WEBVTT - Why is Meta's Andy Stone wanted by Russia? 0:00:04.440 --> 0:00:12.360 Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 0:00:12.360 --> 0:00:15.720 and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 0:00:15.760 --> 0:00:18.639 I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and How the 0:00:18.760 --> 0:00:22.200 Tech are you? If you've been listening to tech Stuff 0:00:22.239 --> 0:00:25.880 for a while, or if you keep up with tech 0:00:25.960 --> 0:00:30.560 news in general, the name Andy Stone might ring a 0:00:30.600 --> 0:00:33.600 bell now. Unlike a lot of the other folks that 0:00:33.680 --> 0:00:36.600 I talk about on the show, you know, like geniuses 0:00:36.760 --> 0:00:41.800 like Ada Lovelace or Nikola Tesla, or you know, company 0:00:41.840 --> 0:00:46.559 founders like Gordon Moore or Steve Wozniak, or even controversial 0:00:46.680 --> 0:00:51.200 corporate leaders like Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg, Andy Stone 0:00:51.479 --> 0:00:55.480 isn't that deeply rooted in the world of tech. In fact, 0:00:56.120 --> 0:00:59.440 until twenty fourteen, he spent his professional career working in 0:00:59.520 --> 0:01:04.880 government and campaign positions and stuff related to that. And now, 0:01:05.000 --> 0:01:10.640 according to reports, Russia's Interior Ministry has added Andy Stone's 0:01:10.720 --> 0:01:14.440 name to its wanted list. So I thought we could 0:01:14.480 --> 0:01:17.400 do a short episode about Stone, the job he's held 0:01:17.400 --> 0:01:20.560 since twenty fourteen, and what might have led him to 0:01:20.600 --> 0:01:23.880 be considered a criminal in Russia. Here in the States, 0:01:24.280 --> 0:01:26.679 there are people who certainly take issues with some of 0:01:26.680 --> 0:01:29.560 the things Stone has said, but I'm not sure anyone 0:01:29.600 --> 0:01:31.400 would go so far as to call him a criminal. 0:01:31.480 --> 0:01:36.920 Here in the US, Stone's forte is at least presumably 0:01:37.000 --> 0:01:42.000 in communications. He attended George Washington University, a prestigious college 0:01:42.040 --> 0:01:45.759 here in the US, and he studied political communication while 0:01:45.800 --> 0:01:49.840 he was there. That school happens to be located in Washington, 0:01:49.960 --> 0:01:52.320 d C. There are a couple of other schools in 0:01:52.360 --> 0:01:55.920 that area where typically the students who are going to 0:01:55.960 --> 0:01:59.400 those schools often end up working with the government in 0:01:59.400 --> 0:02:02.560 some form or another. It's pretty common, like a lot 0:02:02.560 --> 0:02:06.080 of jobs are directly or indirectly connected to the US 0:02:06.120 --> 0:02:10.200 government or at least a government there. Because my partner 0:02:10.280 --> 0:02:13.400 attended Georgetown, which is in DC, and worked for the 0:02:13.520 --> 0:02:17.360 French embassy for a while, so again it's a place 0:02:17.360 --> 0:02:21.600 where you make connections. Stone worked for presidential candidate John 0:02:21.720 --> 0:02:25.639 Kerry's campaign in two thousand and three, and in late 0:02:25.639 --> 0:02:28.799 two thousand and four he joined M and R Strategic 0:02:28.960 --> 0:02:32.880 Services as a consultant. Now that's a company that primarily 0:02:32.880 --> 0:02:37.720 focuses on political communications, so not affiliated with any specific 0:02:38.160 --> 0:02:42.800 candidate or party, but is there to act as a 0:02:42.880 --> 0:02:48.520 consultant for the purposes of creating political communications, so again 0:02:48.880 --> 0:02:51.760 very much in line with what he had already been doing. 0:02:51.800 --> 0:02:55.080 He would then become the communications director for Congress in 0:02:55.120 --> 0:02:57.280 two thousand and seven, and you kind of see where 0:02:57.320 --> 0:02:59.880 this is going. The nature of politics here in America 0:03:00.080 --> 0:03:04.240 means that any role you hold in government, like if 0:03:04.240 --> 0:03:09.040 you're actually connected to a governmental party, it's likely on 0:03:09.120 --> 0:03:12.400 borrowed time election cycles change up who's in charge on 0:03:12.560 --> 0:03:15.800 the rag. Now there are, of course, federal employees who 0:03:15.840 --> 0:03:20.480 typically hold positions from administration