0:13:48.880
<v Speaker 5>not mark the price, so often the financial press calls

0:13:48.920 --> 0:13:51.640
<v Speaker 5>the price list that the Lendon Stock Exchange produce a

0:13:51.679 --> 0:13:55.000
<v Speaker 5>record of bad bargains, because it was essentially brokers who

0:13:55.040 --> 0:13:57.520
<v Speaker 5>would be covering themselves if they got something outside of

0:13:57.520 --> 0:14:00.200
<v Speaker 5>a market price for their client, they would rush to

0:14:00.600 --> 0:14:02.240
<v Speaker 5>have it marked on the board so that it would

0:14:02.240 --> 0:14:03.960
<v Speaker 5>show up in the newspapers or show up in a

0:14:03.960 --> 0:14:06.400
<v Speaker 5>priceless the next day, and they could go back to

0:14:06.400 --> 0:14:08.240
<v Speaker 5>their client and say, oh, look, I got you the

0:14:08.240 --> 0:14:10.120
<v Speaker 5>market price. It's here in the newspaper. It's here in

0:14:10.120 --> 0:14:13.160
<v Speaker 5>the price list, even though for most of the people

0:14:13.200 --> 0:14:15.679
<v Speaker 5>that were immediate in the market, that were in the

0:14:15.720 --> 0:14:19.080
<v Speaker 5>vicinity of the market that day, it was oftentimes not

0:14:19.320 --> 0:14:22.800
<v Speaker 5>actually the real price or the fair price that was predominant.

0:14:40.160 --> 0:14:43.480
<v Speaker 1>So this actually sounds like the ultimate opportunity for arbitrage,

0:14:43.560 --> 0:14:47.920
<v Speaker 1>right because you have different sources of information operating at

0:14:48.080 --> 0:14:51.520
<v Speaker 1>different latencies, really slow latencies where you know, someone is

0:14:51.600 --> 0:14:54.440
<v Speaker 1>running from one location to the other local literally mailing

0:14:54.640 --> 0:14:58.760
<v Speaker 1>yahiling broker in London, sending your servant to get the

0:14:58.840 --> 0:15:02.000
<v Speaker 1>latest price of something. I mean, how did that feed

0:15:02.160 --> 0:15:04.960
<v Speaker 1>into trading activity? Were there a lot of people trying

0:15:04.960 --> 0:15:05.880
<v Speaker 1>to take advantage of that.

0:15:07.640 --> 0:15:11.600
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, So the nineteenth century sees the emergence of the

0:15:11.640 --> 0:15:16.040
<v Speaker 5>first specialty arbitrage firms that are closing pricing gaps in

0:15:16.160 --> 0:15:20.640
<v Speaker 5>dual listed securities between different markets. But then there was

0:15:20.680 --> 0:15:23.760
<v Speaker 5>also just a lot of taking advantage of sort of

0:15:23.840 --> 0:15:27.360
<v Speaker 5>slow retail orders that showed up in the market. So

0:15:27.440 --> 0:15:30.240
<v Speaker 5>one of the things that happened. There's a recent paper

0:15:30.280 --> 0:15:32.080
<v Speaker 5>on this is that the introduction of something like the

0:15:32.120 --> 0:15:36.400
<v Speaker 5>ticker tape, rather than making stock trading more efficient, it

0:15:36.520 --> 0:15:44.880
<v Speaker 5>actually exacerbated irrational trend chasing in numbers because the ticker

0:15:44.920 --> 0:15:48.560
<v Speaker 5>tape numbers that were sent out to investors far away

0:15:48.640 --> 0:15:51.560
<v Speaker 5>were on a slight delay. It took some time to

0:15:51.800 --> 0:15:55.000
<v Speaker 5>even via a ticker tape send out numbers. But then,

0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:56.560
<v Speaker 5>if you think about it, the order has to be

0:15:56.640 --> 0:16:00.280
<v Speaker 5>routed back towards the initial exchange after you see a

0:16:00.320 --> 0:16:03.920
<v Speaker 5>number on the ticker tape, and so oftentimes the people

0:16:03.960 --> 0:16:08.440
<v Speaker 5>who are trading on ticker tape prices are smaller investors.

0:16:08.920 --> 0:16:11.800
<v Speaker 5>They send their order back to their broker, and per

0:16:11.800 --> 0:16:15.040
<v Speaker 5>the name of the show, the broker would not want

0:16:15.040 --> 0:16:18.160
<v Speaker 5>to place these small lots. They would wait until they

0:16:18.160 --> 0:16:21.960
<v Speaker 5>had aggregated a number of orders from smaller investors that

0:16:21.960 --> 0:16:24.200
<v Speaker 5>were trading off the ticker tape and only then go

0:16:24.320 --> 0:16:27.360
<v Speaker 5>back into the stock exchange and place a larger block order.

0:16:27.640 --> 0:16:29.360
<v Speaker 5>And so there were all of these complaints that the

0:16:29.360 --> 0:16:31.760
<v Speaker 5>prices on the ticker tape were never actually accurate. You

0:16:31.760 --> 0:16:34.680
<v Speaker 5>could execute a price on a ticker tape, and so

0:16:34.720 --> 0:16:38.360
<v Speaker 5>there was all of these issues with matching up the

0:16:38.400 --> 0:16:41.000
<v Speaker 5>time and the latency of when information was produced, whether

0:16:41.040 --> 0:16:43.440
<v Speaker 5>it was the priceless after the fact, whether it was

0:16:43.480 --> 0:16:45.720
<v Speaker 5>the ticker tape during the day. It was very hard

0:16:45.760 --> 0:16:49.360
<v Speaker 5>to get those two actually match what an accurate market

0:16:49.400 --> 0:16:52.280
<v Speaker 5>price was. So the firms that tended to do better

0:16:52.600 --> 0:16:55.280
<v Speaker 5>were ones that use the telegraph and the telephone and

0:16:55.320 --> 0:16:58.760
<v Speaker 5>were more professional arbitrage traders that took advantage of these

0:16:58.760 --> 0:17:01.880
<v Speaker 5>prices again, rather than detail traders that had to rely

0:17:01.960 --> 0:17:03.720
<v Speaker 5>on things like the price list or the ticker ty.

0:17:06.000 --> 0:17:09.480
<v Speaker 4>So in the late seventeen hundreds, I guess it was

0:17:09.720 --> 0:17:14.000
<v Speaker 4>a somewhat different environment. There was less i think obvious

0:17:14.080 --> 0:17:17.080
<v Speaker 4>room for arbitrage, but there were a few people who

0:17:17.119 --> 0:17:21.280
<v Speaker 4>dominated in the market and therefore the number of transactions

0:17:21.359 --> 0:17:25.320
<v Speaker 4>that they could command gave them a pretty good return

0:17:26.040 --> 0:17:28.840
<v Speaker 4>on the investment of their time. So they're spending a

0:17:28.840 --> 0:17:31.679
<v Speaker 4>lot of time in the Bank of England's lobby, in

0:17:31.840 --> 0:17:35.399
<v Speaker 4>various different coffeehouses, they're picking up business with a lot

0:17:35.440 --> 0:17:38.760
<v Speaker 4>of people, and therefore, you know, sort of having a

0:17:38.800 --> 0:17:43.440
<v Speaker 4>lot of turnover. There's not enough i think movement very

0:17:43.480 --> 0:17:47.760
<v Speaker 4>often for arbitrage to be particularly easy for them, but

0:17:47.880 --> 0:17:51.760
<v Speaker 4>their dominance in the market certainly gives them a real

0:17:51.840 --> 0:17:56.919
<v Speaker 4>kind of command of information, a real command of the

0:17:56.960 --> 0:17:59.840
<v Speaker 4>market as a whole, and just that sort of turnover

0:18:00.760 --> 0:18:04.520
<v Speaker 4>definitely yields them profits. The other thing they're really picking

0:18:04.600 --> 0:18:09.560
<v Speaker 4>up profits from is the initial issues from the government.

