1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:06,040 Speaker 1: So it's not all true crime allegations of the paranormal 2 00:00:06,200 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: and very very spooky stuff here on stuff they don't 3 00:00:09,119 --> 00:00:12,360 Speaker 1: want you to know. In fact, sometimes we get pretty granular. 4 00:00:12,520 --> 00:00:15,920 Speaker 1: And I cannot remember how this when came about, but 5 00:00:16,040 --> 00:00:18,840 Speaker 1: I think we we had an off air conversations we 6 00:00:18,920 --> 00:00:23,520 Speaker 1: often do about things that bugged our paranoid minds, like 7 00:00:23,640 --> 00:00:25,799 Speaker 1: free WiFi. Yeah, like you know, we were at the 8 00:00:25,800 --> 00:00:27,479 Speaker 1: airport and we just said it says like you know, 9 00:00:27,480 --> 00:00:30,000 Speaker 1: we're looking at them that works available and goes airport 10 00:00:30,120 --> 00:00:35,360 Speaker 1: WiFi definitely legit and free log on now, yes, exactly. 11 00:00:35,440 --> 00:00:37,640 Speaker 1: I want to say this came up due to reporting 12 00:00:38,200 --> 00:00:42,640 Speaker 1: surrounding the Olympics and the Olympic Games, and maybe I'm wrong, 13 00:00:42,720 --> 00:00:47,839 Speaker 1: this was somewhere around there. I remember there were specific 14 00:00:47,840 --> 00:00:51,280 Speaker 1: reports about joining free WiFi when you're out to visit 15 00:00:51,320 --> 00:00:54,400 Speaker 1: the Olympic Games in another country. Yeah, and this this 16 00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:59,360 Speaker 1: is something that affects you in your own country, wherever 17 00:00:59,400 --> 00:01:02,600 Speaker 1: you live. We wanted to dive in and learn more 18 00:01:02,640 --> 00:01:06,720 Speaker 1: about it. So here it is free WiFi gambling with 19 00:01:06,760 --> 00:01:11,720 Speaker 1: your privacy. From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. 20 00:01:11,840 --> 00:01:15,680 Speaker 1: History is riddled with unexplained events you can turn back 21 00:01:15,720 --> 00:01:27,679 Speaker 1: now or learn the stuff they don't want you to know. Hello, 22 00:01:27,720 --> 00:01:29,640 Speaker 1: welcome back to the show. My name is Max, my 23 00:01:29,720 --> 00:01:32,080 Speaker 1: name is No. They often call me Ben. You are you? 24 00:01:32,319 --> 00:01:34,600 Speaker 1: This is stuff they don't want you to know. And 25 00:01:34,920 --> 00:01:39,000 Speaker 1: let's start with a question for those of you tuning in, 26 00:01:39,680 --> 00:01:42,479 Speaker 1: how are you listening to this show? And I don't 27 00:01:42,600 --> 00:01:45,600 Speaker 1: just necessarily mean like a boom box, which would be cool. 28 00:01:45,640 --> 00:01:47,640 Speaker 1: I don't know if our shows are on cassette yet 29 00:01:48,160 --> 00:01:52,600 Speaker 1: or are you downloading it? Have you streamed it? And 30 00:01:52,640 --> 00:01:55,520 Speaker 1: if so, where are you streaming it from. If you're 31 00:01:55,520 --> 00:01:59,160 Speaker 1: like most people, you have concerns about your data plan 32 00:01:59,480 --> 00:02:03,360 Speaker 1: on your phone and you probably want to use WiFi. 33 00:02:03,640 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 1: Holy Grail, I certainly do. If I'm going to listen 34 00:02:06,360 --> 00:02:08,840 Speaker 1: to a podcast, I download it through WiFi and then 35 00:02:08,880 --> 00:02:10,280 Speaker 1: throw it on my phone so I can have it 36 00:02:10,320 --> 00:02:13,000 Speaker 1: for later because I have trust issues. You know. Speaking 37 00:02:13,000 --> 00:02:15,760 Speaker 1: of trust issues, A T and T totally bamboozled me 38 00:02:15,800 --> 00:02:19,600 Speaker 1: out of my unlimited data plan to lower my bill 39 00:02:19,639 --> 00:02:20,880 Speaker 1: a little bit because I felt like it was a 40 00:02:20,880 --> 00:02:22,200 Speaker 1: little too high. And they're like, well, you know, if 41 00:02:22,200 --> 00:02:24,079 Speaker 1: you give up your limited data because you're clearly not 42 00:02:24,200 --> 00:02:26,400 Speaker 1: using it, we can give you this amount of data 43 00:02:26,800 --> 00:02:29,160 Speaker 1: and you know you'll be good as gold. Well, it 44 00:02:29,160 --> 00:02:33,000 Speaker 1: turns out that I exceeded just so every single month, 45 00:02:33,760 --> 00:02:39,040 Speaker 1: even with dolls pop. Yeah, So WiFi is huge because 46 00:02:39,280 --> 00:02:42,440 Speaker 1: these phone companies are tightening down data, so it's a 47 00:02:42,440 --> 00:02:45,560 Speaker 1: lot more restrictive these days. They have these plans, these 48 00:02:45,639 --> 00:02:48,240 Speaker 1: tiered plans, where you are paying for every little bit 49 00:02:48,240 --> 00:02:50,440 Speaker 1: of data that you use, much more so than in 50 00:02:50,480 --> 00:02:54,400 Speaker 1: the past. So the obvious choices to find WiFi anywhere 51 00:02:54,440 --> 00:02:57,680 Speaker 1: and everywhere that you possibly can. So a lot of 52 00:02:57,680 --> 00:03:01,320 Speaker 1: people would ask what is whyifi? It's one of those 53 00:03:01,919 --> 00:03:06,120 Speaker 1: things that the average human being just sort of accepts 54 00:03:06,240 --> 00:03:09,120 Speaker 1: as existing. You know, a lot of people own cars 55 00:03:09,160 --> 00:03:11,040 Speaker 1: but have no idea how they work. A lot of 56 00:03:11,040 --> 00:03:14,240 Speaker 1: people own phones, have no idea how they work. WiFi 57 00:03:14,440 --> 00:03:17,480 Speaker 1: is something that people just sort of accept. You're in 58 00:03:17,560 --> 00:03:21,839 Speaker 1: an airport, boom, free WiFi. It's great. You're you could 59 00:03:21,840 --> 00:03:25,240 Speaker 1: be at a restaurant, at a dentist office. There's a 60 00:03:25,240 --> 00:03:27,560 Speaker 1: pizza place next to our office that I go to 61 00:03:27,760 --> 00:03:30,800 Speaker 1: just because they have free WiFi. But what is this stuff? 62 00:03:31,200 --> 00:03:35,560 Speaker 1: WiFi is the name of any wireless networking technology that 63 00:03:35,680 --> 00:03:39,480 Speaker 1: uses radio waves to send out high speed network and 64 00:03:39,520 --> 00:03:42,520 Speaker 1: Internet connections, and it's it's such a cool little term, 65 00:03:42,560 --> 00:03:45,960 Speaker 1: almost like podcast, kind of a coined little buzz term. 66 00:03:46,200 --> 00:03:49,080 Speaker 1: And there is a organization, as it turns out, that 67 00:03:49,320 --> 00:03:53,240 Speaker 1: owns the rights to this trademark called the WiFi Alliance. 68 00:03:53,280 --> 00:03:57,720 Speaker 1: In a burst of creativity, Yes, uh, WiFi is a 69 00:03:57,800 --> 00:04:02,760 Speaker 1: registered trademark, and it's alliance specifically defines WiFi as a 70 00:04:02,800 --> 00:04:07,120 Speaker 1: wireless local area network w LAND products that are based 71 00:04:07,160 --> 00:04:12,720 Speaker 1: on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, where I 72 00:04:12,840 --> 00:04:17,359 Speaker 1: literally I Jonathan Strickland. By the way, I hope be 73 00:04:17,480 --> 00:04:20,960 Speaker 1: so glad to hear that. Um, their standards are at 74 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:24,160 Speaker 1: two dot eleven. The greatest thing about WiFi is that 75 00:04:24,200 --> 00:04:26,440 Speaker 1: you no longer have to plug in the giant ethernet 76 00:04:26,440 --> 00:04:30,080 Speaker 1: cable to get access to that beautiful, sweet sweet Internet 77 00:04:30,360 --> 00:04:32,800 Speaker 1: with all the things that you love, all the the 78 00:04:32,839 --> 00:04:36,920 Speaker 1: podcasts and videos and everything you do on their. Uh, 79 00:04:36,960 --> 00:04:39,160 Speaker 1: that's the best part about it. So it uses radio 80 00:04:39,200 --> 00:04:42,280 Speaker 1: frequencies to transfer all the information of packets, all the 81 00:04:42,320 --> 00:04:46,279 Speaker 1: packets of information rather from your computer to the access 82 00:04:46,320 --> 00:04:50,320 Speaker 1: point to the Internet, essentially through all the chain of 83 00:04:50,360 --> 00:04:52,360 Speaker 1: servers that it goes through to get to its end 84 00:04:52,360 --> 00:04:55,400 Speaker 1: point and then right back through all that stuff through 85 00:04:55,400 --> 00:04:58,480 Speaker 1: the access point to your computer. Just a lovely little 86 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:03,039 Speaker 1: handshaking can action. Yeah, this RF current hits and antenna 87 00:05:03,400 --> 00:05:07,880 Speaker 1: creating an electromagnetic field that's able to propagate through space. 88 00:05:08,279 --> 00:05:10,960 Speaker 1: That's so cool. That's so science fiction e you know, 89 00:05:11,520 --> 00:05:14,880 Speaker 1: uh right right it is. It's the magic that we 90 00:05:15,000 --> 00:05:18,240 Speaker 1: just sort of accept And a lot of a lot 91 00:05:18,320 --> 00:05:21,520 Speaker 1: of current society in the West is built on the 92 00:05:21,560 --> 00:05:25,600 Speaker 1: premise of just accepting things because they are. That way, 93 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:29,600 Speaker 1: we drive these death machines a d plus miles an 94 00:05:29,600 --> 00:05:33,960 Speaker 1: hour and just accept that. Everyone will pretend those yellow 95 00:05:33,960 --> 00:05:37,359 Speaker 1: lines in the middle are doing something much smarter people 96 00:05:37,360 --> 00:05:40,320 Speaker 1: than I figured out how to use radio waves so 97 00:05:40,360 --> 00:05:43,839 Speaker 1: that I can go on Reddit dot com. Uh, and 98 00:05:43,960 --> 00:05:47,120 Speaker 1: I just accepted we stand on the shoulders of giants, 99 00:05:47,160 --> 00:05:50,800 Speaker 1: and every great invention you know is only uh is 100 00:05:50,880 --> 00:05:54,760 Speaker 1: only capable of being discovered or created because of prior inventions. 