1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:25,920 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Hello, 4 00:00:25,960 --> 00:00:28,480 Speaker 1: and welcome back to the show. My name is my 5 00:00:28,560 --> 00:00:31,960 Speaker 1: name is Noel. I'm Ben, and we want to start 6 00:00:32,000 --> 00:00:35,920 Speaker 1: this in a little bit of a different format today. 7 00:00:36,200 --> 00:00:38,600 Speaker 1: At the very top of the show, ladies and gentlemen, 8 00:00:38,920 --> 00:00:42,400 Speaker 1: we have a very important correction. Can you guess what 9 00:00:42,520 --> 00:00:47,159 Speaker 1: it is? It's a single vocabulary word. It is. It's 10 00:00:47,159 --> 00:00:52,600 Speaker 1: a very important one too, five syllables. It is not, 11 00:00:53,000 --> 00:00:56,560 Speaker 1: in fact pre lapsarian. That means before the flood. That's 12 00:00:56,560 --> 00:01:01,440 Speaker 1: a different word. It's anti Deluvian relapse. Arian means before 13 00:01:01,480 --> 00:01:04,200 Speaker 1: the fall, and you know, in other words, before the 14 00:01:04,200 --> 00:01:08,760 Speaker 1: fall of Lucifer and the various rebellious angels in biblical war. 15 00:01:09,280 --> 00:01:11,640 Speaker 1: Thank you to everyone who wrote in. This was on me. 16 00:01:12,240 --> 00:01:15,000 Speaker 1: This is just on me, guys, not on Maturnal. And 17 00:01:15,040 --> 00:01:17,120 Speaker 1: I'm grateful for everyone who wrote in to help me 18 00:01:17,160 --> 00:01:19,600 Speaker 1: out with this. Dufe I caught it too late as 19 00:01:19,680 --> 00:01:22,840 Speaker 1: we were as we were queing and stuff, and and 20 00:01:22,920 --> 00:01:26,119 Speaker 1: we Matt Nolan, I often like to point out that 21 00:01:26,360 --> 00:01:31,040 Speaker 1: you our listeners not a general. You, specifically, you are 22 00:01:31,080 --> 00:01:33,319 Speaker 1: not just as much of a part of this show 23 00:01:33,360 --> 00:01:35,640 Speaker 1: as we are. You are the most important part of 24 00:01:35,680 --> 00:01:38,640 Speaker 1: the show, and we all of us are incredibly lucky 25 00:01:38,680 --> 00:01:42,080 Speaker 1: to have you here, specifically you helping us make this 26 00:01:42,120 --> 00:01:44,160 Speaker 1: show the best thing it can be. Just a little 27 00:01:44,160 --> 00:01:46,720 Speaker 1: peek behind the curtain que a ng as when we 28 00:01:46,720 --> 00:01:48,920 Speaker 1: we all listened to the edit to make sure that 29 00:01:49,000 --> 00:01:52,520 Speaker 1: NOL didn't miss anything, any any goofs. So you know, 30 00:01:52,560 --> 00:01:55,320 Speaker 1: there are layers of of of a blame to go around, 31 00:01:55,320 --> 00:01:59,360 Speaker 1: And I am first to admit my part in this. Um. 32 00:01:59,400 --> 00:02:01,760 Speaker 1: I was gonna say, if you all only knew how 33 00:02:01,760 --> 00:02:05,240 Speaker 1: many things get through my watch, Uh, that imprized that 34 00:02:05,240 --> 00:02:07,640 Speaker 1: I let a lot of things get through. Matt, So well, yeah, 35 00:02:07,640 --> 00:02:12,520 Speaker 1: that's what I'm saying all the time. It's not your fault. 36 00:02:12,560 --> 00:02:16,160 Speaker 1: You have to edit while you're recording. That's true. Well, okay, 37 00:02:16,520 --> 00:02:20,760 Speaker 1: it's always true. We're taking all this out. Oh let's 38 00:02:20,840 --> 00:02:23,840 Speaker 1: keep it in. Uh. The point the point being here 39 00:02:24,000 --> 00:02:26,920 Speaker 1: is that you keep us honest. We try our best, 40 00:02:27,000 --> 00:02:30,119 Speaker 1: and I personally rely on you to help us stay accurate. 41 00:02:30,560 --> 00:02:33,760 Speaker 1: We Matt, Noel and I and you are accountable to 42 00:02:33,840 --> 00:02:37,080 Speaker 1: each other. So thank you to everyone who wrote in. 43 00:02:37,160 --> 00:02:41,280 Speaker 1: We appreciate it immensely. And everybody was so like, very 44 00:02:41,320 --> 00:02:45,240 Speaker 1: supportive too, you know, and that even more so I 45 00:02:45,280 --> 00:02:47,320 Speaker 1: appreciate and I love that they took that tone of 46 00:02:47,400 --> 00:02:52,840 Speaker 1: like you poor idiots, bless your little hearts, mixing up words. 47 00:02:52,960 --> 00:02:55,120 Speaker 1: I thought y'all have the best words. It turns out 48 00:02:55,200 --> 00:02:58,960 Speaker 1: you did not. Every one of those emails we read 49 00:02:59,040 --> 00:03:02,360 Speaker 1: in that little sun their lady voice. So just so 50 00:03:02,440 --> 00:03:04,280 Speaker 1: y'all know, that's how you sound to us, no matter 51 00:03:04,280 --> 00:03:07,440 Speaker 1: who you are. We have a list of words we 52 00:03:07,880 --> 00:03:10,280 Speaker 1: say to ourselves before we read the email to help 53 00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:19,680 Speaker 1: us getting that genteel Southern approach. A delicious mint, oh oh, Jeff, 54 00:03:20,040 --> 00:03:23,680 Speaker 1: good gravy? You are? You are mixing up some That's 55 00:03:23,720 --> 00:03:25,520 Speaker 1: how I do it, though you have to. You have 56 00:03:25,560 --> 00:03:28,080 Speaker 1: to let them kind of combine together. We like to 57 00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:30,800 Speaker 1: have fun. Yeah, And you're an award winning method actors, 58 00:03:30,840 --> 00:03:33,120 Speaker 1: so you really live in the characters, you know. Actually, 59 00:03:33,160 --> 00:03:35,160 Speaker 1: as it turns out, today we're talking about an entire 60 00:03:35,240 --> 00:03:38,760 Speaker 1: agency staffed with award winning method actors, and we're not 61 00:03:38,880 --> 00:03:43,160 Speaker 1: talking about the studio audience of inside the actor's studio, right, 62 00:03:43,280 --> 00:03:46,800 Speaker 1: So let's explore today we're talking about a much much 63 00:03:46,840 --> 00:03:51,840 Speaker 1: more powerful group, one that affects your life again, specifically 64 00:03:51,880 --> 00:03:55,880 Speaker 1: you in profound, immense and often invisible ways. It's an 65 00:03:55,960 --> 00:03:59,160 Speaker 1: organization that you support, that you pay for with a 66 00:03:59,240 --> 00:04:02,000 Speaker 1: percentage of every paycheck you receive if you were an 67 00:04:02,000 --> 00:04:05,600 Speaker 1: American citizen or heck, even a resident, A group that 68 00:04:05,680 --> 00:04:09,800 Speaker 1: may know almost everything about you. A group that is not, 69 00:04:11,440 --> 00:04:14,880 Speaker 1: unlike this show, accountable to you, even if you're one 70 00:04:14,920 --> 00:04:17,560 Speaker 1: of the people paying for it. And you've probably heard 71 00:04:17,600 --> 00:04:20,800 Speaker 1: the name of this group before, the n s A 72 00:04:21,680 --> 00:04:25,000 Speaker 1: or National Security Agency. It sounds so nice. Who doesn't 73 00:04:25,000 --> 00:04:27,520 Speaker 1: want to be secure today? Whether you live in a 74 00:04:27,560 --> 00:04:30,560 Speaker 1: foreign country or the good old US of A, we 75 00:04:30,720 --> 00:04:34,359 Speaker 1: guarantee this organization may know an immense amount of stuff 76 00:04:34,360 --> 00:04:37,680 Speaker 1: about you, and it probably has dirt on numerous government 77 00:04:37,680 --> 00:04:43,600 Speaker 1: officials as well. So how did we get here? Well, 78 00:04:43,680 --> 00:04:45,920 Speaker 1: let's take a look at the history. So while the 79 00:04:46,000 --> 00:04:49,400 Speaker 1: n s A was officially founded on November four, nineteen 80 00:04:49,520 --> 00:04:53,240 Speaker 1: fifty four, its roots go much much further back, all 81 00:04:53,279 --> 00:04:57,320 Speaker 1: the way to nineteen seventeen, and that's when a man 82 00:04:57,400 --> 00:05:01,000 Speaker 1: named Herbert oh Yardley became the head of this newly 83 00:05:01,080 --> 00:05:06,120 Speaker 1: creative thing called the Cipher Bureau of Military Intelligence, which 84 00:05:06,560 --> 00:05:08,559 Speaker 1: he's just a wonderful name. I feel like we should 85 00:05:08,560 --> 00:05:11,520 Speaker 1: have stayed with that the entire way through. People would 86 00:05:11,520 --> 00:05:13,680 Speaker 1: get cyber and cipher mixed up. Now, Oh yeah, I 87 00:05:13,720 --> 00:05:16,880 Speaker 1: guess it's true. But Cipher Bureau, Cipher Bureau, it's a 88 00:05:17,080 --> 00:05:19,440 Speaker 1: comic book. It does sound like a comic book. It's 89 00:05:19,560 --> 00:05:23,360 Speaker 1: very hell boy. So this was just three months or 90 00:05:23,400 --> 00:05:27,320 Speaker 1: so after the United States had declared war on Germany. 91 00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:29,960 Speaker 1: One of the major factors that brought the US into 92 00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:33,160 Speaker 1: the war was a thing called the Zimmerman Telegram, and 93 00:05:33,200 --> 00:05:36,400 Speaker 1: that's a situation where the Foreign Secretary of Germany tried 94 00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:41,000 Speaker 1: to get Mexico to enter into war against the United States, 95 00:05:41,240 --> 00:05:45,400 Speaker 1: but British codebreakers intercepted the message and they told their 96 00:05:45,400 --> 00:05:48,200 Speaker 1: friends in the US. You know, they said, oh, the 97 00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:52,320 Speaker 1: Yanks should probably hear of this, which is apparently how 98 00:05:52,360 --> 00:05:57,000 Speaker 1: they sound. Uh, And the government finally acknowledged the US 99 00:05:57,080 --> 00:06:02,039 Speaker 1: government acknowledged the value of what is called signals intelligence. 100 00:06:02,320 --> 00:06:04,360 Speaker 1: That's correct. By the way, we're speaking about World War 101 00:06:04,360 --> 00:06:07,599 Speaker 1: One there when talking about going to war with Germany. Yes, yes, 102 00:06:08,760 --> 00:06:11,760 Speaker 1: so signals intelligence were We're we've all seem spy movies 103 00:06:11,839 --> 00:06:15,480 Speaker 1: were familiar with the idea of intelligence, which in some 104 00:06:15,600 --> 00:06:19,200 Speaker 1: cases may seem paradoxical. According to the Office of the 105 00:06:19,240 --> 00:06:24,520 Speaker 1: Director of National Intelligence, there's six types of intelligence sources 106 00:06:24,680 --> 00:06:28,440 Speaker 1: or what they call collection disciplines. Now all list these 107 00:06:28,480 --> 00:06:32,320 Speaker 1: off along with their shorthand, sort of an acronym. I 108 00:06:32,360 --> 00:06:35,559 Speaker 1: guess um, not quite an acronym now, just shorthand, that's better. 109 00:06:35,680 --> 00:06:38,719 Speaker 1: So first we have imagery intelligence, which is I'm going 110 00:06:38,760 --> 00:06:42,200 Speaker 1: to pronounce it, I meant, but I think immant maybe 111 00:06:42,279 --> 00:06:45,440 Speaker 1: I don't know. Uh. Then we have measurement and signature 112 00:06:45,480 --> 00:06:51,320 Speaker 1: intelligent or massens. Next we have human source intelligence or humans. 