0:18:09.680 --> 0:18:14.160
<v Speaker 4>So what the government is doing is issuing to trusted

0:18:14.240 --> 0:18:19.520
<v Speaker 4>contractors and prominent businessmans. So they're getting that initial issue

0:18:19.560 --> 0:18:22.639
<v Speaker 4>at very easy prices, which they're then selling into all

0:18:22.680 --> 0:18:24.960
<v Speaker 4>much wider markets, so that there's a there's a real

0:18:24.960 --> 0:18:27.640
<v Speaker 4>profit to be had there, and the government's very conscious

0:18:27.720 --> 0:18:31.560
<v Speaker 4>of that expense, but really up until the early nineteenth

0:18:31.600 --> 0:18:34.000
<v Speaker 4>century can't figure out how to do that and how

0:18:34.000 --> 0:18:35.480
<v Speaker 4>to make that operation work better.

0:18:36.480 --> 0:18:38.800
<v Speaker 3>It's so interesting once again, like all of these things

0:18:38.840 --> 0:18:40.560
<v Speaker 3>that are like what's the term in the US for

0:18:40.640 --> 0:18:43.080
<v Speaker 3>like the bevy or like the ten banks that get

0:18:43.080 --> 0:18:45.760
<v Speaker 3>to bid on the treasury primary deal the primary dealers,

0:18:45.960 --> 0:18:46.919
<v Speaker 3>all of these things, the.

0:18:47.040 --> 0:18:48.560
<v Speaker 1>New issue premium, there's new.

0:18:48.440 --> 0:18:50.160
<v Speaker 2>Issue premium exactly the same.

0:18:50.240 --> 0:18:52.879
<v Speaker 3>And then the idea of like the ticker tape exacerbating

0:18:53.000 --> 0:18:55.680
<v Speaker 3>trend following is opposed to making the market more efficient,

0:18:55.800 --> 0:18:58.520
<v Speaker 3>like all these things, just like we talk about all

0:18:58.520 --> 0:19:00.639
<v Speaker 3>the time. They come up over and over, and you know,

0:19:00.800 --> 0:19:04.160
<v Speaker 3>since both of you talked about this and the need

0:19:04.280 --> 0:19:08.760
<v Speaker 3>for twenty four to seven trade or transaction reconciliation.

0:19:08.880 --> 0:19:10.040
<v Speaker 2>So the market or the.

0:19:10.000 --> 0:19:13.199
<v Speaker 3>Banking day closes at some time and then all the

0:19:13.280 --> 0:19:15.639
<v Speaker 3>clerks get to work and make sure all the books

0:19:15.680 --> 0:19:17.840
<v Speaker 3>are settled. Can you talk a little bit more about

0:19:17.880 --> 0:19:20.879
<v Speaker 3>what happened overnight, maybe both of you and starting for

0:19:21.320 --> 0:19:24.240
<v Speaker 3>in terms of are we talking about handwriting down pieces

0:19:24.240 --> 0:19:26.960
<v Speaker 3>of paper, erasing pens like, can you talk a little

0:19:26.960 --> 0:19:29.640
<v Speaker 3>bit more about what the overnight clerks and all these

0:19:29.640 --> 0:19:32.520
<v Speaker 3>different institutions did overnight to get ready for the next day.

0:19:33.920 --> 0:19:37.600
<v Speaker 4>Sure, So the Bank of England's records actually preserve this

0:19:38.280 --> 0:19:40.399
<v Speaker 4>in a great amount of detail, so we kind of

0:19:40.400 --> 0:19:44.520
<v Speaker 4>know precisely what they're doing. So there are books that

0:19:44.560 --> 0:19:48.000
<v Speaker 4>are worked in the banking hall and so the environment

0:19:48.040 --> 0:19:51.000
<v Speaker 4>where most of the customers would be, and there are

0:19:51.080 --> 0:19:54.160
<v Speaker 4>books that are worked in the accounts department as well.

0:19:55.000 --> 0:19:58.480
<v Speaker 4>So the evening clerks they're kind of taking the books

0:19:58.520 --> 0:20:01.680
<v Speaker 4>that are worked in the banking hall and they are

0:20:01.720 --> 0:20:08.000
<v Speaker 4>transferring those records against customers accounts so that the customer's

0:20:08.080 --> 0:20:11.000
<v Speaker 4>accounts are updated. Not only are they transferring them, but

0:20:11.000 --> 0:20:15.080
<v Speaker 4>they're also checking them. So it goes through a process

0:20:15.320 --> 0:20:20.119
<v Speaker 4>of making sure that the books that are worked in

0:20:20.119 --> 0:20:23.960
<v Speaker 4>the banking hall are adding up in the same way

0:20:24.000 --> 0:20:25.920
<v Speaker 4>as the books that have worked in the account's department,

0:20:26.240 --> 0:20:30.199
<v Speaker 4>and then the customer's ledgers are adding up in the

0:20:30.240 --> 0:20:31.800
<v Speaker 4>same way as the books that are worked in the

0:20:31.800 --> 0:20:36.000
<v Speaker 4>account's department. Then somebody else checks it. The other thing

0:20:36.040 --> 0:20:40.200
<v Speaker 4>that they're doing is making sure that they're really regular

0:20:40.359 --> 0:20:45.080
<v Speaker 4>customers are kept on a separate account. So they would

0:20:45.119 --> 0:20:48.360
<v Speaker 4>work up particular accounts for certain customers because they knew

0:20:48.400 --> 0:20:50.199
<v Speaker 4>that they would be in early the next morning, and

0:20:50.240 --> 0:20:53.080
<v Speaker 4>they knew that they would come and trade very often,

0:20:53.119 --> 0:20:56.320
<v Speaker 4>so they knew that those accounts had to be updated early,

0:20:57.280 --> 0:21:00.000
<v Speaker 4>and they really needed to make sure that the custom

0:21:00.280 --> 0:21:04.840
<v Speaker 4>that they understood where those customers accounts sat. Protection of

0:21:04.840 --> 0:21:07.959
<v Speaker 4>the records is another thing that's really interesting. We can

0:21:07.960 --> 0:21:09.680
<v Speaker 4>go on to talk about that as well, if that

0:21:09.720 --> 0:21:10.480
<v Speaker 4>would be interesting.

0:21:11.000 --> 0:21:12.560
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, Actually, what are you interesting to talk about that?

0:21:12.800 --> 0:21:14.879
<v Speaker 3>You mentioned the fire aspect. I imagine that if it

0:21:14.920 --> 0:21:17.720
<v Speaker 3>all caught on fire be absolutely disastrous for everyone to

0:21:17.800 --> 0:21:19.480
<v Speaker 3>be able to like, so talk a little bit about

0:21:19.480 --> 0:21:20.120
<v Speaker 3>that aspect.

0:21:20.200 --> 0:21:22.800
<v Speaker 2>Just preserving the physical records.