101 00:05:54,960 --> 00:05:57,720 Speaker 1: I guess we're getting a little spacey already, you know. Uh, 102 00:05:57,800 --> 00:06:00,280 Speaker 1: space is the place, my friend, Space is the place 103 00:06:00,320 --> 00:06:02,440 Speaker 1: you're you're killing it with the slogans lately, there is 104 00:06:02,480 --> 00:06:06,120 Speaker 1: a lot more space than stuff. Yes, Yeah, we received 105 00:06:06,120 --> 00:06:09,560 Speaker 1: a great was it a YouTube comment or an email 106 00:06:10,080 --> 00:06:13,560 Speaker 1: where where someone pointed out on our live show recording 107 00:06:13,560 --> 00:06:17,279 Speaker 1: that we released that the table. Yeah, I hit the 108 00:06:17,320 --> 00:06:21,000 Speaker 1: tables and were banging on and they're like, you do 109 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:23,440 Speaker 1: realize that there's a lot more empty space in that 110 00:06:23,520 --> 00:06:26,960 Speaker 1: table than atoms, And I was like, absolutely, wow. So 111 00:06:27,240 --> 00:06:32,200 Speaker 1: to propagate through this mostly empty space, your WiFi connection 112 00:06:32,320 --> 00:06:36,960 Speaker 1: uses an electromagnetic field radio frequencies, and the primary job 113 00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:40,080 Speaker 1: of an access point is to broadcast this wireless signal 114 00:06:40,160 --> 00:06:44,680 Speaker 1: that your computer can detect and just like a radio, 115 00:06:44,839 --> 00:06:48,120 Speaker 1: just like searching for radio station can tune into. To 116 00:06:48,279 --> 00:06:51,200 Speaker 1: connect to an access point. To join a wireless network, 117 00:06:51,520 --> 00:06:54,480 Speaker 1: these computers or these devices have to be equipped with 118 00:06:54,640 --> 00:06:58,640 Speaker 1: wireless network adapters. Pretty simple, right, Yeah, And and the 119 00:06:58,680 --> 00:07:01,080 Speaker 1: great thing about it is it's not just your computer 120 00:07:01,320 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 1: that connects to it. It's anyone who can see the 121 00:07:04,880 --> 00:07:08,480 Speaker 1: network and has an adapter. Right, So who is anyone 122 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:14,200 Speaker 1: within your lifetime listeners, Depending on how young or old 123 00:07:14,320 --> 00:07:18,800 Speaker 1: you are when you were born, you have probably seen 124 00:07:18,840 --> 00:07:23,760 Speaker 1: a precipitous rise in the amount of people hopping online. 125 00:07:24,120 --> 00:07:29,680 Speaker 1: Around of the world population has some sort of Internet connection. 126 00:07:29,720 --> 00:07:32,160 Speaker 1: It's got to the point where it's almost considered like 127 00:07:32,200 --> 00:07:34,560 Speaker 1: a human, right, I mean they're trying. There are all 128 00:07:34,560 --> 00:07:39,640 Speaker 1: these efforts to bring internet access to more rural areas 129 00:07:39,840 --> 00:07:41,640 Speaker 1: and you know, third world countries and things. I mean, 130 00:07:41,680 --> 00:07:47,440 Speaker 1: it's become this thing that we expect. Yeah, in less 131 00:07:47,440 --> 00:07:51,280 Speaker 1: than one percent of the globe had some kind of connections. 132 00:07:51,320 --> 00:07:54,800 Speaker 1: So in slightly less than two decades, we've gone from 133 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:58,840 Speaker 1: one percent to nearly half of the world's population. Are 134 00:07:58,880 --> 00:08:03,200 Speaker 1: you guys part of the one percent with a like 135 00:08:03,240 --> 00:08:08,320 Speaker 1: a old, old old modem? Definitely? I think I may. 136 00:08:08,560 --> 00:08:10,960 Speaker 1: I think my parents may have had a O L. 137 00:08:11,440 --> 00:08:14,960 Speaker 1: We're you guys. Yeah, we had a o L and 138 00:08:15,040 --> 00:08:18,080 Speaker 1: we had compu Serve remember that. And I had a 139 00:08:18,120 --> 00:08:21,520 Speaker 1: friend who had Prodigy. Remember Prodigy. Not I am the 140 00:08:21,520 --> 00:08:24,080 Speaker 1: fire Starter, but the I am the Internet service pro 141 00:08:24,520 --> 00:08:30,560 Speaker 1: the same same people. Actually, seriously, No, that's a good 142 00:08:30,600 --> 00:08:33,520 Speaker 1: side gigh. Yeah, that's a that's a good site gig. 143 00:08:33,720 --> 00:08:38,040 Speaker 1: And if the band's Prodigy had been part of the 144 00:08:38,080 --> 00:08:41,440 Speaker 1: Internet service Prodigy, they may have met with more long 145 00:08:41,559 --> 00:08:44,720 Speaker 1: term success for a while. Because the number of Internet 146 00:08:44,800 --> 00:08:49,520 Speaker 1: users has increased tenfold from two thirteen. So what do 147 00:08:49,600 --> 00:08:52,280 Speaker 1: we mean when we say well, we mean that in 148 00:08:52,440 --> 00:08:56,680 Speaker 1: two thousand five, we reached the first time in history 149 00:08:56,679 --> 00:08:59,360 Speaker 1: that a billion people could get on the internet. Two 150 00:08:59,360 --> 00:09:03,840 Speaker 1: thousand ten, it was two billion, and then it was 151 00:09:04,160 --> 00:09:07,880 Speaker 1: three billion. And there's some really cool infographics you can grab. 152 00:09:08,200 --> 00:09:11,480 Speaker 1: Internet Live Stats is a pretty cool one if you 153 00:09:11,520 --> 00:09:14,120 Speaker 1: want to visit that, not while you're driving, if you're 154 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:16,360 Speaker 1: driving as you listen to this. When you get a chance, 155 00:09:16,440 --> 00:09:18,520 Speaker 1: check out Internet live Stats. It will give you the 156 00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:21,880 Speaker 1: running tally of how many people have access to the Internet. 157 00:09:22,040 --> 00:09:24,800 Speaker 1: And the number just keeps going and going and going, 158 00:09:24,840 --> 00:09:26,839 Speaker 1: and it's a live ticker. It's pretty great. Right now, 159 00:09:26,840 --> 00:09:33,120 Speaker 1: it's at three point four oh one billion, thousand, three 160 00:09:33,720 --> 00:09:37,760 Speaker 1: nine and counting, yes and counting, and we'll come back 161 00:09:37,840 --> 00:09:39,920 Speaker 1: right well, so what we should do is come back 162 00:09:39,960 --> 00:09:44,040 Speaker 1: at the end of the episode and see how many 163 00:09:44,160 --> 00:09:48,360 Speaker 1: new listeners, how many new Internet users have joined us. So, 164 00:09:48,440 --> 00:09:49,680 Speaker 1: like we were staying at the top of the show, 165 00:09:49,679 --> 00:09:52,640 Speaker 1: beyond just expecting to have Internet access, which we do 166 00:09:53,240 --> 00:09:56,040 Speaker 1: part of our job, we definitely need it. Um, we 167 00:09:56,080 --> 00:09:58,160 Speaker 1: have come to a place where we expect that in 168 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:02,920 Speaker 1: many public places, public settings, there's going to be free 169 00:10:03,200 --> 00:10:07,400 Speaker 1: and efficient wireless internet. Like what what kind of places? 170 00:10:08,240 --> 00:10:11,840 Speaker 1: Well's your I mean like cafes, for example, you know Starbucks. 171 00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:14,880 Speaker 1: It is part and parcel of the Starbucks model to 172 00:10:15,040 --> 00:10:19,640 Speaker 1: go there, get your seven dollar prapolatte, and you know, 173 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:22,360 Speaker 1: enjoy some Internet surfing, whether it's on your smartphone or 174 00:10:22,360 --> 00:10:24,160 Speaker 1: your laptop or you're doing work. A lot of people 175 00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:26,600 Speaker 1: who work remotely like to go to coffee shops. You 176 00:10:26,600 --> 00:10:32,040 Speaker 1: are literally using this businesses internet access for your business 177 00:10:32,920 --> 00:10:35,559 Speaker 1: free of charge, and it gets you there, and it's 178 00:10:35,600 --> 00:10:38,800 Speaker 1: that's become kind of like a added benefit of like, 179 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:41,559 Speaker 1: you know, going to certain stores like Target, for example, 180 00:10:41,559 --> 00:10:43,360 Speaker 1: they have free WiFi and they also have a little 181 00:10:43,360 --> 00:10:47,360 Speaker 1: cafe there. Beyond that, you've got airports, which Matt and 182 00:10:47,440 --> 00:10:49,520 Speaker 1: I were talking before the show. We've been doing a 183 00:10:49,520 --> 00:10:51,760 Speaker 1: bit of traveling lately and we're starting to realize that 184 00:10:51,840 --> 00:10:54,080 Speaker 1: airports have kind of wised up a little bit. They're 185 00:10:54,080 --> 00:10:56,000 Speaker 1: a bit of a captive audience at the airport, and 186 00:10:56,240 --> 00:10:58,080 Speaker 1: you know, you don't really have a choice as to 187 00:10:58,120 --> 00:11:00,600 Speaker 1: whether you hang out in that terminal or not. So 188 00:11:00,640 --> 00:11:03,840 Speaker 1: they don't always have free internet. L a X will, 189 00:11:03,920 --> 00:11:07,679 Speaker 1: for instance, they have a model where a user will 190 00:11:07,720 --> 00:11:10,880 Speaker 1: get one hour free and then need to pay for 191 00:11:10,920 --> 00:11:14,160 Speaker 1: additional time. I hope you didn't get delayed. In case 192 00:11:14,200 --> 00:11:16,160 Speaker 1: anyone's interested and want to know which airports do have 193 00:11:16,160 --> 00:11:19,200 Speaker 1: free wife WiFi, there is a site called air fair 194 00:11:19,320 --> 00:11:24,480 Speaker 1: watchdog dot com that has a WiFi access chart. Yeah, 195 00:11:24,840 --> 00:11:27,240 Speaker 1: so that you don't you don't get stuck out out there. 196 00:11:27,280 --> 00:11:29,040 Speaker 1: But you know what, we don't always have to be connected. 197 00:11:29,080 --> 00:11:31,480 Speaker 1: I'm just gonna say, you can bring a book hotels 198 00:11:31,480 --> 00:11:34,920 Speaker 1: though hotels. Hotels want you to have a pleasant stay. 199 00:11:34,960 --> 00:11:37,559 Speaker 1: They want everything to be just. So you're paying out 200 00:11:37,600 --> 00:11:40,120 Speaker 1: the nose for a hotel room, you're gonna get decent 201 00:11:40,400 --> 00:11:46,560 Speaker 1: internet access as part of your stay, unless you're in Alberton, Georgia. Uh, 202 00:11:48,840 --> 00:11:52,320 Speaker 1: I mean, I mean the access was there. It was there. 203 00:11:52,360 --> 00:11:56,920 Speaker 1: It was just snail's pace. It was like dial up speed. 