113 00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:56,280 Speaker 1: Then we have open source intelligent O SENT and geo 114 00:06:56,520 --> 00:07:01,159 Speaker 1: spatial intelligence geo iNTS. And then the first two that 115 00:07:01,240 --> 00:07:08,040 Speaker 1: we mentioned communications intelligent comment uh no comment and electronic 116 00:07:08,080 --> 00:07:14,480 Speaker 1: intelligence ellent elent perhaps. And then we have foreign instrumentation 117 00:07:14,800 --> 00:07:21,640 Speaker 1: signals intelligent my personal favorite fisent. Yes. And those those 118 00:07:21,680 --> 00:07:25,480 Speaker 1: three comment, elent, and fisent are all under the umbrella 119 00:07:25,640 --> 00:07:30,440 Speaker 1: of SIGAN signals intelligence, and that essentially just means the 120 00:07:30,560 --> 00:07:36,520 Speaker 1: interception from signals, whether those be electronic communication, maybe short 121 00:07:36,560 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 1: wave radio interceptions all around the world, foreign and domestic 122 00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:45,840 Speaker 1: and sigan can be any of those three things on 123 00:07:45,880 --> 00:07:50,000 Speaker 1: their own, or a combination of any any of those three. 124 00:07:50,200 --> 00:07:53,960 Speaker 1: Is there communication occurring via a signal? We need to 125 00:07:54,000 --> 00:07:57,640 Speaker 1: hear it, right, And so these other things that these 126 00:07:57,640 --> 00:08:00,680 Speaker 1: other things were mentioning, like human source and intelligence is 127 00:08:00,680 --> 00:08:02,440 Speaker 1: what a lot of people think of when they think 128 00:08:02,480 --> 00:08:05,960 Speaker 1: of spy movies, you know what I mean, Like Noel 129 00:08:06,320 --> 00:08:09,000 Speaker 1: goes and sits on a park bench at twelve oh three, 130 00:08:09,360 --> 00:08:12,280 Speaker 1: someone sits with their back to them and says, you know, 131 00:08:12,360 --> 00:08:15,400 Speaker 1: the proper code phrase, which what would that mean? That 132 00:08:17,880 --> 00:08:25,240 Speaker 1: the cranberry sauce was quite fragrant last afternoon, it was, indeed, 133 00:08:27,040 --> 00:08:30,960 Speaker 1: And they like, yeah, they just agreed in that in 134 00:08:31,040 --> 00:08:34,559 Speaker 1: that kind of human environment, you know, who knows, they 135 00:08:34,679 --> 00:08:38,840 Speaker 1: may be just agreed to an arms deal. Sauce is 136 00:08:38,880 --> 00:08:42,800 Speaker 1: the target. Yeah, and the fragrancy, like the amount of 137 00:08:43,320 --> 00:08:47,000 Speaker 1: that's that's the state of the the condition that's like, 138 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:50,640 Speaker 1: you know, conducive to doing the deal. That is the 139 00:08:50,679 --> 00:08:54,800 Speaker 1: affirmative of the target is prepped and ready for interception. Yeah, 140 00:08:55,040 --> 00:08:58,160 Speaker 1: we're all just pulling this out of our ears. But 141 00:08:59,160 --> 00:09:02,600 Speaker 1: is also pretty yeah, totally, you guys, I actually had 142 00:09:02,720 --> 00:09:07,400 Speaker 1: the uh, the pleasure of UM going to the International 143 00:09:07,440 --> 00:09:12,360 Speaker 1: Spy Museum in Washington, d C. This past weekend. Yeah, 144 00:09:12,400 --> 00:09:16,000 Speaker 1: they had a whole section with UM all of these 145 00:09:16,040 --> 00:09:21,520 Speaker 1: amazing like iterations of various intelligence gathering devices, you know, 146 00:09:21,800 --> 00:09:24,480 Speaker 1: a main one being tape recorders. And it never never 147 00:09:24,480 --> 00:09:27,240 Speaker 1: really occurred to me that like the same companies that 148 00:09:27,320 --> 00:09:30,720 Speaker 1: make tape machines now still they use in the film 149 00:09:31,000 --> 00:09:33,199 Speaker 1: and you know that have now got versions that are 150 00:09:33,360 --> 00:09:37,560 Speaker 1: electronic digital. Rather are the ones who made the best 151 00:09:38,080 --> 00:09:40,520 Speaker 1: tape machines that they would use that could conceal, and 152 00:09:40,559 --> 00:09:43,000 Speaker 1: they got progressively smaller and smaller. The first ones that 153 00:09:43,040 --> 00:09:45,000 Speaker 1: would be like these, you know, about the size of 154 00:09:45,040 --> 00:09:47,360 Speaker 1: a laptop, but obviously much thicker, and you would have 155 00:09:47,400 --> 00:09:50,400 Speaker 1: to put it inside a big giant suitcase to be 156 00:09:50,520 --> 00:09:52,440 Speaker 1: that guy on the park bench. And then they would 157 00:09:52,440 --> 00:09:54,679 Speaker 1: have a little wire that would run up a coat 158 00:09:55,000 --> 00:09:57,600 Speaker 1: and through your sleeve, and that would be the remote control, 159 00:09:57,600 --> 00:09:59,880 Speaker 1: a little clickie button to stop and start the recording, 160 00:10:00,200 --> 00:10:03,080 Speaker 1: and then the microphone would often be picked up into 161 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:05,480 Speaker 1: a wrist watch, so the wrist watch would have the 162 00:10:05,520 --> 00:10:07,400 Speaker 1: mic in it, and the cord would have to go 163 00:10:07,480 --> 00:10:09,800 Speaker 1: all the way up from the suitcase through your coat 164 00:10:10,040 --> 00:10:12,040 Speaker 1: down around and up your sleeve and then plug into 165 00:10:12,040 --> 00:10:16,800 Speaker 1: your wristwatch. You know. Obviously, just consumer electronics nowadays are 166 00:10:17,000 --> 00:10:20,720 Speaker 1: much more concealable and higher quality than that, um, but 167 00:10:20,760 --> 00:10:23,040 Speaker 1: it was fascinating to see the way they progressed to 168 00:10:23,160 --> 00:10:28,040 Speaker 1: these tiny, um little they almost looked like microcassette recorders, 169 00:10:28,120 --> 00:10:31,840 Speaker 1: but they still are ultimately real to real um. What's 170 00:10:31,880 --> 00:10:34,360 Speaker 1: the name of Naga Nagarra was a company and they 171 00:10:34,440 --> 00:10:37,480 Speaker 1: they're still around. In fact, they make really really high 172 00:10:37,559 --> 00:10:41,200 Speaker 1: end um field recording devices that are used in film 173 00:10:41,280 --> 00:10:45,679 Speaker 1: and television, um, you know recording. So that was super cool, uh, 174 00:10:45,800 --> 00:10:47,320 Speaker 1: not to go too far off track, but that they 175 00:10:47,320 --> 00:10:50,320 Speaker 1: had a whole section with like concealed weapons, one of 176 00:10:50,360 --> 00:10:53,160 Speaker 1: which was like an umbrella that you could shoot a 177 00:10:53,200 --> 00:10:55,760 Speaker 1: poisoned dart out of by like you know, doing the 178 00:10:55,840 --> 00:10:57,960 Speaker 1: umbrella mechanism, and it kind of had a cross section 179 00:10:58,000 --> 00:11:01,200 Speaker 1: of it. But super super fun. Uh, you know. I 180 00:11:01,280 --> 00:11:03,800 Speaker 1: was in d C for another show that I work on, 181 00:11:03,880 --> 00:11:06,640 Speaker 1: and I was there the day of the inauguration and 182 00:11:06,960 --> 00:11:10,559 Speaker 1: walked around the National Mall by myself and actually posted 183 00:11:10,640 --> 00:11:13,800 Speaker 1: some a couple of good creepy picks on the stuff 184 00:11:13,800 --> 00:11:15,800 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know Instagram accounts, so if 185 00:11:15,800 --> 00:11:18,560 Speaker 1: you want to check those out, conspiracy stuff show, conspiracy 186 00:11:18,559 --> 00:11:23,160 Speaker 1: stuff show. Um, but let's get back to uh Intel. Ah, yes, 187 00:11:23,280 --> 00:11:25,559 Speaker 1: and we I'd love to go to that museum in person. 188 00:11:25,600 --> 00:11:27,520 Speaker 1: It was really really I recommended anyone that's in the 189 00:11:27,559 --> 00:11:30,040 Speaker 1: DC area. It's right by the Gordon beersch So you 190 00:11:30,040 --> 00:11:31,800 Speaker 1: can go over there and get you a sausage platter 191 00:11:32,120 --> 00:11:36,000 Speaker 1: and then check out some some you know spycraft and 192 00:11:36,080 --> 00:11:38,760 Speaker 1: also check out our interview with Robert Mazer where he 193 00:11:39,240 --> 00:11:43,280 Speaker 1: discusses his whole setup that yeah, sire, what you're describing 194 00:11:43,320 --> 00:11:47,760 Speaker 1: with a big tape recorder inside a briefly previous audio podcast. 195 00:11:47,840 --> 00:11:52,440 Speaker 1: And while we're talking about history, uh, let's go back 196 00:11:52,480 --> 00:11:56,199 Speaker 1: to in nineteen nineteen, when the war ended, the cypher 197 00:11:56,240 --> 00:11:59,800 Speaker 1: Bureau moved all the way up to New York City. 198 00:12:00,360 --> 00:12:03,440 Speaker 1: I've always am going to remember that Salsi commercial whenever 199 00:12:03,480 --> 00:12:06,840 Speaker 1: I say New York City. Every time advertising is in cities, 200 00:12:06,880 --> 00:12:10,480 Speaker 1: New York City and they shift up very forceful. It's 201 00:12:10,559 --> 00:12:13,240 Speaker 1: much more of a New York City. Oh, I guess 202 00:12:13,240 --> 00:12:15,360 Speaker 1: you're right. I thought they got angry, like you got 203 00:12:15,360 --> 00:12:17,280 Speaker 1: more and more angry. It depends on which it was 204 00:12:17,320 --> 00:12:24,560 Speaker 1: a very successful act content. If you ever feel like 205 00:12:24,720 --> 00:12:28,280 Speaker 1: wasting your time on YouTube, go check those out, and 206 00:12:28,320 --> 00:12:32,040 Speaker 1: then also stay for that Egyptian panda commercial for cheese. 207 00:12:32,200 --> 00:12:35,000 Speaker 1: That's my favorite. And that has nothing to do with 208 00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:39,839 Speaker 1: the Cipher Bureau because in nineteen twenty two, uh they 209 00:12:39,840 --> 00:12:45,160 Speaker 1: had shifted from two from military intelligence where the tanks 210 00:12:45,160 --> 00:12:48,760 Speaker 1: were the planes, to diplomatic intelligence, and in twenty two 211 00:12:48,800 --> 00:12:53,600 Speaker 1: they proved their worth because they served they intercepted Japanese 212 00:12:53,640 --> 00:12:58,880 Speaker 1: communications that helped American diplomats negotiate with Japan on naval 213 00:12:59,040 --> 00:13:03,360 Speaker 1: arms limited sations. But the thing was, even at this point, 214 00:13:03,640 --> 00:13:07,960 Speaker 1: the Cipher bureaus methods were always questionable, and if the 215 00:13:07,960 --> 00:13:11,480 Speaker 1: public had been more aware, they probably would have noticed 216 00:13:11,559 --> 00:13:16,800 Speaker 1: that these are technically illegal or you know, everything the 217 00:13:16,840 --> 00:13:21,480 Speaker 1: public knows would indicate these are illegal. And we've heard 218 00:13:21,480 --> 00:13:24,000 Speaker 1: a lot of well, let me just paint this picture 219 00:13:24,000 --> 00:13:27,040 Speaker 1: and tell me if this sounds familiar. The Cipher Bureau, 220 00:13:27,040 --> 00:13:30,520 Speaker 1: working for the federal government, made a deal with private 221 00:13:30,720 --> 00:13:34,000 Speaker 1: telegraph companies, you know, Western Union and the like, and 222 00:13:34,080 --> 00:13:38,520 Speaker 1: these companies gave the Cipher Bureau unprecedented access the messages 223 00:13:38,720 --> 00:13:43,880 Speaker 1: entering and exiting the United States all telegrams and the 224 00:13:43,960 --> 00:13:49,600 Speaker 1: Secretary of State Henry Stimpson closed the agency nine and 225 00:13:49,679 --> 00:13:53,520 Speaker 1: he thought he had some moral issues with the increasing surveillance. 