WEBVTT - Judging Sam: Judging the FTX Bankruptcy

0:00:15.316 --> 0:00:26.036
<v Speaker 1>Push Kim. Hey everyone, it's Michael Lewis here and this

0:00:26.116 --> 0:00:29.156
<v Speaker 1>is judging Sam. For the past few months, we've been

0:00:29.156 --> 0:00:32.116
<v Speaker 1>covering the story of Sam Bankman Freed. He's the founder

0:00:32.156 --> 0:00:36.236
<v Speaker 1>of the cryptocurrency exchange FTX. It was worth billions of

0:00:36.236 --> 0:00:39.196
<v Speaker 1>dollars before it came a part at the scenes. I

0:00:39.236 --> 0:00:41.836
<v Speaker 1>wrote a book about all this and Sam called Going

0:00:41.876 --> 0:00:45.356
<v Speaker 1>Infinite and reported on his trial here on the podcast.

0:00:46.556 --> 0:00:49.036
<v Speaker 1>He was found guilty of fraud and conspiracy in his

0:00:49.116 --> 0:00:53.676
<v Speaker 1>sentencing a schedule for later this week. Meanwhile, FTX has

0:00:53.716 --> 0:00:57.476
<v Speaker 1>been going through bankruptcy proceedings, and in a surprising twist,

0:00:57.716 --> 0:01:01.356
<v Speaker 1>ftx's lawyers recently announced that all the creditors will likely

0:01:01.436 --> 0:01:04.876
<v Speaker 1>be paid in full. All the FDx customers who couldn't

0:01:04.916 --> 0:01:07.916
<v Speaker 1>get their money out when FTX collapsed will probably get

0:01:07.956 --> 0:01:11.156
<v Speaker 1>their money back. But my guest today argues that the

0:01:11.196 --> 0:01:15.996
<v Speaker 1>bankruptcy process has been handled badly. His name is Jonathan Lipson.

0:01:16.676 --> 0:01:20.276
<v Speaker 1>He's a bankruptcy expert at Temple University and he co

0:01:20.356 --> 0:01:23.996
<v Speaker 1>wrote a research paper about the FTX bankruptcy that will

0:01:24.036 --> 0:01:29.796
<v Speaker 1>be published next year in the Stanford Law Review. So

0:01:30.076 --> 0:01:33.236
<v Speaker 1>Sam bachmcfreed has been tried, convicted, and is going to jail,

0:01:33.356 --> 0:01:35.716
<v Speaker 1>and everybody's been paying attention to that, and that is

0:01:35.996 --> 0:01:38.556
<v Speaker 1>seems to be the human drama. But there's this whole

0:01:38.716 --> 0:01:42.716
<v Speaker 1>other legal process, the bankruptcy process, that's getting very little attention,

0:01:42.996 --> 0:01:45.196
<v Speaker 1>and that you have written about. Why is it important?

0:01:46.596 --> 0:01:48.916
<v Speaker 2>It's important for a number of reasons. You know, it

0:01:48.996 --> 0:01:51.556
<v Speaker 2>is important because we're concerned about how the bankruptcy was

0:01:51.636 --> 0:01:56.316
<v Speaker 2>run for the benefit of you know, creditors and investors

0:01:56.356 --> 0:01:57.836
<v Speaker 2>and so on. There are millions of people who have

0:01:57.996 --> 0:02:01.276
<v Speaker 2>lost money in this company, and if it was handled properly,

0:02:01.316 --> 0:02:04.916
<v Speaker 2>perhaps they would do better. Number Two, it appears that

0:02:05.156 --> 0:02:10.516
<v Speaker 2>the bankruptcy process itself and the company itself were you know,

0:02:10.556 --> 0:02:15.596
<v Speaker 2>in effect accelerating and perhaps distorting the criminal prosecution. And

0:02:15.876 --> 0:02:18.876
<v Speaker 2>you know, like that's a really serious problem because we

0:02:18.956 --> 0:02:23.236
<v Speaker 2>have certain legitimate expectations about how prosecutors do their job,

0:02:23.636 --> 0:02:25.876
<v Speaker 2>and for that matter, we have certain basic expectations about

0:02:25.996 --> 0:02:27.636
<v Speaker 2>how lawyers are supposed to act.

0:02:27.676 --> 0:02:30.356
<v Speaker 1>So let's back up. Can you just tell me what

0:02:30.436 --> 0:02:32.436
<v Speaker 1>caught your eye in the first place. Let's start there,

0:02:32.516 --> 0:02:33.356
<v Speaker 1>like what caught your fry.

0:02:34.716 --> 0:02:37.556
<v Speaker 2>A lot of my work involves bankruptcy. I researched it,

0:02:37.596 --> 0:02:42.276
<v Speaker 2>I write about it, teach it, and really I had

0:02:42.316 --> 0:02:44.756
<v Speaker 2>no particular interest in crypto at all. I was interested

0:02:44.796 --> 0:02:47.756
<v Speaker 2>in FTX only because it was the kind of a

0:02:47.836 --> 0:02:51.276
<v Speaker 2>bankruptcy where you would have expected to see something that

0:02:51.316 --> 0:02:54.796
<v Speaker 2>I had studied in the past, an examiner. The idea

0:02:55.556 --> 0:02:58.356
<v Speaker 2>being that when Congress created the Bankruptcy Code, they said,

0:02:58.476 --> 0:03:01.316
<v Speaker 2>in some cases, you really need somebody from the outside

0:03:01.396 --> 0:03:04.836
<v Speaker 2>to come in and conduct an investigation of what happened

0:03:05.316 --> 0:03:08.676
<v Speaker 2>and write a report about it for the public. In FTX,

0:03:08.796 --> 0:03:11.996
<v Speaker 2>the the United States Trustee has sought an examiner at

0:03:12.036 --> 0:03:15.636
<v Speaker 2>the beginning of the bankruptcy case, and to my surprise,

0:03:15.676 --> 0:03:17.996
<v Speaker 2>and I think the surprised that some folks, the bankruptcy

0:03:18.036 --> 0:03:20.556
<v Speaker 2>judge said no. And we can talk more about why

0:03:20.596 --> 0:03:23.516
<v Speaker 2>it was surprising, but the short answer was that when

0:03:23.556 --> 0:03:27.356
<v Speaker 2>the US Trustee sought to appeal that decision to the

0:03:27.356 --> 0:03:30.236
<v Speaker 2>Third Circuit, I agreed to write an amikus brief in

0:03:30.316 --> 0:03:33.916
<v Speaker 2>support of the US Trustee, basically seeking to have an

0:03:33.916 --> 0:03:37.396
<v Speaker 2>examiner appointed. We won in the Third Circuit, and you know,

0:03:37.956 --> 0:03:41.436
<v Speaker 2>as you probably know your listeners probably know, an examiner

0:03:41.436 --> 0:03:43.516
<v Speaker 2>has been appointed in the case. As of a couple

0:03:43.516 --> 0:03:44.116
<v Speaker 2>of days ago.

0:03:44.356 --> 0:03:46.876
<v Speaker 1>I doubt our listeners do know because it's also our kane,

0:03:46.916 --> 0:03:49.276
<v Speaker 1>and it's been striking to me how little attention the

0:03:49.276 --> 0:03:51.796
<v Speaker 1>bankruptcy has gotten compared to the rest of the case.

0:03:52.116 --> 0:03:55.076
<v Speaker 1>So act, let's go in a little more detail. Why

0:03:55.156 --> 0:03:57.436
<v Speaker 1>would you have expected in this case for there to

0:03:57.436 --> 0:04:01.156
<v Speaker 1>be an examiner? And actually backup, backup even further than that,

0:04:01.876 --> 0:04:05.796
<v Speaker 1>just explain what the checks are on the bankruptcy process generally,

0:04:05.876 --> 0:04:09.116
<v Speaker 1>like how we did this with your co author, David's.

0:04:09.276 --> 0:04:12.556
<v Speaker 1>But let's deal a little refresher, Like a company goes

0:04:12.556 --> 0:04:14.356
<v Speaker 1>into bankruptcy, then what happens.

0:04:14.756 --> 0:04:17.316
<v Speaker 2>So you know, to take a step back, bankruptcy in

0:04:17.356 --> 0:04:20.956
<v Speaker 2>the US is for companies like FTX that are purporting

0:04:20.996 --> 0:04:24.596
<v Speaker 2>to reorganize. The basic intuition that Congress had in the

0:04:24.676 --> 0:04:28.196
<v Speaker 2>nineteen seventies was, well, we shouldn't just kill the company

0:04:28.236 --> 0:04:31.756
<v Speaker 2>and sell off the assets to pay the creditors if

0:04:31.756 --> 0:04:33.796
<v Speaker 2>we could avoid it, because if we can keep the

0:04:33.796 --> 0:04:37.036
<v Speaker 2>company going, then everybody's probably going to be better off.

0:04:37.036 --> 0:04:39.116
<v Speaker 2>We'll save jobs, the company will make more money because

0:04:39.156 --> 0:04:42.636
<v Speaker 2>it'll be profitable, maybe if it returns to profitability, and

0:04:42.836 --> 0:04:44.756
<v Speaker 2>you know, it's just just much better than what used

0:04:44.796 --> 0:04:48.356
<v Speaker 2>to happen, which was a liquidation. But Congress realized that,

0:04:48.796 --> 0:04:50.916
<v Speaker 2>you know, if you allow the company to stay in

0:04:50.956 --> 0:04:54.836
<v Speaker 2>business even when it's in bankruptcy, then maybe the guys

0:04:54.876 --> 0:04:58.076
<v Speaker 2>who got the company into trouble are still running the roost,

0:04:58.276 --> 0:05:00.316
<v Speaker 2>and maybe that's not so great. So they said, look

0:05:00.596 --> 0:05:02.836
<v Speaker 2>in large cases, in cases where we have any concerns

0:05:02.836 --> 0:05:06.116
<v Speaker 2>about what happened before bankruptcy, an examiner should be appointed.

0:05:06.116 --> 0:05:08.796
<v Speaker 2>Should be mandatory, right, the statute says an examiner shall

0:05:08.796 --> 0:05:10.556
<v Speaker 2>be a I did in a certain class of cases.

0:05:11.516 --> 0:05:13.236
<v Speaker 2>And the reason I got involved in all this in

0:05:13.276 --> 0:05:14.956
<v Speaker 2>part is because you know, I did a study on

0:05:15.156 --> 0:05:17.156
<v Speaker 2>these guys many years ago, because everybody sort of knew

0:05:17.156 --> 0:05:18.996
<v Speaker 2>it didn't really happen the way Congress expected.

0:05:20.156 --> 0:05:23.276
<v Speaker 1>How how did it not happen the way Congress expected?

0:05:23.396 --> 0:05:23.956
<v Speaker 1>What was different?

0:05:24.676 --> 0:05:26.396
<v Speaker 2>What was different is that, you know, while debtors and

0:05:26.436 --> 0:05:28.836
<v Speaker 2>creditors fight all the time about all sorts of things,

0:05:29.236 --> 0:05:31.036
<v Speaker 2>there is one thing they agree on, and that is

0:05:31.076 --> 0:05:32.076
<v Speaker 2>that they hate examiners.

0:05:32.436 --> 0:05:32.676
<v Speaker 1>Huh.