204 00:11:57,320 --> 00:11:59,360 Speaker 1: But that's neither here nor there. Well, I was gonna 205 00:11:59,360 --> 00:12:01,640 Speaker 1: say just a quick story, just a quick story. We 206 00:12:01,720 --> 00:12:05,120 Speaker 1: had ami fi uh one of these little access points 207 00:12:05,200 --> 00:12:09,480 Speaker 1: to use wireless uh data like through Verizon or another 208 00:12:09,880 --> 00:12:13,280 Speaker 1: service like this, and that was what ten times faster 209 00:12:13,760 --> 00:12:17,120 Speaker 1: easily to make fair of those little boxes do kind 210 00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:19,400 Speaker 1: of kick um. But then we've got like other places 211 00:12:19,400 --> 00:12:24,400 Speaker 1: like museums, aquariums, hospitals, libraries. More and more, we're having 212 00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:28,559 Speaker 1: outdoor access that's even provided by cities. So let's do 213 00:12:28,960 --> 00:12:33,360 Speaker 1: a hypothetical situation. Let's say Matt, you're going to be 214 00:12:33,440 --> 00:12:36,040 Speaker 1: our main character, and Nolan I are going to tell 215 00:12:36,360 --> 00:12:41,400 Speaker 1: the story of what happened to you. Uh, let's say, 216 00:12:42,160 --> 00:12:46,600 Speaker 1: you know, let's let's begin it this way. One day, 217 00:12:46,800 --> 00:12:53,440 Speaker 1: one afternoon, a traveler named Matt Frederick arrives at the 218 00:12:53,520 --> 00:12:58,960 Speaker 1: Colorado Airport and he just sits down in one of 219 00:12:59,000 --> 00:13:02,439 Speaker 1: the terminals who mentioned earlier. No, do you remember specifically 220 00:13:02,640 --> 00:13:04,360 Speaker 1: what he was doing. Oh? Sure, he had a little 221 00:13:04,360 --> 00:13:06,920 Speaker 1: time to kill, and he wanted to maybe catch up 222 00:13:06,920 --> 00:13:10,319 Speaker 1: on his social media, looking at his stock tickers, maybe 223 00:13:10,480 --> 00:13:13,520 Speaker 1: check his his bank account in foe, make sure that 224 00:13:13,600 --> 00:13:16,480 Speaker 1: his cash flow is good for the sweet trip that 225 00:13:16,520 --> 00:13:18,160 Speaker 1: he was about to go on. And he got his 226 00:13:18,200 --> 00:13:23,840 Speaker 1: frat his frailte in hand, laptop in lap like you do, 227 00:13:24,520 --> 00:13:29,080 Speaker 1: and it up, opens it up, bam, pay dirt. You 228 00:13:29,120 --> 00:13:33,040 Speaker 1: know what's interesting here for our traveler is that he 229 00:13:33,200 --> 00:13:39,160 Speaker 1: notices there are several free WiFi points. Two of them 230 00:13:39,280 --> 00:13:45,800 Speaker 1: say free public WiFi. One of them says, just airport 231 00:13:45,840 --> 00:13:51,680 Speaker 1: WiFi looks good. Let's click on this one, and that's 232 00:13:51,679 --> 00:13:55,800 Speaker 1: how they get his bank account information, that's how they 233 00:13:55,840 --> 00:14:00,160 Speaker 1: get his log in for Twitter, for Facebook, for or 234 00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:06,000 Speaker 1: let's see what else. You want my trade trade? Yeah, uh, 235 00:14:06,120 --> 00:14:10,640 Speaker 1: farmers only, Yeah, and you know whatever else. And it's 236 00:14:10,720 --> 00:14:14,280 Speaker 1: because there's this illusion of safety, and it's the same 237 00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:16,920 Speaker 1: illusion of safety that we find when people are driving 238 00:14:16,960 --> 00:14:20,080 Speaker 1: at high speeds on the highway right in traffic. The 239 00:14:20,200 --> 00:14:23,200 Speaker 1: convenience of WiFi, just like the convenience of driving on 240 00:14:23,240 --> 00:14:27,040 Speaker 1: an interstate, often leads us to mistakenly believe that it's 241 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:29,280 Speaker 1: got to be safe. Everybody else is doing it right. 242 00:14:29,280 --> 00:14:31,640 Speaker 1: There are certain rules you have to follow, and everyone's 243 00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:34,160 Speaker 1: following them. That's because we live in a society that 244 00:14:34,240 --> 00:14:36,960 Speaker 1: teaches us if something, if you're in a public place 245 00:14:37,120 --> 00:14:40,520 Speaker 1: and there are multiple people doing something, then you are 246 00:14:40,600 --> 00:14:44,920 Speaker 1: somehow safe. But that is also the exact reason a 247 00:14:45,000 --> 00:14:49,560 Speaker 1: hacker would choose a terminal at the Denver airport to 248 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:54,400 Speaker 1: set up something that just says airport WiFi or free WiFi. 249 00:14:54,680 --> 00:14:58,240 Speaker 1: I haven't checked the charpnel, but it's quite possible that 250 00:14:58,320 --> 00:15:02,040 Speaker 1: all three of those points are just separate hackers. Yeah, 251 00:15:02,080 --> 00:15:04,520 Speaker 1: it's a perfect hunting ground. And then and they're like 252 00:15:04,600 --> 00:15:09,080 Speaker 1: we need Matt Frederick's Twitter. Yeah, I think of the 253 00:15:09,160 --> 00:15:13,800 Speaker 1: change we could affect. Yeah, I wish I had a Twitter, 254 00:15:13,960 --> 00:15:16,160 Speaker 1: so that would make sense. Yeah, I'm gonna start one 255 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:18,840 Speaker 1: for this You're gonna start one for this episode. So 256 00:15:19,080 --> 00:15:21,240 Speaker 1: you know, we had talked at the top of the 257 00:15:21,240 --> 00:15:25,160 Speaker 1: show about Mr Robot, who's working with us on this episode. 258 00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:29,680 Speaker 1: And one thing that is really cool. You guys were 259 00:15:29,760 --> 00:15:32,360 Speaker 1: hipped to Mr Robot before I was. But in the 260 00:15:32,480 --> 00:15:37,800 Speaker 1: very first episode is a mild spoiler alert, we see 261 00:15:37,840 --> 00:15:42,480 Speaker 1: an example of WiFi gone wrong. If you have not 262 00:15:42,600 --> 00:15:47,280 Speaker 1: watched the first episode of Mr. Robot Season one, the 263 00:15:47,320 --> 00:15:50,160 Speaker 1: pilot episode, go and check it out before you listen 264 00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:52,400 Speaker 1: to this. Uh, if you've seen it, then here we go. 265 00:15:52,520 --> 00:15:54,400 Speaker 1: Oh wait, wait, if you haven't seen it, go ahead, 266 00:15:54,400 --> 00:15:59,040 Speaker 1: we'll wait. Okay, you're back. So, at some point in 267 00:15:59,080 --> 00:16:02,360 Speaker 1: the past, the main character that we identify with in 268 00:16:02,440 --> 00:16:07,680 Speaker 1: Mr Robots Elliott. He notices that there's this free WiFi 269 00:16:07,760 --> 00:16:10,640 Speaker 1: at this place called Ron's Coffee that seems to be 270 00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:13,800 Speaker 1: a large chain of coffee shops that exist in his world, 271 00:16:13,840 --> 00:16:17,200 Speaker 1: his immediate vicinity, and this WiFi is great. Oh man, 272 00:16:17,280 --> 00:16:20,560 Speaker 1: it is so good. It's fast. In fact, let's hear 273 00:16:20,560 --> 00:16:26,520 Speaker 1: a little clip something I like coming here because your 274 00:16:26,520 --> 00:16:28,520 Speaker 1: WiFi was fast. I mean, you're one of the few 275 00:16:28,520 --> 00:16:32,000 Speaker 1: spots that has a fiber connection with gigabit speed. It's good, 276 00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:36,800 Speaker 1: so good. It scratched that part of my mind, part 277 00:16:36,880 --> 00:16:41,520 Speaker 1: that doesn't allow good to exist without condition. So I 278 00:16:41,600 --> 00:16:45,200 Speaker 1: started intercepting all the traffic on your network. That's when 279 00:16:45,200 --> 00:16:49,400 Speaker 1: I noticed something strange. That's when I decided to hack you. 280 00:16:52,200 --> 00:16:56,000 Speaker 1: I know you run a website called Plato's Boys. You're 281 00:16:56,080 --> 00:16:58,960 Speaker 1: using tor networking to keep the servers anonymous. You made 282 00:16:58,960 --> 00:17:01,320 Speaker 1: it really hard for any wanted to see it, but 283 00:17:01,400 --> 00:17:04,719 Speaker 1: I saw it. The Onion routing protocol. It's not as 284 00:17:04,720 --> 00:17:07,800 Speaker 1: anonymous as you think it is. Whoever is in control 285 00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:10,560 Speaker 1: of the exit notes is also in control of the traffic, 286 00:17:10,720 --> 00:17:15,440 Speaker 1: which makes me the one in control. And you see 287 00:17:15,440 --> 00:17:20,399 Speaker 1: Elliott discovers that the owner hosts a massive horn site, 288 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:24,600 Speaker 1: the worst kind, from his server in the cafe, and 289 00:17:25,000 --> 00:17:28,879 Speaker 1: he thinks that he's hiding this because he's using something 290 00:17:28,880 --> 00:17:32,040 Speaker 1: that we've talked about before, tour the Onion router, the 291 00:17:32,080 --> 00:17:36,000 Speaker 1: Onion routing protocol, like you said, Ben, something we discussed before. Uh, 292 00:17:36,040 --> 00:17:38,240 Speaker 1: it's got some weird ties and I think we'll get 293 00:17:38,280 --> 00:17:42,439 Speaker 1: into it a little later on exactly how it functions. Um, 294 00:17:42,480 --> 00:17:48,720 Speaker 1: but it's supposedly or it's meant to anonymize traffic Internet traffic. Yes, 295 00:17:49,240 --> 00:17:53,240 Speaker 1: but a little known fact about tour for a lot 296 00:17:53,280 --> 00:17:55,600 Speaker 1: of people who assume that it is safe. When we 297 00:17:55,600 --> 00:17:57,800 Speaker 1: did our stuff on the Silk Road, you know, we 298 00:17:57,960 --> 00:18:02,000 Speaker 1: learned that tour was originally create did by the US government. Yes, 299 00:18:02,640 --> 00:18:08,040 Speaker 1: and there there are a set of servers amongst the 300 00:18:08,080 --> 00:18:12,359 Speaker 1: Onion router that are the endpoint, the the the last 301 00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:15,679 Speaker 1: server in the chain, the exit nodes. They're they are 302 00:18:15,720 --> 00:18:19,920 Speaker 1: referred to as exit nodes. And we have seen historically 303 00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:23,040 Speaker 1: in two thousand seven and two thousand eleven a couple 304 00:18:23,119 --> 00:18:27,800 Speaker 1: other times, we've seen that if you choose and you're 305 00:18:27,800 --> 00:18:31,080 Speaker 1: operating one of these exit nodes, you can spy on 306 00:18:31,119 --> 00:18:34,400 Speaker 1: any and all traffic that goes through that server. It's 307 00:18:34,400 --> 00:18:38,320 Speaker 1: a it's a code between the volunteer operators that run 308 00:18:38,359 --> 00:18:41,680 Speaker 1: these things that say, hey, this is all anonymous, We're 309 00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:44,560 Speaker 1: not going to spy on these people. In the end, 310 00:18:44,880 --> 00:18:48,440 Speaker 1: it's about trust, whether or not you trust I'm saying 311 00:18:48,440 --> 00:18:53,879 Speaker 1: this correctly. The volunteers who run this stuff. So Elliott, 312 00:18:54,200 --> 00:18:59,639 Speaker 1: in a very deadpan, monotonous way, explains to Ron of 313 00:18:59,760 --> 00:19:05,280 Speaker 1: Ron Coffee how he hacked the WiFi and took control 314 00:19:05,800 --> 00:19:08,480 Speaker 1: of these exit notes, meaning he could watch all the 315 00:19:08,520 --> 00:19:12,600 Speaker 1: traffic because he wondered why this WiFi connection in particular 