226 00:13:53,800 --> 00:13:57,679 Speaker 1: But then also it's pretty expensive at that time to 227 00:13:58,679 --> 00:14:02,000 Speaker 1: pay off these companies, right, even if they are making 228 00:14:02,040 --> 00:14:05,280 Speaker 1: what they feel is a patriotic decision, and to have 229 00:14:05,480 --> 00:14:09,280 Speaker 1: the just the people power to double or you know, 230 00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 1: copy every single message that goes in or out of 231 00:14:11,760 --> 00:14:19,560 Speaker 1: their systems, read every telegram. Ultimately, the Hoover administration wouldn't 232 00:14:19,600 --> 00:14:23,680 Speaker 1: see the need for peacetime surveillance, like why do we 233 00:14:24,080 --> 00:14:28,080 Speaker 1: have this if there's not a war, why are we 234 00:14:28,200 --> 00:14:30,840 Speaker 1: monitoring this and we don't have any active enemies, then 235 00:14:30,920 --> 00:14:33,960 Speaker 1: why are we wasting all his money? And it's seductive 236 00:14:34,000 --> 00:14:35,840 Speaker 1: to have that much power, you know, So we'd like 237 00:14:35,920 --> 00:14:39,920 Speaker 1: to think they saw the danger of this agency monitoring 238 00:14:39,960 --> 00:14:45,640 Speaker 1: all citizens in peacetime. After the end of the cyber 239 00:14:45,840 --> 00:14:50,640 Speaker 1: Bureau cipher bureau every time, I'm just going to call 240 00:14:50,680 --> 00:14:54,000 Speaker 1: it the beurea cyber man. The cyber is tough cyber 241 00:14:54,080 --> 00:15:00,440 Speaker 1: and stuff. After after the end of that era, you're lee. 242 00:15:00,520 --> 00:15:03,680 Speaker 1: The man we mentioned the beginning was not only out 243 00:15:03,680 --> 00:15:06,960 Speaker 1: of a job, he was very, very bitter and a 244 00:15:07,040 --> 00:15:11,040 Speaker 1: ninety one he published a book called The American Black Chamber, 245 00:15:11,520 --> 00:15:13,280 Speaker 1: And this was the first time that much of the 246 00:15:13,320 --> 00:15:17,840 Speaker 1: public knew the activities and exploits of the Bureau. The 247 00:15:17,880 --> 00:15:22,840 Speaker 1: Saturday Evening Post published an excerpt. And the thing is, 248 00:15:22,880 --> 00:15:27,720 Speaker 1: not only was the public and Saturday Evening Post readership 249 00:15:28,360 --> 00:15:33,960 Speaker 1: astounded and no small part uh Terror terrified, the intelligence 250 00:15:33,960 --> 00:15:41,640 Speaker 1: community was also having a gigantic WTF moment. So the 251 00:15:41,680 --> 00:15:46,840 Speaker 1: founding father of American surveillance in many ways, you'll you'll 252 00:15:46,840 --> 00:15:49,560 Speaker 1: hear this quote around I was gonna say around town, 253 00:15:49,600 --> 00:15:51,960 Speaker 1: you'll hear this quote around this topic. The founding father 254 00:15:52,000 --> 00:15:57,000 Speaker 1: of American surveillance also became its first trader. Now, by 255 00:15:57,040 --> 00:15:59,280 Speaker 1: the time you published this book, it was already out 256 00:15:59,280 --> 00:16:03,520 Speaker 1: of date on American spy programs. That's because five months 257 00:16:03,560 --> 00:16:06,880 Speaker 1: before the end of the Cipher Bureau, before they closed 258 00:16:06,880 --> 00:16:10,880 Speaker 1: it down back in May of n the United States 259 00:16:11,000 --> 00:16:13,080 Speaker 1: Army decided that it was going to start up its 260 00:16:13,120 --> 00:16:16,720 Speaker 1: own version of an agency of this sort, its own independent, 261 00:16:17,480 --> 00:16:22,400 Speaker 1: let's say, State Department spy agency. So it's a military 262 00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:26,720 Speaker 1: intelligence instead of diplomatic. Yes, And in nineteen thirty William 263 00:16:26,840 --> 00:16:31,560 Speaker 1: Friedman began building this thing called the Signal Intelligence Service 264 00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:37,040 Speaker 1: or SIS. SIS. It's a sweeter name, not quite as 265 00:16:37,320 --> 00:16:41,520 Speaker 1: you know comic bookie as the Cipher Bureau. But it's okay, 266 00:16:41,520 --> 00:16:44,120 Speaker 1: well we'll we'll roll with it. So it's unclear really 267 00:16:44,160 --> 00:16:48,880 Speaker 1: to what extent the end of the Cipher Bureau um, 268 00:16:48,920 --> 00:16:52,640 Speaker 1: like how that went into the birth of this new agency, 269 00:16:52,720 --> 00:16:55,840 Speaker 1: like because it ended, was this one created or was 270 00:16:55,880 --> 00:16:59,920 Speaker 1: this one created? Uh? And that one killed off simultaneously? 271 00:17:00,160 --> 00:17:02,280 Speaker 1: Like was that the thinking? Well, you know, every new 272 00:17:02,280 --> 00:17:06,359 Speaker 1: beginning comes from some other beginnings. And man, it's a window. 273 00:17:06,560 --> 00:17:10,679 Speaker 1: The door was closed. The window was opened. But in 274 00:17:10,720 --> 00:17:14,440 Speaker 1: October nineteen twenty nine, Friedman did go to New York 275 00:17:14,520 --> 00:17:17,679 Speaker 1: and obtain all of the files of the Cipher Bureau. 276 00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:22,600 Speaker 1: So whether or not they were related bureaucratically in terms 277 00:17:22,800 --> 00:17:29,280 Speaker 1: of archives and contents, they were even more comprehensive. Wait, 278 00:17:29,320 --> 00:17:31,119 Speaker 1: so he was he sent or was he just like 279 00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:33,840 Speaker 1: unilaterally like I'm gonna have that, give me those files, 280 00:17:34,160 --> 00:17:36,480 Speaker 1: I'm gonna do whatever I want. How to be sent? 281 00:17:36,720 --> 00:17:40,720 Speaker 1: I mean that the power of the Cipher Bureaus library 282 00:17:40,880 --> 00:17:43,639 Speaker 1: at that point is pretty significantly. Think it makes so 283 00:17:43,680 --> 00:17:46,359 Speaker 1: much sense. You you have to it's It's kind of 284 00:17:46,359 --> 00:17:50,080 Speaker 1: like in our Human Experimentation episodes, we discuss how it 285 00:17:50,200 --> 00:17:53,399 Speaker 1: is scary and terrible the way some of that information 286 00:17:53,480 --> 00:17:57,000 Speaker 1: is obtained and the way the experiments are carried out, 287 00:17:57,040 --> 00:17:59,240 Speaker 1: And in the same way with the Cipher Bureau. It's 288 00:17:59,359 --> 00:18:02,399 Speaker 1: things that look down upon by the public and perhaps 289 00:18:02,440 --> 00:18:05,399 Speaker 1: even by some government agencies. But you have the information, 290 00:18:05,880 --> 00:18:08,560 Speaker 1: and do you just let it go away or do 291 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:11,240 Speaker 1: you use it to build this new thing? That's a 292 00:18:11,359 --> 00:18:13,480 Speaker 1: that's a very good comparison. It's already sort of a 293 00:18:13,520 --> 00:18:15,600 Speaker 1: sunk cost at this point, and we're not even the 294 00:18:15,640 --> 00:18:21,080 Speaker 1: World War two so CIS big SIS expanded rapidly in 295 00:18:21,119 --> 00:18:24,680 Speaker 1: the nineteen thirties, uh and open bases to help it 296 00:18:24,760 --> 00:18:29,800 Speaker 1: concentrate on the Pacific theater so Alaska, China, Australia, and 297 00:18:30,119 --> 00:18:34,480 Speaker 1: this was in response to the expansion of the Japanese 298 00:18:34,480 --> 00:18:39,000 Speaker 1: Empire during World War two. Uh SIS played a crucial 299 00:18:39,080 --> 00:18:42,360 Speaker 1: role in helping to crack some of these Japanese codes. 300 00:18:43,040 --> 00:18:49,720 Speaker 1: After the war, President Truman reorganized the the entire American 301 00:18:49,760 --> 00:18:53,720 Speaker 1: pursuit of this sort of intelligence under something he called 302 00:18:54,040 --> 00:18:58,960 Speaker 1: the National Security Agency. In ninety seven, the NSA moved 303 00:18:58,960 --> 00:19:01,680 Speaker 1: to Fort Mead and May, Maryland. It began as a 304 00:19:01,720 --> 00:19:07,200 Speaker 1: secret organization. Uh in many ways. I mean they're keepers 305 00:19:07,240 --> 00:19:10,919 Speaker 1: of intelligence, right. Uh. And it was half jokingly referred 306 00:19:10,960 --> 00:19:15,080 Speaker 1: to by a lot of people as uh not national 307 00:19:15,200 --> 00:19:21,080 Speaker 1: security agency, but no such agency, no agency here. And 308 00:19:21,359 --> 00:19:24,680 Speaker 1: growing up, my father had a had a running joke 309 00:19:25,359 --> 00:19:31,440 Speaker 1: with within his his field where it's such a bad joke, 310 00:19:31,440 --> 00:19:33,440 Speaker 1: do you guys want to hear it? I do want 311 00:19:33,440 --> 00:19:35,840 Speaker 1: to hear it. I live for your bad jokes. Ben, Well, 312 00:19:35,960 --> 00:19:41,400 Speaker 1: let's uh just the joke. So so, the the old 313 00:19:41,480 --> 00:19:46,280 Speaker 1: joke that people would tell all around these various circles, 314 00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:49,800 Speaker 1: right was, how can you tell the extrovert at the 315 00:19:49,880 --> 00:19:53,879 Speaker 1: n s A. It's one in the elevator looking at 316 00:19:53,920 --> 00:19:59,440 Speaker 1: someone else's shoes. It's that bad. It's what passes the 317 00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:01,479 Speaker 1: humor in those circles. Hold on, I'm trying to get 318 00:20:01,520 --> 00:20:05,280 Speaker 1: it though, okay, because they're also controverted. That the little 319 00:20:05,400 --> 00:20:09,600 Speaker 1: intributed that they're all staring at their own shoes. That 320 00:20:09,880 --> 00:20:12,679 Speaker 1: is their form of reaching out, like to look at 321 00:20:12,680 --> 00:20:15,399 Speaker 1: the other shoes. I said it was a bad no, 322 00:20:15,520 --> 00:20:17,960 Speaker 1: But I think I think I think it's appropriate. Yeah, 323 00:20:18,000 --> 00:20:22,080 Speaker 1: it works. I guess you have to be in those 324 00:20:22,160 --> 00:20:25,400 Speaker 1: circles to go. Yes, you gotta be in an elevator 325 00:20:25,440 --> 00:20:27,840 Speaker 1: with a bunch of n ss A agents. Oh man, 326 00:20:28,359 --> 00:20:30,679 Speaker 1: I know, don't put me in there. You know, I 327 00:20:30,680 --> 00:20:33,399 Speaker 1: would like to avoid that. So this made the U. 328 00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:35,200 Speaker 1: The n s A grew to a peak of more 329 00:20:35,240 --> 00:20:38,800 Speaker 1: than nine employees in sixty nine. This made it the 330 00:20:38,880 --> 00:20:44,800 Speaker 1: largest intelligence organization in the US and possibly in the world. 