1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:02,600 Speaker 1: So, John Mack in your book Up Close and All End, 2 00:00:02,680 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: you talk about your experience with Morgan Stanley, but also 3 00:00:04,720 --> 00:00:06,640 Speaker 1: a Credit Suite. Right, you had a period of time 4 00:00:06,720 --> 00:00:10,200 Speaker 1: running Credit Suez. You're pretty explicit about some challenges that 5 00:00:10,240 --> 00:00:12,280 Speaker 1: they had a Credit Swees when you were there. Now 6 00:00:12,320 --> 00:00:14,800 Speaker 1: we have Credit Sweets that basically is going out of business, 7 00:00:14,800 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 1: going to merge with ubs. What is it about Credit 8 00:00:17,360 --> 00:00:19,920 Speaker 1: Suite that has given them so much difficulty? Oh more 9 00:00:20,000 --> 00:00:23,560 Speaker 1: so much time? Well, I think the transition from being 10 00:00:23,840 --> 00:00:29,040 Speaker 1: a Swiss private bank to a publicly held bank, that 11 00:00:29,160 --> 00:00:33,240 Speaker 1: the rules and reporting have changed. I mean the Swiss banks. 12 00:00:33,280 --> 00:00:35,640 Speaker 1: I remember years ago when I was there, you could 13 00:00:35,680 --> 00:00:38,320 Speaker 1: go down in their vaults. He would see pieces of 14 00:00:38,440 --> 00:00:41,680 Speaker 1: art locked up, things like that, And I think they 15 00:00:41,720 --> 00:00:44,560 Speaker 1: had a real advantage of bank secrecy. They had a 16 00:00:44,640 --> 00:00:47,879 Speaker 1: lot of people around the world who wanted to be protected. 17 00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:49,760 Speaker 1: We put money in there and knowing it would be 18 00:00:50,159 --> 00:00:53,960 Speaker 1: secure or safe and secretive. And the world's changed, and 19 00:00:54,000 --> 00:00:55,960 Speaker 1: that's what they're dealing with because they need to change 20 00:00:56,040 --> 00:00:58,440 Speaker 1: with it. Were you trying to change Credit Swie affair 21 00:00:58,440 --> 00:00:59,840 Speaker 1: amount when you were there and you made a friend 22 00:00:59,880 --> 00:01:02,320 Speaker 1: of changes, but the board didn't always like it. I 23 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:04,319 Speaker 1: mean they said they had some choice words for you, 24 00:01:04,400 --> 00:01:07,120 Speaker 1: like arrogant. You had some choice words for them as well. Yeah, 25 00:01:07,360 --> 00:01:09,559 Speaker 1: they said I'm the most arrogant person they ever met. 26 00:01:10,920 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: And I said that the stupidest people I've ever dealt with. 27 00:01:13,920 --> 00:01:17,319 Speaker 1: So we had a great relationship. As soon as my 28 00:01:17,400 --> 00:01:19,720 Speaker 1: contract was up, they shot me. So it was fine. 29 00:01:19,920 --> 00:01:22,280 Speaker 1: But when when you say stupid, what didn't they get 30 00:01:22,520 --> 00:01:24,039 Speaker 1: from your point of view? I mean, you've spent a 31 00:01:24,080 --> 00:01:27,120 Speaker 1: lifetime in banking, you know, banking. What didn't they understand? 32 00:01:27,160 --> 00:01:30,520 Speaker 1: You need to build financial service business built on trust 33 00:01:31,240 --> 00:01:35,720 Speaker 1: and built on not hiding money or putting money in 34 00:01:35,720 --> 00:01:37,800 Speaker 1: different spots. But you need to be opened. You need 35 00:01:37,840 --> 00:01:40,600 Speaker 1: to give a return on the investments or the assets 36 00:01:40,720 --> 00:01:44,399 Speaker 1: someone gives you, and just having bank secrecy is not enough. 