316 00:19:13,040 --> 00:19:18,600 Speaker 1: was so extraordinarily fast, and he found out why. And 317 00:19:18,640 --> 00:19:22,720 Speaker 1: as he is telling this guy's stuff, he tells him 318 00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:25,439 Speaker 1: there's a strange there's like a dark humor to it 319 00:19:25,480 --> 00:19:28,440 Speaker 1: when he tells him, you know, usually I do this online, 320 00:19:28,480 --> 00:19:31,320 Speaker 1: but I'm working on my people's skills, so i wanted 321 00:19:31,359 --> 00:19:34,080 Speaker 1: to come tell you in person. And yeah, he says, 322 00:19:34,119 --> 00:19:36,720 Speaker 1: I wanted to do this one a f K right, yes, 323 00:19:37,359 --> 00:19:39,240 Speaker 1: and uh and what does a f K stays on 324 00:19:39,280 --> 00:19:41,520 Speaker 1: the same as I R L I R in real 325 00:19:41,560 --> 00:19:44,200 Speaker 1: life or away from keyboard. AFK was a great thing 326 00:19:44,240 --> 00:19:46,960 Speaker 1: to use back in the day. I did not know that. Yeah, well, 327 00:19:47,320 --> 00:19:50,600 Speaker 1: for mmrpgs, that was a huge thing, like like we're 328 00:19:50,640 --> 00:19:54,919 Speaker 1: just saying let b RB Well, um, now, so this 329 00:19:55,000 --> 00:19:56,960 Speaker 1: character that was obviously like an example of a white 330 00:19:57,000 --> 00:20:00,560 Speaker 1: hat hacker where he is using his skills and you know, 331 00:20:00,640 --> 00:20:04,720 Speaker 1: hacking this WiFi network to shut down somebody doing something 332 00:20:04,840 --> 00:20:09,679 Speaker 1: terrible and using this technology too horrible abusive ends. What 333 00:20:09,880 --> 00:20:13,560 Speaker 1: we're talking about for this episode largely is these black 334 00:20:13,560 --> 00:20:16,480 Speaker 1: hat hackers who just want to steal your stuff or 335 00:20:16,600 --> 00:20:19,800 Speaker 1: just affect chaos in some way or another, and people 336 00:20:19,840 --> 00:20:21,639 Speaker 1: just want to see the world burn. But what I 337 00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:27,240 Speaker 1: want to know is how vulnerable are we at the airport? 338 00:20:27,280 --> 00:20:31,960 Speaker 1: How vulnerable is Matt at the Denver terminal? Could this 339 00:20:32,080 --> 00:20:35,959 Speaker 1: happen in real life? And we'll get right into my 340 00:20:36,040 --> 00:20:54,320 Speaker 1: vulnerabilities right after this word from our sponsor. Here's where 341 00:20:54,320 --> 00:20:59,080 Speaker 1: it gets crazy. The answer is absolutely yes, this could 342 00:20:59,080 --> 00:21:02,960 Speaker 1: happen in real life. Absolutely yes, we are as vulnerable 343 00:21:03,480 --> 00:21:06,720 Speaker 1: as we allow ourselves to be. Yeah, the same things 344 00:21:06,880 --> 00:21:10,080 Speaker 1: as we said to make free WiFi so convenient also 345 00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:16,040 Speaker 1: make it potentially and in many cases likely dangerous. Most 346 00:21:16,160 --> 00:21:20,280 Speaker 1: the most specific thing is that no authentication is needed. 347 00:21:20,520 --> 00:21:24,440 Speaker 1: Your computer just says, hey, can I ride this ride 348 00:21:24,480 --> 00:21:28,920 Speaker 1: this crazy internet train with you? And the access point says, 349 00:21:28,960 --> 00:21:32,280 Speaker 1: oh yeah, hop on. There's room for everyone. Yes, and 350 00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:36,399 Speaker 1: everyone includes people who are interested in taking your stuff, 351 00:21:36,440 --> 00:21:40,880 Speaker 1: your personal information, any other kind of info that you're 352 00:21:41,080 --> 00:21:46,040 Speaker 1: sending across that signal, compromising photographs for instance, little texts 353 00:21:46,280 --> 00:21:49,199 Speaker 1: or chat messages you're having anything like that. Yes, So 354 00:21:50,000 --> 00:21:54,600 Speaker 1: there are dangers for our hypothetical traveler who happens to 355 00:21:54,640 --> 00:21:58,040 Speaker 1: be named Matt Frederick. He let's see, we outlined a 356 00:21:58,040 --> 00:22:00,000 Speaker 1: couple of places he went to, so they have access 357 00:22:00,119 --> 00:22:03,439 Speaker 1: to his personal information. But it doesn't stop there. They 358 00:22:03,440 --> 00:22:07,520 Speaker 1: can also install a thing that will follow him like 359 00:22:07,560 --> 00:22:10,720 Speaker 1: a shadow, and it will see what he does when 360 00:22:10,720 --> 00:22:14,280 Speaker 1: the hackers not around, even logs, key strokes. I mean, 361 00:22:14,320 --> 00:22:18,560 Speaker 1: they're any number of little, you know, wormy type things 362 00:22:18,600 --> 00:22:22,360 Speaker 1: that can be installed remotely on someone's machine that can 363 00:22:22,440 --> 00:22:26,200 Speaker 1: capture all kinds of input. It can hijack the camera. 364 00:22:26,960 --> 00:22:30,200 Speaker 1: I mean, it's sort of all all bets are off, 365 00:22:30,280 --> 00:22:35,520 Speaker 1: and depending on the security, the network itself can be subverted. Yeah, 366 00:22:35,560 --> 00:22:40,040 Speaker 1: So that the airport WiFi one that is the actual 367 00:22:40,119 --> 00:22:43,320 Speaker 1: connection that the Colorado Airport is set up, could then 368 00:22:43,440 --> 00:22:46,359 Speaker 1: be malicious or dangerous. If I was gonna be that hacker, 369 00:22:46,359 --> 00:22:51,920 Speaker 1: I would name mine. This is the real airport WiFi. Yeah, yeah, 370 00:22:52,359 --> 00:22:55,120 Speaker 1: I would name mine super Okay, fun time, free beer. 371 00:22:57,160 --> 00:23:00,600 Speaker 1: What what could go wrong? But with the emphasis on 372 00:23:00,760 --> 00:23:05,640 Speaker 1: free beer. Okay, So there's there's another issue that happens 373 00:23:06,440 --> 00:23:10,440 Speaker 1: that this reminds me of and that's a t M skimming, oh, 374 00:23:10,480 --> 00:23:13,480 Speaker 1: you know, because it works in a similar way. If 375 00:23:13,520 --> 00:23:16,399 Speaker 1: someone is skimming and a t M, what they're doing 376 00:23:16,520 --> 00:23:20,200 Speaker 1: is installing a very small piece of hardware, usually something 377 00:23:20,240 --> 00:23:24,640 Speaker 1: that looks legit, that still allows you to interface with 378 00:23:25,720 --> 00:23:28,240 Speaker 1: the bank or even at a gas station, and it 379 00:23:28,240 --> 00:23:31,520 Speaker 1: allows you to buy gas, to access your banking information, 380 00:23:31,600 --> 00:23:34,919 Speaker 1: pull cash out, make a deposit, etcetera. But it sets 381 00:23:34,920 --> 00:23:38,679 Speaker 1: a middleman between it so that it's also capturing your information. 382 00:23:39,240 --> 00:23:42,560 Speaker 1: And they leave these things on and they come back 383 00:23:42,640 --> 00:23:44,600 Speaker 1: and they scoop it out, and you don't know until 384 00:23:44,640 --> 00:23:49,919 Speaker 1: you become a victim of identity theft. These attacks are 385 00:23:50,680 --> 00:23:55,080 Speaker 1: more common than you might think because the price of 386 00:23:55,119 --> 00:23:58,840 Speaker 1: the technology is, as you know, is going down. The 387 00:23:58,920 --> 00:24:03,320 Speaker 1: software is available to anyone who wants to find it, 388 00:24:03,680 --> 00:24:06,520 Speaker 1: and there are more and more people who have these 389 00:24:06,560 --> 00:24:10,560 Speaker 1: skill sets. So what what type of threats are we 390 00:24:10,640 --> 00:24:16,159 Speaker 1: talking about? What? What? Who is out there trying to 391 00:24:16,200 --> 00:24:19,120 Speaker 1: take over Matt Frederick's life at the Denver Airport. Well, 392 00:24:19,200 --> 00:24:23,160 Speaker 1: I have identified a couple of my potential assailants here 393 00:24:23,560 --> 00:24:27,920 Speaker 1: and I've given them, uh maybe some names that aren't official, 394 00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:30,240 Speaker 1: but I'm going to call them some things. The first 395 00:24:30,280 --> 00:24:34,399 Speaker 1: one would be sniffers just looking around, Oh what is that? 396 00:24:34,920 --> 00:24:37,560 Speaker 1: What's what's that over there? Reminds me of just kind 397 00:24:37,560 --> 00:24:40,640 Speaker 1: of a dog that's going around the airport, just trying 398 00:24:40,680 --> 00:24:43,240 Speaker 1: to see what everything is, giving a little sniff. Is 399 00:24:43,280 --> 00:24:45,800 Speaker 1: this worth my time? Over here? Is that? Some? Is that? 400 00:24:45,880 --> 00:24:50,800 Speaker 1: Some old pizza? And maybe some banking information? Um. These 401 00:24:50,840 --> 00:24:54,280 Speaker 1: these people will use some kind of application or a 402 00:24:54,359 --> 00:24:57,320 Speaker 1: program that they would just run from their computer that 403 00:24:57,440 --> 00:25:00,960 Speaker 1: then connects up to the access point and they're going 404 00:25:01,000 --> 00:25:04,399 Speaker 1: to capture, you know, as much of the traffic as 405 00:25:04,440 --> 00:25:07,760 Speaker 1: they want. You can you can break it down sometimes 406 00:25:07,760 --> 00:25:10,560 Speaker 1: depending on the application, or you can just gather everything. 