331 00:20:44,800 --> 00:20:50,760 Speaker 1: People known, oh good call. So the n s A 332 00:20:51,440 --> 00:20:55,280 Speaker 1: did contribute valuable intelligence to help the US anticipate UH 333 00:20:55,400 --> 00:20:58,680 Speaker 1: several things, especially during the Cold War, like the foundation 334 00:20:58,720 --> 00:21:01,199 Speaker 1: of Berlin Wall, the Q and Missile crisis, but they 335 00:21:01,240 --> 00:21:07,640 Speaker 1: weren't always successful. In nineteen sixty four, the n Essay 336 00:21:07,880 --> 00:21:11,480 Speaker 1: was considered largely responsible for the Gulf of Tonking incident, 337 00:21:11,760 --> 00:21:15,400 Speaker 1: which drew the US into the Vietnam War. They say 338 00:21:15,440 --> 00:21:18,600 Speaker 1: it was faulty intelligence, They say, you know what not 339 00:21:18,800 --> 00:21:21,800 Speaker 1: everybody gets everything right all the time. But the big 340 00:21:21,960 --> 00:21:25,600 Speaker 1: question here is whether or not it was truly faulty 341 00:21:25,840 --> 00:21:29,040 Speaker 1: the intelligence they had or was it something else? And 342 00:21:29,119 --> 00:21:32,800 Speaker 1: what are they up to today? We let feel as 343 00:21:32,800 --> 00:21:36,000 Speaker 1: though these things are all right for exploration. But first 344 00:21:36,840 --> 00:21:48,600 Speaker 1: a word from our sponsor, So the n s A today, 345 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:51,320 Speaker 1: what are its goals, what is its purpose? What is 346 00:21:51,440 --> 00:21:55,080 Speaker 1: it doing with all that stuff it has? On you? Again, 347 00:21:55,200 --> 00:21:59,919 Speaker 1: specifically you that's here, You ask Ben. Aren't those the 348 00:22:00,000 --> 00:22:04,800 Speaker 1: tell us what listen to my phone calls? Yes, asked, 349 00:22:04,920 --> 00:22:08,360 Speaker 1: and U you shall receive the answer. Uh. They are 350 00:22:08,400 --> 00:22:10,480 Speaker 1: the people who run the computers that listen to the 351 00:22:10,480 --> 00:22:14,359 Speaker 1: phone calls. And if the certain conditions are met, yeah, 352 00:22:14,359 --> 00:22:16,920 Speaker 1: there will be a person on there. I do declare 353 00:22:16,960 --> 00:22:20,040 Speaker 1: if I have nothing to hide, I have nothing to hide, 354 00:22:20,119 --> 00:22:22,920 Speaker 1: and you can riffle through my phone calls. Hivot and 355 00:22:22,960 --> 00:22:28,880 Speaker 1: pivoted sea ladies and gentleman. We told you Bett, it's 356 00:22:28,920 --> 00:22:31,560 Speaker 1: gotta crack it up here. Part of it's the costume. 357 00:22:33,240 --> 00:22:35,840 Speaker 1: Part of it's also the nerve gas that's slowly filling 358 00:22:35,920 --> 00:22:39,159 Speaker 1: up this chamber. Um that the n s A is 359 00:22:39,200 --> 00:22:42,919 Speaker 1: clearly employing. Yes, so before they cut us off, before 360 00:22:42,920 --> 00:22:47,440 Speaker 1: we pass out. Officially, the National Security Agency slash Central 361 00:22:47,480 --> 00:22:53,520 Speaker 1: Security Service leads the US government in cryptology that encompasses signals, intelligence, 362 00:22:53,560 --> 00:22:58,200 Speaker 1: and information assurance products and services, and it enables computer 363 00:22:58,280 --> 00:23:01,880 Speaker 1: network operations UH to gain what they call a decision 364 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:05,399 Speaker 1: advantage for the nation and its allies under all circumstances. 365 00:23:05,600 --> 00:23:11,920 Speaker 1: That gobbledegook in in English means that they're both receiving 366 00:23:12,280 --> 00:23:16,080 Speaker 1: intelligence and they're making sure that it's real so it's 367 00:23:16,119 --> 00:23:23,040 Speaker 1: not incorrect or purposefully misleading. And then their their networking 368 00:23:23,400 --> 00:23:28,240 Speaker 1: computers together so that the US and the us IS 369 00:23:28,320 --> 00:23:30,840 Speaker 1: friends and the rest of five eyes or whatever will 370 00:23:30,880 --> 00:23:35,520 Speaker 1: all have the best information going into any sort of 371 00:23:36,720 --> 00:23:40,879 Speaker 1: any sort of geopolitical situation, ultimately to to gain a 372 00:23:40,960 --> 00:23:45,160 Speaker 1: decision advantage, right, right, And did you notice that part 373 00:23:45,200 --> 00:23:51,399 Speaker 1: about the h air quotes Central Security Service. That's a 374 00:23:51,440 --> 00:23:54,280 Speaker 1: tricky thing that a lot of like I missed as well. 375 00:23:54,640 --> 00:23:58,840 Speaker 1: The Central Security Service affiliated here includes elements of the 376 00:23:59,040 --> 00:24:03,119 Speaker 1: armed forces that that performed code making and code breaking 377 00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:06,199 Speaker 1: work with the n s A. This was established in 378 00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:09,600 Speaker 1: two and the n s A directors also the chief 379 00:24:09,800 --> 00:24:14,399 Speaker 1: of the CSS. So members of the c s S 380 00:24:14,440 --> 00:24:16,680 Speaker 1: work side by side with the n s A around 381 00:24:16,720 --> 00:24:20,800 Speaker 1: the world and we do mean literally around the world, 382 00:24:20,880 --> 00:24:23,880 Speaker 1: so that there's not as much of a barrier between 383 00:24:24,080 --> 00:24:28,320 Speaker 1: civilian code cracking and military code cracking. Sort of an 384 00:24:28,320 --> 00:24:32,879 Speaker 1: efficient way to uh to streamline efforts and get the 385 00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:36,520 Speaker 1: most bang for your cryptographic buck. Essentially, think of these 386 00:24:36,560 --> 00:24:42,159 Speaker 1: folks almost as intelligence agencies. Embedded in the armed forces. Yeah, well, okay, 387 00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:49,360 Speaker 1: so that's the official goal decision advantage. So if it's 388 00:24:49,400 --> 00:24:52,520 Speaker 1: just collecting information making sure that information, whatever it is, 389 00:24:52,640 --> 00:24:56,639 Speaker 1: is accurate, how do they use use it for multiple purposes? 390 00:24:56,680 --> 00:24:59,920 Speaker 1: From assisting in trade negotiations, you know. So let's say 391 00:25:00,040 --> 00:25:03,320 Speaker 1: Matt is an ambassador gets a hot tip from the 392 00:25:03,480 --> 00:25:07,399 Speaker 1: n s A right before he goes into negotiate some 393 00:25:07,440 --> 00:25:11,679 Speaker 1: sort of deal about tea in China or whatever. Then 394 00:25:11,800 --> 00:25:16,120 Speaker 1: he knows essentially insider information or something that got leverage. 395 00:25:16,160 --> 00:25:19,760 Speaker 1: Who's got leverage exactly. But then it also can go 396 00:25:19,880 --> 00:25:24,160 Speaker 1: down to what to blow up when it's a dirty job. 397 00:25:24,480 --> 00:25:28,560 Speaker 1: But it would be disingenuous to not admit it's one 398 00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:32,399 Speaker 1: of the prime reasons that the US achieved hedge, became 399 00:25:32,440 --> 00:25:36,160 Speaker 1: a hedgemony, you know, the most powerful of the nation's 400 00:25:36,240 --> 00:25:41,320 Speaker 1: currently for for for the moment, for the months. Oh boy, 401 00:25:41,359 --> 00:25:43,800 Speaker 1: did you guys feel that chill that went through the room? 402 00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:47,760 Speaker 1: I really did. I noticed that are we dripping? Is 403 00:25:47,760 --> 00:25:51,560 Speaker 1: there something dripping up here? Because oh, I feel like 404 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:55,600 Speaker 1: we have been invaded by some kind of foreign uh 405 00:25:55,640 --> 00:25:59,800 Speaker 1: intelligence here with this water that doth dripped down. Oh 406 00:25:59,800 --> 00:26:06,080 Speaker 1: my goodness. Okay, yeah, all right, you guys, this isn't good. 407 00:26:06,200 --> 00:26:08,119 Speaker 1: The n s A is a floor above us and 408 00:26:08,160 --> 00:26:12,040 Speaker 1: it's poisoning the roof of our building. It's right around 409 00:26:12,040 --> 00:26:17,080 Speaker 1: the valve for the fire um system. Yeah, sprinkler system. 410 00:26:17,280 --> 00:26:19,600 Speaker 1: Was that that siren that was going off? Do anybody 411 00:26:19,600 --> 00:26:22,919 Speaker 1: else hear that? I just just well, I'm usually actively hallucinating, 412 00:26:22,920 --> 00:26:25,480 Speaker 1: so I didn't know. I don't I still don't know 413 00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:28,800 Speaker 1: the best way to check. Put your arms up and 414 00:26:28,840 --> 00:26:34,560 Speaker 1: go just a spin a top and if it stays spinning, 415 00:26:34,640 --> 00:26:36,880 Speaker 1: then you know you're hallucinating. If it falls down, then 416 00:26:37,160 --> 00:26:40,160 Speaker 1: but if the camera cuts away before it falls, then 417 00:26:40,160 --> 00:26:44,040 Speaker 1: you don't know what I do without you guys, well, 418 00:26:44,520 --> 00:26:47,760 Speaker 1: before we drown or die from nerve gas, we should 419 00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:51,520 Speaker 1: mention that the n s A is full of controversies, 420 00:26:52,200 --> 00:26:56,000 Speaker 1: a little bit historical controversies. We mentioned the Gulf of 421 00:26:56,040 --> 00:27:01,359 Speaker 1: Tonkin already. It's commonly it's it's common acknowledged outside of 422 00:27:01,400 --> 00:27:05,520 Speaker 1: the US by various organizations as a false flag operation. 423 00:27:05,720 --> 00:27:11,080 Speaker 1: And that would be someone purposely pretending to be an 424 00:27:11,200 --> 00:27:17,480 Speaker 1: enemy to create the circumstances for their own aggression. Right, 425 00:27:17,560 --> 00:27:20,480 Speaker 1: so then something becomes a war of defense or retaliation. 426 00:27:20,720 --> 00:27:25,080 Speaker 1: Rather than an invasion. It helps to make the populace 427 00:27:25,320 --> 00:27:29,520 Speaker 1: agree with the reason for going to war. Another one 428 00:27:29,600 --> 00:27:32,080 Speaker 1: would be UH the U. S. Senate when they formed 429 00:27:32,080 --> 00:27:37,200 Speaker 1: the Church Committee in nine to investigate possible abuses by 430 00:27:37,240 --> 00:27:40,120 Speaker 1: the n s A as well as the CIA, FBI, 431 00:27:40,440 --> 00:27:44,120 Speaker 1: I R S. UH. This went on for nine months. UH. 432 00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:48,159 Speaker 1: The committee chair, Frank Church, who was a military intelligence 433 00:27:48,160 --> 00:27:51,240 Speaker 1: officer at one time in his life, got kind of 434 00:27:51,280 --> 00:27:55,280 Speaker 1: freaked out by their tremendous surveillance ability. And he has 435 00:27:55,320 --> 00:27:59,119 Speaker 1: a great quotation here from The New York Times in 436 00:27:59,320 --> 00:28:03,640 Speaker 1: nineteen seven A five that capability at any time could 437 00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:07,480 Speaker 1: be turned around on the American people, and no American 438 00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:11,480 Speaker 1: would have any privacy left, such as the capability to 439 00:28:11,600 --> 00:28:17,080 Speaker 1: monitor everything, telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would 440 00:28:17,080 --> 00:28:20,360 Speaker 1: be no place to hide. And boy was it ever 441 00:28:20,720 --> 00:28:24,359 Speaker 1: turned around on the American people. Uh. I feel like 442 00:28:24,400 --> 00:28:28,520 Speaker 1: we're living in a time where, because of various leaks Mr. 443 00:28:28,600 --> 00:28:32,840 Speaker 1: Snowden and the like, we are painfully aware that this 444 00:28:32,960 --> 00:28:37,800 Speaker 1: technology is impact and has been used on us. And 445 00:28:38,440 --> 00:28:41,160 Speaker 1: at the same time, as as outraged as many of 446 00:28:41,240 --> 00:28:45,120 Speaker 1: us are, a whole lot of us also very willingly 447 00:28:45,240 --> 00:28:51,560 Speaker 1: participate Uh, in feeding this beast by giving our own 448 00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:55,880 Speaker 1: personal information out higgody pigody, as Matt would