WEBVTT - This Is the Impact of Billions Flowing Into Private Credit

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 2>And I'm Joe.

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<v Speaker 3>Why isn't thal Joe.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a new year, Happy New Year, Happy New Year.

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<v Speaker 1>This is our first podcast recording of the year, and

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's fair to say that we are going

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<v Speaker 1>into a different environment in terms of sentiment than we

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<v Speaker 1>were going into twenty twenty three. So this time last year,

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<v Speaker 1>everything was very pessimistic. Lots of people were expecting recession.

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<v Speaker 1>The hills were alive with the sounds of inverted yield

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<v Speaker 1>curves and things like that. This year feels a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit better. Stalks are up, lots of talk about a

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<v Speaker 1>soft landing. Of course, the irony is that if there

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<v Speaker 1>is going to be a recession, and you know one

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<v Speaker 1>hundred percent chance there will be a recession in the future,

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<v Speaker 1>it's closer than ever, and yet we feel a lot

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<v Speaker 1>better about it.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it is.

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<v Speaker 2>It's funny the optimism that we really felt in December

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<v Speaker 2>about soft landings and bull markets and raids coming down

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<v Speaker 2>in normalization. Interestingly enough, we're recording this January third so far,

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<v Speaker 2>I guess this is we're looking at. We've had a

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<v Speaker 2>few down days but you know whatever, a few days

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<v Speaker 2>here there, it doesn't make a big difference.

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<v Speaker 1>I call it profit taking Joe profit But anyway, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>New Year, New Themes to discuss.

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<v Speaker 3>Taking profits, I wish.

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<v Speaker 1>But one of the things that's still with us is

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<v Speaker 1>this concern about whether or not the economy can escape

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<v Speaker 1>the full force of these very dramatic interest rate hikes

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<v Speaker 1>that we've seen over the past couple of years, whether

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<v Speaker 1>or not there's still a shoe to drop.

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<v Speaker 2>Basically, yeah, you know, it gets to the lags debate.

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<v Speaker 2>We talked about it with Anna Wong at the end

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<v Speaker 2>of twenty twenty three. The market expects rate cuts, obviously,

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<v Speaker 2>some people think as soon as March. Unclear when or

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<v Speaker 2>if that will be. That theoretically is taking off some

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<v Speaker 2>of the pressure from markets, particularly credit markets. But yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>we had this really big rise in raids. Some people

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<v Speaker 2>think that the lagged effect still has yet to come,

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<v Speaker 2>and so sort of trying to understand what's changed from

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<v Speaker 2>when we were etserped to when we're at five percent,

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<v Speaker 2>I think is still an important conversation to.

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<v Speaker 1>Have, absolutely, and in my mind one of the big

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<v Speaker 1>areas of concerns, And it also goes to the idea

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<v Speaker 1>of what's changed over the past few years has to

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<v Speaker 1>be private credit. Ye. Right, We've seen this absolute swelling

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<v Speaker 1>of this particular asset class at a time when interest

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<v Speaker 1>rates have been going up, and there's still lots of

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<v Speaker 1>concern over whether or not this new source of funding

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<v Speaker 1>basically knows what it's doing right, Like are these managers,

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<v Speaker 1>are these investors like getting it right? But then the

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<v Speaker 1>other thing I keep thinking about, and we've sort of

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<v Speaker 1>talked a little bit about this, but this idea of

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<v Speaker 1>the macro impact of private credit. If you have a

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<v Speaker 1>body of money that is now one point three trillion

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<v Speaker 1>or one point six trillion outstanding, depending on which estimate

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<v Speaker 1>you're looking at, that is more or equivalent to the

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<v Speaker 1>size of the entire junk created corporate bond market. So

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<v Speaker 1>there's basically this like new pool of money in the

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<v Speaker 1>economic system at a time when interest rates are going

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<v Speaker 1>up and we're not really sure what impact it's having.

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<v Speaker 2>And I'll just add on to that. Part of the

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<v Speaker 2>interest obviously is Okay, what does it mean for this

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<v Speaker 2>cycle a higher rates, et cetera. But this acid class

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<v Speaker 2>that's exploded, it's not going to go away regardless. And

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<v Speaker 2>the expectation is that it's going to overtime continue to grow.

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<v Speaker 2>So I think there was just a lot of need

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<v Speaker 2>and interest, but I would say need to sort of understand,

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<v Speaker 2>as you say, the macro impacts from this space. I'm

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<v Speaker 2>also curious about the source of excess returns. We talked

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<v Speaker 2>about it a little bit, but it's always sort of

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<v Speaker 2>important when thinking about an asset classes, like, Okay, what

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<v Speaker 2>is it specifically that's being exploited here for above average returns?

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<v Speaker 2>How correlated uncorrelated is I think it's still worth trying

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<v Speaker 2>to untangle the impact and the role of this asset class.

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<v Speaker 1>Absolutely so. We've done one episode on this topic. Previously,

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<v Speaker 1>we spoke with Laura Holsen from New Mountain and she

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<v Speaker 1>basically gave us the elevator pitch for why this asset

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<v Speaker 1>class has been growing so dramatically in recent years. But

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<v Speaker 1>in this particular episode, we're going to dig a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit more into the macro impact of private credit, how

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<v Speaker 1>it competes with other types of funding, and per Joe's point,

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<v Speaker 1>where the source of those excess returns is actually coming from.

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<v Speaker 1>And I'm very pleased to say we have the perfect guest.

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<v Speaker 1>We're going to be speaking with Ben Emmons. He's a

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<v Speaker 1>senior portfolio manager at New Edge twelf. Some of you

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<v Speaker 1>might remember that we spoke to him last year about

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<v Speaker 1>the contraction in bank lending after the collapse of Silicon

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<v Speaker 1>Valley Bank and a few others. He's had a very

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<v Speaker 1>wide ranging career. He was at PIMCO for a long time.

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<v Speaker 1>A great person to give us an overview of how

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<v Speaker 1>private credit is interacting with the rest of the financial

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<v Speaker 1>system and the economy. So Ben, thank you so much

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<v Speaker 1>for coming back on all thoughts.

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<v Speaker 4>Tracy Joe, it's great to be back. Happy New Year,

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<v Speaker 4>Thank you for having.

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<v Speaker 2>Me, Happy New Year, Thank you for coming back.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So maybe to begin with tell us, what's your

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<v Speaker 1>particular interest in private credit? You know, sitting at New Edge,

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<v Speaker 1>you're a portfolio manager. What is the offering posed by

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<v Speaker 1>private credit?

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, it's driven much by clients interest in demand for

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<v Speaker 4>this asset class, you know, in part maybe because the

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<v Speaker 4>type of clients at New Edge in this case services

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<v Speaker 4>are working in the private credit industry themselves ironically, so

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<v Speaker 4>they're interested in investing out of private credit strategies. But

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<v Speaker 4>it's also i think born out of clients who have

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<v Speaker 4>connection with the companies that these private credit lenders are

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<v Speaker 4>lending to or have some sort of involvement in that,

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<v Speaker 4>and are interested and allocating the effort to this as

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<v Speaker 4>a class as opposed to you know, let's say the

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<v Speaker 4>retail approach of like, well, okay, I heard about private credit.

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<v Speaker 4>There may be an ETF on it, like you know,

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<v Speaker 4>and so let's buy this ETF and and now I

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<v Speaker 4>go to a wealth man's perform like new Egine and

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<v Speaker 4>they will help me with that. That's far less. So

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<v Speaker 4>the investors that we talk to are very involved in

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<v Speaker 4>private credit themselves, So it gives you an interesting angle

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<v Speaker 4>on it because once you are starting to talk to

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<v Speaker 4>these clients, you know, you have to really learn about

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<v Speaker 4>what this aesca class truly is about. You know, it's

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<v Speaker 4>far less an asked class about the way we're trading

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<v Speaker 4>public markets. You know, if you look at treasury bonds,

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<v Speaker 4>that's not what private credit is really, how it is

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<v Speaker 4>traded or how it is functioning. So I find it

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<v Speaker 4>a really interesting different alternative way of investing as something

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<v Speaker 4>I had not looked at in my career previously, you know,

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<v Speaker 4>until I really started to get into the Vegisa's investment

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<v Speaker 4>advisory business and so interesting the watches to see this unfold.

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<v Speaker 2>So what is it for an investor? You know, you

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<v Speaker 2>think about overall portfolio. People have some equity, and they

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<v Speaker 2>have some maybe risk free government debt, et cetera, and

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<v Speaker 2>whatever it is. What is it about private credit? What

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<v Speaker 2>does it deliver for a portfolio?

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<v Speaker 4>So the one it is truly diversification, and it is

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<v Speaker 4>an asset class that's traditionally non correlated to equity or

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<v Speaker 4>fixed income, even though you know all of the loans

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<v Speaker 4>that are in the devocredit funds are off based off

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<v Speaker 4>the secured overnight funding rate, that's the self rate, right,

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<v Speaker 4>So there's there is obviously a connection with interest rates,

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<v Speaker 4>but it has been long term uncorrelated based upon how

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<v Speaker 4>the returns have behaved relative to returns and equities and

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<v Speaker 4>fixed income. I think what the tracks people is that

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<v Speaker 4>the loans that are being issued by those private lenders,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, they have been at extreme low default rates

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<v Speaker 4>for a really long period of time. Now, I always

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<v Speaker 4>talk to the private credit managers with a bit of

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<v Speaker 4>a caution here because coming from a world of total

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<v Speaker 4>return and fixed income training, you take immediately set back well, okay,

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<v Speaker 4>load the faults. Really, I mean so.