37 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:47,120 Speaker 1: And I don't think they got that. And for years 38 00:01:48,240 --> 00:01:50,680 Speaker 1: the Swiss was a haven for people all over the 39 00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:53,680 Speaker 1: world who wanted to put money away. They did and 40 00:01:54,360 --> 00:01:55,960 Speaker 1: you know, for those who are putting the money in, 41 00:01:56,000 --> 00:01:58,960 Speaker 1: it made a lot of sense. But long term, I 42 00:01:59,000 --> 00:02:02,200 Speaker 1: think it really helped hurt the Swiss banks in a 43 00:02:02,240 --> 00:02:05,160 Speaker 1: competitive way. They weren't as competitive they should have been, 44 00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:08,440 Speaker 1: and they're great banks. They just needed to open up 45 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:10,639 Speaker 1: a vault a little more and not be so secretive. 46 00:02:10,800 --> 00:02:12,440 Speaker 1: It looks like it we're in for a new era 47 00:02:12,560 --> 00:02:16,639 Speaker 1: now as UBS is slated to take over credit swies 48 00:02:16,680 --> 00:02:19,600 Speaker 1: to purchase at a bargain rate, and Calm Color, somebody 49 00:02:19,639 --> 00:02:21,240 Speaker 1: you know well worked for you, is going to take 50 00:02:21,240 --> 00:02:23,800 Speaker 1: it over. What do you expect Calm Color and UBS 51 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:26,520 Speaker 1: to do with credit Swies? Well, I think they'll look 52 00:02:26,680 --> 00:02:29,000 Speaker 1: number one or are They're overlaps and there'll be a 53 00:02:29,000 --> 00:02:31,960 Speaker 1: lot of overlaps, and you want to get the best 54 00:02:32,000 --> 00:02:36,720 Speaker 1: people from each institution and still have those lines of businesses, 55 00:02:36,760 --> 00:02:40,640 Speaker 1: but with a better rolodecks of who are the talent 56 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:43,120 Speaker 1: to people into the two banks. So I see it 57 00:02:43,240 --> 00:02:45,720 Speaker 1: business as usual. But I think it will be a 58 00:02:45,800 --> 00:02:49,200 Speaker 1: smaller institution when they put them together, and I think 59 00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:53,640 Speaker 1: they will focus on performance, not just bank secrecy. You've 60 00:02:53,639 --> 00:02:56,520 Speaker 1: spent a lifetime managing risk, knowing when to take it 61 00:02:56,560 --> 00:02:59,679 Speaker 1: when not to take it right, Well, is it likely 62 00:02:59,720 --> 00:03:02,200 Speaker 1: they'll take less risk? Already? We've had calm callers said 63 00:03:02,320 --> 00:03:04,359 Speaker 1: we want to cut back on the investment bank. We're 64 00:03:04,400 --> 00:03:06,480 Speaker 1: not as interested investment bank. Would you expect to sort 65 00:03:06,720 --> 00:03:09,840 Speaker 1: the sort of profile the bank to shift. Yeah, I do, 66 00:03:10,000 --> 00:03:14,440 Speaker 1: but I think that's universal. I think the big banks 67 00:03:14,440 --> 00:03:17,399 Speaker 1: who've had big trading positions and taken a lot of risk, 68 00:03:17,480 --> 00:03:20,040 Speaker 1: I think they've all dilled that back, and clearly the 69 00:03:20,080 --> 00:03:22,000 Speaker 1: Swiss is going to do that now. When I was there, 70 00:03:22,919 --> 00:03:25,440 Speaker 1: it was first Boston was their investment bank, and the 71 00:03:25,600 --> 00:03:29,440 Speaker 1: amount of risk that we took