say, via 449 00:28:56,040 --> 00:28:59,000 Speaker 1: various social media networks. I mean it's it's like turning 450 00:28:59,000 --> 00:29:01,680 Speaker 1: on location service arning on location services, Like we are 451 00:29:01,680 --> 00:29:05,520 Speaker 1: exchanging the convenience of being able to know that there's 452 00:29:05,600 --> 00:29:14,000 Speaker 1: a burger king nearby for basically seven monitoring. And you know, again, 453 00:29:14,040 --> 00:29:18,320 Speaker 1: as Matt said earlier in his delightful voice, uh, we 454 00:29:18,920 --> 00:29:21,040 Speaker 1: many people feel like they have nothing to hide, so 455 00:29:21,080 --> 00:29:23,760 Speaker 1: who cares? And honestly, I'm one of those people? Do 456 00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:25,320 Speaker 1: You guys are not so much? You guys both have 457 00:29:25,360 --> 00:29:28,360 Speaker 1: the tape over your phone. I'm I'm I'm just like, 458 00:29:28,400 --> 00:29:29,560 Speaker 1: what am I? What are you gonna do? What are 459 00:29:29,600 --> 00:29:32,320 Speaker 1: you gonna see me doing? I'm I'm very boring. I 460 00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:35,400 Speaker 1: know that's not the point, but it is kind of 461 00:29:35,440 --> 00:29:37,880 Speaker 1: how I justify it because I like all the tech 462 00:29:37,960 --> 00:29:42,800 Speaker 1: the technologies. Yeah, and there's a larger conversation the concept 463 00:29:42,880 --> 00:29:46,800 Speaker 1: of privacies. We understand it is fairly recent in the 464 00:29:46,840 --> 00:29:49,560 Speaker 1: span of human civilization, and I've heard you've been before 465 00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:53,440 Speaker 1: say that you feel like, further down the line, privacy 466 00:29:53,520 --> 00:29:55,880 Speaker 1: will be not a right at all. It will be 467 00:29:55,920 --> 00:29:59,280 Speaker 1: a luxury afforded only to the super rich. Yes, I 468 00:29:59,360 --> 00:30:03,480 Speaker 1: do believe what m I won't get on a soapbox 469 00:30:03,600 --> 00:30:06,560 Speaker 1: quite yet. Well, okay, you know what, No, we're halfway there. 470 00:30:06,640 --> 00:30:10,480 Speaker 1: Let's just walk up the box. So what we are 471 00:30:10,600 --> 00:30:13,920 Speaker 1: facing as a country and as a species is not 472 00:30:14,080 --> 00:30:18,160 Speaker 1: so much the end of privacy or the erosion of privacy, 473 00:30:18,240 --> 00:30:23,360 Speaker 1: but the rise of an inequality in privacy. This means that, 474 00:30:23,920 --> 00:30:27,760 Speaker 1: just as Noel said, the one of the most precious 475 00:30:27,880 --> 00:30:30,920 Speaker 1: resources of the future may be the ability to have 476 00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:36,080 Speaker 1: an unmonitored thought. Will that happen within our lifetimes? That's 477 00:30:36,080 --> 00:30:40,200 Speaker 1: a tough call to make. But do you want to 478 00:30:40,280 --> 00:30:45,560 Speaker 1: live in a world where, based on your income or 479 00:30:45,600 --> 00:30:50,920 Speaker 1: your family, you may or may not have the privilege 480 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:55,880 Speaker 1: of holding your thoughts to yourself. It's a it's a 481 00:30:55,920 --> 00:31:00,400 Speaker 1: scary question, and some of these past controversies have just 482 00:31:00,440 --> 00:31:03,560 Speaker 1: been have been escalating to the point where that's less 483 00:31:03,600 --> 00:31:05,600 Speaker 1: and less of a matter of science fiction. Now. I 484 00:31:05,640 --> 00:31:08,320 Speaker 1: know that sounds alarmost and to a degree it is, 485 00:31:08,920 --> 00:31:13,600 Speaker 1: but it is not as impossible as it was just 486 00:31:13,640 --> 00:31:15,800 Speaker 1: a few decades ago. Well again, let me read this 487 00:31:15,880 --> 00:31:18,240 Speaker 1: quote again one more time. That capability and anytime could 488 00:31:18,240 --> 00:31:20,360 Speaker 1: be turned around on the American people, and no American 489 00:31:20,400 --> 00:31:23,400 Speaker 1: would have any privacy left. Such is the capability to 490 00:31:23,560 --> 00:31:27,200 Speaker 1: monitor everything. It doesn't matter. There would be no place 491 00:31:27,240 --> 00:31:31,080 Speaker 1: to hide. Yeah, I mean, that's that about some style. 492 00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:38,000 Speaker 1: Unless you can encrypt things really, really efficiently, which great point. 493 00:31:38,320 --> 00:31:42,440 Speaker 1: That's another controversy. The Data Encryption Standard or d e S. 494 00:31:42,680 --> 00:31:45,640 Speaker 1: It's an algorithm developed by IBM in the early nineteen 495 00:31:45,720 --> 00:31:50,240 Speaker 1: seventies to encrypt sensitive electronic data. By the late nineteen 496 00:31:50,280 --> 00:31:55,280 Speaker 1: seventies it had become the worldwide standard. Everybody was into this. 497 00:31:55,600 --> 00:31:57,960 Speaker 1: It was the new It was like when Pokemon Go 498 00:31:58,120 --> 00:32:02,320 Speaker 1: first came out. But think encryption that didn't work. I 499 00:32:02,320 --> 00:32:07,040 Speaker 1: think it's fairly obvious. They don't play Pokemon God, right. 500 00:32:07,120 --> 00:32:11,959 Speaker 1: So what happened is some civilians who were affiliated with 501 00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:16,920 Speaker 1: this movement alleged that the n s A had really 502 00:32:17,240 --> 00:32:20,160 Speaker 1: become involved in the development of the algorithm, and they 503 00:32:20,200 --> 00:32:23,920 Speaker 1: convinced IBM to change some things to shorten the key 504 00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:26,560 Speaker 1: to make it possible for the n Essay to decipher 505 00:32:27,000 --> 00:32:31,200 Speaker 1: every message, and he keeps going in The BBC reported 506 00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:34,440 Speaker 1: a story that they said sounded like science fiction. They 507 00:32:34,440 --> 00:32:37,320 Speaker 1: claimed that the n S A, along with partner agencies 508 00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:41,959 Speaker 1: in the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, operated a 509 00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:48,040 Speaker 1: worldwide surveillance network capable of intercepting every international phone call, 510 00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:54,840 Speaker 1: facts and email. This was called Project Echelon. The U S, 511 00:32:55,040 --> 00:32:59,520 Speaker 1: Canada and the UK still deny it officially, but Australia 512 00:32:59,640 --> 00:33:02,600 Speaker 1: and New Zealand officials there say that it is a 513 00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:08,360 Speaker 1: real thing, and warrantless surveillance went mainstream under some previous 514 00:33:08,360 --> 00:33:13,840 Speaker 1: presidential administrations, believe Bush. But it's existed since the days 515 00:33:13,920 --> 00:33:17,760 Speaker 1: of the Black Chamber. And then of course the bomb 516 00:33:17,800 --> 00:33:27,160 Speaker 1: that dropped which Noel mentioned was when Edward Snowden revealed prism. 517 00:33:27,240 --> 00:33:30,680 Speaker 1: That was a crazy day. Yes, you remember, we were 518 00:33:30,680 --> 00:33:37,360 Speaker 1: in the office. That was a crazy day. We're not 519 00:33:37,480 --> 00:33:39,480 Speaker 1: going to we of all people are not going to 520 00:33:39,560 --> 00:33:42,240 Speaker 1: judge you, ladies and gentlemen, but we would say that 521 00:33:43,720 --> 00:33:50,360 Speaker 1: at this point, I think very carefully before sending inappropriate 522 00:33:50,400 --> 00:33:55,000 Speaker 1: pictures to your friends, or even taking inappropriate pictures with 523 00:33:55,120 --> 00:33:59,320 Speaker 1: something that's connected to the internet, right, even taking appropriate 524 00:33:59,360 --> 00:34:03,920 Speaker 1: pictures to be careful, oh boy, yeah, some things can 525 00:34:03,960 --> 00:34:07,400 Speaker 1: come back to haunt you. So here's where it gets crazy, though. 526 00:34:07,840 --> 00:34:12,640 Speaker 1: Legislation passed quite recently in the final days of President 527 00:34:12,680 --> 00:34:18,239 Speaker 1: Obama's administration um and also passed relatively quietly. Uh. You 528 00:34:18,360 --> 00:34:20,799 Speaker 1: may not have heard of it because it was sort 529 00:34:20,840 --> 00:34:24,080 Speaker 1: of slipped in under the radar. But here's here's how 530 00:34:24,080 --> 00:34:26,719 Speaker 1: it went down and why it's important. From the New 531 00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:30,120 Speaker 1: York Times, the n s A can now quote share 532 00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:36,520 Speaker 1: globally intercepted personal communications with the government's sixteen other intelligence 533 00:34:36,560 --> 00:34:43,920 Speaker 1: agencies before applying privacy protections. Yes, so the way it 534 00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:46,239 Speaker 1: used to work until now. The way it used to 535 00:34:46,280 --> 00:34:47,880 Speaker 1: work is that the n s A would do some 536 00:34:47,960 --> 00:34:53,400 Speaker 1: things to protect American citizens privacy, so they could share 537 00:34:53,440 --> 00:34:57,520 Speaker 1: intelligence about something happening, but not you know, necessarily attached 538 00:34:57,520 --> 00:35:00,760 Speaker 1: it to Matt Frederick, who is just a guy who 539 00:35:01,239 --> 00:35:04,960 Speaker 1: happened to be on the conference call and didn't do anything, 540 00:35:05,280 --> 00:35:09,400 Speaker 1: has no idea you know of, has no nefarious plans 541 00:35:09,640 --> 00:35:14,359 Speaker 1: because you'd be dealing with IP addresses and numbers. And 542 00:35:14,440 --> 00:35:17,640 Speaker 1: so now what's happened again, very very recently, is that 543 00:35:17,719 --> 00:35:24,480 Speaker 1: these new rules significantly relax those limits. Now the surveillance 544 00:35:24,520 --> 00:35:29,919 Speaker 1: operations are beyond wire tapping regulations, and they're shipping out 545 00:35:30,120 --> 00:35:33,160 Speaker 1: raw data. So they're shipping out the data with your 546 00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:38,200 Speaker 1: personal information. And again, of course there's the old idea 547 00:35:38,239 --> 00:35:41,000 Speaker 1: of you know, well, why should I be worried. I'm 548 00:35:41,000 --> 00:35:44,880 Speaker 1: not I'm not moving, you know, I'm not illegally smuggling 549 00:35:44,960 --> 00:35:50,880 Speaker 1: iguanas in and out of theo's arks. I don't know 550 00:35:51,000 --> 00:35:55,719 Speaker 1: much about the iguana smuggling tree. Nobody does. It's a racket. 