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<v Speaker 1>I yesh, it's sort of true of every new asset class, right, like, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>the history is limited, so there aren't many defaults exactly.

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<v Speaker 4>So that's exactly a very good point. That's one reason.

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<v Speaker 4>On the other hand, it's about you know, okay, the

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<v Speaker 4>individual companies that they lend to have had a good

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<v Speaker 4>credit history so far, at least in many of the funds.

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<v Speaker 4>If we looked at that's been the case. Very little

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<v Speaker 4>impairments that have happened. Second, the private lenders are in control,

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<v Speaker 4>so they set the covenance. It's not like a bank

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<v Speaker 4>involved or another intermediary that is controlling the contract. It's

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<v Speaker 4>really Blue Out Blackstone KKR. Those companies. They set the

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<v Speaker 4>terms and they also are very good at enforcing those terms.

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<v Speaker 4>And think it gives clients a confidence that these loans

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<v Speaker 4>are staying current and we're not get any major impairments

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<v Speaker 4>of anything. Now, what I think otherwise is I think

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<v Speaker 4>of attraction to clients is that you know, it is

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<v Speaker 4>an astraclass that is not out on the screen. It

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<v Speaker 4>is privately managed and traded. Private credit funds are nothing

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<v Speaker 4>like a mutual fund of etfor or hedgephone manager they

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<v Speaker 4>are very selective in how they pick their different companies

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<v Speaker 4>to lend to. I think all of those things play

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<v Speaker 4>a role in why investors are interested in this aska class.

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<v Speaker 1>So a lot of this reminds me of the debate

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<v Speaker 1>around cove Light in sort of like the middle twenty tens,

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<v Speaker 1>when there was an explosion in cove Light bonds or

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<v Speaker 1>a dramatic deterioration in the amount of protections that investors

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<v Speaker 1>were demanding in order to lend to companies. And I

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<v Speaker 1>remember that time. There was an argument sort of for

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<v Speaker 1>and against. So you know, some people were arguing, this

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<v Speaker 1>is terrible. This is the result of the search for yield.

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<v Speaker 1>It basically means people will lend to anywhere they can

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<v Speaker 1>get a return, and they're not going to ask for

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<v Speaker 1>any protections because they're just desperate to get any sort

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<v Speaker 1>of yield. But then the offsetting argument was that, well,

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<v Speaker 1>actually it sounds bad. Cove Light sounds bad. The idea

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<v Speaker 1>of investors giving up protections sounds bad. But if something

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<v Speaker 1>were to happen, if there were a recession, then it

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<v Speaker 1>could end up being a good thing because it means

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<v Speaker 1>companies have more flexibility to refinance. They don't have as

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<v Speaker 1>many restrictions around what they can do. So I always

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<v Speaker 1>remember there were sort of pros and cons to the

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<v Speaker 1>cove light argument, and it feels similar in private credit,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe to.

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<v Speaker 4>An extent ration. But I would say the managers that

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<v Speaker 4>we've spoken with, and you know, we talked to over

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<v Speaker 4>one hundred managers in that space, what we've read from

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<v Speaker 4>most of those governance they're not lights. They're actually stricter,

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<v Speaker 4>and I think it is because of the personal relationships

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<v Speaker 4>that these private lenders have of the company that they're

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<v Speaker 4>lending to. And they told us that we've actually got

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<v Speaker 4>an examples they've shown also, you know, uh, a presentation

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<v Speaker 4>of the different companies that are actually we are in

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<v Speaker 4>the fund right who are basically let's say, long term

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<v Speaker 4>standing relationship between say a Blackstone and that company itself.

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<v Speaker 4>So I'm trying to get us that the covenants are

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<v Speaker 4>sort of maybe like customized governance. They certainly don't do

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<v Speaker 4>to us as light. You know, there's a very strict

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<v Speaker 4>control on payments of interest and it's about trying to

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<v Speaker 4>you know, really help the company move ahead. So there's

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<v Speaker 4>much of a i think also a private equity aspect

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<v Speaker 4>to this, and that's typical in private credit anyway, where

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<v Speaker 4>you have a sponsor that it's involved in the structure

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<v Speaker 4>of private credit fund. But having that private equity approach

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<v Speaker 4>gives these companies that sort of, let's say, empower those

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<v Speaker 4>companies to do the right thing with that money and

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<v Speaker 4>invest in the right way. And therefore the governance, although

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<v Speaker 4>they look really strict, are not necessarily going to be

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<v Speaker 4>at some moment like, Okay, you can't pay off those loans,

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<v Speaker 4>We're going to, you know, really put the screws on

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<v Speaker 4>this company if we're going to take the keys right

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<v Speaker 4>at lily and and therefore the company becomes totally impaired

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<v Speaker 4>and dysfunctional. That doesn't seem to be the case so far,

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<v Speaker 4>even though from what I read, those governants there are

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<v Speaker 4>strict compared to say, clos where that governant light showed

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<v Speaker 4>up in the mid to twenty.

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<v Speaker 1>TENHS for now, So what what cause a company to

0:12:45.679 --> 0:12:49.440
<v Speaker 1>decide to go the private route versus you know, either

0:12:49.480 --> 0:12:52.200
<v Speaker 1>issue a bond or take out a loan from a

0:12:52.240 --> 0:12:53.520
<v Speaker 1>bank in the public market.

0:12:54.120 --> 0:12:56.920
<v Speaker 4>So I did announcers on the b credit fund, for example,

0:12:56.920 --> 0:13:01.600
<v Speaker 4>from Blackstone, and all those are in there are non listed.

0:13:02.040 --> 0:13:05.160
<v Speaker 4>All of those companies have what we from our conversations

0:13:05.160 --> 0:13:07.640
<v Speaker 4>with them, have no interest in going public at all.

0:13:08.360 --> 0:13:10.840
<v Speaker 4>And Thirdly, what I did find, and I did say

0:13:10.880 --> 0:13:14.640
<v Speaker 4>that to Blackstone, about ten percent or so of that pool,

0:13:15.120 --> 0:13:17.720
<v Speaker 4>there's very little information I can find on these companies,

0:13:17.960 --> 0:13:20.000
<v Speaker 4>and I go online, I don't see much of any

0:13:20.080 --> 0:13:23.040
<v Speaker 4>kind of information. So some of our really really private,

0:13:23.120 --> 0:13:27.200
<v Speaker 4>private type companies we talk about literally like services companies

0:13:27.200 --> 0:13:30.720
<v Speaker 4>a car wash or some technology services company like that

0:13:30.760 --> 0:13:34.760
<v Speaker 4>you've never heard of before. And so these companies I

0:13:34.800 --> 0:13:37.240
<v Speaker 4>think are no also not in the position to just

0:13:37.280 --> 0:13:40.400
<v Speaker 4>go to the public markets unless there's a bank that

0:13:40.559 --> 0:13:43.560
<v Speaker 4>is really that easy in terms of his lending standards,

0:13:43.600 --> 0:13:46.839
<v Speaker 4>that is willing to give these companies money or allow

0:13:46.880 --> 0:13:49.720
<v Speaker 4>them to come to market. On the other hand, I mean,

0:13:49.960 --> 0:13:53.040
<v Speaker 4>some of these companies may be in a position where

0:13:53.559 --> 0:13:55.640
<v Speaker 4>they get better and better revenues, they get more traction,

0:13:55.760 --> 0:13:58.320
<v Speaker 4>get more attention to their business model, and at some

0:13:58.360 --> 0:14:00.320
<v Speaker 4>point some big investor compans like, hey, look, you know,

0:14:00.559 --> 0:14:03.640
<v Speaker 4>we can help you go public and raise equity. We've

0:14:03.679 --> 0:14:06.199
<v Speaker 4>not found those examples in these pools so far.

0:14:06.600 --> 0:14:09.679
<v Speaker 2>How much of the rise of this acid class, in

0:14:09.720 --> 0:14:13.400
<v Speaker 2>your view, is simply about scale and capacity within the banks,

0:14:13.480 --> 0:14:16.280
<v Speaker 2>or maybe lack thereof, because if the story is right,

0:14:16.600 --> 0:14:20.480
<v Speaker 2>the companies are not listed, they're not particularly well known, so,

0:14:20.600 --> 0:14:22.840
<v Speaker 2>like you know, you're sort of starting from scratch on

0:14:22.960 --> 0:14:27.800
<v Speaker 2>due diligence or familiarity. Perhaps the covenants are bespoke. In

0:14:27.840 --> 0:14:31.000
<v Speaker 2>many cases, as you've described, they're tailored, so that obviously

0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:35.080
<v Speaker 2>takes legwork on the part of whoever is making lending decisions.

0:14:35.480 --> 0:14:37.480
<v Speaker 2>So is this like a story of like essentially going

0:14:37.520 --> 0:14:41.080
<v Speaker 2>to post Dodd Frank world where like banks are constrained,

0:14:41.200 --> 0:14:45.240
<v Speaker 2>et cetera, that essentially it just makes more sense for

0:14:45.760 --> 0:14:47.880
<v Speaker 2>in many cases for a third parties who have the

0:14:47.920 --> 0:14:51.920
<v Speaker 2>capacity and scale to specialize and find in creating that relationship.