0:21:23.440 --> 0:21:26.000
<v Speaker 4>So the bank is doing a variety of things to

0:21:26.160 --> 0:21:28.800
<v Speaker 4>make sure that it's not at risk of fire. It's

0:21:28.840 --> 0:21:33.920
<v Speaker 4>really worried about fire throughout most of its existence, through

0:21:34.040 --> 0:21:36.760
<v Speaker 4>the sort of eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century,

0:21:36.960 --> 0:21:40.320
<v Speaker 4>so it's a really aggressive landlord. It kind of does

0:21:40.359 --> 0:21:44.159
<v Speaker 4>a slum clearance operation, particularly to create a fire break

0:21:44.800 --> 0:21:47.800
<v Speaker 4>around its buildings. It sort of pushes out resident population.

0:21:47.960 --> 0:21:51.520
<v Speaker 4>It pushes out all the old wooden buildings. It makes

0:21:51.600 --> 0:21:55.000
<v Speaker 4>duplicates of a lot of its accounts and sends them

0:21:55.000 --> 0:21:57.679
<v Speaker 4>out of the bank every night to the house of

0:21:57.720 --> 0:22:00.720
<v Speaker 4>one of its directors, so that they know that if

0:22:01.240 --> 0:22:04.639
<v Speaker 4>records are lost by fire, there is a duplicate sitting

0:22:04.680 --> 0:22:10.760
<v Speaker 4>out in another office. They have kind of technological solutions,

0:22:10.960 --> 0:22:13.720
<v Speaker 4>so they have wheeled trucks in which they put the

0:22:13.720 --> 0:22:18.119
<v Speaker 4>most important ledgers so that they can wheel them out overnight.

0:22:18.760 --> 0:22:21.280
<v Speaker 4>They keep their own fire engines and they train the

0:22:21.320 --> 0:22:25.880
<v Speaker 4>watchmen to operate those fire engines. And from the seventeen

0:22:26.040 --> 0:22:30.040
<v Speaker 4>sixties or so, they create a kind of archive building.

0:22:30.080 --> 0:22:33.240
<v Speaker 4>They call it a library, and they attempt to fireproof

0:22:33.320 --> 0:22:37.600
<v Speaker 4>that library by lining the building with copper, so that

0:22:37.800 --> 0:22:41.160
<v Speaker 4>you know there's a really elaborate set of protection against

0:22:41.160 --> 0:22:42.040
<v Speaker 4>attack and fire.

0:22:42.920 --> 0:22:45.440
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I remember when I was living in London, actually

0:22:45.480 --> 0:22:47.760
<v Speaker 1>working at Bloomberg way back in the day. I used

0:22:47.760 --> 0:22:50.440
<v Speaker 1>to walk past the Bank of England building every day

0:22:50.480 --> 0:22:53.679
<v Speaker 1>on my way to work, and it's just this enormous,

0:22:53.960 --> 0:22:59.239
<v Speaker 1>imposing building with these famously thick walls. Was that for

0:22:59.359 --> 0:23:02.200
<v Speaker 1>fire prof or was that for fear of theft?

0:23:02.640 --> 0:23:06.639
<v Speaker 4>So probably not so much for fear of theft, but

0:23:06.760 --> 0:23:11.760
<v Speaker 4>it was for fear of unrest and rioting mobs in

0:23:12.000 --> 0:23:19.159
<v Speaker 4>eighteenth century London would very often, even if they weren't

0:23:19.200 --> 0:23:22.520
<v Speaker 4>interested in attacking a building, they would sort of they

0:23:22.520 --> 0:23:26.040
<v Speaker 4>would go into the building and sort of pull things apart,

0:23:26.720 --> 0:23:30.760
<v Speaker 4>particularly buildings that hadn't lit their windows. So you know,

0:23:30.760 --> 0:23:33.560
<v Speaker 4>putting lights in your window indicated to the mob that

0:23:33.560 --> 0:23:36.840
<v Speaker 4>you were you were supportive of whatever they were protesting against,

0:23:36.920 --> 0:23:39.840
<v Speaker 4>or what they were they were rioting against. If you

0:23:39.880 --> 0:23:42.360
<v Speaker 4>didn't put lights in your windows then then your your

0:23:42.400 --> 0:23:44.800
<v Speaker 4>property was at risk. So one of the things that

0:23:44.800 --> 0:23:47.080
<v Speaker 4>the Bank does very early on is has these sort

0:23:47.080 --> 0:23:50.800
<v Speaker 4>of windowless walls at the ground floor level so it

0:23:50.840 --> 0:23:52.919
<v Speaker 4>doesn't have to they don't have to light its windows.

0:23:52.960 --> 0:23:56.879
<v Speaker 4>But also it protects itself against that that possibility of

0:23:56.920 --> 0:23:59.119
<v Speaker 4>people sort of coming in through the windows or breaking

0:23:59.200 --> 0:24:02.040
<v Speaker 4>the windows the other thing it does. So there's a

0:24:02.160 --> 0:24:05.240
<v Speaker 4>church next door to the bank, which during the Gordon

0:24:05.320 --> 0:24:08.920
<v Speaker 4>Riots in seventeen eighty, the rioters try to get into

0:24:08.920 --> 0:24:12.600
<v Speaker 4>the bank through the church. So almost the next day

0:24:12.720 --> 0:24:15.000
<v Speaker 4>the Bank of England's directors take the decision that the

0:24:15.080 --> 0:24:18.960
<v Speaker 4>church has to go, and they eventually managed to buy

0:24:19.040 --> 0:24:21.280
<v Speaker 4>up the church and they buy out the churchyard. But

0:24:21.280 --> 0:24:24.040
<v Speaker 4>if you ever go into the Bank of England today,

0:24:24.280 --> 0:24:25.959
<v Speaker 4>you'll see one of the first things you see as

0:24:25.960 --> 0:24:28.120
<v Speaker 4>you walk through the door is that there's a nice

0:24:28.160 --> 0:24:32.560
<v Speaker 4>garden which the governor's office looks out onto this garden.

0:24:33.119 --> 0:24:36.320
<v Speaker 4>That garden is the graveyard of the old Saint Christophila

0:24:36.359 --> 0:24:38.720
<v Speaker 4>Stock's church, So when the governor is looking out onto

0:24:38.720 --> 0:24:41.159
<v Speaker 4>his garden, he's actually looking out onto a graveyard.

0:24:41.760 --> 0:24:43.679
<v Speaker 3>John, why did you come in and talk to us

0:24:43.680 --> 0:24:47.000
<v Speaker 3>about the overnight clerks and the trade reconciliation and how

0:24:47.000 --> 0:24:48.760
<v Speaker 3>it advanced at the point of your research.

0:24:50.119 --> 0:24:53.359
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, So in the nineteenth century, the brokers start to

0:24:53.400 --> 0:24:57.080
<v Speaker 5>be more organized than they were in Anne's period. In

0:24:57.160 --> 0:24:59.480
<v Speaker 5>her period, it's mostly the clerks at the Bank of

0:24:59.520 --> 0:25:02.199
<v Speaker 5>England doing the lion's share of work on behalf of

0:25:02.400 --> 0:25:04.600
<v Speaker 5>most of the rest of the system. But by the

0:25:04.680 --> 0:25:08.879
<v Speaker 5>nineteenth century, individual firms, brokerage firms have developed a pretty

0:25:08.920 --> 0:25:13.160
<v Speaker 5>advanced system of bookkeeping and again an army of clerks.