551 00:35:55,880 --> 00:35:59,480 Speaker 1: It's a racket. Uh So, there's not gonna be any 552 00:35:59,520 --> 00:36:04,000 Speaker 1: warrant necessary, there's not any privacy baked into it, and 553 00:36:04,160 --> 00:36:10,040 Speaker 1: perhaps more importantly, there's no real oversight. Uh this, this 554 00:36:10,160 --> 00:36:16,000 Speaker 1: raw intelligence it shares is derived from mass surveillance under 555 00:36:16,160 --> 00:36:19,560 Speaker 1: Executive Order twelve three three three, and that's been in 556 00:36:19,560 --> 00:36:23,560 Speaker 1: effect since it's raw intelligence would be stuff like emails, 557 00:36:23,640 --> 00:36:27,480 Speaker 1: phone calls, not just the metadata of the phone calls, 558 00:36:27,840 --> 00:36:31,840 Speaker 1: not just NOLL called this number at three two pm 559 00:36:31,920 --> 00:36:35,360 Speaker 1: or something. Can be very very useful in and of itself, 560 00:36:35,400 --> 00:36:37,600 Speaker 1: but taking it to the next level, you know, it's 561 00:36:37,600 --> 00:36:40,960 Speaker 1: pretty much godlike. Yeah, they're not minimized, they're not redacted 562 00:36:41,040 --> 00:36:44,960 Speaker 1: to mask identifying information. Previously, the n s A filtered 563 00:36:44,960 --> 00:36:47,480 Speaker 1: this stuff before they shared it with you know, the 564 00:36:47,520 --> 00:36:50,600 Speaker 1: CIA or the FBI or the d e A, and 565 00:36:50,960 --> 00:36:53,000 Speaker 1: the analyst at the n s A, who are very 566 00:36:53,080 --> 00:36:57,239 Speaker 1: very intelligent people. Uh, passed on information only if they 567 00:36:57,280 --> 00:37:01,960 Speaker 1: deemed it pertinent, and they could tell if someone's innocent 568 00:37:02,280 --> 00:37:05,560 Speaker 1: usually But because the way, So this is supposed to 569 00:37:05,600 --> 00:37:08,280 Speaker 1: be foreign communication, right, But here's the scary thing. Because 570 00:37:08,280 --> 00:37:11,239 Speaker 1: of the way the Internet works, you might be surprised 571 00:37:11,320 --> 00:37:15,080 Speaker 1: at how much of your personal communication activity accounts as 572 00:37:15,120 --> 00:37:18,439 Speaker 1: foreign communication. Like, let's let's think about it this way, 573 00:37:18,480 --> 00:37:23,200 Speaker 1: all right, if you imagine our office, Matt, you and 574 00:37:23,320 --> 00:37:26,799 Speaker 1: Noel sit relatively close to each other. Yeah, just just 575 00:37:26,880 --> 00:37:30,600 Speaker 1: across the room. Yeah, you'll literally maybe twelve feet from 576 00:37:30,640 --> 00:37:35,000 Speaker 1: each other, fifteen ft And that's really busy on something. 577 00:37:35,040 --> 00:37:39,560 Speaker 1: So we sends Nolan email. By the time the email 578 00:37:39,719 --> 00:37:43,160 Speaker 1: travels to Noll's inbox, it might have gone to a 579 00:37:43,200 --> 00:37:46,040 Speaker 1: server across the country or even outside of the country 580 00:37:46,120 --> 00:37:49,400 Speaker 1: before landing with him. So that young Pope meme that 581 00:37:49,480 --> 00:37:52,799 Speaker 1: you just sent became foreign communication, which makes it fair 582 00:37:52,840 --> 00:37:54,719 Speaker 1: game for the n s A. And I thought you 583 00:37:54,719 --> 00:37:58,399 Speaker 1: would appreciate a young pope shout out. Thanks, but I'm 584 00:37:58,400 --> 00:38:02,719 Speaker 1: still excited to still haven't seen an yet. I like 585 00:38:02,920 --> 00:38:06,480 Speaker 1: the concept of it, though, Matt, Well, yeah, it's we 586 00:38:06,480 --> 00:38:08,400 Speaker 1: don't have to get into more young Pope stuff. This 587 00:38:08,440 --> 00:38:14,000 Speaker 1: is not a young popecast young popecast. Yeah, that's pretty good, Yes, 588 00:38:14,160 --> 00:38:17,120 Speaker 1: but I've watched it. I watched some of it. Well. 589 00:38:17,120 --> 00:38:20,120 Speaker 1: Since we've derailed the conversation yet again, should we go 590 00:38:20,160 --> 00:38:25,360 Speaker 1: ahead and break for a sponsor you approve? Sounds great? Good, 591 00:38:34,200 --> 00:38:36,919 Speaker 1: So there we are. There we are an innocent meme 592 00:38:36,960 --> 00:38:40,680 Speaker 1: has traveled around the world between two innocent people, and 593 00:38:40,719 --> 00:38:44,960 Speaker 1: because it's traveled around it now counts as foreign communication, 594 00:38:45,040 --> 00:38:47,640 Speaker 1: which means that now the FBI, the CIA, the whole 595 00:38:47,719 --> 00:38:51,319 Speaker 1: Uncle Sam Alphabet can check it out. If Matt has 596 00:38:51,440 --> 00:38:55,520 Speaker 1: accidentally or purposefully included certain words or phrases, or if 597 00:38:55,520 --> 00:38:57,480 Speaker 1: he has already been flagged as someone to keep an 598 00:38:57,480 --> 00:38:59,400 Speaker 1: eye on, then the US may also and share it 599 00:38:59,480 --> 00:39:03,560 Speaker 1: with the other five eyes countries the echelons, and years 600 00:39:03,640 --> 00:39:07,880 Speaker 1: later on vacation that might just land at the airport 601 00:39:07,920 --> 00:39:11,719 Speaker 1: in Australia to be refused entry and he might never 602 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:14,080 Speaker 1: know exactly why I got put on a no fly 603 00:39:14,200 --> 00:39:17,279 Speaker 1: list and nobody even told me about it. We're not 604 00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:19,919 Speaker 1: saying this will happen, but we are saying that right now. 605 00:39:19,960 --> 00:39:25,360 Speaker 1: The scary thing is, there's not a solid way for 606 00:39:25,440 --> 00:39:29,200 Speaker 1: someone to tell if abuse occurs. And the definition of 607 00:39:29,239 --> 00:39:34,719 Speaker 1: foreign communication is even more deceptive. Check out this this 608 00:39:34,880 --> 00:39:39,480 Speaker 1: great quote from Slate. Foreign intelligence is really a catch 609 00:39:39,520 --> 00:39:43,200 Speaker 1: all that can include most anything happening abroad. Executive Order 610 00:39:43,239 --> 00:39:47,400 Speaker 1: twelve three three three defines it as information relating to 611 00:39:47,440 --> 00:39:53,560 Speaker 1: the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons. 612 00:39:54,120 --> 00:39:57,400 Speaker 1: Don't let the quote organizations or persons part of that 613 00:39:57,480 --> 00:40:02,880 Speaker 1: definition hide behind the more important scene term foreign powers. Exactly. 614 00:40:03,160 --> 00:40:07,440 Speaker 1: This definition means that quote unquote for an intelligence includes 615 00:40:08,520 --> 00:40:11,680 Speaker 1: speech about political and human rights activities. So if you 616 00:40:11,760 --> 00:40:15,279 Speaker 1: send an email as part of a nonprofit thing to 617 00:40:16,200 --> 00:40:22,200 Speaker 1: free political prisoner, uh, it can include stuff impacting the economy. 618 00:40:22,280 --> 00:40:25,759 Speaker 1: One of the great examples that Slate has is what 619 00:40:25,920 --> 00:40:28,640 Speaker 1: about an email that talks about a business trip to 620 00:40:28,680 --> 00:40:31,680 Speaker 1: Europe to get the finest French chocolate for your cookies? 621 00:40:32,800 --> 00:40:37,759 Speaker 1: Then that would qualify technically. And there's one last note here. 622 00:40:38,360 --> 00:40:40,600 Speaker 1: William Benny, who we have mentioned on the show before, 623 00:40:40,640 --> 00:40:43,279 Speaker 1: is one of the highest level whistleblowers to ever come 624 00:40:43,400 --> 00:40:47,000 Speaker 1: from the n Essay. He was a leading code breaker 625 00:40:47,160 --> 00:40:49,879 Speaker 1: against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, but after 626 00:40:49,920 --> 00:40:54,560 Speaker 1: the events of September eleven, he resigned. He saw that, 627 00:40:54,840 --> 00:40:58,480 Speaker 1: in his opinion, Washington was moving toward mass surveillance and 628 00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:02,040 Speaker 1: it disgusted him on a profound level, surveillance of its 629 00:41:02,040 --> 00:41:06,480 Speaker 1: own people. Right on en He's spoke in London at 630 00:41:06,560 --> 00:41:12,799 Speaker 1: the Center for Investigative Journalism and revealed that people in 631 00:41:12,840 --> 00:41:17,040 Speaker 1: general had no idea about the scope of these programs 632 00:41:17,120 --> 00:41:21,920 Speaker 1: under their growth under the President Bush and President Obama administrations. 633 00:41:22,480 --> 00:41:25,960 Speaker 1: And his quote, he says, at least of fiber optic 634 00:41:26,040 --> 00:41:29,800 Speaker 1: cables globally go via the US. This is no accident 635 00:41:29,880 --> 00:41:32,920 Speaker 1: and allows the US to view all communication coming in. 636 00:41:33,120 --> 00:41:36,839 Speaker 1: At least of all audio calls, not just metadata, are 637 00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:40,040 Speaker 1: recorded and stored in the US. The n s A, Ben, 638 00:41:40,040 --> 00:41:45,040 Speaker 1: he said, lies about what it stores. And he said 639 00:41:45,120 --> 00:41:47,239 Speaker 1: that the ultimate goal of the n s A. We 640 00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:50,440 Speaker 1: talked about the official goals, all understandable said the ultimate 641 00:41:50,480 --> 00:41:55,399 Speaker 1: goal is about total population control. And it's disturbing. Yeah, 642 00:41:55,440 --> 00:41:57,960 Speaker 1: it's disturbing because it means the information gathered on people 643 00:41:58,000 --> 00:42:02,080 Speaker 1: could be used to theoretically suppressed the scent. Let's say 644 00:42:02,200 --> 00:42:05,560 Speaker 1: you're a senator and you're gunning to stop programs like these. 645 00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:08,640 Speaker 1: You got elected on this is your main platform, and 646 00:42:08,680 --> 00:42:12,920 Speaker 1: all of a sudden you receive notice, subtle notice that 647 00:42:12,960 --> 00:42:17,400 Speaker 1: you're passed in. Discretions, perhaps ideological or sexual, or financial 648 00:42:17,480 --> 00:42:21,520 Speaker 1: or something else will be made painfully public if you 649 00:42:21,880 --> 00:42:26,359 Speaker 1: persist in this mission, if you pursue this line of investigation, 650 00:42:26,880 --> 00:42:31,920 Speaker 1: what would you do, ladies and gentlemen? So blackmail? Huh? Yeah, 651 00:42:32,080 --> 00:42:34,960 Speaker 1: that seems like a good way to use this information. Well, 652 00:42:35,120 --> 00:42:39,200 Speaker 1: it looks like we're going to find out how people 653 00:42:39,239 --> 00:42:41,840 Speaker 1: answer that question, perhaps sooner than we all would like 654 00:42:42,320 --> 00:42:46,480 Speaker 1: to think. We are to be completely clear in no 655 00:42:46,800 --> 00:42:51,480 Speaker 1: way saying that we have proof this has occurred. We don't. 656 00:42:51,560 --> 00:42:54,640 Speaker 1: The three of us have not found an example of 657 00:42:54,680 --> 00:42:58,320 Speaker 1: a senator who was out gunning for the n essay 658 00:42:58,560 --> 00:43:02,920 Speaker 1: and then got some weird, you know, compromising photos and 659 00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:05,760 Speaker 1: then turned off the search or anything. But we're saying 660 00:43:06,200 --> 00:43:10,480 Speaker 1: with this increasing move, with this move, it's increasingly possible. 661 00:43:10,800 --> 00:43:14,840 Speaker 1: It'll be interesting to see how Donald Trump's seeming animosity 662 00:43:15,080 --> 00:43:20,040 Speaker 1: um that between himself and the intelligence community. There's no animosity. 