0:14:52.360 --> 0:14:55.880
<v Speaker 4>That's spot on, Joe. I think the outer part of

0:14:55.920 --> 0:14:59.520
<v Speaker 4>that story is that as banks have skilled back ye

0:15:00.000 --> 0:15:04.200
<v Speaker 4>dedicated market, that created a void, and I think that

0:15:04.320 --> 0:15:07.960
<v Speaker 4>was part of the story too, of these companies automatically

0:15:07.960 --> 0:15:11.520
<v Speaker 4>getting towards a private lender as supposed to going to

0:15:11.640 --> 0:15:14.120
<v Speaker 4>it let's say mid size or smaller bank trying to

0:15:14.160 --> 0:15:16.880
<v Speaker 4>get a loan or business loan. But as I mentioned,

0:15:16.880 --> 0:15:21.600
<v Speaker 4>the personal aspect that found really fascinating of how personal

0:15:21.640 --> 0:15:25.440
<v Speaker 4>relationships they've had. Now, any private banker has this right

0:15:25.520 --> 0:15:27.240
<v Speaker 4>if you go to I don't think of any of

0:15:27.280 --> 0:15:31.000
<v Speaker 4>the major banks there's a personal relationship. But I think

0:15:31.080 --> 0:15:35.880
<v Speaker 4>in this case it's very driven by personal long term relationships.

0:15:36.280 --> 0:15:40.680
<v Speaker 4>So that void of the banks, not you know, lendings

0:15:40.680 --> 0:15:44.320
<v Speaker 4>as much in that syndicated loan channel, is one reason

0:15:44.320 --> 0:15:46.480
<v Speaker 4>why there is a lot of demand for private lending.

0:15:46.920 --> 0:15:48.960
<v Speaker 4>On the other hand, it's really the personal relationships. I

0:15:49.000 --> 0:15:49.760
<v Speaker 4>think that's driving it.

0:15:50.160 --> 0:15:53.760
<v Speaker 2>Tracy, it still strikes me as perverse that the banks

0:15:53.800 --> 0:15:57.080
<v Speaker 2>that failed in twenty twenty three were like the banks

0:15:57.080 --> 0:16:00.320
<v Speaker 2>where they actually took like private relationships seriously. Like it

0:16:00.360 --> 0:16:01.760
<v Speaker 2>sort of bothered me. It's like, oh, this is like

0:16:01.760 --> 0:16:04.040
<v Speaker 2>what I think like bankers should be, like really getting

0:16:04.080 --> 0:16:07.680
<v Speaker 2>to know the clients, bespoke offerings that isn't just like

0:16:07.720 --> 0:16:08.760
<v Speaker 2>some generic website.

0:16:08.800 --> 0:16:10.880
<v Speaker 1>There's a difference between getting to know the clients and

0:16:10.920 --> 0:16:12.280
<v Speaker 1>doing whatever they want you to do.

0:16:12.400 --> 0:16:14.640
<v Speaker 2>I guess that's it, but it still feels like man like,

0:16:15.040 --> 0:16:16.960
<v Speaker 2>I think that's what bankers should be doing, but I

0:16:16.960 --> 0:16:19.040
<v Speaker 2>guess apparently not, that's not what the market said.

0:16:19.200 --> 0:16:21.840
<v Speaker 1>Well, I mean, just going back to the regulation, I

0:16:21.840 --> 0:16:25.560
<v Speaker 1>mean a lot of this was by design. I remember

0:16:25.600 --> 0:16:28.320
<v Speaker 1>when the leverage lending guidelines came out again in the

0:16:28.360 --> 0:16:30.760
<v Speaker 1>mid twenty tens. That was back when the market was

0:16:30.800 --> 0:16:34.040
<v Speaker 1>going absolutely haywire, and the regulators came out and said,

0:16:34.040 --> 0:16:36.520
<v Speaker 1>hold on, you guys have to like take a breath

0:16:36.520 --> 0:16:38.760
<v Speaker 1>here and stop doing so many things that are risky,

0:16:39.400 --> 0:16:42.960
<v Speaker 1>basically forcing that activity into what we used to refer

0:16:43.040 --> 0:16:45.200
<v Speaker 1>to as the shadow banking system. I don't see that

0:16:45.280 --> 0:16:46.880
<v Speaker 1>term as much as I used to, but that is

0:16:46.960 --> 0:16:50.240
<v Speaker 1>exactly what private credit is, of course. But just on

0:16:50.280 --> 0:16:53.280
<v Speaker 1>this note, I remember there was a really interesting chart.

0:16:53.360 --> 0:16:55.000
<v Speaker 1>I think I put it in one of the All

0:16:55.040 --> 0:16:58.800
<v Speaker 1>Thoughts newsletters maybe a couple months back, but it showed

0:16:59.040 --> 0:17:04.520
<v Speaker 1>commercial and industrial bank lending in the US versus USGDP,

0:17:05.400 --> 0:17:09.119
<v Speaker 1>and for most of the history of that time series,

0:17:09.160 --> 0:17:12.520
<v Speaker 1>they pretty much moved together. So if there are more

0:17:12.760 --> 0:17:17.479
<v Speaker 1>commercial and industrial loans, then GDP tends to be growing.

0:17:17.880 --> 0:17:20.800
<v Speaker 1>But over the past couple of years they've kind of decoupled,

0:17:21.480 --> 0:17:24.040
<v Speaker 1>and in my mind, it really raises the question of, like,

0:17:24.320 --> 0:17:27.600
<v Speaker 1>what is driving GDP growth. If it isn't bank lending,

0:17:27.640 --> 0:17:29.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, maybe it's government funding. We've seen a lot

0:17:29.720 --> 0:17:33.479
<v Speaker 1>of infrastructure spending and things like that, but maybe it

0:17:33.560 --> 0:17:37.560
<v Speaker 1>is also the more than one trillion dollars of private

0:17:37.600 --> 0:17:39.320
<v Speaker 1>credit that now exists.

0:17:39.880 --> 0:17:42.240
<v Speaker 4>I think that's right, because you know the fact that

0:17:42.280 --> 0:17:46.679
<v Speaker 4>it is one point three trillion dollars going to lily

0:17:46.720 --> 0:17:49.480
<v Speaker 4>companies that making twenty five to fifty one hundred million

0:17:49.560 --> 0:17:53.200
<v Speaker 4>dollars of gross revenues a year. That's part of the

0:17:53.240 --> 0:17:57.679
<v Speaker 4>really the small mid size backbone of America that's driving

0:17:57.720 --> 0:18:01.480
<v Speaker 4>GDP and again doing reach own these companies. From the

0:18:01.480 --> 0:18:05.120
<v Speaker 4>information that I've found on it is, you can really

0:18:05.160 --> 0:18:07.639
<v Speaker 4>tell like their business models have expanded very rapidly of

0:18:07.760 --> 0:18:11.760
<v Speaker 4>last several years. In part I think is the infusion

0:18:11.800 --> 0:18:15.560
<v Speaker 4>of private credit and the availability of private credit. Again

0:18:15.680 --> 0:18:18.160
<v Speaker 4>to that question of Joe like that if the availability

0:18:18.240 --> 0:18:21.520
<v Speaker 4>is from private lenders not from banks, it does eventually

0:18:21.560 --> 0:18:24.800
<v Speaker 4>do show up in GDP, maybe not because of the

0:18:24.880 --> 0:18:28.000
<v Speaker 4>commercial and industrial loan contractions you're see in there, but

0:18:28.520 --> 0:18:31.880
<v Speaker 4>through the other channel of private credit extension. I think

0:18:31.920 --> 0:18:36.359
<v Speaker 4>also that the impact in itself of leveraging gearing in

0:18:36.400 --> 0:18:40.840
<v Speaker 4>the financial markets is actually none by from private credit.

0:18:40.880 --> 0:18:44.679
<v Speaker 4>There has been one colo now issues of Blackstone's bi

0:18:44.800 --> 0:18:47.760
<v Speaker 4>credit fund that was very very recently. It was about

0:18:47.760 --> 0:18:50.720
<v Speaker 4>a five hundred million dollar deal. They took the most

0:18:51.520 --> 0:18:53.280
<v Speaker 4>I think that the best loans that they had in

0:18:53.280 --> 0:18:56.480
<v Speaker 4>their fund and bundled them together and sold them to

0:18:56.520 --> 0:19:00.640
<v Speaker 4>investors at a very i think, very tight spread compared

0:19:00.680 --> 0:19:04.000
<v Speaker 4>to where high yielders and anything else, so very conservative.

0:19:04.480 --> 0:19:06.720
<v Speaker 4>But as not much more of that is happening yet.