0:05:32.676 --> 0:05:36.236
<v Speaker 2>They don't want somebody coming in from the outside poking

0:05:36.276 --> 0:05:40.116
<v Speaker 2>around in their negotiations because basically, a Chapter eleven bankruptcy

0:05:40.196 --> 0:05:44.236
<v Speaker 2>is just a protracted negotiation in the shadow of a

0:05:44.316 --> 0:05:47.716
<v Speaker 2>court with some procedural rules that are designed to facilitate

0:05:47.756 --> 0:05:51.236
<v Speaker 2>that negotiation. Right, So an examiner is a problem for that, right,

0:05:51.276 --> 0:05:54.756
<v Speaker 2>because the examiner is coming in from the outside, maybe

0:05:54.836 --> 0:05:58.396
<v Speaker 2>you know, asking questions of management that management doesn't necessarily

0:05:58.436 --> 0:06:03.156
<v Speaker 2>want to answer, maybe, you know, interfering with or distracting

0:06:03.156 --> 0:06:07.196
<v Speaker 2>from the negotiations that are happening, and certainly costing money. Right.

0:06:07.276 --> 0:06:10.076
<v Speaker 2>The examiner doesn't work for free. The government doesn't pay

0:06:10.116 --> 0:06:14.196
<v Speaker 2>the examiner. The examiner is paid really ultimately by creditors, right,

0:06:14.396 --> 0:06:16.556
<v Speaker 2>in the same way that all of the folks who

0:06:16.676 --> 0:06:18.996
<v Speaker 2>run the bankruptcy are ultimately paid by creditors.

0:06:19.276 --> 0:06:19.396
<v Speaker 1>Right.

0:06:20.036 --> 0:06:22.276
<v Speaker 2>So, you know, if you think about it, kind of intuitively,

0:06:22.276 --> 0:06:23.996
<v Speaker 2>the folks on the ground who run these cases are

0:06:24.036 --> 0:06:26.996
<v Speaker 2>lawyers who see each other all the time in different cases,

0:06:27.476 --> 0:06:29.716
<v Speaker 2>and you know, they fight sometimes and they get along sometimes.

0:06:29.716 --> 0:06:32.956
<v Speaker 2>But what they don't want as an outsider, like for example,

0:06:32.956 --> 0:06:35.356
<v Speaker 2>Bob Cleary, the prosecutor's now been appointed to be the

0:06:35.396 --> 0:06:39.196
<v Speaker 2>examiner in FTX, coming in from the outside and saying, actually,

0:06:39.876 --> 0:06:42.876
<v Speaker 2>let's do a little forensics here and see what actually happened.

0:06:43.396 --> 0:06:45.636
<v Speaker 2>And so even though Congress said, oh, well, you know,

0:06:45.756 --> 0:06:49.876
<v Speaker 2>we should have these, you know, examiners routinely, as you know,

0:06:49.916 --> 0:06:53.716
<v Speaker 2>a way of serving the public interest in understanding what happened,

0:06:54.276 --> 0:06:57.756
<v Speaker 2>Like nobody ever asks for them, and you know frequently

0:06:58.236 --> 0:07:01.156
<v Speaker 2>judges say, yeah, we know the statute requires it, but

0:07:01.316 --> 0:07:04.516
<v Speaker 2>you know, when in those rare cases they're asked, they've

0:07:04.556 --> 0:07:06.876
<v Speaker 2>often said no. But the one exception that we found

0:07:06.916 --> 0:07:09.716
<v Speaker 2>in our research was, well, look, when there's a massive

0:07:09.876 --> 0:07:13.996
<v Speaker 2>free fall case like Enron or Lehman Brothers or World

0:07:14.076 --> 0:07:16.636
<v Speaker 2>Commra any of these, you know, then you know, all

0:07:16.676 --> 0:07:18.756
<v Speaker 2>the inside guys are like, well, right, we get it,

0:07:18.996 --> 0:07:22.116
<v Speaker 2>like you do need somebody to come in and explain

0:07:22.196 --> 0:07:25.116
<v Speaker 2>what the hell happened. And so in FTX, you're like, well,

0:07:25.116 --> 0:07:27.356
<v Speaker 2>that certainly looks like that, right, it looks like Lehman

0:07:27.636 --> 0:07:29.916
<v Speaker 2>and Ron or something. So that's why I was surprising

0:07:29.956 --> 0:07:33.796
<v Speaker 2>that you didn't see an examiner appointed in FTX, although

0:07:33.996 --> 0:07:37.396
<v Speaker 2>you know, the explanation that was given at the time was, well,

0:07:37.956 --> 0:07:39.596
<v Speaker 2>you know, Bankment Freed had given up control of the

0:07:39.596 --> 0:07:41.676
<v Speaker 2>company to a guy named John Ray, who I'm sure

0:07:41.676 --> 0:07:45.116
<v Speaker 2>we'll talk about, who clearly was independent of Bankman Freed

0:07:45.196 --> 0:07:47.476
<v Speaker 2>and who was a bankruptcy expert. He'd done a lot

0:07:47.476 --> 0:07:49.996
<v Speaker 2>of work in a lot of cases. And so if

0:07:50.036 --> 0:07:51.956
<v Speaker 2>you think that, you know, an examiner is just going

0:07:51.996 --> 0:07:55.636
<v Speaker 2>to be independent of prior management, you know, Ray is

0:07:55.636 --> 0:07:58.876
<v Speaker 2>that guy. I think the bigger problem than certainly the

0:07:58.876 --> 0:08:00.756
<v Speaker 2>one that we focus on in the paper that we've

0:08:00.796 --> 0:08:04.516
<v Speaker 2>just released, is the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell,

0:08:04.556 --> 0:08:08.356
<v Speaker 2>who had been company counsel for certain purposes before bankruptcy,

0:08:08.556 --> 0:08:11.396
<v Speaker 2>brought Ray in and you know, as far as we

0:08:11.436 --> 0:08:14.756
<v Speaker 2>can tell, had a very specific set of interests in

0:08:14.836 --> 0:08:18.156
<v Speaker 2>seeing how the bankruptcy was going to proceed, and so

0:08:18.676 --> 0:08:22.196
<v Speaker 2>maybe they weren't quite as independent in a in a

0:08:22.356 --> 0:08:26.076
<v Speaker 2>in a problematic way from Bankman Freed as you would

0:08:26.116 --> 0:08:26.436
<v Speaker 2>have thought.

0:08:26.676 --> 0:08:29.796
<v Speaker 1>My understanding, and this is from interviewing John Ray, is

0:08:29.836 --> 0:08:33.396
<v Speaker 1>that Sullivan and Cromwell, who had been Sam Bankman Fried's

0:08:33.436 --> 0:08:38.076
<v Speaker 1>lawyers before the bankruptcy in Good Times, had found John

0:08:38.156 --> 0:08:40.876
<v Speaker 1>Ray to come in and take over from Sam Bankman Freed.

0:08:41.196 --> 0:08:43.996
<v Speaker 1>And then the minute Sam Bankminfreed signs the documents handing

0:08:43.996 --> 0:08:46.876
<v Speaker 1>the company to John Ray, he hires Sullivan and Cromwell

0:08:46.876 --> 0:08:49.156
<v Speaker 1>to run the bankruptcy. And that's going to be worth

0:08:49.356 --> 0:08:52.276
<v Speaker 1>hundreds of millions of dollars to Sullivan and Cromwell. Is

0:08:53.716 --> 0:08:54.116
<v Speaker 1>that right?

0:08:54.196 --> 0:08:58.436
<v Speaker 2>That's I think that's I think that's mostly correct. I mean,

0:08:58.436 --> 0:09:01.196
<v Speaker 2>I think that you know, the the kind of the

0:09:01.236 --> 0:09:04.796
<v Speaker 2>three different versions of the story about this law firm, Sullivan, Cromwell,

0:09:06.196 --> 0:09:07.876
<v Speaker 2>and just to be clear, like we are not out

0:09:07.916 --> 0:09:11.236
<v Speaker 2>to get Cromwell, were not out to fight the verdict,

0:09:11.276 --> 0:09:13.076
<v Speaker 2>like we just want to understand what happened here. But

0:09:14.756 --> 0:09:16.756
<v Speaker 2>you know, there's a little bit of detail on all this.

0:09:16.836 --> 0:09:19.996
<v Speaker 2>But you know, Solomon Cromwell was clearly doing important work

0:09:20.036 --> 0:09:24.036
<v Speaker 2>for FTX before bankruptcy, and it was mostly work involving

0:09:24.956 --> 0:09:28.556
<v Speaker 2>the acquisition of other companies like ledger X and other subsidiaries,

0:09:28.996 --> 0:09:36.036
<v Speaker 2>and even more importantly representing FTX in dealings with regulators,

0:09:36.076 --> 0:09:40.036
<v Speaker 2>in particular the CFTC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which

0:09:40.076 --> 0:09:43.116
<v Speaker 2>was super important for FTX because they wanted to, you know,

0:09:43.236 --> 0:09:46.756
<v Speaker 2>establish some kind of regulatory legitimacy for crypto. And it

0:09:46.836 --> 0:09:49.156
<v Speaker 2>was really important for Solivon Cromwell because they're one of

0:09:49.156 --> 0:09:52.836
<v Speaker 2>the premier firms at interacting with regulators. Many of the

0:09:52.876 --> 0:09:56.036
<v Speaker 2>folks at the firm were former regulators themselves, and you know,

0:09:56.196 --> 0:09:59.876
<v Speaker 2>they're an extremely well regarded firm precisely because they do

0:09:59.916 --> 0:10:03.396
<v Speaker 2>that stuff really well. And you know, I think that

0:10:03.596 --> 0:10:06.636
<v Speaker 2>the short version of the story is that Solomon Cromwell

0:10:07.236 --> 0:10:11.676
<v Speaker 2>didn't probably know about the underlying problems at FTX until

0:10:11.756 --> 0:10:15.116
<v Speaker 2>November eighth of twenty twenty two. But they were telling

0:10:15.196 --> 0:10:18.516
<v Speaker 2>the world that everything was fine. They were implying that

0:10:18.716 --> 0:10:22.356
<v Speaker 2>actually they did know everything they needed to know to

0:10:22.396 --> 0:10:26.316
<v Speaker 2>say to the CFTC and to creditors and contract counterparts.

0:10:26.956 --> 0:10:29.156
<v Speaker 2>FTX is rock solid, in the words of one of

0:10:29.196 --> 0:10:33.196
<v Speaker 2>the Solovon Cromol lawyers, and I think probably on November

0:10:33.236 --> 0:10:35.836
<v Speaker 2>eighth or around then, they woke up to the fact

0:10:35.836 --> 0:10:38.916
<v Speaker 2>that things were not rock solid, that there was a

0:10:38.956 --> 0:10:42.436
<v Speaker 2>problem because the company was commingling assets, even though Sam

0:10:42.476 --> 0:10:44.356
<v Speaker 2>had promised everybody that would never happen.

0:10:44.916 --> 0:10:45.876
<v Speaker 1>What is com mingling.

0:10:46.956 --> 0:10:50.796
<v Speaker 2>It simply means that that FTX and Bankment Free had

0:10:50.836 --> 0:10:55.396
<v Speaker 2>promised depositors that their crypto would be held by FTX,

0:10:55.436 --> 0:10:57.556
<v Speaker 2>it would be on the FTX exchange and nobody else

0:10:57.596 --> 0:10:59.596
<v Speaker 2>would have it. But that turned out to be false

0:10:59.676 --> 0:11:02.716
<v Speaker 2>for some very important number of depositors because it ended

0:11:02.796 --> 0:11:05.716
<v Speaker 2>up at a related company known as Alameda, and that

0:11:05.956 --> 0:11:08.836
<v Speaker 2>was you know, a big problem because Alameda used the

0:11:08.876 --> 0:11:13.276
<v Speaker 2>money for all these other purposes that obviously depositors didn't expect.