407 00:25:11,000 --> 00:25:13,800 Speaker 1: And it is very disturbing if you just do a 408 00:25:13,880 --> 00:25:18,560 Speaker 1: cursory search on the internet like hacking, WiFi hacking tools, 409 00:25:19,320 --> 00:25:22,480 Speaker 1: and the number that shows up. There's lists and lists 410 00:25:22,520 --> 00:25:24,399 Speaker 1: of you know, there was like a list of twenty 411 00:25:24,440 --> 00:25:28,760 Speaker 1: of the best WiFi hacking tools and they're simple to use. 412 00:25:28,920 --> 00:25:33,320 Speaker 1: They'll they'll break the security on the WiFi and just 413 00:25:33,400 --> 00:25:37,600 Speaker 1: let you run amok. Uh. And then there are other 414 00:25:37,680 --> 00:25:41,680 Speaker 1: types right like gatherers might be after you, and these 415 00:25:41,680 --> 00:25:45,000 Speaker 1: people are almost like bounty hunters, so they'll take steps 416 00:25:45,040 --> 00:25:48,840 Speaker 1: to track your activity for a third party. This is 417 00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:52,840 Speaker 1: something we talked about earlier in an episode with our 418 00:25:52,880 --> 00:25:57,159 Speaker 1: buddy Jonathan. Yes, targeted advertising. Yeah, so it can be 419 00:25:57,240 --> 00:26:02,640 Speaker 1: done in several ways. Having a email address or phone 420 00:26:02,680 --> 00:26:06,359 Speaker 1: number required to access a server, requiring a share on 421 00:26:06,520 --> 00:26:09,399 Speaker 1: social media, or a similar action where you're required to 422 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:13,520 Speaker 1: log into another site before using the service, or and 423 00:26:13,560 --> 00:26:15,359 Speaker 1: this is always a red flag to me, requiring you 424 00:26:15,440 --> 00:26:19,400 Speaker 1: to download something to access the WiFi. And of course cookies, 425 00:26:19,440 --> 00:26:23,359 Speaker 1: which we've talked about before and are not as cool 426 00:26:23,560 --> 00:26:26,040 Speaker 1: in the internet world as they are in real life. 427 00:26:26,359 --> 00:26:32,800 Speaker 1: Sweet sweet cookies? Is that a cookie monster? What's the 428 00:26:32,840 --> 00:26:35,200 Speaker 1: other kind? So this is delicious sounding too, it's called 429 00:26:35,200 --> 00:26:40,480 Speaker 1: they're called honeypots. Um. So word to the wise, never, never, 430 00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:45,360 Speaker 1: not ever, never, don't just don't do this thing wherein 431 00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:49,800 Speaker 1: you connect to an unfamiliar, unlocked WiFi hotspot like Ben's 432 00:26:49,960 --> 00:26:54,560 Speaker 1: not even super okay, Yeah, that's that's that's red flaggy 433 00:26:55,040 --> 00:26:57,760 Speaker 1: if you ask me, this is just it's it is 434 00:26:57,800 --> 00:27:01,600 Speaker 1: a complete and utter crapshoot. We're gambling with your privacy, 435 00:27:01,720 --> 00:27:05,920 Speaker 1: your personal information, because while not every unlocked access point 436 00:27:06,040 --> 00:27:12,240 Speaker 1: is malicious, every functioning malicious. Access point is unlocked. It's 437 00:27:12,240 --> 00:27:15,160 Speaker 1: a trap, that's right. There are a couple of other 438 00:27:15,200 --> 00:27:17,040 Speaker 1: things here that we we should walk through real quick. 439 00:27:17,119 --> 00:27:21,680 Speaker 1: So we're talking before about data interception right easily captured 440 00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:26,080 Speaker 1: by eavesdroppers even within a few hundred feet, and their 441 00:27:26,160 --> 00:27:29,399 Speaker 1: reach extends further if they have directional antennas. Then of 442 00:27:29,440 --> 00:27:33,080 Speaker 1: course d O S right denial of service. Everyone shares 443 00:27:33,119 --> 00:27:38,480 Speaker 1: the same unlicensed frequencies, making competition inevitable in populated areas. 444 00:27:38,520 --> 00:27:41,480 Speaker 1: That's why sometimes if you're at an airport and super crowded, 445 00:27:42,359 --> 00:27:47,560 Speaker 1: you're gonna have worse Internet access. Crap service, CREP service. 446 00:27:47,800 --> 00:27:51,080 Speaker 1: They're clogging up the tubes with all their wifis the 447 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:55,520 Speaker 1: Internet tubes because that's how the Internet runs in tubes. 448 00:27:58,480 --> 00:28:01,959 Speaker 1: You really sold me on that one. Rogue access points. 449 00:28:02,040 --> 00:28:06,000 Speaker 1: So that's when a business network is penetrated by an unknown, 450 00:28:06,080 --> 00:28:09,720 Speaker 1: unauthorized access point, and that's on the business end. That's 451 00:28:09,760 --> 00:28:13,680 Speaker 1: something that a lot of corporations and such are very 452 00:28:13,720 --> 00:28:18,680 Speaker 1: concerned about. For example, our internet here at the office 453 00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:24,800 Speaker 1: is so tightly locked down that we sometimes have trouble 454 00:28:25,440 --> 00:28:29,320 Speaker 1: doing certain things, connecting to certain services. Um even doing 455 00:28:29,400 --> 00:28:32,040 Speaker 1: like a one to one connection with another with an 456 00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:36,800 Speaker 1: outside party, whether it's like a you know, Skype type 457 00:28:36,800 --> 00:28:40,520 Speaker 1: connection or like a more direct video chat connection. If 458 00:28:40,520 --> 00:28:42,880 Speaker 1: we're trying to do like a really high end um 459 00:28:42,960 --> 00:28:45,680 Speaker 1: high quality video stream where we're connecting one piece of 460 00:28:45,760 --> 00:28:49,480 Speaker 1: hardware to another piece of hardware, there are certain um 461 00:28:49,560 --> 00:28:52,840 Speaker 1: things about our firewall and you know lack of open 462 00:28:52,920 --> 00:28:55,320 Speaker 1: ports that completely prevent us from doing that. And it's 463 00:28:55,320 --> 00:28:57,960 Speaker 1: because of this exact reason. So to even get on 464 00:28:58,120 --> 00:29:00,920 Speaker 1: our wireless here at the offer, which is different from 465 00:29:00,960 --> 00:29:03,840 Speaker 1: plugging in and being you know, jacked into the network 466 00:29:03,880 --> 00:29:07,160 Speaker 1: through a land um, we have to have these specific 467 00:29:07,640 --> 00:29:11,040 Speaker 1: files on our computer that have various credentials that we 468 00:29:11,040 --> 00:29:14,120 Speaker 1: don't actually enter. Their called certificates, and they have to 469 00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:17,560 Speaker 1: be authenticated every time you log into our WiFi here. 470 00:29:17,720 --> 00:29:20,680 Speaker 1: So there is we do have a public WiFi that 471 00:29:20,760 --> 00:29:23,080 Speaker 1: people who are visiting can access, but it has a 472 00:29:23,200 --> 00:29:25,280 Speaker 1: lease on it where you can only sort of like 473 00:29:25,360 --> 00:29:27,760 Speaker 1: if you go to Starbucks and it tells you that 474 00:29:27,800 --> 00:29:30,240 Speaker 1: you get you to password and it will expire. Your 475 00:29:30,280 --> 00:29:32,600 Speaker 1: session will expire in two hours and you have to 476 00:29:32,640 --> 00:29:35,320 Speaker 1: get a new password. Same with this, but yeah, the 477 00:29:35,360 --> 00:29:39,280 Speaker 1: corporations are particularly concerned about this stuff and they act 478 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:44,520 Speaker 1: accordingly right, and they're also misconfigured access points, their endpoint attacks, 479 00:29:44,560 --> 00:29:48,440 Speaker 1: their evil twin ap s fraudulent access points that can 480 00:29:48,480 --> 00:29:52,160 Speaker 1: advertise the same network name as a legit hotspot or 481 00:29:52,320 --> 00:29:56,400 Speaker 1: business land and cause UH other WiFi clients to connect 482 00:29:56,480 --> 00:29:59,680 Speaker 1: with them. So one of the strange things about this 483 00:30:00,960 --> 00:30:03,600 Speaker 1: is that it's easier and easier for people who want 484 00:30:03,640 --> 00:30:05,719 Speaker 1: to do this sort of stuff to do it. You 485 00:30:05,760 --> 00:30:09,040 Speaker 1: can find tools that will do a lot of the 486 00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:13,280 Speaker 1: heavy lifting for you, like Carmetta, disploit and UH these 487 00:30:13,320 --> 00:30:17,320 Speaker 1: things like listen to nearby clients, discover s s I 488 00:30:17,440 --> 00:30:20,040 Speaker 1: d s they're willing to connect to, and automatically start 489 00:30:20,080 --> 00:30:23,440 Speaker 1: advertising those and once they connect then d n S 490 00:30:23,440 --> 00:30:25,280 Speaker 1: and d h c P are used to route the 491 00:30:25,280 --> 00:30:30,000 Speaker 1: client traffic through the evil twin where a local web 492 00:30:30,080 --> 00:30:33,560 Speaker 1: mail file server executes those men in the middle attacks 493 00:30:33,600 --> 00:30:37,920 Speaker 1: that we're talking about. And there are different ways to well, 494 00:30:38,280 --> 00:30:42,400 Speaker 1: there are different ways to lessen the likelihood of this 495 00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:46,280 Speaker 1: stuff working. And companies, in particular, as you said, Noel 496 00:30:46,560 --> 00:30:51,040 Speaker 1: spend a lot of scratch on this Lota moola butter cheese, 497 00:30:51,240 --> 00:30:55,800 Speaker 1: what's another word for money. Deno Dinero spent a lot 498 00:30:55,800 --> 00:31:02,320 Speaker 1: of Robert de Niro Scrilla, so much of that money. Uh, 499 00:31:02,520 --> 00:31:04,960 Speaker 1: and what what we have nol Nichols. I feel like 500 00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:08,360 Speaker 1: you think I need Yeah, I need a better I 501 00:31:08,360 --> 00:31:12,360 Speaker 1: think you do. I don't. I mean, you know what 502 00:31:12,800 --> 00:31:17,040 Speaker 1: the pound is tanking, you can just take over that. Yeah, 503 00:31:17,080 --> 00:31:18,760 Speaker 1: well we're gonna put a pin on it and send 504 00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:21,960 Speaker 1: your suggestions to us. Uh. We do want to establish 505 00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:26,920 Speaker 1: also that we are not ourselves hackers, white hat nor 506 00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:29,640 Speaker 1: black hat. And a lot of people for those of 507 00:31:29,680 --> 00:31:32,200 Speaker 1: you listening who are familiar with this, let's say you 508 00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:35,440 Speaker 1: work in network security or something, or let's say you 509 00:31:35,480 --> 00:31:40,480 Speaker 1: are a white hat or a black hat. Uh what 510 00:31:40,480 --> 00:31:43,760 Speaker 1: what you're probably irritated by will be the so called 511 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:50,200 Speaker 1: script kitties who just borrow, borrow code and and use 512 00:31:50,280 --> 00:31:52,840 Speaker 1: it themselves without making it. Like you said, man, I mean, 513 00:31:52,920 --> 00:31:56,080 Speaker 1: there's an insane amount of resources out there for people 514 00:31:56,120 --> 00:31:58,120 Speaker 1: that just want to dabble in this stuff. But it 515 00:31:58,160 --> 00:31:59,920 Speaker 1: was you. I'm sorry, Matt. You're just saying that you found, 516 00:32:00,240 --> 00:32:04,440 Speaker 1: like you know, ready made little apps, a little ex 517 00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:09,480 Speaker 1: executable files for probably Windows and MACNUS Linux that you 518 00:32:09,520 --> 00:32:12,160 Speaker 1: can just download and you know, give it a try, 519 00:32:12,360 --> 00:32:16,200 Speaker 1: and it's it's total fair weather novice hacking, and it 520 00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:19,360 Speaker 1: you know, like you said, people that really devote a 521 00:32:19,400 --> 00:32:22,200 Speaker 1: lot of time and effort to this, I'm sure doing 522 00:32:22,280 --> 00:32:24,760 