to administration, and they don't 0:03:20.560 --> 0:03:25.440 necessarily change each time there's a change in leadership, although 0:03:25.680 --> 0:03:29.920 there are efforts to make that be very different. Anyway, 0:03:29.960 --> 0:03:33.079 that's getting into a whole different realm. But from two 0:03:33.120 --> 0:03:35.760 thousand and three to twenty fourteen, pretty much all of 0:03:35.840 --> 0:03:41.200 Andy Stone's work focused on political communications, either as part 0:03:41.360 --> 0:03:44.760 of a campaign or part of a governmental body or 0:03:44.840 --> 0:03:48.320 part of the private sector, but still catering to politics. 0:03:48.840 --> 0:03:53.320 Now that changed in the spring of twenty fourteen, That 0:03:53.480 --> 0:03:56.640 is when Meta, then known as Facebook they had not 0:03:56.760 --> 0:04:00.440 changed their name yet, offered Stone a gig as a 0:04:00.600 --> 0:04:07.320 policy communications manager for Facebook. Now, by this time, Facebook 0:04:07.320 --> 0:04:12.440 had already sailed past the incredible milestone of having a 0:04:12.480 --> 0:04:16.640 billion active users per month. That had happened actually back 0:04:16.680 --> 0:04:21.640 in twenty twelve, so it was definitely already a huge 0:04:21.800 --> 0:04:26.239 company by twenty fourteen. They had also acquired Instagram. Also 0:04:26.320 --> 0:04:30.520 back in twenty twelve, and just before Stone would join 0:04:30.600 --> 0:04:35.039 the company, Facebook had announced it was acquiring Wattsapp. This 0:04:35.279 --> 0:04:39.040 was a truly huge acquisition deal in the billions of dollars, 0:04:39.560 --> 0:04:43.240 so a lot was going on. In fact, when Stone 0:04:43.520 --> 0:04:47.400 joined Facebook, that very same month, the company announced its 0:04:47.440 --> 0:04:50.960 intention to acquire Oculus VR, so a lot of the 0:04:52.000 --> 0:04:56.520 components that make up you know, various foundational elements of 0:04:56.760 --> 0:05:00.480 Meta today, those were all being acquired around the same 0:05:00.560 --> 0:05:03.719 time that Andy Stone joined the company. Now, on top 0:05:03.760 --> 0:05:06.560 of all that, the company was also launching some very 0:05:06.600 --> 0:05:12.240 progressive features. For example, one month before Stone joined Facebook, 0:05:12.600 --> 0:05:15.920 the company updated its platform to allow for different gender 0:05:16.000 --> 0:05:20.560 designations in support of the LGBTQ plus community, So you 0:05:20.560 --> 0:05:24.000 suddenly had a lot more pronouns that you could use 0:05:24.000 --> 0:05:28.320 when you were creating your profile and thus represent yourself 0:05:28.360 --> 0:05:33.000 more accurately. This was a pretty progressive approach, especially in 0:05:33.000 --> 0:05:36.800 twenty fourteen, and Andy Stone had focused a lot of 0:05:36.839 --> 0:05:41.320 his career on how to communicate progressive policies to the public, 0:05:41.440 --> 0:05:45.920 because most of the time he was focusing on socially 0:05:45.960 --> 0:05:50.640 progressive democratic campaigns and policies, So this kind of was 0:05:50.960 --> 0:05:55.800 a type of synergy when he joined Facebook. I don't 0:05:55.800 --> 0:06:00.920 have very much background about Andy Stone beyond this. I'm 0:06:00.960 --> 0:06:04.360 sure there's stuff that's out there. Right now, the news 0:06:04.360 --> 0:06:07.159 cycle is just flooded with this story about Russia putting 0:06:07.200 --> 0:06:10.360 him on a wanted list. But when I started trying 0:06:10.400 --> 0:06:12.280 to dig around and just learn a little bit more 0:06:12.320 --> 0:06:15.120 about him, I mean, I've seen his name dozens of times. 0:06:15.440 --> 0:06:17.880 When I tried to learn more about him, there really 0:06:18.120 --> 0:06:21.640 wasn't a whole lot to find. Again, I'm sure if 0:06:21.640 --> 0:06:23.760 I did a super deep dive, I could change that, 0:06:23.880 --> 0:06:27.000 But it is interesting to me that someone who has 0:06:27.040 --> 0:06:30.880 dedicated his career in public communications has also managed to 0:06:30.920 --> 0:06:35.880 maintain a pretty low profile. Stone's name pops up a 0:06:35.920 --> 0:06:40.960 lot since twenty fourteen. These days, according to LinkedIn anyway, 0:06:41.080 --> 0:06:45.279 his title is communications director, and