0:19:06.760 --> 0:19:09.280
<v Speaker 4>So if you think of impact from private credit on

0:19:09.320 --> 0:19:12.400
<v Speaker 4>the economy, we go through leverage and securitization as an example,

0:19:12.480 --> 0:19:15.600
<v Speaker 4>so that maybe the next stage in the future, as

0:19:15.640 --> 0:19:18.560
<v Speaker 4>Blackstone sort of tipped the waters there and figured out, hey,

0:19:18.640 --> 0:19:22.119
<v Speaker 4>there is investor demand instead of direct into our fund,

0:19:22.280 --> 0:19:26.080
<v Speaker 4>we can securitize. If that were to pick up that securitization,

0:19:26.160 --> 0:19:28.640
<v Speaker 4>I would think you're going to get an even more

0:19:28.680 --> 0:19:32.600
<v Speaker 4>compounded effect from this, and then maybe the fears about

0:19:32.640 --> 0:19:35.959
<v Speaker 4>the risk of private credit will become more justified. Right

0:19:36.000 --> 0:19:40.520
<v Speaker 4>because I'm maybe jumping ahead of another question, but you

0:19:40.560 --> 0:19:42.800
<v Speaker 4>know the risk if you think of macro impact on

0:19:42.840 --> 0:19:45.600
<v Speaker 4>the economy and you think of risk, I would think

0:19:45.800 --> 0:19:48.080
<v Speaker 4>the real risk of private credit is that the leverage,

0:19:48.280 --> 0:19:50.960
<v Speaker 4>yeah that's in these funds, which tends to be about

0:19:51.000 --> 0:19:54.240
<v Speaker 4>one and a half two times is sort of most

0:19:54.280 --> 0:19:57.120
<v Speaker 4>of the funds that have that sort of leverage that

0:19:57.119 --> 0:20:01.040
<v Speaker 4>that gets compounded by securitization the loans in the funds,

0:20:01.359 --> 0:20:04.040
<v Speaker 4>and we haven't gotten to that stage yet. So the

0:20:04.119 --> 0:20:07.359
<v Speaker 4>actual leverage itself, I think relatively low. If you compare

0:20:07.400 --> 0:20:10.760
<v Speaker 4>it to the public markets take investment grade leverage is

0:20:10.760 --> 0:20:14.800
<v Speaker 4>still three four times. Yeah, earnings is supposed to one

0:20:14.880 --> 0:20:15.479
<v Speaker 4>or two times.

0:20:15.720 --> 0:20:18.119
<v Speaker 2>I've brought this up in a few different conversations, but

0:20:18.200 --> 0:20:20.639
<v Speaker 2>always blows my mind. So I keep asking the same question.

0:20:20.720 --> 0:20:24.520
<v Speaker 2>But people like the fact that it's not on a screen.

0:20:25.320 --> 0:20:28.960
<v Speaker 2>You mentioned that, And so there's this attraction to prices

0:20:29.000 --> 0:20:31.200
<v Speaker 2>that I guess you don't have to look at every day.

0:20:31.240 --> 0:20:34.200
<v Speaker 2>And if the market's read one day and the stock

0:20:34.280 --> 0:20:37.440
<v Speaker 2>market's down two percent, but you look at your privacy easy.

0:20:37.240 --> 0:20:39.000
<v Speaker 1>To be diversified if you're not traded.

0:20:39.080 --> 0:20:42.520
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, there's like, oh, hey, my credit exposure was totally fat,

0:20:42.560 --> 0:20:45.280
<v Speaker 2>even though like implicitly like that's a lie. I mean,

0:20:45.320 --> 0:20:47.320
<v Speaker 2>we all know, but like, here's what I don't get

0:20:47.320 --> 0:20:50.320
<v Speaker 2>about that. So A, like, is that real like that

0:20:50.440 --> 0:20:54.680
<v Speaker 2>premium that people pay for the appearance of non diversification,

0:20:55.040 --> 0:20:57.440
<v Speaker 2>And b it seems to me that the people who

0:20:57.440 --> 0:21:00.080
<v Speaker 2>should really like pay up for the privilege of not

0:21:00.119 --> 0:21:03.359
<v Speaker 2>having to look at their quotes. Are like individual retail

0:21:03.400 --> 0:21:05.920
<v Speaker 2>investors who are like prone to panic and selling it

0:21:06.000 --> 0:21:07.880
<v Speaker 2>the worst time and buying at the top, et cetera.

0:21:08.280 --> 0:21:12.240
<v Speaker 2>But for the sophisticated investor, which I imagine most people

0:21:12.240 --> 0:21:14.440
<v Speaker 2>who are like allocating to private credit, you know, they're

0:21:14.440 --> 0:21:16.639
<v Speaker 2>not mom and pop. They're you know, they're people with

0:21:16.960 --> 0:21:20.520
<v Speaker 2>moving serious money and sophisticated, like they're pros at this.

0:21:20.600 --> 0:21:23.879
<v Speaker 2>Shouldn't they like be able to bear to look at

0:21:23.880 --> 0:21:25.879
<v Speaker 2>their portfolio on a day to day basis? Why do

0:21:25.920 --> 0:21:27.080
<v Speaker 2>they need to not have the screen?

0:21:27.920 --> 0:21:30.880
<v Speaker 4>Yeah? I know, And that actually has happened because if

0:21:30.880 --> 0:21:32.680
<v Speaker 4>it takes step back, yeah and go to the four

0:21:32.800 --> 0:21:35.840
<v Speaker 4>quote of twenty twenty two, they are suddenly this news

0:21:35.880 --> 0:21:40.320
<v Speaker 4>out that institutional investors in Asia were taking their money

0:21:40.359 --> 0:21:42.760
<v Speaker 4>out of Beat Credit, and that was the first news

0:21:43.480 --> 0:21:47.879
<v Speaker 4>of sort of this redemption starting, and that did spill

0:21:47.920 --> 0:21:50.000
<v Speaker 4>over to the US and cause a little bit of

0:21:50.000 --> 0:21:53.320
<v Speaker 4>a nerve, including with some of our clients that we

0:21:53.720 --> 0:21:56.920
<v Speaker 4>got redemption requests. And because it's a gated fund, but

0:21:57.000 --> 0:21:58.919
<v Speaker 4>they only pay out up to five percent of the

0:21:58.960 --> 0:22:01.720
<v Speaker 4>total bull per cord order and it's an an auction

0:22:01.840 --> 0:22:04.040
<v Speaker 4>type basis right, so you don't get your the five

0:22:04.040 --> 0:22:06.400
<v Speaker 4>percent is a pro rade idea, you know, I did

0:22:06.440 --> 0:22:10.160
<v Speaker 4>think made people wary of that. To your point, it's

0:22:10.200 --> 0:22:12.600
<v Speaker 4>not on the screen, it's not mark the market, but

0:22:12.640 --> 0:22:15.560
<v Speaker 4>there are marks clearly, and if you follow the ten

0:22:15.640 --> 0:22:19.040
<v Speaker 4>Q ten K filing every quarter, you can see that

0:22:19.119 --> 0:22:20.879
<v Speaker 4>the change of the value. This is what I do

0:22:20.920 --> 0:22:23.640
<v Speaker 4>obviously because I have to do this for my job.

0:22:24.400 --> 0:22:27.040
<v Speaker 4>And yeah, there's some stresses have built in over the

0:22:27.080 --> 0:22:29.640
<v Speaker 4>last year, and you could tell us from the spreads

0:22:29.680 --> 0:22:32.879
<v Speaker 4>on those loans they were when I started a new

0:22:33.000 --> 0:22:36.359
<v Speaker 4>edge somewhere in the three the five hundred base points

0:22:36.400 --> 0:22:39.600
<v Speaker 4>over sofa more than the fifty percent of the pools

0:22:39.640 --> 0:22:41.560
<v Speaker 4>right now i'm looking at are more like five hundred

0:22:41.600 --> 0:22:43.880
<v Speaker 4>to seven hundred base points over sofa, So that has

0:22:43.920 --> 0:22:47.800
<v Speaker 4>a change has happened. So I think the sophisticated investor

0:22:47.840 --> 0:22:51.719
<v Speaker 4>looks at this similarly, saying I'm getting wider spreads than

0:22:51.800 --> 0:22:55.440
<v Speaker 4>in high almost double now Kearney, and the marks are

0:22:55.480 --> 0:22:58.960
<v Speaker 4>indeed somewhat deteriorating now that the fault rates stay low.

0:22:59.119 --> 0:23:01.479
<v Speaker 4>That's you know, of the total pool, that's how they

0:23:01.520 --> 0:23:04.480
<v Speaker 4>present it. But if you break it out by different sectors,

0:23:04.480 --> 0:23:06.320
<v Speaker 4>and a lot of these, by the way, these private

0:23:06.359 --> 0:23:10.760
<v Speaker 4>credit pools are allocated significantly to software and healthcare, and

0:23:10.800 --> 0:23:13.520
<v Speaker 4>that's where the weaknesses have been in the economy, so

0:23:13.560 --> 0:23:16.000
<v Speaker 4>you can tell that those president only wider than they

0:23:16.000 --> 0:23:18.680
<v Speaker 4>were a year ago. There's also I think from the

0:23:18.720 --> 0:23:21.280
<v Speaker 4>marks on the loans from when I looked at different

0:23:21.400 --> 0:23:24.800
<v Speaker 4>ten K filings, Yeah, there's some default breaters picked up

0:23:24.800 --> 0:23:29.119
<v Speaker 4>there and there's some impairments have been reported. That is

0:23:29.160 --> 0:23:33.159
<v Speaker 4>also showing up again to the covenant and the control

0:23:33.720 --> 0:23:35.600
<v Speaker 4>that seems to be quite tight, and that I think

0:23:35.640 --> 0:23:38.879
<v Speaker 4>why it hasn't been a floodgates of redemptions coming out

0:23:38.920 --> 0:23:42.359
<v Speaker 4>of these funds, but that is ongoing is I think

0:23:42.400 --> 0:23:44.440
<v Speaker 4>it's a sign of that people are looking at the

0:23:44.480 --> 0:23:48.800
<v Speaker 4>ASKA saying we want more transparency and not so much ovagueness.