Speaker 1: some hard eye rolls thinking about those folks just kind 523 00:32:24,760 --> 00:32:27,120 Speaker 1: of like hopping in and dipping their toes. And again 524 00:32:27,200 --> 00:32:30,720 Speaker 1: not saying that we support doing this stuff, but there are, 525 00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:33,600 Speaker 1: as we talked about with the Mr Robot examples, interesting 526 00:32:33,760 --> 00:32:37,040 Speaker 1: uses of this technology and of these you know, of 527 00:32:37,160 --> 00:32:41,080 Speaker 1: exploiting these vulnerabilities. But the point of this show, I think, 528 00:32:41,160 --> 00:32:45,480 Speaker 1: is to give people information they need to protect themselves 529 00:32:45,880 --> 00:32:49,360 Speaker 1: from malicious intent, right. And this is one of those 530 00:32:49,400 --> 00:32:52,760 Speaker 1: things where we'll have a lot of people say we'll 531 00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:57,080 Speaker 1: just use common sense, but common sense itself, and I 532 00:32:57,120 --> 00:32:59,640 Speaker 1: think anybody can attest to this. Common sense itself is 533 00:32:59,640 --> 00:33:02,720 Speaker 1: a rather uncommon trade, especially when people feel that they 534 00:33:02,760 --> 00:33:07,200 Speaker 1: are already again in a safe place, public place, a 535 00:33:07,280 --> 00:33:10,479 Speaker 1: bunch of people. Crime doesn't happen like that. Crime happens 536 00:33:10,480 --> 00:33:13,600 Speaker 1: in dark alleys, right, Crime happens to other people. Crime 537 00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:17,960 Speaker 1: happens to other people. Right. So let's face facts. Most 538 00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:20,800 Speaker 1: of us will continue to use public WiFi, either for 539 00:33:20,840 --> 00:33:25,120 Speaker 1: its convenience or out of necessity. What if anything can 540 00:33:25,120 --> 00:33:28,040 Speaker 1: we do to protect ourselves. The best way to stay 541 00:33:28,080 --> 00:33:32,000 Speaker 1: safe while you're using a public WiFi network, it's one rule. 542 00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:36,160 Speaker 1: Don't do anything on there that you wouldn't be comfortable 543 00:33:36,200 --> 00:33:40,720 Speaker 1: doing with the pope standing directly behind you and watching 544 00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:48,880 Speaker 1: your screen. Hello, what what? What the Yeah? I can explain, 545 00:33:49,600 --> 00:33:53,560 Speaker 1: they doesn't look holy. Well, this is a subreddit. It's 546 00:33:53,600 --> 00:33:58,320 Speaker 1: called it's called funny. Yeah. You see that. That's a 547 00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:03,680 Speaker 1: kangaroo just like person. Pretty cool guy. Yeah, that was 548 00:34:04,160 --> 00:34:06,160 Speaker 1: that was all right? To be fair, we have a 549 00:34:06,280 --> 00:34:11,719 Speaker 1: very accepting pope, right picture, perhaps a slightly you know, 550 00:34:12,120 --> 00:34:16,720 Speaker 1: more judgmental post or a pope with a pad and paper, 551 00:34:16,880 --> 00:34:18,960 Speaker 1: just writing. Nothing worse than a pope with a pad. 552 00:34:19,520 --> 00:34:22,000 Speaker 1: Pope with a pad, which was originally the name of 553 00:34:22,000 --> 00:34:25,719 Speaker 1: our podcast. I'm kidding, but yeah, that's that's a great point. 554 00:34:25,719 --> 00:34:28,799 Speaker 1: I assume that everything is public. I would add that 555 00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:32,720 Speaker 1: just for the record. Uh, the best way to avoid 556 00:34:32,760 --> 00:34:35,680 Speaker 1: that kind of stuff is to not use it at all. 557 00:34:35,840 --> 00:34:38,879 Speaker 1: But you'll want to and sometimes you'll have to. If 558 00:34:38,920 --> 00:34:41,319 Speaker 1: you do, confirm the exact name of the access point 559 00:34:41,360 --> 00:34:46,120 Speaker 1: at any given location, and be very very very aware 560 00:34:47,200 --> 00:34:51,000 Speaker 1: similar names that are they are not quite the same 561 00:34:51,160 --> 00:34:54,080 Speaker 1: usually those are the most dangerous, right, Yeah, and then 562 00:34:54,520 --> 00:34:57,080 Speaker 1: you know you can also use if you're on a laptop, 563 00:34:57,080 --> 00:35:00,000 Speaker 1: you can also use browser tools to prevent unwanted cookie, 564 00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:04,520 Speaker 1: the other tracking techniques, and there's some stuff that's a 565 00:35:04,600 --> 00:35:07,839 Speaker 1: little more advanced but worth your time to do as well. Yeah. 566 00:35:07,880 --> 00:35:11,839 Speaker 1: Big one that's offered now is HTTPS, which is just 567 00:35:11,880 --> 00:35:15,680 Speaker 1: the hypertext transfer protocol that you know, and this is 568 00:35:15,719 --> 00:35:17,920 Speaker 1: pretty great. There's an extra layer of security when you 569 00:35:18,040 --> 00:35:22,040 Speaker 1: use HTTPS. There are some browsers like Chrome that have 570 00:35:22,200 --> 00:35:26,880 Speaker 1: options that will say always use HDT. In other words, 571 00:35:26,920 --> 00:35:28,920 Speaker 1: as the prefix to the U r L you're visiting. 572 00:35:29,000 --> 00:35:31,080 Speaker 1: You can't type that in, but but if you do that, 573 00:35:31,200 --> 00:35:35,120 Speaker 1: then the protocol is more secure. Uses transport layer security. 574 00:35:35,760 --> 00:35:39,400 Speaker 1: The previous iteration of this was secure sockets layer. And 575 00:35:39,560 --> 00:35:43,160 Speaker 1: doing this just adds an extra layer of authentication with 576 00:35:43,239 --> 00:35:46,719 Speaker 1: your communication. Wow, some of these words strung together like this, 577 00:35:46,840 --> 00:35:53,319 Speaker 1: it's it's pretty fun. Extra communication authentication, authentication of your 578 00:35:53,360 --> 00:35:59,360 Speaker 1: communication across the nation, regardless of mobile device or PC, 579 00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:02,320 Speaker 1: MAC pers ways. Yes, but the great thing about using 580 00:36:03,000 --> 00:36:07,439 Speaker 1: a browser that says hd GPS always on is that 581 00:36:07,480 --> 00:36:10,040 Speaker 1: when you're not on a secure site like that, it 582 00:36:10,120 --> 00:36:12,319 Speaker 1: lets you know, and you can get the heck out 583 00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:24,280 Speaker 1: of there if you want to. So then there's another 584 00:36:24,360 --> 00:36:27,880 Speaker 1: thing that you've heard about, probably, which is VPN, a 585 00:36:28,040 --> 00:36:34,040 Speaker 1: virtual private network. What is a VPN. Well, a VPN, 586 00:36:34,719 --> 00:36:37,520 Speaker 1: virtual private network can be used in several different ways, 587 00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:41,040 Speaker 1: and UM, like Matt, I do not purport to be 588 00:36:41,320 --> 00:36:44,279 Speaker 1: an expert in all things, all the minutia of of 589 00:36:44,320 --> 00:36:48,239 Speaker 1: these various Internet tools. But what I can't tell you 590 00:36:48,320 --> 00:36:52,440 Speaker 1: is that the VPN essentially reroutes your signal through a 591 00:36:52,520 --> 00:36:54,759 Speaker 1: third party more or less, so instead of being a 592 00:36:54,800 --> 00:36:58,560 Speaker 1: direct connection between you the wireless not your network you're 593 00:36:58,560 --> 00:37:02,560 Speaker 1: connecting to, and the Internet being provided, you are sent 594 00:37:03,120 --> 00:37:07,080 Speaker 1: out and then back in through this third party tool, 595 00:37:07,280 --> 00:37:11,480 Speaker 1: which is the virtual private network. Using that, you can 596 00:37:12,040 --> 00:37:15,000 Speaker 1: do several things. For example, if you were using a 597 00:37:15,080 --> 00:37:18,160 Speaker 1: VPN at home, you might do it to get around 598 00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:24,279 Speaker 1: UM certain region restrictions for content. For example, so like 599 00:37:24,360 --> 00:37:27,480 Speaker 1: if you want to watch a clip on the BBC 600 00:37:28,200 --> 00:37:32,240 Speaker 1: that is only meant for people in the United Kingdom, 601 00:37:32,320 --> 00:37:35,439 Speaker 1: you could conceivably use a VPN to make it look 602 00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:37,239 Speaker 1: like you are in the United Kingdom and then you 603 00:37:37,239 --> 00:37:40,960 Speaker 1: can access that content it will not be restricted to you. 604 00:37:40,960 --> 00:37:44,759 Speaker 1: You can also use it to anonymize your browsing. So if, 605 00:37:44,760 --> 00:37:49,520 Speaker 1: for example, if you're God forbid downloading torrents or illegal 606 00:37:50,360 --> 00:37:53,600 Speaker 1: pirated content um you know, we all know that Internet 607 00:37:53,600 --> 00:37:56,840 Speaker 1: service providers get reports of that stuff, and they can 608 00:37:56,840 --> 00:37:58,320 Speaker 1: pay you for it, and they can send you a 609 00:37:58,400 --> 00:38:01,120 Speaker 1: letter a cease and desist, you know, they they will 610 00:38:01,120 --> 00:38:04,080 Speaker 1: serve you that letter that HBO or whoever sends to them. 611 00:38:04,440 --> 00:38:07,000 Speaker 1: By using one of these VPNs in this way, you 612 00:38:07,040 --> 00:38:12,799 Speaker 1: can disguise your IP address somewhat exactly, and none other 613 00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:15,560 Speaker 1: thing is perfect. But a VPN in a public WiFi 614 00:38:15,560 --> 00:38:19,600 Speaker 1: setting essentially acts as an additional layer of encryption for 615 00:38:19,680 --> 00:38:24,040 Speaker 1: your for your data. The thing is, though, like many things, 616 00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:28,080 Speaker 1: there are free versions and there are pay versions. More 617 00:38:28,120 --> 00:38:32,759 Speaker 1: often than not, the free versions are really just proxies. 