0:11:13.596 --> 0:11:16.676
<v Speaker 2>And so, you know, I don't know that the most

0:11:17.116 --> 0:11:20.916
<v Speaker 2>sort of the you know, nefarious version of the story

0:11:21.036 --> 0:11:23.036
<v Speaker 2>of Solomon Promwell is true, namely that they you know,

0:11:23.076 --> 0:11:24.876
<v Speaker 2>they got John ready to come in and steal the

0:11:24.876 --> 0:11:27.916
<v Speaker 2>company from bankman free. I think that's improbable, if only

0:11:27.956 --> 0:11:30.436
<v Speaker 2>because Suli Cromwell has tons of money already, Like they

0:11:30.436 --> 0:11:32.436
<v Speaker 2>don't really need hundreds of millions of dollars because they

0:11:32.436 --> 0:11:35.396
<v Speaker 2>already have hundreds of millions of dollars. I do, however,

0:11:35.476 --> 0:11:37.076
<v Speaker 2>think they might have panicked, and I think in that

0:11:37.116 --> 0:11:39.756
<v Speaker 2>moment of panic did several things that we'd describe in

0:11:39.796 --> 0:11:43.636
<v Speaker 2>our paper that I think at minimum were ethically problematic

0:11:43.676 --> 0:11:48.916
<v Speaker 2>and from our perspective, more importantly problematic, from the bankruptcy perspective,

0:11:48.916 --> 0:11:51.196
<v Speaker 2>from the process, the perspective of the goals of the

0:11:51.196 --> 0:11:52.076
<v Speaker 2>bankruptcy process.

0:11:52.116 --> 0:11:54.036
<v Speaker 1>And they're all going that are going on behind closed

0:11:54.076 --> 0:11:57.516
<v Speaker 1>doors because there's no examiner to reveal all this. Describe

0:11:57.556 --> 0:12:01.036
<v Speaker 1>those things that you think Sulimon Crumwell did that are problematic.

0:12:02.156 --> 0:12:07.316
<v Speaker 2>Sure, So I think the first thing that happens is

0:12:07.556 --> 0:12:10.516
<v Speaker 2>you know, on November eighth, Tourney named Andy Dieterrik, who's

0:12:10.516 --> 0:12:13.476
<v Speaker 2>an important person in the story as a bankruptcy lawyer,

0:12:13.716 --> 0:12:17.276
<v Speaker 2>I think, realizes, you know, because he gets at a

0:12:17.276 --> 0:12:20.476
<v Speaker 2>panic call from some lower level attorneys at FTX that

0:12:21.716 --> 0:12:24.396
<v Speaker 2>there's commingling going on that there's a real problem that

0:12:24.436 --> 0:12:26.396
<v Speaker 2>the company is having a liquidity crisis because they can't

0:12:26.436 --> 0:12:30.596
<v Speaker 2>honor withdrawals. We don't know what happens internally at S

0:12:30.596 --> 0:12:32.356
<v Speaker 2>and C, but we do know that the very next

0:12:32.516 --> 0:12:36.836
<v Speaker 2>day Sullivan and Cromwell does something very important, which is

0:12:36.876 --> 0:12:41.596
<v Speaker 2>that they go to the prosecutors. Now that's a problem

0:12:41.676 --> 0:12:44.356
<v Speaker 2>for a couple of reasons. Number One, you're not really

0:12:44.396 --> 0:12:47.236
<v Speaker 2>supposed to go to the prosecutors and rat your client

0:12:47.276 --> 0:12:50.476
<v Speaker 2>out unless a couple of things are true. Number One,

0:12:50.516 --> 0:12:52.876
<v Speaker 2>you're sure there's a crime, and we don't know that

0:12:52.916 --> 0:12:56.316
<v Speaker 2>they had determined that. Number Two, you've gone to the

0:12:56.396 --> 0:13:00.396
<v Speaker 2>highest authority in the company to confirm that there's a

0:13:00.396 --> 0:13:01.796
<v Speaker 2>crime and confront them and say, by the way, we

0:13:01.796 --> 0:13:04.276
<v Speaker 2>think there's a crime, you should stop committing that crime.

0:13:04.676 --> 0:13:06.676
<v Speaker 2>We don't think there's any evidence of that. And then

0:13:06.756 --> 0:13:09.316
<v Speaker 2>number three, say to that highest authority, if you don't stop.

0:13:09.596 --> 0:13:11.636
<v Speaker 2>We might have to go to the authorities because otherwise

0:13:11.676 --> 0:13:13.596
<v Speaker 2>we'll be implicated in it, and we don't want that.

0:13:13.916 --> 0:13:16.396
<v Speaker 2>We don't see any evidence that that happened either, quite

0:13:16.476 --> 0:13:20.676
<v Speaker 2>the contrary. So the second thing that happens that's really

0:13:20.676 --> 0:13:24.996
<v Speaker 2>problematic is that on that same day, November ninth, when

0:13:25.596 --> 0:13:28.876
<v Speaker 2>they went to the prosecutors, the same lawyer, Andy Dieterrick,

0:13:28.956 --> 0:13:31.756
<v Speaker 2>sent Sam Bateman Freed what I think is a very

0:13:31.796 --> 0:13:36.236
<v Speaker 2>important email. I call it the reassurance email. At nine

0:13:36.236 --> 0:13:39.236
<v Speaker 2>point thirty two that evening, he sends Sam an email

0:13:39.276 --> 0:13:42.876
<v Speaker 2>basically saying, look, we are here to help you in

0:13:42.916 --> 0:13:47.276
<v Speaker 2>your efforts to rescue FTX however we can. And that

0:13:47.716 --> 0:13:50.876
<v Speaker 2>meant something very specific because basically Sam's view of life,

0:13:50.916 --> 0:13:52.796
<v Speaker 2>as far as I can tell, was he thought there

0:13:52.836 --> 0:13:55.876
<v Speaker 2>was just a liquidity crisis and that crisis could be

0:13:55.956 --> 0:13:59.356
<v Speaker 2>solved by finding more liquidity, finding new loans, which is

0:13:59.396 --> 0:14:02.636
<v Speaker 2>normally what happens when companies have liquidity crises but are

0:14:02.636 --> 0:14:07.356
<v Speaker 2>otherwise basically sound. So Solivon Cromwell, this attorney, mister Deeter,

0:14:07.596 --> 0:14:09.996
<v Speaker 2>sends Sam this email saying we're here to help you

0:14:10.156 --> 0:14:13.796
<v Speaker 2>do that however we can, and you know by the way,

0:14:13.836 --> 0:14:16.836
<v Speaker 2>we need you to sign a contract to hire Genre.

0:14:17.756 --> 0:14:20.796
<v Speaker 2>He'll come in as what's known as the Chief Restructuring

0:14:20.836 --> 0:14:24.796
<v Speaker 2>Officer a CRO, which implies that Sam would remain the

0:14:24.836 --> 0:14:28.156
<v Speaker 2>CEO of the chief executive officer. Sam, we want you

0:14:28.236 --> 0:14:30.796
<v Speaker 2>to remain director, Sam. We want you to continue to

0:14:30.796 --> 0:14:33.476
<v Speaker 2>go out and find resources for the company. You know,

0:14:33.676 --> 0:14:37.396
<v Speaker 2>financing for the company. Sam, you know, the bankruptcy if

0:14:37.396 --> 0:14:39.276
<v Speaker 2>that happens at all, it's just an alternative, and it's

0:14:39.276 --> 0:14:43.076
<v Speaker 2>a couple of weeks away, but we need to be ready.

0:14:43.116 --> 0:14:44.796
<v Speaker 2>And here are some things that we need you to do.

0:14:45.916 --> 0:14:48.596
<v Speaker 2>All very normal things to say to a client that

0:14:48.796 --> 0:14:51.036
<v Speaker 2>is facing a liquidity crisis and may have to go

0:14:51.036 --> 0:14:53.916
<v Speaker 2>into bankruptcy, but not what you say to a client

0:14:54.676 --> 0:14:57.516
<v Speaker 2>who you think is committed crimes, and when you've already,

0:14:57.756 --> 0:15:00.116
<v Speaker 2>you know, without the knowledge of that client, gone to

0:15:00.156 --> 0:15:04.316
<v Speaker 2>the prosecutors to inform the prosecutors apparently that there were

0:15:04.356 --> 0:15:07.476
<v Speaker 2>crimes ongoing. So, to me, the second big problem, and

0:15:07.476 --> 0:15:10.036
<v Speaker 2>in some ways, you know, I don't know if it's

0:15:10.036 --> 0:15:11.676
<v Speaker 2>the biggest, but it's a really big one, is what

0:15:11.756 --> 0:15:14.596
<v Speaker 2>I appears to us to have been deception. Now, maybe

0:15:14.756 --> 0:15:16.556
<v Speaker 2>it turns out that there's more to the story than

0:15:16.596 --> 0:15:19.756
<v Speaker 2>we know. Maybe Sam knew. Sam has you know, I

0:15:19.756 --> 0:15:21.556
<v Speaker 2>talked to him. He said no, absolutely not. We had

0:15:21.596 --> 0:15:24.676
<v Speaker 2>no idea. He did have his own lawyers by this point, right,

0:15:24.716 --> 0:15:27.156
<v Speaker 2>Paul Weiss was involved, and you know, I don't know

0:15:27.196 --> 0:15:29.156
<v Speaker 2>if they knew or not. If they did, there's a

0:15:29.156 --> 0:15:31.556
<v Speaker 2>different kind of problem. But in any case, you know

0:15:31.596 --> 0:15:34.636
<v Speaker 2>that this reassurance email I think is all in service

0:15:34.636 --> 0:15:37.356
<v Speaker 2>of getting Sam to do the thing that he did

0:15:37.556 --> 0:15:39.916
<v Speaker 2>then in the early morning hours I guess the eleventh

0:15:39.956 --> 0:15:43.396
<v Speaker 2>of November, which is sign over not just control of

0:15:43.436 --> 0:15:47.156
<v Speaker 2>the company but all of his powers, you know, having

0:15:47.196 --> 0:15:49.476
<v Speaker 2>anything to do with company to John Ray, which you

0:15:49.516 --> 0:15:53.516
<v Speaker 2>know ends up being I think, from bankman Freed's perspective, disasters.

0:15:53.876 --> 0:15:57.036
<v Speaker 1>Given how that, it's unusual that Sullivan and Cromwell would

0:15:57.036 --> 0:16:00.436
<v Speaker 1>have gone to the prosecutors right away. Do you have

0:16:00.436 --> 0:16:02.556
<v Speaker 1>any thoughts about why they might have done that.

0:16:04.436 --> 0:16:07.316
<v Speaker 2>I do. I think that that's to me most consistent

0:16:07.356 --> 0:16:11.596
<v Speaker 2>with a story panic. I think they correctly view themselves

0:16:11.356 --> 0:16:17.756
<v Speaker 2>as being really important intermediaries between large, important regulated companies

0:16:18.236 --> 0:16:21.796
<v Speaker 2>and the folks who regulate those companies, and if you've

0:16:21.836 --> 0:16:25.756
<v Speaker 2>been making a significant mistake with those regulators for a

0:16:25.796 --> 0:16:30.916
<v Speaker 2>while with a prominent company, and you wake up one

0:16:30.916 --> 0:16:33.516
<v Speaker 2>morning and realize that, like maybe you panic, Maybe that's

0:16:33.556 --> 0:16:37.156
<v Speaker 2>a problem for you. Now there are a variety of

0:16:37.196 --> 0:16:38.676
<v Speaker 2>ways you could fix that. They could have, you know,

0:16:38.716 --> 0:16:41.836
<v Speaker 2>withdrawn and perhaps tried to ameliorate that with the regulators.

0:16:42.996 --> 0:16:44.516
<v Speaker 2>And maybe they even did that. We don't know, because

0:16:44.556 --> 0:16:48.796
<v Speaker 2>although they had filed an application for FTX with the CFTC,

0:16:48.836 --> 0:16:52.396
<v Speaker 2>they withdrew it the same day that the company went

0:16:52.436 --> 0:16:54.996
<v Speaker 2>into bankruptcy, the eleventh of November, and nobody's ever seen

0:16:55.036 --> 0:16:57.316
<v Speaker 2>it since then. So we don't really know what else

0:16:57.356 --> 0:16:59.516
<v Speaker 2>they said to the CFTC, but we know a little bit.