0:23:49.320 --> 0:23:52.520
<v Speaker 4>I like to better understand what the liquidity truly is.

0:23:53.200 --> 0:23:56.600
<v Speaker 4>And therefore I'm also reserved cautious. So it's not all

0:23:56.600 --> 0:23:59.720
<v Speaker 4>in private credit and it's fantastic and you don't have

0:23:59.720 --> 0:24:01.800
<v Speaker 4>to do it. I think there are just a lot

0:24:01.800 --> 0:24:25.360
<v Speaker 4>of investors that have caution.

0:24:18.080 --> 0:24:22.879
<v Speaker 1>What would be the proximate cause or catalyst for this

0:24:22.960 --> 0:24:26.440
<v Speaker 1>might be an unfair question, but like the doomsday scenario

0:24:26.720 --> 0:24:30.080
<v Speaker 1>in private credit, because I keep thinking, like, okay, one

0:24:30.080 --> 0:24:33.960
<v Speaker 1>of the strengths of the asset class is that in

0:24:34.000 --> 0:24:36.840
<v Speaker 1>some respects it's very liquid and you don't have to

0:24:36.880 --> 0:24:39.280
<v Speaker 1>mark to market on a daily basis, and so you

0:24:39.320 --> 0:24:45.040
<v Speaker 1>can kind of withstand short lived down cycles. But at

0:24:45.080 --> 0:24:48.320
<v Speaker 1>the same time, you know, I imagine if those pressures were

0:24:48.359 --> 0:24:52.440
<v Speaker 1>to build up enough at some point you would have

0:24:52.520 --> 0:24:56.240
<v Speaker 1>to crystallize losses. At some point you would have investors

0:24:56.400 --> 0:25:00.480
<v Speaker 1>running for the gates, per your example. So what would

0:25:00.480 --> 0:25:03.040
<v Speaker 1>be the sort of trigger for that to actually happen.

0:25:04.280 --> 0:25:07.920
<v Speaker 4>That's the burning question on the mind of every client

0:25:07.960 --> 0:25:11.879
<v Speaker 4>I talked to about. And there's different ways to analyze that,

0:25:11.960 --> 0:25:15.000
<v Speaker 4>I think, because on the one hand, it's just as

0:25:15.040 --> 0:25:19.080
<v Speaker 4>I described, there's some level of stresses building into these pulls,

0:25:19.200 --> 0:25:20.879
<v Speaker 4>and in a way you would think that maybe just

0:25:20.920 --> 0:25:24.439
<v Speaker 4>simply how the economy is evolving, it gets overtime software

0:25:24.480 --> 0:25:27.320
<v Speaker 4>and weaker, and you get some impairments, there will be

0:25:27.359 --> 0:25:30.359
<v Speaker 4>some companies that will be behind in payments. On the

0:25:30.359 --> 0:25:33.720
<v Speaker 4>other hand, it's about the liquidity aspect that yes, people

0:25:33.720 --> 0:25:36.080
<v Speaker 4>have tied it up there. Liquidity in that vehicle and

0:25:36.119 --> 0:25:39.760
<v Speaker 4>wanted out. And so that big credit example is one

0:25:39.840 --> 0:25:43.280
<v Speaker 4>example of people trying to maneuver the liquidity out and

0:25:43.359 --> 0:25:46.040
<v Speaker 4>keep redeeming from it with the good news that there's

0:25:46.640 --> 0:25:49.280
<v Speaker 4>all these funds are gated so you don't get a

0:25:49.359 --> 0:25:52.399
<v Speaker 4>run on those funds, because that would be the normal

0:25:52.480 --> 0:25:55.359
<v Speaker 4>financial trigger, right right, I have an edge on a

0:25:55.440 --> 0:25:57.880
<v Speaker 4>ETF out there, and people, Okay, this is wrong, I'm

0:25:57.880 --> 0:26:00.720
<v Speaker 4>pulling all my money out, and that effect on that

0:26:00.760 --> 0:26:02.840
<v Speaker 4>they could have on broader markets. It's not the case

0:26:02.840 --> 0:26:05.800
<v Speaker 4>with private credit funds. But I think that what people

0:26:06.080 --> 0:26:10.719
<v Speaker 4>will look at carefully as the realization that the loans

0:26:10.720 --> 0:26:14.320
<v Speaker 4>that they've extended to these companies, if there are issues

0:26:14.359 --> 0:26:18.760
<v Speaker 4>with fraud cases or other types of issues, that that

0:26:18.840 --> 0:26:21.919
<v Speaker 4>will become a trigger of realization of hey, there's actually

0:26:21.960 --> 0:26:25.479
<v Speaker 4>been some deterioration of lending standards have actually taken place,

0:26:25.800 --> 0:26:28.480
<v Speaker 4>and as a result, invest started to react like they

0:26:28.520 --> 0:26:30.960
<v Speaker 4>started to look at Okay, I'm going to start redeeming

0:26:31.080 --> 0:26:34.800
<v Speaker 4>more from these funds. Now there's little evidence of this curny,

0:26:35.240 --> 0:26:37.280
<v Speaker 4>I think really because of the state of the economy

0:26:37.280 --> 0:26:40.439
<v Speaker 4>where we are, or there's not been much report on

0:26:40.520 --> 0:26:42.879
<v Speaker 4>this yet. I want to mention this because as this

0:26:42.960 --> 0:26:45.920
<v Speaker 4>podcast gets out there, the private credit fundman as will

0:26:45.920 --> 0:26:48.119
<v Speaker 4>listen to this. One of the complaints I had was

0:26:48.200 --> 0:26:52.320
<v Speaker 4>that the vakeness of the funds is also expressing that

0:26:52.680 --> 0:26:56.159
<v Speaker 4>some of these companies very little information available. So as

0:26:56.160 --> 0:26:58.880
<v Speaker 4>an investor would I would want to know, like if

0:26:58.880 --> 0:27:00.639
<v Speaker 4>I put one dollar in that funds and you're going

0:27:00.720 --> 0:27:03.879
<v Speaker 4>to lend that out to company XYZ that I cannot

0:27:03.920 --> 0:27:06.199
<v Speaker 4>find any information on, I at least want to know

0:27:06.240 --> 0:27:09.840
<v Speaker 4>what that company is really about. So I've been kind

0:27:09.840 --> 0:27:13.920
<v Speaker 4>of messaging this to different managers, but I think this

0:27:13.960 --> 0:27:17.200
<v Speaker 4>is a concern expressly for other investors too, and probably

0:27:17.320 --> 0:27:19.879
<v Speaker 4>is one of those where you say trigger ideas of

0:27:20.040 --> 0:27:22.439
<v Speaker 4>like if it shows up more and more of like

0:27:22.480 --> 0:27:25.439
<v Speaker 4>we're lending to companies that we can find little information on,

0:27:25.720 --> 0:27:26.760
<v Speaker 4>that will be in concerned, right.

0:27:26.800 --> 0:27:29.680
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, and also there is clearly a tension in that,

0:27:29.800 --> 0:27:33.159
<v Speaker 1>Like part of the investment case of this asset class

0:27:33.200 --> 0:27:37.800
<v Speaker 1>is the idea of lenders building really strong relationships with

0:27:37.960 --> 0:27:42.159
<v Speaker 1>private companies doing really good due diligence and very like

0:27:42.320 --> 0:27:46.080
<v Speaker 1>customized deals. But then it's weird if none of that

0:27:46.160 --> 0:27:49.680
<v Speaker 1>work actually shows up for the end investor, like if

0:27:49.680 --> 0:27:51.360
<v Speaker 1>there's no way for you to actually check it out,

0:27:51.400 --> 0:27:53.320
<v Speaker 1>and you're sort of buying into it on blind faith.

0:27:53.359 --> 0:27:57.840
<v Speaker 4>Almost yeah, you're buying into a bull of loans that

0:27:57.960 --> 0:28:00.960
<v Speaker 4>is presented as this is a load of fault vehicle.

0:28:01.400 --> 0:28:05.240
<v Speaker 4>It's very steady and it's yields and payout and therefore

0:28:06.040 --> 0:28:08.400
<v Speaker 4>you don't need to worry about those nuances and details.

0:28:09.400 --> 0:28:11.320
<v Speaker 4>And yet I think as a vestors, you should worry

0:28:11.320 --> 0:28:14.120
<v Speaker 4>about that because you know, in the end, the money

0:28:14.119 --> 0:28:16.560
<v Speaker 4>that you put into that fund gets to those companies,

0:28:17.080 --> 0:28:20.480
<v Speaker 4>and so that due diligence should really matter. And you know,

0:28:20.520 --> 0:28:22.720
<v Speaker 4>you get a lot of assurances that that due diligence

0:28:22.760 --> 0:28:25.280
<v Speaker 4>process is water tight and the covenants are very strict.