663 00:43:20,480 --> 00:43:25,000 Speaker 1: There's definitely animosity. Now, did you not see a speech? Yeah, 664 00:43:25,239 --> 00:43:30,400 Speaker 1: that doesn't exist. I maybe, let's say between the intelligence 665 00:43:30,400 --> 00:43:33,160 Speaker 1: agencies and the president, I kid, you guys, I mean 666 00:43:33,239 --> 00:43:36,320 Speaker 1: he clearly had a little bit of a Twitter feud 667 00:43:36,360 --> 00:43:38,759 Speaker 1: with the CIA and the n s A. I mean 668 00:43:38,800 --> 00:43:43,400 Speaker 1: about he accused them of having shoddy intelligence when finding 669 00:43:43,560 --> 00:43:45,560 Speaker 1: weapons of mass destruction and things like that. You know, 670 00:43:46,480 --> 00:43:49,560 Speaker 1: I'm I'm interested to see how that relationship plays out. 671 00:43:50,360 --> 00:43:53,520 Speaker 1: It goes to it goes to a larger conversation, of course, 672 00:43:53,560 --> 00:43:58,320 Speaker 1: about what the deep state is, you know, who holds 673 00:43:58,400 --> 00:44:02,360 Speaker 1: the reins of power and who functions more in a 674 00:44:02,440 --> 00:44:05,640 Speaker 1: figurehead uh manner. And I'm not, of course, seeing that 675 00:44:06,280 --> 00:44:10,160 Speaker 1: the president or any president is necessarily a figurehead. I 676 00:44:10,160 --> 00:44:13,520 Speaker 1: am saying that there are groups of unelected people who 677 00:44:13,520 --> 00:44:18,799 Speaker 1: wield tremendous amounts of power. And also, in defense of 678 00:44:18,840 --> 00:44:22,799 Speaker 1: the n Essay, to be absolutely fair, the n s 679 00:44:22,880 --> 00:44:30,320 Speaker 1: A has done immense amounts of work and successfully accomplished 680 00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:33,359 Speaker 1: intelligence goals for the United States. And I just want 681 00:44:33,400 --> 00:44:35,359 Speaker 1: to put this out there. This maybe an obvious thing 682 00:44:35,400 --> 00:44:38,440 Speaker 1: to too many listeners, but a big difference between the 683 00:44:38,520 --> 00:44:40,320 Speaker 1: n s A and the c I A is that 684 00:44:40,400 --> 00:44:44,600 Speaker 1: the n s A they don't have field operatives. You're yeah, 685 00:44:44,640 --> 00:44:47,120 Speaker 1: you're not. You're not gonna see an n ess A 686 00:44:47,120 --> 00:44:50,200 Speaker 1: age or n s A squad, you know, like kicking 687 00:44:50,200 --> 00:44:55,160 Speaker 1: down the door or something. And we are, as Matt said, 688 00:44:55,160 --> 00:44:59,560 Speaker 1: and we're in a very fascinating and unpredictable time. It's 689 00:44:59,600 --> 00:45:04,120 Speaker 1: quite possible that within a few months this podcast could 690 00:45:04,680 --> 00:45:08,400 Speaker 1: need an update, at which case we will endeavor to 691 00:45:08,719 --> 00:45:12,879 Speaker 1: do so. But for now, as always, whether or not 692 00:45:13,440 --> 00:45:16,919 Speaker 1: an organization like this exist, whether or not you are 693 00:45:18,920 --> 00:45:25,040 Speaker 1: concerned or unconcerned about the state of surveillance, I think 694 00:45:25,160 --> 00:45:30,080 Speaker 1: very carefully about what you put out there. It's not 695 00:45:30,200 --> 00:45:35,560 Speaker 1: just a black box. The stuff does not disappear, and 696 00:45:36,840 --> 00:45:40,719 Speaker 1: if you have information that you would like to share, 697 00:45:40,760 --> 00:45:43,680 Speaker 1: if you're affiliated with the n s A. Remember how 698 00:45:43,719 --> 00:45:46,719 Speaker 1: he's always joke about if the n Essay was monitoring us, 699 00:45:47,280 --> 00:45:51,280 Speaker 1: it had to be some poor, unfortunate intern, painfully familiar 700 00:45:51,360 --> 00:45:55,160 Speaker 1: with the intern that poor guy, buddy. I hope if 701 00:45:55,160 --> 00:45:57,319 Speaker 1: you're listening, I hope things are all right. You've seen 702 00:45:57,360 --> 00:46:03,759 Speaker 1: me at the worst, uh joking joking. Aside of the 703 00:46:03,960 --> 00:46:07,680 Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know, here is perhaps 704 00:46:07,760 --> 00:46:11,160 Speaker 1: the extent of the monitoring that is occurring, and it 705 00:46:11,320 --> 00:46:14,839 Speaker 1: is not a theory. It is happening. So let us 706 00:46:14,840 --> 00:46:17,080 Speaker 1: know what you think we would I would like to 707 00:46:17,080 --> 00:46:19,840 Speaker 1: hear your opinions on the n s A. We'd like 708 00:46:19,960 --> 00:46:22,799 Speaker 1: to hear if it's um a bunch of you know, 709 00:46:22,880 --> 00:46:30,480 Speaker 1: alarmists ado about nothing, higgotty pigoty, if you will or 710 00:46:31,680 --> 00:46:37,320 Speaker 1: should people be concerned? And speaking of listener mail shout 711 00:46:37,440 --> 00:46:43,360 Speaker 1: at corners two days. First shout out goes to Miguel. 712 00:46:44,200 --> 00:46:46,360 Speaker 1: Miguel says, you guys should make a video on Seth 713 00:46:46,520 --> 00:46:48,799 Speaker 1: rich a person who worked for the d n C 714 00:46:49,160 --> 00:46:51,839 Speaker 1: who was randomly murdered when someone tried to rob him 715 00:46:51,880 --> 00:46:54,760 Speaker 1: but took nothing. At the end, Wiki leak said someone 716 00:46:55,000 --> 00:46:57,160 Speaker 1: leaked the information of the d n C and it 717 00:46:57,239 --> 00:47:00,239 Speaker 1: wasn't Russian hackers, but the news went with Russian act 718 00:47:00,680 --> 00:47:04,800 Speaker 1: just the same. The guy who ran against Debbie Wasserman Schultz, 719 00:47:05,320 --> 00:47:08,400 Speaker 1: Tim Canova, made a video talking about the situation, and 720 00:47:08,440 --> 00:47:11,280 Speaker 1: he didn't seem convinced it was a robbery gone wrong. 721 00:47:11,320 --> 00:47:14,719 Speaker 1: Are either of you fellas familiar with this incident? Yes, 722 00:47:15,080 --> 00:47:19,200 Speaker 1: very familiar with Seth Rich. Um. You know there's an 723 00:47:19,200 --> 00:47:22,080 Speaker 1: interview with Juliana sand where he'd discussed it. He doesn't 724 00:47:22,120 --> 00:47:26,920 Speaker 1: say Seth Rich was or wasn't the source of the 725 00:47:27,000 --> 00:47:30,759 Speaker 1: leaks from the d n C. But I would say 726 00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:36,399 Speaker 1: if you watch it very closely, it seems perhaps that 727 00:47:36,600 --> 00:47:39,600 Speaker 1: he's leaning in that way without saying it. Yeah, it's interesting. 728 00:47:39,600 --> 00:47:44,400 Speaker 1: I read about this story when it first emerged. But sadly, 729 00:47:44,840 --> 00:47:49,160 Speaker 1: there are apparently a lot of unexplained murders that have 730 00:47:49,239 --> 00:47:53,400 Speaker 1: been happening or deaths that have been happening in the 731 00:47:53,440 --> 00:47:56,480 Speaker 1: past decade or so. I always remember the British intelligence 732 00:47:56,520 --> 00:48:01,200 Speaker 1: officer who apparently committed suicide by what shooting himself and 733 00:48:01,280 --> 00:48:04,840 Speaker 1: zipping himself into a bag that was locked on the outside. 734 00:48:04,880 --> 00:48:08,680 Speaker 1: That's what I would do. We talked about that. But yeah, 735 00:48:08,960 --> 00:48:11,120 Speaker 1: I'm gonna dig into this and and thank you so 736 00:48:11,200 --> 00:48:17,240 Speaker 1: much for writing. Our next message comes from Eric says, Hey, guys, 737 00:48:17,280 --> 00:48:20,360 Speaker 1: I was listening to your podcast about Grimoire and I 738 00:48:20,440 --> 00:48:24,120 Speaker 1: was surprised that you didn't mention the malius maleficarum. Is 739 00:48:24,120 --> 00:48:26,359 Speaker 1: that how you say that? The witches hammer? That's how 740 00:48:26,400 --> 00:48:29,320 Speaker 1: I know it, which is hammer. It was a text 741 00:48:29,400 --> 00:48:33,840 Speaker 1: published in four six on how to identify and interrogate witches. 742 00:48:34,440 --> 00:48:37,320 Speaker 1: That is good information to know. Always have that information 743 00:48:37,360 --> 00:48:40,480 Speaker 1: with you. I went to school at California State University, 744 00:48:40,520 --> 00:48:42,560 Speaker 1: Long Beach, and they have the They have an original 745 00:48:42,760 --> 00:48:46,440 Speaker 1: edition from that year when it was published uh in 746 00:48:46,480 --> 00:48:49,480 Speaker 1: their Special Collections archive. Anyone can go to the Special 747 00:48:49,520 --> 00:48:52,040 Speaker 1: Collections and actually sit down with the text and look 748 00:48:52,120 --> 00:48:55,960 Speaker 1: through it. It makes your skin crawl just looking at it. 749 00:48:56,040 --> 00:48:59,120 Speaker 1: Does it have a big bald, green lady witch face 750 00:48:59,280 --> 00:49:02,200 Speaker 1: that pops out of the spinal I don't know about that, 751 00:49:02,280 --> 00:49:05,239 Speaker 1: but there are sections that are underlined with notes in 752 00:49:05,280 --> 00:49:09,719 Speaker 1: the margins that could have been made by interrogators. I 753 00:49:09,880 --> 00:49:12,360 Speaker 1: just thought if there were listeners in southern California, they 754 00:49:12,440 --> 00:49:14,440 Speaker 1: might wanted the chance to go and see something like 755 00:49:14,480 --> 00:49:17,160 Speaker 1: that in person. Thanks keep up the good work, Eric. 756 00:49:18,120 --> 00:49:22,560 Speaker 1: Thanks for Ryan. Eric, it seems like we're off to California. Yeah, Noel, 757 00:49:22,680 --> 00:49:24,600 Speaker 1: you and I had talked a little bit about some 758 00:49:24,680 --> 00:49:27,759 Speaker 1: of these different grimois off air when we were kind 759 00:49:27,760 --> 00:49:31,040 Speaker 1: of talking about what makes something a grim wi, and 760 00:49:32,360 --> 00:49:34,440 Speaker 1: we we went back and forth on some of this 761 00:49:34,600 --> 00:49:38,920 Speaker 1: because one of the one of the questions would be 762 00:49:39,000 --> 00:49:43,080 Speaker 1: is it just a collection of perhaps lore, yeah, pagan 763 00:49:43,160 --> 00:49:49,080 Speaker 1: text or something more of um a compilation or is 764 00:49:49,120 --> 00:49:53,239 Speaker 1: it anything related to magical signs? And if this was 765 00:49:53,280 --> 00:49:57,600 Speaker 1: written for the purposes of witch hunts, still counted as 766 00:49:57,640 --> 00:50:01,239 Speaker 1: a grimoire. And I was after we were off the 767 00:50:01,320 --> 00:50:04,880 Speaker 1: arrow is reading intensely in that and I appreciate you 768 00:50:05,000 --> 00:50:08,440 Speaker 1: writing in Eric, because I want us to travel to 769 00:50:08,640 --> 00:50:11,920 Speaker 1: southern California. What do you think, guys, I'm all about 770 00:50:12,080 --> 00:50:18,200 Speaker 1: some travels. Hey, what a science textbook be considered a 771 00:50:18,200 --> 00:50:22,960 Speaker 1: grimoire in the future perhaps where maybe we've lost some 772 00:50:23,120 --> 00:50:27,080 Speaker 1: of what some of these scientific experiments that are now 773 00:50:27,680 --> 00:50:30,960 Speaker 1: we would consider normal and regular. Now something as simple 774 00:50:31,080 --> 00:50:36,960 Speaker 1: as using baking soda to make a volcano, But then 775 00:50:37,000 --> 00:50:40,239 Speaker 1: it's magic again if we've lost that knowledge that there's 776 00:50:40,239 --> 00:50:42,000 Speaker 1: a book that tells you it's a spell of how 777 00:50:42,040 --> 00:50:43,200 Speaker 1: to do it. And that was the thing that I 778 00:50:43,239 --> 00:50:46,080 Speaker 1: was saying, is like, what constitutes a grimoire is largely 779 00:50:46,120 --> 00:50:50,759 Speaker 1: determined by what you considered to be magic. Right, that's 780 00:50:50,760 --> 00:50:52,480 Speaker 1: a very good I mean, I don't know, maybe I'm 781 00:50:52,520 --> 00:50:55,000 Speaker 1: reaching there, but it just feels to me like you 782 00:50:55,040 --> 00:50:59,840 Speaker 1: could be absolutely right. It could be a collection of procedural, 783 00:51:00,760 --> 00:51:06,080 Speaker 1: you know, steps to create a battery. Oh right there. 