0:17:00.836 --> 0:17:02.716
<v Speaker 2>But so I think they were just concerned about protecting

0:17:02.716 --> 0:17:04.556
<v Speaker 2>their reputation. I think it's also true that, you know,

0:17:04.596 --> 0:17:06.276
<v Speaker 2>Dieter k had said like, look, we want to build

0:17:06.276 --> 0:17:08.836
<v Speaker 2>a Chapter eleven practice here. We don't have one. Right.

0:17:08.876 --> 0:17:11.636
<v Speaker 2>We are great litigators, we're great regulatory lawyers, we're great

0:17:11.636 --> 0:17:15.036
<v Speaker 2>corporate lawyers. But we should also be doing Chapter eleven work.

0:17:15.036 --> 0:17:18.156
<v Speaker 2>And this might be an entree into it. More importantly,

0:17:18.196 --> 0:17:20.636
<v Speaker 2>I think, from a very strategic standpoint, is if you're

0:17:21.156 --> 0:17:24.356
<v Speaker 2>the lawyer for the company in bankruptcy, as Solving promo is,

0:17:24.716 --> 0:17:27.516
<v Speaker 2>you control the process, You control all of the information

0:17:27.716 --> 0:17:30.396
<v Speaker 2>at the company. As a practical matter, unless you have

0:17:30.436 --> 0:17:34.196
<v Speaker 2>a fight with management, you and management will be aligned

0:17:34.396 --> 0:17:37.676
<v Speaker 2>on really everything having to do with the company. And

0:17:37.716 --> 0:17:39.836
<v Speaker 2>so one of the things that we figured out very

0:17:39.876 --> 0:17:44.556
<v Speaker 2>early on is that it appeared that Solving, Cromwell and

0:17:44.596 --> 0:17:48.356
<v Speaker 2>Ray were actually providing significant support to the prosecution of

0:17:48.396 --> 0:17:48.996
<v Speaker 2>Bankman Freed.

0:17:49.316 --> 0:17:51.596
<v Speaker 1>How unusual is that? I mean, the creditors are paying

0:17:51.636 --> 0:17:56.156
<v Speaker 1>for that. Solivan and Crommell's billing the company to provide

0:17:56.196 --> 0:17:58.516
<v Speaker 1>the prosecutors with information that will help them make their

0:17:58.556 --> 0:18:01.956
<v Speaker 1>case against Sam Bankman Freed. Creditors don't sign off on that.

0:18:01.996 --> 0:18:04.956
<v Speaker 1>It's unclear why that's even in the creditors' interests. So

0:18:06.076 --> 0:18:09.956
<v Speaker 1>how do they is that? Is that unusual? I mean,

0:18:09.996 --> 0:18:12.396
<v Speaker 1>I just don't know. Is it unusual? And yeah, it's unusual?

0:18:12.396 --> 0:18:13.356
<v Speaker 1>Hous it unusual?

0:18:13.756 --> 0:18:16.596
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a great question. So I want to be

0:18:16.636 --> 0:18:19.036
<v Speaker 2>careful here. I mean, you know there the creditors are

0:18:19.076 --> 0:18:22.116
<v Speaker 2>represented in the case by an official committee of unsecured

0:18:22.156 --> 0:18:24.076
<v Speaker 2>creditors yep, and they have their own lawyers of firm

0:18:24.116 --> 0:18:26.676
<v Speaker 2>called Paul Hasting's a very good firm, and you know,

0:18:27.036 --> 0:18:29.796
<v Speaker 2>one response, you can imagine Solving Cromwell having to anything

0:18:29.836 --> 0:18:32.116
<v Speaker 2>we have to say as well, like, look, the creditors

0:18:32.116 --> 0:18:34.236
<v Speaker 2>have lawyers and they haven't objected to it. I have

0:18:34.436 --> 0:18:38.116
<v Speaker 2>never seen this level of support by a company in

0:18:38.156 --> 0:18:41.876
<v Speaker 2>bankruptcy for the prosecution of its insiders at you know,

0:18:41.956 --> 0:18:45.516
<v Speaker 2>this level, this cost, this intensity. I haven't studied it

0:18:45.556 --> 0:18:48.956
<v Speaker 2>carefully because it doesn't happen much. And certainly it makes

0:18:48.996 --> 0:18:52.476
<v Speaker 2>sense for the company to cooperate and to enter into

0:18:52.476 --> 0:18:55.796
<v Speaker 2>some kind of plea agreement or something of some sort

0:18:55.876 --> 0:18:58.756
<v Speaker 2>with the prosecutors, you know, which I think does happen

0:18:58.756 --> 0:19:01.316
<v Speaker 2>fairly frequently, and part of that will, you know, undoubtedly

0:19:01.356 --> 0:19:05.996
<v Speaker 2>require some cooperation. The cooperation is different from running analyzes.

0:19:06.036 --> 0:19:07.476
<v Speaker 2>And you know, one of the lawyers for Solving and

0:19:07.476 --> 0:19:11.196
<v Speaker 2>Cromwell gets up in court in I think February of

0:19:11.356 --> 0:19:14.996
<v Speaker 2>twenty three at the hearing on the appointment of the Examiner,

0:19:15.036 --> 0:19:17.556
<v Speaker 2>initial hearing on that and says, you know, we've been

0:19:17.636 --> 0:19:20.316
<v Speaker 2>doing tens of millions of dollars worth of work in

0:19:20.356 --> 0:19:24.196
<v Speaker 2>support of the prosecution and other interactions with regulars. Well,

0:19:24.236 --> 0:19:28.436
<v Speaker 2>that's shocking, that's shocking, because that's tens of millions of

0:19:28.516 --> 0:19:32.276
<v Speaker 2>creditor dollars that they're spending on this, and I think

0:19:32.316 --> 0:19:34.716
<v Speaker 2>he thought that that was in service of the argument

0:19:34.756 --> 0:19:36.316
<v Speaker 2>that we don't need an examiner because we'd have to

0:19:36.356 --> 0:19:38.956
<v Speaker 2>spend tens of millions of dollars on an examiner too,

0:19:39.076 --> 0:19:41.716
<v Speaker 2>which isn't really true because the examiner is really just

0:19:41.716 --> 0:19:44.036
<v Speaker 2>focusing on Solivan and Cromwell, not all the other stuff.

0:19:44.836 --> 0:19:47.396
<v Speaker 2>But it was pretty surprising. It was pretty surprising.

0:19:47.396 --> 0:19:50.196
<v Speaker 1>I guess how much ConTroll do John Ray and Sullivan

0:19:50.196 --> 0:19:54.116
<v Speaker 1>and Cromwell have of the information inside of FTX, Like

0:19:54.436 --> 0:19:58.156
<v Speaker 1>how easily accessed is that information by either the prosecutors

0:19:58.196 --> 0:20:00.476
<v Speaker 1>or the defense attorneys, And how hard is it to

0:20:00.516 --> 0:20:03.436
<v Speaker 1>see inside and see why they're doing what they're doing.

0:20:03.956 --> 0:20:07.436
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, great question. So first of all, I think Ray,

0:20:07.636 --> 0:20:09.716
<v Speaker 2>you know, is the CEO of a company, has, you know,

0:20:09.756 --> 0:20:12.316
<v Speaker 2>all the powers that bankman free would have had enhanced

0:20:12.316 --> 0:20:15.076
<v Speaker 2>to a certain extent by the bankruptcy good, so he

0:20:15.116 --> 0:20:19.436
<v Speaker 2>controls it all. Counsel to the company solventing problem was

0:20:19.796 --> 0:20:22.276
<v Speaker 2>retained by Ray. That was I think one of the

0:20:22.316 --> 0:20:25.956
<v Speaker 2>first things he did. So they too have unfettered access

0:20:25.996 --> 0:20:29.236
<v Speaker 2>to all of the company's information, all the company's resources.

0:20:29.516 --> 0:20:31.276
<v Speaker 2>I think that's a lot of money, a lot of

0:20:31.276 --> 0:20:34.236
<v Speaker 2>other assets, and they can decide who gets to see

0:20:34.236 --> 0:20:36.556
<v Speaker 2>it and who doesn't. So, for example, I think they

0:20:36.596 --> 0:20:39.356
<v Speaker 2>decided to let the prosecutor see, you know, if not

0:20:39.396 --> 0:20:41.116
<v Speaker 2>all of it, a great deal of it, and to

0:20:41.236 --> 0:20:44.716
<v Speaker 2>perform significant analyzes. That's certainly what Bankman Freed's lawyers alleged

0:20:45.036 --> 0:20:47.876
<v Speaker 2>in the criminal case, and we've seen some evidence of

0:20:47.956 --> 0:20:51.756
<v Speaker 2>that independently. But they're not obligated to share it with

0:20:51.796 --> 0:20:53.716
<v Speaker 2>anybody else if they don't want to, so they haven't,

0:20:53.756 --> 0:20:56.516
<v Speaker 2>for example, allowed Bankment Freed access to any of the

0:20:56.556 --> 0:20:59.196
<v Speaker 2>information as far as I can tell at all, which

0:20:59.236 --> 0:21:01.716
<v Speaker 2>creates a very basic problem in criminal law, which is

0:21:01.756 --> 0:21:04.556
<v Speaker 2>a little outside of my expertise, but basically, you know,

0:21:04.596 --> 0:21:07.076
<v Speaker 2>the concern that was raised in the criminal trial is, look,

0:21:08.036 --> 0:21:10.676
<v Speaker 2>the government has a due need to provide what's called

0:21:10.716 --> 0:21:13.756
<v Speaker 2>for exculpatory information, evidence that you know they have that

0:21:13.956 --> 0:21:17.556
<v Speaker 2>would exonerate Sam. The government has that duty, but other

0:21:17.596 --> 0:21:21.636
<v Speaker 2>private actors don't have that duty. And so the fight

0:21:21.716 --> 0:21:24.556
<v Speaker 2>in the criminal trial and part was about whether ft

0:21:24.796 --> 0:21:28.276
<v Speaker 2>X had the duty to provide exculpatory evidence to help

0:21:28.316 --> 0:21:31.156
<v Speaker 2>Sam's defense, and the answer was no, right, they didn't

0:21:31.196 --> 0:21:32.476
<v Speaker 2>have to do that and didn't do that. And so

0:21:32.516 --> 0:21:34.516
<v Speaker 2>it's not at all difficult to imagine that the prosecutors

0:21:34.556 --> 0:21:37.236
<v Speaker 2>were like, this is awesome. This is the best thing

0:21:37.276 --> 0:21:41.276
<v Speaker 2>that's ever happened to us, because we have really smart

0:21:41.356 --> 0:21:44.756
<v Speaker 2>lawyers and other people to analyze this stuff, and we

0:21:44.796 --> 0:21:47.476
<v Speaker 2>don't have to share hardly any of it unless we

0:21:47.596 --> 0:21:51.876
<v Speaker 2>choose to with the defense. It's like kaching, like it's

0:21:51.916 --> 0:21:54.316
<v Speaker 2>awesome for the prosecutors, right, I mean, it's you know,

0:21:54.396 --> 0:21:56.956
<v Speaker 2>it's and you can imagine that. And I don't mean,

0:21:57.116 --> 0:21:58.796
<v Speaker 2>you know, cast us persons on the prosecutors, like, I

0:21:58.796 --> 0:22:02.396
<v Speaker 2>think they have very good reason to want to take

0:22:02.436 --> 0:22:03.356
<v Speaker 2>advantage of this right.