was really out of 72 00:03:29,440 --> 00:03:32,120 Speaker 1: proportion what we should have been doing. So I think 73 00:03:32,160 --> 00:03:34,880 Speaker 1: all the banks are focused a lot more on risk. 74 00:03:35,040 --> 00:03:38,440 Speaker 1: I think their regulators are better at defining and seeing 75 00:03:38,480 --> 00:03:43,000 Speaker 1: the risk. But I think banks have to maintain confidence 76 00:03:43,040 --> 00:03:45,880 Speaker 1: in their institution, and when you have big swings, when 77 00:03:45,880 --> 00:03:48,520 Speaker 1: you take a huge loss on some risk position, it 78 00:03:48,600 --> 00:03:51,640 Speaker 1: hurts their credibility and it hurts the trust that people 79 00:03:51,680 --> 00:03:53,960 Speaker 1: have in them. So I think most of these banks 80 00:03:53,960 --> 00:03:55,880 Speaker 1: are going to be much more conservative and the risk 81 00:03:55,960 --> 00:03:57,920 Speaker 1: they take, which brings us back to the United States 82 00:03:57,960 --> 00:03:59,720 Speaker 1: to some extent, we have our own problems with banks 83 00:03:59,760 --> 00:04:01,960 Speaker 1: right in the United States, starting with Silicon Valley Bank 84 00:04:02,080 --> 00:04:05,680 Speaker 1: going beyond that. At the same time, is this similar 85 00:04:05,680 --> 00:04:07,600 Speaker 1: to what you saw in twenty eight, two and nine, 86 00:04:07,640 --> 00:04:10,520 Speaker 1: again you were running Morgan Stanley. The banks, including Morgan 87 00:04:10,520 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 1: Stanley had taken a lot of risk on there's a 88 00:04:12,240 --> 00:04:15,040 Speaker 1: lot of leverage in the respect retrospect didn't work out 89 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:18,159 Speaker 1: so well. Do we have a similar issue now, you know, David, 90 00:04:18,200 --> 00:04:20,800 Speaker 1: I don't think so. I think the banking issue at 91 00:04:20,839 --> 00:04:24,360 Speaker 1: Silicon Bank is pretty straightforward. What they were doing, who 92 00:04:24,360 --> 00:04:27,120 Speaker 1: they were underwriting, who they were lending money to. I 93 00:04:27,160 --> 00:04:29,560 Speaker 1: think you go back to the crisis here in New 94 00:04:29,640 --> 00:04:33,960 Speaker 1: York and the markets we're really volatile. We were just 95 00:04:34,000 --> 00:04:37,680 Speaker 1: taking market risk. We were not taking tremendous credit risk, 96 00:04:37,760 --> 00:04:42,039 Speaker 1: either with companies or with individuals. So when you look 97 00:04:42,040 --> 00:04:44,240 Speaker 1: at Wall Street back then, a lot of our risker 98 00:04:44,320 --> 00:04:47,640 Speaker 1: and government securities and just loading up the balance sheet 99 00:04:47,680 --> 00:04:50,720 Speaker 1: saying there's making a bet on interest rates, not on credit. 100 00:04:51,200 --> 00:04:54,040 Speaker 1: So I think the difference today is the credit risk, 101 00:04:54,480 --> 00:04:57,280 Speaker 1: not so much the interest rate risk. But we have 102 00:04:57,360 --> 00:04:59,520 Speaker 1: interest rate risk now all the time. They have interest 103 00:04:59,560 --> 00:05:01,240 Speaker 1: rate risk well, and the feed is meeting just this 104 00:05:01,279 --> 00:05:03,480 Speaker 1: week and it's we don't know if it's going to 105 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:06,400 Speaker 1: raise rates again or not. There are a lot of institutions, 106 00:05:06,520 --> 00:05:09,400 Speaker 1: banks as well as the corporations that maybe have based 107 00:05:09,440 --> 00:05:12,520 Speaker 1: their whole theory on low interest rates forever, which we're 108 00:05:12,520 --> 00:05:14,360 Speaker 1: not going to have. So how much risk is there 109 00:05:14,440 --> 00:05:16,719 Speaker 1: in terms of interest rate risk in the system, do 110 00:05:16,720 --> 00:05:19,200 Speaker 1: you think? I don't think as much as we've seen 111 00:05:19,240 --> 00:05:22,640 Speaker 1: in the past. I mean I don't. I just don't 112 00:05:22,640 --> 00:05:25,240 Speaker 1: see banks, and again I've been retired for a while. 