0:28:25.280 --> 0:28:27.000
<v Speaker 4>And I have to say, but from what I've read,

0:28:27.119 --> 0:28:30.520
<v Speaker 4>that's true. But we know from subprime lending, we know

0:28:30.560 --> 0:28:33.119
<v Speaker 4>from other types of lending that it could not always

0:28:33.119 --> 0:28:36.119
<v Speaker 4>work out that way, especially if you have an exuberance

0:28:36.760 --> 0:28:39.600
<v Speaker 4>that we're dealing with currenty. So the private credit market

0:28:39.640 --> 0:28:42.600
<v Speaker 4>is in an exuberance face currenty, you know, because everybody's

0:28:42.600 --> 0:28:44.560
<v Speaker 4>focused on a lot and a lot of money is

0:28:44.600 --> 0:28:48.400
<v Speaker 4>being allocated to it, and a lot of nowadays mutual

0:28:48.400 --> 0:28:50.920
<v Speaker 4>fun companies for example, jumping to the opportunity to coming

0:28:51.000 --> 0:28:53.720
<v Speaker 4>very late in that race, and that would be to

0:28:53.880 --> 0:28:56.160
<v Speaker 4>be interested to watch too, right, And how if they're

0:28:56.200 --> 0:28:59.400
<v Speaker 4>starting to become private lenders, you know, what does their

0:28:59.480 --> 0:29:03.600
<v Speaker 4>lending stand practices compared to the experts in that space, say,

0:29:03.800 --> 0:29:07.120
<v Speaker 4>you know, well established firm side Blackstone and KKR and

0:29:07.160 --> 0:29:10.440
<v Speaker 4>Blue Owl, who have years of experience with been lending

0:29:10.440 --> 0:29:11.680
<v Speaker 4>to private companies.

0:29:11.880 --> 0:29:16.000
<v Speaker 2>I guess on some level, this is every credit cycle, right,

0:29:16.040 --> 0:29:18.280
<v Speaker 2>I mean in the sense that at some point people

0:29:18.400 --> 0:29:20.640
<v Speaker 2>want to start lending money to people who can't pay

0:29:20.640 --> 0:29:22.479
<v Speaker 2>it back, and then some people will make a lot

0:29:22.520 --> 0:29:24.200
<v Speaker 2>of money doing that, and then someone will lose a

0:29:24.200 --> 0:29:27.120
<v Speaker 2>lot of money doing that. Can you talk a little

0:29:27.120 --> 0:29:32.680
<v Speaker 2>bit more about the leverage and the fund structure. So

0:29:33.080 --> 0:29:37.640
<v Speaker 2>company X launches a private credit fund, how much is

0:29:37.680 --> 0:29:40.800
<v Speaker 2>it like sort of like equity investors in that fund?

0:29:41.160 --> 0:29:43.959
<v Speaker 2>And then how much would they theoretically like borrow from

0:29:44.040 --> 0:29:46.720
<v Speaker 2>some bank or someone else to like add leverage or

0:29:46.880 --> 0:29:48.480
<v Speaker 2>sort of juice the fund. Like, how does that work?

0:29:49.120 --> 0:29:53.440
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so you have to sponsor at a private equity firm. Okay,

0:29:53.640 --> 0:29:58.960
<v Speaker 4>that's the main I'd say capital provider and as a

0:29:59.080 --> 0:30:02.800
<v Speaker 4>fund then gets long. It literally is like, yes, they

0:30:02.880 --> 0:30:05.959
<v Speaker 4>use intermediaries the fund, right, because you have ultimately, you know,

0:30:06.040 --> 0:30:09.600
<v Speaker 4>the companies who borrow from that private credit fund, you

0:30:09.640 --> 0:30:13.160
<v Speaker 4>know they're facing essentially a bank. Yeah, the same idea,

0:30:13.800 --> 0:30:17.080
<v Speaker 4>but the private credit fund itself has gets capital backing

0:30:17.120 --> 0:30:20.280
<v Speaker 4>from a private equity firm, but still has to use

0:30:21.040 --> 0:30:25.440
<v Speaker 4>intermediaries to raise the funds for in order to lend.

0:30:25.520 --> 0:30:25.680
<v Speaker 1>Right.

0:30:25.760 --> 0:30:29.200
<v Speaker 4>So now, on the other hand, it's also about I

0:30:29.200 --> 0:30:33.120
<v Speaker 4>think the combination of other types of leverage. So what

0:30:33.160 --> 0:30:35.720
<v Speaker 4>I've noticed was that a lot of these funds do

0:30:36.520 --> 0:30:40.840
<v Speaker 4>partially invest their pull into clos I know, that's obviously

0:30:40.880 --> 0:30:43.720
<v Speaker 4>where the financial leverage to an extent comes from. I

0:30:43.960 --> 0:30:46.480
<v Speaker 4>found that interesting, even though it's a very small portion

0:30:46.560 --> 0:30:48.400
<v Speaker 4>of it tends to be like one to two percent

0:30:48.600 --> 0:30:51.400
<v Speaker 4>of the total pool. But it's it's another, i think,

0:30:51.400 --> 0:30:53.880
<v Speaker 4>another source of their their leverage of funding, if you

0:30:53.920 --> 0:30:56.120
<v Speaker 4>call it. On the other hand, it's a very low

0:30:56.200 --> 0:30:59.680
<v Speaker 4>leverage though I've compared to other lending vehicles that they're

0:30:59.720 --> 0:31:01.680
<v Speaker 4>out there. I mean, if you talk about say the

0:31:01.720 --> 0:31:03.920
<v Speaker 4>total notion of the fund is leveled one to two

0:31:03.920 --> 0:31:06.480
<v Speaker 4>times max, most of them are more like one to

0:31:06.560 --> 0:31:06.920
<v Speaker 4>one and.

0:31:06.840 --> 0:31:08.560
<v Speaker 2>A half, So they're not going crazy.

0:31:08.800 --> 0:31:14.719
<v Speaker 4>No, it's quite conservative. So that's I think, why are

0:31:14.800 --> 0:31:17.720
<v Speaker 4>kinds of not a concern about the leverage unwind idea

0:31:17.800 --> 0:31:22.080
<v Speaker 4>of what we've seen with SPVs during the financial crisis, right,

0:31:22.160 --> 0:31:26.040
<v Speaker 4>some off bounce sheet vehicle fifty nine levers and it

0:31:26.080 --> 0:31:29.560
<v Speaker 4>has to unwind and we get all the disaster that follows.

0:31:30.120 --> 0:31:32.640
<v Speaker 4>That I think is not so much to worry. It's

0:31:32.680 --> 0:31:36.040
<v Speaker 4>more that opakness and the issue about lending to companies

0:31:36.080 --> 0:31:39.160
<v Speaker 4>that although strict covenance, turned out to be issues with

0:31:39.240 --> 0:31:41.680
<v Speaker 4>those companies and we didn't know about that, and therefore

0:31:42.360 --> 0:31:44.480
<v Speaker 4>we're dealing with the deterioration of the pool and we

0:31:44.560 --> 0:31:46.920
<v Speaker 4>have to reassess the risk. And as I mentioned, if

0:31:46.960 --> 0:31:49.200
<v Speaker 4>you could tell from the change of the spreads on

0:31:49.240 --> 0:31:51.440
<v Speaker 4>those loans over the past year, than there's some risk

0:31:51.560 --> 0:31:54.400
<v Speaker 4>is creeptive. So I think that's the bigger risk. But

0:31:55.040 --> 0:31:57.840
<v Speaker 4>back to your original question, I think it's really the

0:31:57.840 --> 0:32:01.440
<v Speaker 4>structure of having this sponsored company providing the majority of

0:32:01.480 --> 0:32:04.680
<v Speaker 4>that capital, which is I think is maybe what gives

0:32:04.720 --> 0:32:06.640
<v Speaker 4>a lot of clients of confidence, like you have a

0:32:06.680 --> 0:32:10.440
<v Speaker 4>private equity company involved, you know, that's that's kind of

0:32:10.480 --> 0:32:12.760
<v Speaker 4>like a choke hold on a particular company, right, because

0:32:12.800 --> 0:32:15.680
<v Speaker 4>private equity is very keen on we want our equity.

0:32:16.160 --> 0:32:19.240
<v Speaker 4>So you're going to have to stick by these covenance

0:32:19.280 --> 0:32:21.840
<v Speaker 4>that we set on these loans, and the moment that

0:32:21.880 --> 0:32:24.520
<v Speaker 4>there's a change there will come in and make changes

0:32:24.640 --> 0:32:27.800
<v Speaker 4>to make sure that you stay current. But there's been

0:32:27.800 --> 0:32:30.560
<v Speaker 4>examples of that they actually have to take in what

0:32:30.600 --> 0:32:32.840
<v Speaker 4>they call the keys of the company. They just can

0:32:33.040 --> 0:32:34.480
<v Speaker 4>the company can no longer do it, and they have

0:32:34.520 --> 0:32:37.240
<v Speaker 4>to take in the keys. I think that's when the

0:32:37.280 --> 0:32:41.719
<v Speaker 4>online process happens and where the private equity manager then

0:32:41.800 --> 0:32:44.240
<v Speaker 4>has to just divest. And I think that's the other

0:32:44.360 --> 0:32:47.200
<v Speaker 4>part of this risk of that those turning in keys

0:32:47.880 --> 0:32:51.640
<v Speaker 4>becomes more problematic wider than this leverage on my So

0:32:51.640 --> 0:32:52.800
<v Speaker 4>the leverage is quite low.