that means that when 0:06:45.279 --> 0:06:49.040 you come across a story that includes something like Facebook 0:06:49.080 --> 0:06:53.359 says it's disappointed in the EU's decision or whatever, there's 0:06:53.400 --> 0:06:57.440 a darn good chance that Facebook was actually Andy Stone 0:06:57.480 --> 0:06:59.920 who said this. He's been the spokesperson for the cum 0:07:00.520 --> 0:07:03.960 in many of its trials and tribulations over the last 0:07:03.960 --> 0:07:07.479 several years. Stone's job is really to serve as the 0:07:07.520 --> 0:07:11.200 mouthpiece for the company and to craft communications on the 0:07:11.240 --> 0:07:14.760 company's behalf, and I imagine his job has grown a 0:07:14.800 --> 0:07:18.240 lot more challenging over recent years in the wake of 0:07:18.280 --> 0:07:22.600 a series of scandals and difficult events, such as the 0:07:22.680 --> 0:07:26.480 unraveling of the Cambridge Analytica scandal. Now, if you don't 0:07:26.520 --> 0:07:30.440 remember the Cambridge Analytica story, good for you. But it 0:07:30.520 --> 0:07:34.520 refers to a political consulting company that leaned on an 0:07:34.560 --> 0:07:38.320 app that was used to scrape data from Facebook without 0:07:38.360 --> 0:07:41.240 first getting user permissions. And they were able to do 0:07:41.280 --> 0:07:45.040 this because for a while, Facebook really didn't provide adequate 0:07:45.080 --> 0:07:51.000 protections with its application programming interface. So essentially, before Facebook 0:07:51.080 --> 0:07:54.480 actually addressed this issue, a developer could create an app 0:07:54.680 --> 0:07:59.680 for Facebook that, when installed, could access way more information 0:07:59.840 --> 0:08:02.880 than what was actually needed for the app to work. 0:08:03.280 --> 0:08:06.120 For example, maybe you create a game, a very simple 0:08:06.200 --> 0:08:11.120 game that is within Facebook or just uses Facebook credentials 0:08:11.160 --> 0:08:13.400 in or for you to log into the game, but 0:08:13.520 --> 0:08:17.280 as part of that installation process, the app gets permissions 0:08:17.320 --> 0:08:21.440 from the user to access all kinds of data, like 0:08:22.080 --> 0:08:26.679 maybe everything that is personal information related to the user 0:08:26.800 --> 0:08:30.800 gets sent to the developer. Maybe it gives the developer 0:08:30.920 --> 0:08:35.439 access to view all of that user's friends and contacts 0:08:35.440 --> 0:08:38.720 on Facebook, and none of that is necessary for the 0:08:38.760 --> 0:08:42.840 game to work. But really, until the mid twenty tens, 0:08:43.360 --> 0:08:46.600 Facebook kind of let that go, like they just let 0:08:46.679 --> 0:08:49.600 developers get access to all sorts of information, whether it 0:08:49.720 --> 0:08:52.400 was necessary for the app to work or not. So 0:08:52.880 --> 0:08:56.760 in the case of Cambridge Analytica, the company was making 0:08:56.880 --> 0:09:00.720 use of a survey app, and this particular survey would 0:09:00.760 --> 0:09:04.079 actually offer a fee to users. It would pay people 0:09:04.280 --> 0:09:07.120 to take the survey. Folks like getting money, so that 0:09:07.160 --> 0:09:09.520 was a huge incentive. A lot of folks said sure, 0:09:09.920 --> 0:09:12.360 and they ended up installing this little app so they 0:09:12.360 --> 0:09:14.680 could take the survey. Now, what they may not have 0:09:14.760 --> 0:09:17.760 realized is that by installing the app, they were essentially 0:09:17.760 --> 0:09:21.640 opening up all of their connections to scrutiny, because now 0:09:21.720 --> 0:09:25.760 Cambridge Analytica, through this app, could view not just the 0:09:26.000 --> 0:09:30.400 survey taker's information, but all the people who that person 0:09:30.520 --> 0:09:33.120 was friends with. They could view those profiles as if 0:09:33.120 --> 0:09:35.480 they were the person who took the survey. So it 0:09:35.559 --> 0:09:38.760 suddenly opened up the opportunity to scrape data on a 0:09:38.840 --> 0:09:43.800 much larger scale. In fact, millions of accounts were affected 0:09:43.800 --> 0:09:45.599 by this, and so you didn't have to be the 0:09:45.640 --> 0:09:47.720 person who downloaded the survey. You just had to have 0:09:47.760 --> 0:09:49.839 a friend who did it. And if they did it, 