0:22:03.356 --> 0:22:06.716
<v Speaker 1>They would to win. They would to win exactly right.

0:22:06.836 --> 0:22:09.556
<v Speaker 1>I mean, your paper pointed out something it had not.

0:22:09.796 --> 0:22:12.796
<v Speaker 1>It's an idiocy of mine had not occurred to me,

0:22:13.316 --> 0:22:17.276
<v Speaker 1>and that was that the check on the bankruptcy process

0:22:17.476 --> 0:22:20.116
<v Speaker 1>is the Department of Justice. The person in the bankruptcy,

0:22:20.356 --> 0:22:23.036
<v Speaker 1>the trustee is a is an employee of the Department

0:22:23.076 --> 0:22:26.156
<v Speaker 1>of Justice. But it's also the Department of Justice that's

0:22:26.196 --> 0:22:28.836
<v Speaker 1>bringing the case against Sam Bankman free. And so you

0:22:28.876 --> 0:22:32.796
<v Speaker 1>wonder what happened between when you see that the trustee

0:22:32.836 --> 0:22:36.436
<v Speaker 1>not pressing really hard for an examiner or not making

0:22:36.476 --> 0:22:39.156
<v Speaker 1>a huge stink when the examiner is not appointed, you

0:22:39.196 --> 0:22:42.476
<v Speaker 1>wonder what conversations occurred within the Department of Justice on

0:22:42.516 --> 0:22:43.116
<v Speaker 1>this subject.

0:22:44.076 --> 0:22:45.876
<v Speaker 2>No, that's a great point, and yes, I mean we

0:22:46.356 --> 0:22:48.636
<v Speaker 2>you know that the subtitle of the paper is conflicts

0:22:48.636 --> 0:22:51.596
<v Speaker 2>of you know, public and private interests in chapter eleven,

0:22:51.636 --> 0:22:54.116
<v Speaker 2>because you know, it's easy enough to say, well, it

0:22:54.116 --> 0:22:56.796
<v Speaker 2>looks like there might be some evidence that Sullivan and

0:22:56.836 --> 0:22:59.036
<v Speaker 2>Cromwell had a kind of private conflict of interest. They

0:22:59.076 --> 0:23:03.036
<v Speaker 2>didn't want any of their mistakes, you know, before bankruptcy

0:23:03.076 --> 0:23:04.796
<v Speaker 2>to be revealed, and so they're you know, use the

0:23:04.836 --> 0:23:08.916
<v Speaker 2>bankruptcy to conceal that. But it's also apparently the case

0:23:08.956 --> 0:23:11.236
<v Speaker 2>that there was some kind of conflict between the public

0:23:11.276 --> 0:23:14.076
<v Speaker 2>actors here, as you point out. So the US Trustee

0:23:14.116 --> 0:23:17.916
<v Speaker 2>Program is the watchdog for the bankruptcy system, and they're

0:23:17.956 --> 0:23:19.436
<v Speaker 2>not the only people are going to ask for an examiner,

0:23:19.436 --> 0:23:20.876
<v Speaker 2>but they did here, and they often are the ones

0:23:20.916 --> 0:23:23.356
<v Speaker 2>who do. They're the ones who was supposed to police

0:23:23.356 --> 0:23:26.636
<v Speaker 2>for conflicts of interest, and they did object to solvent

0:23:26.676 --> 0:23:28.956
<v Speaker 2>Cromwell's retention. But I'm not sure they knew any of

0:23:28.996 --> 0:23:32.796
<v Speaker 2>the stuff that we've now put forward. But at the

0:23:32.836 --> 0:23:37.076
<v Speaker 2>same time, the Southern District of New York US Attorney

0:23:37.076 --> 0:23:39.836
<v Speaker 2>program is part of the Department of Justice, and it's

0:23:39.836 --> 0:23:41.916
<v Speaker 2>not at all difficult to imagine that there were tough

0:23:41.956 --> 0:23:46.276
<v Speaker 2>negotiations between them, Because if the prosecutors are getting really

0:23:46.316 --> 0:23:50.236
<v Speaker 2>important support from FTX and Solivan Cromwell, you know, who

0:23:50.316 --> 0:23:53.476
<v Speaker 2>have a very large and very well respected white collar practice,

0:23:54.836 --> 0:24:00.156
<v Speaker 2>maybe the US attorneys in New York don't want anybody

0:24:00.196 --> 0:24:02.876
<v Speaker 2>to toss Solivan Cromwell out on grounds that they have

0:24:02.956 --> 0:24:05.556
<v Speaker 2>some kind of conflict. Maybe you don't want an examiner

0:24:05.596 --> 0:24:08.476
<v Speaker 2>coming in and poking around to figure any of that

0:24:08.516 --> 0:24:11.516
<v Speaker 2>stuff out. So there's a tension. There's a kind of conflict,

0:24:11.556 --> 0:24:15.316
<v Speaker 2>we think, between the US trustee, who wants this transparency

0:24:15.356 --> 0:24:17.596
<v Speaker 2>and wants this stuff to come out because that's their job,

0:24:18.396 --> 0:24:21.596
<v Speaker 2>and the prosecutors, who, under these circumstances, which we think

0:24:21.596 --> 0:24:25.756
<v Speaker 2>are probably unusual, to say no, no, no, no, this is like

0:24:25.836 --> 0:24:28.596
<v Speaker 2>a really good thing, do not mess it up. And

0:24:28.676 --> 0:24:30.436
<v Speaker 2>you know, obviously we have no idea if that's really true,

0:24:30.436 --> 0:24:32.596
<v Speaker 2>although we have good reason to think it is. Certainly

0:24:32.636 --> 0:24:34.556
<v Speaker 2>we have no idea how it gets resolved, because there

0:24:34.596 --> 0:24:37.116
<v Speaker 2>is no rule book for resolving those kinds of you know,

0:24:37.436 --> 0:24:39.436
<v Speaker 2>internal disputes in the Department of Justice, at least not

0:24:39.516 --> 0:24:40.356
<v Speaker 2>one that's public.

0:24:43.316 --> 0:24:56.636
<v Speaker 1>Judging. Sam will be right back. We're back. So there's

0:24:56.636 --> 0:24:58.116
<v Speaker 1>one other thing I wanted to ask you about. It

0:24:58.596 --> 0:25:01.356
<v Speaker 1>seems that's one of the unusual things about the ftics

0:25:01.356 --> 0:25:06.916
<v Speaker 1>bankruptcy is just how many assets were still there. It's

0:25:06.916 --> 0:25:09.556
<v Speaker 1>sounding more and more like the deposit are going to

0:25:09.556 --> 0:25:11.756
<v Speaker 1>get all their money back with interest, that they're sitting

0:25:11.756 --> 0:25:15.036
<v Speaker 1>on a pile of many, many billions of dollars of assets.

0:25:15.556 --> 0:25:19.356
<v Speaker 1>And is that unusual? Is it unusual for the bankrupt

0:25:19.396 --> 0:25:23.276
<v Speaker 1>company to have such wealth inside of it? And does

0:25:23.316 --> 0:25:25.836
<v Speaker 1>that change? Does that have is that queering in any

0:25:25.836 --> 0:25:29.516
<v Speaker 1>way the way the bankruptcy might be conducted, Like, does it,

0:25:29.556 --> 0:25:31.996
<v Speaker 1>for example, create an incentive to string it out longer

0:25:32.036 --> 0:25:34.676
<v Speaker 1>because it's because you can actually bill so much more

0:25:34.756 --> 0:25:35.956
<v Speaker 1>because the money is there.

0:25:36.636 --> 0:25:38.796
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So put that incentive question to one side, because

0:25:38.796 --> 0:25:40.196
<v Speaker 2>that is the right question, and we'll come back to

0:25:40.236 --> 0:25:44.316
<v Speaker 2>it in a second. You know, the crypto cases are

0:25:44.436 --> 0:25:49.036
<v Speaker 2>kind of unusual because you know, these firms, especially the exchanges,

0:25:49.076 --> 0:25:50.796
<v Speaker 2>seem to look a little bit like banks, but they

0:25:50.796 --> 0:25:54.316
<v Speaker 2>weren't regulated like banks, and banks themselves are not allowed

0:25:54.316 --> 0:25:56.756
<v Speaker 2>to go into bankruptcy for a good reason, like it

0:25:56.796 --> 0:26:00.036
<v Speaker 2>would totally screw up the system if they could. You know,

0:26:00.036 --> 0:26:02.996
<v Speaker 2>I think most companies when they go into bankruptcy that

0:26:03.156 --> 0:26:06.316
<v Speaker 2>have you know, any real business that's going you know,

0:26:06.356 --> 0:26:07.716
<v Speaker 2>they're not going to be solvent, and they're not going

0:26:07.756 --> 0:26:10.356
<v Speaker 2>to pay creditors in full, but they'll pay something. Probably

0:26:10.396 --> 0:26:12.956
<v Speaker 2>they will pay them, you know, partially in cash and

0:26:12.996 --> 0:26:15.916
<v Speaker 2>partially in stock of the company will issue new stock,

0:26:15.956 --> 0:26:19.276
<v Speaker 2>and they'll wipe out the old shareholders, which is intuitive, right,

0:26:19.356 --> 0:26:21.316
<v Speaker 2>Like all right, well, you know, the old shared holders

0:26:21.316 --> 0:26:23.996
<v Speaker 2>took the risk and they lost you know, the kinds

0:26:24.036 --> 0:26:27.636
<v Speaker 2>of assets that the peers saw that FTX was sitting on,

0:26:28.076 --> 0:26:30.436
<v Speaker 2>you know, like anthropic stock, like all that stuff seems

0:26:30.436 --> 0:26:32.676
<v Speaker 2>extraordinary to me. I think you called it in your

0:26:32.676 --> 0:26:36.236
<v Speaker 2>book the Dragon's Layer, which I thought was such a colorful,

0:26:36.516 --> 0:26:40.716
<v Speaker 2>you know, way of capturing this strange collection of assets,

0:26:40.716 --> 0:26:42.716
<v Speaker 2>many of which turned out to be quite valuable that

0:26:42.836 --> 0:26:45.956
<v Speaker 2>Alameda or you know, other entities and the complex were

0:26:45.956 --> 0:26:48.876
<v Speaker 2>holding on to and that's highly unusual. The other thing

0:26:48.916 --> 0:26:51.796
<v Speaker 2>to bear in mind is that even though the company

0:26:51.796 --> 0:26:55.196
<v Speaker 2>has said, well, we think that customers may get their

0:26:55.236 --> 0:27:01.396
<v Speaker 2>deposits back, they've said that the value of those deposits

0:27:01.436 --> 0:27:04.756
<v Speaker 2>has been determined as of the data of the bankruptcy petition,

0:27:05.156 --> 0:27:07.996
<v Speaker 2>which is November eleventh, when the value of those deposits

0:27:08.076 --> 0:27:10.076
<v Speaker 2>was quite a bit lower, right, So, well.

0:27:10.396 --> 0:27:12.756
<v Speaker 1>Means they all got dollarized. Then it was sort of

0:27:12.796 --> 0:27:15.596
<v Speaker 1>like if you had crypto, you got the dollar value

0:27:15.596 --> 0:27:17.516
<v Speaker 1>equivalent and that's what you're going to get back.