0:25:13.600 --> 0:25:18.440
<v Speaker 5>There's probably at least five clerks for every one broker.

0:25:18.480 --> 0:25:21.040
<v Speaker 5>I would say that would maybe a high estimate, but

0:25:21.080 --> 0:25:23.840
<v Speaker 5>there's quite a few. So just to give a quick

0:25:23.880 --> 0:25:26.719
<v Speaker 5>instance here, sure is there would be one clerk who

0:25:26.760 --> 0:25:29.679
<v Speaker 5>would be responsible for checking the bargains every day, so

0:25:29.760 --> 0:25:32.080
<v Speaker 5>he would get a series of slips or tickets from

0:25:32.160 --> 0:25:34.720
<v Speaker 5>the principal broker about all of the deals that had

0:25:34.720 --> 0:25:37.360
<v Speaker 5>been done. This clerk would record them in a day

0:25:37.359 --> 0:25:39.919
<v Speaker 5>book and then go back over and check with the

0:25:39.960 --> 0:25:43.399
<v Speaker 5>counterparties the next day, the next morning before the open,

0:25:44.080 --> 0:25:45.720
<v Speaker 5>just to make sure that they were on the same

0:25:45.760 --> 0:25:50.280
<v Speaker 5>page about having executed a deal the night before. The

0:25:50.359 --> 0:25:54.000
<v Speaker 5>second aspect of this is that settlements, the actual exchange

0:25:54.200 --> 0:25:58.320
<v Speaker 5>of cash or checks for securities, whether they're bonds or stocks,

0:25:58.800 --> 0:26:05.000
<v Speaker 5>only happened every two weeks at the London Stock Exchange. Yes, yes,

0:26:05.800 --> 0:26:09.320
<v Speaker 5>we can talk about settlement time. It was very complicated

0:26:09.320 --> 0:26:13.320
<v Speaker 5>in the nineteenth century because different exchanges had wildly different

0:26:13.359 --> 0:26:17.160
<v Speaker 5>settlement procedures and settlement times. The New York Stock Exchange

0:26:17.160 --> 0:26:21.879
<v Speaker 5>settled overnight, so it was t minus zero, while London

0:26:21.920 --> 0:26:25.199
<v Speaker 5>settled every two weeks, and this gave London brokers a

0:26:25.240 --> 0:26:30.240
<v Speaker 5>lot more opportunity to balance out their books to operate

0:26:30.280 --> 0:26:34.360
<v Speaker 5>with less capital, whereas a lot of firms that were

0:26:34.400 --> 0:26:37.600
<v Speaker 5>operating in London and New York would have to have

0:26:37.720 --> 0:26:41.639
<v Speaker 5>pretty large margin accounts parked in New York just to

0:26:41.680 --> 0:26:44.640
<v Speaker 5>meet any obligations that would come up in overnight settlement,

0:26:44.920 --> 0:26:47.199
<v Speaker 5>which was again not the case in London. Settlement in

0:26:47.240 --> 0:26:50.600
<v Speaker 5>London tended to be viewed as much easier. And what

0:26:50.600 --> 0:26:52.439
<v Speaker 5>would happen is at the end of the two weeks,

0:26:52.760 --> 0:26:56.160
<v Speaker 5>you would have hundreds of clerics cram into the basement

0:26:56.200 --> 0:26:58.560
<v Speaker 5>of the London Stock Exchange, it was the settlement room,

0:26:59.320 --> 0:27:02.840
<v Speaker 5>and they would concile all of the transactions that had

0:27:02.840 --> 0:27:06.080
<v Speaker 5>happened the previous two weeks. Often what happened is that

0:27:06.119 --> 0:27:08.880
<v Speaker 5>they would pass around a ticket, so someone would write

0:27:09.200 --> 0:27:13.920
<v Speaker 5>the name of a primary security like Union Pacific, and

0:27:13.960 --> 0:27:16.439
<v Speaker 5>they would pass around the ticket and you would write

0:27:16.520 --> 0:27:19.320
<v Speaker 5>how many shares you either bought or sold of Union

0:27:19.359 --> 0:27:21.680
<v Speaker 5>Pacific and at what price over those two weeks, and

0:27:21.680 --> 0:27:25.680
<v Speaker 5>it would get passed around until everyone had written their

0:27:25.720 --> 0:27:28.480
<v Speaker 5>transaction on the ticket, and then it would be essentially

0:27:28.480 --> 0:27:31.159
<v Speaker 5>translated into a balance sheet and netted out so that

0:27:31.200 --> 0:27:35.160
<v Speaker 5>there only needed to be one payment of differences and

0:27:35.320 --> 0:27:38.640
<v Speaker 5>shares if things had just been sort of like shuffled

0:27:38.680 --> 0:27:41.600
<v Speaker 5>back and forth on the books without actually netting out,

0:27:41.640 --> 0:27:44.240
<v Speaker 5>if that makes sense. So that was how they dealt

0:27:44.240 --> 0:27:47.680
<v Speaker 5>with this very cumbersome, large process of settlement was by

0:27:47.800 --> 0:27:50.920
<v Speaker 5>slowly recreating all of these individual transactions that took place

0:27:50.960 --> 0:27:53.119
<v Speaker 5>on the floor once every two weeks.

0:27:53.480 --> 0:27:55.439
<v Speaker 1>So John, you know we were talking about the actual

0:27:55.480 --> 0:27:58.440
<v Speaker 1>design of the Bank of England. Talk to us about

0:27:58.440 --> 0:28:01.520
<v Speaker 1>the design of the London Stock Exchange, because of course,

0:28:01.600 --> 0:28:03.879
<v Speaker 1>you know that was also a building that was built

0:28:03.880 --> 0:28:05.480
<v Speaker 1>for a specific purpose.

0:28:06.800 --> 0:28:07.159
<v Speaker 2>Sort of.

0:28:07.840 --> 0:28:10.399
<v Speaker 5>So one of the financial journalists in the early nineteen

0:28:10.480 --> 0:28:13.240
<v Speaker 5>hundreds calls the London Stock Exchange a monument to the

0:28:13.240 --> 0:28:15.560
<v Speaker 5>Middle Ages in the middle of the city.

0:28:15.920 --> 0:28:19.160
<v Speaker 1>I love how people were like complaining about infrastructure even

0:28:19.320 --> 0:28:19.800
<v Speaker 1>back then.