113 00:05:25,720 --> 00:05:27,880 Speaker 1: I don't see them taking all that kind of risk 114 00:05:28,320 --> 00:05:31,320 Speaker 1: to try to get earnings up. They're all always that 115 00:05:31,440 --> 00:05:33,600 Speaker 1: it's going to be a risk in the marketplace. There's 116 00:05:33,640 --> 00:05:36,480 Speaker 1: always interest rate risk. But I think all the banks 117 00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:38,760 Speaker 1: are much more discipline and the kind of risk they want. 118 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:42,159 Speaker 1: I also think the Federal Reserve and regulators are much 119 00:05:42,200 --> 00:05:45,080 Speaker 1: more astute at looking at these balance sheets and the 120 00:05:45,160 --> 00:05:49,320 Speaker 1: risk they're taking. The risk should be in helping build businesses, 121 00:05:49,800 --> 00:05:52,120 Speaker 1: not speculating in the market. If you want to speculate 122 00:05:52,120 --> 00:05:56,040 Speaker 1: in the market, divine or define a certain amount of 123 00:05:56,080 --> 00:05:58,000 Speaker 1: capital you want to put on the trading desk and 124 00:05:58,120 --> 00:06:00,640 Speaker 1: take a risk that way. But in the risk of 125 00:06:00,839 --> 00:06:04,520 Speaker 1: making these big loans and taking a lot of exposure 126 00:06:04,600 --> 00:06:07,760 Speaker 1: if the markets change in these companies, I think that 127 00:06:07,839 --> 00:06:10,800 Speaker 1: has really been dialed back. Is the big banking business 128 00:06:10,839 --> 00:06:12,520 Speaker 1: in it says as interesting as it was when you 129 00:06:12,560 --> 00:06:14,440 Speaker 1: were in it. In this sense, a lot of the 130 00:06:14,480 --> 00:06:16,480 Speaker 1: business is going into credit. The prior to credit. Now 131 00:06:16,680 --> 00:06:19,120 Speaker 1: it's gone out from the regulatory part right, and the 132 00:06:19,160 --> 00:06:21,080 Speaker 1: big money center banks, as you say, have gotten a 133 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:26,120 Speaker 1: lot more conservative. You built a career actually and taking risk. Yeah, 134 00:06:26,360 --> 00:06:30,000 Speaker 1: some would argue we took too much risk, and thank 135 00:06:30,040 --> 00:06:33,599 Speaker 1: God for the Chinese and the Japanese who helped us 136 00:06:33,640 --> 00:06:37,320 Speaker 1: get through all that. Yeah. I think given the crisis 137 00:06:37,360 --> 00:06:39,640 Speaker 1: that we all went through years ago, I think bank 138 00:06:40,200 --> 00:06:43,960 Speaker 1: boards are much more astute, much more involved, and I 139 00:06:44,000 --> 00:06:47,920 Speaker 1: think the CEOs and treasures of the institutions are really 140 00:06:47,960 --> 00:06:50,440 Speaker 1: concerned about how much risk are we taking and how 141 00:06:50,480 --> 00:06:54,479 Speaker 1: much can we afford? John famous story in your book 142 00:06:54,560 --> 00:06:56,920 Speaker 1: Up Close and All End actually is when you had 143 00:06:56,920 --> 00:07:00,039 Speaker 1: Tim Geitner and Hank Paulson and Ben Burnanky on the 