0:09:50.200 --> 0:09:55.520 you were affected too. So Cambridge Analytica accesses millions of 0:09:55.559 --> 0:09:59.680 people's profiles without their permission, and Andy Stone had the 0:09:59.720 --> 0:10:04.640 un inviewable task of announcing findings to the media about 0:10:04.760 --> 0:10:09.160 that situation. So when Facebook did an investigation and estimated 0:10:09.160 --> 0:10:12.839 that around eighty seven million accounts were affected, this number 0:10:12.840 --> 0:10:16.360 would fluctuate quite a bit throughout the investigations, but this 0:10:16.480 --> 0:10:19.600 was an early one. Well, Andy Stone was the person 0:10:19.640 --> 0:10:23.960 who had to actually deliver that information to the media. 0:10:24.559 --> 0:10:28.360 Not a whole lot of fun. Anyway, we're gonna come 0:10:28.400 --> 0:10:32.000 back to talk more about Andy Stone in just a moment. 0:10:32.040 --> 0:10:34.080 Before we can do that, let's take a quick break 0:10:34.160 --> 0:10:46.480 to thank our sponsors. So I was talking before the 0:10:46.520 --> 0:10:50.240 break about Andy Stone having to deliver rough news about 0:10:50.280 --> 0:10:55.040 the Cambridge Analytica to the media as this scandal was unfolding. 0:10:55.440 --> 0:10:57.480 But This was around the same time where Stone began 0:10:57.520 --> 0:11:01.840 to build a reputation for being let's call it assertive 0:11:02.400 --> 0:11:07.160 on platforms like Twitter and using that platform to refute 0:11:07.280 --> 0:11:11.840 or criticize Facebook's own critics, kind of like striking back 0:11:11.880 --> 0:11:14.840 at the critics. One of the journalists who covered the 0:11:14.880 --> 0:11:19.439 Cambridge Analytica story was Carol Cadwaller, So on top of 0:11:19.520 --> 0:11:23.000 being a journalist, Cadwaller became a member of the independent 0:11:23.120 --> 0:11:27.760 Oversight Board for Facebook. You might remember this board reviews 0:11:27.800 --> 0:11:32.719 Facebook's decisions to determine if the company is actually aligning 0:11:32.760 --> 0:11:36.080 with its own policies. You may also remember that the 0:11:36.120 --> 0:11:39.200 board can make recommendations to Facebook, but the company is 0:11:39.280 --> 0:11:45.400 under no obligation to actually adopt those recommendations, which obviously 0:11:45.520 --> 0:11:48.760 brings up the question how effective the board can actually be. 0:11:48.920 --> 0:11:53.640 But anyway, Cadwaller says that Stone attempted to discredit her 0:11:53.720 --> 0:11:59.720 by sharing quote deliberate deceptions regarding Cambridge Analytica and deliberately 0:12:00.360 --> 0:12:04.560 trolled me. It was just in no way appropriate for 0:12:04.640 --> 0:12:08.440 the corporate pr of a trillion dollar company to behave 0:12:08.600 --> 0:12:12.200 like that toward a journalist end quote. So this would 0:12:12.240 --> 0:12:14.840 not be the last time the journalists as well as 0:12:15.080 --> 0:12:21.000 others would complain of Andy Stone's approach, particularly on Twitter. 0:12:21.880 --> 0:12:25.800 Another high profile case was when former Facebook employee Francis 0:12:25.840 --> 0:12:29.040 Hogan came forward in late twenty twenty one with a 0:12:29.040 --> 0:12:34.520 whistleblower report on the company. She shared thousands of internal 0:12:34.520 --> 0:12:37.880 documents that didn't exactly put Facebook in a good light. 0:12:38.280 --> 0:12:40.840 In fact, we're still learning about stuff that was in 0:12:40.920 --> 0:12:43.640 those documents, and a lot of the stuff in there 0:12:43.679 --> 0:12:47.280 suggests that the people in Facebook now known as Meta 0:12:47.520 --> 0:12:51.920 were more aware of negative aspects that the company and 0:12:52.000 --> 0:12:57.600 its platforms had on certain users than had been previously disclosed. Anyway, 0:12:58.080 --> 0:13:00.240 Andy Stone frequently had to go to bat for the 0:13:00.280 --> 0:13:03.560 company and defend it, as report after report filed in 0:13:03.640 --> 0:13:07.600 about issues like the company's influence on young users in particular. 0:13:08.080 --> 0:13:10.640 And I'm not sure that Stone's efforts were always effective 0:13:10.880 --> 0:13:14.120 when it came to deflecting her testimony in front of Congress, 0:13:14.559 --> 0:13:18.280 because again he took to Twitter to try and discredit 0:13:18.320 --> 0:13:23.320 her or to hang some doubt upon her and her point. 