0:28:19.960 --> 0:28:23.359
<v Speaker 5>Right, this is from the Middle Ages and the London

0:28:23.359 --> 0:28:25.760
<v Speaker 5>Stock Exchange is opposed to, say, the Bank of England

0:28:25.840 --> 0:28:30.640
<v Speaker 5>was very There's a sociologist, one Pablo Pardo Guera, who

0:28:30.720 --> 0:28:34.000
<v Speaker 5>calls it opportunistic bricklage, which is it was just sort

0:28:34.040 --> 0:28:36.399
<v Speaker 5>of thrown together based on what they needed at a

0:28:36.400 --> 0:28:39.240
<v Speaker 5>particular moment, and so it becomes this sort of strange

0:28:39.240 --> 0:28:44.920
<v Speaker 5>agglomeration of buildings. For most of the eighteen hundreds, it's

0:28:45.080 --> 0:28:48.960
<v Speaker 5>just one wooden building, but they slowly add other buildings

0:28:48.960 --> 0:28:52.040
<v Speaker 5>around to it. It's not until the eighteen eighties that

0:28:52.120 --> 0:28:55.880
<v Speaker 5>they finally enclose it. It's marbled and it's like actually

0:28:55.960 --> 0:29:00.640
<v Speaker 5>looks like something more real and steady, and has one

0:29:00.680 --> 0:29:03.880
<v Speaker 5>continuous trading floor that doesn't happen till quite late in

0:29:03.920 --> 0:29:09.120
<v Speaker 5>the nineteenth century. The one part that is quite consciously designed, however,

0:29:09.400 --> 0:29:12.520
<v Speaker 5>is the settlement room in the basement and its connection

0:29:12.720 --> 0:29:16.000
<v Speaker 5>to the big safe room that they have. So one

0:29:16.040 --> 0:29:19.160
<v Speaker 5>of the problems with settlements in the eighteen hundreds and

0:29:19.200 --> 0:29:22.080
<v Speaker 5>the seventeen hundreds in Ann's period is that if you

0:29:22.080 --> 0:29:24.880
<v Speaker 5>were walking around to settle up your deals, you had

0:29:24.920 --> 0:29:26.840
<v Speaker 5>to carry a lot of especially if you were a

0:29:26.840 --> 0:29:29.479
<v Speaker 5>stockbroker that was doing a large amount of business, you

0:29:29.520 --> 0:29:31.920
<v Speaker 5>had to carry a lot of share certificates, a lot

0:29:31.960 --> 0:29:34.560
<v Speaker 5>of cash, and money with you, and it was very

0:29:34.600 --> 0:29:38.680
<v Speaker 5>easy to lose it in the traffic of city life,

0:29:39.000 --> 0:29:42.600
<v Speaker 5>let alone the bustle of an extremely crowded stock exchange.

0:29:42.920 --> 0:29:45.320
<v Speaker 5>So what the London Stock Exchange did was that they

0:29:45.480 --> 0:29:49.280
<v Speaker 5>connected their settlement room where deals were actually netted and

0:29:49.440 --> 0:29:52.240
<v Speaker 5>cleared and settled out, and right next door in the

0:29:52.240 --> 0:29:56.200
<v Speaker 5>basement they had a safe room where brokers could rent

0:29:56.320 --> 0:30:00.440
<v Speaker 5>essentially small lockers and safes and store their securities money

0:30:00.480 --> 0:30:02.680
<v Speaker 5>in the basement so that they didn't have to transport

0:30:02.760 --> 0:30:05.880
<v Speaker 5>it out in the street of the city. The one

0:30:05.920 --> 0:30:08.840
<v Speaker 5>complication to this was that one of these waiters, these

0:30:08.880 --> 0:30:12.160
<v Speaker 5>living servants that I talked about earlier, one of them

0:30:12.240 --> 0:30:14.440
<v Speaker 5>was in charge of the safe room, and it was

0:30:14.800 --> 0:30:18.080
<v Speaker 5>very common for them. This happened on a couple of occasions.

0:30:18.120 --> 0:30:20.640
<v Speaker 5>It was a very cool room, and so they would

0:30:20.720 --> 0:30:25.520
<v Speaker 5>show their friends the safe room. And these are lower

0:30:25.520 --> 0:30:28.880
<v Speaker 5>class guys who would sneak their friends in after hours

0:30:28.880 --> 0:30:31.200
<v Speaker 5>at the London Stock Exchange and show them the safe rooms,

0:30:31.200 --> 0:30:33.880
<v Speaker 5>show them all the cool aspects of the building. And

0:30:33.920 --> 0:30:36.720
<v Speaker 5>this really irked the brokers, and so there was a

0:30:36.720 --> 0:30:39.320
<v Speaker 5>lot of tension between these sort of lower class workers

0:30:39.320 --> 0:30:42.400
<v Speaker 5>who were responsible for maintaining a lot of the exchange's

0:30:42.400 --> 0:30:46.400
<v Speaker 5>critical infrastructure, and the brokers who depended on, you know,

0:30:46.560 --> 0:31:03.640
<v Speaker 5>safely storing their securities money in the exchange.

0:31:06.400 --> 0:31:09.800
<v Speaker 1>So we've been talking a lot about how finance used

0:31:09.840 --> 0:31:12.720
<v Speaker 1>to operate in the seventeen hundreds eighteen hundreds, and we've

0:31:12.760 --> 0:31:16.320
<v Speaker 1>been mostly focusing on how it was supposed to work.

0:31:16.560 --> 0:31:21.440
<v Speaker 1>Were there any famous or interesting examples of things going wrong? So,

0:31:21.600 --> 0:31:24.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, a ledger gets lost, or a certificate that's

0:31:24.920 --> 0:31:27.920
<v Speaker 1>supposed to go from one place to another doesn't show up,

0:31:28.240 --> 0:31:30.760
<v Speaker 1>settlement doesn't work, any examples.

0:31:31.720 --> 0:31:34.600
<v Speaker 4>So one of my favorite stories is the story of

0:31:35.000 --> 0:31:39.560
<v Speaker 4>Francis Fonton, and he's a very ordinary clerk in the

0:31:40.480 --> 0:31:45.400
<v Speaker 4>late eighteenth century, but sooner or later his marriage seems

0:31:45.400 --> 0:31:49.880
<v Speaker 4>to break down and he finds himself a lady friend

0:31:50.560 --> 0:31:55.640
<v Speaker 4>who has Antiinomian tendencies. So the Antiinomians believed that they

0:31:55.680 --> 0:31:58.800
<v Speaker 4>were saved by grace, so it didn't really matter how

0:31:58.840 --> 0:32:03.000
<v Speaker 4>they behaved because they were saved anyway. So that this

0:32:03.120 --> 0:32:07.000
<v Speaker 4>lady convinced Francis that they could sin all day, and

0:32:07.040 --> 0:32:09.920
<v Speaker 4>they could sin all night as long as they rose

0:32:09.960 --> 0:32:14.120
<v Speaker 4>early in the morning and went to the chapel run

0:32:14.160 --> 0:32:17.040
<v Speaker 4>by a kind of itinerant preacher who is a friend

0:32:17.040 --> 0:32:21.840
<v Speaker 4>of this lady. So Francis clearly enjoys this opportunity, but

0:32:21.920 --> 0:32:24.520
<v Speaker 4>his new lifestyle costs him quite a bit of money.

0:32:24.560 --> 0:32:27.800
<v Speaker 4>So he uses his position as a transfer clerk in

0:32:27.840 --> 0:32:33.040
<v Speaker 4>the Bank of England to transfer shares from people he

0:32:33.160 --> 0:32:37.040
<v Speaker 4>knows who are dead to himself, and so he makes

0:32:37.040 --> 0:32:39.480
<v Speaker 4>a fair bit of money out of that, until, of course,

0:32:39.520 --> 0:32:42.480
<v Speaker 4>inevitably he gets caught. And the Bank of England at

0:32:42.520 --> 0:32:46.960
<v Speaker 4>this point is exacting the ultimate penalty from its clerks

0:32:47.240 --> 0:32:50.440
<v Speaker 4>who it catches transgressing in this way. So poor old

0:32:50.440 --> 0:32:54.440
<v Speaker 4>Francis Fontan is condemned to death and is hung for

0:32:54.480 --> 0:32:59.479
<v Speaker 4>his crimes. And there were several other incidents like this,

0:33:00.200 --> 0:33:03.280
<v Speaker 4>and the Bank of England, no matter how well the

0:33:03.360 --> 0:33:07.160
<v Speaker 4>clerk had behaved up until that point, it always extracts

0:33:07.200 --> 0:33:10.040
<v Speaker 4>the ultimate penalty, so it always seeks the death penalty

0:33:10.040 --> 0:33:12.680
<v Speaker 4>against them as an example to the others.