144 00:07:00,040 --> 00:07:02,600 Speaker 1: phone saying you got to sell to Jamie Diamond as 145 00:07:02,640 --> 00:07:05,760 Speaker 1: I recall at a discount price, and you stood up 146 00:07:05,760 --> 00:07:09,200 Speaker 1: to them. There are some bank leaders right now having 147 00:07:09,240 --> 00:07:14,000 Speaker 1: similar conversations in Switzerland, in Washington with bank regulators. How 148 00:07:14,000 --> 00:07:16,560 Speaker 1: did you have the courage it was required to stand 149 00:07:16,640 --> 00:07:21,480 Speaker 1: up to Hank Poulson and Tim Geitner. Well, I guess 150 00:07:21,480 --> 00:07:25,720 Speaker 1: the courage came from if we had listened to them. 151 00:07:26,240 --> 00:07:30,000 Speaker 1: Morgan Stanley wouldn't exist now, and my gut feel was 152 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:33,080 Speaker 1: that we were going to get through this. I believe 153 00:07:33,280 --> 00:07:35,400 Speaker 1: that Japanese We're going to put money in. We had 154 00:07:35,400 --> 00:07:38,720 Speaker 1: a great relationship with the Japanese and that came from 155 00:07:38,880 --> 00:07:42,360 Speaker 1: years of doing business in Japan and we used to 156 00:07:42,360 --> 00:07:46,240 Speaker 1: bring in When I joined Morgan Stanley, there were always 157 00:07:46,360 --> 00:07:51,000 Speaker 1: two to five Japanese employees of the banks from Japan 158 00:07:51,440 --> 00:07:56,120 Speaker 1: as trainees, and the Japanese had remembered the culture and 159 00:07:56,200 --> 00:07:58,880 Speaker 1: they really adopted the culture. And when we were in trouble, 160 00:07:58,920 --> 00:08:02,240 Speaker 1: the reason the Japanese stepped up they knew our culture. 161 00:08:02,840 --> 00:08:06,640 Speaker 1: And God bless the founding partners of Morgan Stanley of 162 00:08:06,680 --> 00:08:10,400 Speaker 1: having that kind of relationship and the foresight to bring 163 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 1: people from all over the world, but especially from China 164 00:08:13,360 --> 00:08:16,640 Speaker 1: and from Japan to see the culture. How we manager is, 165 00:08:16,680 --> 00:08:19,840 Speaker 1: how we built a business, how we built relationships, and 166 00:08:19,920 --> 00:08:24,200 Speaker 1: the Japanese clearly had a lot of respect for that 167 00:08:24,280 --> 00:08:26,720 Speaker 1: and admiration for it. So that's why they stood up 168 00:08:26,720 --> 00:08:29,600 Speaker 1: and said, we'll put the money in. How would the 169 00:08:29,640 --> 00:08:32,800 Speaker 1: world of look, the financial world look different if, in fact, 170 00:08:33,000 --> 00:08:35,400 Speaker 1: JP Morgan had bought Morgan Stanley and you didn't have 171 00:08:35,440 --> 00:08:37,680 Speaker 1: a Morganstown anymore. What would it have meant for the 172 00:08:37,720 --> 00:08:40,760 Speaker 1: overall economy and the financial world. Well, look, I think 173 00:08:40,800 --> 00:08:45,640 Speaker 1: to have broad based investment banking community gives you better ideas, 174 00:08:45,679 --> 00:08:49,240 Speaker 1: creative ideas, and also it dissipates risk over a much 175 00:08:49,320 --> 00:08:55,880 Speaker 1: larger platform. So I think concentration too much concentrations a negative. 176 00:08:56,400 --> 00:08:59,120 Speaker 1: And if we'd have lost Morgan Stanley and I remember 177 00:09:00,679 --> 00:09:03,439 Speaker 1: Paulson colony and saying Saint John, you got to hang 178 00:09:03,480 --> 00:09:05,840 Speaker 1: on because if you go down, we're right behind you, 179 00:09:06,400 --> 00:09:09,160 Speaker 1: and it would have eroded. I think the investment banking business, 180 00:09:09,160 --> 00:09:13,839 Speaker 1: which I believe really diversifies risk, also is very creative, 181 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:17,400 Speaker 1: a global business, and I think helps liquidity in the market. 