0:32:53.680 --> 0:32:57.000
<v Speaker 1>Is there any way to short private credit? Because well,

0:32:57.040 --> 0:32:59.920
<v Speaker 1>if I think about, you know, like a corporate bond,

0:33:00.040 --> 0:33:03.160
<v Speaker 1>and there are all sorts of ways, you know, primarily

0:33:03.240 --> 0:33:06.320
<v Speaker 1>using derivatives, but I could short like a CDX index

0:33:06.440 --> 0:33:09.080
<v Speaker 1>or something like that, or I could do you know,

0:33:09.480 --> 0:33:12.800
<v Speaker 1>individual like CDs tied to that specific bond. Is there

0:33:12.800 --> 0:33:14.200
<v Speaker 1>something similar for private credit?

0:33:14.560 --> 0:33:18.400
<v Speaker 4>Well, you would have to be back to the financial engineering.

0:33:18.840 --> 0:33:21.680
<v Speaker 4>I think there's three ways to do it. One is

0:33:21.680 --> 0:33:25.240
<v Speaker 4>to short the stock of the company itself, which is,

0:33:25.760 --> 0:33:27.600
<v Speaker 4>you know, if you have shorted the stock of Blackstone,

0:33:27.640 --> 0:33:29.760
<v Speaker 4>that would have not have been a good trade. It

0:33:29.840 --> 0:33:32.680
<v Speaker 4>was pretty bad. There is a there's a senior loan

0:33:32.760 --> 0:33:36.240
<v Speaker 4>ETF out there, that's several of them, So those are

0:33:36.280 --> 0:33:39.640
<v Speaker 4>actually loans that are very similar, if not coming out

0:33:39.640 --> 0:33:42.600
<v Speaker 4>of private credit funds. You could that can be short

0:33:42.600 --> 0:33:45.959
<v Speaker 4>that does. I believe even the private credit ETF in

0:33:46.080 --> 0:33:49.720
<v Speaker 4>there that has invested in the different private credit funds

0:33:49.720 --> 0:33:52.120
<v Speaker 4>and bundled in the ETF. So I guess that's another

0:33:52.200 --> 0:33:53.000
<v Speaker 4>way of.

0:33:53.880 --> 0:33:58.400
<v Speaker 2>Shorting here VPC Right, that's the one, is you private credit?

0:33:58.760 --> 0:34:00.680
<v Speaker 4>But I believe I believe that's the one. But there's

0:34:00.720 --> 0:34:04.040
<v Speaker 4>no derivatives on private credit or anything like that at

0:34:04.040 --> 0:34:05.600
<v Speaker 4>this moment. But yeah, I think.

0:34:05.960 --> 0:34:10.080
<v Speaker 1>I sent an opportunity, maybe just to bring it back

0:34:10.120 --> 0:34:12.919
<v Speaker 1>to the macro impact. I mean, what does it mean

0:34:13.280 --> 0:34:16.759
<v Speaker 1>for the functioning of the economy and the wider financial

0:34:16.800 --> 0:34:21.520
<v Speaker 1>system if we now have this pool of money that

0:34:21.680 --> 0:34:25.040
<v Speaker 1>really wasn't there before, or you know, if it was there,

0:34:25.080 --> 0:34:27.359
<v Speaker 1>it was in a different form, Like what does that

0:34:27.440 --> 0:34:29.080
<v Speaker 1>mean for the future.

0:34:30.440 --> 0:34:34.440
<v Speaker 4>Wow. And one is positive because you know, we found

0:34:34.480 --> 0:34:39.440
<v Speaker 4>an avenue to fund small mid sized companies without having

0:34:39.680 --> 0:34:43.200
<v Speaker 4>banks involved in a way that you know, that could

0:34:43.280 --> 0:34:47.759
<v Speaker 4>lead to more like shot prime lending and financial stresses

0:34:48.120 --> 0:34:50.840
<v Speaker 4>that could ultimately end up into the negative. The detriment

0:34:50.880 --> 0:34:54.160
<v Speaker 4>of those companies, those companies of the private credit markets

0:34:54.200 --> 0:34:57.560
<v Speaker 4>created competition too, you know, so the regional banks are

0:34:57.719 --> 0:35:01.160
<v Speaker 4>in more competition now with those funds, which lowers the

0:35:01.200 --> 0:35:04.799
<v Speaker 4>cost of funding potentially. And as I mentioned, the cost

0:35:04.840 --> 0:35:09.319
<v Speaker 4>of funding, I mean currently that seems quite high if

0:35:09.320 --> 0:35:11.840
<v Speaker 4>you think of you're all in yield on those loans

0:35:11.880 --> 0:35:16.040
<v Speaker 4>being anywhere from eight to eleven to fifteen percent, quite high.

0:35:16.480 --> 0:35:18.759
<v Speaker 4>But I think the other positive of that is, though,

0:35:18.840 --> 0:35:21.640
<v Speaker 4>is that as much as that's high interest, these companies

0:35:21.640 --> 0:35:24.800
<v Speaker 4>have a stable source of funding and are not dealing

0:35:24.800 --> 0:35:28.440
<v Speaker 4>with any other sort of restraints other than their covenant

0:35:28.520 --> 0:35:32.200
<v Speaker 4>on that loan. So therefore they can go back to

0:35:32.239 --> 0:35:35.080
<v Speaker 4>that same source and keep tapping it as long as

0:35:35.120 --> 0:35:38.319
<v Speaker 4>they continue to perform and return the loans, pay off

0:35:38.320 --> 0:35:41.960
<v Speaker 4>the loans, and make money as a company. So the

0:35:42.040 --> 0:35:44.919
<v Speaker 4>macro impact I think is getting more significant. I think

0:35:44.960 --> 0:35:49.000
<v Speaker 4>in that sense, it would be interesting to understand better though,

0:35:49.120 --> 0:35:52.720
<v Speaker 4>of the different areas where this lending is taking place,

0:35:53.200 --> 0:35:55.480
<v Speaker 4>we can think of a coastal areas as usual, just

0:35:55.480 --> 0:35:59.440
<v Speaker 4>like with residential mortgages, you know, because as I mentioned,

0:35:59.600 --> 0:36:02.880
<v Speaker 4>the big component in these pools is technology and software.

0:36:03.360 --> 0:36:06.600
<v Speaker 4>So we know that that's obviously concentrated on east and

0:36:06.640 --> 0:36:09.160
<v Speaker 4>west coast bars and maybe maybe a little bit down south.

0:36:10.160 --> 0:36:12.440
<v Speaker 4>But what would be interesting is that if there's more

0:36:12.440 --> 0:36:16.600
<v Speaker 4>expansion in the industrial area, manufacturing area through private credit,

0:36:16.719 --> 0:36:20.560
<v Speaker 4>that would be I think meaningful in terms of the economy.

0:36:20.800 --> 0:36:23.440
<v Speaker 4>So it is very much a stable source of funding.

0:36:23.440 --> 0:36:26.200
<v Speaker 4>There have available credit to companies that may not be

0:36:26.239 --> 0:36:29.920
<v Speaker 4>able to get that elsewhere. I think that's the macro impact.

0:36:30.760 --> 0:36:33.160
<v Speaker 1>All right, Ben, thank you so much for coming back

0:36:33.160 --> 0:36:35.880
<v Speaker 1>on all thoughts and talking to us. Not bank lending

0:36:35.920 --> 0:36:38.560
<v Speaker 1>this time, but an alternate form of lending.

0:36:38.640 --> 0:36:39.279
<v Speaker 3>Appreciate it.

0:36:39.520 --> 0:36:41.399
<v Speaker 4>Thank you, Tracy, Joe, it's great to be on.

0:36:41.320 --> 0:36:55.720
<v Speaker 3>Thanks for coming back, Joe.

0:36:55.840 --> 0:36:57.960
<v Speaker 1>That was really interesting. There was so much to pick

0:36:58.040 --> 0:37:00.399
<v Speaker 1>out there. One of the things I keep coming back

0:37:00.440 --> 0:37:05.000
<v Speaker 1>to is this idea of like outsourcing the due diligence

0:37:05.840 --> 0:37:08.800
<v Speaker 1>to a private equity company or a sponsor or something

0:37:08.840 --> 0:37:10.840
<v Speaker 1>like that, and it's a bit of a cliche to

0:37:11.000 --> 0:37:13.600
<v Speaker 1>reach for subprime, but Ben did mention it, and it

0:37:13.680 --> 0:37:16.080
<v Speaker 1>sounds a lot like the rating agencies, right, Like you're

0:37:16.120 --> 0:37:19.600
<v Speaker 1>kind of relying on an entity to do that due

0:37:19.600 --> 0:37:22.799
<v Speaker 1>diligence for you, and maybe it'll work out, maybe it'll

0:37:22.800 --> 0:37:25.520
<v Speaker 1>all be fine, but seems like there's a big question

0:37:25.560 --> 0:37:25.960
<v Speaker 1>mark there.