0:33:13.040 --> 0:33:17.000
<v Speaker 3>Penalties for financial crimes in general were really more severe

0:33:17.040 --> 0:33:17.920
<v Speaker 3>back then, weren't they.

0:33:18.680 --> 0:33:23.360
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, And there's some really interesting work, particularly by a

0:33:23.400 --> 0:33:28.800
<v Speaker 4>scholar called Carl Wennelund, who really equates that sort of

0:33:28.840 --> 0:33:33.480
<v Speaker 4>the gallows as monetary policy in eighteenth century Britain that

0:33:34.040 --> 0:33:38.760
<v Speaker 4>Britain is a commercial nation, and a commercial nation needs

0:33:38.760 --> 0:33:41.640
<v Speaker 4>to be able to trust paper and trust the integrity

0:33:41.640 --> 0:33:45.840
<v Speaker 4>of paper, and therefore the death penalty becomes part of

0:33:45.920 --> 0:33:51.000
<v Speaker 4>that process of protecting the integrity of paper and making

0:33:51.080 --> 0:33:53.080
<v Speaker 4>sure that fraud is limited.

0:33:54.240 --> 0:33:56.600
<v Speaker 1>And John, what about in the eighteen hundreds.

0:33:56.760 --> 0:33:59.600
<v Speaker 5>Oh man, there are a ton I could choose from,

0:34:00.160 --> 0:34:03.960
<v Speaker 5>I'll choose I'll stay with two on this theme of

0:34:04.000 --> 0:34:06.640
<v Speaker 5>the waiters. So one of the main points that I

0:34:06.640 --> 0:34:10.200
<v Speaker 5>think is important to understand is that as financial markets

0:34:10.239 --> 0:34:14.400
<v Speaker 5>became more complicated and larger, as things like the telegraph

0:34:14.440 --> 0:34:17.680
<v Speaker 5>and the ticker tape were introduced to financial markets, this

0:34:17.760 --> 0:34:22.640
<v Speaker 5>actually made the brokers the principles more dependent on an

0:34:22.800 --> 0:34:27.880
<v Speaker 5>army of secondary laborers to execute trades profitably and quickly,

0:34:28.320 --> 0:34:32.520
<v Speaker 5>whether it was telegraph operators, whether it was their clerks,

0:34:32.560 --> 0:34:35.480
<v Speaker 5>whether it was telegraph messenger boys or waiters who delivered

0:34:35.480 --> 0:34:38.160
<v Speaker 5>the messages. And so the London Stock Exchange is this

0:34:38.239 --> 0:34:40.800
<v Speaker 5>really massive place. By the end of the nineteenth century,

0:34:40.800 --> 0:34:44.080
<v Speaker 5>there are twenty five hundred member brokers and that's not

0:34:44.160 --> 0:34:47.120
<v Speaker 5>including any of their clerks. So it was very hard

0:34:47.160 --> 0:34:50.760
<v Speaker 5>to keep track of where messages needed to be delivered

0:34:50.800 --> 0:34:53.279
<v Speaker 5>into whom often. One of the ways that this was

0:34:53.400 --> 0:34:56.640
<v Speaker 5>organized was there would be waiters stationed at the different

0:34:56.680 --> 0:34:59.839
<v Speaker 5>doors at the London Stock Exchange, and if you entered

0:34:59.840 --> 0:35:03.000
<v Speaker 5>in exited one door each day, you sort of had

0:35:03.040 --> 0:35:05.719
<v Speaker 5>your waiter who knew you, who knew your schedule, who

0:35:05.840 --> 0:35:07.640
<v Speaker 5>knew where he could find you if he needed to

0:35:07.640 --> 0:35:11.680
<v Speaker 5>get you a message. But oftentimes there was one. There

0:35:11.760 --> 0:35:15.040
<v Speaker 5>was one order that was sent and a messenger boy ran,

0:35:15.400 --> 0:35:17.560
<v Speaker 5>ran it to the wrong door, delivered it to the

0:35:17.600 --> 0:35:19.719
<v Speaker 5>wrong waiter, and the waiter looked at the message and said,

0:35:19.760 --> 0:35:21.319
<v Speaker 5>I don't know this guy, he's not here, and sent

0:35:21.400 --> 0:35:24.399
<v Speaker 5>it back and the broker never got his order for

0:35:24.760 --> 0:35:27.319
<v Speaker 5>days after the fact, and then dragged this waiter in

0:35:27.360 --> 0:35:30.400
<v Speaker 5>front of the managers of the London Stock Exchange and

0:35:30.440 --> 0:35:33.040
<v Speaker 5>complained that he should have just directed it to another door.

0:35:33.440 --> 0:35:36.920
<v Speaker 5>But again, there were twenty five hundred brokers in the exchange,

0:35:37.000 --> 0:35:39.439
<v Speaker 5>and so they let the waiter off the hook because

0:35:39.440 --> 0:35:44.120
<v Speaker 5>they excused his ignorance of this random broker who operated

0:35:44.200 --> 0:35:45.880
<v Speaker 5>on the other side of the exchange.

0:35:46.239 --> 0:35:48.080
<v Speaker 1>They didn't send him to the gallows.

0:35:48.480 --> 0:35:51.759
<v Speaker 5>No, they did not it was very nice. The only

0:35:51.840 --> 0:35:54.040
<v Speaker 5>other thing I'd add to this as well is that

0:35:55.160 --> 0:35:59.360
<v Speaker 5>there was still a prevalence for these These waiters needed

0:35:59.360 --> 0:36:01.600
<v Speaker 5>to have a lot of dependence in order to do

0:36:01.680 --> 0:36:04.800
<v Speaker 5>their job well. So one of the waiters was always

0:36:04.800 --> 0:36:07.840
<v Speaker 5>responsible for going and collecting the mail from the General

0:36:07.840 --> 0:36:10.560
<v Speaker 5>Post Office early in the morning and then making sure

0:36:10.600 --> 0:36:13.280
<v Speaker 5>it was distributed to brokers in a timely manner before

0:36:13.280 --> 0:36:15.600
<v Speaker 5>the market opened, so that they could place any orders

0:36:15.640 --> 0:36:18.520
<v Speaker 5>they'd received in the mail. One of the waiters tended

0:36:18.520 --> 0:36:21.560
<v Speaker 5>to abuse this privilege and he was gone for long

0:36:21.640 --> 0:36:25.560
<v Speaker 5>periods of time. He claimed that he was delayed at

0:36:25.560 --> 0:36:28.360
<v Speaker 5>the Dead Letter Office, where they would ask for the

0:36:28.440 --> 0:36:31.520
<v Speaker 5>names of letters that hadn't been delayed or delivered at

0:36:31.560 --> 0:36:35.040
<v Speaker 5>the Stock Exchange, but really he was out drinking and

0:36:35.200 --> 0:36:38.480
<v Speaker 5>visiting pubs, and he finally gets caught when they find

0:36:38.520 --> 0:36:41.799
<v Speaker 5>him passed out in the London Stock Exchange's bathroom with

0:36:42.160 --> 0:36:43.440
<v Speaker 5>letters spewn everywhere.