618 00:38:32,840 --> 00:38:36,680 Speaker 1: They don't actually offer the full layer of security that 619 00:38:36,760 --> 00:38:41,680 Speaker 1: a proper VPN offers. They just reroute your your your 620 00:38:41,719 --> 00:38:46,240 Speaker 1: traffic traffic exactly, and they log everything that you do, 621 00:38:46,560 --> 00:38:49,600 Speaker 1: all of your browsing habits, and they sell it off 622 00:38:49,640 --> 00:38:53,839 Speaker 1: to third parties. That's how these free sites support, you know, 623 00:38:53,920 --> 00:38:57,480 Speaker 1: the work that they're doing. A pay VPN will encrypt 624 00:38:57,880 --> 00:39:00,000 Speaker 1: your stuff and they claim you never know a hundred 625 00:39:00,000 --> 00:39:03,400 Speaker 1: resent that they don't store your information, that it is destroyed, 626 00:39:03,760 --> 00:39:06,520 Speaker 1: that no one has access to it. So those are 627 00:39:06,520 --> 00:39:08,800 Speaker 1: definitely things to consider it. If you're traveling a lot, 628 00:39:09,320 --> 00:39:11,160 Speaker 1: there's a lot of places you can do some research on. 629 00:39:11,200 --> 00:39:14,960 Speaker 1: In fact, Gizmoto has a great article called VPNs, What 630 00:39:15,080 --> 00:39:17,279 Speaker 1: they do, how they work, and why you're dumb for 631 00:39:17,360 --> 00:39:20,919 Speaker 1: not using one. Um I recommend that highly for which 632 00:39:20,920 --> 00:39:23,200 Speaker 1: ones to go with, and a little more in depth 633 00:39:23,239 --> 00:39:26,799 Speaker 1: explanations of what VPNs are. Careful How I say this 634 00:39:26,880 --> 00:39:31,040 Speaker 1: because I don't want to let the let the badger 635 00:39:31,120 --> 00:39:35,840 Speaker 1: out of the bag just yet. But another thing that 636 00:39:36,600 --> 00:39:41,000 Speaker 1: I think we should always emphasize about VPNs is that 637 00:39:41,120 --> 00:39:46,320 Speaker 1: it's not just for you know, pornography or getting the 638 00:39:46,400 --> 00:39:49,920 Speaker 1: latest Star Wars film right without having to pay to 639 00:39:49,920 --> 00:39:54,080 Speaker 1: see in the theater. In parts of the world where 640 00:39:54,160 --> 00:39:58,000 Speaker 1: access to information is restricted, such as the use of 641 00:39:58,080 --> 00:40:02,200 Speaker 1: social media in some places because it's associated with protests 642 00:40:02,400 --> 00:40:06,720 Speaker 1: or it's associated with coup's, VPNs are crucial for people 643 00:40:06,760 --> 00:40:09,400 Speaker 1: to be able to communicate with the world at large 644 00:40:09,600 --> 00:40:12,360 Speaker 1: or to visit sites that have been banned. That is 645 00:40:12,360 --> 00:40:14,600 Speaker 1: a really good point. Something that hadn't even really considered. 646 00:40:14,640 --> 00:40:17,040 Speaker 1: But sure, like in China, I mean, where you don't 647 00:40:17,080 --> 00:40:23,080 Speaker 1: get access to certain sites that give you unbiased, let's say, 648 00:40:23,280 --> 00:40:25,840 Speaker 1: or at least biased in a different direction versions of 649 00:40:25,840 --> 00:40:29,680 Speaker 1: the news. I mean that is pretty important to being 650 00:40:29,960 --> 00:40:35,400 Speaker 1: a you know, fully uh informed member of the global community. 651 00:40:35,760 --> 00:40:38,640 Speaker 1: And it's it's it's almost a form of protests to 652 00:40:38,680 --> 00:40:41,920 Speaker 1: be able to say, hey, we reject this restriction and 653 00:40:41,960 --> 00:40:46,920 Speaker 1: we're able to use this technology to equip ourselves with 654 00:40:47,000 --> 00:40:49,680 Speaker 1: the information we need. Yeah, I think that's I think 655 00:40:49,760 --> 00:40:53,160 Speaker 1: that's a good point because often this will be painted 656 00:40:53,239 --> 00:40:56,160 Speaker 1: as one of those what you need VPN for? Huh, 657 00:40:56,200 --> 00:40:57,759 Speaker 1: will you do it? Will you do it? Will you 658 00:40:57,800 --> 00:40:59,879 Speaker 1: do it? You know, if you're not doing something wrong 659 00:41:00,640 --> 00:41:03,399 Speaker 1: us regular connection, let me just see what you're doing. 660 00:41:03,440 --> 00:41:04,960 Speaker 1: Come on, let me just see it. Why are you 661 00:41:04,960 --> 00:41:07,600 Speaker 1: ashame that? What are I looking at? My son? No? Look, 662 00:41:07,640 --> 00:41:11,240 Speaker 1: because it's a came but the shows you an no VPN, 663 00:41:11,719 --> 00:41:16,680 Speaker 1: VPN show me our history, my son, I can't come 664 00:41:16,680 --> 00:41:21,040 Speaker 1: on man. So then uh, then there's another aspect here 665 00:41:21,080 --> 00:41:23,720 Speaker 1: that we we talked about briefly, which is the tour 666 00:41:24,200 --> 00:41:28,600 Speaker 1: right the onion router U. There are issues here that 667 00:41:28,920 --> 00:41:33,560 Speaker 1: Elliott stated in our example from Mr robot right, volunteer 668 00:41:33,640 --> 00:41:38,080 Speaker 1: operators maintain most of these tour network's final set of 669 00:41:38,120 --> 00:41:42,240 Speaker 1: servers right the exit notes. And this excludes the course 670 00:41:42,280 --> 00:41:47,480 Speaker 1: servers run by law enforcement, sure sure, because they are used. 671 00:41:47,520 --> 00:41:51,480 Speaker 1: There are other private tour servers that can be set up, um, 672 00:41:51,520 --> 00:41:53,560 Speaker 1: but the vast majority ones. If you're just a user 673 00:41:53,880 --> 00:41:57,720 Speaker 1: and connecting up, you're going through one of these, uh, 674 00:41:57,800 --> 00:42:00,480 Speaker 1: one of these that has volunteers an operators who are 675 00:42:00,560 --> 00:42:03,480 Speaker 1: just you're just trusting that they're going to keep it anonymous, 676 00:42:04,320 --> 00:42:07,439 Speaker 1: right right, And as we said, it's easy to see 677 00:42:07,480 --> 00:42:10,040 Speaker 1: the traffic flowing through these servers if you control an 678 00:42:10,080 --> 00:42:14,759 Speaker 1: exit node. So one of the questions that you might 679 00:42:14,800 --> 00:42:19,760 Speaker 1: have listening to this will be the following the question 680 00:42:19,760 --> 00:42:24,279 Speaker 1: that we get asked often, who exactly are they in 681 00:42:24,320 --> 00:42:30,160 Speaker 1: this situation we're talking about compromising public WiFi. There's more 682 00:42:30,200 --> 00:42:35,799 Speaker 1: than one they, uh, there are many of them, and 683 00:42:36,400 --> 00:42:40,239 Speaker 1: often one thing that one thing that I dislike is 684 00:42:40,280 --> 00:42:44,000 Speaker 1: that often this will be painted as oh, here is 685 00:42:44,080 --> 00:42:49,239 Speaker 1: an individual who has low morals or just likes to 686 00:42:49,280 --> 00:42:53,120 Speaker 1: mess with people because their statistic or their board, or 687 00:42:53,160 --> 00:42:55,359 Speaker 1: they had a bad childhood. But The thing is, it's 688 00:42:55,360 --> 00:42:59,040 Speaker 1: not necessarily an individual. Yes, there are many individuals doing that, 689 00:42:59,440 --> 00:43:01,880 Speaker 1: some of whom maybe listening to this show. And if so, 690 00:43:02,000 --> 00:43:04,960 Speaker 1: I hope to stay on your good side, Hank the hacker, 691 00:43:05,160 --> 00:43:08,240 Speaker 1: We mean you no ill will Yeah, big fans actually. 692 00:43:08,960 --> 00:43:11,440 Speaker 1: And then the thing that doesn't get talked about as 693 00:43:11,520 --> 00:43:13,879 Speaker 1: often but should be talked about more is that they're 694 00:43:14,120 --> 00:43:17,359 Speaker 1: organized rings of people doing this. And I don't just 695 00:43:17,400 --> 00:43:22,799 Speaker 1: mean private organizations. State sponsored hacking like this is real, 696 00:43:23,160 --> 00:43:28,200 Speaker 1: it is continual. Make no mistake if the country you 697 00:43:28,280 --> 00:43:34,440 Speaker 1: live in has an active interest in surveillance and hacking, 698 00:43:34,719 --> 00:43:37,359 Speaker 1: and it doesn't matter which country it is, and the 699 00:43:37,480 --> 00:43:41,279 Speaker 1: US is no better than the other countries that you 700 00:43:41,360 --> 00:43:45,480 Speaker 1: might hear about doing state sponsored hacking. One example would 701 00:43:45,480 --> 00:43:50,120 Speaker 1: be UH hackers using hotel internet to steal nuclear secrets. 702 00:43:50,239 --> 00:43:53,440 Speaker 1: Is a great article in Gizmoto from two thousand fourteen, 703 00:43:53,520 --> 00:43:57,080 Speaker 1: so this is old stuff. There was an elite team 704 00:43:57,239 --> 00:44:00,400 Speaker 1: of possibly state sponsored hackers that were in full trading 705 00:44:00,480 --> 00:44:03,640 Speaker 1: WiFi networks, although that they wouldn't have that much luck 706 00:44:03,920 --> 00:44:10,560 Speaker 1: in Alberton. They were infiltrating WiFi networks, probably to steal 707 00:44:10,640 --> 00:44:14,120 Speaker 1: nuclear secrets and the security researchers who discovered this called 708 00:44:14,160 --> 00:44:18,200 Speaker 1: the cyber spies Dark Hotel, and their efforts to track 709 00:44:18,239 --> 00:44:24,160 Speaker 1: down this group we're tenacious. But the further they went, 710 00:44:24,480 --> 00:44:29,600 Speaker 1: the more disturbing stuff they discovered. These people were insanely talented. 711 00:44:30,239 --> 00:44:33,880 Speaker 1: They're some of the members were traced back to South Korea, 712 00:44:34,000 --> 00:44:37,080 Speaker 1: but at the time of writing, they still weren't, at 713 00:44:37,120 --> 00:44:43,800 Speaker 1: least publicly sure what these people were doing and why 714 00:44:43,920 --> 00:44:51,120 Speaker 1: and this Ben do you remember Winter Olympics so stuff? Yeah, 715 00:44:51,160 --> 00:44:53,239 Speaker 1: and tell me about it. Well, it sounds very similar 716 00:44:53,480 --> 00:44:56,160 Speaker 1: to to what you're talking about, where there were reports 717 00:44:56,200 --> 00:44:59,680 Speaker 1: coming out of American media that if you're using the 718 00:44:59,840 --> 00:45:03,880 Speaker 1: y fi in restaurants around Sochi while you're at the Olympics, 719 00:45:03,960 --> 00:45:06,880 Speaker 1: there's a very high chance that you're going to get hacked. 720 00:45:07,880 --> 00:45:12,200 Speaker 1: There's a lot of fear about that stuff. So there's 721 00:45:12,280 --> 00:45:15,440 Speaker 1: also you know, this group Dark Hotel is still active 722 00:45:16,120 --> 00:45:19,920 Speaker 1: as of March of They also have a goth band 723 00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:22,400 Speaker 1: on the side. They have a goth band on the side. 724 00:45:23,040 --> 00:45:25,439 Speaker 1: It's kind of a Prodigy all over again. Wait, wait, 725 00:45:25,480 --> 00:45:30,000 Speaker 1: is this real? It could be excited, it could be 726 00:45:30,120 --> 00:45:32,479 Speaker 1: Maybe maybe you should ask them what kind of music 727 00:45:32,520 --> 00:45:34,319 Speaker 1: they like. Okay, those of you who don't know Matt 728 00:45:34,360 --> 00:45:36,879 Speaker 1: and haven't maybe seen him. He is so goth right now. 729 00:45:38,239 --> 00:45:43,200 Speaker 1: Guyliner for days. Uh yeah, So Dark Hotel is still active. 