0:27:17.556 --> 0:27:19.836
<v Speaker 2>So you right, And that's very different from actually getting

0:27:19.916 --> 0:27:23.556
<v Speaker 2>your crypto back, because to day that crypto is it

0:27:23.596 --> 0:27:26.836
<v Speaker 2>sounds like it's worth a great deal more than it

0:27:26.996 --> 0:27:30.276
<v Speaker 2>was back then. And so you know, if if in

0:27:30.356 --> 0:27:33.316
<v Speaker 2>fact it was your crypto, always, even if the company

0:27:33.356 --> 0:27:35.156
<v Speaker 2>was comingling, it should just be your crypto. They should

0:27:35.156 --> 0:27:36.556
<v Speaker 2>just give it back to you. And if it's worth more,

0:27:36.956 --> 0:27:39.076
<v Speaker 2>muzzle tough. And if it's not worth more, it's too

0:27:39.076 --> 0:27:41.516
<v Speaker 2>bad for you. But neither way, right, the company is

0:27:41.516 --> 0:27:44.076
<v Speaker 2>getting the delta there. The company is getting the delta there,

0:27:44.076 --> 0:27:48.836
<v Speaker 2>and that in part is presumably subsidizing everything else that's happening.

0:27:49.556 --> 0:27:51.876
<v Speaker 2>On top of the fact that the company did have

0:27:52.036 --> 0:27:53.796
<v Speaker 2>all of these assets, some of which looked like they

0:27:53.836 --> 0:27:57.956
<v Speaker 2>were extremely valuable. Now your question about incentives is the

0:27:57.996 --> 0:28:00.036
<v Speaker 2>right one, which is like, well, who's got what incentives here?

0:28:00.756 --> 0:28:04.116
<v Speaker 2>You know, ordinarily in a reorganization, the lawyers always get

0:28:04.116 --> 0:28:06.196
<v Speaker 2>paid off the top, and you know, people grouse about it,

0:28:06.196 --> 0:28:07.956
<v Speaker 2>but it's not a big deal because otherwise, how are

0:28:07.996 --> 0:28:08.956
<v Speaker 2>you going to get it done? Right?

0:28:09.196 --> 0:28:09.476
<v Speaker 1>Can't?

0:28:10.836 --> 0:28:13.236
<v Speaker 2>And so you know, the company make sure that its

0:28:13.436 --> 0:28:18.036
<v Speaker 2>plan to reorganize has you know, sufficient cash build into

0:28:18.116 --> 0:28:20.356
<v Speaker 2>it to make sure that those lawyers get paid. But

0:28:20.396 --> 0:28:21.836
<v Speaker 2>mostly the money is going to go to keep the

0:28:21.836 --> 0:28:25.796
<v Speaker 2>company going. One of the most troubling things in the

0:28:25.836 --> 0:28:28.956
<v Speaker 2>bankruptcy here is that it doesn't really look like Ray

0:28:29.596 --> 0:28:33.236
<v Speaker 2>ever honored the promise that deeterrik had made to Bankman

0:28:33.316 --> 0:28:36.796
<v Speaker 2>Free back in November ninth of twenty twenty two, which

0:28:36.836 --> 0:28:39.796
<v Speaker 2>is like, we're here to help you rescue this company.

0:28:40.636 --> 0:28:44.156
<v Speaker 2>And you know that would presumably have involved finding new

0:28:44.196 --> 0:28:47.436
<v Speaker 2>financing to you know, provide the liquidity that you needed

0:28:47.476 --> 0:28:51.356
<v Speaker 2>to permit withdrawals to start again and to then keep going.

0:28:51.476 --> 0:28:55.516
<v Speaker 2>Because if the company was fundamentally profitable but have this

0:28:56.076 --> 0:28:58.316
<v Speaker 2>you know, serious problem. I don't think anybody disputes there

0:28:58.396 --> 0:29:00.956
<v Speaker 2>was a serious problem of commingling, right, But you've stopped

0:29:00.956 --> 0:29:03.356
<v Speaker 2>that problem and you've found ways to fix it. And

0:29:03.436 --> 0:29:08.156
<v Speaker 2>otherwise these exchanges are pretty viable, like the most value

0:29:08.236 --> 0:29:10.396
<v Speaker 2>for the most people, but would come from keeping the

0:29:10.436 --> 0:29:14.036
<v Speaker 2>business going. One of the other remarkable things about the

0:29:14.076 --> 0:29:16.556
<v Speaker 2>Examiner hearing again from you know about a year ago,

0:29:16.596 --> 0:29:19.956
<v Speaker 2>little over a year ago, is that Ray testifies extensively

0:29:19.996 --> 0:29:23.836
<v Speaker 2>and he says, I never talked to Bangman Freed Yea.

0:29:24.356 --> 0:29:27.196
<v Speaker 1>He told me that I couldn't. That blew my mind too,

0:29:27.236 --> 0:29:32.916
<v Speaker 1>because it's he and the other executives are trove of information.

0:29:33.356 --> 0:29:35.756
<v Speaker 1>You would think you'd want the information, but he told

0:29:35.796 --> 0:29:37.796
<v Speaker 1>me he didn't. As a matter of principle, he said

0:29:37.796 --> 0:29:39.276
<v Speaker 1>he didn't speak to him.

0:29:39.556 --> 0:29:41.596
<v Speaker 2>Very early in the case. Because what did Sam do

0:29:42.836 --> 0:29:44.716
<v Speaker 2>in the middle of November of twenty twenty two. He

0:29:44.796 --> 0:29:48.596
<v Speaker 2>did what Sullivan Cromwell encouraged him to do and what

0:29:48.636 --> 0:29:50.036
<v Speaker 2>he thought he should be doing, which is trying to

0:29:50.036 --> 0:29:52.716
<v Speaker 2>find rescue financing. So he goes out and he gets

0:29:53.196 --> 0:29:55.276
<v Speaker 2>Tron and Numura and who knows, you know, all these

0:29:55.316 --> 0:29:57.676
<v Speaker 2>other folks to say, yeah, we'll lend you three or

0:29:57.676 --> 0:30:01.436
<v Speaker 2>four billion dollars. Now I have no idea if those

0:30:01.436 --> 0:30:04.796
<v Speaker 2>were worth the paper that they were written on, Like,

0:30:04.796 --> 0:30:06.956
<v Speaker 2>I just don't know. I do know that your job

0:30:07.076 --> 0:30:10.316
<v Speaker 2>as the CEO of the company in chapter eleven is

0:30:10.356 --> 0:30:12.516
<v Speaker 2>to at least figure it out right, take a look

0:30:12.556 --> 0:30:14.916
<v Speaker 2>at them, say ah hm, are these good or not?

0:30:15.156 --> 0:30:18.036
<v Speaker 2>Like Sam, tell me about these things. We understand you

0:30:18.116 --> 0:30:20.596
<v Speaker 2>might have some other issues, but at least at least, like,

0:30:20.836 --> 0:30:22.956
<v Speaker 2>you know, make the connection, help us understand how we

0:30:22.956 --> 0:30:25.556
<v Speaker 2>can do this. And they didn't do that, and that

0:30:25.636 --> 0:30:29.516
<v Speaker 2>to me is extraordinary, right, It's extraordinary for a couple

0:30:29.556 --> 0:30:32.196
<v Speaker 2>of reasons, one being that, like if the point of

0:30:32.356 --> 0:30:35.556
<v Speaker 2>having this whole system Congress created in the seventies is

0:30:35.876 --> 0:30:39.956
<v Speaker 2>to keep viable companies going, then for whatever reasons, a

0:30:40.036 --> 0:30:43.236
<v Speaker 2>decision was made to not do that. Now we don't

0:30:43.276 --> 0:30:45.516
<v Speaker 2>know obviously internally what was going on, and they definitely

0:30:45.516 --> 0:30:48.876
<v Speaker 2>made they being FTX and Solvent Promo made some you know,

0:30:48.956 --> 0:30:52.236
<v Speaker 2>statements about possibly restarting the exchange, and so maybe they tried.

0:30:52.436 --> 0:30:54.716
<v Speaker 2>I know, ultimately they didn't, and they just blamed it

0:30:54.716 --> 0:30:57.156
<v Speaker 2>on Bateman Free But again it you know, if Ray

0:30:57.236 --> 0:30:58.676
<v Speaker 2>was correct when he said, well, this is just old

0:30:58.716 --> 0:31:02.476
<v Speaker 2>fashion embezzlement, and we know factually everybody agrees that there

0:31:02.516 --> 0:31:06.516
<v Speaker 2>was commingling between Alameda and FTX, and that I think

0:31:06.556 --> 0:31:10.636
<v Speaker 2>that was stopped then, Like this was a simple problem

0:31:10.716 --> 0:31:12.996
<v Speaker 2>and that the criminal part of it was solved a

0:31:13.036 --> 0:31:16.916
<v Speaker 2>while ago or very easily. So why not restart the

0:31:16.916 --> 0:31:19.596
<v Speaker 2>exchanges if you think they're fundamentally sound? Like this problem

0:31:19.796 --> 0:31:21.516
<v Speaker 2>it was like, you know, it was like a benign tumor.

0:31:21.556 --> 0:31:23.316
<v Speaker 2>It was a tumor. It had to be taken out,

0:31:23.356 --> 0:31:25.036
<v Speaker 2>but it was benign and there was no reason to

0:31:25.036 --> 0:31:26.156
<v Speaker 2>think that it had metastasie.

0:31:26.676 --> 0:31:29.436
<v Speaker 1>And so getting back to you, why wouldn't they have

0:31:29.476 --> 0:31:32.876
<v Speaker 1>done that? What are their incentives and the.

0:31:32.676 --> 0:31:35.276
<v Speaker 2>Incentives I think they're sort of two conflicting ones. One

0:31:35.316 --> 0:31:37.836
<v Speaker 2>is the one kind of on the surface that you identify,

0:31:37.876 --> 0:31:40.036
<v Speaker 2>which is like, well, you know, the lawyers can make

0:31:40.116 --> 0:31:43.676
<v Speaker 2>lots and lots of money in the case by billing,

0:31:43.796 --> 0:31:45.636
<v Speaker 2>and so in fact they have, I mean, the billing

0:31:45.676 --> 0:31:48.156
<v Speaker 2>rate in the case has been extraordinary. So that's on

0:31:48.196 --> 0:31:50.476
<v Speaker 2>the surface. But as I said earlier, like I don't

0:31:50.516 --> 0:31:52.956
<v Speaker 2>think Sullivan Cromwell was interested in stealing the business from

0:31:52.996 --> 0:31:56.476
<v Speaker 2>bankman Freed like to make money on it, right, I mean,

0:31:56.916 --> 0:31:59.116
<v Speaker 2>like they don't need the money. I think they were

0:31:59.236 --> 0:32:03.916
<v Speaker 2>concerned about embarrassment. I think they wanted to maintain good

0:32:03.916 --> 0:32:07.316
<v Speaker 2>relations with the government and public actors. And number two

0:32:07.316 --> 0:32:09.396
<v Speaker 2>and this is a little more subtle. You know, you

0:32:09.436 --> 0:32:12.156
<v Speaker 2>can imagine that Sullivan Cromwell sort of shows up at

0:32:12.196 --> 0:32:16.236
<v Speaker 2>the prosecutor's office on November ninth and says, we know

0:32:16.276 --> 0:32:19.116
<v Speaker 2>you've been concerned about Crypto for a while. We've got

0:32:19.156 --> 0:32:24.236
<v Speaker 2>a story to tell you. And then you know, maybe

0:32:24.236 --> 0:32:26.756
<v Speaker 2>that prosecutors were already thinking about it and investigating whatever,

0:32:26.996 --> 0:32:30.036
<v Speaker 2>but they come to realize that, like, there's this incredibly

0:32:30.116 --> 0:32:33.876
<v Speaker 2>fortuitous set of events that can make it possible for

0:32:33.916 --> 0:32:37.076
<v Speaker 2>Sullivan and Cromwell to really be heroes to the prosecutors

0:32:37.076 --> 0:32:38.716
<v Speaker 2>that they work with all the time, to be heroes

0:32:38.756 --> 0:32:40.956
<v Speaker 2>to the regulators who they might have you know, misled

0:32:40.996 --> 0:32:43.756
<v Speaker 2>a little bit earlier, but who they've now made, you know,

0:32:43.876 --> 0:32:46.356
<v Speaker 2>functional amends with. And by the way, we get to

0:32:46.356 --> 0:32:49.676
<v Speaker 2>build a chapter eleven practice along the way. So I

0:32:49.716 --> 0:32:53.676
<v Speaker 2>think those are the kinds of incentives that are more

0:32:53.836 --> 0:32:55.516
<v Speaker 2>plausibly at work. But again, you know, we don't know

0:32:55.516 --> 0:32:56.796
<v Speaker 2>there's more to the story, and we don't know what

0:32:56.836 --> 0:32:57.436
<v Speaker 2>that story.