0:36:44.200 --> 0:36:46.359
<v Speaker 3>So, and you know you talked about the scene at

0:36:46.360 --> 0:36:48.640
<v Speaker 3>the Bank of England with the bustling lobby and the

0:36:48.680 --> 0:36:51.080
<v Speaker 3>clerks in twenty four to seven, can you talk a

0:36:51.160 --> 0:36:54.239
<v Speaker 3>little bit more about like was that scene replicated at

0:36:54.400 --> 0:36:57.280
<v Speaker 3>other banks? Around the country, whether it was private banks

0:36:57.360 --> 0:36:59.799
<v Speaker 3>or regional banks, and how much was that sort of

0:37:00.160 --> 0:37:02.640
<v Speaker 3>like ai is that seen at the Bank of England

0:37:02.680 --> 0:37:05.560
<v Speaker 3>reflective of what other banks were like at that time.

0:37:06.880 --> 0:37:09.120
<v Speaker 4>So the Bank of England has a monopoly at this time,

0:37:09.560 --> 0:37:12.960
<v Speaker 4>so and it deliberately seeks this monopoly in order to

0:37:13.040 --> 0:37:16.960
<v Speaker 4>keep other banks small. So banks in London are allowed

0:37:17.000 --> 0:37:19.440
<v Speaker 4>to have no more than six partners, so you know,

0:37:19.440 --> 0:37:23.160
<v Speaker 4>they are very small, very discrete, very discrete, an elite

0:37:23.239 --> 0:37:27.040
<v Speaker 4>set of customers. Very often. You get many more provincial

0:37:27.080 --> 0:37:30.960
<v Speaker 4>banks emerging from the seventeen eighties onwards, but often they're

0:37:31.000 --> 0:37:35.399
<v Speaker 4>quite small as well, and relatively unstable because they're very

0:37:35.440 --> 0:37:38.520
<v Speaker 4>reliant on the regional economy. And if the regional economy

0:37:38.920 --> 0:37:43.000
<v Speaker 4>becomes problematic in some way or goes into recession, then

0:37:43.040 --> 0:37:45.960
<v Speaker 4>the banks are immediately affected. So you get a lot

0:37:46.000 --> 0:37:49.080
<v Speaker 4>of growth of banks and then a decline of banks.

0:37:49.880 --> 0:37:54.000
<v Speaker 4>You do see banks represented in the banker's lobby though,

0:37:55.080 --> 0:37:59.600
<v Speaker 4>and you do see a lot of their work being

0:37:59.680 --> 0:38:03.320
<v Speaker 4>done there, but they are they're not a huge force

0:38:03.360 --> 0:38:05.680
<v Speaker 4>to be reckoned with. So the Bank of England is

0:38:05.800 --> 0:38:10.600
<v Speaker 4>dominant throughout this period, and it exercises that dominance as

0:38:10.640 --> 0:38:14.000
<v Speaker 4>far as I can see. Also, the Bank of England's

0:38:14.040 --> 0:38:18.600
<v Speaker 4>clerks are not taking their skills out to other banking environments,

0:38:19.000 --> 0:38:21.120
<v Speaker 4>so they come into the Bank of England and they

0:38:21.160 --> 0:38:22.719
<v Speaker 4>pretty much stay there until they die.

0:38:24.880 --> 0:38:27.919
<v Speaker 1>So let me ask a big picture question now, which

0:38:27.960 --> 0:38:30.680
<v Speaker 1>is you know, we started this discussion talking about the

0:38:30.719 --> 0:38:34.279
<v Speaker 1>episode we did with Stuart Butterfield that was a conversation

0:38:34.480 --> 0:38:39.000
<v Speaker 1>largely about technological revolution, the introduction of artificial intelligence and

0:38:39.040 --> 0:38:42.680
<v Speaker 1>what it might mean for technology in particular. But as

0:38:42.800 --> 0:38:46.360
<v Speaker 1>both of you look in the past, through your work

0:38:46.440 --> 0:38:51.480
<v Speaker 1>at previous technological developments or revolutions in the world of

0:38:51.560 --> 0:38:56.440
<v Speaker 1>finance and banking, what can history tell us about these

0:38:56.480 --> 0:38:59.920
<v Speaker 1>sort of developmental arcs. What should our takeaway be as

0:38:59.920 --> 0:39:02.720
<v Speaker 1>we look at how things worked in the seventeen hundreds

0:39:02.719 --> 0:39:05.680
<v Speaker 1>and eighteen hundreds to how they might work in the future.

0:39:06.280 --> 0:39:10.040
<v Speaker 5>I think my big takeaway is that most technological revolutions

0:39:10.280 --> 0:39:14.839
<v Speaker 5>never really replace human labor, They just transform the relationships

0:39:14.840 --> 0:39:17.360
<v Speaker 5>of it. So what I mean by that again I

0:39:17.440 --> 0:39:20.160
<v Speaker 5>mentioned like the introduction of something like the telegraph or

0:39:20.200 --> 0:39:22.759
<v Speaker 5>the ticker tape didn't actually replace a lot of the

0:39:22.800 --> 0:39:26.160
<v Speaker 5>functions of people in the stock Exchange, the paper price

0:39:26.239 --> 0:39:29.839
<v Speaker 5>list was still a really important check that was sent

0:39:29.880 --> 0:39:32.200
<v Speaker 5>out to investors at the end of each day, and

0:39:32.239 --> 0:39:35.960
<v Speaker 5>it created this influx of new laborers into financial markets

0:39:36.000 --> 0:39:39.080
<v Speaker 5>to help operate the telegraph and the ticker tape. And

0:39:39.080 --> 0:39:41.640
<v Speaker 5>then you see this sort of similar thing happen in

0:39:41.680 --> 0:39:44.840
<v Speaker 5>the twentieth century with the move to automated systems as well.

0:39:45.320 --> 0:39:48.439
<v Speaker 5>Even though the waiters of the London Stock Exchange are

0:39:48.920 --> 0:39:52.760
<v Speaker 5>essentially put out of business by the automation of stock trading,

0:39:52.800 --> 0:39:55.440
<v Speaker 5>you no longer need these guys to deliver messages. In

0:39:55.480 --> 0:39:58.880
<v Speaker 5>a world of computers and telephones, you get an influx

0:39:59.000 --> 0:40:03.440
<v Speaker 5>of compute your coders and electrical engineers into exchanges in

0:40:03.480 --> 0:40:07.719
<v Speaker 5>the nineteen sixties through the eighties to begin implementing technological systems.

0:40:08.320 --> 0:40:12.920
<v Speaker 5>So the relationship between human work and technology shifts around.

0:40:13.160 --> 0:40:16.640
<v Speaker 5>It ends up the crucial locus of that changes, but

0:40:16.840 --> 0:40:19.880
<v Speaker 5>there's always a human element that emerges, and there is

0:40:20.000 --> 0:40:24.799
<v Speaker 5>critical human labor in maintaining and implementing these technological systems whenever.

0:40:24.520 --> 0:40:40.680
<v Speaker 1>They are Indeed, so Joe, you know, I love Financial

0:40:40.760 --> 0:40:43.760
<v Speaker 1>history episodes. That was like the ultimate Finance History episodes.