0:13:23.960 --> 0:13:26.720 One message he posted to Twitter, of course, now known 0:13:26.720 --> 0:13:30.760 as x read quote just pointing out the fact that 0:13:30.800 --> 0:13:34.280 Francis Hogan did not work on child safety or Instagram 0:13:34.440 --> 0:13:37.240 or research these issues, and has no direct knowledge of 0:13:37.280 --> 0:13:40.560 the topic from her work at Facebook. End quote, which, 0:13:40.960 --> 0:13:43.120 if you were to ask me, that seems like a 0:13:43.240 --> 0:13:48.680 pretty darn weak defense. Because if someone dumped tens of 0:13:48.880 --> 0:13:54.000 thousands of actual corporate documents in my lap and then 0:13:54.080 --> 0:13:56.960 told me that this stuff comes from inside company so 0:13:57.040 --> 0:13:59.920 and so, and it says the company has knowingly engaged 0:14:00.080 --> 0:14:04.600 in some questionable stuff and continues to do so, even 0:14:04.720 --> 0:14:08.400 knowing the potential consequences for that, I wouldn't really be 0:14:08.520 --> 0:14:15.080 concerned about that person's expertise in whatever the field was. Right, 0:14:15.200 --> 0:14:18.319 assuming that I could determine that the documents are legitimate, 0:14:18.600 --> 0:14:21.280 that they in fact came from within the company that 0:14:21.480 --> 0:14:25.320 was claimed, then it doesn't matter the level of expertise 0:14:25.320 --> 0:14:27.520 of the person who brought them to me. I would 0:14:27.520 --> 0:14:30.560 be more concerned about the actual content of the documents, 0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:35.560 and the people who produce those documents presumably were experts 0:14:35.880 --> 0:14:39.320 in their field. It doesn't matter if the messenger is 0:14:39.360 --> 0:14:44.000 an expert. In fact, Andy Stone should know that quite 0:14:44.000 --> 0:14:47.440 well because he has been the messenger many times. He 0:14:47.560 --> 0:14:51.760 is not the person who creates the different message or 0:14:51.800 --> 0:14:54.760 the different policies. I should say, he creates the messages 0:14:54.800 --> 0:14:59.120 around them, So you should know that a person's expertise 0:14:59.160 --> 0:15:03.040 isn't really the matter of concern when you're talking about 0:15:03.280 --> 0:15:08.320 documents that have some pretty damning content in them. Now, 0:15:08.360 --> 0:15:13.600 Stone's posts on Twitter prompted some pretty interesting responses around 0:15:13.680 --> 0:15:18.040 the journalist field and beyond. So for example, Bob Pickard, 0:15:18.360 --> 0:15:21.800 who is the CEO of Signal Leadership Communication, This is 0:15:21.840 --> 0:15:28.320 a consulting group that helps executives create communications to the 0:15:28.360 --> 0:15:30.760 public so that they can do so in a way 0:15:30.800 --> 0:15:34.480 that is responsible and accountable, that's going to have the 0:15:34.520 --> 0:15:37.080 best impact, that's not going to run a foul of 0:15:37.440 --> 0:15:39.160 the law of that kind of stuff like this is 0:15:39.720 --> 0:15:44.680 high level communications we're talking about here. Well, Pickman said, 0:15:44.760 --> 0:15:50.800 quote Facebook's crisis comms on this issue are embarrassingly bad. 0:15:51.400 --> 0:15:55.680 Everyone is talking about Facebook's poor PR, which is often 0:15:55.720 --> 0:15:58.520 a proxy for other issues, but I think the comms 0:15:58.600 --> 0:16:03.600 themselves are in d crap end quote. Now, that wasn't 0:16:03.760 --> 0:16:07.520 just referring to Andy Stone, but certainly Stone was being 0:16:08.200 --> 0:16:12.600 lumped in with this criticism. Several PR professionals question why 0:16:12.680 --> 0:16:16.400 Stone was even posting on Twitter at all about this stuff, 0:16:16.840 --> 0:16:20.400 why he was taking this particular tactic. They said it 0:16:20.440 --> 0:16:24.800 was antithetical to the way you would typically try to 0:16:24.840 --> 0:16:29.360 build up a communications department within a company. They said that, 0:16:29.480 --> 0:16:32.120 you know, usually you want to build relationships with the 0:16:32.160 --> 0:16:36.120 press so that you can get more favorable coverage, and 0:16:36.440 --> 0:16:40.479 using Twitter to snipe at journalists who have posted stories 0:16:40.720 --> 0:16:45.480 that critique the company isn't really conducive toward doing that. 0:16:45.960 --> 0:16:49.160 They compared it more to his work in politics, and 0:16:49.200 --> 0:16:53.040 that in politics, often communications leads to a quote unquote 0:16:53.160 --> 0:16:55.400 zero sum game where there has to be a winner 0:16:55.400 --> 0:17:01.400 and a loser, and in those sort of of avenues, 0:17:02.120 --> 0:17:06.280 it was more common to see this kind of banter 0:17:06.440 --> 0:17:09.439 going back and forth between a PR person and the press. 