0:32:57.276 --> 0:32:59.636
<v Speaker 1>But why does that lead to not trying to restart

0:32:59.676 --> 0:33:01.636
<v Speaker 1>the company as a going enterprise.

0:33:01.716 --> 0:33:04.996
<v Speaker 2>Right, because if you restart the company is a going enterprise,

0:33:05.076 --> 0:33:08.316
<v Speaker 2>it comes out of bankruptcy sooner, and I think more

0:33:08.396 --> 0:33:13.596
<v Speaker 2>information about the company comes out sooner. What I think

0:33:13.716 --> 0:33:15.956
<v Speaker 2>is going to happen is, if you know, FTX and

0:33:15.996 --> 0:33:17.396
<v Speaker 2>Solvent and Promwell are able to do what they want

0:33:17.396 --> 0:33:18.956
<v Speaker 2>to do, they're going to liquidate the company and seal

0:33:18.956 --> 0:33:19.596
<v Speaker 2>all the records.

0:33:20.396 --> 0:33:23.196
<v Speaker 1>So no, don't do No one will ever know what happened.

0:33:23.676 --> 0:33:27.756
<v Speaker 2>Correct, And so if you reorganize the company instead and

0:33:27.796 --> 0:33:29.476
<v Speaker 2>it survives as a going concern, oh guess what. They're

0:33:29.476 --> 0:33:31.156
<v Speaker 2>going to be managers, and they're going to be shareholders,

0:33:31.196 --> 0:33:34.076
<v Speaker 2>and they're going to be other human beings interacting with

0:33:34.116 --> 0:33:36.236
<v Speaker 2>this large company, and they're going to learn all sorts

0:33:36.276 --> 0:33:38.076
<v Speaker 2>of stuff that might not be so great for Solving

0:33:38.076 --> 0:33:42.516
<v Speaker 2>and Cromwell, mostly about what happened in that moment of panic,

0:33:42.556 --> 0:33:44.476
<v Speaker 2>if it was in fact a moment of panic, and

0:33:44.516 --> 0:33:47.836
<v Speaker 2>then thereafter, because there were many, many puzzling decisions made

0:33:48.116 --> 0:33:51.676
<v Speaker 2>during the bankruptcy case that are hard to explain accept

0:33:51.796 --> 0:33:54.836
<v Speaker 2>perhaps as a way of helping Solve and Promwell manage

0:33:54.836 --> 0:33:57.356
<v Speaker 2>these other problems, which is, you know, if we're right,

0:33:57.436 --> 0:33:59.276
<v Speaker 2>is a very very big problem. All of that would

0:33:59.316 --> 0:34:01.916
<v Speaker 2>come out eventually if the company were reorganized.

0:34:13.436 --> 0:34:16.796
<v Speaker 1>So the Court of Appeals reversed the bankruptcy judge on

0:34:16.836 --> 0:34:20.076
<v Speaker 1>the subject of the examiner. How unusual is that? How

0:34:20.156 --> 0:34:21.956
<v Speaker 1>unusual is it for a court of appeals to say,

0:34:22.036 --> 0:34:24.076
<v Speaker 1>to tell the bankruptcy judge, know you did it wrong?

0:34:25.116 --> 0:34:27.036
<v Speaker 2>So it was this is the third Circuit Court of Appeals,

0:34:27.036 --> 0:34:28.676
<v Speaker 2>which is, you know, a very sort of well regarded

0:34:28.716 --> 0:34:32.316
<v Speaker 2>powerful court. I don't think the reversal rate. I don't

0:34:32.316 --> 0:34:34.556
<v Speaker 2>think it was that unusual, and especially in this case,

0:34:34.596 --> 0:34:39.756
<v Speaker 2>because the statute is clear. It's obvious. It's so obvious, right,

0:34:39.876 --> 0:34:42.476
<v Speaker 2>And so to me, part of what's so interesting about this,

0:34:42.556 --> 0:34:45.516
<v Speaker 2>and I don't know the answer is why Solivan Cromwell

0:34:45.516 --> 0:34:49.076
<v Speaker 2>didn't just settle this request for an examiner back when

0:34:49.076 --> 0:34:51.516
<v Speaker 2>the US Trustee made the request. Because if I'm Solivan

0:34:51.516 --> 0:34:55.756
<v Speaker 2>and Cromwell, like I should be like, sure, we have

0:34:55.796 --> 0:34:59.196
<v Speaker 2>nothing to hide here, guys, there's no problem here, bring

0:34:59.196 --> 0:35:01.676
<v Speaker 2>an examiner, and like, let's keep it focused on you know,

0:35:01.756 --> 0:35:03.676
<v Speaker 2>you concerned about our conflict. We have no conflict. We

0:35:03.716 --> 0:35:06.316
<v Speaker 2>got nothing to hide from you. And keep it short,

0:35:06.436 --> 0:35:09.076
<v Speaker 2>keep it sweet, keep it focused, all of which they

0:35:09.156 --> 0:35:13.076
<v Speaker 2>could have done by agreement with the US Trustee. And

0:35:13.076 --> 0:35:15.476
<v Speaker 2>that like, if I'm Solivan Promo, that's a total win

0:35:17.356 --> 0:35:18.996
<v Speaker 2>because you can say, hey, we had an examiner, We're

0:35:19.036 --> 0:35:20.716
<v Speaker 2>all fine, Like he gave us a clean bill of health.

0:35:20.796 --> 0:35:22.796
<v Speaker 2>Nothing to see here, guys. And by the way, if

0:35:22.836 --> 0:35:24.676
<v Speaker 2>that had happened, I wouldn't be here right.

0:35:24.996 --> 0:35:27.836
<v Speaker 1>An attorney named Bob Cleary has been appointed as the examiner,

0:35:27.876 --> 0:35:31.356
<v Speaker 1>and I'm curious what happens next. Is he a genuinely

0:35:31.396 --> 0:35:34.716
<v Speaker 1>independent person or is he Is he a bankruptcy person

0:35:34.716 --> 0:35:38.036
<v Speaker 1>who's is a repeat player in this in the bankruptcy system.

0:35:38.156 --> 0:35:40.996
<v Speaker 2>No, definitely not that he was the prosecutor. Apparently the

0:35:40.996 --> 0:35:45.076
<v Speaker 2>prosecutor who prosecuted the unibomber ted Kazinski. Oh, when he

0:35:45.116 --> 0:35:49.276
<v Speaker 2>was a prosecutor, and now he's a white collar, you know,

0:35:49.356 --> 0:35:52.676
<v Speaker 2>criminal defense lawyer at Patterson Bell Knapp is not a

0:35:52.716 --> 0:35:54.916
<v Speaker 2>bankruptcy insider. If I guess, I would say he's probably

0:35:54.996 --> 0:36:00.156
<v Speaker 2>very independent. I think the bigger question about Cleary is

0:36:00.196 --> 0:36:03.956
<v Speaker 2>going to be how much access he really has to

0:36:04.036 --> 0:36:07.116
<v Speaker 2>what really happened. And it's not at all difficult for

0:36:07.156 --> 0:36:10.236
<v Speaker 2>Solivan Promo FTX just row sand in his gears.

0:36:11.116 --> 0:36:13.116
<v Speaker 1>How would they do that? How would they do that?

0:36:14.356 --> 0:36:15.836
<v Speaker 1>So he does have the right to walk in and

0:36:15.876 --> 0:36:16.636
<v Speaker 1>ask for anything.

0:36:17.676 --> 0:36:21.316
<v Speaker 2>I have not seen the final order on the scope

0:36:21.356 --> 0:36:24.756
<v Speaker 2>of his retention, but unless it orders the company to

0:36:25.596 --> 0:36:30.836
<v Speaker 2>waive privilege and you know, gives him access to everything,

0:36:30.876 --> 0:36:33.676
<v Speaker 2>even if it's been designated confidential, he's going to have

0:36:33.676 --> 0:36:36.636
<v Speaker 2>to ask for it. And the company absolutely can fight

0:36:36.676 --> 0:36:39.956
<v Speaker 2>about things like privilege, attorney client privilege, and can absolutely

0:36:39.956 --> 0:36:42.996
<v Speaker 2>fight about things like confidentiality. My guess is that at

0:36:42.996 --> 0:36:46.356
<v Speaker 2>this point Sullivan and Cromwell probably won't fight too hard,

0:36:46.476 --> 0:36:49.596
<v Speaker 2>certainly not openly. I mean, they were fighting the examiner

0:36:49.636 --> 0:36:52.596
<v Speaker 2>tooth and nail until a couple of weeks ago, and

0:36:52.636 --> 0:36:55.196
<v Speaker 2>then they seem to have stopped. So I think they

0:36:55.276 --> 0:36:59.276
<v Speaker 2>understand that, you know, they should just sort of you know,

0:37:00.276 --> 0:37:02.996
<v Speaker 2>like take the medicine and deal with it. But they

0:37:02.996 --> 0:37:05.116
<v Speaker 2>can still you know, fight in sort of small ways.

0:37:05.236 --> 0:37:08.596
<v Speaker 2>And whether clearly has the resources meaning basically the money,

0:37:08.596 --> 0:37:11.516
<v Speaker 2>the budget for the bankruptcy court, you know, really from

0:37:11.516 --> 0:37:14.996
<v Speaker 2>the company, Whether the bankruptcy court has the patience to

0:37:15.036 --> 0:37:19.716
<v Speaker 2>deal with challenges buy cleary to whatever Solivon Cromwell, may

0:37:19.796 --> 0:37:22.636
<v Speaker 2>or FTX might be withholding. You know, those are questions

0:37:22.636 --> 0:37:24.636
<v Speaker 2>that will have to be answered. He's going to produce

0:37:24.676 --> 0:37:26.436
<v Speaker 2>a report in fairly short order. My hunt is that

0:37:26.436 --> 0:37:29.716
<v Speaker 2>it will say something like this. You know, we've investigated.

0:37:29.756 --> 0:37:31.476
<v Speaker 2>We couldn't get everything we wanted to see. We saw

0:37:31.476 --> 0:37:34.756
<v Speaker 2>a lot. We think there's some problems. This is not great,

0:37:36.316 --> 0:37:38.996
<v Speaker 2>but you know, mostly the problems that we've seen would

0:37:39.036 --> 0:37:42.636
<v Speaker 2>involve claims of you know, an ethical nature having to

0:37:42.676 --> 0:37:45.636
<v Speaker 2>do with bankment freed and they don't really affect the bankruptcy.

0:37:46.116 --> 0:37:48.076
<v Speaker 2>The scope of our retention really doesn't ask us to

0:37:48.076 --> 0:37:50.996
<v Speaker 2>look at the whole bankruptcy and everything else. So, you know,

0:37:51.076 --> 0:37:53.676
<v Speaker 2>unless the judge wants to do a fuller thing, you know,

0:37:53.836 --> 0:37:55.396
<v Speaker 2>we're not really going to say but we'll wag a

0:37:55.436 --> 0:38:00.036
<v Speaker 2>finger at Sulivan Cromwell and we'll let it go. Now

0:38:00.116 --> 0:38:02.596
<v Speaker 2>that's not great, but it wouldn't be terribly surprising. That's

0:38:02.596 --> 0:38:04.236
<v Speaker 2>why we say in the paper we think that most

0:38:04.236 --> 0:38:06.476
<v Speaker 2>of the damage has been done and it can't be undone.