0:37:26.120 --> 0:37:28.680
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I mean it kind of makes sense to me,

0:37:29.000 --> 0:37:33.000
<v Speaker 2>just intuitively. The banks only have so much scale, right

0:37:33.320 --> 0:37:36.400
<v Speaker 2>and like obviously there's only so much balance sheet that

0:37:36.480 --> 0:37:39.520
<v Speaker 2>banks can allocate, you know, how much they can lend out,

0:37:39.800 --> 0:37:42.520
<v Speaker 2>but there's also like going to just be a constraint

0:37:42.560 --> 0:37:45.279
<v Speaker 2>on how much due diligence and how many relationships they

0:37:45.280 --> 0:37:48.160
<v Speaker 2>can build, and the types of industries that the individual

0:37:48.239 --> 0:37:52.479
<v Speaker 2>bankers at the banks like truly become familiar with enough

0:37:52.480 --> 0:37:55.480
<v Speaker 2>to lend, and particular for smaller companies that may not

0:37:55.560 --> 0:37:58.080
<v Speaker 2>be like you know, megafeed generators or whatever. So I

0:37:58.080 --> 0:38:01.279
<v Speaker 2>guess like intuitively it makes sense that we sort of

0:38:01.320 --> 0:38:04.680
<v Speaker 2>see like the sort of like breakup of the bank

0:38:04.760 --> 0:38:07.439
<v Speaker 2>and that more and more of the credit extension part

0:38:07.880 --> 0:38:12.359
<v Speaker 2>would essentially be from individual specialist companies of various sorts.

0:38:12.239 --> 0:38:14.640
<v Speaker 1>Well, and also going back to the regulation I mean

0:38:15.000 --> 0:38:16.839
<v Speaker 1>again by design.

0:38:16.640 --> 0:38:18.360
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, by design, by design exactly.

0:38:18.800 --> 0:38:21.520
<v Speaker 1>Regulators decided they didn't want banks to take so many

0:38:21.600 --> 0:38:23.800
<v Speaker 1>risks in the aftermath of the two thousand and eight crisis,

0:38:23.800 --> 0:38:27.000
<v Speaker 1>and so they put in restrictions on various types of lending,

0:38:27.040 --> 0:38:30.680
<v Speaker 1>and a lot of that activity got squeezed to private credit,

0:38:30.800 --> 0:38:34.359
<v Speaker 1>business development companies, that type of thing. So it makes

0:38:34.360 --> 0:38:37.920
<v Speaker 1>some sense. And to Ben's point, if we have basically

0:38:38.080 --> 0:38:41.920
<v Speaker 1>established a way for small to medium sized companies to

0:38:42.239 --> 0:38:46.040
<v Speaker 1>get stable funding. This was always a concern in the

0:38:46.080 --> 0:38:49.800
<v Speaker 1>public markets, right that if you're a smaller medium sized company,

0:38:50.200 --> 0:38:53.280
<v Speaker 1>you are probably not going to be issuing a massive

0:38:53.520 --> 0:38:56.440
<v Speaker 1>leverage loan in the same way mega corporation can do it.

0:38:56.480 --> 0:38:59.319
<v Speaker 1>So if there is an alternative, that seems like a

0:38:59.360 --> 0:39:04.839
<v Speaker 1>good thing. However, I still kind of wonder about that,

0:39:05.000 --> 0:39:10.319
<v Speaker 1>like cataclysmic trigger, because it seems like the incentives are

0:39:10.400 --> 0:39:14.239
<v Speaker 1>all really well aligned for the time being. So if

0:39:14.280 --> 0:39:17.759
<v Speaker 1>you're the lender, you can keep blending money because you

0:39:17.800 --> 0:39:20.720
<v Speaker 1>don't want to crystallize a loss and take a default,

0:39:20.800 --> 0:39:24.680
<v Speaker 1>and you have that relationship with the company. But if

0:39:24.680 --> 0:39:28.120
<v Speaker 1>that ever changes, Yeah, and we're talking about companies that

0:39:28.160 --> 0:39:31.200
<v Speaker 1>don't have access to alternative forms of funding. You know,

0:39:31.239 --> 0:39:33.000
<v Speaker 1>they can't go to a bank and get a loan.

0:39:33.160 --> 0:39:36.040
<v Speaker 1>Often that's why they're knocking at private credit store.

0:39:36.880 --> 0:39:37.319
<v Speaker 3>I don't know.

0:39:37.840 --> 0:39:40.240
<v Speaker 1>No, maybe I shouldn't worry about the worst case scenario,

0:39:40.360 --> 0:39:41.120
<v Speaker 1>but no.

0:39:41.000 --> 0:39:42.759
<v Speaker 2>I mean I guess the way I would just sort

0:39:42.800 --> 0:39:45.120
<v Speaker 2>of like I said, and I would maybe like sort

0:39:45.160 --> 0:39:48.239
<v Speaker 2>of go down the middle on this question, which is

0:39:48.280 --> 0:39:52.399
<v Speaker 2>that like the worst case scenario will happen, in other words,

0:39:52.440 --> 0:39:54.799
<v Speaker 2>at some point, because this is like, you know, there

0:39:54.800 --> 0:40:00.480
<v Speaker 2>have been banking cycles and credit cycles and people wearing

0:40:00.520 --> 0:40:04.160
<v Speaker 2>the rose colored goggles probably since the first loan was made. Yeah,

0:40:04.280 --> 0:40:07.160
<v Speaker 2>none of us like really know the timing, but we

0:40:07.280 --> 0:40:10.440
<v Speaker 2>definitely know that there will be some point in which

0:40:11.040 --> 0:40:15.719
<v Speaker 2>lenders basically lend to bad credits make loans. Maybe the

0:40:15.840 --> 0:40:19.040
<v Speaker 2>terms are too nice, maybe the spreads are too narrow,

0:40:19.160 --> 0:40:21.120
<v Speaker 2>Maybe the conditions that no big legs. I mean, we

0:40:21.200 --> 0:40:23.320
<v Speaker 2>know this is a phenomenon, right, I mean, like maybe

0:40:23.320 --> 0:40:26.799
<v Speaker 2>the terms in the conditions, the covenants are solid now,

0:40:26.840 --> 0:40:29.640
<v Speaker 2>but it's only a matter of time before that deteriors

0:40:29.680 --> 0:40:33.040
<v Speaker 2>the longer you go without defaults. This is how it's

0:40:33.120 --> 0:40:35.480
<v Speaker 2>going to work. We don't know the timing, But it

0:40:35.560 --> 0:40:38.319
<v Speaker 2>just seems like no matter what the lending category, at

0:40:38.320 --> 0:40:40.919
<v Speaker 2>some point, someone is going to come along and lend

0:40:41.000 --> 0:40:43.640
<v Speaker 2>to bad borrowers at two favorable prices.

0:40:43.680 --> 0:40:45.560
<v Speaker 1>Well, I guess the thing to watch out for is

0:40:45.880 --> 0:40:48.600
<v Speaker 1>the leverage question, like whether or not you start to

0:40:48.600 --> 0:40:52.240
<v Speaker 1>see leverage bills, yeah, on private credit, at which point

0:40:52.360 --> 0:40:54.040
<v Speaker 1>it would become a systemic.

0:40:53.920 --> 0:40:59.239
<v Speaker 2>Securitization allowing end investors, has been said, securitization allowing them

0:40:59.320 --> 0:41:01.600
<v Speaker 2>to sort of lay on to their own credit. This

0:41:01.640 --> 0:41:05.240
<v Speaker 2>will happen. It will happen. We don't know when it'll happen, eventually,

0:41:05.320 --> 0:41:06.520
<v Speaker 2>because this is what humans do.

0:41:08.160 --> 0:41:11.319
<v Speaker 1>Very philosophical start to the new year. It is true,

0:41:11.360 --> 0:41:13.080
<v Speaker 1>all right, I am just going to say that we

0:41:13.120 --> 0:41:15.560
<v Speaker 1>are going to talk more about private credit, and we

0:41:15.640 --> 0:41:19.680
<v Speaker 1>actually have a really interesting guest lined up, something we've

0:41:19.680 --> 0:41:23.680
<v Speaker 1>never done before. So that ohtally yeah. Hopefully that will

0:41:23.719 --> 0:41:27.560
<v Speaker 1>be out relatively soon after this one. But in the meantime,

0:41:27.680 --> 0:41:28.400
<v Speaker 1>shall we leave it there.

0:41:28.480 --> 0:41:29.200
<v Speaker 2>Let's leave it there.

0:41:29.600 --> 0:41:32.600
<v Speaker 1>This has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast.

0:41:32.719 --> 0:41:35.720
<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway

0:41:35.880 --> 0:41:37.120
<v Speaker 1>and I'm Jill Wisenthal.

0:41:37.200 --> 0:41:39.920
<v Speaker 2>You can follow me at the Stalwart. Follow Ben Emmons,

0:41:39.960 --> 0:41:44.279
<v Speaker 2>He's at Marco Madness too. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez

0:41:44.320 --> 0:41:47.439
<v Speaker 2>at Carmen armand dash, Ol Bennett at Dashbot and cal

0:41:47.520 --> 0:41:50.800
<v Speaker 2>Brooks at kel Brooks. And thank you to our producer

0:41:50.840 --> 0:41:53.680
<v Speaker 2>Moses On. For more Odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg

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