0:17:10.080 --> 0:17:13.960 Less so when it comes to corporate communications now. Earlier 0:17:14.000 --> 0:17:17.520 this year, Stone served as the messenger for another sticky 0:17:17.760 --> 0:17:23.480 situation see Meta slash. Facebook has a strict policy against 0:17:23.840 --> 0:17:29.359 data scraping. The most valuable asset that Meta has is 0:17:29.520 --> 0:17:33.960 access to our information. We are the product. You've often 0:17:34.359 --> 0:17:38.280 probably heard that that if you go someplace and the 0:17:38.359 --> 0:17:40.679 thing is free, then it turns out you are the 0:17:40.720 --> 0:17:43.959 product that's for sale. That's definitely the case when it 0:17:43.960 --> 0:17:48.240 comes to Meta's platforms. All of our interactions, everything we 0:17:48.359 --> 0:17:52.280 post to the platform, everything we look at and engage 0:17:52.280 --> 0:17:56.640 with on those platforms. All of that is valuable, right, 0:17:56.720 --> 0:17:59.840 That's all data that's incredibly valuable because Meta can pack 0:17:59.840 --> 0:18:03.560 it this up and then sell it to advertisers. So 0:18:03.640 --> 0:18:08.040 the more you use Meta's products, the more valuable you become, 0:18:08.760 --> 0:18:11.159 and the more information you share about other people in 0:18:11.160 --> 0:18:14.199 your life, the more valuable you become. We are a 0:18:14.480 --> 0:18:19.360 gold mine for Meta, and Meta guards that gold mine jealously. 0:18:20.119 --> 0:18:22.640 The fact that people don't flip out. More over, how 0:18:22.680 --> 0:18:26.639 their personal information is exploited for the benefit of a 0:18:26.880 --> 0:18:32.480 truly massive corporation amazes me. I guess, I guess not 0:18:32.600 --> 0:18:35.360 everyone fully understands it, and the people who do understand 0:18:35.400 --> 0:18:37.760 it ultimately think, ah, it's not that big a deal. 0:18:37.800 --> 0:18:42.520 I mean, it's just some personal information. But it's really not. 0:18:42.840 --> 0:18:45.359 I mean, it's really a big deal. It's really not 0:18:45.560 --> 0:18:50.000 something you should just dismiss. It's important, and the point 0:18:50.000 --> 0:18:53.520 where it can become important for you specifically as opposed 0:18:53.520 --> 0:18:57.159 to just in the general, then it's too late. But 0:18:57.280 --> 0:19:01.040 this is a potentially fragile arrangement. Meta records that Meta 0:19:01.080 --> 0:19:04.639 recognizes that if people wake up to the fact that 0:19:05.680 --> 0:19:09.080 they really need to protect their personal information in a 0:19:09.200 --> 0:19:12.480 more aggressive way. And if you start to see governments 0:19:12.520 --> 0:19:17.000 around the world pass laws to help actually achieve this goal, 0:19:17.840 --> 0:19:23.360 Meta's revenue is in danger. So Meta is very very 0:19:23.400 --> 0:19:26.800 careful to not really bring too much attention to this 0:19:26.840 --> 0:19:29.040 part of its business, at least not in a way 0:19:29.080 --> 0:19:33.280 that is obvious to users. But it also means Meta 0:19:33.400 --> 0:19:36.800 is very jealous of this information. If some other company 0:19:36.800 --> 0:19:40.480 swoops in and starts to crawl Meta's platforms in order 0:19:40.480 --> 0:19:44.679 to build out databases, that can threaten Meta's own business model, 0:19:44.920 --> 0:19:47.400 because if we notice that this other company is doing it, 0:19:47.880 --> 0:19:50.320 and we're worried about this other company, we might start 0:19:50.359 --> 0:19:55.560 asking questions about Meta itself. So take Clearview AI for example. 