0:38:07.236 --> 0:38:09.316
<v Speaker 1>Do you have any idea whether Bob Cleary is read

0:38:09.356 --> 0:38:10.116
<v Speaker 1>your paper.

0:38:11.396 --> 0:38:12.036
<v Speaker 2>Not a clue?

0:38:12.396 --> 0:38:14.156
<v Speaker 1>Well, he should write, I mean if he reads your

0:38:14.156 --> 0:38:15.716
<v Speaker 1>paper he's going to have, he's gonna be able to

0:38:15.756 --> 0:38:17.476
<v Speaker 1>ask some questions that he might it might not occur

0:38:17.516 --> 0:38:18.316
<v Speaker 1>to him otherwise.

0:38:18.796 --> 0:38:21.636
<v Speaker 2>Absolutely, and for that matter, Solivon Cromwell should read it, right,

0:38:21.676 --> 0:38:24.756
<v Speaker 2>I mean, like, you know, we are not hiding anything

0:38:24.796 --> 0:38:27.316
<v Speaker 2>from them. They may well have a different version of

0:38:27.356 --> 0:38:30.716
<v Speaker 2>the facts than we have. Undoubtedly they do. Undoubtedly they

0:38:30.716 --> 0:38:32.916
<v Speaker 2>know more facts than we know. And if they think

0:38:32.956 --> 0:38:35.236
<v Speaker 2>we have gotten something wrong, if they think we are

0:38:35.476 --> 0:38:38.356
<v Speaker 2>missing some important things, like they should tell us, like

0:38:38.436 --> 0:38:40.076
<v Speaker 2>you know, we're not. We're not here to get anybody.

0:38:40.076 --> 0:38:41.076
<v Speaker 2>We're just here to get the truth.

0:38:41.556 --> 0:38:44.116
<v Speaker 1>How did talking to Sam directly and his mom affect

0:38:44.116 --> 0:38:44.916
<v Speaker 1>your view of the case.

0:38:46.356 --> 0:38:49.716
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's a great question. I you know, got connected

0:38:49.716 --> 0:38:52.116
<v Speaker 2>to them initially through a colleague of mine at Stanford

0:38:52.116 --> 0:38:54.356
<v Speaker 2>who's you know, called me after I'd already agreed to

0:38:54.356 --> 0:38:56.396
<v Speaker 2>do the Amigas brief to say, you know, can I

0:38:56.436 --> 0:38:58.836
<v Speaker 2>tell you this crazy story and ask you a favor?

0:38:58.836 --> 0:39:02.036
<v Speaker 2>And he told me, you know, basically Sam's version of

0:39:02.076 --> 0:39:04.956
<v Speaker 2>the Solvent Cromwell stole the company from me story. And

0:39:04.956 --> 0:39:06.876
<v Speaker 2>I was like, yeah, that can't be right, that's nuts.

0:39:07.356 --> 0:39:08.916
<v Speaker 2>He's like, well, look would you talk to them? Would

0:39:08.956 --> 0:39:10.716
<v Speaker 2>you do me a favor and talk to them about this?

0:39:11.316 --> 0:39:13.076
<v Speaker 2>I'm like, of course, I'll talk to anybody. I can't

0:39:13.076 --> 0:39:14.636
<v Speaker 2>be the lawyer, but I'll talk to anybody. And I

0:39:14.676 --> 0:39:17.316
<v Speaker 2>did talk to them, and you know, he sent me,

0:39:17.556 --> 0:39:20.636
<v Speaker 2>They sent me the you know, all the stuff that

0:39:20.676 --> 0:39:23.276
<v Speaker 2>Sam was sending to everybody about this, and over time

0:39:24.476 --> 0:39:27.756
<v Speaker 2>I came to appreciate that there was more to the

0:39:27.796 --> 0:39:29.836
<v Speaker 2>story than just solving Cromwell's version of it.

0:39:30.316 --> 0:39:33.636
<v Speaker 1>What did do you come come away from this experience

0:39:33.716 --> 0:39:35.956
<v Speaker 1>thinking that the bankruptcy system needs to be reformed.

0:39:37.436 --> 0:39:40.596
<v Speaker 2>M That's a great question. So no, David and I

0:39:40.636 --> 0:39:44.036
<v Speaker 2>do have some pretty concrete recommendations in the final part

0:39:44.036 --> 0:39:48.036
<v Speaker 2>of the paper, like we think maybe, you know, we

0:39:48.076 --> 0:39:51.276
<v Speaker 2>should use examiners a little more frequently on a somewhat

0:39:51.276 --> 0:39:53.316
<v Speaker 2>more targeted basis, because again, you need this kind of

0:39:53.356 --> 0:39:57.196
<v Speaker 2>outside check. We think in a broader class of cases,

0:39:57.556 --> 0:40:00.996
<v Speaker 2>we absolutely think that judges should take much more seriously

0:40:01.836 --> 0:40:05.236
<v Speaker 2>questions about whether the lawyers for the company who have

0:40:05.316 --> 0:40:07.836
<v Speaker 2>so much control and power in these cases, really had

0:40:07.876 --> 0:40:11.956
<v Speaker 2>any pre bankruptcy relationships here, you know, or in any

0:40:11.996 --> 0:40:15.196
<v Speaker 2>case like this, and it's you know, it's it's tricky

0:40:15.236 --> 0:40:18.036
<v Speaker 2>because you know, every large firm has done something for

0:40:18.116 --> 0:40:21.236
<v Speaker 2>every large company, So I've always had some kind of relationship,

0:40:21.756 --> 0:40:23.596
<v Speaker 2>not always but frequently. It's not hard to imagine it,

0:40:24.356 --> 0:40:26.356
<v Speaker 2>but you really, you know, need to like take a

0:40:26.396 --> 0:40:30.316
<v Speaker 2>beat if you're the judge, think about like, okay, exactly

0:40:30.316 --> 0:40:32.796
<v Speaker 2>what's going on here. So, you know, we think judges

0:40:32.796 --> 0:40:35.196
<v Speaker 2>should be more mindful of this kind of problem. We

0:40:35.276 --> 0:40:37.116
<v Speaker 2>think that you should use examiners a little bit more.

0:40:37.196 --> 0:40:39.436
<v Speaker 2>We think the US Trustee should probably have more independence

0:40:39.836 --> 0:40:42.276
<v Speaker 2>in the Justice Department or from the Justice Department, maybe

0:40:42.276 --> 0:40:44.116
<v Speaker 2>be housed outside. You know, the truth is the US

0:40:44.156 --> 0:40:47.396
<v Speaker 2>Trustee is often the only person coming into the bankrupcy

0:40:47.436 --> 0:40:49.356
<v Speaker 2>court and saying like, hey, guys, we think there's a

0:40:49.356 --> 0:40:51.716
<v Speaker 2>problem here. Can you please slow this down? And you know,

0:40:51.796 --> 0:40:54.476
<v Speaker 2>the I think sometimes the judges feel like the US

0:40:54.516 --> 0:40:57.076
<v Speaker 2>Trustees are just kind of meddlesome bureaucrats and they don't

0:40:57.116 --> 0:40:59.676
<v Speaker 2>maybe you know, get quite the difference that they deserve.

0:40:59.716 --> 0:41:01.996
<v Speaker 2>You know, here they were I think, onto something very important,

0:41:02.156 --> 0:41:03.636
<v Speaker 2>even though they were limited in what they could do

0:41:03.676 --> 0:41:06.356
<v Speaker 2>because of the relationship with the prosecutors.

0:41:06.356 --> 0:41:09.316
<v Speaker 1>The paper was great. It's very very I mean for

0:41:08.996 --> 0:41:12.076
<v Speaker 1>a for this kind of thing, it was really it

0:41:12.116 --> 0:41:12.956
<v Speaker 1>was a page turner.

0:41:13.196 --> 0:41:16.156
<v Speaker 2>Se congratulations, Well, that is very kind of been thinking.

0:41:18.796 --> 0:41:22.876
<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Lipson is a bankruptcy expert at Temple University. And

0:41:22.956 --> 0:41:25.476
<v Speaker 1>as for Sullivan Cromwell, all I can say is that

0:41:25.516 --> 0:41:28.356
<v Speaker 1>a spokesperson for Sullivan and Cromwell referred me to a

0:41:28.396 --> 0:41:33.796
<v Speaker 1>statement from the FTX debtors which reads as follows quote.

0:41:34.956 --> 0:41:37.516
<v Speaker 1>In an effort to support mister Bankman Freed at the

0:41:37.516 --> 0:41:40.516
<v Speaker 1>expense of his victims and the dedicated professionals who have

0:41:40.556 --> 0:41:44.636
<v Speaker 1>worked tirelessly to rectify the harm he caused, certain academics

0:41:44.636 --> 0:41:48.756
<v Speaker 1>and others have parroted his false narratives, certain of which

0:41:48.796 --> 0:41:52.116
<v Speaker 1>cite their source as being interviews with Sam Bankmanfreed and

0:41:52.156 --> 0:41:55.236
<v Speaker 1>his parents in an attempt to elevate his standing and

0:41:55.356 --> 0:41:58.356
<v Speaker 1>image before the court that is about to sentence him.

0:41:59.076 --> 0:42:01.556
<v Speaker 1>In fact, but for the work of a large team

0:42:01.596 --> 0:42:05.356
<v Speaker 1>of committed advisors, including Sullivan and Cromwell and others who

0:42:05.396 --> 0:42:08.156
<v Speaker 1>have been unfairly maligned as part of mister Bankman Freed's

0:42:08.196 --> 0:42:12.076
<v Speaker 1>defense strategy, billions of additional dollars would have been lost

0:42:12.156 --> 0:42:15.636
<v Speaker 1>or stolen, and the recoveries to customers would be a

0:42:15.636 --> 0:42:18.836
<v Speaker 1>fraction of what we can now expect. It's time to

0:42:18.876 --> 0:42:23.596
<v Speaker 1>put blame where it rightfully belongs. And coming up on

0:42:23.716 --> 0:42:26.276
<v Speaker 1>Judging Sam, I'll be in court for a sentencing and

0:42:26.356 --> 0:42:28.996
<v Speaker 1>I'm also going to speak to a formal federal prosecutor

0:42:29.316 --> 0:42:34.796
<v Speaker 1>and possibly Sam Bagman freed himself. Judging Sam is hosted

0:42:34.796 --> 0:42:38.836
<v Speaker 1>by Me Michael Lewis Lydia Gene Kott is our court reporter.

0:42:40.076 --> 0:42:43.636
<v Speaker 1>This episode was produced by Ariella Markowitz and edited by

0:42:43.716 --> 0:42:48.596
<v Speaker 1>Jacob Goldstein. It was engineered by Sarah Bruguer. The music

0:42:48.676 --> 0:42:52.196
<v Speaker 1>was composed by Matthias Bossi and John Evans of stell

0:42:52.236 --> 0:42:56.196
<v Speaker 1>Wagon Symphonette. Judging Sam is a production of Pushkin Industries.

0:42:56.636 --> 0:43:00.116
<v Speaker 1>To find more Pushkin podcasts, listen on the iHeartRadio app,

0:43:00.276 --> 0:43:04.276
<v Speaker 1>Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. If you'd

0:43:04.316 --> 0:43:07.516
<v Speaker 1>like to access bonus episodes and listen ad free, don't

0:43:07.516 --> 0:43:11.116
<v Speaker 1>forget to sign up for a Pushkin Play subscription at pushkin,

0:43:11.196 --> 0:43:16.236
<v Speaker 1>dot fm, slash plus, or on our Apple show page.