182 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:20,880 Speaker 1: Plus also hiring a lot of people who do really 183 00:09:20,920 --> 00:09:23,800 Speaker 1: well and helping companies. So it would have been a 184 00:09:23,840 --> 00:09:26,959 Speaker 1: disaster if we had gone down, and I think it 185 00:09:26,960 --> 00:09:29,480 Speaker 1: would have been a domino effect. And thank God for 186 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:32,800 Speaker 1: Hank Paulson. And when you talk about heroes, Hank Paulson's 187 00:09:32,840 --> 00:09:35,400 Speaker 1: a hero. He really stood up. When you talk about 188 00:09:35,480 --> 00:09:38,720 Speaker 1: hiring people, You've made it clear in your book that 189 00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:41,160 Speaker 1: people are really what it's all about. Getting the right 190 00:09:41,200 --> 00:09:43,360 Speaker 1: people getting the right places. You have a couple that 191 00:09:43,400 --> 00:09:45,640 Speaker 1: you had working for you, we're gone on. We have, 192 00:09:45,720 --> 00:09:48,720 Speaker 1: of course James Gorman running Morgan Stanley, who's done a 193 00:09:48,720 --> 00:09:51,079 Speaker 1: pretty good job by all the great job, and Calm 194 00:09:51,080 --> 00:09:54,400 Speaker 1: Color now who's back in the spotlight running Ubs, which 195 00:09:54,440 --> 00:09:56,800 Speaker 1: is going to take over credit Sueez. What do you 196 00:09:56,840 --> 00:09:59,640 Speaker 1: think about Calm Color as a leader? I think as 197 00:09:59,640 --> 00:10:03,520 Speaker 1: a first class leader. Clearly he's very smart, and I 198 00:10:03,559 --> 00:10:06,440 Speaker 1: think working together through the crisis, it showed that he 199 00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:09,280 Speaker 1: was able to keep his financial team on board. In 200 00:10:09,320 --> 00:10:13,160 Speaker 1: other words, people were close to panicking and he calmed 201 00:10:13,200 --> 00:10:15,000 Speaker 1: them down. And I gave him a little bit of 202 00:10:15,080 --> 00:10:17,720 Speaker 1: help on that, but he did it. Says a natural leader, 203 00:10:18,000 --> 00:10:19,840 Speaker 1: and I think he's a natural for what he's going 204 00:10:19,920 --> 00:10:23,320 Speaker 1: to do in Switzerland. Finally, what does it take to 205 00:10:23,400 --> 00:10:25,520 Speaker 1: become in the middle of a crisis? You didn't with 206 00:10:25,600 --> 00:10:27,360 Speaker 1: respect to the pressure, but Morgan stun You just talk 207 00:10:27,400 --> 00:10:29,360 Speaker 1: about Colm Color hurt in the crisis. You were there 208 00:10:29,760 --> 00:10:33,280 Speaker 1: and in some really difficult times. What separates the people 209 00:10:33,280 --> 00:10:37,080 Speaker 1: who can handle that from the ones who can't? I 210 00:10:37,160 --> 00:10:42,760 Speaker 1: want to say stupidity. I knew if I cracked, they 211 00:10:42,800 --> 00:10:45,840 Speaker 1: all cracked. So I had to put on a face 212 00:10:45,960 --> 00:10:51,000 Speaker 1: that you know, I'll never forget Tom, and I'd say 213 00:10:51,120 --> 00:10:53,240 Speaker 1: to me, you know, you act like nothing's going on. Well, 214 00:10:53,240 --> 00:10:56,400 Speaker 1: what they didn't know I was shut my office