0:19:56.200 --> 0:20:00.639 This company created a huge facial recognition database. But in 0:20:00.760 --> 0:20:03.720 order to do that, you first have to grab a 0:20:03.760 --> 0:20:07.440 whole bunch of pictures of people. Now that's obvious, right, 0:20:07.520 --> 0:20:10.639 Like you have to get the pictures in order to 0:20:11.200 --> 0:20:14.960 actually have a database of facial recognition photos. But where 0:20:14.960 --> 0:20:17.600 do you get the pictures from? Right? You know, you're 0:20:17.600 --> 0:20:20.440 not just going door to door and snapping photos of people. No, 0:20:20.600 --> 0:20:24.120 what clearview AI did and the CEO admitted as much. 0:20:24.560 --> 0:20:29.000 The company scraped various social network platforms, including Facebook to 0:20:29.080 --> 0:20:33.840 build out its database of thirty billion photographs, and clearview 0:20:33.880 --> 0:20:39.359 AI's customers included authoritarian organizations you know we're talking about 0:20:39.359 --> 0:20:42.120 like law enforcement agencies, that kind of thing that would 0:20:42.200 --> 0:20:45.280 use clearview AI's databases to try and do things like 0:20:45.280 --> 0:20:47.640 like identify suspects that sort of stuff. So it kind 0:20:47.680 --> 0:20:52.040 of ties into issues like a surveillance state. So obviously 0:20:52.320 --> 0:20:54.639 this kind of story can have a negative impact on 0:20:54.680 --> 0:20:57.800 companies like Meta, and Meta has made it clear that 0:20:57.960 --> 0:21:01.520 it is against its terms of service for other companies 0:21:01.560 --> 0:21:05.359 to scrape Meta's platforms, you know, like Facebook or Instagram 0:21:05.560 --> 0:21:08.879 or to get data. But what if journalists discover that 0:21:08.960 --> 0:21:13.159 Meta is also engaged in data scraping from other websites. 0:21:13.960 --> 0:21:16.119 And this brings us to the curious case of Meta 0:21:16.240 --> 0:21:20.240 and a data collection company called Bright Data. So Meta 0:21:20.280 --> 0:21:24.560 recently sued Bright Data in January of this year, twenty 0:21:24.640 --> 0:21:28.240 twenty three, and accused the company of scraping data from 0:21:28.280 --> 0:21:32.359 Meta platforms. However, it has also come to light that 0:21:32.440 --> 0:21:37.000 Bright Data and Meta have been engaged in a subcontractor 0:21:37.040 --> 0:21:41.480 relationship that Bright Data has worked for Meta and has 0:21:41.920 --> 0:21:45.639 pulled data from other websites so that Meta could do 0:21:45.720 --> 0:21:50.600 stuff like build out brand profiles and reportedly do things 0:21:50.640 --> 0:21:54.200 like identify potential bad actors out there. So, in other words, 0:21:54.200 --> 0:21:58.399 Bright Data was pulling data or scraping data off of 0:21:58.480 --> 0:22:02.080 other sites in order to supply that information to Meta. 0:22:02.600 --> 0:22:04.960 So Stone was pulled into action to comment on this, 0:22:05.359 --> 0:22:08.919 and he said, quote, the collection of data from websites 0:22:08.960 --> 0:22:13.800 can serve legitimate integrity and commercial purposes if done lawfully 0:22:14.040 --> 0:22:17.760 and in accordance with those websites terms end quote. This 0:22:17.920 --> 0:22:21.880 was a really awkward situation because he had to defend 0:22:21.960 --> 0:22:26.239 Meta's work with a data collection company, while Meta is 0:22:26.560 --> 0:22:30.320 famous for going after companies that were data scraping its 0:22:30.320 --> 0:22:32.960 own platforms. So, in other words, Meta saying, it's not 0:22:33.080 --> 0:22:35.280 cool for you to do that to us, but it's 0:22:35.280 --> 0:22:38.119 totally cool if we do that to other websites. You 0:22:38.160 --> 0:22:42.200 know that's fine. So do as we say, now as 0:22:42.200 --> 0:22:46.000 we do. Okay, we're gonna take another quick break. When 0:22:46.040 --> 0:22:49.320 we come back, we'll talk more about the actual lead 0:22:49.400 --> 0:22:55.240 into Andy Stone being named a wanted individual by Russia's government. 0:22:55.520 --> 0:23:08.840 The first a word from our sponsors. Okay, why was 0:23:08.960 --> 0:23:13.720 Andy Stone, a communications director for Meta, put on a 0:23:13.880 --> 0:23:16.919 wanted list. In fact, some outlets call it a most 0:23:17.119 --> 0:23:23.200 wanted list for Russia. Well, it relates to Russia's invasion 0:23:23.280 --> 0:23:27.800 of Ukraine and potentially to some temporary changes to Meta's 0:23:27.800 --> 0:23:33.560 policies regarding violent content on Facebook or calls for violence 0:23:33.800 --> 0:23:38.760 to be more specific on Facebook, and so in that regard. 