730 00:45:43,239 --> 00:45:47,239 Speaker 1: They were reported exploiting a Chinese telecom. I'm not condoning 731 00:45:47,280 --> 00:45:51,600 Speaker 1: these actions, but the three of us feel that it 732 00:45:51,719 --> 00:45:55,200 Speaker 1: is important to be aware of the situation that you're 733 00:45:55,239 --> 00:45:59,480 Speaker 1: in when you're in an airport, and also to be 734 00:45:59,520 --> 00:46:03,279 Speaker 1: aware that governments are doing this. Don't let the don't 735 00:46:03,400 --> 00:46:07,360 Speaker 1: let the Sunday News or whatever fool you into thinking 736 00:46:07,560 --> 00:46:10,799 Speaker 1: it's just a couple of missing thropes in every airport. Now, 737 00:46:10,800 --> 00:46:12,879 Speaker 1: I would imagine the government is doing things like this 738 00:46:13,040 --> 00:46:16,879 Speaker 1: anyway and anywhere they can, well, especially in airports. I mean, 739 00:46:16,920 --> 00:46:20,880 Speaker 1: you're you're gonna want to have a lockdown on every 740 00:46:20,960 --> 00:46:24,680 Speaker 1: packet that goes to and from within an airport from 741 00:46:24,680 --> 00:46:27,560 Speaker 1: the user. And airport is great because it has instant 742 00:46:27,760 --> 00:46:32,680 Speaker 1: distance baked in yep, so uh, you know which terminal 743 00:46:32,719 --> 00:46:35,520 Speaker 1: you're at and probably where you're sitting right and then 744 00:46:36,000 --> 00:46:39,440 Speaker 1: you're gone, so it's not like there's someone in the 745 00:46:39,480 --> 00:46:43,080 Speaker 1: cafe with you anymore. So we hope that you have 746 00:46:43,320 --> 00:46:47,160 Speaker 1: enjoyed this episode, and we would like to hear from 747 00:46:47,200 --> 00:46:50,200 Speaker 1: you if you have any war stories about free WiFi, 748 00:46:50,680 --> 00:46:52,560 Speaker 1: or you have any tips or tricks that you think 749 00:46:52,640 --> 00:46:56,920 Speaker 1: your fellow listeners should hear. And to prove that we 750 00:46:57,000 --> 00:47:02,440 Speaker 1: have ears, what listen and eyes, Let's see, we'd like 751 00:47:02,520 --> 00:47:04,720 Speaker 1: to jump into a little thing we like to call 752 00:47:05,239 --> 00:47:11,720 Speaker 1: shot at Corners. Our first shout out goes to Paula. 753 00:47:12,400 --> 00:47:15,200 Speaker 1: She and her thirteen year old nephew. You guys are 754 00:47:15,280 --> 00:47:18,919 Speaker 1: going to space camp in July. Another another person writing 755 00:47:18,960 --> 00:47:21,120 Speaker 1: in to let us know they're they're excited to go 756 00:47:21,160 --> 00:47:23,600 Speaker 1: to space Camp. She's so happy about it. She's been 757 00:47:23,640 --> 00:47:26,920 Speaker 1: dancing a jig for several days. She said, Well, Paula, 758 00:47:26,920 --> 00:47:30,480 Speaker 1: we're dancing a little jig for you right now. Nola's 759 00:47:30,520 --> 00:47:33,759 Speaker 1: but I am nodding my head rhythmically. Space camp is cool. 760 00:47:33,840 --> 00:47:36,640 Speaker 1: I'm sorry, We'll take you, I promise. Do you want 761 00:47:36,640 --> 00:47:41,080 Speaker 1: to go so much? Okay, Well, while we're getting our 762 00:47:41,120 --> 00:47:44,400 Speaker 1: stuff together for space Camp, let's hear from Chase from Alabama. 763 00:47:44,760 --> 00:47:48,000 Speaker 1: Chase says, uh It doesn't believe in the Illuminati per se, 764 00:47:48,080 --> 00:47:50,840 Speaker 1: but wants us to further explore the connections between separate 765 00:47:50,880 --> 00:47:54,320 Speaker 1: groups we've covered in the past. The Builderberg's skull and bones, 766 00:47:54,560 --> 00:47:59,879 Speaker 1: Trilateral commission, central banks, etcetera, all of which are real 767 00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:03,640 Speaker 1: all and all of which have been accused of doing 768 00:48:03,680 --> 00:48:06,320 Speaker 1: some shady things. So to take a page from the 769 00:48:06,360 --> 00:48:09,520 Speaker 1: book of Beyonce and perhaps some up chase his position. 770 00:48:10,239 --> 00:48:14,279 Speaker 1: Y'all haters corny talking that Illuminati mess, but I think 771 00:48:14,280 --> 00:48:16,839 Speaker 1: it warrants further exploration, So we're gonna do that thing. Yep. 772 00:48:17,200 --> 00:48:19,440 Speaker 1: Finally we have one from Daniel who wants us to 773 00:48:19,520 --> 00:48:22,960 Speaker 1: take a look at the French alchemist and author Fulconelli 774 00:48:23,440 --> 00:48:27,279 Speaker 1: who allegedly attempted to warn a French physicist about the 775 00:48:27,280 --> 00:48:32,960 Speaker 1: potential dangers of weaponized nuclear fission in nineteen thirty seven. Fascinating, 776 00:48:32,960 --> 00:48:35,680 Speaker 1: and he claimed that it had been used on humanity before. 777 00:48:36,760 --> 00:48:40,359 Speaker 1: And this is one interesting customer. Yeah, that's right. He 778 00:48:40,440 --> 00:48:44,520 Speaker 1: even goes into the great work and trying to find 779 00:48:44,560 --> 00:48:47,839 Speaker 1: that place that all alchemists search for, where you can 780 00:48:48,160 --> 00:48:52,680 Speaker 1: it's a point, some point where you can access all 781 00:48:52,719 --> 00:48:55,440 Speaker 1: of space and time at once, all that has ever 782 00:48:55,520 --> 00:48:59,919 Speaker 1: existed and will never exist, traveling without moving. Yeah, tie 783 00:49:00,040 --> 00:49:03,919 Speaker 1: hm as a flat circle. He allegedly found this and 784 00:49:03,920 --> 00:49:06,520 Speaker 1: and was able to truly access it at least, you know, 785 00:49:06,920 --> 00:49:09,600 Speaker 1: according to articles written about him. If you haven't listened 786 00:49:09,640 --> 00:49:13,879 Speaker 1: to our episode on alchemy, we had a guest, dear 787 00:49:13,960 --> 00:49:17,680 Speaker 1: friend of Ben's and now the show, Mr Damian Patrick Williams. 788 00:49:17,680 --> 00:49:22,440 Speaker 1: We had a fantastic conversation about um the nature of alchemy, 789 00:49:22,840 --> 00:49:25,000 Speaker 1: and then there's a nice companion episode we did on 790 00:49:25,000 --> 00:49:28,320 Speaker 1: the same day about technology and its relationship with the occult. 791 00:49:28,320 --> 00:49:30,360 Speaker 1: As are some of my favorite episodes. I really recommend 792 00:49:30,480 --> 00:49:33,000 Speaker 1: going back into the archives and checking those out. And 793 00:49:33,160 --> 00:49:40,160 Speaker 1: this concludes our Gosh, but wait, as Billy Mays was 794 00:49:40,200 --> 00:49:43,560 Speaker 1: wont to say during his glory days, there is more. 795 00:49:44,840 --> 00:49:46,759 Speaker 1: This is usually the part of the show where we 796 00:49:46,800 --> 00:49:49,640 Speaker 1: talked about our Facebook and Twitter and ask you to 797 00:49:49,880 --> 00:49:53,200 Speaker 1: check it out because you'll see suth that doesn't make 798 00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:55,520 Speaker 1: it onto the air for one reason or another. You'll 799 00:49:55,560 --> 00:50:00,319 Speaker 1: also see us actively taking suggestions where conspiracy up at 800 00:50:00,320 --> 00:50:04,480 Speaker 1: Those were also on Instagram. Now that's right, and we 801 00:50:04,520 --> 00:50:08,359 Speaker 1: are conspiracy stuff show there and you guys, we haven't 802 00:50:08,360 --> 00:50:10,360 Speaker 1: done this before, but we would really appreciate it. Wherever 803 00:50:10,440 --> 00:50:13,680 Speaker 1: you listen to the podcast, be at iTunes, Stitcher, We're 804 00:50:13,719 --> 00:50:17,360 Speaker 1: now on Spotify, We're on Google Play, tons of places 805 00:50:17,440 --> 00:50:19,200 Speaker 1: you can get it. Leave us a review. I mean 806 00:50:19,200 --> 00:50:21,719 Speaker 1: that really helps the algorithm. It helps more people find 807 00:50:21,719 --> 00:50:23,880 Speaker 1: out about the show, and you know, it makes us 808 00:50:23,880 --> 00:50:26,920 Speaker 1: feel good in our hearts a need that every time 809 00:50:27,320 --> 00:50:31,560 Speaker 1: we get a review, our boss goes up to this 810 00:50:32,000 --> 00:50:34,359 Speaker 1: thing he painted on the wall. You know how they're 811 00:50:34,400 --> 00:50:37,839 Speaker 1: like fundraisers for schools and stuff where they'll have you know, 812 00:50:37,840 --> 00:50:41,520 Speaker 1: like a thermometer with the levels of money. Well, ours 813 00:50:41,680 --> 00:50:44,279 Speaker 1: is the level of likelihood of us being fired. And 814 00:50:44,320 --> 00:50:46,640 Speaker 1: if it gets to the top, and we've been very 815 00:50:46,640 --> 00:50:48,879 Speaker 1: close to the top for a while, then boom, we're 816 00:50:48,880 --> 00:50:52,239 Speaker 1: out here. So every like, every review ticks us down 817 00:50:52,400 --> 00:50:55,440 Speaker 1: just a little bit further away from being fired. Because, 818 00:50:55,480 --> 00:50:58,640 Speaker 1: as Ben Is said in the past, the biggest investment 819 00:50:58,680 --> 00:51:01,280 Speaker 1: that you make and the show is with your time. 820 00:51:01,719 --> 00:51:03,839 Speaker 1: So we would really really appreciate if you would take 821 00:51:03,840 --> 00:51:05,880 Speaker 1: just a little more of your time and say how 822 00:51:05,920 --> 00:51:08,200 Speaker 1: do you you feel about the show? All Right, we said 823 00:51:08,239 --> 00:51:11,080 Speaker 1: we were gonna do it. The active Internet users in 824 00:51:11,080 --> 00:51:17,919 Speaker 1: the world right now total comes to three billion, four 825 00:51:18,040 --> 00:51:21,439 Speaker 1: hundred and one million, one hundred and twenty one thousand, 826 00:51:21,440 --> 00:51:25,640 Speaker 1: five hundred and forty and counting. And that's the end 827 00:51:25,719 --> 00:51:29,080 Speaker 1: of this classic episode. If you have any thoughts or 828 00:51:29,239 --> 00:51:33,040 Speaker 1: questions about this episode. You can get into contact with 829 00:51:33,160 --> 00:51:35,160 Speaker 1: us in a number of different ways. One of the 830 00:51:35,200 --> 00:51:37,040 Speaker 1: best is to give us a call. Our number is 831 00:51:37,120 --> 00:51:40,560 Speaker 1: one eight three three st d w y t K. 832 00:51:41,080 --> 00:51:42,879 Speaker 1: If you don't want to do that, you can send 833 00:51:42,920 --> 00:51:46,200 Speaker 1: us a good old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at 834 00:51:46,200 --> 00:51:49,840 Speaker 1: i heart radio dot com. Stuff they don't want you 835 00:51:49,880 --> 00:51:52,520 Speaker 1: to know is a production of I heart Radio. For 836 00:51:52,600 --> 00:51:54,960 Speaker 1: more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the i heart 837 00:51:55,040 --> 00:51:57,839 Speaker 1: Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your 838 00:51:57,840 --> 00:51:58,520 Speaker 1: favorite shows.