door 215 00:10:58,120 --> 00:11:01,280 Speaker 1: and just try to pull myself together. Couldn't. I couldn't 216 00:11:01,280 --> 00:11:04,800 Speaker 1: show the stress of fear that we were under. And 217 00:11:05,440 --> 00:11:08,679 Speaker 1: I'll never forget Colin, Christie my wife and saying, Christie, 218 00:11:08,880 --> 00:11:11,319 Speaker 1: I don't know if I can get this done. And 219 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:14,840 Speaker 1: you turn to people you can trust and people who 220 00:11:14,920 --> 00:11:18,440 Speaker 1: know you well and people who are not going to leak. Oh, guy, 221 00:11:18,520 --> 00:11:22,319 Speaker 1: John Mack is really frightened about the crisis. And for me, 222 00:11:22,880 --> 00:11:26,120 Speaker 1: the best person was Christie. And then I had other 223 00:11:26,160 --> 00:11:29,240 Speaker 1: people like Tom Knigs, who's a close friend, various stute, 224 00:11:29,600 --> 00:11:31,160 Speaker 1: and he was one of the few people who would 225 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:34,440 Speaker 1: constantly come to my office and say, stupid, you can't 226 00:11:34,440 --> 00:11:37,320 Speaker 1: do that, and you need someone to put a mirror 227 00:11:37,360 --> 00:11:40,000 Speaker 1: in front of you and challenging. Tom did that. Colin 228 00:11:40,120 --> 00:11:45,240 Speaker 1: did that. And I had great talent and James Gorman 229 00:11:45,360 --> 00:11:50,800 Speaker 1: was unbelievable and so cool given what we were going through. 230 00:11:51,440 --> 00:11:55,200 Speaker 1: So the leadership team remained very calm, and I you know, 231 00:11:55,200 --> 00:11:59,439 Speaker 1: I give Tom Knigs credit I give Colum credit, Gorman credit, 232 00:12:00,080 --> 00:12:03,319 Speaker 1: and I just listened to the people out there in 233 00:12:03,360 --> 00:12:05,880 Speaker 1: the business. If they did say, John, you need to 234 00:12:05,880 --> 00:12:08,920 Speaker 1: get on a plane and fly to London, I was gone. 235 00:12:09,440 --> 00:12:11,040 Speaker 1: I would do whatever they asked me to do. They 236 00:12:11,080 --> 00:12:14,800 Speaker 1: were more in contact with people and issues than I was, 237 00:12:15,280 --> 00:12:18,319 Speaker 1: and also made it a point to be seen. I'd 238 00:12:18,320 --> 00:12:21,040 Speaker 1: get out and walk the trading floor, walk investment banking floor, 239 00:12:21,559 --> 00:12:23,440 Speaker 1: and people looked at me. I'd be joking on the 240 00:12:23,480 --> 00:12:26,200 Speaker 1: trading floor. They'd say it cut. Max seems to be 241 00:12:26,240 --> 00:12:29,480 Speaker 1: really relaxed about this, and it kind of let some 242 00:12:29,559 --> 00:12:31,600 Speaker 1: of their air out of tension, just kind of went 243 00:12:31,600 --> 00:12:33,200 Speaker 1: out of their bodies and they said, no, we're going 244 00:12:33,280 --> 00:12:37,120 Speaker 1: to be all right. And you know, I really believed 245 00:12:37,120 --> 00:12:39,240 Speaker 1: we weren't going to be all right, and the worst 246 00:12:39,280 --> 00:12:41,600 Speaker 1: thing we could have done was panicked, and we didn't. 247 00:12:41,960 --> 00:12:44,240 Speaker 1: And I had a team in place, is starting with 248 00:12:44,280 --> 00:12:47,600 Speaker 1: people like Tom Nds and James Gorman and Colum callaher 249 00:12:48,040 --> 00:12:50,360 Speaker 1: who really got us through that. So I was lucky 250 00:12:50,840 --> 00:12:53,200 Speaker 1: in many ways that it wasn't me. It was the 251 00:12:53,240 --> 00:12:54,600 Speaker 1: team that's who got us through it.