0:23:38.800 --> 0:23:41.439 If that's all true, this very much becomes a shoot 0:23:41.520 --> 0:23:45.720 the Messenger kind of story. I should point out apparently 0:23:45.800 --> 0:23:49.159 Stone's name has actually been on this wanted list since 0:23:49.400 --> 0:23:53.359 February twenty twenty two. We only learned about it this 0:23:53.480 --> 0:23:56.040 week when a media outlet that keeps an eye on 0:23:56.080 --> 0:23:58.400 such things posted a story about it and it went 0:23:58.400 --> 0:24:01.240 in viral from there. But to be clear, the actual 0:24:01.400 --> 0:24:05.639 charges against Stone remain undisclosed. The media reports simply that 0:24:05.680 --> 0:24:09.120 Stone is quote wanted under an article of the Criminal 0:24:09.160 --> 0:24:13.400 Code of the Russian Federation end quote. That's not helpful. 0:24:13.440 --> 0:24:16.920 It's not descriptive at all. We don't know what code, 0:24:17.520 --> 0:24:20.760 what article he's wanted under, right, we don't know what 0:24:21.000 --> 0:24:26.840 law he supposedly broke under the Russian Federation law. But 0:24:26.960 --> 0:24:29.640 let's look back at the early days of Russia's invasion 0:24:29.720 --> 0:24:33.399 of Ukraine to kind of at least get a working 0:24:33.480 --> 0:24:38.280 hypothesis here. There had been aggressive actions between Russia and 0:24:38.359 --> 0:24:41.280 Ukraine dating back since at least twenty fourteen, but the 0:24:41.320 --> 0:24:46.280 actual invasion began on February twenty fourth, twenty twenty two. 0:24:46.520 --> 0:24:53.159 On March tenth, Meta made a really big change. And traditionally, 0:24:53.200 --> 0:24:57.640 posts on Meta's platforms that include calls for violence against 0:24:57.680 --> 0:25:02.879 people are a huge violation of Meta's rules that Meta 0:25:02.920 --> 0:25:07.440 would take such things down immediately or at least investigate them, 0:25:07.720 --> 0:25:11.000 assuming that someone had flagged the post. That's at least 0:25:11.000 --> 0:25:13.119 according to the policy. Whether or not that's actually how 0:25:13.200 --> 0:25:17.639 it plays out depends on the situation, but often it 0:25:17.720 --> 0:25:21.960 means that that Meta ends up sending the flag to 0:25:22.240 --> 0:25:26.720 someone like a subcontractor to review the incident and determine 0:25:26.720 --> 0:25:28.879 whether or not it was actually against Meta's policies and 0:25:28.920 --> 0:25:32.240 then figure out where to go from There. Doesn't mean 0:25:32.880 --> 0:25:36.240 removing the post or banning the person for a given 0:25:36.280 --> 0:25:39.000 amount of time. It all just depends on the situation. 0:25:39.880 --> 0:25:43.640 But on March tenth, Meta announced it would allow users, 0:25:43.680 --> 0:25:47.240 at least in certain countries to post calls for violence 0:25:47.680 --> 0:25:52.440 against Russians and specifically Russian soldiers, and this was all 0:25:52.480 --> 0:25:56.640 within the context of the Ukraine invasion. Reuters reported that 0:25:56.840 --> 0:26:00.359 internal messages within Meta even indicated that posts that would 0:26:00.359 --> 0:26:04.080 call for the deaths of Russia's president Vladimir Putin or 0:26:04.119 --> 0:26:08.800 the president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashinko were fair game. Again, 0:26:08.880 --> 0:26:12.840 this is something that typically is very much against Meta's policies, 0:26:13.520 --> 0:26:18.480 and Reuters reported that, well, they didn't name the Meta spokesperson, 0:26:18.520 --> 0:26:21.280 but later it was revealed to be Andy Stone. They 0:26:21.320 --> 0:26:25.240 revealed a spokesperson release the statement quote as a result 0:26:25.359 --> 0:26:28.760 of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we have temporarily made 0:26:28.800 --> 0:26:32.760 allowances for forms of political expression that would normally violate 0:26:32.840 --> 0:26:36.440 our rules, like violent speech such as death to the 0:26:36.520 --> 0:26:40.480 Russian invaders. We still won't allow credible calls for violence 0:26:40.520 --> 0:26:45.399 against Russian civilians end quote. A couple of weeks later, 0:26:45.960 --> 0:26:52.400