784 00:51:07,440 --> 00:51:10,239 Speaker 1: I don't know. I think it's interesting the way we 785 00:51:10,280 --> 00:51:15,719 Speaker 1: interpret the contents and the intent. Yeah, that's great. So 786 00:51:15,800 --> 00:51:18,440 Speaker 1: in that case, if there was someone who considered themselves 787 00:51:18,520 --> 00:51:22,800 Speaker 1: a practicing magician or someone who would consider themselves adept 788 00:51:22,920 --> 00:51:26,239 Speaker 1: at witchcraft, and they were using this book by which 789 00:51:26,360 --> 00:51:30,280 Speaker 1: hunters to you know, enact some kind of magical process. 790 00:51:30,320 --> 00:51:32,359 Speaker 1: Then wouldn't the fact it would become a groom ware 791 00:51:32,440 --> 00:51:34,200 Speaker 1: Well that was the thing too, that book that I 792 00:51:34,239 --> 00:51:36,839 Speaker 1: brought up, the name escapes Me where it was one 793 00:51:36,880 --> 00:51:39,560 Speaker 1: of the early collections of witchcraft lore, and it was 794 00:51:39,600 --> 00:51:43,560 Speaker 1: kind of meant by the writer to um make it 795 00:51:43,600 --> 00:51:46,879 Speaker 1: appear foolish and frivolous in some way and to not 796 00:51:47,120 --> 00:51:50,600 Speaker 1: lend any weight to it, and to kind of degrade 797 00:51:50,640 --> 00:51:52,600 Speaker 1: the Catholic Church for the part that it played and 798 00:51:52,960 --> 00:51:56,200 Speaker 1: killing so many of of what the writer considered to 799 00:51:56,239 --> 00:52:00,000 Speaker 1: be innocent victims potentially practicing witchcraft, which was a complete 800 00:52:00,000 --> 00:52:02,719 Speaker 1: really harmless. What ended up being the use of this 801 00:52:02,800 --> 00:52:06,720 Speaker 1: book was much more in the witchcraft community, people trying 802 00:52:06,719 --> 00:52:10,680 Speaker 1: to find remnants of spells and different things. So again, 803 00:52:10,719 --> 00:52:13,239 Speaker 1: I think it's also the intent of the user that 804 00:52:13,320 --> 00:52:16,400 Speaker 1: determines whether or not sagramore since how it seems to 805 00:52:16,400 --> 00:52:20,120 Speaker 1: me and a lot of magical working is about ultimately intent. 806 00:52:21,040 --> 00:52:24,400 Speaker 1: There you go, it's pretty interesting. We have one more. 807 00:52:24,840 --> 00:52:27,360 Speaker 1: We have one more shout out today, and that is 808 00:52:27,400 --> 00:52:30,759 Speaker 1: from Michael. Michael says, hey, guys, love the podcast, listen 809 00:52:30,800 --> 00:52:33,440 Speaker 1: to it every week. Downloaded all the episodes from iTunes. 810 00:52:33,520 --> 00:52:36,440 Speaker 1: Thank you, Michael. Have you ever thought about doing a 811 00:52:36,560 --> 00:52:38,920 Speaker 1: video episode, as in just having a camera in the 812 00:52:38,960 --> 00:52:41,879 Speaker 1: studio set up and we can see what happens when 813 00:52:41,880 --> 00:52:45,080 Speaker 1: you're doing the podcast? Can I please have a shout out? 814 00:52:45,320 --> 00:52:48,359 Speaker 1: If you guys are ever in Brisbane, Australia, I can 815 00:52:48,400 --> 00:52:50,839 Speaker 1: be your tour guide and you've always got a free 816 00:52:50,880 --> 00:52:54,440 Speaker 1: room to stay in nice Michael, I would say, I 817 00:52:54,520 --> 00:52:56,600 Speaker 1: kind of don't want to do that because I'd have 818 00:52:56,640 --> 00:52:59,440 Speaker 1: to put a shirt on. I guess I don't know. 819 00:53:00,719 --> 00:53:04,080 Speaker 1: Do you know only podcast in the nude, the nude 820 00:53:04,800 --> 00:53:07,280 Speaker 1: in the nude with the mint, with the mint julip, 821 00:53:08,680 --> 00:53:11,760 Speaker 1: A cold mental Julip in my hand. I do declare 822 00:53:11,800 --> 00:53:14,880 Speaker 1: it's a bit hot for Lennen's. Somebody's gonna get so 823 00:53:15,000 --> 00:53:17,560 Speaker 1: offended by us doing this, and we're totally just having 824 00:53:17,600 --> 00:53:21,280 Speaker 1: fun with it because we're in Atlanta, we're Southern boys. 825 00:53:22,160 --> 00:53:25,040 Speaker 1: I don't think it's offensive. It's somebody's gonna be upset. 826 00:53:25,040 --> 00:53:29,000 Speaker 1: Please don't be upset if someone is offended by that, 827 00:53:29,480 --> 00:53:33,279 Speaker 1: by that character that we're hatching up, then please send 828 00:53:33,400 --> 00:53:38,319 Speaker 1: us an audio version of your complaint and tell us 829 00:53:38,360 --> 00:53:41,520 Speaker 1: how we should do the voice. Thank you to Michael, 830 00:53:41,640 --> 00:53:45,279 Speaker 1: thank you to Eric, and thank you to Miguel. This 831 00:53:45,440 --> 00:53:51,879 Speaker 1: concludes this week's edition of Gosh. And before we get 832 00:53:51,880 --> 00:53:53,759 Speaker 1: out of here, Holy cow, you guys, we got some 833 00:53:53,800 --> 00:53:57,279 Speaker 1: plugs to plug. I want to get pluggy. We have 834 00:53:57,320 --> 00:54:00,840 Speaker 1: one huge plug. We're doing it. We're doing it's so big. 835 00:54:01,520 --> 00:54:06,120 Speaker 1: We're going to New York City, New York City. That's 836 00:54:06,200 --> 00:54:10,520 Speaker 1: what I said, basbic content TM. We're going April eight, 837 00:54:11,160 --> 00:54:15,279 Speaker 1: New York City as part of the Podfest. We are 838 00:54:15,320 --> 00:54:21,000 Speaker 1: going to be doing a live show with a cavalcade 839 00:54:21,040 --> 00:54:24,759 Speaker 1: of other podcasters and we would love it if you're 840 00:54:24,760 --> 00:54:27,080 Speaker 1: in the area and want to come by and say Hi, 841 00:54:27,200 --> 00:54:31,359 Speaker 1: we're we're I was gonna say, we're normal people. We're 842 00:54:31,400 --> 00:54:34,520 Speaker 1: fun to hang out with. Yes, it's a fun thing. 843 00:54:34,520 --> 00:54:37,960 Speaker 1: Though it's a three day festival. Um Ticket info is 844 00:54:38,040 --> 00:54:42,640 Speaker 1: available online at the Bellhouse in y dot com um 845 00:54:42,680 --> 00:54:45,840 Speaker 1: and the events are from the I will leave the 846 00:54:46,080 --> 00:54:49,160 Speaker 1: sixth no the seventh, which is a Friday through the 847 00:54:49,280 --> 00:54:53,960 Speaker 1: ninth Sunday, and we are on Saturday, April eight with uh, 848 00:54:54,360 --> 00:54:57,440 Speaker 1: The Majority Report with Sam Seed. Really looking forward to 849 00:54:57,680 --> 00:55:01,040 Speaker 1: hanging out with Sam. Yeah, another great podcast that has 850 00:55:02,000 --> 00:55:05,319 Speaker 1: pretty ancient roots in the podcasting in radio world. So 851 00:55:05,520 --> 00:55:07,680 Speaker 1: check you're definitely gonna want to listen to that and 852 00:55:07,680 --> 00:55:09,359 Speaker 1: watch that, and then you know we'll be there too, 853 00:55:09,400 --> 00:55:13,160 Speaker 1: And Michael iam Black's podcast is going to be there, Yeah, 854 00:55:13,200 --> 00:55:18,759 Speaker 1: Lore and Kevin McDonald, Kevin McDonald and smattering of other 855 00:55:19,040 --> 00:55:23,440 Speaker 1: podcast Illuminaire, the Book of Ya if you're into Kanye West. 856 00:55:24,320 --> 00:55:27,680 Speaker 1: So we're really excited too. We're really excited to be 857 00:55:27,760 --> 00:55:30,319 Speaker 1: a part of this, and we would I would love 858 00:55:30,360 --> 00:55:33,080 Speaker 1: to see you there. And if you can't make this one, 859 00:55:33,520 --> 00:55:36,600 Speaker 1: right in and let us know where we should travel next, 860 00:55:36,680 --> 00:55:39,200 Speaker 1: because apparently we've got a budget now for this kind 861 00:55:39,200 --> 00:55:42,880 Speaker 1: of jazz. Watch out just sign out here. It's twelve 862 00:55:42,920 --> 00:55:45,200 Speaker 1: dollars in advance if you buy your tickets now. If 863 00:55:45,200 --> 00:55:47,040 Speaker 1: you want to wait till you get to the door, 864 00:55:47,120 --> 00:55:49,319 Speaker 1: it's going to be an extra three perfect but I 865 00:55:49,320 --> 00:55:51,600 Speaker 1: believe we get a solid hour, so you will get 866 00:55:52,239 --> 00:55:55,279 Speaker 1: a live podcast from us, and you also get to 867 00:55:55,320 --> 00:55:58,160 Speaker 1: see the Majority Report, and I think they let you 868 00:55:58,239 --> 00:56:01,640 Speaker 1: drink during the show. Pretty sure that if anyone's on 869 00:56:01,680 --> 00:56:07,680 Speaker 1: defence about that, also unlimited high fives from that from that. Yes, 870 00:56:07,880 --> 00:56:10,960 Speaker 1: So that's our that's our show for this week. We've 871 00:56:10,960 --> 00:56:13,480 Speaker 1: gotta show coming up in April. And if you want 872 00:56:13,520 --> 00:56:16,879 Speaker 1: to take a page from your fellow listeners, book right 873 00:56:16,960 --> 00:56:19,800 Speaker 1: to us and let us know what you think we 874 00:56:19,800 --> 00:56:21,680 Speaker 1: should cover in the future, what you think about the 875 00:56:21,680 --> 00:56:24,000 Speaker 1: state of MAS surveillance, where you think we should go 876 00:56:24,040 --> 00:56:27,040 Speaker 1: on tour, or any of the other questions that we 877 00:56:27,160 --> 00:56:30,360 Speaker 1: asked throughout this podcast. You can write to us directly 878 00:56:30,440 --> 00:56:35,080 Speaker 1: on Facebook and Twitter, where we are conspiracy stuff. Check 879 00:56:35,080 --> 00:56:39,160 Speaker 1: out some of those awesome and somewhat frightening pictures that 880 00:56:39,280 --> 00:56:42,600 Speaker 1: Noel has from Washington, d C on our Instagram. It 881 00:56:42,640 --> 00:56:45,360 Speaker 1: was weird, man. I'm not gonna I'm not gonna wax 882 00:56:45,440 --> 00:56:47,520 Speaker 1: too poetic about it, but it was just like walking 883 00:56:47,520 --> 00:56:52,160 Speaker 1: around in a weird, foggy, gray dream. Uh. And I 884 00:56:52,200 --> 00:56:54,359 Speaker 1: hope that the pictures reflect that, so let me know. Hey, 885 00:56:54,360 --> 00:56:56,600 Speaker 1: and guys, also, if you're interested, I've really I've started 886 00:56:56,600 --> 00:56:59,759 Speaker 1: getting into glitch art. I've been glitching out videos and 887 00:57:00,080 --> 00:57:02,560 Speaker 1: making weird music to it. Uh. They're kind of weird 888 00:57:02,600 --> 00:57:05,120 Speaker 1: and reflective and meditative in a sort of disturbing way. 889 00:57:05,120 --> 00:57:06,920 Speaker 1: So if you're interested in seeing any of that, hit 890 00:57:07,000 --> 00:57:08,879 Speaker 1: us up and well maybe we'll post some you had. 891 00:57:09,040 --> 00:57:10,880 Speaker 1: You should post some right now, the one you just 892 00:57:10,920 --> 00:57:15,880 Speaker 1: showed me. Yeah. Well, and if none of that quite 893 00:57:15,960 --> 00:57:20,560 Speaker 1: stirs your jewelupe, you can write to us directly via 894 00:57:20,640 --> 00:57:24,240 Speaker 1: the old email and stay hi to whatever poor unfortunate 895 00:57:24,280 --> 00:57:28,120 Speaker 1: and essay intern has to read it. We are conspiracy 896 00:57:28,360 --> 00:57:46,360 Speaker 1: How stuff Works dot com