0:40:43.760 --> 0:40:46.560
<v Speaker 2>It was so much in there that I really liked, and.

0:40:46.640 --> 0:40:49.080
<v Speaker 3>All these light bulbs go off about like, Okay, what

0:40:49.200 --> 0:40:52.279
<v Speaker 3>is the connection between like T plus two and the

0:40:52.320 --> 0:40:54.759
<v Speaker 3>fact that like they had T minus one, well they

0:40:54.760 --> 0:40:57.080
<v Speaker 3>had T minus one, and like people think like why

0:40:57.080 --> 0:40:59.640
<v Speaker 3>do we have two plus zero? And as John explained,

0:41:00.160 --> 0:41:02.040
<v Speaker 3>like well you have to keep more money and there's

0:41:02.120 --> 0:41:05.719
<v Speaker 3>like a financial inefficiency aspect of that, like all of

0:41:05.760 --> 0:41:07.880
<v Speaker 3>the every time we talk finance history, like all of

0:41:07.920 --> 0:41:10.040
<v Speaker 3>these things like just suddenly make more.

0:41:09.880 --> 0:41:12.920
<v Speaker 1>Sense, right. And also it feels like we often talk

0:41:12.960 --> 0:41:15.880
<v Speaker 1>about things and we think the restraints are technological, h well,

0:41:15.880 --> 0:41:18.600
<v Speaker 1>why don't we settle things faster? But so often they're

0:41:18.680 --> 0:41:23.960
<v Speaker 1>actually about you know, preferences, habits, incentives that people have

0:41:24.040 --> 0:41:27.000
<v Speaker 1>built up over time, and not the actual underlying technology.

0:41:27.280 --> 0:41:27.520
<v Speaker 2>Yeah.

0:41:27.560 --> 0:41:29.759
<v Speaker 3>And you know, even like we talked about like we

0:41:29.840 --> 0:41:32.680
<v Speaker 3>framed this as like before computers, but we remember, like

0:41:32.840 --> 0:41:36.040
<v Speaker 3>both of us like remember floor trading, right, yes, and

0:41:36.080 --> 0:41:37.960
<v Speaker 3>that seems crazy and I wonder how that worked and

0:41:38.000 --> 0:41:40.200
<v Speaker 3>why would they weren't losing? How could you trust that

0:41:40.239 --> 0:41:42.680
<v Speaker 3>person you were talking to? Like even that sort of

0:41:42.719 --> 0:41:45.200
<v Speaker 3>like blows in my mind, and you know, it's interesting,

0:41:45.200 --> 0:41:47.200
<v Speaker 3>I've never really thought about this before but I remember

0:41:47.200 --> 0:41:49.279
<v Speaker 3>reading in history about how like the death penalty was

0:41:49.320 --> 0:41:49.920
<v Speaker 3>often applied.

0:41:49.960 --> 0:41:52.480
<v Speaker 2>And finally, oh yeah, and it kind of makes sense, like.

0:41:53.000 --> 0:41:57.280
<v Speaker 3>Not to be an apologist for you know, hanging clerks.

0:41:56.880 --> 0:41:59.000
<v Speaker 1>Hanging white collar criminals in the seven gen.

0:41:59.200 --> 0:42:02.840
<v Speaker 3>You know, hanging in the seventeen hundreds. But like, okay,

0:42:02.880 --> 0:42:04.719
<v Speaker 3>like this is like that you have to have some

0:42:04.880 --> 0:42:06.840
<v Speaker 3>sort of like you know, this is everyone trust the

0:42:06.840 --> 0:42:07.480
<v Speaker 3>Bank of England.

0:42:07.520 --> 0:42:09.840
<v Speaker 2>Well this is right, and this right, Yeah.

0:42:09.680 --> 0:42:12.200
<v Speaker 1>AD's whole point is that like so much of what

0:42:12.239 --> 0:42:16.840
<v Speaker 1>the Bank of England does is mixed in with Britain's

0:42:16.880 --> 0:42:20.880
<v Speaker 1>reputation trust as an empire, trust in the financial system,

0:42:20.920 --> 0:42:23.880
<v Speaker 1>and like ultimately all that political power is built on

0:42:23.960 --> 0:42:25.080
<v Speaker 1>that foundation.

0:42:24.840 --> 0:42:26.400
<v Speaker 3>Right, And so you could imagine if you have like

0:42:26.600 --> 0:42:29.360
<v Speaker 3>any sort of like lenients and you're a little slipping

0:42:29.400 --> 0:42:31.640
<v Speaker 3>and you know, too many pages lost or too and

0:42:31.760 --> 0:42:33.920
<v Speaker 3>you could see how easy it was. Also the part

0:42:33.920 --> 0:42:37.799
<v Speaker 3>about architecture and clearing the space around the Bank of

0:42:37.880 --> 0:42:41.640
<v Speaker 3>England so that no fires could come in. Yeah, duplicates

0:42:41.680 --> 0:42:44.520
<v Speaker 3>like sending someone home with records, you know, again, like

0:42:44.560 --> 0:42:46.560
<v Speaker 3>they do the same thing today with like storing things

0:42:46.640 --> 0:42:47.800
<v Speaker 3>in multiple data centers.

0:42:47.840 --> 0:42:51.080
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, Also the dead letter office. That's fascinating.

0:42:51.080 --> 0:42:51.920
<v Speaker 2>Nothing ever changes.

0:42:51.960 --> 0:42:53.880
<v Speaker 1>All right, Well, we could go on, but shall we

0:42:53.960 --> 0:42:54.279
<v Speaker 1>leave it there?

0:42:54.400 --> 0:42:54.960
<v Speaker 2>Let's leave it there?

0:42:55.000 --> 0:42:57.400
<v Speaker 1>All right? This has been another episode of the All

0:42:57.480 --> 0:43:00.359
<v Speaker 1>Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on

0:43:00.400 --> 0:43:01.800
<v Speaker 1>Twitter at Tracy Alloway.

0:43:01.960 --> 0:43:04.840
<v Speaker 3>And I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me on Twitter

0:43:04.960 --> 0:43:09.120
<v Speaker 3>at the Stalwart. Follow our guests on Twitter. Professor Ann Murphy,

0:43:09.280 --> 0:43:14.440
<v Speaker 3>She's at eighteenth c Underscore Finance, John Handel, He's at

0:43:14.600 --> 0:43:18.600
<v Speaker 3>John Handel. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman

0:43:18.760 --> 0:43:21.920
<v Speaker 3>and Dashel Bennett at Dashbot. And check out all of

0:43:21.960 --> 0:43:25.440
<v Speaker 3>our podcasts at Bloomberg under the handle at podcasts, and

0:43:25.600 --> 0:43:28.319
<v Speaker 3>for our odd loots content, go to Bloomberg dot com

0:43:28.360 --> 0:43:31.200
<v Speaker 3>slash od lots, where we have a blog, transcripts and

0:43:31.239 --> 0:43:34.759
<v Speaker 3>a newsletter. And check out our discord chat about all

0:43:34.800 --> 0:43:38.000
<v Speaker 3>these topics twenty four to seven with other listeners. Go

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<v Speaker 3>to discord dot gg slash od lots, and.

0:43:41.640 --> 0:43:46.720
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0:43:53.840 --> 0:44:12.440
<v Speaker 3>Thanks for listening and thanks for watching it

0:44:20.840 --> 0:44:20.880
<v Speaker 5>In